Blea 1

THE DECLINE AND REEMERGENCE OF THE INSTRUMENTATION DIRECTORATE by Anthony Blea

A Paper Presented in Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements of LEAD 500 LEADERSHIP THEORY February 2006

Blea 2 ABSTRACT

For over 50 years The Instrumentation Directorate (ID) at White Sands Missile Range was one of the premier instrumentation development organizations in the Department Of Defense Major Range Test Facility Bases. Through its decline and eventual reemergence as the Sensors Division (BD-S) within the Business & Technology Development Directorate (BD), instrumentation programs in Optics, Radar, Telemetry and many other new technology disciplines have flourished. Much of the success can be attributed directly to the leadership style employed within BD-S. With concern expressed by new management within BD that more oversight needs to be placed upon instrumentation development, a new White Sands instrumentation modernization process is being drafted for consideration. This paper looks at leadership within the old ID, the emergent ID in the form of BD-S and, at the new instrumentation development process.

Blea 3 Table of Contents

Table of contents.3 Introduction.4 A Brief History of ID..6 BD-S Instrumentation Development...10 Case Study I12 The New Instrumentation Modernization Process..13 Conclusion...20 References21

Blea 4 INTRODUCTION

White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) is Americas premier military test range. It encompasses nearly 3700 square miles in south central New Mexico. It is one of nineteen Major Range & Test Facility Bases (MRTFB) in the world. MRTFBs are a set of test installations operated and maintained for the Department of Defense (DOD) in support of U.S. warfighting capabilities. WSMR has the unique distinction of owning all of its airspace, from ground to outer space and, has the distinction of exploding the worlds first atomic bomb on July 16th, 1945 at Trinity Site, located the northern part of the missile range. The Business and Technology Development Directorate (BD) is one of five directorates at White Sands Missile Range. It is also the newest. It was stood up October 1st, 2004 after it became apparent that the range, after three years without a separate instrumentation development directorate, was missing a crucial part of its Test & Evaluation (T&E) capability. BD eventually absorbed the groups that made up the now defunct Instrumentation Directorate (ID) which, up until 2001, was one of the only instrumentation development directorates in the constellation of MRTFBs. Much of the instrumentation and knowledge used at the other eighteen MRTFBs came out of ID over the course of nearly fifty years. A brief history of my tenure in the Instrumentation Directorate and its eventual decline due to changing leadership styles will be the focus of the first part of my paper. The Business & Technology Development Directorate is made up of four divisions. Each division is responsible for specific aspects of range T&E. For clarity, I

Blea 5 will only focus on the instrumentation development aspect of the BD directorate. The Sensors Division (BD-S), which is where I work, is the group within BD that most resembles the old Instrumentation Directorate. The reemergence of the ID mission in the form of BD-S played an important role in its success. I will discuss the role that leadership had on this success. And while the success of the Sensors Division had become apparent to the BD and WSMR leadership, new rules and methodologies for program development began to be developed by the emerging leadership within BD. These rules and methodologies have been coalesced into a document titled WSMR Instrumentation Investment and Modernization Process. This document, when adopted, will define the process an individual or group must go through to develop new instrumentation programs. The process is comprised of seven discrete steps. As part of my report, I will look at the first three steps of the process which define the development of an Instrumentation Strategic Plan. I will consider how this strategic plan holds up when compared to the seven rules of high-performing companies as described by Mankins & Steele (2005).

Blea 6 BODY

A Brief History of ID I began my career at WSMR on December 20th, 1982. I was fresh out of college with a hard fought bachelors degree in Electrical Engineering. I spent a fitful three months in my first assignment as an engineer before transferring to the Instrumentation Directorate (ID) in March 1983. At that time ID was comprised of approximately 160 engineers, scientists, technicians and, support staff in three divisions. Each division was made up of three to four branches. Each branch was comprised of a supervisory engineer, from six to ten junior engineers and scientists and, one to three technicians. Each of the three divisions was responsible for one of the major data gathering disciplines of Test and Evaluation. These three disciplines are Radar, Telemetry and, Optics (see Figure 1). It was within these major areas of T&E that WSMRs Instrumentation Directorate stood out in the MRTFB community. Much of the research and development work that took place in each of the three discipline areas was done within ID.

Blea 7

Optical Tracking System

MOTR Radar

Mobile Telemetry System

Figure 1. Representative Range Instrumentation at WSMR

I believe that much of the success of the organization in those days was due to the strong dedicated leadership within the organization. The director, the three division chiefs and most of the branch chiefs had been at WSMR since the 1950s and 60s. They were there during the heyday of the range, when developments in Radar, Telemetry and Optics were new and no one person had the answers to the difficulties encountered with weapons testing. Most of the leadership had grown up when our country was involved in World War II and strongly united. Because the worlds first Atomic bomb was detonated in 1945 at Trinity Site at the northern end of the missile range, I think there was a great sense of pride in the leadership and they felt that their jobs were of great importance and relevant to the nations defense. Based upon the oral history that Ive heard over the years from individuals who were at White Sands in those early days, the leadership was demanding and unrelenting in its quest to solve the issues associated with weapons

Blea 8 testing. Much of the leadership at the time was military and ex-military. I can assume that the leadership style was driven by the situation and was but one of several well defined roles required within White Sands to move it forward and solve problems that arose during testing in those early days. In our textbook, Bass (1990) defines this as, Leadership as a differentiated role, where the leadership is but one of many needed roles in a social system and, whos combined contributions move the group closer to its ultimate goal. I think that the autocratic and transactional leadership styles were also prevalent during this time. Where decisions had to be made quickly and efficiently by the leadership and followed up by the subordinates with a success oriented test scenarios. The payoff to both parties would have been a successful test with the desired data sets. During my time as a junior engineer in ID, I served in the Optics Branch (ID-O) led by one of the protgs of the early leadership at the range. During those formative first years I came to appreciate and adopt the dedication and vision of my first branch chief. The work during those eleven years was always challenging and interesting. After six years under the guidance and tutelage of the branch chief, I served as a team member and overall program manager on the development of a new high speed tracking system built for support of the Line of Site Anti-Tank (LOSAT) program. These nine optical tracking systems are still used daily on the range fifteen years after they were developed. The demise of the Instrumentation Directorate, in my opinion, began in the early 1990s. It was during this time that most of the leadership, who were responsible for the development of range T&E techniques and hardware, began to retire. Most of the retiring leadership in ID had worked at the range for well over thirty-five years. Most of them had worked on the same types of instrumentation programs and technical issues. They

Blea 9 continuously fostered incremental improvements in methodologies and hardware as technology allowed. They were all transformational in their leadership style because of their loyalty to their work and deep held beliefs that they were contributing to the security of the nation by insuring that the weapons being developed were tested to their designed capability. Many of the new emerging leaders at the time appeared to lack a sense of purpose and direction. I especially sensed this in the group that I worked in, ID-O. Our mission was to develop and modernize range optics and tracking systems. Our new branch chief had tutored for several years under the retiring branch chief. Somehow, the work ethic that we had become accustomed to didnt get transferred to the new leadership. It was not long after the new branch chief took over that things in our group began to change. Few new programs were initiated or developed and funding became scarce. Work did continue because of programs that had been developed under the old leadership were still ongoing. Our new branch chief began to look to other senior engineers in the group for guidance and direction. What do you call a leader who doesnt lead? In reading 9 of Pierce & Newstrom (2005), Kirkpatrick & Locke (1991) define six traits from which leaders are differentiated from nonleaders. They are Drive, Leadership Motivation, Honesty and Integrity, Self-Confidence, Cognitive Ability and, Knowledge of the Business. Our leadership exhibited none of these traits and had more self-interest in being a branch chief than running a branch. The interesting thing about this period in ID is that other branches in the directorate began to suffer from this same leadership apathy. This Laissez-Faire or avoidance of leadership eventually had its toll on our branch as well as others. After three years I and four others in ID-O left and joined a newly established

Blea 10 group in the ID Directorate. It is this new group that I described the peculiar leadership style in homework assignment Unit 4 Action Assignment 1. After a few more years with no real change in the leadership style within the directorate and a shift in the political climate at White Sands, ID was stripped of its Directorate status and became a division within the National Range (NR) Directorate. It was during this transition that I and several others became part of the Sensor Development Branch within the National Range Directorate in late 2001 under our current branch chief. Then, after three years, we became part of the Business and Technology Development Directorate where our named was shortened to Sensors Branch (BD-S). It was during this time when we, as a group, under the Leadership style of our new branch chief began to develop the first of many T&E programs.

BD-S Instrumentation Development Up to now I have described the Instrumentation Directorate through a brief history, its decline and eventual emergence as part of the Business & Technology Development Directorate. I will now discuss the methodology, through a case study, of how instrumentation programs were developed in the Sensors Branch of BD and why the leadership style of the division was instrumental to its success. Our group BD-S is comprised of twenty-nine engineers, scientists and technicians. Twenty-three of us are senior engineers. The majority of our group has now been under the same branch chief for about five years. Prior to becoming part of BD, we were a branch within a division of the National Range Directorate. This occurred after ID had ceased to exist and its groups had been scattered. Our branch consists of people who

Blea 11 are experts in Radar, Telemetry, Optics, Global Positioning, Targets Control, Servo Control, Lasers, Structural Mechanics, Information Technology and, Computer Technology. Most of us have at least twenty years of employment at White Sands. We have all worked in different parts of the range and have a variety of experience and skills in range T&E. We were a melting pot of ideas when we came together as a group. As I have proceeded through this first course in leadership and have read about the many styles of leadership, I feel strongly that our branch chief exhibits the characteristics of SuperLeadership as described by Manz & Sims (1991). Vadim Kotelnikov (www.1000ventures.com) describes SuperLeadership as A new form of leadership for the era of Knowledge-based enterprises distinguished by flat organizational structures and employee empowerment. A super-leader is one who leads others to lead themselves through designing and implementing the system that allows and teaches employees to be self-leaders. When I considered this quote and how it related to our group, it was evident that the reason the leadership style of our branch chief has worked so well is that so many of us are seasoned veterans of T&E. We just needed someone in a leadership capacity to allow us to pursue programs that were not only of interest to us but, were needed to solve critical shortfalls within the range T&E infrastructure. Often, we worked directly with customers to develop solutions for shortfall within the range infrastructure. At other times we developed solutions and built programs based upon Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) published on the DOD website. Our structure as a branch was indeed flat since the majorities of us were senior engineers and are just one step removed from our branch chief.

Blea 12 In 1986 Charles C. Manz introduced the concept of self-leadership. Essentially, this is a follower who can exercise self-direction and self-control such that it negates the need in the leader to provide much direction or guidance. This is an individual who we often characterize as a self-starter. We, as a group, have been afforded this opportunity and the result has been the successful initiation and development of thirty-three instrumentation programs. And while this leadership style has been extremely successful, it has not translated to every person in our division. We have a small group who, by their actions, has decided to react differently to this leadership style. They have exhibited the desire to be led through their work rather than take the initiative to run their programs and assignments. I think this is understandable given that we, as human beings, have a variety of personality types and respond differently to a given situation. This is talked about in Pierce & Newstrom (2005). They hypothesize that, based on the Manz concept of selfleadership, individuals with strong self-esteem and a sense of self would likely have the capacity to self-lead. This is evident when you consider the number of programs we as a group have initiated and succeeded in developing into full scale instrumentation developments within the last five years. Most of these programs range in length from three to six years. When the cumulative cost of these thirty-three programs is added up, it exceeds $220 million dollars. For perspective, when our division was formed under the National Range Directorate and our current branch chief had just been selected, we had four programs totaling less than $10 million dollars. Our branch chief has coached us, empowered us, supported us, defended us and, stood next to us through the labyrinth of steps involved in DOD program development. I feel that he has been the embodiment of super-leadership. A quote attributed to Ralph Nader (www.1000ventures.com) states,

Blea 13 The function of leadership is to produce more leaders, not more followers. I think in the case of our branch chief, these words ring true.

Case Study I As an example of how the leadership in our branch has empowered us to develop into self-leaders, I will describe the development of the largest program in our division. It is a defined as a Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program (CTEIP). The Program itself is titled Directed Energy Test and Evaluation Capability (DETEC) Program. CTEIP programs are tri-service (Army, Navy, and Air Force) funded programs that fulfill a Test and Evaluation shortfall requirement across the three services. The DETEC program seeks to fulfill the T&E need created by the emergence of Laser and High Power Microwave (HPM) weapons into the nations arsenal. These weapons are unconventional in the sense that they disable/destroy by means of radiation emission. The challenge to the MRTFBs is to develop technologies that will detect and score the performance of these weapons on targets. A small group from our division was involved in the initial testing at WSMR of the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL). The THEL program developed a laser weapon designed to disable enemy rockets and mortars. It was an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. Our support of this program was generated because we had a type of camera that could see the particular wavelength of light emitted by the weapon system. And, while over the course of two years we were able to collect some data for the program, we were not able to collect the required data sets. This experience led two of our senior engineers to begin putting the framework of an instrumentation program together that would develop the specifications,

Blea 14 based upon customer requirements, for a suite of instrumentation that could support Directed Energy Testing. This was only possible because our leadership listened, encouraged and helped these two engineers build the program. It took three years and countless trips to the Pentagon and a myriad of briefings but, the result has been the DETEC program is now the largest CTEIP program ever developed. Our branch chief has backed out of the picture and allowed the program to be run by these two engineers. If not for our branch chiefs unwavering support and guidance, this program would not have been possible.

The New Instrumentation Modernization Process In the last section I discussed our branch and its success as a direct result of the leadership style of our branch chief. I will now discuss the initiative currently underway within BD that will change the way that we develop instrumentation programs. This new process is called The WSMR Instrumentation Investment and Modernization Process. This new process is outlined in Figure 2. The seven steps shown constitute the entire process from policy development that attempts to project the market for future testing to the execution plan that takes the authorized funding and develops new or modernizes existing instrumentation capability.

1 Policy 2 Assessment 3 Action Plan

4 Solution Development

5 Funding Strategy

6 Execution

7 Closeout

Figure 2. WSMR Instrumentation Investment and Modernization Process Overview

Blea 15 This new process came about because some within the top management in BD and other organizations at WSMR determined that they had lost influence and understanding of the instrumentation modernization process and so decided to implement a plan that would add many layers of oversight and assessment to program development before it is allowed to go forward. I will focus on the first three steps in the proposed process, Policy, Assessment and, Action Plan which, when combined, constitutes the WSMR Strategic Plan for instrumentation modernization. These three steps are broken down further into an overall master schedule as shown in Figure 3.

Strategic Plan Development Chapter by Chapter

2.0 Assessment

3.0 Action Plan MAY

1.0 Policy

WSTC Strategic Plan WSMR Strategic Plan Document 1.0 Policy 2.0 Assessment 3.0 Action Plan

FEB

MAR

NOV

DEC

OCT

AUG

APR

JAN

JUN

Policy Research SPT Projected Customers Marketing Capabilities Description WSTC

Policy Determination Policy Forum

Capabilities Assessment WSTC Directorates

Action Plan Management Review Panel

Idea Submissions WSTC Workforce

Figure 3. Master Schedule used to Create the WSMR Strategic Plan..

SEP

JUL

Blea 16 The master schedule describes how steps 1-3 come together to form the WSMR Strategic Plan Document. Each of these three steps can be broken down further into their elemental form as shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6.

Figure 4. Policy portion of instrumentation investment and modernization process

Figure 5. Assessment portion of instrumentation investment and modernization process

Publish

Blea 17 Figure 6. Action Plan portion of instrumentation investment and modernization process

I will consider if this new instrumentation modernization strategy can be analyzed by using the seven rules of successful companies strategic planning and execution as described by Mankins & Steele (2005). Their research describes how many companies, who spend vast amounts of resources on their strategic development yet, only deliver about 63% of the promised financial performance. They go on to describe that through their research, certain companies were able to close this strategy-to-performance gap through better planning and execution. The research conducted by Mankins & Steele (2005) suggests that these companies employ seven basic rules that apply to their planning and execution. These seven rules described by Mankins & Steele (2005) are shown below with commentary on how they relate to the WSMR modernization plan. Rule 1) Keep it simple. Make it concrete. This basically states that the WSMR plan needs to clearly state the instrumentation modernization goals. From this viewpoint I think that the plan looks for too much input from too many sources to clearly delineate an instrumentation modernization goal. From Figure 3, the policy research and policy forums are made up of many people outside of the mission support element at the range. Many have no concept of how the mission support element at the range functions. Trying to include too many voices in the development process will make it difficult to establish a coherent policy and therefore, a clear strategic plan. Rule 2) Debate assumptions, not forecasts. Are the forecasts for the work coming to WSMR being used to determine what feeds the input to the modernization plan? From Figure 3, we see that projected customers are fed into the policy forum from the

Blea 18 marketing division in BD. This would be a good course of action. However, the marketing division does not consult with the Material Test Directorate (MT). MT is White Sands interface to outside customers and they provide the Program Engineers (PE) to ensure that the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for testing is coordinated with the different range elements. This lack of coordination between the BD marketing group and MT makes the job of forecasting work imprecise. Rule 3) Use a rigorous framework, speak a common language. Decide upon a metric that can be used by all parties involved in the modernization process to determine if the programs developed are producing the expected results. I think one of the only metrics that can be used is the reimbursable workload from range customers. This could be done on a monthly or quarterly basis to gauge range performance. And, attempt to tie this to current and future instrumentation program development. Rule 4) Discuss resource deployments early. Making an early determination of the resources required to develop the programs that have been forecasted by the policy forum. Within steps 1 through 3 of the WSMR Instrumentation Investment and Modernization Process, there is no mention of resources required. This is something that I think can be corrected and implemented within the strategic plan. Rule 5) Clearly identify priorities. Identify the key elements and decisions that must be made to meet expected performance goals in the instrumentation modernization process. Currently there is no process of identifying the steps that are the most important to the strategic plan. The steps outlined in Figures 5 through 7 show a series of steps that must be performed before going on to the next step. There is no way to know if one of the steps can be circumvented to move on to the next step. This could result if a customer

Blea 19 required a rapid response from the range on the development of a process or technique for testing. Rule 6) Continuously monitor performance. Is there a way for performance of a program to be monitored and fed back into the strategic plan? Based upon information in the Investment and Modernization Document, Monthly status reviews are held by the program manager during the execution phase, step 6. Solution assessment does not occur until closeout of the program in section 7. By this time execution of the program has completed. Rule 7) Reward and develop execution capabilities. Reward good work and develop new leadership. This clearly is not in the document and I dont think that it needs to be. The development and recognition of team players into the management infrastructure should be in the foundation of any organization. Our branch chief has constantly recognized those in our group that have developed and executed instrumentation programs effectively. Unfortunately, this has almost never been the case within any other group Ive worked for at WSMR. Selections for promotions rarely are based upon merit and more often on popularity with the management. Too often individuals are promoted that lack the knowledge of the business and the leadership skills to effectively move an organization in the right direction. This will certainly change as the opportunity for education allows those of us who seek the tools of education to place in our respective toolboxes. I have briefly looked at how The WSMR Instrumentation Investment and Modernization Process plan fits within the framework of the seven rules of planning and execution as described by Mankins & Steele (2005). Ive concluded that while the

Blea 20 process makes a step in the right direction, it needs to be retooled and slimed down to meet the needs of range customers. Many of whom cannot possibly wait for the myriad of panels and forums to meet and determine if a particular solution is the right one. It also needs the right mix of players on cross-functional teams that can assess and make sound recommendations on instrumentation programs. It also needs to identify and prioritize what the goals are and layout a clear path to reaching them. And more than anything, it needs leadership that can recognize the strengths within its workforce and strive to nurture and develop a new generation of leadership.

CONCLUSION

In my paper I have sought to describe an organization and its leadership that was responsible for the development of techniques, processes and, hardware that aided the developers of the nations offensive and defensive military machine at White Sands Missile Range. The data collected by this hardware was used to understand and improve the nations military hardware. Ive described how, through a change in leadership, this organization declined and was eventually disbanded. And, how a group of engineers from this disbanded organization came together through a fortuitous chain of events and were paired with a leader that embodied the super-leadership style. This group of engineers under the direction of our new branch chief is responsible for programs that directly

Blea 21 affect the data products that White Sands delivers to its customers. The thirty-three programs that have been developed by our group account for over $220 million dollars in reimbursable work for WSMR. The method of program development that was so successful is now being challenged by new leadership within our young organization in an attempt to understand and better control how these programs are developed and funded. Ive attempted to compare this new instrumentation development process to a series of steps used by successful companies to better plan and execute their corporate strategy. And, have determined that while the proposed process is a step in the right direction, it will need major modification if hopes to succeed in satisfying range customer requirements.

REFERENCES

Bass, B. (1990). Bass & Stogdills handbook of leadership. New York: Free Press Kirkpatrick, S.A., & Locke, E.A. (1991). Leadership: Do Traits Matter? Academy of Management Executive, 5, 48-60. Kotelnikov, V. (n.d.). 1000ventures.com. Retrieved February 1, 2006 from http://www.1000ventures.com/business_guide/crosscuttings/leadership_super.html Mankins, M., Steele, R. (2005July/Aug). Turning great strategy into great performance. [Electronic version]. Harvard Business Review. 83 (7). Retrieved January 28, 2006 from http://sc.blackboard.com Manz, C. C. (1986). Self-leadership: Toward an Expanded Theory of Self-influence Processes in Organizations. Academy of Management Review 11, pp. 585-600.

Blea 22 Manz, C. C., & Sims, H. J., Jr. (1991). SuperLeadership: Beyond the Myth of Heroic Leadership. Organizational Dynamics 32, p. 1. Pierce, J. & Newstrom, J (2005). Leaders and the Leadership Process: Readings, Selfassessments & Applications. McGraw Hill: New York U.S. Department of Army. (2005). The WSMR Instrumentation Investment and Modernization Process.