Jerusalem Al-Quds History and Walls

Jerusalem/ Al-Quds Between Two Walls: the Urban Planning Strategy and Policy for Reaching Hegemony Rassem
Khamaisi Department of Geography and environmental studies, University of Haifa. Rassem@013.net This Paper will be presented on: Gulf First Urban Planning and Development Conference & Exhibition, 12-14, December 2005, Kuwait Introduction Since the city of Jerusalem/Al-Quds emerged, a physical Wall was built around it. Just like other cities in the world, this ancient wall constituted an important part of the main character and feature of the urban fabric of Jerusalem. Today, the urban fabric of metropolitan Jerusalem expands from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem in the south. This urban fabric distorted, truncated and divided politically, functionally, and socio-culturally. After the war of 1967, Israel occupied West Bank including East Jerusalem. Later, Israel built Jewish settlements between the Palestinians localities. The spatial control and partisan spatial planning policy used by the Israelis can be summarized by first surrounding the Palestinian locality and consist such an outside and inside belt. Later these settlements penetrating between the Palestinians localities, which create fragmented Palestinians residential areas. The Israeli planning strategy and policies of Jerusalem/ Al-Quds translated partisan perception and ideologies for reaching ethno-national domination and hegemony over Jerusalem. In 1993, and after Oslo peace interim agreements, the Israeli government imposed a closure on Jerusalem, and limit development and entrance of the Arab Palestinians in Jerusalem. Today, the Israeli government is building a new Wall around New Jerusalem and mostly alongside the Municipal boundary as the Israelis defines it. The new wall separates Jerusalem from its organic and natural environment, dividing, once again, the urban fabric of Jerusalem and returning to the situation of division. The Israelis used the ancient concept of Wall as important element and physical barriers to create more personal and collective security, which was an incentive for building the old wall to justify building the new wall In the Jerusalem area. The aim of this paper is to describe in short the development of urban fabric Jerusalem in the first part. The second part analyzes the urban planning strategies and policies of the Israeli and the Palestinian in the Jerusalem area, and their implication over the spatial development of the city, which leads to the creation of barriers and later built wall. The third part comes to discuss the consequences and the implications of the new wall on the urban fabric of Jerusalem. The assumption of the paper is that the wall is not just a physical barrier, but also a psychological, functional, socio-cultural and geo-political one. * Dr Rassem Khamaisi is an urban planner, a senior lecturer in Haifa University, Department of Geography and Environment Studies and a researcher at the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies and the International Peace and Cooperation Center in Jerusalem.
Jerusalem/Al-Quds Between Two Walls: the Urban Planning Strategy and Policy for reaching hegemony
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The Meaning of Walls for Securing Territorial Belonging
The persons, the communities and nations try to define their territorial belonging by boundaries (Gallusser, 1994). Some boundaries demarcate by the agreed line, by fence or by wall. On the territories within the wall, persons and states have had sovereignty and domination (Soja, 1971; Sack, 1986). In side, the area surrounded by wall people feels secure, in trust space, which belongs to him, and they can do and manage the space according to their consideration (Chisolm and Smith, 1990). The development in area within the boundary can be organic and spontaneous (Akbar, 1988), but in the modern age most of the development is planned and organized from up to down. The spatial planning and space organizing is the outcome of the power relation among the communities (Forester, 1989). The community that has power and domination used the spatial planning for reaching their strategies and policies to secure domination, hegemony and control the space development. The concept of a separation wall dates back to ancient times as an architectural mechanism to limit the use of space and to assert territorial control or ownership by an individual, group or nation (Falah and Newman, 1995). Importantly, walls have been used historically to create and define borders (Dunn, 1994). Moreover, walls represent important elements of defending cities. In ancient times, walls were built around most cities as shields from which adversaries could be fought and as a means to control entry through specific gates. The existing wall surrounding the Old City of Jerusalem was built during the Roman period in the second century and then rebuilt during the Ottoman period in the sixteenth century. this is just one historical example of the many that could be cited. In modern times, after cities grew and evolved into nation states, walls or fences were built on national borders to control the entry of foes, strangers and illegal immigrants. The shape, height and type of the wall or fence on national borders came to reflect the shape and nature of the relationship between adjacent countries. The general rule is this: the higher and wider the wall or fence, and the more security components it includes, the more hostile is the relationship between the adjacent countries. The phenomenon of constructing national walls between countries was derived from the behavior of individuals who sought to create separation between themselves and their neighbors. The English proverb says, Good fences make good neighbors. This principle can have a positive side when it reflects an attitude of neighbors mutually recognizing each others legal right to his own space under his own control. However, when there are differences between neighbors and one imposes a wall unilaterally and by force (as Israel today), then the other neighbor assuredly waits for a moment when he can change the reality and demolish the wall. In the case of hostility between the neighboring countries, the wall pushes the neighbors apart and exacerbates the state of hostility and, in many cases, effectively prevents stable relationships between the neighboring countries. In such cases, the wall does not ultimately contribute to the security and safety for citizens residing along either side of the wall. Further, walls create separation and define rigid roles, preventing interaction and interconnection across borders and implementing the principle: "We are here and they are there. This mentality has been evident in Palestine, beginning with the protective walls of the early Zionist Movement which established the wall and the tower settlements (Reichman, 1979), and continue with this traditional by building fence around all the settlements where Arab Palestinians are concentrated
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within Israel and the occupied territory. Since that day, most Israeli settlements and agricultural communities have erected protective barriers that separate them from their surroundings. It is perhaps a moot point as to whether these protective walls reflected or contributed to a state of hostility. The construction of fences and walls within a city between community groups belonging to different nations, ethnicities or religions, however, is a relatively new phenomenon that did not appear until national and ethnic conflicts began to enter urban spaces. The conflict led to national/ethnic separation between communities, creating a situation in which typically each national, ethnic and cultural group lives in isolation in its own space and does not interact with other groups (Bollens, 2000). This process has given rise to numerous divided cities scattered about the planet. After World War II, walls divided some cities, as in the case of Berlin (Pounds, 1962) until its wall was demolished in 1989. In Nicosia, a wall and a fence were constructed to separate the Turkish and the Greek parts of the city. This wall still exists inside this dismembered city. In Belfast, on the other hand, the walls and fences separate Catholic from Protestant neighborhoods and contribute to a state of stability between the various neighborhoods (Boal, 1996). By comparison, Johannesburg is still divided based on ethnicity even after a period of near-civil war and an antebellum situation that had sanctioned the control of certain neighborhoods over others. Beirut is divided based on ethnic/religious membership and has well-defined internal borders between groups. During their civil war, no one dared cross these boundaries. In the Balkans, Moztar is divided between Muslim Bosnians and Catholic Croatians by a river that transects the city. Jerusalem itself was divided into East and West Jerusalem; the Arab and the Israeli sides by a border fence from 1948 until 1967. After 1967, the city continued to be divided into neighborhoods on cultural, ethnic and national bases in spite of the annexation efforts and incorporation policies pursued by successive Israeli governments (Romann and Alex, 1991; Hasson, 1996). Since 1993, the Arabs in East Jerusalem has become isolated and closed to its Palestinian surroundings, which had constituted a basic source of commercial activity and cultural influence on the city. The concept of building a separate wall around the West Bank, include within the Jerusalem area alongside the Israel Municipal boundary come after political and ideology change in among the Israeli public and political system (Schueftan, 1999). The implementation of this concept is part of the security, political and ideological considerations. Security has many meanings, which include the personal and collective security on the short and long-term range. For instance to prevent entry of outsider violence, resistance, enemies or immigrants and workers, avoid change or threaten of the ethno-national and demographic structure, or possible of territorial (Eeredanta), put basic for future state boundary by preserving vital recourses are part of the security led to built security and separate wall for controlling Israel including the Jerusalem area. Historical Overview of Jerusalem Jerusalem is a unique phenomenon in the history of cities. Indeed, its spiritual status, its rich historical heritage and geographic characteristics made it one of the oldest and holiest cities in the world. The earliest settlement at the present location of Jerusalem dates back to the Stone Age, approximately 5,000 years ago. Around that time, a Canaanite people, the Jebusites, built the city. Its first Canaanite name was Ursalem the City of Salem, and its various other names have always been associated with peace. Yet throughout its long history, Jerusalem has witnessed several wars and catastrophes and was demolished and rebuilt more than eighteen
times (Cohen, 1977). Jerusalem was first mentioned in a written text circa 1842 BC when it was referred to as Roshalimom in an Egyptian writing. King David captured the Jebusites fortress circa 997 BC and changed its Canaanite name to the City of David, which he proclaimed the capital of the united Israelite Kingdom. Seventy-three years later, however, Egyptian forces destroyed the city and the Israelite Kingdom. Subsequently, the Babylonians, the Persians, the Hellenistic and then the Roman-Byzantine Empire, captured Jerusalem. In 132 AD, the Roman Emperor Hadrian captured Jerusalem after crushing the Great Judean Revolt led by Bar Kochba. He renamed the city Aelia Capitolina and expelled the Jews from it. It was not until 1855 when Lord Montefiore obtained a decree from the Ottoman Sultan that Jews were allowed to buy the first piece of land in Jerusalem in order to establish a Jewish residential neighborhood there. From there on, the Jewish settlement in Jerusalem accelerated until it reached its peak in 1948 with the establishment of the State of Israel on the land. This mounted to about 70% of the area of the mandated Palestine. The Jewish population in Jerusalem increased. In 1995, the Jewish population became a majority forming more than 62% of the citys 715,400 residents. Caliph Omar Ibn Al-Khattab conquered Jerusalem in 636 AD. Hence, except for about 88 years (1099-1187 AD) while Jerusalem was under the rule of the Crusaders, the city remained under Muslim rule until December 9, 1917. That marked the surrender of the Ottoman forces in Jerusalem to the British forces led by General Allenby. During this Muslim era, the Umayyad, Abbasid, Tulunid, Ikhshidid, Fatimid, Seljuk, Ayyubid, Mameluke and the Ottoman dynasties, ruled Jerusalem. Jerusalem has thus seen the passage of several civilizations and political entities that have ruled it and have left their imprints and landmarks in it. The result is a city with several layers of landmarks, crowned by the Dome of the Rock, which was built in 691 AD by the Umayyad Caliph Abd Al-Malik Ibn Marwan. In 708 AD, Abd Al-Maliks son, Al-Walid Ibn Abd Al-Malik, built Al-Aqsa Mosque. Jerusalems special status for Muslims encouraged most caliphs and leaders to build monuments and cultural landmarks, like mosques, schools, public baths, water fountains, etc., in the city. The names of those Muslim caliphs, kings, emirs and leaders associated with these monuments are proof of their presence in the city and of their contribution towards its development and its preservation. The Ottoman Caliph Suleiman the Magnificent, who came to power in 1520 AD, took special care of Jerusalem and endowed the city with several landmarks, the most notable of which is the wall, which, to this day, surrounds the Old City. Following the great Ottoman-Russian war in 1853, Christian denominations were granted special prerogatives, which enabled them to build churches and convents in Jerusalem, as well as to expand some of the old ones. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, the residents of Jerusalem were concentrated inside the walls of the Old City. Construction and expansion outside the walls did not begin until 1842 and did not accelerate until 1917 when Jerusalem became the center of the British Mandate in Palestine. The British Mandate was terminated in 1948 immediately after the establishment of the State of Israel. Shortly following Israels proclamation of independence, a war broke out which resulted in the division of Jerusalem into two parts: the western part ruled by Israel and the eastern by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In 1967, the Jordanian part of Jerusalem was in its turn conquered by Israeli forces. Immediately after the occupation of the eastern part of the city, the Israeli government imposed Israeli law there. The western part had already been
declared Israels capital in 1948. Since then Israel has been working systematically on enforcing its physical and political presence in Jerusalem by attempting to change its geographic and demographic balance and by transforming it into the functional center of the new state. In 1980, the Israeli Knesset (parliament), against all UN resolutions, unilaterally declared East Jerusalem part of united Jerusalem, the capital of the State of Israel. Later some of the Israeli leaders declared Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish people. It is important to look back at history in order to understand the current situation, urban fabric and structure of the city. This urban fabric can be divided to three parts close one to other. First, one is include the area of the old city, inside the old Wall, and older nuclear part of villages surrounding Jerusalem and later annexed to it later. The second include the area around the old city that was developed during the end of the ottoman era and the British Mandate era. The third part include new and modern parts of Jerusalem which built since the mid of the twentieth century (Hasson, 2004). In spite of the merging of the three parts in one large city under Israeli rule, but we can distinguish clearly every parts of the urban fabrics of the city by the building style, economic activity and ethno-national division. Changes of Physical Layout The geographic layout of any area is characterized by the topographic structure that includes mountains, valleys and geological breaks, as well as the result of human intervention through the construction and destruction processes. Hence, the natural geographic layout of Jerusalem has affected its development, population distribution and economic activities. The City of Jerusalem emerged from the Old City of Beit Al-Maqdes, which is located on AlThuhoor hill, overlooking the village of Silwan to the southeast of the Haram Al-Sharif (The Holy Sanctuary). The Old City of Jerusalem is surrounded by three valleys, which facilitates the task of defending it. Ein Um Al-Daraj (Um Al-Daraj Spring) is located at the bottom of AlThuhoor hill, and is the only spring in Old Jerusalem. The hill on which Old Jerusalem was built represents the center of the Jerusalem Mountains located in the middle of Palestine and which stretch from Marj Ibn Amer in the north to the Negev Desert in the south. Jerusalem is located in the middle of this chain of mountains, at an altitude of 720-830 meters above sea level. Jerusalem was a historical passage for convoys traveling between the African, European and Asian civilizations. The city lies at less than 290 kilometers from Damascus, 388 kilometers from Beirut, at 528 kilometers from Cairo and less than 865 Kilometers from Baghdad, the cradle of the civilization the Arabs call Between the Two Rivers. Jerusalem is also about 85 kilometers away from Amman and 55 kilometers from Jaffa (near present-day Tel Aviv). This central position gave Jerusalem a unique status and made it a coveted place to live in, as far back as the Stone Age that dates back to about 12,000 BC. The present city of Jerusalem has evolved from the Old City and has extended towards the north-west along the road from Damascus Gate to Jaffa Road (formerly Allenby Road) which heads west to Jaffa. It is along this road that began the demographic growth and development of Jerusalem at the turn of the century. This growth was due to the following factors: a. b. The relatively easy topographic character of the area and the absence of natural barriers, like mountains and valleys in the eastern and southern areas. The integrative relationship between Jaffa, which formed the center of the Palestinian
c.
d. e.
coastal area and the city of Jerusalem. The development of a Jewish settlement in the Yemin Moshe neighborhood, which was established on the land bought by Lord Montefiore in West Jerusalem, in addition to the concentration and thickening of Jewish settlements along the Palestinian coastal area. A close link existed between these settlements and those in Jerusalem. The pleasant climate in the western side of Jerusalem encouraged people to live there rather than in any other part of the city. The planning strategies that were worked out during the consecutive Mandatory master plans prepared for Jerusalem since 1917. These had always referred to the eastern sector (Mount of Olives and Al-Tour) as an area to be preserved and protected, by preventing construction activities there. These strategies were changed because of religious considerations.
Therefore, the physical layout and the relationship between various cities in Palestine have affected the direction of development in Jerusalem. Both Arab and Jewish neighborhoods were established to the west of the Old City. These neighborhoods include Bab Al-Zahirah, Sheikh Jarrah, Al-Musrarah, Yofarim, Meah Shearim, the German Colony, Yemin Moshe, Talpiyot and Qatamon. Development to the east of the Old City did not begin until the 1920s. This development did not include the establishment of new neighborhoods, as in the case of the western sector, but rather an expansion around the nucleus or existing neighborhoods, like Al-Tour and Silwan. The size and direction of geographic and demographic developments, as well as economic activities in Jerusalem changed after 1948. The factors that shaped the direction and pace of development were: a. The change of political borders between Israel and Jordan. This factor was central and crucial in shifting the direction and pace of development of the geographic structure of Jerusalem. The enforcement of the relationship between East Jerusalem and Amman to the east, Nablus to the north and Hebron to the south. Palestinian demographic, economic and administrative development in Jerusalem began along the roads, which link Jerusalem to these cities. Meanwhile, Israeli presence in the city expanded after Arabs in West Jerusalem were evicted from their neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were then filled with Jews. The Israeli government sought to increase the number of Jews in Jerusalem by focusing on settlement and construction in West Jerusalem and fostering the relationship between Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem. The difference in the planning and development policies in the two parts of the city: the western part of Jerusalem was declared as the capital of the new State of Israel, and began attracting positive migration, while the eastern part of Jerusalem became a city within a province affiliated with Amman, the capital of Jordan. The eastern part ceased to play a role in national politics and became a national administrative center. Therefore, the size of population growth was limited in comparison with the western sector.
b.
c.
There was, thus, intensive Israeli development in the western part of the city between 19481965, while there was only limited vertical development in the eastern part, especially along
Nablus Road, and circular expansion around the west and south in Sour Baher, Abu Dies and Al-Ezariyeh. The direction of development in Jerusalem changed once again after 1967 as a direct result of a national planning policy that sought to strengthen Israeli Jewish settlements in the eastern part, while limiting the expansion of Palestinian localities and neighborhoods. Therefore, the direction and size of development moved from the western part to the eastern part through the establishment of new Israeli settlements changed to be later as neighborhoods, like Ramot, Gilo, Talpiyot, the French Hill, Ramat Eshkol, Neveh Yaacov, Pisgat Zeev and Maaleh Adummim. Meanwhile, there was limited Palestinian development in the form of local expansion of existent villages and neighborhoods. This political intervention by Israel in the geographic layout of Jerusalem never took into consideration the protection of the natural characteristics and assets that were unique to Jerusalem. The Israeli strategy and policy to secure domination and hegemony create over urbanization in Jerusalem.
Figure 1: The development of built up area in Jerusalem between 1841- 2000
Factors for developing Jerusalems urban space The expansion of the spatial and urban space in Jerusalem is related to several factors, some of which are general and similar to any urban center in Israel, Palestine and the world. The others are specific to the status of Jerusalem. Following are these specifics in brief: 1. Colonial invasion and expansion: this invasion and expansion began at the end of the Crimean war and the start of the eastern question. It also originated from the desire of Western countries to have control over the Ottoman Empire in general and Palestine in particular with Jerusalem at its heart. This multi-colonialist invasion began to prove its existence through exporting new models of buildings and establishing its centers in Jerusalem. Part of this colonialism was Zionist settlement. Colonialism, as is the situation in various parts of the world, prefers the new and the outstanding rather than being preoccupied with improving the old and the integration in it. Therefore, throughout the various periods, beginning in the mid- 19th century until present day, and despite the changes in the roles of the colonialist powers and their implementation mechanisms, the mentality of the colonialist power, which wishes to dominate through the new, kept pace with the urban and spatial architectural development in Jerusalem. This colonial expansion was strengthened through the establishment of additional quarters during the British mandate. This was after the establishment by the construction of buildings and features before that. It reached its peak during the Israeli rule by establishing new buildings, most of which were build inside East Jerusalem which are currently (2004) inhabited by 170.2 thousand Israelis, constituting 40% of the population of Jewish Jerusalem. The colonial mentality preferred building the new rather than repairing the old and being engaged in it. This had its impact on the deterioration of the situation in the Old City and the Arab Palestinians areas where less attention and resources given to develop these neighborhoods by the colonial regimes, which create gaps and disparity between the different parts of the city. 2. Urbanization: despite the long urban history of Jerusalem, it remained a small center surrounded by village communities. During the last century, Jerusalem witnessed an urban and civilization process. This process, which included the population in Jerusalem and the surrounding villages. This process was accompanied by a significant increase in the population. In addition there are marked changes in styles of spatial and consumption behaviors by the population of Jerusalem. This process of urbanization was accelerated due to the continuation of communication with foreign, civilized and modern communities, which immigrated to Jerusalem as a colonialist power. Moreover, the positive immigration to Jerusalem, was greatly due to political and structural factors that contributed to the process of urbanization and civilization in Jerusalem and the surrounding villages, which led to the formation of an urban center in which the Old City was a confined site with special characteristics. 3. Sub-urbanization: This process began with the departure of part of social elite other classes of the society from the Old City; Muslim, Christian and Armenian quarters; and its construction of quarters outside the walls. Furthermore, this process was intensified by the establishment of new quarters beyond the outskirts of Jerusalem including new areas along the Nablus-Jerusalem road such as Shufat, Beit Hanina and Dahiet al-Barid. This was preceded by the construction of quarters in western section of the Old City of Jerusalem such as: Talbeieh, Al-Manieh etc. Later, the process of sub-urbanization included the Arab and Jewish population by their transfer to quarters and villages outside Jerusalem, which led to the expansion of these quarters, which consequently became a part of the urban structure of Jerusalem. During the process of sub-urbanization, the Old City has been emptied of its inhabitants and its economic and administrative activities although it maintained its religious centrality.
4. Structural and value changes: Undoubtedly, the process of urbanization, sub-urbanization and the colonial mentality in implementation had a direct impact on the development of changes in structure and value in the manners of consumption and the use of urban space including the selection of settlement sites. Perhaps these structural and value changes in the Palestinian society were a part and a cause for the acceleration of the urbanization and sub-urbanization process, thereby forming an integral process with them. Due to the structural and value changes within the Palestinian society, the desire for modernity in housing, trade and services arose which required a large space that could not be provided in the Old City or in the nucleus of the internal villages. Therefore, the new was built to provide these modern needs as a response to internal structural and value changes. These internal changes cannot be separated from the external changes and indicators, which pushed towards the acceleration of these internal changes, despite the fact that part of these external changes, were imported while others were for the sake of achieving political goals. 5. Political conflict and division of the city: the conflict over Jerusalem between Israel and Palestine, despite of its abatement, has had a noticeable impact on the development of urban space in Jerusalem. One example of this is the competition between Jews and Arabs during the British mandate. This competition was mainly on the division of the city. The Arab population was evicted from its western sector. Later on, the eviction of the Arab population from some quarters inside the Old City took place after its occupation in 1967. Those residents were the residents of Magharbe, Al-Sharif, Al-Midan and Nevi Daoud and the settlement of a part of them in the Nuseibeh quarter in Beit Hanina. Another impact was the restrictions on developing Palestinian quarters directing the development of Israeli quarters. All of these factors had an impact on the development of the shape and other components of urban space in Jerusalem. Thus, the emerging and continuing conflict in Jerusalem, which includes the Old and New city and all its surroundings, has contributed to an illogical and misguided expansion of the architectural space. This constitutes a burden on the harmonized development of the city and has disfigured its scenes and personality. 6. Duels and doubles on the outskirts of the city: the ethnic-national division in the urban space of Jerusalem quarters before 1948 effected the formation of functional and spatial duels and doubles in the outskirts of Jerusalem. This voluntary ethnic national division of Jerusalem into quarters before 1948 was intensified through the political division and arbitrary eviction. This arbitrary division led to the creation of dual centers and the isolation of populated quarters, which could not expand in its space and had to follow a different center (Tel Aviv and Amman). During the period between 1948 -1967, the division led to the formation of edges in both the western and eastern Jerusalem. After the occupation of Jerusalem by Israel in 1967 and its unity annexation according to the Israeli government decision, there were still functional and residential doubles in the urban space of the city. In which the Israeli and Palestinian populations shared the same space in terms of utilizing and consuming services and communal needs. These dualities and doubles, despite sharing the same space, are also found inside the Old City. In spite of the fact that the Palestinian and Israeli Jerusalem fell in the structural, administrative and functional margins, it still exists within the heart of conflict. This has direct impact on the formation of the urban space in the city. 7. Replacement instead of participation: the process of spatial development in Jerusalem was accompanied by the Israeli mentality of replacing the Palestinians instead of sharing the space in between them. We can find demonstrations to this in land confiscation, eviction of the population and the geo-demographic policy. These factors have had a direct impact of crystallization of the urban from, fabric, but the development occurred under geo-political, and spatial planning limitations with out physical wall, exclude the wall around
the old city. This development happened under Israeli barriers and limitations by using the statutory spatial planning for achieving the Israeli goals.
Planning Land Use in Jerusalem as a tool for creating a mental wall

The process of formulating a land-use plan for Jerusalem did not begin in the year 1967, when East Jerusalem was occupied and annexed to West Jerusalem. The municipality and the local councils of East Jerusalem were cancelled. Rather, it began in the year 1918 and was approved according to the town planning orders of 1921. During the Mandate period, a land-use plan was formulated. Between 1948 - the year in which Jerusalem was divided- and 1967; two structural plans pertaining to land use in West Jerusalem were formulated. One plan was formulated for the eastern part of the city and another for the western part of the city. However, when East Jerusalem was annexed to West Jerusalem in 1967, a main plan, which included the municipal borders of Jerusalem, was formulated. This plan, which came to be known as the Main Structural Plan of Jerusalem-1968, is currently used as a guide for the local and divisional plans formulated for the areas within the municipal borders of Jerusalem. Parallel to the formulation of the plans, the Israelis began to establish formal planning institutions consisting of local committees, provincial committees, and regional committees (Yiftachel, 1998). Formulated by the ministries of the Israeli Government or municipalities, these committees represent the use of planning as a tool to implement policies pertaining to construction. That inevitably resulted of in some kind of political change. Thus, the land-use plan for Jerusalem is a direct result of regional and political goals that reflect the geopolitical and environmental values and ideologies that Israel wishes to impose in order to strengthen its dominance and control over the city. The plan increased the opportunities for the Jews and decreased the opportunities for the Palestinians (Marom, 2004). The local, regional and national plans are implemented through detailed plans prepared for certain neighborhoods in Jerusalem. The plans become the basis for issuing permits, for constructing houses and roads, and for developing the infrastructure. These plans have frequently been used to hinder Palestinian development, and this has increased the gap that exists between the overall situations in the Palestinian areas on the one hand and the Israeli areas on the other. The main reason that caused this gap is clearly the land-use policy: its implementation is succeeding in ensuring that the Jewish areas are developed whilst the opportunities available to the Palestinians are restricted (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003). The national, district and local statutory plan aims to develop Jerusalem as Israeli capital and metropolitan as part of Israeli core. This was the matter of the last local outline plan prepared for Jerusalem by the Jerusalem Municipality supported by the Israeli Government. The plan is called (Jerusalem 2000). This plan places the boundary of Jerusalem alongside the New Wall that is under construction. The Israeli urban planning has impact of Jerusalem.
The Implications of the Land-Use Plans

The Israeli approved plans for the Palestinian neighborhoods will continue to have several negative effects vis--vis the developing and promoting of the Palestinian existence in Jerusalem
and on the central and international role of the city(Khamaisi, 2003a). What follows is a brief summary of these negative effects: 1. The total area of Arab Jerusalem, which was annexed to Israel after the War of 1967 and planned, is 26 square kilometers (from 71 square kilometers which have been annexed), accounting for 37 percent of the total area annexed. It was allocated for Palestinian Arab development. However, more than one-third of this land is categorized as green or protected areas, which means that Palestinian development is prohibited there. Thus, in reality only 23 percent of the total area of East Jerusalem is currently available for the Palestinian use and development. 2. The plans detailing the housing and local services areas for the Arab localities is directly dependent on the plans for the Jewish areas where the land is allocated for commercial, industrial and service providing uses. This is not only for the entire city only, but for the Israeli State as well. Accordingly, the Palestinian development needs in Jerusalem are further affected in a negative manner as these needs are addressed only after those of the entire State of Israel. 3. The limitation of construction rights helps guarantee that the housing capacity in the Palestinian suburbs remains to a minimum. At the same time, the Jewish suburbs enjoy a high housing capacity and new areas of Israeli settlement emerged in the Arab areas. The maximum percentage of land associated with any given plot on which the Palestinians are allowed to construct in the Palestinian suburbs is 75 percent e.g. Beit Hanina. While in the Jewish areas, such as the French Hill area and the settlement of Neve Yacouv, the percentage is much higher. 4. The Israelis classified large portions of lands owned by the Palestinian residents as green areas, in most cases where the owner had reserved it for future development. However, when the Municipality classifies areas as a green areas where the land belongs to an individual. The consequence of such an act is that the owner is forbidden or hindered from developing the land. The green areas, which do not serve the local Palestinian residents, are used as a means to limit Palestinian civil development. In some cases, they are converted to Jewish settlements. An example is what happened in the case of Shufat (Ramat Hashafit). In 1985, a green area in Shufat was converted into a Jewish housing area based on a 1973 development plan labeled B/3000 (an outdated plan). Another case is Jabal Abu Ghneim. The plan was categorized as a green area in 1968. In 1969, more trees were planted there and it came to be considered a protected green area. However, in 1990, it was confiscated according to the decree of the Israeli Minister of Finance for the public good. Later, on June 12 1991, the Jerusalem Municipality came up with a plan that revealed its intentions to turn the so-called green area into an area for housing and development. In 1996, development plan number 5053 was approved and the green area was converted into a housing and development area. The name of which was changed from Jabal Abu Ghneim to Har Homa. The development process began with the preparation of the infrastructure for the 6,500 housing units to be built there on some 2,058 dunums of land. In total, some 1,850 dunums of land were confiscated. 5. The Municipality has adopted a policy whereby it reunifies then reclassifies land that belongs to Palestinian residents (reparcelation). This process of reparcelation is designed to precede the confiscation of land. According to this process, when the Municipality
wishes to confiscate an area of land, rather than take all the land from just one owner, leaving him with nothing. The first step is to reclassify an area and then reunify it to make the plots of land of all the neighboring landowners smaller. The Municipality then obliges the owners of the land bordering the land they desire to give up a portion of their land to compensate the individual whose entire land was confiscated. Some areas, it should be noted, were set aside to be reunified and reclassified later because several people claimed to be the owners of the same plots. The measure is supposed to introduce equality in confiscating the land for the public good and distributing it among the owners equally, but in practice, social relations are strained and the political situation is made worse. Such measures delay the Palestinian construction and development process for the following reasons: The measures result in conflict and competition among the owners, even if they are relatives, which lead them to reject the idea of reunification and classification. The different owners do not usually have the same goals; some of them would like to use their plots of land for housing, while others reject this idea because they are afraid of having to pay high taxes. In light of the fact that the Palestinian society is historically an agrarian one, there is a strong social connection to the land. The plot of land belonging to any given owner has usually been passed down to them by their fathers and grandfathers, and it is for this reason, amongst others, that they often refuse to give it up or accept compensation in the form of land elsewhere. The owners do not trust the Israeli planning and registration system and are afraid that part or all of their land will be confiscated during the reunification and classification process. When a large number of people own the land, then they tend to reject the idea of reunifying and classifying it because each owner would end up with only a very small share. Israel considers some plots of land absentee property. The owners, who either live in the country or else abroad, refuse to transfer the property of these plots to the State of Israel. The formal ownership of some plots of land has not been settled, in spite of the fact that the plots involved have been identified as private property; the owners are afraid of losing their rights because of the reunification and classification process. Some of the inheritors of plots of land are still keeping them formally registered in the names of their fathers or grandfathers due to a fear of losing them or else paying high fees to register them in their own names.
The Israeli Jerusalem Municipality has used the policy of reunification and classification as a way to hinder the planning and construction of the Palestinian suburbs. The Municipality requires the landowners to finance this process of reunification and classification by themselves. In addition, the landowners are required to complete this entire process within a specified period, even though the Israelis realize that it is an extremely difficult and time-consuming process. All this, of course, freezes Palestinian development, and, importantly, decreases Palestinian trust in the Israeli intentions.
We can see that the objectives and contents of the plans that are formulated by the Jerusalem Municipality for the Arab suburbs have resulted in wastage of privately owned land and the imposition of restrictions that result in advantages for the Israelis and disadvantages for the Palestinians. A perfect case in point is Al-Issawiya village, where several radars used for military purposes can be found. In order to keep the area around these radars vacant, the Jerusalem Municipality declared some areas green areas. The Municipality also places impossible restrictions on Palestinian development; in some cases, the restrictions pertain to the maximum height of houses, making development in some area impossible. There are also restrictions pertaining to the permitted distances between buildings and roads. For instance in Shufat and Beit Hanina, there are three local roads. Yet the specified distance is that usually involving regional highways. Plots of land that have no development plans are exploited by the same objective. The Jerusalem Municipality and the Israeli Regional Committee for Planning and Construction delay formulating land-use plans of these areas and declare them green areas. Interestingly, these areas (such as Ras Khamisi) are later reclassified by the Jerusalem Municipality and become areas for Jewish development A good example is the plan for the Eastern Gate (Shaar Mizrah called E1 zone), which involves constructing a commercial center, an industrial center, a bus station and a housing compound of 2,000 housing units on an area of approximately 800 dunums. The objective of the plan is to connect the settlement of Pisgat Zeev with Maaleh Adumim and to disconnect Jerusalem from all other Palestinian areas. According to the Municipalitys plan, these areas are still formally considered green areas or non-planned areas. The Mar Elias area on the eastern side of the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road (Hebron Road) is an example of land that was classified as a green area according to the municipal plans. In reality, it is an unplanned area. Plans are currently being prepared in order to change the uses of land there in favor of the Israeli development. There are some small areas for which there are no development plans, in spite of the fact that such plans are definitely needed. In contrast, there are areas that have been organized and declared green areas even though they do not fulfill the normal criteria (for example, Adassa, Al-Sawahreh, Al-Gharbiyeh, and Ras AlAmud). The planning and development of new Israeli settlements such as the internal and the external belt around the Arab Palestinians neighborhoods and localities is part of colonial policy of existence and control of the spatial. Other matters, to secure the domination over Jerusalem are used enforcing rule after annexation, confiscating land, limitation of Palestinians population growth and development for securing Jerusalem as a capital of Israel and get out the city from situation of fringe and periphery from the Israel point of view. This domination, limitation, surrounding, and penetration the Palestinians existence help the Israeli standpoint for future geopolitical arrangements through the peace negotiation. Israel began with the closure of Jerusalem ahead of Palestinians by military checkpoints located on the main road entrances of Jerusalem. Since the 2000, Al- Aqsa Intifada, the closure chain became tighter, particularly after violence and resistance. Since 2003, Israel decided to build a separation wall as a part of the wall between West Bank excluding East Jerusalem, and Israel. Part of this wall built alongside the municipal boundary was imposed by Israel since 1967. In addition, the other factor is considering the
territorial and demographic dimensions. For instance, the wall isolates the Palestinian areas of Kuffer Akab, Samiramis, Kalandia, and Dahiat Ebared of northern Jerusalem municipality. Despite the fact, these areas are within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries and the residents of which are Israeli ID holder. While the wall suggested to include Israel settlements outside the Jerusalem municipality within the West Bank such as Male Adomen and Gevat Zaiv, which consists part of the settlements belt. The new wall plan is expected to create a lot of implication. Some of these implications are summarized in this paper below: The new physical wall as part of geo-political re-organizing and its implication
Israel continues to build a separation wall that dismembers the Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods and suburbs, as well as the West Bank territories, this in spite of the Palestinian opposition and in clear contravention of international law. Israel claims that security needs force it to erect this wall and that the routing and types of construction are dictated by security. Furthermore, Israel claims that the location of the wall does not set political borders, although whoever wanders about in the Jerusalem area and along the wall finds that it creates a very different reality than the one that existed before the wall intruded on the daily life. Indeed, the wall dismembers the fabric of the Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods and divides them into spatially discontinuous, functionally crippled Bantustans. This reality can only exacerbate the long-running suffering that has arisen over the course of thirty-seven years of Israeli occupation. This part of the paper will identify the main geopolitical, sociological, and urban functioning effects of the wall. Although the wall is as yet not complete. Yet some of its effects will merge in the future. we believe there is ample evidence, drawn from the experience of other walled societies and from Jerusalems past, to support the argument that constructing walls within a city shreds its urban fabric and erodes its ability to sustain its suburbs and hinterland surroundings and to attract urban functions to it. For example, trends that developed in the urban fabric in 1948-1967 during the citys division have emerged more fully since the closures of 1993. They provide evidence of these effects and allow us to project a bleak post-wall future for the Palestinian Jerusalem. Moreover, we shall see that the wall will not only affect on the Jerusalem metropolis but on outlying areas as well. Constructing border fences isolates countries from each other; the areas near the borders become peripheral and suffer decay. This has sociopsychological ramifications that are manifest in separation and discontinuity within societies, severing the continuity of human settlement and disrupting economic life. Viable outlying centers will become remote and desolate areas. Admittedly, the changing and incomplete status of the wall makes a detailed, systematic study of its effects difficult; that will have to await further research. Nonetheless, the effects that we discuss here are not conjectural: they are derived from numerous field trips to affected neighborhoods, observation of behaviors in the Jerusalemite society, analyses of Israeli political stances, as well as from a review of relevant literature. This approach has been supplemented by studying the case of Jerusalem as a divided city in its recent past. While the past is never a complete guide to the future, in this case it may be unusually reliable since the central influential component remains unchanged, which is a physical separation in a hostile reality (Brooks and other, 2005).
Figure no. 2: the location of the new wall within Jerusalem area creating ethno-national enclaves
Wall around Jerusalems New Borders: Claims and Realities
In an effort to convince Palestinians and the international world, Israel offers a litany of rationalizations intended to justify the separation barrier. The Israeli government contends: That the wall is a protective barrier; That its construction is a direct result of the actual security needs of Israel; That the wall is needed to form a barrier to Palestinian entry into the Israeli space; That constructing the wall was accompanied and justified by a political plan adopted by the Israeli government and the United States which aims at separating the Palestinians from the Israelis; and that the best mechanism for separation is the construction of the wall to form a physical border between them. These spurious claims notwithstanding, the essential fact is that Israel unilaterally chose to locate the wall at the expense of the Palestinian side. It annexes Palestinian lands occupied in the 1967 Warincluding land on which Israeli settlements were established in contravention to international legitimacy, much of world opinion, and certainly contrary to the will of the Palestinian people. Alternatively, let us examine a rhetorical method by which Israel seeks to minimize their transgression by claiming the wall is only temporary and does not seek to demarcate political borders. When one looks at the length of the wall, the imposing and elaborate components of which it is made, its expense to the troubled Israeli economy, and the good fit the wall has with long-term Israeli objectives, it flies in the face of common sense to give any credence to the claim that the wall is a temporary phenomenon. Our reading of Israeli history in such matters argues, Everything temporary is mostly permanent. A salient case in point: the ceasefire border drawn by the Rhodes Truce in 1949 was supposed to be temporary and based on extant security needs; it later became the political border known as the Green Line. Palestinians and Israeli claim this Green Line to be the boundary between Israel the Future Palestinians State includes in Jerusalem, such as Geneva Convention Group. Alternatively, consider the 71,000 dunums (17,500 acres) in the greater East Jerusalem area that Israel annexed in the 1967 war. By all international standards, land taken in military conquest is to be only temporarily occupied, to be returned eventually to the original party (refer to the unconvention on occupation). In contravention to international legitimacy, Israel has built settlements on this land and now defines these communities as a permanent and indivisible part of Israel. This means that the location of the wall as it is proposed and is being built is designed for not only security objectives, but also for takes into account geo-political and geodemographic objectives and may even form the future borders of the state of Israel. In other words, all territories on the Israeli side of the wall may be annexed to Israeli sovereignty. This is not a hypothetical assumption, but a certainty derived from experience. There is already number of declarations and claims of Israeli politicians, particularly in the right side insist that the wall should be the new border of Israeli sovereignty, after annexing most of the Israeli settlements surrounding Jerusalem. Once again, we may be faced with a unilateral Israeli decision made without Palestinian input and utterly devoid of international approval. It is clear in Israels disdainful response to the opinions of the United Nations and the International Court that Israel has given no regard to the rule that the final borders between the Palestinians and Israelis are to be determined by negotiations between the two parties. It is also evident that transforming the wall into an international border will create ill-fated peripheral cities on both sides; that the
security components associated with the wall will bisect the city and make it impossible to live in peace or in security. Dismembering the Palestinian Spatial, Geopolitical, Social and Economic Space The wall forms a mechanism for dismembering the Palestinian spatial continuity on the national level, thereby undermining the possibility of establishing a viable Palestinian state. Dividing the proposed Palestinian state into regions, such as the one encircled the Jerusalem Envelop, eliminates spatial continuity and undermines integration. This dismemberment is in part achieved through: Disrupting Jerusalems role as the hub linking the North and South West Bank. Jerusalem represents the geographic heart of mandatory Palestine. After 1949, the city became the transit center of the West Bank, funneling almost all the traffic between the northern and southern areas of the territory. Since the closure of Jerusalem to the West Bankers in 1993, the Wad An-Nar [Valley of Fire] Road running through the outskirts of Jerusalem has become the only road connecting the north and the south. Now, with the imposition of the barrier, a part of this road will be annexed to the Israeli side of the separation wall in the process of annexing the Maale Adumim settlement to Israel. Blocking this route further marginalizes Jerusalem as a Palestinian center and further undermines the geo-political, cultural, social and economic continuity between the Palestinian territories, cities and villages. This unilaterally imposed reality, a temporary fact on the ground, will significantly reduce the possibility of the birth of a viable and capable Palestinian state enjoying geo-political contiguity with Holy Jerusalem as its capital. Isolating Jerusalem from its surroundings and isolating Palestinian villages and cities. The route of the wall will exclude from Jerusalem many of its satellite centers and villages. Some of these communities, such as Ar Ram and Beer Nabala, will effectively be annexed to Israel, becoming besieged isolated towns. In addition, some of these isolated communities will not only be cut off from Jerusalem and Ramallah but also from other Palestinian centers in the West Bank. This force isolation will destroy any natural continuity. Further, the fragmentation will eliminate the support Jerusalem has depended upon from its surroundings. The economic and social implications are at once negative and obvious. Giving priority to the creation of integrity and continuity in the Israeli geo-political space. The planning and construction of the wall maximizes this Israeli value. The serpentine path of the wall effectively annexes to West Jerusalem many of the Israeli settlements built on East Jerusalem lands. This strengthens Israeli continuity at the expense of Palestines integrity. Related projects, such as tunnels which will route Palestinians under Jewish neighborhoods, rather than roadways through them, also are designed to enhance Israeli contiguity. These imposed spatial solutions cannot guarantee stability and security for any party. The dismemberment of the Jerusalem area and the inevitable concomitant decline in the citys central status will have several predictable consequences. The most obvious are:
Negative immigration from Jerusalem, especially of the upper and middle classes that represent the economic engine of every city. A decline in investment in the city due to the increased difficulty of entering Jerusalem and to the risk of violence and disorder developing there. A sharp deterioration of the infrastructure and municipal services resulting from declining financial resources to support or improve them. A significant decline in economic activities and diminishing development opportunities will result in higher unemployment and higher poverty rates. Increasing ethnic and national conflicts within the city area due to emergence of economic disparities between groups (Garb, 2004). Finally, the dismemberment of the Palestinian space will clearly lead to social instability, the first enemy of peace. It will make impossible the achievement of such central political goals as Jerusalem becoming the vital capital of the Palestinian state. Isolated from its natural reserve, it is very difficult to imagine it serving a meaningful national role. Clearly, it does not take into account the need for spatial continuity of future Palestinians State, as a basis for political, social, and economic stability. Israel seems unmindful that without stability there can be no security (Rand, 2004). A Weakened Jerusalem
The decision to build the wall, when combined with the effects of the closure policies in place since 1993, which bar the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to Jerusalem, have transformed Jerusalem from a service, commercial and administrative center of the West Bank and Gaza into an isolated city barely surviving and dependent on its local residents. The closure and wall polices have ended the citys centrality and weakened the economy. Both effects are evident in this reality: tourists have virtually stopped coming to East Jerusalem; most major hotels are shuttered; tour guides services and tour bus companies have experienced catastrophic reductions; and general unemployment now tops 25%. In contrast to the impoverished situation of Arab East Jerusalem, Israel has provided generous support for Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and its surroundings by providing social, economic, housing and infrastructure services that ensure the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, in spite of these efforts of support, Jerusalem (East and west combined) is the second poorest city in Israel ( Khamaisi, 1997, 2003). Instead of Israel developing policies and mechanisms for enhancing and enabling development in the city, it is establishing a separation wall that increases the weakness of the city and deepens poverty in it more and more. Divided physically, ethnically, and nationally within and outside the wall, economic and commercial activity between the city and its surroundings is effectively severed, and the city is isolated from the suburbs and outlying communities, which have nourished it. It is becoming a border city absent of hinterland and catchments area. Fragmentation and Urban Demise Both Palestinian and Israeli interests lie in having a Jerusalem that is safe, open and stable. However, in the present reality, the city is divided into neighborhoods along national/ethnic, economic and social group lines. Building the wall will harden the internal fragmentation within
East and West Jerusalem and deepen the division between the citys sectors. Jerusalem as an isolated divided city cannot create an image or conditions that can attract visitors or investors to the city. Ultimately, even its residents will be exhausted by the reality of isolation and will attempt to emigrate, further weakening the city dramatically. The End of Metropolitan Jerusalem In spite of the conflict that has been waged over the control of Jerusalem since the middle of the twentieth century, the spatial development of Jerusalem and its surrounding villages created an urban continuity that extended from Bethlehem in the south to Birzeit in the north, via Ramallah and Al-Bireh. The independent centers, the towns and the satellite sub-centers and villages around Jerusalem have all developed as a result of population increases based on the natural growth rate (birth-rate minus death rate) as well as on positive immigration. Since the beginning of the 1980s, Israel has sought to impose the concept of a single metropolis on Jerusalem and its surroundings, using geopolitical rather than functional considerations. That approach has clearly failed. Moreover, an examination of the realities of life in Jerusalem reveals that a split, dual metropolis has evolved because of geopolitical domination (Khamaisi, 1997). However, the separation wall will thwart even this dual reality in the urban and functional network of the Jerusalem metropolis. The Israelis may think that their free mobility will remain uninterrupted by the wall and that they will succeed in linking the surrounding Jewish settlements with Israeli Jerusalem. However, their plans deny the Palestinians a similar mobility. Such plans will result in an apartheid model that will give rise to forces that will eventually curtail the free movement of Israelis. Now, concerning the Palestinian part of the dual metropolis, barring movement between the East Jerusalem and the major secondary urban centers surrounding the city (such as Ar-Ram, Ramallah, and Bethlehem) and between these and their the rural sub-centers (such as Beer Nabala, Anata, Al-Ezariyeh) will undermine the functional structure of metropolitan Arab Jerusalem. This state of affairs began appearing after the closure of Jerusalem in 1993 and the trend towards fragmentation will be even more pronounced with construction of the wall. The evolving integral relationship between the urban centers in metropolitan Jerusalem has become distorted. The distortion will deepen to the point of preventing any possibility of spatial and functional mobility. This entire means that the wall will undermine the evolution of Jerusalem as a metropolitan center, in accordance with neither Israeli nor Palestinian concepts.
Return to a Peripheries Reality
Until 1967, Jerusalem was identified by the Israelis as a peripheral border area and was accorded generous governmental support to attract Jewish residents and Israeli investors. Since 1967, Israel has sought to elevate the status of the city by adopting a policy of expanding Israeli settlements around it, transferring governmental institutions to it and creating jobs and development opportunities. However, since 1993 Jerusalem has begun reverting to its peripheral status. Construction of the wall will accelerate this regression. In the end, Jerusalem will lose its
centrality and suffer the consequences of the division imposed by the wall. It will become an Israeli and Palestinian border town. Demolition of Houses and Confiscation of Lands The route of the Wall runs across Palestinian lands and through Palestinian neighborhoods. Part of this barrier is a wall and other parts are a fence. The fence sections are expected to involve the confiscation of vast areas of Palestinian lands. The wall sections, which are primarily constructed in built-up established neighborhoods, will necessitate the demolition of buildings and the confiscation of scarce lands allocated for Palestinian expansion. Furthermore, security roads are either planned or already built on both sides of the wall or fence, increasing the width of the lands to be allocated for construction of the barrier to 50-80 meters. In other words, the will lead to: Confiscation of private Palestinian lands. Demolition of buildings, thereby creating tragedies for their owners and their families and contributing to the growing housing crisis. Reduction of the already scarce areas allocated for construction in the Palestinian neighborhoods. Creation of obstacles to the expansion of already established buildings that stand adjacent to the barrier path. The pain that arises from the confiscation of lands and the demolition of homes cannot be erased from the memories of the Palestinian families. This memory passes from fathers to sons and remains engraved in the minds of children until a time comes for them to seek revenge and regain what had been confiscated. This means persistence of the conflict and continuing instability. The wall will not bring peace (Khamaisi, 2005; Marom, 2004). Persistence of the Majority-Minority Relationship and Continuation of the Citizenship vs. Residency Dilemma After Israels occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, it effectively created a separation between the demography and the space (the population and the land). While on the one hand Israel extended its sovereignty over the land, it accorded Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem only residency status, not Israeli citizenship. Absent a wall, if the Palestinian Jerusalemites were granted citizenship and the enfranchisement it carries with it, given their higher growth rate they would soon become an Arab majority in the capital of the Jewish state. To absolutely ensure against that possibility, the Jerusalem Envelop is configured along a path that minimizes the number of Palestinians on its western side, which Israeli intends to annex. Therefore, construction of the wall must be seen in the context of strategies designed to ensure a Jewish majority in Jerusalem and in greater Israel, strategies that deprive Palestinian residents of citizenship status even if they live under Israeli sovereignty. In the long term, it is anticipated that Palestinian Jerusalemites who find themselves annexed to the Israeli side of the wall will become dissatisfied with their minority plight and Israeli repression and will seek to emigrate back to the Palestinian side or out of the country. Either way, their departure will further ensure a Jewish majority on Israeli turf (Garb, 2004). Some may think that the present discrepancy in the economic level between the relatively well off Israelis and the definitely impoverished Palestinians will lead to a wave of Palestinian emigration to the Israeli side of the wall, especially in the short and medium terms, thereby increasing the Palestinian population there even though the immigrants status will remain as
residents. However, in the long term, the residency issue and Israels border controls will restrict massive migration. Social Implications of the Separation Wall: Social Dismemberment, Community Marginalization, Rising Poverty Levels, Housing Crises, and Increasing Crime. The Breakup of Societys Basic Units. The wall will lead to community and societal dismemberment. The wall passes through rural neighborhoods in Jerusalem, which are undergoing an urbanization and urbanism phase. These communities are comprised of clans and extended families that will be separated by the wall. This will effectively end close relationships between these groups and shatter the continuity of the social and cultural fabric. An example of this dismemberment can be found in Arab-Sawahreh village. Its eastern and western sectors are now separated by the wall thus barring social continuity among members of the principal family of this community. Since the partition of Jerusalem in 1948, the city has suffered from community marginalization in spite of the political and spiritual centrality that it enjoys. Community marginalization means preventing or inhibiting the development of community structures that lead to the emergence of elites and community leaders capable of advancing the society toward higher development and stability. Under British Mandate, Jerusalem attracted the Palestinian elites; it became the central city in mandatory Palestine. However, after the catastrophe of 1948, the upper and middle classes fled or were expelled, many seeking refuge in Amman. Indeed, this was the case was in all other Palestinian cities (Khamaisi, 2004). Over the next twenty years, Jerusalem continued to evolve as an urban community, rudderless, essentially without a significant cadre of elite or middle class leadership. In 1967, following the occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem, the city experienced some notable growth but disproportionately in the lower middle and working classes. These years also saw an urbanism process beginning in the villages that were annexed to the borders of Jerusalem. However, these trends did not create a cohesive integrated civic and urban society capable of enhancing and empowering Jerusalems community development. As a result, no elite or influential middle social classes evolved in Jerusalem in the last half of the twentieth century to form a leadership force for developing the city. Moreover, the community marginalization of Jerusalem has obviously worsened since Israels 1993 closure of the city to Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And even though the Oslo Accords contributed to the return from abroad of Palestinian social and political elites to the Palestinian territories, especially Ramallah, very few chose to reside in a crowded and impoverished East Jerusalem. This continued the transformation of Jerusalem from a central city expected and required to play a pioneering role in the network of the Palestinian cities and villages into a secondary inferior city comprised of residential neighborhoods with ever less economic, cultural, political or administrative significance. This situation had direct negative impacts on investment, creation of job opportunities, attraction of social elites and the development of a cultural life. Hence, the social reality of East Jerusalem continued to deteriorate. Construction of the wall will only lead to an exacerbation of community marginalization. It will further diminish all forms of development and increase the social decline of the city and the suffering of its people. Cut off from its network of suburbs and secondary centers, the city will lose even more of the few remaining elite and middle classes. They will seek residence in cities
that offer them business and cultural opportunities and freedom of movement. Jerusalem will continue to decline. Exacerbation of the Housing Crisis. One of the central Israeli motives for building the wall is an Israeli demographic goal of minimizing the Palestinian population so that Arabs cannot exceed one third of the population of Jerusalem. In order to achieve this geo-demographic and geopolitical goal, the Israeli authorities adopted a policy of land and housing planning that effectively eliminated housing opportunities to meet the needs of the East Jerusalemite community. The obvious effect is a housing crisis, which is characterized by a) a shortage of residential units that meet the needs of young couples; b) deteriorated building and living conditions; c) greater housing density, including increases in the number of persons per room and more residential units per dunums; d) unacceptable infrastructure conditions in neighborhoods which experience population growth but no increase or provision of infrastructure services. With the beginning of the planning and construction of the wall, some Jerusalem neighborhoods are already experiencing a worsening of the housing crisis. Here are some of the main factors, which brought this about: 1) A population increase due to the return to Jerusalem of Palestinians with Jerusalem ID cards but who were residing outside the city. They are returning in order to ensure their right to residency there and to receive the Israeli welfare and entitlement benefits that an East Jerusalem residency conveys. This influx of returnees has not been matched by an increase in available proper housing. Thus, families are forced to live under highly dense living conditions and in apartments where appropriate services were unavailable. Indeed, some families have moved into the Old City in ground level shop and storage vault areas, which as residences offer very small and primitive living conditions (Khamaisi, 2003). 2) An increase demand for housing within the barrier wall in Jerusalem has lead to a sharp increase in real estate prices and rental rates, even though much of the available housing is in fact inappropriate from a public health standpoint. On the other hand, the exodus of Palestinians returning to Jerusalem and the fragmentation of the Jerusalem area has caused real estate prices in the areas outside the wall to plummet. This has lead to enormous losses for some families who have spent their life savings investing in their homes. 3) Construction of the wall was not accompanied by an increased supply of housing. To the contrary, demand increased while supply remained very limited. This reality has lead to various community crises, feuds within families, increased housing density and it has exacerbated the deteriorated situation of the Arab neighborhoods. Meanwhile, in the face of this housing crisis, ad hoc substandard construction is increasing at an alarming rate to provide shelter for Palestinian families who wish to live within the wall. Some of the constructions are essentially shacks or incomplete stone buildings inhabited by poor needy families. All of this exacerbates the housing problem and creates flimsy, provisional neighborhoods (Marom, 2004). Formation of Poverty Neighborhoods. The wall represents a physical, social and psychological separator that intensifies the problems of discrimination. Arab neighborhoods are dismembered
and the populations within them have only restricted mobility and are confines in neighborhoods that lack appropriate housing opportunities, modern services and a developed infrastructure. The wall not only dismembers the Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods and divides them into two halves; they will also live under conditions of a neglected infrastructure, stringent security and constant surveillance. Those neighborhoods will be transformed from integrated neighborhoods enjoying free spatial mobility into divided scattered neighborhood that attracts illegal immigration. Most Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods will become poverty pockets inhabited mostly by the lower middle and lower classes. Israel cannot be relied upon to do anything positive to alleviate the situation.
Exacerbating Crime The appearance of substandard ad hoc construction, the housing crisis, the deterioration of the economic situation, and the community and spatial dismemberment all represent fertile grounds for increasing crime rates. The spread of drugs, crime and sexual assaults in some Arab neighborhoods could have been checked and confronted had development opportunities materialized and had a national and local authority managed community development. However, construction of the separation wall will isolate Jerusalem neighborhoods from the Palestinian political and economic center, and that will prevent devising and implementing plans in the Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods. Furthermore, the positive immigration, the deformed urbanization process, the Israeli governmental policy that seeks to reduce the population, and the treatment of those citizens from a security standpoint which views them as a fifth column do not create a climate for social progress. All these components will lead to an increase in the crime rate in the Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods and will nurture a return to dependence on family and clan affiliations for protection. None of this is conducive to the evolution of a modern civil society. Some Palestinian criminals in the West Bank territories will seek refuge from in the Jerusalemite neighborhoods inside the wall where territorial authorities cannot pursue them. Doubtless they will commit crimes, especially in the Palestinian enclave neighborhoods where there is no central authority to preserve the individual and community security. The Wall as a Killing Zone The ramifications of the wall do not only affect the location where it is constructed. A security belt that confiscates Palestinian lands on both sides surrounds it. This security system will be operated according to regulations that will make it impossible to cross the barrier. Whoever approaches the barrier zone will be arrested or shot. In order to protect their lives most Palestinians will avoid approaching the wall. Thus, a large area inside the Palestinian Jerusalemite neighborhoods will remain isolated and void of development. The killing incidents that occurred in Berlin in the early 1960s after the wall was erected will happen in Jerusalem. That poses a serious threat to stability. The wall must be dealt with not only on the basis of being a vertical line that prohibits mobility and movement, but also as a broad security zone comprised of multiple obstacle components, built on vast confiscated acreage which will prevent development of neighborhoods and threaten the lives of innocent people. Transformation of Jerusalem into a City Lacking Stability and Security In the collective Palestinian memory, Jerusalem is as an indivisible part of their heritagepast, present and future. This mindset prevents them from accepting any reality that will not allow
them to interact with this heritage, live in it, and access their holy shrines. For this reason, they will resist and struggle against anything that prevents them from realizing their personal, national and religious aspirations in the city. Undoubtedly, the wall denies them this possibility. Inevitably, there will be resistance operations that will threaten the security and stability of all Jerusalemites, Palestinians and Israelis alike. Moreover, the deteriorated social and economic realities in Jerusalem will lead to an increase in violence in the city, some of which will take the form of resistance actions against the Israelis. This will complicate the citizens lives, especially when confrontations are between Israelis and Palestinians who belong to the same economically and socially deteriorated classes and who feel threatened by the other and believe that the other is competing with them over limited resources. The loss of security and stability will lead to social, economic and urban destruction of the city, and this will serve the interests of neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis. Conclusion Today the development of urban fabric of Jerusalem exists under numbers of walls and barriers. These walls and barriers include planning, geo-political, Ethno-national, socio-economic, sociocultural and physical. The physical wall is crown and merges most of the barriers. The urban planning strategies and policies create the arena for creating and building the walls. This paper has attempted to present an overview of the development of the urban fabric of Jerusalem, the spatial planning policies as tools for achieving geo-political and demographic matters and it implications and the ramifications and effects of the wall on the fabric of Jerusalem and its surroundings. It has argued that the wall is not a mere physical barrier that the Israelis believe will preserve their security, but rather a barrier with psychological, geopolitical, geodemographic, economic and social consequences that will threaten the citys stability. Beside that, there exist Israeli partisan urban planning contributes for reducing the instability in Jerusalem area (Bollens, 2000). The paper presents the walls effects on the citys fabric are multiple and that, they will complicate the geopolitical and urban reality, including the services and infrastructure in the city. The unilateral imposition of the wall, shape and ramifications on the Israeli and Palestinian sides only worsens the walls impact on the citys fabric and threatens its growth and development. It will even transform Jerusalem into a divided, fragmented city without supporting environs; it will create and enhance secondary centers that will compete with it and contribute continually to its further demise. So, under the current circumstances, Jerusalem will be peripheral for Arabs and Jews. In order to ensure the survival and development of Jerusalem alternative urban planning concepts and policies, beside other geopolitical arrangements and solutions must be found. Such concepts and solutions must contribute to the stability and sustainable development of this Holy City, so dear to the hearts of millions of people.
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Jerusalem Al-Quds History and Walls

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Jerusalem/ Al-Quds Between Two Walls: the Urban Planning Strategy and Policy for Reaching Hegemony Rassem

page 1 of 27Rassem Khamaisi

The Meaning of Walls for Securing Territorial Belonging

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Figure 1: The development of built up area in Jerusalem between 1841- 2000

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Planning Land Use in Jerusalem as a tool for creating a mental wall

The Implications of the Land-Use Plans

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Wall around Jerusalems New Borders: Claims and Realities

Return to a Peripheries Reality

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