The Enduring Power of Patronage in Peruvian Elections: Quispicanchis, 1860

Natalia Sobrevilla Perea

The Americas, Volume 67, Number 1, July 2010, pp. 31-55 (Article)
Published by The Academy of American Franciscan History DOI: 10.1353/tam.0.0300

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THE AMERICAS 67:1/July 2010/31-55 COPYRIGHT BY THE ACADEMY OF AMERICAN FRANCISCAN HISTORY

THE ENDURING POWER OF PATRONAGE IN PERUVIAN ELECTIONS: Quispicanchis, 1860

olitical patronage was at the very basis of societys functioning in nineteenth-century Latin America, yet we still know very little about its inner dynamics. Recent analyses of national politics have questioned the idea that Latin American elections were restrictive and fraudulent, or that there was no effective citizenship.1 These studies have widened the understanding of political participation, and have argued persuasively for the agency of those who had been previously reduced to the background. Leading scholars have stressed the importance of early widespread suffrage and electoral mobilization in Latin America, noting that detailed analysis of local power struggles promise to reveal the dynamics of social structures and electoral politics.2 This new literature has also firmly established that in Latin America the process through which this happened was not linear, as generous voting rights were often restricted over time. The result has been an abandonment of the more traditional view of nineteenthcentury elections as a farce or mere class instrument. As Marta Irurozqui has asserted, seeing the electoral marketplace as a space for competitioneven if voters did not always act as the autonomous, free citizen envisioned by liberals established the principle that authority had to emerge from periodic elections,
Research was funded by the University of London and was made possible thanks to the generosity of Ada Arrieta and Marta Solano at the Instituto Riva Agero in Lima and the staff of the Archivo Regional del Cuzco. A previous version was presented in LASA Puerto Rico, March 2006 as Las Elecciones a la diputacin de Quispicanchis en 1860. I am grateful to Eduardo Posada-Carb, Iigo Garca-Bryce and the two anonymous reviewers of The Americas for their comments, as well as to Richard Warren for his help editing the final manuscript. I am particularly indebted to Vincent Peloso for his unwavering support. His insights have greatly improved this work. All shortcomings remain my own. 1. For an excellent review of historiography on elections see Marta Irurozqui, La Ciudadana en debate en Amrica Latina. Discusiones historiogrficas y una propuesta terica sobre el valor pblico de la infraccin electoral, Documento de Trabajo 139 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruano, 2004), p. 15. See also the comparative studies by Antonio Annino, Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamrica, siglo XIX (Mxico: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1995), Carlos Malamud, Elecciones y partidos polticos en Amrica Latina y la Pennsula Ibrica, 1830-1930, (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1995), and Eduardo Posada Carb, Elections before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America (London: MacMillan, 1996). 2. Posada Carb, Elections before Democracy, p. 5 and Annino, Historia de las elecciones, p. 15.

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giving way to a new conception of political legitimacy.3 Irurozqui has also noted that authors interested in the electoral behavior of elites have questioned the idea that elections were simply the reproduction of pre-arranged agreements. These studies suggest a potential dilemma faced by elites: how to reconcile their own political control, the legitimacy of the political system, and the unknowns of elections.4 This study examines this dilemma and contributes to this discussion, as it departs from most work on elections in two ways. First, it focuses on a campaign for a seat in Congress in a rural area instead of a presidential campaign in a main city. This perspective allows for a fresh view of the local dynamics of power, and makes it possible to shed light on how provincial and national elites worked together to resolve the electoral dilemma. Second, it analyzes in detail the endurance of a patron-client system weathering the mid-century liberal reform movements, a subject to which scant attention has been paid. The following detailed analysis of the battle for a seat in the Peruvian national Congress representing Quispicanchis, a typical provincial center in the Department of Cuzco, illustrates how patronage continued to guide the political process despite a successful election reform that gave individuals greater access to the polls. Quispicanchis was chosen because it was the province where Manuel de Mendiburu, a major figure in mid-nineteenth century Peruvian political society, ran for a seat in the national Parliament in 1860. Mendiburu, a man whose aristocratic background and connections allowed him to enjoy an illustrious career as a military officer, politician, and confidant of many powerful individuals on both sides of the liberal-conservative divide, also enjoyed a reputation as an extraordinary amanuensis, and later in life an accomplished historian; he went on to write a ten-volume Diccionario Histrico Biogrfico of Peru. One might have expected Mendiburu to have been reluctant to enter politics at a time of radical liberal reform, since he had been a very powerful member of the government that Ramn Castilla overthrew. As Minister of Finance, he had signed an agreement in London to convert Peruvian debt into bonds, and thus he was blamed for being the author of the consolidation policy that was the central act of the government of Jos Rufino Echenique (1851-1854). Yet, given his connections and his talents, he was encouraged to run by some of the reformers who knew him well and trusted him. Highly skilled in the use of patronage to get things done in the public sphere as well as in the private sector, he returned to politics hoping to clear his name. 5

3. Irurozqui, La Ciudadana en debate en Amrica Latina, p. 21, 26. 4. Ibid., p. 28. 5. For him as a historian, see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, Soldier and Scribe: Manuel de Mendiburu and Biography paper presented at the workshop, Writing the Republic: Historical Writing in Nineteenth-Century Spanish America, University of Warwick, 7 November 2008.

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This article is structured in four sections. The first, Background to the 1860 Election, looks at the context that led to this election, explaining why the administration worked so hard to ensure that the candidates selected would support constitutional change. The second section, Mendiburus Electoral Campaign, presents the actors involved in the electoral process and how patronage was practiced. The following section, The Seat of Quispicanchis, details the events that took place after the ballots were cast. It shows how seats in Congress were confirmed, paying particular attention to the political maneuvering at the national, departmental and local level. The final section, The 1860 Congress, concludes with a reflection on the results of the election and how patronage was used to perpetuate local and national elites in power.

BACKGROUND TO THE 1860 ELECTION

At mid-century the struggle between liberals, conservatives, and radicals was evident in all of Hispanic America. As the great upheavals that followed independence diminished, a second wave of more ideologically charged conflict ensued, influenced by the 1848 European revolutions.6 The results were mixed. Some countries, like Mexico, entered into a prolonged period of instability during the Wars of the Reform. Similarly in Colombia, radicals introduced universal male suffrage and direct elections in the 1850s, and the country soon faced recurrent civil wars.7 In other places, most notably Chile, those in power made incremental changes after defeating revolutions, and were able to maintain a large degree of stability.8 In Peru, liberals came to power through revolution and were initially able to introduce the innovations they had campaigned for, but their success was short-lived. Peruvian liberals had sought electoral reform since the 1840s, but they failed to win an important presidential election in 1851. They revolted in 1853 and backed ex-President Ramn Castilla, the General who had governed Peru during the years of economic expansion fueled by the export of the natural fertilizer, guano. During the revolution some of the policies liberals had been promoting for over a decade, including the abolition of slavery and of the Indian head tax, were enacted. After the victory in early 1855 the most radical members of the governing parliamentary coalition were able to impose an electoral directive that allowed all adult men to vote for the one-house National Convention. In turn, the Convention began drafting a new constitution.

6. For the influence of 1848 in Latin America see Guy Thompson, ed. The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas (London: ILAS, 2002). 7. James E. Sanders, Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 8. Maurice Zeitlin, The Civil Wars in Chile or the Bourgeois Revolutions that Never Were (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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Broad participation in elections had been the norm since the 1812 Cdiz Constitution, when illiterates were first allowed to vote. However, electoral colleges had mediated this participation until 1855, when the Convention first provided for direct elections.9 This change promised to dilute the political power of the aristocracy and political elites in general and spread that power more widely through a voting age population that was deeply distrusted by a political class whose attitudes about politics were linked to deeply held feelings about race. Leading members of the elite were horrified when recently freed slaves were given the vote.10 Debates over whether illiteratesIndians and castasshould be allowed to vote had been recurrent, and an extension of such a provision had been granted for a time in the 1840s.11 A decade later the political class faced a dilemma: they needed this constituency but feared that it might get out of hand. In 1856 the National Convention sought to resolve the problem by enacting the most radical constitution Peru had yet seen. The constitution stripped the executive of some of its power and handed it to the national Parliament, and also restricted the independence of the Church. In reaction, a conservative revolution broke out in the south, the Parliament was closed, and elections were called for in 1858. The new national legislature repeated the resolve of their predecessors, and again Parliament was shut down. Fresh elections were held in 1860, and this time the National Congress (formerly the Parliament) was filled with more conservative representatives. The legislators this time passed a new, more moderate constitution, whichafter a brief failed attempt at a return to radicalism in 1867proved to be the most durable of Perus 13 Constitutions, lasting for 60 years. It brought an end to years of confrontation between liberals and conservatives. Suffrage was no longer an issue after indirect voting was reintroduced in 1861, and in 1896 the franchise was finally limited to those who could read and write.12
9. On direct voting see Gabriella Chiaramonti, Ensayos de sufragio electoral directo in Ciudadana y en el Per (1808-1860): Los itinerarios de la soberana (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2005), pp. 305319. Also see Cristbal Aljovn Sufragio y participacin poltica en el Per 1808-1896 in Cristbal Aljovn and Sinesio Lpez, Historia de las elecciones en el Per: Estudios sobre el gobierno representativo en el Per (Lima: IEP, 2005), pp. 19-74. The Reglamento de Eleccciones de 6 de febrero de 1857 gave the vote to those who could either read and write, were in charge of workshops, owned a property, or had retired from the army or navy. See http://www.congreso.gob. pe/ntley/Imagenes/LeyesXIX/1857221.pdf . 10. For slaves voting see Barriga y lvarez, El Per y los gobiernos del General Echenique y de la revolucin por Timolen (Lima: Imp. Monterola, 1855), p. 69; Manuel Atanasio Fuentes, Aletazos del murcilago (Paris: Imp. Lain y Havard, 1866), p. 8; and Monsalve, Del sufragio a la sociedad civil: Pnicos morales, utopas liberales y las campaas electorales limeas de 1850 a 1858, in Paulo Drinot and Leo Garofalo, eds. Ms all de la dominacin y la resistencia (Lima: IEP, 2005), pp. 215-237. 11. For the debate on illiterate suffrage, Chiaramonti, A propsito del Debate Herrera-Glvez: breves reflexiones sobre el sufragio de los indios analfabetos in Aljovn and Lpez, Historia de las elecciones, pp. 325-358. 12. Indirect elections were reinstated by the new electoral law of 1861. See Cesar Gamboa, Los filtros electorales decimonnicos: los rganos y procedimientos electorales. Per: 1822-1896 in Aljovn and Lpez, Historia de las elecciones, pp. 179-261, esp. p. 223. For the closing of the franchise, see Gabriella Chiaramonti, Andes o nacin: la reforma electoral de 1896 en el Per in Antonio Annino, ed., Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamrica, siglo XIX (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1995), pp. 315-346.

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The National Convention of 1855 was dominated by liberals. Some of its most prominent members had become ever more radical over time. This made it difficult for the regime to control the legislature, even as it was presided over by Grand Marshall Miguel de San Romn, a close collaborator of Castilla.13 After fifteen months of intense debate, the 1856 Constitution was enacted, but opinion was divided.14 Some saw it as a triumph of liberal ideas that sought to modernize the country, including the ending of military and ecclesiastical fueros, the death penalty, and life tenure jobs; creating new public offices such as the Attorney General and the Council of Ministers; and reviving departmental government in Juntas Departamentales. Radicals, however, were disappointed that separation of Church and State had not been more complete. Freedom of worship was not declared, and instead the constitution defended Catholicism. At the other end of the political spectrum were those who thought that the new constitution was an attack on the nation. This was a diverse group that brought together conservatives, members of the clergy, the army and the state bureaucracy, most of whom lost significant privileges.15 Castilla remarkably contained his impatience with the radical reforms. The presidential term was reduced from six to four years, and the national legislature was empowered to declare the presidency vacant if he abused his power, prevented the meeting of Congress, suspended its sessions, or attempted to dissolve it.16 Castilla wrote to the bishop of Arequipa that he hoped the charter would soon be reformed because it is against the most vital interests of the country.17 Although he publicly endorsed the constitution, the president sought, at the same time, to reform it. He failed because of the intransigence of the National Convention. In the context of confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches, an uprising broke out in Arequipa. During the constitutional debates, conservatives in the southern city had declared they would not obey a charter if it attacked the Church.18 According to the rebels, the Convention had sanctioned a constitution that was anomalous, anti-religious, inopportune, and opposed to popular opinion.19 Some provinces, such as Moquegua, and some areas of Ayacucho supported
13. During the many years of their political and military careers, Castilla and San Romn were as often enemies as they were friends. 14. The parliamentary debates are reproduced in Convencin Nacional de 1855-1856. Actas Oficiales y Extractos de las Sesiones en que fue discutida la Constitucin de 1860 (Lima: Empresa Tipogrfica Unin, 1911). 15. For details on constitutional change see Jos Glvez, La Contencin Nacional y la Constitucin de 1856 in Pensamiento Constitucional (Lima), no. 6, 1999, p. 657. 16. Ibid. 17. Letter from Ramn Castilla to Jos Sebastin de Goyeneche, Lima, 13 October 1856 in Archivo Castilla, vol. V (Lima: Instituto Libertador Ramn Castilla, 1966), p. 162. 18. Acta de Protesta, Arequipa, 30 April 1855, signed by Manuel Arredondo Barreda, rector of the University and its corporation followed by 10,000 signatures, published in El Catlico, Lima, 12 May 1855. 19. Acta de la Revolucin de Arequipa 31 Octubre 1856, El Registro Oficial del Departamento, no. 21, Cuzco, 8 November 1856, p. 59.

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the rebels, who held control of parts of the south for nearly eighteen months.20 When the navy joined the uprising the government lost its main source of income: the guano-rich Chincha islands. Some cities in the north briefly joined the rebels. Castilla took personal charge of the response and in his absence two attempts to take Callao were defeated. Parliament was closed by a subaltern officer when the Convention announced it was prepared to begin talks with the rebels.21 Although Castilla was not involved with this closure, he found it useful not to have to deal with the Convention.22 Once the revolution was defeated, elections were held once again and the new Congress confirmed Castilla as president under the 1856 charter. Congress then reviewed all the governments actions from the closing of the Convention on and answered a formal request to discuss the convenience of constitutional reform, as well as to ensure that it was done following all legal provisions.23 An ideological sea change had weakened the liberals in the second phase of Castillas second term. Of the two hundred and twelve representatives in the National Congress, in 1855 and 1858 only five were elected both times.24 Even without the participation of well known liberals and the return of many long term deputies, the Castilla government was unable to implement the constitutional changes it desired. The situation was further complicated when, instead of supporting the actions of the previous administration, Parliament voted to censure the closure of the Convention. The officer responsible was struck off the military payroll and stripped of his citizenship.25 The executive objected, claiming the legislature had no right to take this action. Ensuing tension led ministers to be called to Parliament. Not all attended, but those who did accepted the punishment meted out to the officer and an Acta (official report) was prepared acknowledging that the legislative branch had acted within its powers. When ministers refused to sign it, a motion was presented declaring the nation in peril and the presidency vacant.26 Castilla used all his connections in Congress to prevent these from passing. He was partly successful when the demand for presidential vacancy was dropped. With the country at the brink of war with Ecuador, Castilla was able
20. Details on this uprising can be found in Hiplito Snchez, Vencer o Morir, (Arequipa, no editorial: 1857). 21. More on the closing of the Convention in Basadre, Historia de la Repblica, tomo III, pp. 1142-1150. 22. Letter from Ramn Castilla to Manuel Ortiz de Cevallos, Sacacha, 20 November 1857 in Archivo Castilla. vol. VI, p. 129. 23. Miguel de San Romn, Manuel Ortiz de Zevallos, Manuel Morales y Luciano Mara Cano, Mensaje del Consejo de Ministros al Congreso Extraordinario de 1858 in Mensajes de los Presidentes del Per (Lima: Imprenta Gil, 1941), p. 321. 24. This total includes the 94 deputies that were owners, the 68 substitutes and the 50 senators, see Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo y sus Representantes 1822-2000 (Lima: Congreso de la Repblica, 1998), pp. 355-359, 678, 688. Under the electoral regulations of 1855 and 1857 the representatives were elected and 50 were selected at random to be Senators after Congress was installed, see Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y Representacin, p. 310. 25. For more details on this Congress see Basadre, Historia de la Repblica, vol. III, pp. 1153-1163. 26. Ibid.

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to convince enough legislators to temporarily close Congress with the understanding it would resume its activities in July 1859. But the most radical press accused Parliament of prostituting itself.27 Meanwhile rebels arose in Cuzco, asserting that Castilla had systematically violated the Constitution, and established, over the broken law, an indescribable DICTATORSHIP.28 After quelling this small uprising, Castilla called for elections by decree on July 11, 1859. He argued that the previous legislature had no right to call itself into session, and accused its members of having not done any work after his confirmation as constitutional president. The president believed that not enough effort [had been put] to the other objectives set for them, even though they had extended their sessions one hundred and twenty five days over the one hundred that were stipulated by article 48 in the constitution.29 Many believed the closure of the 1858 Congress was the death of the Republic hurt by a poisoned dagger.30 The move was controversial even within the Castilla administration. Vice-president Juan Manuel del Mar assured the Prime Minister that the July 11 decree was unconstitutional, and he concluded from today [forward], all thinking men consider the government one of force. It will be sustained by force, but you know how much public opinion is worth.31 In spite of all the political uncertainty, Castilla traveled to Ecuador in September to wage war. Two months later elections to the new legislature took place. The president was convinced the Constitution needed reform, and he sought to ensure that those elected could be trusted. One of the men he called upon was Manuel de Mendiburu. Mendiburu was born in Lima in 1805. His father was a Creole lawyer at the Tribunal del Consulado and the Real Audiencia. His mother was the daughter of Creole landowners who lost their fortune during independence. Educated at home by his father and not wanting to be a lawyer or a cleric, he studied mathematics at the school of medicine. He joined the patriots after San Martn declared independence in Lima just shy of his sixteenth birthday. He participated in all the conflicts of the early republic and earned quick promotion due to his skills as a soldier and a secretary.32 Between 1839 and 1842 he held the post of Prefect of Tacna, an administration that won him praise, and he remained loyal
27. La Zamacueca Poltica, no. 26, Lima, 20 April 1859. 28. Capitals from the original, La Opinin en Triunfo, peridico poltico y popular, no. 2, Cuzco, 9 July 1859. 29. Ramn Castilla Decreto de 11 de Julio de 1859, Convocando a elecciones para Congreso y poniendo fin al existente, in Documentos Relativos al Decreto de 11 de Julio de 1859 (Lima: Imprenta del El Comercio, 1859), pp. 1112. 30. La Zamacueca Poltica, no. 47, Lima, 13 July 1859. 31. Letter from Juan Manuel del Mar to Manuel Ortiz de Zevallos, Lima, 11 July 1859, Archivo Castilla, vol. VIII, 1974, pp. 148, 149. 32. Mendiburus biographical information can be found in his manuscript Memoirs in the Archivo Historico del Instituto Riva Agero.

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to the central government even when, surrounded by hostile troops in 1841, he was asked to join a rebellion. Unable to defend the province from Bolivian occupation and with the city under siege, Mendiburu was called to Lima by a caretaker government, and he was appointed Minister of War and Navy in 1845. Between 1847 and 1850, he was a member of the State Council, and in 1851 he was made Minister of Hacienda. During his tenure he signed the controversial conversion of debt into bonds payable in the London Stock Exchange. The scandal that ensued from this act on his part helped trigger the revolution of 1854 that brought expresident Ramn Castilla back to power with the support of the liberals.33 Branded a consolidado, which at the time was synonymous with being corrupt, he retired to private life. Although distanced from politics since then, Mendiburu had remained close to Castillas Vice-President Juan Manuel del Mar, who convinced Mendiburu to be a candidate in the congressional elections. Although he had never before been a member of the legislature, it was hoped that he could organize the administrations position in Congress. Mendiburus private correspondence opens a window onto the campaign and offers a privileged view of how the political apparatus and patronage networks worked together.

MENDIBURUS ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

As Ulrich Muecke proposes, to understand elections it is necessary to look at more than the polls; it is also necessary to take note of the exchange of favors, recommendations, and help, all of which are part of the work that takes place before and after the balloting.34 These elections for Congress did not see mass mobilization around electoral clubs, editorials in the press, or other indications that the civic life described by Carlos Forment had made inroads in the rural provinces of Cuzco.35 Rather, the campaign was managed within patronage networks in the department combined with those in Lima. Sponsorship of candidates by notables was of utmost importance. Moreover, in this context where the aim of the government was so explicitly to reform the constitution, the ideological persuasion of the candidates was taken into account when decisions were made to give or withhold support.
33. For more details of the economic policies implemented during the Echenique administration, see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, Entre el Contrato Gibbs y el Contrato Grace: la participacin britnica en la economa peruana (18421890), Histrica, Lima, vol. XXVII, no. 2, December 2003. On the revolution see, El proyecto Liberal, la Revolucin de 1854 y la Convencin de 1855, in Carmen McEvoy ed., La Experiencia Burguesa Peruana (Madrid, Frankfurt: Veuvert Verlag, Iberoamericana, 2004). For the consolidation see Alfonso Quiroz, La deuda defraudada, consolidacin de 1850 y dominio econmico en el Per, Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1987. 34. Ulrick Mcke, Elections and Political Participation in Nineteenth-Century Peru: The 1871-1872 Presidential Campaign, Journal of Latin American Studies, 33:2 (May 2001), pp. 311-346, esp. p. 318. 35. Carlos Forment, Democracy in Latin America, 1760-1900, Volumen I, Civic selfhood and Public Life in Mexico and Peru, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 36. The only times when he was not a member of Congress were 1855, 1849, and 1839. There is no reference to Mars experience as a legislator in any of Mendiburus letters, but information appears in Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, pp. 348, 352, 358, 362.

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Mendiburus political sponsor, Vice-President Mar, was an established politician in Cuzco. Mar had represented different provinces of Cuzco in nearly every Congress since 1832.36 To ensure that the campaign ran smoothly, the administration appointed as prefect General Miguel Saturnino Zavala, a close collaborator of Mendiburu. They had been friends since at least 1849, when they ran a government road-building project.37 In spite of the recent uprising, the new prefect was given a warm welcome in Cuzco with bells tolling, parades, and dances. He noted with satisfaction that my friends here wanted to honor me, and felt that these acts expressed that the country is anxious to change authority.38 The patronage machine was set in motion from the very beginning. Prefect Zavala wrote to Mendiburu of a Colonel Beleaser, a friend, helped no doubt by the introduction letter sent by you. He has endeavored to entertain me. He has helped me and he is at the moment my most trusted associate. Mr. Becerras courtesy has not been lessyou owe him your appreciation.39 Zavala initially established contacts with the most influential residents in the province of Canas but changed his plans when he found out a crucial ally also was campaigning there. The sub-prefect of Canchis, a man Zavala described as very important in his locality, was vying for the Canas seat.40 The new Prefect of Cuzco noted how awkward it would be to campaign in a province where the Mares family is used to working. It was critical to retain the support of this ally and at the same time maintain the agreements already reached with good people he had met.41 To control the results in the province Mendiburu would run in, it was vital not to enter into conflict with other powerful groups in the region. Rather than Canas, the province of Quispicanchis was selected for Mendiburus campaign because there was plenty of room to maneuver. It was the only province in the Department of Cuzco, outside of the city, that had three representatives and two substitutes. Support was immediately sought from friends, acquaintances, friends of friends and important local people with whom favors would be traded later.42 In Quispicanchis, Zavala established contact with those he described as the most powerful locals: the priest, the governor, a retired judge, a local colonel, and the governor
37. See Gua de Forasteros, 1849. 38. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 11 September 1859, Coleccin Mendiburu Archivo Histrico del Instituto Riva Agero (CMAHIRA) 129-2. 39. Ibid. 40. Gervacio Mercado had represented Canchis in Congress in 1853, Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 352. 41. Justo Mar was the representative for Canas in 1855 and for Anta in 1860, Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, pp. 136, 362. 42. The networks described by Zavala are very similar to those studied by Jeremy Boissevain in Friends of friends: Networks, manipulators and coalitions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).

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of the town of Urcos.43 The judge was not only the cousin of a society lady they knew, but also a candidate, so an agreement for reciprocal help was reached.44 Mendiburus three main local correspondents were the priest Mariano Chacon y Becerra, local landowner Ramn Nadal, and aspiring politician and son of a mill owner Jos Valcarcel, who traveled immediately to the province with letters from Zavala and Becerra.45 Zavala described them as fanatical friends of yours.46 The vice-president considered it important for Mendiburu to be a candidate in several provinces.47 Zavala agreed. He believed Mendiburu should run in more provinces just in case.48 One of the options considered was Chumbivilcas because the sub-prefect, Juan Antonio Salas, was a friend. Zavala portrayed him as not simply influential, but the most powerful man in the province. He reported that Salas objected to Mendiburus candidacy
because he wanted his godson D. Felipe Barrionuevo elected. But talking to him about you, in the terms you can imagine, and offering him with your friendship a sure protection, I found him accessible. I obtained his word decidedly in your favor. The basis of our agreement is thisyou will be the main deputy and Barrionuevo the substitute. As you will also be elected for Quispicanchis, you will choose to represent that province leaving the place for Chumbivilcas to his godson.49

Salas agreed to work with him, and sent Mendiburu a list of people to whom he should write. Even though Zavala had not met the sub-prefect before, he warmed to Salas because Mendiburu knew him, and because Salas had been a representative in 1853. Zavala wrote that he appreciated Salas because of his decent appearance, his forthright judgment and his air of sincerity.50
43. A review of the most important tax payers in Quispicanchis for the years there are records 1845 and 1865 reveals that the only landowners were Farfn and Jara. Archivo Regional del Cuzco (ARC) Extracto de la Matricula de Predios Rsticos de la Provincia de Quispicanchis actuado por el sub-prefecto Dn. Francisco Hermosillo y su apoderado fiscal D.D. ngel Ugarte. Semestre de Navidad 1845 and Padroncillo de predios rsticos que empiezan a regir desde el semestre de San Juan inclusive del presente ao de 1865, Provincia de Quispicanchis. 44. Letter from Miguel Zavala, CMAHIRA 129-2, fls. 2, 3. Although no letters from any of these men survives, the Prefect made several references to them. 45. In the notary records of Juan Chacn y Garca held at the ARC a contract signed 1858 shows that Mariano Chacn y Becerra had this post and that he was involved in selling of church land following the decree of February 1856. In this contract it is noted that land, such as the one in this deed could be sold with no public auction or governmental license as long as it was valued under 300 pesos. 46. From these the only one who was a landowner in Quispicanchis was Ramn Nadal, who in 1845 had been the collector of the Indian head tax in Quispicanchis, see Extracto de la matricula de Indgenas de la Provincia de Quispicanchis actuada por su Sub-prefecto Dn. Francisco Hermosilla y Apoderado Fiscal Dr. Dn. ngel Ugarte, Navidad 1845, fl. 143a, in ARC. Valcarcels family owned mills in this cereal producing valley see Padroncillo de predios rsticos. 47. Letter from Juan Manuel del Mar, Lima, 24 August 1859, CMAHIRA 190-6. 48. The underlining is from the original. Letter from Miguel Zavala, 11 September 1859, CMAHIRA 129-2, fl. 3. 49. Barrionuevo was elected and confirmed as the deputy for Chumbivilcas, the underlining is from the original, Ibid. 50. Ibid., fl. 4.

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Zavalas work for the campaign was not restricted to receiving lists of correspondents and talking to supporters. He also made political appointments, replacing, for instance, the sub-prefect of Quispicanchis with the one for Abancay. He did so because the elections were as much to prevent liberals from being elected as to ensure that those close to the administration would gain access to seats and to avoid liberals who might want constitutional change. As a result, previous ideological positions were carefully evaluated. The vice-president criticized Zavala for his choice for the sub-prefecture of Urubamba since this man was in no way the right person to lead and who should have no influence. He was a deputy for the Convention, as a substitute due to the death of Peralta, and his behavior was reproachable.51 Yet, differences between Mar and Castilla existed, and Zavala did not make all the changes Mar asked him to, so as not to alarm the president.52 Mendiburu mobilized the patronage network through the letters of recommendation he wrote to, and received from, associates in Cuzco. Favors were not always asked for up front, but a relationship that facilitated future exchange was built on offers of support. In his first letter, prominent Cuzqueo property owner Francisco Garmendia wrote:
By allowing me to help in your campaign you give me the pleasure of serving you. I will work for it, as if it were my own cause. I have already contacted Misters Becerra, Barcarcel [sic] and some neighbors in the province who are all very happy to back you.53

Garmendia was the owner one of the largest and most prosperous haciendas in Quispicanchis.54 In 1858, when he was the mayor of Cuzco, he had asked Parliament whether Indians, as property owners, could vote.55 It was decided they could, and he was elected to Congress. In 1859 when the Parliament was closed he was appointed prefect, and soon after he was replaced by Zavala.56 Garmendia offered funds for the campaign, but wrote that he did not consider them necessary. He thanked Mendiburu for recommending him to the new prefect, and said
51. Letter from Juan Manuel del Mar, Lima, no date but due to the context it must have been written in 1859, CMAHIRA 190-214. 52. Ibid. 53. Letter from Francisco Garmendia, Cuzco 11 September 1859, CMAHIRA 22-1. 54. The information on Garmendia can be found in the ARC, the papers of the Consejo Provincial del Cuzco 18601867, a document that shows he rented large houses in the city of Cuzco where schools functioned. The Padroncillo de predios rsticos shows him as the owner of the hacienda Lucre, later the locale of an important textile factory. 55. For his queries on the Indian vote see Chiaramonti, A propsito del Debate Herrera-Glvez, p. 326. 56. Roberto Cceres Oliva, Los Prefectos del Cuzco siglo XIX, Revista del Archivo Histrico del Cuzco, No. 15, (2000), pp. 121-128, has a complete list of all the Prefects, and the Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 356, has him as a Deputy in 1858-1859. By the 1870s he had become a prominent supporter of Pardo. Carmen, Mc Evoy, Estampillas y Votos: El rol del correo poltico en una campaa electoral decimonnica, Histrica (1994), vol. XVIII, no. 1, p. 116.

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he was happy the government was adopting the system of conciliation I believe is the most adequate for peace and for the people.57 Another of Mendiburus correspondents was an experienced legislator, Jos Enrique Gamboa. He had twice represented the province of Paruro in Congress, first in 1845-1848 when he advocated the opening of the franchise to Indians, and again in 1858-1859.58 After congratulating Mendiburu on his candidacy, he assured him he would be elected without opposition. Like Garmendia, he mentioned money. He wrote I will take the liberty to impose only one condition. Please do not ever think again of sending money. This might be necessary in other places, but here it could even be prejudicial.59 Gamboa explained that all municipal authorities and decent men favored his election. So, he asked why money would be needed, if the men who were in charge of generating the public vote supported him with the enthusiasm shown by the likes of Nadal, Garmendia, and Barrios. He also recommended writing to Don Jos Astete, a member of another important landowning family in Quispicanchis.60 The main pillar of the patronage network was the reciprocal exchange of favors. Examples of this abound. Zavala asked Mendiburu for help approaching the vice-president. He described his situation as very difficult, claiming that the supplement he received to his salary was insufficient to cover his expenses. The prefect wanted Mendiburu to make the kind of effort you know how to use in favor of your friends.61 Gamboa asked Mendiburu to help him look after his orphaned nephew who studied in Lima, claiming he did so because he knew of Mendiburus inexhaustible kindness to Cuzqueos. He also asked Mendiburu to assure Vice-President Mar that his desires are commands for me, and in all elections he is interested in, I will always be the first to help, please tell him I will never be ungrateful for his distinguished favors.62 Gamboa, the career bureaucrat and sometime deputy for Paruro, would soon inform Mendiburu that he was looking for a position either in Lima or Callao.63 Shortly thereafter, having rejected one position in the For57. Letter from Francisco Garmendia, Cuzco, 11 September 1859, CMAHIRA 22-1. 58. For his career in Parliament see Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, pp. 337, 356. For his stance on Indigenous voting see Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y representacin, p. 313. 59. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 25 September 1859, CMAHIRA 5-1. 60. Jos Astete was a landowner in Quispicanchis ARC Padroncillo de predios rsticos for 1865 and Extracto de la Matricula de Predios Rsticos for 1845. Pedro Astete had been the representative for Quispicanchis in 1849, 1851-1852, and 1853, Bartlom Astete held the post in the National Convention between 1855-1857 see Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, pp. 135, 341, 347, 351. Bartolom Astete was the Prefect of Cuzco during two revolutionary conjunctions for six months in 1843, and between 1854 and 1855, both times appointed by General Miguel de San Romn see Cceres Oliva Los Prefectos del Cuzco siglo XIX, p. 125. 61. Letter from Miguel Zavala, 11 September 1859, CMAHIRA 129-2., fl. 3. 62. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 25 September 1859, CMAHIRA 5-1. 63. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 11 November 1859, CMAHIRA 5-3.

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eign Service, Gamboa thanked Mendiburu for his help in securing for him the Consulate in Valparaiso.64 The police commissioner of Cuzco, Juan Jos Larrea, also corresponded with Mendiburu, illustrating Meniburus independent power base from his tenure as Minister of War. Larrea noted:
I have spoken often with Prefect Zavala about you; he must have told you about my feelings. I assure you that if, as I hope, I am elected deputy for the province of Convencin, you can count me amongst your best friends. You have my vote for the legislature guaranteed.65

Larrea was an important political operator. He was related to Andrs de Santa Cruzs wife and had been Prefect of Cuzco between 1835 and 1837 during the Peru-Bolivia Confederation.66 He was a deputy for Abancay between 1845 and 1848, and in the 1870s he ran Manuel Pardos presidential campaign in Cuzco.67 Larrea understood patronage as reciprocal, and he expected help to be elected just as he promised his vote in Congress. These letters illustrate how favors were at the heart of the patronage network. Mendiburu took Gamboas nephew as his protg in Lima. In exchange, Gamboa assured him there would be no opposition in the province.68 Garmendia asked for help with electing a friend, and took the opportunity to tell him of his efforts to get in direct contact with the citizens of Ocongate and Marcapata.69 These two highland towns, populated by Indians, became the heads of new districts after the elections. Garmendia, however, made no mention of who these citizens were or what was discussed. In some cases, even if favors were not granted in the short term, support was still provided. Larrea, the police commissioner from Cuzco, thanked Mendiburu for his interest in recommending my son for the sub-prefecture of La Convencin. But another has been appointed.70 Larrea assured him he would obtain the seat for Quispicanchis canonically. He explained that as soon as Zavala told the influential people in the province of his candidacy, we set in motion our relations and influences immediately. Positive answers had been nearly unanimous.71
64. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 17 December 1859, CMAHIRA 5-4. 65. Letter from Juan Jos Larrea, Cuzco, 17 September 1859, CMAHIRA 390-1. 66. Cceres Oliva, Los Prefectos del Cuzco, p. 124. 67. Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 337, Mc Evoy, Estampillas y Votos, p. 118, and Ulrich Muecke, Elections and Political Participation, p. 325. 68. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 11 October 1859, CMAHIRA 5-2. 69. Letter from Francisco Garmendia, Capana, 13 October 1859, CMAHIRA 22-2. 70. Letter from Juan Jos Larrea, Cuzco, 11 October 1859, CMAHIRA 390-2. 71. Ibid.

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Reciprocity was the general expectation, as can be gleaned from the correspondence of Manuel Aurelio Orihuela. He was an important landowner in the Urubamba valley who had been a representative for Cuzco in 1858-1859, and senator in 1853.72 He explained that as soon as he found out about Mendiburus candidacy in Quispicanchis, I gave up my usual seat to a candidate who made his regular seat available to you. Support for your candidacy was so unanimous that once Dr. Manuel Luna was given my place, all awkwardness has disappeared.73 Orihuela assured Mendiburu he deserved no gratitude. Instead, he asked Mendiburu to write letters to support his election for the city of Cuzco, guaranteeing he would work with Mendiburu in Congress. A month later he thanked Mendiburu for having recommended him to the prefect.74 There was only one threat to Mendiburus election, and it came from outside Cuzco. Mendiburu was being encouraged to think about a presidential candidacy for 1862. One of his correspondents, the vicar of the church of Pupuja in Azngaro (the province between Quispicanchis and Puno) wrote to Mendiburu, arguing he should not be content with a miserly provincial seat. Instead, he should run for president, and the vicar promised his unconditional support.75 General Miguel de San Romn, who had been president of the National Convention in 1855, and had represented Puno since 1831, also had presidential ambitions. He had only been absent from Congress in 1849, when he was exiled by Castilla. By 1860 he had grown close to liberals and lost the confidence of the government.76 San Romn had a safe seat in Puno, but he wanted to prevent Mendiburus election, thus short-circuiting any greater ambitions.77 San Romn recruited troops in Puno, and used them to pressure candidates to abandon the race. Zavala stood firm and prevented him from doing the same in Cuzco.78 According to the prefect, the election in Quispicanchis was exempt from all doubt, all peril, even considering the plans that could be brought forward by the Indian, a disparaging reference to San Romn. 79 Gamboa wrote,

72. Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 356, 685. 73. In 1858, Luna had been the representative for Quispicanchis where he was an important landowner. Letter from Manuel Aurelio Orihuela, Cuzco, 13 October 1859, CMAHIRA 65-1. 74. Letter from Manuel Aurelio Orihuela, Cuzco, 25 November 1859, CMAHIRA 65-2. 75. Letter from Mariano Chacn y Becerra, Cuzco, 13 September 1859, CMAHIRA 564-1. 76. Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, for the details of San Romns participation in Congress. 77. Very little is known of San Romn, who was elected president with the backing of the liberals in 1862 and died in office in 1863. He began his career at independence and was a fixed participant in all the events of the first half of the nineteenth century. He was well known for his ability to recruit men both in Cuzco and Puno and in the 1840s he organized a veterans association. 78. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 27 October 1859, CMAHIRA 129-3. 79. This is how San Romn was referred to. See Ibid.

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[M]any think the plan of the Low Marshall80 is to force electoral boards to desist, so he can appoint deputies by force, and use his power against you. Whether this is true or not it is impossible to say, butbecause in politics nothing can be discounted and everything is possibleI have decided to return to the province to strengthen the resolve of our friends. I will explain to them the real significance of Don Miguel, and to assure them that the day the electoral board meets in the capital, I will be there to protect them.81

Violence during these elections was common. Most references come from Lima and Arequipa, where armed men fought to control the plazas where the polling stations were set up.82 Although fears of attacks coming from Puno were not unwarranted, as Quispicanchis is located on the road connecting that province to Cuzco, there were no reports of unrest here. The local political operators who were members of the elite commanded support at the polls. Now, Mendiburus network had to secure the support of the provincial electoral board.

THE SEAT OF QUISPICANCHIS

Voting took place in the first days of December of 1859. Precise data on elections and other demographic information are inconsistent and cannot be compared over time. The 1827 census reported 26,865 inhabitants, of which 23,033 were indigenous, 3,832 were castas and none were considered white.83 In 1845, however, the tax register showed that only 8,217 Indians were paying the head tax. Changes in the size of the jurisdiction can account for some of the differences between the 1827 census and the records that can be located for 1845, but further confusion is added by the 1876 Census, which reports 10,239 men 20 years of age and older in the province.84 In terms of electoral participation, although the franchise was slightly restricted when a new set of rules was approved in 1857, it still allowed for wide participation, and Indians, as property owners, voted.85 According to the 1860 Diario de Debates, 707,955 citizens voted nationally; 11,890 votes were recorded in the province of Quispicanchis.86
80. This was an irreverent reference to San Romns rank of Grand Marshall. 81. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 11 November 1859, CMAHIRA 5-3. 82. For descriptions of violence in elections during this period see Jos Ragas, Cultura poltica, Representacin y Modernidad en el Per: La campaa electoral de 1850, Licenciatura Thesis, Pontificia Universidad Catlica del Per (2004), and Monsalve, Del sufragio a la sociedad civil. 83. Paul Gootenberg Population and Ethnicity in Early Republican Peru: Some Revisions in Latin American Research Review 26:3 (October 1991), p. 124. 84. For the 1845 numbers see ARC Extracto de la matricula de Indgenas de la Provincia de Quispicanchis, fl. 141, for the 1876 Census see Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y representacin en el Per, p. 319. 85. For voting regulations and their changes see Gamboa Los filtros electorales, pp. 179-261. 86. Actas de Elecciones Provincias de Apurimac, Ayacucho y Cuzco in ACP, also quoted in Chiaramonti, Ciudadana y representacin en el Per, pp. 318, 319.

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While it is therefore impossible to measure quantitatively voter sentiment in this election, or to compare it with others, Mendiburus supporters had no doubt that they had done their job well. As soon as he returned from the province, Gamboa assured Mendiburu that his victory was absolute.87 Jos Valcarcel added that there had been no opposition and assured him that he had thanked all the presidents of the voting stations and all its members in his name.88 Prefect Zavala described Mendiburus success as splendid, and he assured him that
if it has cost me anything, it has been more because of my fervor than for the difficulties your election could have presented. I have nothing more to add; and nothing to fear from the electoral board. With such a comfortable election there can be none of the scheming or fraud often seen at polling stations. Nevertheless, my attention will not diminish until I have the Actas in my hands.89

Gamboa did not want unscrupulous men to demand payment from Mendiburu, so he explained that inasmuch as the sub-prefect had embezzled the 190 pesos assigned by the government for the election, no funds had been used in Quispicanchis.90 Mariano Chacn y Becerra also assured Mendiburu that, according to the parish priests, his election had been welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm even by the Indigenous class, without any expense.91 Zavala mentioned how Nadal had asked if it was possible to raise funds in Mendiburus name, but the prefect had been clear:
I prohibit you using Mister Mendiburus name in this matter. I will cover any expenses you might have. But I am sure that outside of some bottles opened the day the electoral board met, and the small expenditure made by Balcarcel [sic] solely in two trips to the province, no more has been needed.92

Mendiburu immediately wrote to Nadal offering to repay him, but the landowner and former tax collector refused. His response makes it possible to gauge how favors took precedence over money. Nadal claimed he had not spent much, and he considered the debt more than covered by the help Mendiburu had given his friends in their election in Lima.93 Similarly, Valcarcel assured him he had only needed a cigar box. As for payment, he only expected the kind steps you have given to aid me with the fair demands I have pending with the government. Please
87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 129-5. 93. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 17 December 1859, CMAHIRA 5-4. Letter from Jos Valcarcel to Manuel de Mendiburu, Cuzco, 17 December 1859, CMAHIRA 78-1. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 December 1859, CMAHIRA 129-4. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Callapampa, 17 January 1860, CMAHIRA 5-5. Letter from Mariano Chacn y Becerra, Cuzco, 26 March 1860, CMAHIRA 564-1. The underlining is from the original, letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 January 1860, CMAHIRA Letter from Ramn Nadal, Cuzco, 2 March 1860, CMAHIRA 248-1.

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continue helping me with them, as I am sure you will be able to achieve the needed results.94 It is possible that these political operators had spent more money than they were admitting to, but what is clear is that in exchange they wanted the favors they were asking for. To ensure that Mendiburu would obtain his seat, however, not only was it necessary to guarantee the results at the polling stations; he also had to be confirmed by the provincial electoral board in the official report of their meeting, the Acta. Gamboa, who presided over the board meeting in Quispicanchis, was a skillful political operator. He also became a substantial landowner in the province; he moved from having no property in 1845 to owning an important hacienda in 1865.95 As the secretary of the electoral board he took care of all the details and asked Mendiburu to write thanking the priest and the three young men who had worked hard to ensure everything was in place for their meeting. He also took care that the electoral board ran smoothly. Santiago Muiz, an important landowner in the town of Quiquijana, the second largest urban center in Quispicanchis, had hoped to be elected secretary of the provincial electoral board, but he only obtained four votes.96 To prevent conflict, and to have Muiz confirmed as a deputy, Don Antonio Monteagudo was asked to give up his candidacy. Gamboa asked Mendiburu to thank him personally for his help.97 Another important landowner in the province who was owed special acknowledgement was Jos Astete. He had made every effort to ensure the timely presence of the Presidents. He traveled to many of the towns providing for those who needed items such as cargo beasts, servants and all kinds of resources.98 Not everyone had been so helpful and Gamboa provided Mendiburu with those details as well, not to cast the opponents as enemies, but to ensure that he wrote to those who had proven to be friends. Opposition did exist and it was expressed in the so-called dualities. These were a particularly Peruvian phenomenon that happened when rival political forces set up parallel polling stations. When one of the sides monopolized access to the ballot box, either because of the number of men or because of their use of weapons, alternate spaces for voting were created in a different plaza or in private residences. Congress then had to decide which of the parallel processes was con94. Letter from Jos Valcarcel, Cuzco 25 January 1860, CMAHIRA 78-2. 95. Gamboa does not appear in the records for 1845, but by 1865 he owned the hacienda Callapacpa valued in 600 pesos. See ARC Padroncillo de predios rsticos 1865, fl. 1. 96. ACP, Actas de Elecciones de las Provincias del Cuzco, not numbered. Santiago Muiz appears as an important landowner both in the records for 1845 Estracto de la Matricula de Predios Rusticos and those for 1865, see Padroncillo de predios rsticos for 1865, ARC. 97. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco 17 January 1860, CMAHIRA 5-5. 98. For details on Astete see footnote 63. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco 17 January 1860, CMAHIRA 5-5.

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sidered legal.99 Not only could this happen during polling days, as was often described in the press, but it could also be claimed in the Actas of the electoral board meetings. This is what happened in Quispicanchis. Manuel Luna, a large landowner in Quispicanchis, had been a member of the 1858 Congress. Now, in spite of having been allocated the seat of Urubamba, usually occupied by Orihuela, he had proposed that the electoral board report a duality (where none had actually taken place) to show that some opposition to Mendiburu existed. The aim, Luna claimed, was to prove the election had not been rigged. According to Gamboa, Luna made it a condition not to oppose the proclamation of Generals Mendiburu, Muis and Jara as the deputies.100 Convinced that this was already an agreement, Gamboa wrote:
[W]e were surprised by an infinite number of malicious claims presented by Luna. He wanted time to persuade other members of the electoral board and convince them to change the Actas. He even attempted to switch Mendiburus name with San Romns. This clumsy and aspiring boy hatched many schemes and I thank you very much for having warned me about him in your last letter.101

So even if conflict had been absent from election day, there was some when the electoral board met, when three deputies for the province had yet to be confirmed. Zavala claimed to Mendiburu that he had more sympathy for one candidate due to the relationship between his family and yours, but this was a time to repay other favors.102 The prefect claimed that he could not interfere on behalf of this candidate because of agreements he had entered into with Luna to ensure Mendiburus election, which demand of my honor at least the neutrality he has asked for.103 Indeed, Luna and Gamboa quickly managed to repair their relationship. A month after having called him a clumsy and aspiring boy, Gamboa described him as our friend Luna. Luna received four-fifths of the votes in the provincial electoral board of Urubamba and Gamboa asked the General to support him in Lima.104 Luna was confirmed, to a large degree because he had been instrumental in providing Mendiburu with backing in Quispicanchis, even if at the meeting of the provincial electoral board he had not been the most reliable participant.
99. Chiaramonti describes this process and how it became stronger after 1855, Ciudadana y representacin en el Per, p. 305. See also Vincent Peloso, Liberals, Electoral Reform, and the Popular Vote in mid-nineteenth-century Peru, in Vincent Peloso and Barbara Tenenbaum, eds. Liberals, Politics and Power, State Formation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), p. 202. 100. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco 17 January 1860, CMAHIRA 5-5. 101. Ibid. 102. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 December 1859, CMAHIRA 129-4. 103. Ibid. 104. Letter from Jos Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco 16 February 1860, CMAHIRA 5-6. Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 362 lists Manuel Luna as the representative for Huancavelica, but the Actas de Elecciones Provincias de Apurimac, Ayacucho y Cuzco in ACP, show him as the representative for Urubamba, as do the letters of Mendiburu.

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Repayment of a favor was also the central issue in the confirmation of Manuel Orihuela, the prominent Urubamba landowner. This case highlights the importance of having a friend when the congressional confirmation board met. To help Mendiburu, Orihuela had given his usual seat to Luna, so that he would free the one for Quispicanchis. In return for this he asked for help with his confirmation in the city of Cuzco, claiming he had to fight against the ministers recommendation for another candidate.105 Orihuela wrote that he only wanted to be in the legislature to work with Mendiburu and promote questions of true public value, offering in exchange his vote in Congress.106 Fearing he would not be confirmed because of jealousy, he offered his future support to Mendiburu, assuring him my vote would never be for whims or sinister interests, but only for the public good, and for the true national interest.107 The provincial electoral board confirmed Orihuela, even though his opponent had organized a noisy mob outside the place where the board met. He had insisted on being acclaimed by the people and although he managed to get them to shout his name, he could not prevent them from also shouting that of Doctor Torres, so his acclamation was confused.108 Orihuela was nevertheless afraid that his opponent, who claimed to have the support of Vice-President Mar, would travel to Lima and receive confirmation directly from the Congress. Zavala explained, there is nothing against the election of Orihuela, [. . .] as it is of a different kindthat grew out of a popular outcry that democrats call Elections by acclamation.109 The prefect remarked that Orihuelas alarm stemmed from his strained relationship with Vice-President Mar and General Castilla.110 Because he had to be confirmed by Congress, possible popular opposition combined with the lack of government support made his position precarious. This support at the congressional level was eagerly sought, and it is not always clear why some candidates were backed instead of others, even when ideology should have played a decisive role. Zavala had assured Mendiburu that no red would represent Cuzco.111 He could guarantee the vote of nineteen of the twenty representatives because all the deputies of the Department are resolute that they will be guided by your inspiration.112 Due to their background and circumstances, the prefect claimed they offered security of order. Only the vote of Pio Benigno Mesa could not be guaranteed. The prefect described this
105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. Letter Ibid. Ibid. Letter Letter Ibid. Letter Letter from Manuel Aurelio Orihuela, Cuzco 25 December 1859, CMAHIRA 65-3.

from Manuel Aurelio Orihuela, Cuzco 11 January 1860, CMAHIRA 65-4. from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco 11 February 1860, CMAHIRA 129-6. from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 Decembre 1859, CMAHIRA 129-4. from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 January 1860, CMAHIRA 129-5.

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man who had represented Cuzco in the 1855 Convention as an ex-red.113 According to Zavala he had been elected due to the ineffectiveness of police commissioner Larrea. Mesa and Larrea both wanted the seat for La Convencin, and Congress had to decide on dualities. Mesa, who had been an active advocate of extending the franchise, asked Zavala for a recommendation letter. Aware that he lacked the help of a patron in Lima, Mesa now made clear to Zavala his regret for the exaggeration of his previous ideas; he assures me that the disappointments he has suffered have corrected his fantasy.114 The prefect wrote to Mendiburu that Mesa has very clearly said he will subordinate and correct his ideas, under the power or yours he is sly, but can be led with care not to hurt his pride.115 Larrea, on the other hand, wrote directly to Mendiburu accusing his opponent of being dangerous. To prove this, he sent him copies of Mesas articles in the newspaper Instructor Popular. His aim was to demonstrate that
this character is against all of Congress, but especially against you and Bishop Herrera. Even more, this furious Jacobin or Red, as he calls himself, says to his correspondents that in Lima, work is being carried out to raise the rabble against moderates like you and bait you to death.116

The seat for La Convencin ultimately went to Mesa in spite of Larreas efforts to paint him as a radical. The police commissioner offered Mendiburu his potential vote in Congress, but this was not enough. Larrea did not have much clout. He had already failed to secure a post for his son as the sub-prefect of La Convencin. Mid-level government officials like Larrea could not control electoral results without the backing of men like Mendiburu and Zavala. The prefect believed the police commissioner lost the election due to a lack of capacity, so at that point even an appeal to ideological differences and the risk of having a Jacobin as a representative was not enough to gain him support. Mesa, meanwhile, needed Mendiburu at the last level of confirmation. To obtain his backing, he offered the General his vote in Congress, the same thing Larrea was offering. But with Zavala as an intermediary, Mesa was ultimately more successful in his bid for a seat than Larrea, who worked for the state and was ideologically closer to Mendiburu. Larreas repeated appeals to Mendiburu were not enough.
113. Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 136. When the new voting regulations were discussed in the Convention Mesa voted as the liberal Galvez brothers for an inclusive direct vote for all males. See Convencin Nacional de 1855-1856. Actas Oficiales, p. 112. He had also defended the State Council, but advocated representation should be elected by the departments, see Daniel Soria Lujan, La defensa poltica de la Constitucin del Per en el Siglo xix (18391855), Revista de estudios histricos-jurdicos 23 (2003), pp. 525-545, esp. p. 539. 114. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 January 1860, CMAHIRA 129-5. 115. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 12 June 1860, CMAHIRA 129-9. 116. Letter from Juan Jos Larrea, Cuzco 11 August 1860, CMAHIRA 390-4.

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In the nineteenth century the Congress was not in session permanently, but was called for specific purposes. In 1860 it was called to reform the 1856 Constitution. These letters show how Castillas government tried to ensure that those close to the regime were elected. Thanks to this effort, Mendiburu went from being a disgraced General to Minister of War and congressional candidate. The correspondence also provides evidence on how elections were carried out at the provincial and national level, making it clear that even in direct elections with an inclusive franchise, getting the majority of the votes in the polling station was no guarantee of winning a seat in the National Congress. Control of provincial electoral boards and support from powerful patrons in Congress were needed before one could be confirmed in a seat.

THE CONGRESS OF 1860

Castilla had been repeatedly unable to obtain a constitutional arrangement he considered appropriate. The National Convention was dominated by the most radical liberals, and the charter they produced in 1856 did not suit the president, who approved it only reluctantly. This led to a conservative reaction and to the eventual closure of the legislature. As it was no longer possible to achieve change within the constitutional framework and Castilla did not want to call the Convention back, a new Congress was elected in 1858. Even though it was composed of new members, this Parliament was dominated by men who thought the 1856 Constitution needed no reform. Irritated by this groups lack of compliance, the executive again closed the legislature and in spite of some protest, Castilla once more called for congressional elections. Pressured to obtain results, the administration sought experienced legislators. Many of those ousted in the revolution of 1855 were returned, confirming that the regime veered back toward more conservative positions. Career politicians from Arequipa and Cuzco, the two most important southern Andean provinces, were returned to the national legislature in 1858.117 In 1860, out of the 159 representatives to Congress (120 deputies, 4 substitutes and 35 Senators) eighteen had also been elected to that body in 1858, while seven had been members of the Convention. Only four men had held seats in 1855, 1858 and 1860. One was Miguel de San Romn. Another was Manuel Macedo from Cuzco, who had been in every Parliament since 1845. The other two were members of the Terry family who held on to the seats for Conchucos in the northern
117. This was the case of Evaristo Gomez Sanchez from Arequipa who from 1829 on had been a member of every Congress, except 1839, 1851, and 1855 as well as vice-president Juan Manuel del Mar who had represented Cuzco since 1832, with only three exceptions. All the information on members of Congress can be found in the Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo.

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department of Ancash for more than thirty years, sending two members of the clan to each Congress from 1845 on. Only three other representatives that had been legislators earlier in the 1850s returned in 1858 and 1860.118 These longserving congressmen provide a good example of men whom the government considered most suited to bring about constitutional reform. They were a combination of landowners and local bosses who controlled the politics of particular regions, career politicians, members of the army and bureaucrats. Opposition to constitutional change was still strong, and in July 1860, when Congress was to begin sessions, Mendiburu received information from Tacna that there was a project circulating to present a pledge that would accept the Congress, but reject its mandate to modify the charter.119 The regime already knew that 73.59% of the voters had already approved constitutional change in their ballots, and to counter any possible difficulties, the government prepared a massive signing of counter-pledges to back constitutional change. Mendiburu organized this initiative using the large network of friends and associates he had throughout the country. Letters from Trujillo, Cuzco and Arequipa show his involvement in preparing the pledges, publishing newspaper articles and putting forward the governments position.120 Under the presidency of conservative cleric Bartolom Herrera, several constitutional projects were presented. The proposal to reinstate the ecclesiastical fuero made by writer and career politician Felipe Pardo y Aliaga and the proclerical charter proposed by Herrera elicited particularly passionate responses in the intense public debate that ensued.121 Disillusioned by the rejection of his constitutional project, Herrera stepped down and Mendiburu was elected president of Congress, playing a crucial part in the defense of a moderate solution.122 In the final draft of the Constitution of 1860 a mixed moderate solution to the crisis of electoral power emerged. Corporate courts were not restored, but the executive regained many of the prerogatives it had lost in 1856, especially control over the army and the legislature. Meanwhile, new electoral regulations in 1861 continued to allow for wide popular participation in indirect elections.

118. Mariano Loli, Manuel Osores and Jos Nicols Rebaza Coleccin Documental: El Poder Legislativo. 119. Letter from Domingo Valle Riestra, Tacna, July 1860, CMAHIRA 82-2. 120. In Trujillo Manuel Amadeo Alzadora worked see CMAHIRA 516-1, from Arequipa he received news from Jos Bustamante CMAHIRA 589-3, and Zavala sent him an acta with more than 700 signatures CMAHIRA 129-11. 121. Felipe Pardo y Aliaga Proyecto de Constitucin Poltica con notas y comentarios de Jos Antonio Lavalle (Lima:Tip Alfaro, 1859) and Bartolom Herrera Proyecto de Constitucin Poltica (Lima, no editorial 1860). 122. For details on the electoral debate see Basadre, Historia de la Repblica, vol. III, pp. 1167-1179.

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CONCLUSIONS
Large-scale fraud, the purchase of votes, or the generalized falsifying of electoral board documents were not needed to guarantee success in elections such as those for Quispicanchis. Instead they were won by mobilizing local political brokers, provincial notables, and other candidates in a patronage network that linked regional and national elites. The available documentation reveals little about how power brokers worked at the level of individual voters, but local political bosses such as Gamboa and Garmendia felt so confident in their ability to obtain the backing of Indians that they sought to make Indians eligible to vote when the issue came up in 1849 and again in 1858. Although not much can be said about how Indians actually voted, what can be asserted is that large amounts of money were not needed to bribe them, there was no recourse to violence and soon after the elections some of the most heavily indigenous areas in Quispicanchis were given greater local advantages. In spite of the reforms introduced by the liberals, few changes were made to empower direct elections. The most delicate decisions were made by the elites at the provincial electoral boards and in Congress, especially when there was genuine disagreement at the polling stations and more than one candidate claimed to be legitimate. After the moderate electoral reforms of 1860, support from government agents and powerful men at the departmental and national levels remained crucial for political success. Members of the army continued to engage meaningfully in politics, some landowners became professional politicians and bureaucrats, and in some provinces principal families held on to their seats in the national Congress. Competition between local elites was significant. The fact that in some provinces there were two or three candidates for a congressional seat whose cases had to be decided in the national arena illustrates how when there were discrepancies among provincial elites, the backing of powerful patrons in the capital became essential. The importance of favors and the symmetry in providing support is evident in the case of Manuel Orihuela. Despite a lack of sympathy from the president or the vicepresident, Orihuela did manage to get a seat because he had the support of Mendiburu, who owed him for the help he had given his campaign. In contrast, Larrea, a career bureaucrat and experienced political operator, failed to prevent an ideologically dangerous candidate from being elected and as a result lost support. Mendiburu and Zavala did not owe him favors and he was ultimately unable to gain a seat in the National Congress because he did not have the backing he needed. In contrast to most of the candidates discussed, Luna and Mesa had no parliamentary experience prior to 1855. They both acted in ways that were considered questionable by the other actors, but were nevertheless confirmed in their seats. Mendiburu owed much of his success in the province to Luna, a powerful

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landowner in Quispicanchis. So when confirmation time came the General had to pay his debt and support him. In the case of Mesa, a radical politician, damage control was put into effect when he defeated the governments candidate. In spite of his known political inclinations he was willing to play the game and asked for a letter of recommendation from Zavala, and to further ensure his confirmation, he offered his vote in Congress to Mendiburu. He proved, however, to be an untrustworthy client, as he tried to prevent Congress from being seated altogether and published an embarrassing pamphlet that accused many government-backed candidates (most prominently Herrera) of having been elected irregularly.123 Even though the country had seen much polarization, with revolutions in 1854 and 1858 proposing liberal and conservative ideas respectively, the correspondence between Mendiburu and his clients show a lack of deep ideological conflict. These men were interested in obtaining their own advancement: a post, a salary increase, or a confirmation in Congress for oneself or a friend. Although certain provinces were tightly held by local powerbrokers who controlled access to seats in Congress, sometimes over generations, this was not always the case. Different factions were present even within the government and there was no hegemonic group that acted with complete coherence during the elections. Those deeply entrenched in particular provinces were most often landowners, and their experience is very similar to the ones described for Brazil and the northern provinces of Argentina. What was different and emerges very strongly in these letters was how it was possible, and in mid-century Peru quite common, to be a successful politician at the provincial and national level sustaining patronage networks based on a state post. While it was possible to make the jump and become a landowner thanks to a successful career as bureaucrat and politician (as Gamboa had), some members of the military held important political posts, but did not become large landowners themselves. Mendiburu, Zavala and even Castilla did not have large haciendas and only San Romn held vast properties in Puno, which he had inherited. Much remains to be learned about how these provincial elites, bureaucratic or otherwise, managed the relationship between national prominence and local clout. In the second half of the nineteenth century local elites became more powerful; I contend that to unravel this process it is necessary to understand the mechanisms its members used to maintain and increase their influence. More studies are needed to understand how power was exercised in the provincial and rural settings and the links between provincial and national elites, as their relationship was much more fluid than has been hitherto believed. Local elections provide an opportunity to delve into the process of the consolidation of these
123. Ibid. p. 1167.

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elites. The political practices seen in this case illustrate how patronage networks were used to create alliances based on the exchange of favors and not money, and how direct elections did not guarantee more participation and inclusion. In spite of the efforts made by reformers to make crucial changes in the political system, real change was not forthcoming. This was because patronage, the very core of the political process, remained untouched. This undermined reform to such an extent that even with direct elections, the most crucial decisions were still made by elites at the provincial electoral boards and in Congress. Patronage remained at the center of politics, so to understand the limits of mid-nineteenth century reforms it is necessary not only to look at changes in legislation or how elites reacted in the capital and large urban centers, but also to reconstruct the way in which elections were actually carried out at all levels. University of Kent Canterbury, United Kingdom NATALIA SOBREVILLA PEREA