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Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions

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Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey

Filiz Ba kan
a a

Izmir University of Economics, Turkey

Available online: 08 Sep 2010

To cite this article: Filiz Ba kan (2010): Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 11:2, 167-183 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14690764.2010.511458

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Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 11, No. 2, 167183, June 2010

Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey

FILIZ BASKAN*
C S] E [I D L

Izmir University of Economics, Turkey

Original Article 1469-0764 Francis Totalitarian(print)/1743-9647Political Religions 2010 & Francis 11 0 2000002010 10.1080/14690764.2010.511458 Taylor and Movements and (online) FTMP_A_511458.sgm

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ABSTRACT During the post-1980 period, the rise of the Justice and Development Party to power in 2002, increasing visibility of Islamic symbols like the use of the headscarf in the cultural field and the growth of Islamic businesses and markets in the economic field, have all caused anxiety among secular groups in Turkey, concerned that it will lose its economic and social status. This resentment has led to a fierce struggle among secular and religious groups both at state and societal levels. Therefore, during the post-1980 period the struggle between religious and secular actors in Turkey has turned into a struggle between two rival middle classes. This article examines the influence of globalisation on both religious and secular groups and concludes that the Islamic middle class has benefited from globalisation to increase its influence in the social, economic and political realms. However, upon the growing visibility of Islamic actors, the secular middle class feel that they will lose their secular lifestyle so they have tried to demonstrate their determination to defend it.

KEY WORDS: Turkey; Justice and Development Party; globalisation; secular groups; religious groups

Religious vs Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey During the post-1980 period, we have observed significant changes in state society relations, and statereligion arrangements due to the increasing pace of globalisation in Turkey. Although Turkey is the only Muslim country that has retained a secular state structure since its foundation in 1923, it is important to stress that secularisation has not been a smooth process; there have always been struggles and contests between secular groups and religious groups over the nature of the political system. The nature of this contestation has changed significantly during the post-1980 period as Turkey adopted a market-oriented instead of a state-dominated economic model. Religious groups, especially the conservative business community, have begun to integrate into international markets thanks to the economic liberalisation associated with globalisation. As they have begun to take a greater share of the
*Email: filiz.baskan@ieu.edu.tr
ISSN 1469-0764 Print/ISSN 1743-9647 Online/10/020167-17 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14690764.2010.511458

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countrys economic cake, they have adopted new consumption patterns. In addition, they have adopted a moderate discourse since they would have much to lose in a conflict with the secular establishment and the state elite. In addition, since 2002, they have been represented at a political level by the conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (AKP)), which was established as an offspring of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi hereinafter Refah) but with a more moderate rhetoric. It can be claimed that the conservative business community has been a driving force in the moderation of the AKP. Meanwhile, secular groups have become angry about the growing visibility of religious groups in economic, political and social spheres. This resentment has led to a fierce struggle between secular and religious groups, both at state and societal levels. At state level, the secular public bureaucracy is trying to protect the secular nature of the Turkish Republic by monitoring the AKPs activities. At a societal level, we have observed a growing polarisation between secular and conservative circles in recent years. The aim of this article is to examine the influence of globalisation both on religious and secular groups, on statesociety relations and statereligion arrangements in Turkey. In doing so, I will try to answer the following questions: how do religious groups utilise globalisation to gain both economic and political power? How do secular groups struggle to preserve the secular nature of statesociety relations in Turkey against the growing prominence of religious groups? Before going into the detail of the struggle between Islamic and secular actors during the post-1980 period, the next section will briefly consider secularisation theory, which appears to have been falsified by the worldwide rise of religious movements during the second half of the twentieth century. The article will then describe Turkish secularisation before discussing how globalisation has changed the consumption patterns of both Islamic and secular groups. Secularisation and Globalisation According to secularisation theory, modernisation leads to a decline in religions role in the public realm, with it turning into a matter for the private sphere. Instead, however, the contemporary world has witnessed a resurgence of religion with the emergence of religious movements throughout the world. For this reason, Berger argues that the secularisation theory has been falsified.1 To put it differently, for Berger, the contemporary world (except western European countries) is religious, rather than a secularised environment.2 However, this pattern is not uniform. In a comparative study on secularisation, Norris and Inglehart maintain that in advanced industrial societies which provide the basic conditions of human security, like those found in western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Canada, people have more secular orientations, whereas in poorer and more vulnerable countries people tend to have more religious views.3 The challenge to secularisation theory is also reflected in the secularisation process of the Turkish Republic since its foundation. Like the modernising elite of
1 P.L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 118. 2 Ibid., p. 9. 3 P. Norris and R. Ingelhart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey 169 the late Ottoman Empire, the founders of the republic viewed Islam and Islamic institutions as major obstacles to progress. For this reason, the Kemalist4 elite were very sensitive about the issue of Islam and initiated radical secular reforms as soon as they came to power with the intention of transferring Islam into the private sphere. A list of reforms undertaken during the early republican period reveals a radical transformation of Turkish society from an Islamic to a western orientation. However, instead of adopting the ideal meaning of secularism, i.e. the separation of religion and the state, religion in Turkey was put under state control by controlling and limiting religious education, outlawing tarikats5 and replacing religious laws with secular ones.6 Therefore, we can claim that, like other countries, secularisation in Turkey was initiated as an elite-driven, coercively achieved, ideological project.7 In other words, it did not have a popular support. As a result, despite the exaggerated emphasis on secularism as the symbol of Kemalist spirit, Islam has remained a significant force in social and political life: it has served the function of integrating the individual into the larger social system. In other words, Islam is a significant force in social life as a symbolic system forming the basis of both individual and community identity. Political parties with an Islamist agenda began to emerge in the Turkish political scene in the 1970s, which led the state elite to reiterate that they consider themselves as guardians of secularism and a secular lifestyle against the threat, as they see it, of Islamist parties. During the post-1980 period, Turkish secularism has been severely criticised by religious groups. They feel themselves excluded from the secular system and denied state support; now they want not only to take their share of countrys economy but also to make political and social changes too. Secular actors have therefore become suspicious about a perceived hidden agenda of these religious groups,8 and secularism has become a dividing line in Turkish politics with political actors defining themselves in relation to their position regarding secularism. After this brief discussion about secularisation theory and the process of secularisation in Turkey, it is necessary to delineate the struggle between religious and secular actors during the post-1980 period. This struggle has taken place on the ground of struggles between different lifestyles.9 In this period, globalisation has been an important factor that has provided a suitable ground for the growing influence of religious actors in Turkey. That is, the rising pace of globalisation can be considered as the most significant international factor increasing the importance of Islam in Turkish political and economic life. Globalisation has contributed to a change in the role of the state from being an instigator of economic activity to being more a facilitator in an increasingly
Kemalists are the supporters of the ideas and principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatrk who was the founder and first president of the Turkish Republic. Their priorities have changed over time in accordance with changing circumstances but during the post-1980 period their main concern has been to defend the secular nature of the Turkish Republic against the rise of political Islam. 5 Tarikat means a method of moral psychology for the guidance of individuals directing their lives toward a knowledge of God, and refers to an Islamic religious order. The Encyclopedia of Religion, 1987. 6 N.R. Keddie, Secularism and the State: Towards Clarity and Global comparison, New Left Review, 226 (1997), p. 25. 7 K. Tambar, Secular Populism and the Semiotics of the Crowd in Turkey, Public Culture, 21:3 (2009), p. 521. 8 B. Trkmen, Laikligin Dn m: Liseli Genler, Trban ve Atatrk Rozeti, in Nilfer Gle (ed.), s I slamn Yeni Kamusal Yzleri (Istanbul: Metis Yaynlar, 2000), p. 116. 9 Ibid., p. 117.
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pluralist and market-oriented environment. In 1980, Turkey began, with the help of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to adopt the new marketoriented economic model in place of the previous import-substitution model. Within the framework of this liberalisation programme, the government adopted various measures to liberalise Turkeys imports regime and encourage the growth of an export-oriented private sector.10 During the post-1980 period, the liberalisation and global integration of the Turkish economy, the initiation of the Customs Union between the European Union and Turkey, and the emergence of new markets after the fall of Soviet Union all provided new opportunities for Turkish entrepreneurs.11 As a result of all these economic developments, Turkey has experienced the proliferation of foreign brand-name products, the emergence of new spaces for shopping and entertainment, the growth of the advertising industry, and the development of a consumption-oriented urban middle class.12 However, it is not only this middle class that has developed new global luxurious consumption patterns;13 the Islamic middle class has also developed such bourgeois consumption patterns. By examining the role of MS IAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), the next section will analyse how Islamic businesses have grown by utilising globalisation. This will lead to a discussion of the emergence of the Islamic middle class and their new consumption patterns.
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Emergence of Islamic Businesses and the Islamic Middle Class The adoption of an export-oriented economic model instead of an inward-looking model in the 1980s allowed small and medium-sized enterprises of Anatolian cities to grow. MSIAD was founded by a young businessmens group in Istanbul on 5 May 1990 to represent small and medium-sized entrepreneurs with Islamic values as an alternative to TSIAD (the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen) that had been founded in 1971 to represent large industrialists. The founders of MSIAD claimed that up until then the state had preferentially allocated various privileges like investment funds to the large industrialists of big cities represented by TS IAD. MSIAD members believe that it is the close links of these large industrialists with the state, rather than their entrepreneurial abilities, that has been the main factor behind their economic growth, and that they have been an obstacle to the growth of the smaller enterprises represented by MS IAD.14 Consequently, they have felt excluded from an economic life that was dominated by large industrialists with the support of the secular Turkish state.15
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10 S. Gms, Economic Liberalization, Devout Bourgeoisie, and Change in Political Islam: Comparing Turkey and Egypt, EUI Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies Working Papers 19, 2008, p. 3. 11 J.B. White, The Islamist Paradox, in Deniz Kandiyoti and Ay se Saktanber (eds), The Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 196. 12 . Sandk and G. Ger, Constructing and Representing the Islamic Consumer in Turkey, Fashion Theory, 11:23 (2007), p. 192. 13 . Sandk and G. Ger, In-Between Modernities and Postmodernities: Theorizing Turkish Consumptionscape, in Susan Broniarczyk and Kent Nakamoto (eds), Advances in Consumer Research (Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 2002). 14 M. okgezen, New Fragmentations and New Cooperations in the Turkish Bourgeoisie, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 18:5 (2000), p. 538. 15 A. Bugra, Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30:4 (1998), p. 529.
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Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey 171 In 18 years, MSIAD, in addition to Istanbul, has opened up branches in 28 Anatolian cities, and the number of its member firms reached around 3440 in 2008. Regarding the size of member firms, although there are large firms employing thousands of employees, it represents mainly small firms employing less than 50 workers. The majority of MSIAD member firms were established during the late 1980s, parallel to the adoption of neo-liberal policies by the Turkish authorities in the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention.16 At the time of MSIADs establishment, an important problem for these smaller Anatolian enterprises was a lack of information, since their owners were generally not well educated and their staff were not very skilled. This made it very difficult for them to gain information about recent developments in global markets and to participate in international trade fairs. In addition, for small firms the cost of getting information on recent issues was high.17 Thus, MSIAD was not only established to eliminate the difficulties caused by unfair treatment of the state authorities, in the sense of supporting large industrialists rather than smaller and medium-sized enterprises, as stated above.18 It also aimed to solve its members problems regarding information about recent global trends. MSIAD carries out various activities to provide information on technological innovations, marketing, global production and trade patterns for its members.19 For instance, it establishes special commissions and professional committees, organises conferences on certain political and economic issues and arranges international fairs in Turkey and foreign trips to fairs abroad. In addition, in order to help its members to establish business connections with foreign compa nies, MSIAD arranges business trips to foreign countries where it arranges talks among entrepreneurs and meetings with government authorities and higher level officials of public and private sector institutions. Through participating in international fairs and business trips to foreign countries, MSIADs member firms have been able to establish contacts with foreign firms in global markets so that they overcome the restrictions of Turkeys domestic market.20 This has in turn enabled MSIADs members integration into AD, mer Bolat, claims that, since global markets. The third president of MSI the foundation of MSIAD, tradesmen have been turned into small enterprises, and small enterprises have been turned into medium-sized enterprises. With the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies and Turkeys integration into the global market, new consumption patterns emerged during the post-1980 period. As Islamic businessmen became successful in economic life and increased their share in the market, a new Islamic middle class with alternative consumption patterns and an alternative lifestyle came into existence and became more visible in the public sphere. Islamic businessmen created both an alternative market for an Islamic lifestyle21 and a consumer segment that wanted to spend
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Y. Atasoy, Cosmopolitan Islamists in Turkey: Rethinking the Local in a Global Era, Center for Global Political Economy Working Papers, 04-03, January 2004, p. 21; okgezen, op. cit., p. 537. 17 okgezen, op. cit., p. 541. 18 Bugra, Class, Culture, and State, op. cit., pp. 524525. 19 Atasoy, op. cit., pp. 2223. 20 okgezen, op. cit., p. 540. 21 Y. Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities: Secularism, Islamism, Commodities, in Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayse Saktanber (eds), The Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 224.
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money in this market.22 Thus, it can be argued that the secular and Islamic middle classes are connected to the same consumption market and that Islamists are as active as secularists in the making and shaping of this market.23 Islamic businessmen differentiate themselves from secular businessmen by doing business in accordance with the prescriptions of Islam (for example, they are reluctant to profit from lending money, which is forbidden in Islam) on the one hand, while following the logic of contemporary capitalism on the other. Navro-Yashin gives the example of Tekbir (an Islamic clothing company), whose owner closely followed the waves of fashion, as produced and reproduced by Turkeys secular clothing companies, sought after in Europe. He aspired to no less a worldwide prestige or personal capital than those companies, and he shared their modern capitalist practice and outlook.24 The headscarved university students have also contributed to the increasing visibility of Islamic actors in public sphere. According to the present dress code in Turkey, women wearing headscarves are not allowed in state offices and universities. Consequently, a number of female university students have not been allowed into universities, which has caused several protests nationwide and increased the exposure of Islamic actors to the public. The secular middle class has identified the headscarf with backwardness, rural origin, and an uncivilized lifestyle.25 However, the headscarf, together with the long coat, is also viewed as an emblem of political Islam.26 As new Islamic clothing products have emerged in the market, the large headscarf and long coat have began to be used even by poor women living in squatter areas.27 The rise of the AKP to power in 2002 has increased the visibility of this new Islamic middle class, revealing that a bourgeois lifestyle is not peculiar to secular groups in Turkish society; Islamists too have a bourgeois lifestyle.28 Sociologist Nur Vergin maintains that Islamists are no longer hiding their religious dispositions; being wealthy has increased their self-confidence, and as a result, the Islamic way of life has become more visible.29 Following this increase in their income, the Islamic middle class want to spend money and live like their secular counterparts, so new products have appeared to satisfy these Islamic consumption preferences. For example, the Islamic middle class have begun to take summer vacations in hotels respecting Islamic rules.30 The first such hotel opened on the Aegean coast in 1996 for Islamic guests wanting to have separate swimming pools and beaches for men and women.31 Islamists also preferentially patronise restaurants and cafes that do not serve alcoholic beverages.32 They attend Islamic fashion shows.33 The Islamic middle class are decorating their
Sandk and Ger, Constructing and Representing the Islamic Consumer, op. cit., p. 194. Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities, op. cit., p. 249. 24 Ibid., p. 236. 25 J.B. White, The Ebbing Power of Turkeys Secularist Elite, Current History (2007), pp. 427428. 26 Sandk and Ger, Constructing and Representing the Islamic Consumer, op. cit., p. 192. 27 Ibid., p. 195. 28 Milliyet, 5 October 2003. 29 Ibid. 30 N. Gle, The Gendered Nature of the Public Sphere, Public Culture 10:1 (1997), pp. 6181. 31 Sandk and Ger, In-Between Modernities and Postmodernities, op. cit. 32 U. Kmeoglu, New Sociabilities: Islamic Cafes in Istanbul, in Nilfer Gle and Ludwig Amman (eds), Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran and Europe (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2006), pp. 163191. 33 Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities (op, cit.).
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Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey 173 homes using an interior designer, asking for bathrooms with faucets encrusted with gold or Swarovski crystal, or a swimming pool in the bedroom.34 They are driving luxury cars like jeeps.35 They are living in villas within gated communities.36 However, these new consumption practices of Islamic middle class are different from the secular middle class so that they can identify themselves as such by buying and using things distinct from those used by secularists.37 By means of different consumption patterns, the Islamic middle class differentiate themselves both from secular groups and from other segments of Turkeys Islamic community. For instance, a multitude of styles of clothing and ways of tying variously shaped and sized headscarves have developed as markers of taste, difference, and social position among the Islamic middle classes.38 Klbay and Binark maintain that middle class headscarved women wear headscarves and overcoats with new designs in order to be different from other female members of their Islamic community and from the rest of the society.39 Nevertheless, despite their attempts to differentiate themselves from secular groups, the consumption patterns of the Islamic middle class are becoming more and more similar to the lifestyle of the secular middle class.40 Ironically, there is also a widespread belief that a luxurious lifestyle is incompatible with Islam. The luxurious lifestyle of the Islamic middle class is not approved of by secular groups in Turkey. They criticise, for instance, companies that are organising fashion shows, claiming that they are exploiting religion to increase their revenue.41 The increasing visibility of an Islamic lifestyle is leading to divisions within the Islamic community too.42 First, radical Islamists are against this visibility since they believe that Islamism requires modesty and censorship in the public presentation of the self.43 Islamist intellectuals criticise the adoption of a western lifestyle by the Islamic middle class (like vacationing in five-star hotels offering services in accordance with Islamic rules or fashion shows of Islamic clothing companies) on the grounds that these new consumption practices are indications of conformism to a capitalist system that aims to motivate people to increase consumption.44 For instance, for journalist Cihan Aktas, Islamic fashion means the surrender of the religion and its practices to the capitalist consumption culture in which headscarved women become consumers in the capitalist system.45 However, Erol Yarar, the founding president of MSIAD,
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Yeni Aktel, vol. 174. D. Gksu and H. Demirel, Atlas ve ul: Zenginligin Dikotomisi ve Islami Sosyete, Birikim, 232233 (2008), p. 97. 36 Ak sam, 8 February 2009. 37 Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities (op, cit.), p. 248. 38 Sandk and Ger, Constructing and Representing the Islamic Consumer, op. cit., p. 195. 39 B. Klbay and M. Binark, Consumer Culture, Islam and the Politics of Lifestyle: Fashion for Veiling in Contemporary Turkey, European Journal of Communication, 17:4 (2002), p. 507. 40 P.A. Binnet and .D. Ba kr, Fashioning the Muslim Body: Modernizing Closure through Politicizing s and Globalizing Muslim Industries in Turkey, paper presented at 50th ISA Annual Convention, New York, 1518 February 2009. Interview with zlem Madi, a researcher on Islamic economy, Ak sam, 8 February 2009. 41 Sandk and Ger, Constructing and Representing the Islamic Consumer, op. cit., p. 196. 42 Milliyet, 5 October 2003. 43 Gle, op. cit., p. 75. 44 Gle, op. cit., p. 77; Sandk and Ger, Constructing and Representing the Islamic Consumer, op. cit., p. 195. 45 Aktas (1995), p. 194, mentioned in Klbay and Binark, op. cit., p. 502.
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states that he does not believe in mystical frugality, as the mystical motto, associated with Islam, one mouthful of food, one short coat proposes. He argues that Islamic people do not have to live as if they were poor when they generate wealth.46 Having considered the emergence of Islamic businesses and the Islamic middle class and their new consumption patterns, we can turn to the emergence of new Islamist political parties representing this Islamic middle class in the political realm. From the National Salvation Party to the AKP The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), founded on 26 January 1970, was the first Islamist party in republican history. However, the Constitutional Court dissolved the party on 20 May 1971 because it was found guilty of trying to establish a theocratic order in Turkey. In 1972, soon after the dissolution of the MNP, its leaders established the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) to take its place. Following the 1980 military intervention, the MSP was banned, together with all other political parties. Both the MNP and the MSP supported the interests of small and medium-sized enterprises who had been demanding state protection47 and their due share of the expanding economic cake.48 Following the militarys decision to transfer political power to civilian politicians in 1983, the MSPs former leaders founded the Refah Party.49 Refah won 7.2 per cent of the popular vote in the 1987 general elections, but did not gain any seats in the Parliament because of the 10 per cent threshold barrier. Therefore, before the 1991 general elections, Refah formed an alliance with the Nationalist Labor Party and the Reformist Democracy Party to be able to pass the electoral threshold. This alliance got 16.9% of the total vote and gained 62 seats in the Parliament, coming fourth, both in terms of seats gained in the Parliament and its vote.50 In the 1980s, like its predecessors, Refah put the interests of small and mediumsized capital at the centre of Turkish politics. The 1990s saw Refahs rise to power. In the 1994 municipal elections, the party gained 28 municipalities, including the metropolitan municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara. In the 1995 general elections, Refah came first both in terms of its vote and seats gained in the parliament, winning 21.3 per cent of the total votes and 158 seats out of 550 in the parliament. It subsequently formed a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi, DYP), and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, became prime minister for the first two years of the coalition. Bugra claims that the main reason behind Refahs electoral successes lay in its ability to mobilize different segments of the population, ranging from the newly emerging entrepreneurs, Islamic intellectuals and professionals to the marginalised masses, especially in big
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Star, 20 July 2009. H. Glalp, Globalization and Political Islam: the Social Bases of Turkeys Welfare Party, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33:3 (2001), p. 438. 48 I. Sunar and B. Toprak, Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey, Government and Opposition, 18:4 (1983), p. 438. 49 B. Toprak, The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds), State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988), p. 128. 50 T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu, Milletvekili Genel Secim Sonuclari: 20 October 1991 (Ankara: Basbakanlik Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu, 1992).
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Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey 175 cities.51 In this sense, it can be claimed that MS IAD members held a significant place among Refahs constituents, and they expected, accordingly, to gain access to state resources through these new political connections.52 However, Refah did not stay in power for long. Because of the policies of the coalition government and some speeches by various Refah deputies, the party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court on16 January 1998 on the grounds that the party acted against the principles of the secular republic.53 In addition, its leader and five deputies and a mayor were banned from active politics for five years because they were found guilty of provocative speeches and attitudes that were in conflict with the secular and democratic principles of the Republic.54 Just before the dissolution of Refah, its members founded the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) on 17 December 1997, but its ideology was much more moderate than that of Refah.55 This led to a split between the reformist and the traditionalist faction of the FP over the new partys ideology. Despite its moderate rhetoric, the FP was banned by the Constitutional Court on 22 June 2001 for acting against the principles of the secular republic. After the dissolution of the party, the reformist and the traditionalist factions established two different parties. The traditionalist wing founded the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) on 20 July 2001 under the leadership of Recai Kutan, while the AKP was set up by the reformist wing on 14 August 2001. In this regard, small and medium-sized enterprises played a key role in the AKPs emergence as a centre-right party. As mentioned earlier, small and medium-sized enterprises were traditionally supporters of Refah, which defended state interventionism, social justice and redistribution. During the 1990s, these small entrepreneurs began to utilise the increasing pace of globalisation through starting business activities in international markets. In order to be able to preserve their place in the Turkish economic system, they tried to keep their distance from Islamist movements and brought their political preferences into line with more moderate political movements defending economic liberalism and democracy.56 Therefore, the support of this Islamic business community has been essential for the moderation of the AKP since they have a lot to lose from
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Bugra, Labour, Capital, and Religion: Harmony and Conflict among the Constituency of Political Islam in Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, 38:2 (2002), p. 189. 52 okgezen, op. cit., p. 539. 53 See A. Gney and F. Ba kan, Party Dissolutions and Democratic Consolidation: The Turkish Case, s South European Society and Politics, 13:3 (2008). 54 For instance, on 13 April 1994, Erbakan asked Refahs representatives in the Parliament to consider whether the change in the social order which the party sought would be peaceful or violent and would be achieved harmoniously or by bloodshed. In another speech on 13 January 1991 in Sivas, Erbakan called on Muslims to join Refah, saying that only his party could establish the supremacy of the Koran through a holy war (jihad) and that Muslims should therefore make donations to Refah rather than distributing alms to third parties. Sevki Ylmaz, a Refah deputy, in public speeches in 1994 said: Our mission is not to talk but to implement the war plan as a soldier in the army, The question Allah [God] will ask you is this: Why, in the time of the blasphemous regime, did you not work for the construction of an Islamic State? 55 Z. ni , Political Islam at the Crossroads: from Hegemony to Co-existence, Contemporary Politics, 7:4 s (2001), p. 287. 56 F. Ba kan, Political Involvement of the Rising Islamist Business Elite in Turkey, paper presented at s the Tenth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence and Montecatini Terme, 2528 March 2009, organised by the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Florence.
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open confrontation with the secular establishment and the state elites.57 In addition, they wished to support a political party that favoured a free-market economy rather than state interventionism.58 Consequently, they provided the AKP with financial and human resources. The AKP leaders noted how Refah had been able to win enough votes and parliamentary seats to participate in a coalition government, making an Islamist party a potential party of power for the first time in republican history. The AKP leaders consequently moderated their rhetoric in order to establish a centre-right party able to embrace all Turkish society and take power.59 In the 2002 general elections, the AKP achieved a dramatic victory by obtaining 34.3% of the votes and 365 seats out of 550 in the parliament, whereas the SP won only a marginal share of the vote: 2.5 per cent. Significantly, following the elec tions, the AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that the AKP was not a religiously oriented party in order to remove the doubts about the partys Islamist background. In contrast to its predecessors (MNP, MSP, Refah and finally FP), the AKPs rhetoric was moderate from the start. Unlike Refah, which was against Turkeys European Union (EU) membership, the AKP became an ardent supporter of Turkeys EU membership bid as soon as it came to power.60 Accordingly, the AKP government has introduced the democratisation reforms in order to meet the EU criteria. In this sense, the AKP has tried to form a political identity for itself based on the notion of conservative democracy.61 In other words, the party defined itself as a conservative democratic party that promotes a free market economy with minimal state intervention in the economic realm, democratisation and liberalisation in political life, and conservatism in social life.62 Many scholars of Turkish politics therefore maintain that the AKP is not an Islamist party but a centre-right party.63 Heper, for example, notes that since its inception, the AKP has displayed stronger pro-system features than its predecessors64 and Ylmaz defines the AKP as [primarily] a conservative political party made up of members who have strong Islamic feeling.65 Thus, we can claim that both the performance of the AKP governments since 200266 and party discourse strongly suggest that the AKP is different from its predecessors. Nevertheless, the AKP is still suspected of
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Z. ni , The Political Economy of Turkeys Justice and Development Party, in Hakan M. Yavuz (ed.), s The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 212. 58 s S. Gm and D. Sert, The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, Middle Eastern Studies, 45:6 (2009), p. 963. 59 s Gney and Ba kan, op. cit., p. 276. 60 I.N. Grigoriadis, Islam and Democratization in Turkey: Secularism and Trust in a Divided Society, Democratization, 16:6 (2009), p. 1199. 61 Y. Akdogan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi (Ankara: Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, 2003). 62 s Gm and Sert, op. cit., p. 957. 63 s S. Co ar and A. zman, Centre-right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General Election: s Neo-liberalism with a Muslim Face, Contemporary Politics, 10:1 (2004), pp. 6768; ni , op. cit.; E. zbudun, From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, South European Society and Politics, 11:34 (2006); E. Kalaycoglu, Politics of Conservas tism in Turkey, Turkish Studies, 8:2 (2007); F. Keyman and Z. ni , Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery: Paradoxes of the Turkish Experience, Globalizations, 4:2 (2007). 64 M. Heper, The Victory of the Justice and Development Party, Mediterranean Politics, 8:1 (2003), p. 131. 65 N. Ylmaz, Islamclk, AKP, Siyaset, in Modern Trkiyede Siyasi D snce, Cilt 6: I slamclk ( Istanbul: s Ileti im Yaynlar, 2004), p. 617. 66 s Gm and Sert, op. cit., p. 959.
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Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey 177 harboring a secret agenda to impose Islamic law, and is therefore seen as posing a threat to the westernised lifestyle championed by the republics founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, and guaranteed by the military, which sees itself as the guardian of Atatrks vision.67 The fierceness of this suspicion reached its peak in spring 2007. The term of the tenth President of the Republic of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, had come to an end in May 2007. The AKP, having a majority in parliament, could choose some one from its own ranks as the eleventh president, so on 24 April 2007 Erdogan announced that the AKPs candidate was the then minister of foreign affairs, Abdullah Gl. Secular groups, including the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), mainstream media and civil societal organisations objected to the candidacy on the grounds that it prepared for the abolition of secularism and the very principles of the Republic.68 For them, Gls presidency meant the defeat of secular groups by the AKP. On 27 April 2007, parliament voted to elect Gl as the new president but the CHP and other parties boycotted the election, so there were only 361 deputies in parliament.69 Then the CHP petitioned the Constitutional Court, arguing that this election was illegal since there were fewer than 367 deputies, two-thirds of members of parliament, present in the first round of the presidential election. That same evening, the militarys general staff posted a memorandum on its website that has come to be called an e-coup, listing some events that were perceived as threats to the secular nature of the republic. It was stated that upon such events the Turkish military would not remain indifferent to such a development.70 The Constitutional Court then declared that 367 deputies must be present in parliament for the election of a president. It was a highly disputed decision since the constitution just stated that in the first two rounds of the presidential election, two-thirds of deputies must vote for a candidate to be elected as a president.71 The Court interpreted this article as meaning that a quorum of 367 was necessary for electing the president. Therefore, since parliament could not elect a new president because of the boycott of the CHP, early elections must be held. In the elections held in 2007, the AKP dramatically increased its vote, winning 46.5 per cent of the total votes and 341 seats out of 550 in the parliament. This was a significant event because, for the first time in 53 years, a ruling party won an election victory with an increased number of votes in Turkey. After the elections, parliament duly elected Gl as the eleventh president of the Turkish Republic. On 9 February 2008, the AKP made two legislative amendments with the support of the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (Milliyeti Hareket Partisi, MHP), to lift the headscarf ban in universities:
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The amendment to Article 10 includes that the state has to respect the equality of all citizens when receiving public services. The second amendment to Article 41 states that, no one can be denied his/her

67 68

White, The Ebbing Power of Turkeys Secularist Elite, op. cit., p. 428. Grigoriadis, Islam and Democratization in Turkey, op. cit., p. 1204. 69 G. Back, The Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, July 2007, Electoral Studies, 27:2 (2008), p. 378. 70 Grigoriadis, Islam and Democratization in Turkey, op. cit., pp. 12041205. 71 After the 2007 general elections, this article of the constitution was amended for the election of president by popular vote for a five-year term and a referendum was held to approve this amendment in Fall 2007. Since then the president has been elected by popular vote.

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These amendments led to a fierce debate about the AKPs alleged hidden agenda of establishing a Sharia-based state,73 with the opposition CHP immediately asking the Constitutional Court to annul the amendments. Meanwhile, on 14 March 2008, the Chief Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals appealed to the Constitutional Court to dissolve the AKP on the grounds that it had become a centre of activities contrary to the principles of secularism, and to ban 71 of its members from seeking elected office for five years. The main evidence in this case was the above-mentioned two constitutional amendments introduced by the AKP and the MHP.74 The Constitutional Court cancelled the amendments on 5 June 2008 on the grounds that they violated the Constitutions secular principles. However, on 30 July 2008, the Constitutional Court narrowly decided not to dissolve the AKP. Six members of the Court voted for closure of the party, while four of them voted for depriving the party of the financial assistance of the Treasury instead of its dissolution.75 Accordingly, the AKP was deprived of half of its previous level of state assistance. Having discussed the growing influence of Islamic actors in the economic, political and cultural realms, we turn now to the struggle of secular groups to keep their space intact as a reaction to this growing influence of Islamic groups. Atatrk Imagery Following the victories of the Islamist Refah in the 1994 municipal elections and 1995 general elections, rapid growth of Islamist business activities since the beginning of the 1980s and growing visibility of the Islamist middle class through distinct consumption patterns, secular groups in Turkey have started to feel that secularism and the secular lifestyle are under threat. In addition, they believe that they are losing their dominant economic, political and social position. In order to demonstrate their commitment to Atatrk and determination to defend secularism, the secular middle class began to purchase and use Atatrk imagery.76 Following Refahs electoral victories in 1994 and 1995, citizens could buy many items with Atatrks image on them.77 For example, state employees, school teachers, working women, business women and men started to wear Atatrk lapel pins.78 Many high school students started to wear an Atatrk pin as a symbol of defending their secular and westernised lifestyle. For them, the Atatrk pin was a sign of secular and modern identities that had developed as a reaction to the spread of Islamist ways of thinking.79
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E. elik Wiltse, The Gordian Knot of Turkish Politics: Regulating Headscarf Use in Public, South European Society and Politics, 13:2 (2008), pp. 205206. 73 Gm and Sert, op. cit., p. 960. s 74 Gney and Ba kan, op. cit., p. 271. s 75 Seven of the 11 members of the Constitutional Court have to vote for a partys dissolution. 76 E. zyrek, Miniaturizing Atatrk: Privatization of State Imagery and Ideology in Turkey, American Ethnologist, 31:3 (2004), pp. 375379. 77 Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities (op, cit.), p. 229. 78 J.B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002), p. 55; Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities (op, cit.), p. 229; zyrek, op. cit., p. 378. 79 Trkmen, op. cit., pp. 125126.
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Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey 179 The secular middle class purchased pictures of Atatrk and displayed them in their homes and work places.80 These pictures of Atatrk depict the leader not as a soldier or a state leader but as a westernised, urban bourgeois who enjoyed simple but highly marked pleasures, such as wearing European-designed outfits, eating food at a table rather than seated on the floor, drinking alcohol, and being in the company of unveiled, stylish women.81 In other words, these pictures reveal Atatrks westernised, secular and bourgeois lifestyle that these people believed must be adopted and protected.82 Not only individuals, but also some companies also wanted to show their reaction to Refah through displaying Atatrks pictures in their companies. For instance, after the municipal elections of 1994, and before the 1995 general elections in December 1995, the entrance corridor of Akmerkez83 looked different. Behind a glossy glass curtain were lined up black-and-white portraits of Atatrk, enlarged to four times life size.84 In further reaction to this growing visibility of Islamic actors in political, economic and cultural fields, state institutions increased the number of statues, busts and portraits of Atatrk in the public sphere.85 In 1994, private companies too wanted to have Atatrk statues in order to show their commitment to defend secular lifestyle.86 All these examples of the privatisation and commercialisation of Atatrk imagery suggest that individuals were voluntarily starting to defend secularism.87 Secularism, which is strongly identified with state institutions, now appeared to have a popular support base in Turkey.88 Since the second half of the 1990s privatisation of not only Atatrk imagery but also of Republic Day (29 October) celebrations, which commemorate the declaration Turkish Republic by Atatrk on 29 October 1923, emerged. Until 1994, the celebrations were organised by state institutions in forms such as a disciplined school ceremony, an annual ritual of the military, a boring old program on state TV, an obligatory ceremony organized by municipalities and attended by state employees.89 However, in the mid-1990s, due to the rise of political Islam, Republic Day celebrations were taken over by civil society organisations to provide popular excitement so that they could demonstrate popular support for the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. As a result, they have turned into a festival through celebrating the event in city centres rather than stadiums.90 Municipalities even started to organise outdoor concerts with popular singers to appeal to the masses. In addition, many Turkish citizens began to hang Turkish flags on their balconies to demonstrate their participation in Republic Day celebrations.

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zyrek, op. cit., pp. 375378; Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities (op, cit.), p. 229; White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey, op. cit., p. 55. 81 zyrek, op. cit., p. 375. 82 zyrek, op. cit., p. 385. 83 It is a shopping mall of the middle and upper classes, located in Etiler, Istanbul. 84 Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities (op, cit.), p. 233. 85 zyrek, op. cit., p. 378. 86 Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities (op, cit.), p. 230. 87 zyrek, op. cit., p. 388. 88 Tambar, op. cit., p. 524. 89 Y. Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State:Secularism and Public Life in Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 146. 90 E. zyrek, Modernlik Nostaljisi: Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Gndelik Hayatta Siyaset (Istanbul: Bogazii niversitesi yaynevi, 2007), p. 184.
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Republic Rallies In April-May 2007, secular organisations organised demonstrations in major cities in order to try to prevent the election of Abdullah Gl, whose wife is headscarved, as the next president. Because the presidency is the highest national post, the prospect of a candidate with an Islamist background deeply disturbed secular groups in Turkey. These demonstrations were called republic rallies. The first demonstration was held in Tandogan Square in Ankara near Antkabir, the monumental mausoleum of Atatrk, on 14 April 2007. On 29 April nearly 1 million people gathered in Caglayan Square in Istanbul. This was followed by other such demonstrations in Manisa and anakkale on 5 May, in Izmir on 13 May, in Samsun on 20 May and in Denizli on 26 May. They were organised by the Association for Atatrkist Thought (Atatrk Dsnce Dernegi) and gathered large crowds with the support of the CHP, the Democratic Left Party, the Independent Republican Party, the Workers Party and major universities.91 The military also took part in these demonstrations.92 The slogan of the organisers was Lay claim to your republic. The participants adopted various slogans, such as Turkey is secular, and it will remain secular, We dont want an imam as president and The path to the presidential palace is closed to Sharia.93 Regarding the social basis of these demonstrations, it has been claimed that both the organisers and the millions of participants represented the secular middle class who felt under threat due to the AKPs rise to power and the employment of conservative people in state institutions.94 They think that, during its rule, the AKP is steadily taking over important positions in the bureaucracy and that political power is passing into the hands of Islamic groups.95 The secular middle class believe that the AKP, representing the Islamic middle class, has a hidden agenda of establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. They felt that electing Abdullah Gl as the next president captured the highest position at state level.96 This was an upset to secular Turkish people in general and to the secular middle class in particular. The basic reason for the anxiety of the secular middle class is related to the fear of losing its economic and political power. According to Can Paker, Chairman of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, Turkeys secular middle class has not been ready to share economic and political power.97 The rise of the AKP to power in 2002, increasing visibility of Islamic symbols like the use of the headscarf in the cultural field, and the growth of Islamic businesses and markets in the economic field, have all intensified the fears of the secular middle class in Turkey, concerned that it will lose its economic and social status. The process of shrinking the social security system due to neo-liberal restructuring, and the erosion of social solidarity networks have made the life of the lower and middle classes difficult in Turkey; they feel an intensified threat. However, the middle class feel this threat more sharply than the lower classes
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A. Uysal, Siyasi partiler ve mitingler: 2007 Cumhuriyet ve Seim mitingleri, in Trkiyede Neo Liberalizm, Demokrasi ve Ulus Devlet ( Istanbul:Yordam, 2009). 92 Tambar, op. cit., p. 527. 93 Tambar, op. cit., p. 525. 94 Grigoriadis, Islam and Democratization in Turkey, op. cit., p. 1204. 95 Grigoriadis, Islam and Democratization in Turkey, op. cit., p. 1206. 96 S. Tavernise, 30 April 2007. 97 S. Tavernise, 26 December 2008.
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Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey 181 since they think that they have more to lose.98 Until the 1990s, the secular middle class retained dominant positions in the bureaucracy, in the business sector, in universities and in the media. However, since the beginning of the 1990s these positions have been increasingly filled by the Islamic or conservative middle class, deepening the sense of threat felt by the secular middle class.99 In other words, the anxiety of the secular middle class towards the entry of the Islamic middle class into positions previously held by them has been intensified due to the decline of the state-sponsored social security system. Another component of these secular middle class anxieties is related to the maintenance of their lifestyle.100 They fear that sexual equality, as well as drinking alcohol and wearing miniskirts, could eventually be in danger.101 The lifestyle of the secular middle class is consumption-oriented; as a prominent sociologist, Sencer Ayata, argues, the secular middle class have become familiar with new consumption patterns through television, books, magazines and their trips abroad. These new consumption practices are based on individual freedoms, in other words, of living and consuming as they wish. In recent years, however, under the AKP rule, they have begun to fear losing these freedoms.102 Furthermore, they believe that, as Islamic groups increase their social and political power, they may impose a religious lifestyle upon secular groups.103 Thus, it can be claimed that they fear their ontological security is under threat. While some scholars maintain that this fear is groundless,104 it did have a significant impact on the attitudes of a sizeable part of the Turkish people.105 In addition, on December 2008, a report, Being Different in Turkey: Alienation on the Axis of Religion and Conservatism, was published that provides evidence of this fear. It was prepared under the leadership of political scientist Binnaz Toprak, and based on in-depth interviews with 401 people in 12 major cities of Turkey. The report concludes that there is widespread discrimination and pressure on Alevis, women, non-Muslims and Kurdish people. For example, people who do not fast during Ramadan feel under pressure to conform.106 For Toprak, despite the fact that there is no direct relationship between the findings of this research and the policies of ruling AKP, the activities of Islamic communities and the policies of state personnel appointed by the AKP government cause anxiety among secular groups about the future of Turkey.107 Regarding the republican rallies, the high level of participation in these demonstrations suggests that secularism, which has previously tended to be identified with state institutions, now has a popular support base.108 In other words, the participants of these demonstrations generated the idea that secularists constituted not a political cadre of the ruling elite, as has long been claimed, but the
98

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T. Bora, Tahsilli Cehaletin Cinneti, Birikim 211 (2006). Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 S. Tavernise, 25 April 2007. 102 Milliyet, 21 May 2007. 103 White (op. cit.9), p. 58; S. Tavernise, 25 April, 2007. 104 S. Tavernise, 30 April, 2007. 105 Grigoriadis, Islam and Democratization in Turkey, op. cit., p. 1206. 106 s B. Toprak, Trkiyede Farkl Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlk Ekseninde tekile tirilenler ( Istanbul: Metis Yaynlar, 2009). 107 Ibid, p. 23. 108 Tambar, op. cit., p. 524.
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people.109 However, the AKP leader Erdogan denied that the demonstrations had such a popular base by claiming that the participants were not a spontaneous crowd but were rather organised and dispatched to the demonstrations (bindirilmis ktalar) by opposition parties, so these demonstrations did not have a genuine popular base.110 It can be maintained that these demonstrations were the culmination of events that began after Refahs electoral victories in 1994 and 1995. The widespread use of Atatrk imagery and the celebration of Republic Day by civil societal organisations have increased the capacity of secular groups to come together and react to recent developments that they do not approve of.111
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Conclusion During the post-1980 period, the liberalisation and global integration of the Turkish economy, the initiation of the Customs Union between the European Union and Turkey, and the emergence of new markets after the fall of Soviet Union all provided new opportunities for Turkish entrepreneurs. In addition, the increasing pace of globalisation has led to the emergence of new consumption spaces like shopping malls, which have supplied foreign brand-name products. As a result, the middle class has developed new global luxurious consumption patterns. However, the Islamic middle class has also developed such bourgeois consumption patterns. That is why, during the post-1980 period, the struggle between religious and secular actors in Turkey has turned into a struggle between two rival middle classes. Since the foundation of the republic, secular actors have held a dominant position in the economic, political and social fields, despite the resistance of Islamic groups. However, during the post-1980 period, the liberalisation of the Turkish economy, together with the process of globalisation, has provided a fertile ground for Islamic groups to increase their influence in the social, economic and political realms. During the post-1980 period, especially in the 1990s, Islamic businessmen have become successful in generating wealth through their integration into global markets; the Islamic middle class has developed new bourgeois consumption patterns and become more visible in the public sphere; and the Islamist party Refah rose to power in 1995. As a reaction to the growing influence of the Islamic middle class, secular actors in general, and the secular middle class in particular, began to purchase and use Atatrk imagery in order to show their commitment to Atatrk and their determination to defend secularism; they started to celebrate the Republic Day with greater enthusiasm; and in April-May 2007, they organised popular demonstrations known as the republic rallies in major cities in order to prevent the election of Abdullah Gl as the next president. There are two major reasons behind these reactions of the secular middle class. First, they worry about losing their economic and social status due to economic development and the growing visibility of the Islamic middle class. Second, they feel that, as the Islamic groups increase their social and political power, they will lose their secular lifestyle.

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Tambar, op. cit., p. 526. NTV-MSNBC 2007, cited in Tambar, op. cit., p. 526. 111 Tambar, op. cit., p. 533.

Religious versus Secular Groups in the Age of Globalisation in Turkey 183 In conclusion as the Islamic middle class has begun to integrate themselves into both the Turkish national economy and the global economic system, and accumulated wealth, they have transformed their political preferences into a more moderate form. Meanwhile, the secular middle class have found themselves in a difficult position as they are not as successful as their Islamic counterpart in utilising globalisation. Since they are unable to prevent the growing influence of the Islamic middle class, they chose to demostarte their determination to defend the secular nature of Turkish Republic. Notes on Contributor Filiz Baskan is associate professor of political science in the Department of International Relations and the European Union, Izmir University of Economics. She was formerly a Jean Monnet Research Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, Florence (20001). She has published in Turkish Studies, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, International Journal of Turkish Studies, South European Society and Politics, and in several edited volumes.
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