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Middle East FORUM Issue 9, December 2009

FOREIGN POLICIES OF GREECE AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: GEOPOLITICAL AMBITIONS AND POLITICAL REALISM
Petros Siousiouras
Department of Shipping, Trade and Transport University of the Aegean Chios, Greece

Abstract. When the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) became an independent state in 1991, differences of political or cultural nature with Greece rose to the surface. The 21st of September 1995, the day of signing of the Interim Accord (IA) between Greece and FYROM, marks the beginning of the restoration of relations between the two states, after a long period of hostile relations. Questions related to the future of FYROM -especially its European future- are examined in the current paper. The clear conclusion is that FYROM is still divided between two main ethnicities that from time to time openly confront each other. The Albanian-origin part of the population is quit often pressing for changes in the political system, a fact that creates frictions; the dominant ethnicity the so called Slavomacedoniansfinds itself trapped in a virtual reality, which despite the fact that, at first, it was imposed on them, at a later stage they adopted it and today, the third stage, they strongly defend it. Key words: Greece, FYROM, Balkan Peninsula, foreign policy.

148

INTRODUCTION

Tito in 1944, created the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), as Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM). The causes of the establishment of SRM as a federal entity of the Yugoslav Federation should be traced in the movement of Panslavism in the 19th century. The objective was to establish in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula the so-called Balkan Federation, to serve as an obstacle to the Russian influence. SRM would constitute one of the federal entities of the federation, created literally from scratch. The rationale behind its creation was to serve as the starting point within which it would attract and finally attach the whole geographical region of Macedonia. The unification of all macedonians living within the borders of the geographical area called Macedonia would be based on the creation of a macedonian ethnicity an ethnicity invented by Tito on the basis of a well-planned scheme, in order to serve as a link among all macedonians. When SRM became an independent state in 1991, differences of political or cultural nature with Greece rose to the surface. Those preexisting differences remained dormant behind the faade of the federal nature of the Yugoslav state. The prime cause of concern for Greece was the use of the name Macedonia, doubled by certain irredentist provisions in the constitution. This was the exact reason why Greece was from the very beginning against the incorporation of SRM in the international community. The relations of the two states followed a dramatic course as Greece was setting obstacles when it was not receiving the guarantees it demanded on several issues. This juxtaposition climaxed when Greece finally imposed economic sanctions against FYROM, on February 1994. September 21, 1995, the day of signing of the Interim Accord (IA) between Greece and FYROM, marks the beginning of the restoration of relations between the two states after a long period of hostile relations. The conclusion of the IA led to the recognition of FYROM by Greece1 and to the lifting of the sanctions imposed on
1

See article 1 of the IA

149 FYROM2. On the other hand, it led to the change of FYROMs national flag, which used the Vergina Sun as a national symbol3, the abolition/amendment of the irredentist provisions in its constitution4 and its commitment to negotiate with Greece on the issue of its name5. Undoubtedly, the conclusion of the IA by Greece and FYROM led to the lifting of the obstacles, which could function as a stumbling block in the course of the newly founded state to the international affairs. For that reason it signaled the beginning of a new era in its international relation as a fully recognized subject of international law (by Greece also). On the other hand, a fundamental issue also arises: would FYROM manage to survive in the international scene as a state in its present shape? This is because the nature of the state, in which Tito also included Albanian-speaking population -with different national consciousness and difference claims- poses a number of questions as far as its viability is concerned. This becomes more evident, taking into consideration the fact that the percentage of the Albanian-speaking population in FYROM is dramatically increasing, causing strong shocks, endangering the cohesion of the state Tito created in 1944. The answer to these questions attempted in the current studyis necessarily related to the reference of the whole historical context within which it was born and developed, that is the birth of Pan Slavism in Russia.

PANSLAVISM AND THE MACEDONIAN ISSUE

Panslavism first appeared in the 19th century, more specifically during the years 18301860, when the dispute between two important ideological schools of thought was raging: namely, that of the slavophones, who wanted an economically powerful and politically orthodox Russia and that of the pro-western supporters of Europe and its ideas, who saw the future of their country within that context.6 The Crimean war played a catalytic role in the victory of the first school of thought, as it forced the Russian foreign policy to focus in two concrete objectives: confronting the Anglo2 3

See article 8 of the IA See article 7 par. 2 of the IA 4 See article 6 and 7 of the IA 5 See article 5 of the IA 6 See K. Vakalopoulos, Macedonia and Turkey, Vanias Publications, Thessaloniki, 1987, p. 177.

150 French front and freeing the Christian Slav populations of the Ottoman Empire, through an attempt which aims at the ethnic, political and cultural awakening of the enslaved Slavs.7 This is considered to be a turning point, as it serves as a dividing line for a policy of Panslavism that had only theoretical interest up to that point and the beginning of a new course, which would attempt to tranform this theory in practice. Panslavism found ample space to grow, when Tzarist Russia created the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870: an autonomous Church, independent of the Partiarchate of Constantinople, but based in Constantinople. The geopolitical, rather than religious importance of such a move is underlined by the fact that the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate took place under the initiative of the Russian Panslavist and Ambassador to Russia, Ignatiev. It was exactly for that reason that the decision dated February 27, 1870- recognized the existence of a Bulgarian ethnicity and thus of a Bulgarian nation. Ever since, Bulgarias efforts to force the enslaved Greeks to join the Exarchate would create a long period of disputes in Macedonia. The religious divide between those who belong to the Patriarchate and those who belong to the Exarchate, would aquire a political content as well: the accession of the Christian inhabitants of Macedonia to the Bulgarian Exarchate would automatically mean a Bulgarian conscience.8 In that manner and with the motto Macedonia for Macedonians, Bulgaria aimed at the autonomy of Macedonia as a first step and then at its partition, according to the East Romilia precedent. This expansionist Bulgarian policy, which is refered to as the Macedonian issue, was temporarily satisfied with the San Stephano Treaty of 1878, but was totally halted in 1913, due to the unfortunate outcome of the Balkan Wars for Bulgaria. Until the Second World War, there was no reference to a Macedonian ethnicity in the Balkan region. It is obvious that during this first phase the Macedonian issue, having territorial and not ethnological content, evolved in parallel

The founding of the Slav Philanthropic Commission, in Moscow in 1858, but also in other cities where young Bulgarians were invited as scholars, can be seen within this context. See K. Vakalopoulos, ibid. 8 See Th. Christodoulides, Diplomatic History 1648-1901, Athens, A. Sakkoulas Publications, 1985, p. 527.

151 with the decay of the Ottoman Empire and consequently, with the development of the Eastern Question.9

THE HISTORIC JUNCTURE AND THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

On August 2, 1944, Yosip Broz Tito founded in Iliden the SRM within the borders of the Yugoslav Federation to house, at first, the previously non-existing Macedonian ethnicity. At a second stage, it served as the basic piece of the jigsaw, on which the rest of the geographical Macedonia would be incrementally added. This is exactly the reason why intentionaly the borders of the future Macedonian state were not defined then.10 From this point onwards the Macedonian issue reappears, acquiring an ethnic quality. There lies the difference with the Macedonian issue put forward by Bulgaria, which was of purely territorial nature. Indeed, seen from a wider angle the Macedonian Issue, during its first phase, was a seed of the Eastern Question, exhibiting territorial and not ethnological qualities. At that stage, the interest towards that Question was intensified by the aspirations and scheming of the Great Powers. Their main objective was to dominate over the region due to its geopolitical value and use it as a North-South and East-West connecting axis and due to the importance of the port of Thessaloniki.11 The reemergence of the Macedonian issue, in Titos eyes, was based on the establishment of a Macedonian ethnicity with the further objective to bring all inhabitants of Macedonia under the SRM umbrella. It is obvious that Tito was a clever imperialist, who used to hide his expansionist intensions behind an ideological facade. Titos objectives were obvious. Because of his clear-sightedness, he saw that it was impossible to achieve the partition of both the
9

The decay of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of national states Greece being the firstsignaled the beginning of the Eastern Question. The successful attempt of the enslaved nations to break loose of the Ottoman yoke gave the term Eastern Question a notional content, underlying the political will of the peoples, living together within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, to break free and form national states. The Eastern Question developed gradually and aquired a regional dimension when the new national states of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro joined forces to achieve greater territorial gains in the First Balkan War of 1912. See among others E. Driault, La Question dOrient, Paris, F. Alcan, 1898. 10 See I. K. Mazaraki-Ainian, The Macedonian Issue and the Birth of the New Macedonian Issue, Athens, Dodoni Editions, 1992, pp. 24-5. 11 See G. B. Zotiades, The Macedonian Question, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1954, Ch. Markou et. al., Is there a viable solution of the Macedonian Question?, Oikonomikos Tachydromos, November 2, 1995, pp. 35-6.

152 Greek and the Bulgarian part of Macedonia through military means and so he chose to follow an indirect path: that of cultural mutation.12 The plan was premised on the creation of a Macedonian ethnicity in Yugoslav Macedonia.13 This ethnicity has been the offspring of the blurry picture having to do with the Macedonian question that was dominant in the Balkan region. Furthermore, the unfounded arguments for the existence of a Macedonian ethnicity were illustrated in the census of the Hilmi Pasha, the Turkish commander of the then Ottoman Macedonia, in 1904, according to which the ethnicities that were registered were Greeks, Turks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Jews but not even one Macedonian. Neither do Serb scientists, such as J. Cvijic, in the dawn of the 20th century, mention in their works inhabitants of Macedonian ethnicity, but only to Albanians, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and Romanians.14

SRM AND THE YUGOSLAV GREAT IDEA

It is also worth-mentioning that the establishment of the SRM took place in the context of the wider scheme inspired by Tito- for the creation of a Balkan Federation, which comprised, apart from the already existing Yugoslav Federation, the federal republics of Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria. As for the federal republic of Macedonia, it would have been created with the incorporation of the Bulgarian Macedonia into Yugoslavia, after a period of cultural preparation as agreed-, which would aim at the debulgarization and the simultaneous Macedonization of the local populace. At the same time, the federal republic of Bulgaria would be created with the partition of Western Thrace, after the concerted effort of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to distract it from Greece. As Georgy Dimitrov rightfully points out under the Bled Treaty (1947) with some exchange in return, Bulgaria accepted to recognize the inhabitants of the Bulgarian Macedonia (Pirin) as Macedonians and to prepare
12

See E. Kofos, The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation, 27 Balkan Studies, 1986, p. 159. 13 The establishment of a Macedonian ethnicity was based on the creation of a name, a Macedonian language, a Macedonian Orthodox Church and a Macedonian history. See also F. Stergiou, A Retrospection in the History of Macedonia, Oikonomikos Tachydromos, June 11, 1992, p. 98, G. Babiniotis, The Language of Macedonia: Ancient Macedonian and the False Language of Skopje, Athens, Olkos Publications, 1992. 14 It is worth-mentioning that the last census took place under the Ottomans in 1905 and did not provide any evidence of the existence of a Macedonian ethnicity. See F. Stergiou, Retrospective in the History of Macedonia, Oikonomikos Tachydromos, June 11, 1992, pp. 94-8.

153 the incorporation into the SRM. The incorporation of the Greek Macedonia would anticipate the outcome of the civil war.15 Fortunately for the candidate federal states, but also for Greece, Titos grand plan never materialized. Apart from the fact that they maintained their national sovereignty, which would have been sacrificed to serve Titos vision, a potential implementation of the Yugoslav presidents attempt would also alter the existing geopolitical balance in the Balkans. The transformation of Yugoslavia into a great power (Balkan Federation) could constitute a severe blow to the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union in the Balkan region. It would alter the balance of power at the expense of the Soviet Union, for which Yugoslavia as a medium power belonged into its own sphere of influence. Such a geopolitical development in Europe would drastically influence the Soviet Union, which would be automatically distanced, geographically and strategically, from the developments in the Balkans. For that reason the then Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, would never allow Tito to implement his grand vision. Stalin, being the leader of the up till then traditionally friendly state, could not accept the indirect displacement of the Soviet Union by Yugoslavia and the assumption of such a geopolitical and strategic role by the latter. The Soviet Union would obviously prefer the well-tried policy of divide and rule. So, in June 1948 the rift between Tito and Stalin and the consequent renunciation of the former from Cominform became a reality.16 However, apart from this negative development for Titos plan, we would also have to take into account Georgy Dimitrovs death, who had been a fervent supporter of the Balkan Federation.17
15

See S. Lygeros, Winds of War in the Balkans: Skopje, Athens, Nea Synora Publications, 1992, p. 42, G. Tsalouchides, How the Skopje Myth was Imposed, Oikonomikos Tachydromos, October 14, 1993, p. 90. 16 Cominfrom (Communist Information), established in 1947 and disbanded in 1956, was the organization that succeeded Comintern (Communist International) after the Second World War. Comintern, which was created in 1919 as the international organization of the communist parties and dismantled by Stalin in 1943, during its 2nd Congress decided that each communist party within a certain state has the obligation to differentiate between the interests of the suppressed classes from the national ones which coincide with those of the upper class. Thus, all communists regardless of nationality, would have to be ready to perform even the biggest national sacrifices, if something like that is dictated by the wider geographical strategy. They should possess the right of self determination which could possibly lead them in breaking away from the national state in which they were living. See J. Degas, The Communist International 1919-1943, Vol. 1, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1956, E. Kofos, The Making of Yugoslav Peoples Republic of Macedonia, 27 Balkan Studies, 1986. 17 See M. Koppa, A Fragile Democracy: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in Between the Past and the Future, Athens, Papazisis Publications, 1994, p. 43. The reaction of the Bulgarian inhabitants of the Pirin Macedonia (the part of Bulgaria which geographically belongs to Macedonia) who according to the Tito-Dimitrov plan would be incorporated into the SRM, points towards that

154

It is indeed hard to answer the question whether the creation of the federal state of Macedonia ultimately served Yugoslavias interests, bearing in mind that this state was a part of the federation, which lasted for four decades only. That is, for the period that Tito was the dominant figure of the Yugoslav political life. Titos death, in May 1980, signaled the beginning of the disintegration of the federal state. Thus, it was proven that the cohesion of the Yugoslav construction during the preceding decades was the result of the performance of absolute power by Tito, rather than of the peaceful coexistence of the ethnicities comprising this construction. However, Titos impartial attitude towards all ethnicities and his devotion to the creation of the Yugoslav ideal18 should be recognized, despite his Croat descend.19 Indeed, the Yugoslav identity came to be associated with Tito, the man who invented it. The disintegration of his regime, once he was out of the picture, was the ultimate result.20 It was then, when the Yugoslav identity gave way to secessionist nationalism since there were few democratic alternatives.21 Consequently, the developments that occurred after Titos office, constituted a serious argument, justifying the implemented policy, which was based mainly on absolutism. A policy that indicates that a state, which is composed by many ethnicities, reacts less and rallies around the implementation of a more austere and centralized policy under the condition that this policy should be fair. It should be exercised universally, providing all ethnicities with a sense of fairness. However, if and when differences or deviations in its exercise occur, they will appear at the same time, and the relevant reactions will increase proportionately, taking form of centrifugal tendencies by the ethnicities, that share the burden of injustice.

direction. 18 Indeed, Tito, despite his Croat decent, did not share the nationalist and racist behavior of Ade Palevic, the leader of Ustase. See J. M. Le Breton, Historia Magazine, After Tito, Chaos, v. 332, February 1996, p. 78. 19 See Th. Veremis, Kosovo: The Longstanding Crisis, Athens, I. Sideris Publ., 2000, p. 18. 20 See M. Koppa, Minorities in the Post-Communist Balkans, Nea Synora - Livanis Publishing Company, 1997, p. 51. 21 Id. G. Schopflin, The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, John McGarry/Brendan OLeary eds., Routledge, 1993, pp. 172-203.

155

THE FYROM PARADOX

The birth of SRM half a century ago and its presence in the Balkan region so far, constituted an international originality. What signals the paradox of the character of that state is the fact that since its conception it was not formed according to the wishes of its citizens, but it was rather imposed from above, in order to satisfy specific interests: Yugoslavias geopolitical interests, as perceived by the then President, Tito. The whole issue is of particular importance, especially nowadays, as the Slavomacedonians as the dominant ethnicity calls itself in FYROM- Slavs half a century ago, fight for the defense of an ethnicity that was once imposed on them. They are fighting, in particular, for a choice that was not made by them in the context of the notion of the will for self-determination or independence, but by an imperialist leader in the context of fulfilling its grant vision. Based on that logic, the persistence of todays Slavomacedonians to defend Titos choice half a century ago, constitutes a without precedence paradox, in the history of international relations. In a sense, we could say that the dominant ethnicity in FYROM the so-called Slavomacedinians- finds itself trapped in a virtual reality, which despite the fact that, at first, it was imposed on them, at a later stage they adopted it and today the third stage- they defend it. In that sense, FYROMs Slavomacedonians fighting with the Albanian-speaking minority for dominance in a state that if it was not created by Tito it would be a part of Serbia today, they are still paying the price for Titos wrongdoings. The same price is also paid by FYROMs Albanian-speaking population, to the extent that while they were the majority in the Yugoslav federal state, they remained, in practice and in substance, a minority in FYROM. This is because, if there was no FYROM, then its western region, which is inhabited by Albanians, would be a part of Kosovo. Nowadays, however, the Slavomacedonians seem to be largely in control of the situation in FYROM. Despite the mishappenings of the last few years, they managed, by granting certain privileges, rights or freedoms, to bring back the order in FYROM, balancing up to a point, the various inequalities at the expense of their Albanianspeaking fellow citizens. In the August 13, 2001 Orchid Agreement it was decided by

156 the five most prominent leaders in FYROM to go forwards with the following constitutional amendments: (i) the Preamble of the Constitution would refer to the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and not to the Macedonian people, that is the Slavomacedonians, (ii) while point 6.4 of the agreement mentions that the official language is Macedonian, point 6.5 mentions that any other language would be considered official so long as it is spoken by at least 20% of the people (implying the Albanian language), (iii) whereas in the current constitution (art. 19, par. 3) the Macedonian orthodox church is the official church, according to article 19 the Macedonian orthodox church, the Islamic and the Catholic ones are considered to be of equal status and independent from the state, (iv) according to point 3.1 of the agreement, in order to pass a bill in the Parliament, besides the overall voting, a second voting by the MPs of the respective minority group should follow. It is obvious that these amendments guarantee the individual rights of the citizens of FYROM, on the principles of equality and proportionality, and reduce to some extent the rights deriving from the previous constitution in favor of the Slavomacedonians.22 A question that could be asked at this point is how can a sovereign state be in a position to maintain its authority and grant rights when at the same time it is on the brink of losing its own sovereignty? What will happen when, as numbers indicate,23 the ratio between the Albanian-speaking population and the Slavomacedonians changes in favor of the former? Of course, it would be impossible according to the modern perception of human rights for a state to legally impose birth control on the population. All the more, on a different population group, the rights of which are addressed not only by the state jurisdiction but also by the international one. The Director of the Foundation of Political and Economic Sciences, Dr P. Simic, comments on the issue of the high Albanian birth rate: one can copy the Chinese and insist on birth control if one is dealing with a homogeneous populationThe Chinese leadership could not be accused of chinophobia, because birth control was an
22

See Framework Agreement, Republic of Macedonia Agency of Information, August 15, 2001, (http://www.sinf.gov.mk./PressRoomEN/2001/07n0815.htm) 23 The birth rates of the Albanian-speaking population and that of the Slavomacedonians have emerged as major political factors. The birth rate of the FYROMs Albanians is 2.7% and that of the Slavomacedonians is 1.3% and the percentage of the Albanians was, according to the 1994 census, 22.7% (the current one is likely to be from 28 to 30%) it is obvious that in a rather short time span the Albanian-speaking population will be the majority in FYROM. See I. Fisher, Concerns for Albanian Children, The New York Times, reprinted in To Vima, August 14, 2001.

157 acceptable national challenge. If we attempted to put some pressure on a Balkan minority, and especially on a certain ethnic population [the Albanian one], that had suffered so much in the past, then this would be considered by the rest of the world as an act of genocide24

THE DIALECTICAL RELATION BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF DETERMINATION IN THE CASE OF FYROM
We would also have to add that despite all those things said by the Albanian-speaking population of FYROM, it is certain that self-determination is their ulterior desire and aim. Because of this fact a mere alteration of the legal and constitutional context would not be enough to change the situation, even if the use of the Albanian language would be a reality at the official and administrative level. Most of the problem lies on the disputed legitimacy of the state itself [FYROM]. During the Yugoslav era, the Albanians of Macedonia lived, studied and worked in Pristina, Kosovo. The breakup of the Federation disrupted Yugoslavias unified Albanian area and the Albanian communities of Macedonia and the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia never accepted the legality of the new borders. While the raging Macedonian nationalism was inspired by a national dream that finally materialized, the Albanian-speaking population of Macedonia was always viewing FYROM as a temporary mistake of history.25 When, consequently the Albanian speaking population of FYROM consolidates their wish -which may include the running of the state itself- and feel capable of materializing it, it is to be wished that they would claim that through standard peaceful procedures, that is elections. And it is to also be wished for that whatever government is on power at the time it would move towards its implementation. In case the opposite happens, then two principles of contrasting nature would be put into
24

See A. Sherman, On the Threshold of Chaos, (transl. D. Gedeon), Athens, Psychogios Publications, 1996, p. 153. 25 See J. A. Derens, Balkans: Threats for a New Partition, Le Monde Diplomatique, reprinted in the Kiriakatiki Eleftherotypia, October 28, 2001. (The symbols in the text have been added by the author of this paper).

158 test: The principle of self-determination (on behalf of the Albanians, in either its internal or external version) and the principle of sovereignty (on behalf of FYROM).26 We have to underline that in such case, the non-use of violence, which is a fundamental principle of international relations, is highly unlikely or impotent to be practiced.27 According to the existing law, the sovereign state possessing the core of sovereignty, basic component of which is coercion can intervene in order to restore order, when this is threatened.28 Weber, is proposing the same idea according to whom, the state possesses the monopoly of the legal use of natural violence within the boundaries of a state territory,29 even though this does not automatically imply the legalization of any act of violence.30 It is thus, obvious that the use of force on behalf of a state in the context of the implementation of the principle of sovereignty is largely justified according to the existing notion of law. All the more, when an ethnicity in the legal sense of the term- opts for the assumption of the power of the state through the use of force and not through peaceful means. 31 Consequently, it is likely, that if the Albanians in FYROM and especially, the currently dominant Slavomacedonian ethnicity does not show the necessary self restraint, moderation and maturity, it is highly likely that we will have to deal with situations in the near future, in which the very breakup of FYROM would prove to be the most optimistic scenario.32
26

See among others P. D. Datoglou, On Sovereignty, Athens-Komotini, A. Sakkoulas Publications, 1986, p. 69, where extensive bibliography is cited. 27 The threat or the use of force, apart from the fact that is strictly prohibited in article 2, paragraph 4 of UN Charter, also possesses a jus cogens character. These rules appeared for the first time after the Second World War as a fruit of the overall mentality of the time, concerning the prohibition of war and the use of violence. It is for that reason that the prohibition of threat or use of force is considered by many to be the most important rule of jus cogens, expressing the overall spirit of the Charter. For rules of jus cogens see articles 53 ans 64 of the Vienna Convention on Treaty Law (1969). See also K. Economides, Public International Law, v. A, Athens-Komotini, A. Sakkoulas Publications, 1990, pp. 100-1, A. B. Papakostas, Public International Law (Peaceful and Violent Means of International Conflict Resolution), Athens, 1971, p. 103. 28 See K. Stephanou, The Constitutional Reformation of the European Union, (Europena Union Award of the Academy of Athens), Papazisis Publications, Athens, 1996, p. 25. 29 See Max Weber, Essays on Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1948, p. 78. 30 See M. Bossi, On the Definition of Terrorism, Athens, P. Travlos Publishing House, 1999, p. 137-8. 31 See K. Economides, Public International Law, where it is mentioned that: a minority resembles an ethnicity because it is also a group of people ethnically homogeneous, which is different in respect of language, religion, traditions etc. from the majority of the population of the state in which it lives. In contrast to the minority, it does not have the will or the right of partition from the state it belongs. See also S. Perrakis, Peoples and Minorities Rights, Athens-Komotini, A. Sakkoulas Publications, 1993. 32 The following view is mentioned: All the protagonists of the contemporary wars in the Balkans assure us that they want to rectify the misdoings of historyIs Macedonia doomed to serve as the testing ground for this ethnic redefinition of the Balkan borders? See J. A. Derens, Balkans: Threats for a New Partition, Le Monde Diplomatique, reprinted in the Kiriakatiki Eleftherotypia, October 28, 2001. (The symbols in the text have been added by the author of this paper).

159

CONCLUSION

Based on that logic, the value of the things said by either the international community or by FYROM concerning the inviolability of the current borders is relative. The only thing that can be taken for granted is that in international relations, nothing can be seen as static. On the contrary, the course of international relations is a dynamic one and in this course the Albanian-speaking population of FYROM has, among others, the advantage of a high birth rate, which steadily supplants the percentage of the Slavomacedonians. Consequently, under the prevailing circumstances in FYROM, which constantly differentiate in favor of the Albanians, it is indeed doubtful if the wish for the inviolability of the borders can become true in the future. We think that a wish, which would be closer to reality, would be the one to suggest that the future developments in FYROM are handled in a peaceful manner.

References
1. Babiniotis G., The Language of Macedonia: Ancient Macedonian and the False Language of Skopje, Athens, Olkos Publications 2. M. Bossi, On the Definition of Terrorism, Athens, P. Travlos Publishing House, 1999. 3. Christodoulides Th., Diplomatic History 1648-1901, Athens, A. Sakkoulas Publications, 1985. 4. Datoglou P. D., On Sovereignty, Athens-Komotini, A. Sakkoulas Publications, 1986. 5. Degas J., The Communist International 1919-1943, Vol. 1, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1956. 6. Derens. J. A., Balkans: Threats for a New Partition, Le Monde Diplomatique, reprinted in the Kiriakatiki Eleftherotypia, October 28, 2001. 7. Driault E., La Question dOrient, Paris, F. Alcan, 1898.

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161 26. Weber M., Essays on Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1948. 27. Zotiades G. B., The Macedonian Question, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1954. 28. Interim Accord (IA) between the Hellenic Republic and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 29. Orchid Framework Agreement, in http://www.sinf.gov.mk./PressRoomEN/2001/07n0815.htm

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