Privileged Access Manager Faq

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager
Frequently Asked Questions

2014 Hitachi ID Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Contents
1 What business problems does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager address? 1
2 How does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager work? 1
3 How often does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager change passwords? 2
4 How do we control who can sign into which privileged accounts? 2
5 How do we grant someone temporary or one-time access to a privileged account? 3
6 Can we congure a "two keys to launch" scenario for super-sensitive systems? 4
7 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager manage password changes to Windows service
accounts? 4
8 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager randomize passwords on ....? 6
9 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager launch an administrator login sessions to ....? 8
10 What happens when an administrator needs to sign into the physical console of a server? 9
11 Which web browsers does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager support? 9
11.1 Basic user interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.2 ActiveX components used to launch login sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager you secure privileged passwords on laptops
(which move around and get disconnected)? 10
13 How can we automate the setup and teardown of thousands of systems on Hitachi ID
Privileged Access Manager? 11
14 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager assign privileges less than full-administrator to
users? 12
15 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager interoperate with sudo on Unix/Linux? 13
16 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager integrate with SIEM systems? 14
17 How does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager defend itself against compromise of sen-
sitive passwords? 14
i
Privileged Access Manager Frequently Asked Questions
18 How do we protect Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager against data loss? 15
19 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager record what users do while signed into adminis-
trator accounts? 15
20 How does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager control access to recorded login sessions
(privacy protection)? 17
2014 Hitachi ID Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager Frequently Asked Questions
1 What business problems does Privileged Access Manager ad-
dress?
Many organizations have insecure processes for managing privileged accounts IDs and passwords on
servers, workstations, applications and network devices with elevated privileges. Inappropriate disclosure
of these passwords would lead to serious security compromise:
Hundreds or thousands of workstations and servers often share the same ID and password. If the
password on one device is compromised, all of the devices that share the credential are compromised.
Where a password is used on many systems or needed by many people, it is difcult to coordinate
password changes. As a result, passwords on privileged accounts are often left unchanged for months
or years, creating an extended window of opportunity for an attacker.
If privileged passwords are rarely changed, when IT staff leave an organization, they retain access to
sensitive systems.
When many people know the password to a given account, it is impossible to reliably connect changes
(or security compromises) to individual users.
2 How does Privileged Access Manager work?
There are several technological approaches to more securely managing privileged passwords:
Approach Pros Cons
1 Eliminate shared passwords entirely and
assign personal administrator-level
accounts to each IT user, on each asset.
Individual accountability
for conguration
changes.
Too many administrator-level
accounts on each system.
2 Create and delete personal
administrator-level accounts for users on
demand.
Individual accountability
for conguration
changes.
Complex integration
between many systems and
the corporate directory.
3 Modify operating systems and
applications to check whether users are
allowed to perform privileged actions, in
real time. Manage access control
policies centrally.
Fine-grained control
over user access.
Too many administrator-level
accounts on each system
plus complex change control
on each system.
4 Use software installed on each device to
periodically change local passwords.
Send a copy of these passwords to a
secure vault, shared by many systems.
Works even in complex,
segmented networks.
Requires software on each
managed system.
5 Software on a central system periodically
pushes new passwords to each device
and keeps copies in a secure vault.
Minimal footprint on
managed systems.
Requires connectivity from a
central application to
managed systems.
2014 Hitachi ID Systems, Inc.. All rights reserved. 1
3 How often does Privileged Access Manager change passwords?
This is congurable, with the default being every 24 hours.
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager secures sensitive passwords by periodically randomizing them:
1. On push-mode servers and applications:
(a) Periodically for example, every night between 3AM and 4AM.
(b) When users check passwords back in, after they are nished using them.
(c) When users request a specic password value.
(d) In the event of an urgent termination of a system administrator.
2. On pull-mode laptops and similarly congured devices:
(a) Periodically for example, every day.
(b) At a random time-of-day, to prevent transaction bursts.
(c) Opportunistically, whenever network connectivity happens to be available from the workstation
to a central server.
4 How do we control who can sign into which privileged accounts?
The most common formof access control in the Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager is based on managed
system policies. These policies are named collections of managed systems containing privileged accounts
whose passwords may be randomized and access to which is controlled.
Managed systems may either be attached to a policy explicitly (e.g., attach workstation WKSTN01234 to
policy RGWKSTNS) or implicitly, using an expression. Expressions may be based on the operating system
type, IP address, MAC address or workstation name (e.g., attach every workstation running Windows XP
in subnet 10.1.2.3/24 to policy X)
Managed system policies are congured with operational and access control rules, including:
1. Which accounts passwords to randomize on attached systems.
2. How often to change passwords.
3. How to compose random passwords (e.g., length, complexity, etc.).
4. What actions to take after successful or failed attempts to disclose a password.
5. What access disclosure methods to offer users who wish to sign into privileged accounts on attached
systems (e.g., launch remote desktop, launch SSH, temporarily place user in security groups, display
current password to user, etc.).
Privileged Access Manager users are organized into user groups, either explicitly or implicitly. In a typical
deployment, users are assigned to Privileged Access Manager user groups by virtue of their membership in
Active Directory or LDAP groups. Groups of users are then assigned specic rights with respect to specic
managed system policies. For example, every user in group A may launch RDP sessions to privileged
accounts on systems in policy B.
Business rules, such as segregation of duties between different sets of users, can also be enforced. This
is done by examining, managing and limiting group membership on reference systems, such as Active
Directory or LDAP, that can be simultaneously assigned to the same user.
5 How do we grant someone temporary or one-time access to a
privileged account?
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager includes the same authorization workow engine as is used in
Hitachi ID Identity Manager. Workow enables users to request access to a privileged account that was
not previously or permanently authorized. When this happens, one or more additional users are invited (via
e-mail or SMS) to review and approve the request. Approved requests trigger a message to the requests
recipient, including a URL to Privileged Access Manager where he or she can re-authenticate and check
out access.
The workow process is illustrated by the following series of steps:
1. User UA signs in and requests that the then-current password to login account LA on system S be
made available to user UB at some later time T. UA may or may not be the same person as UB.
2. Privileged Access Manager looks up authorizers associated with LA on S.
3. Privileged Access Manager may run business logic to supplement this authorizer list, for example
with someone in the management chain for UA or UB. The nal list of authorizers is LA. There are N
authorizers but approval by just M (M N) is sufcient to disclose the password to AZ.
4. Privileged Access Manager sends e-mail invitations to authorizers LA.
5. If authorizers fail to respond, they get automatic reminder e-mails.
6. If authorizers continue to fail to respond, Privileged Access Manager runs business logic to nd re-
placements for them, effectively escalating the request and invites the replacement authorizers as
well.
7. Authorizers receive invitation e-mails, click on a URL embedded in the e-mail invitation, authenticate
themselves to the Privileged Access Manager web login page, review the request and approve or
reject it.
8. If any authorizers reject the request, e-mails are sent to all participants (UA, UB and AZ) and the
request is terminated.
9. If M authorizers approve the request, thank-you e-mails are sent to all participants. A special e-mail
is sent to the recipient UB with a URL to an access disclosure page.
10. UB clicks on the e-mail URL and authenticates to Privileged Access Manager and displays the pass-
word.
11. UB clicks on a button to check-out privileged access.
12. UB then may click on a button to do one of the following (the options available will vary based on
policy):
(a) Display the password.
(b) Place a copy of the password in the operating system copy buffer.
(c) Launch an RDP, SSH, vSphere or similar remote control session to the server in question.
In other words, display of a sensitive password is not a mandatory or even recommended part of the
solution.
6 Can we congure a "two keys to launch" scenario for super-
sensitive systems?
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager supports approval of change requests by multiple business stake-
holders and/or by multiple groups of business stake-holders. This allows for typical scenarios such as
approve this request by recipients manager plus departmental IT contact plus application owner.
Since individuals may be unavailable to respond to a request, authorization can substitute groups for single
approvers. Thus, the above example may be reformulated as approve this request by recipients manager
or any of the managers peers; plus either of two departmental IT contacts; plus any of three designated
security contacts for the indicated application.
Change authorization is normally conducted by sending invitations to all authorizers at the same time. This
parallel invitation process yields faster approval turn-around times but has no impact on security, since all
requisite approvers must respond before a request is completed. Sequential invitations are also possible
but are not recommended by Hitachi ID Systems due to the longer total time elapsed before all participants
will approve or reject a request.
7 Can Privileged Access Manager manage password changes to
Windows service accounts?
On the Windows operating system, service programs are run either using the SYSTEM login ID, which
possesses almost every privilege on the system (and consequently can do the maximum harm) and which
has no password or using a real users login ID and password, in order to execute with reduced privileges.
This means that on each Windows workstation and server there are a number of service accounts, each
with its own password, which are used to run service programs such as web servers, backup agents, anti-
virus software, etc.
Service account passwords differ from administrator passwords in that they are stored in at least two places:
1. Hashed, in the security database e.g., the local SAM database or Active Directory, just like all users.
2. Reversibly encrypted, in the registry or elsewhere, where the program that starts the service (e.g.,
Service Control Manager or similar) can retrieve it when it needs to start the service.
Other Windows components besides the Service Control Manager also store passwords twice:
1. Virtual directories used to access web content from the IIS web server.
2. Programs scheduled to be run by the Windows Scheduler.
Third party programs may also require passwords to be stored outside the Security Accounts Manager
(SAM) database.
Of the above passwords, all but those used in IIS are static and may represent a security vulnerability.
Privileged Access Manager can be congured to secure service account passwords. This means two
things, depending on the mode of operation:
1. In pull mode, the Privileged Access Manager workstation service periodically scrambles service ac-
count passwords locally, in coordination with the central Privileged Access Manager server cluster.
2. In push mode, Privileged Access Manager servers periodically connect to Windows servers or Active
Directory in order to change the passwords of service accounts.
In both cases, Privileged Access Manager must notify the program that launches services the subscriber
of the new password value, so that it can successfully launch the service at the time of the next system
restart or when an administrator manually stops and restarts the service in question. In some cases,
for example when domain accounts are used to run services, an immediate restart may be required or
advisable, due to Kerberos token expiry.
Privileged Access Manager includes extensive automation to discover subscribers and subscriber-to-service-
account dependency. This allows Hitachi ID Systems customers to review what services are run in the se-
curity context of what named users, on what systems. This is particularly helpful where services run in the
security context of domain accounts, since multiple services on multiple servers may rely on the same ser-
vice account and may therefore require notication of the same new password in a quick and fault-tolerant
fashion.
Privileged Access Manager includes several processes that support safe and secure changes to service
account passwords:
1. Auto-discovery of subscriber/account dependencies for a variety of subscriber types: IIS, Scheduler,
SCM, DCOM, at various OS and subscriber versions.
2. A white-list mechanism (usually table driven, but a plug-in is available for more complex scenarios) so
customers can control which service accounts should have their passwords randomized and when.
3. Built-in tools to notify known subscribers of new password values.
4. A transaction manager that can retry notications to off-line subscribers.
The above are primarily used when managed systems are integrated with Privileged Access Manager in
"push mode" i.e., there is no locally installed software on the target systemand Privileged Access Manager
initiates all connections remotely, over the network, directly or via a co-located Privileged Access Manager
proxy server.
In case push mode is inappropriate for example because the relevant services (remote registry, WMI, etc.)
are disabled or rewalled or because the end system is ofine or inaccessible due to name resolution or
IP routing issues (NAT, etc.), a pull mode service can be installed on the managed system, which performs
essentially the same functions but with much simpler connectivity (call home over HTTPS) and no need for
network accessible services on the local system.
Pull mode is normally used on laptops and in some cases desktop PCs, but works on any system running
any version of the Windows OS.
Any problems encountered in updating a service password can and should be congured to trigger an exit
trap program on the Privileged Access Manager server, to notify an administrator of an imminent problem
when the service in question is next started.
Both the discovery and notication mechanisms described above are extensible. This means that customers
who have other types of subscribers for example, third party job schedulers can add small programs
that discover their account dependencies and notify them of new service account passwords. These are
typically command-line programs (Windows executable or script) that run on the Privileged Access Manager
server. For pull mode, the equivalent form of extensibility is provided via deployment-specic DLLs.
8 Can Privileged Access Manager randomize passwords on ....?
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager comes with built-in connectors for most common systems and appli-
cations, as illustrated below. All connectors are included in the base price.
Directories: Servers: Databases:
Any LDAP, AD, NDS,
eDirectory, NIS/NIS+.
Windows 20002012,
Samba, NDS, SharePoint.
Oracle, Sybase, SQL Server,
DB2/UDB, ODBC, Informix.
Unix: Mainframes: Midrange:
Linux, Solaris, AIX, HPUX,
24 more variants.
z/OS with RAC/F, ACF/2 or
TopSecret.
iSeries (OS400), OpenVMS.
ERP: Collaboration: Tokens, Smart Cards:
JDE, Oracle eBiz,
PeopleSoft, SAP R/3, SAP
ECC 6, Siebel, Business
Objects.
Lotus Notes, Exchange,
GroupWise, BlackBerry ES.
RSA SecurID, SafeWord,
RADIUS, ActivIdentity,
Schlumberger.
WebSSO: Help Desk: HDD Encryption:
CA Siteminder, IBM TAM,
Oracle AM, RSA Access
Manager.
BMC Remedy, BMC SDE,
ServiceNow, HP Service
Manager, CA Unicenter,
Assyst, HEAT, Altiris, Clarify,
Track-It!, RSA Envision, MS
SCS Manager.
McAfee, CheckPoint,
BitLocker, PGP.
SaaS: Miscellaneous: Extensible:
Salesforce.com, WebEx,
Google Apps, MS Ofce
365, SOAP (generic).
OLAP, Hyperion, iLearn,
Cach, Success Factors,
VMWare vSphere. Cisco
IOS, Juniper JUNOS, F5,
iLO cards, DRAC cards,
RSA cards, etc.
SSH, Telnet, TN3270,
HTTP(S), SQL, LDAP,
command-line.
Privileged Access Manager includes a number of exible connectors, each of which is used to script in-
tegration with a common protocol or mechanism. These connectors allow organizations to quickly and
inexpensively integrate Privileged Access Manager with custom and vertical market applications. The abil-
ity to quickly and inexpensively add integrations increases the value of the Privileged Access Manager
system as a whole.
There are exible connectors to script interaction with:
API binding: Terminal
emulation:
Web services: Back end
integration:
Command-line:
C, C++
Java, J2EE
.NET
COM,
ActiveX
MQ Series
SSH
Telnet
TN3270,
TN5250
Simulated
browser
SOAP
WebRPC
Pure
HTTP(S)
SQL
Injection
LDAP
attributes
Windows
Power Shell
Unix/Linux
Organizations that wish to write a completely new connector to integrate with a custom or vertical market
application may do so using whatever development environment they prefer (J2EE, .NET, Perl, etc.) and
invoke it as either a command-line program or web service.
If the organization develops their own integrations, an effort of between four hours and four days is typical.
Alternately, Hitachi ID Systems offers xed-cost custom integrations for a nominal fee.
9 Can Privileged Access Manager launch an administrator login ses-
sions to ....?
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager controls access by users and programs to privileged accounts on
systems and applications. By default, that means that when a user is authorized to connect to a privileged
account, the user is able to launch a login session directly to that account without ever seeing its password.
Display of current password values can be enabled through Privileged Access Manager policy conguration
but is not normally recommended.
Access disclosure options include:
1. IT staff can directly launch Terminal Services (RDP), SSH (PuTTY), VMWare vSphere, SQL Studio,
web browser/form login and other connections to target systems from the Privileged Access Manager
web user interface, without displaying a password value.
2. IT staff can use an ActiveX control embedded in the Privileged Access Manager web portal to place a
copy of a sensitive password into their Windows copy buffer, again without displaying the passwords.
This password is automatically cleared from their copy buffer after a few seconds.
3. Privileged Access Manager can dynamically attach a recipients Active Directory domain login ID to
a local security group on a target system and later remove it. This eliminates the need to disclose
passwords even to a software agent on the recipients workstation.
4. Privileged Access Manager can temporarily place a users public SSH key into the target accounts
.ssh/authorized_keys le.
5. Where password display is required (e.g., a target system is currently ofine), JavaScript in the
Privileged Access Manager web portal removes it from the screen after a few seconds.
A policy dened for each set of managed systems in Privileged Access Manager determines which of these
access disclosure mechanisms is available. For example, password display may be allowed for Windows
workstations, since they may be inaccessible over the network, but RDP sessions with injected passwords
may be mandatory on Windows servers.
10 What happens when an administrator needs to sign into the phys-
ical console of a server?
Password display is supported. Hitachi ID Systems recommends limiting the set of people who have access
to this i.e., only data center staff should be able to display passwords and perhaps only with workow
approvals.
11 Which web browsers does Privileged Access Manager support?
11.1 Basic user interface
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager presents a pure HTML user interface, with small JavaScript snippets
used only for non-essential functions (such as positioning the cursor or closing the current window).
This interface ensures compatibility with all web browsers. Privileged Access Managers web user interface
is routinely and successfully tested using:
Internet Explorer versions 7.x and later (IE6 works but with minor visual artifacts).
Firefox (any version released since about 2010 should be ne).
Safari, Chrome and other WebKit-based browsers.
Opera (full and mini versions).
Browsers on smart phones (BlackBerry native, Safari on iPhone, Android native, Dolphin, etc.).
Even text mode browsers such as lynx and w3m.
The Privileged Access Manager user interface is compatible and periodically tested with speaking web
browsers (for the visually impaired).
In addition to standard HTML, Privileged Access Manager can take advantage of ActiveX components
specically in IE to execute local code. Example uses of this optional capability include:
1. To launch login sessions to privileged accounts on managed systems and inject credentials into those
login sessions (e.g., PuTTY, RDP, SQL, vSphere, etc.).
2. To record screen, keyboard, webcam and other data during the life of such login sessions.
11.2 ActiveX components used to launch login sessions
ActiveX can be used (but is not required) to:
1. Launch connections from administrator PCs to target systems (RDP, SSH, SQL Studio, VMWare
vSphere, etc.) without having to disclose privileged passwords to users and without users having to
type login IDs and passwords for the privileged accounts on systems they need to sign into. Any
command-line client software, plus the RDP control built into Windows, can be activated in this way.
2. Place a copy of a privileged password in a users copy buffer and automatically remove it after a short
time, without having to display it. This allows administrators to (briey) paste a sensitive password
into a login prompt without having to see it.
IE7 and later are supported as a platform to launch connections via ActiveX (IE6 also works but like all
vendors, Hitachi ID Systems would prefer that IE6 disappeared as soon as possible).
Using ActiveX to launch administrator login sessions means the connection is directly from the users PC
to the managed system not though a proxy. This means there is no bottleneck for performance or service
availability. It also means that Privileged Access Manager can launch a variety of client/server administration
tools and is not limited to specic versions of specic protocols.
12 Can Privileged Access Manager you secure privileged passwords
on laptops (which move around and get disconnected)?
A password management system can easily make connections to servers, which have xed network ad-
dresses, are always on and are continuously connected to the network. It is much harder for a central
password management server to connect to mobile laptops, for several reasons:
Laptops frequently move from site to site.
Even when they remain in one place, laptop IP addresses may change dynamically, due to use of
DHCP.
Laptops are often turned off and do not respond to network inquiries when deactivated.
Laptops may be unplugged from the network, either to move them or for periods of disuse.
Laptops may be protected by a rewall that blocks network connections inbound to the PC.
In short, while it is easy for laptops to contact a central server, it is nearly impossible for the reverse to
happen reliably.
To secure privileged accounts on mobile workstations (typically laptops), Hitachi ID Privileged Access
Manager includes a service, which installs on the relevant PCs and which contacts a central server to
coordinate local password changes.
This architecture has several important advantages:
The workstation service uses only HTTPS to communicate with the central server and works even
when the workstation is connected behind NAT devices, rewalls or application proxies.
The workstation service does not randomize passwords unless it has established connectivity with the
central privileged access management server. This avoids a situation where the central server does
not know the new password value for a workstation.
Dynamic IP addresses have no impact on this architecture.
Physical relocation and long periods of detached network connectivity may delay updates to local
passwords, but do not introduce a failure whereby the local administrator passwords on a workstation
are unknown.
Privileged Access Manager supports management of passwords on laptops, which may be mobile, have
dynamic IP addresses, get unplugged, etc. This is done using client software, which works by pulling new,
passwords from the Privileged Access Manager server cluster. Client software is available for:
1. Windows 2000, XP, Windows Vista/7/8, 2003, 2008 and 2008R2.
2. Unix (various vendors) and Linux (IA86).
The Windows pull-mode service includes plug-ins to notify operating system components of new service
account passwords. Plug-ins are provided for the Windows Service Control Manager, Windows Scheduler
and IIS.
13 How can we automate the setup and teardown of thousands of
systems on Privileged Access Manager?
In organizations with large numbers of servers or other systems (e.g., databases, routers, etc.), clearly it
is desirable to auto-discover and auto-maintain a list of systems and lists of accounts to manage on each
managed system, rather than manually adding and maintaining thousands of separate target systems and
accounts.
To auto-discover systems, most organizations pull data from an Active Directory or LDAP directory. Com-
puter objects discovered in the directory are classied based on their attributes and automatically managed
(or not) and attached to appropriate managed system policies, which specify password change frequency,
access control rules, access disclosure methods, etc.
A second auto-discovery process probes each managed system to nd accounts that should be managed.
On most systems, a list of local users and groups is generated. Specically on Windows systems, this
process also lists services, scheduled jobs, IIS objects (e.g., anonymous users, application pools, etc.) and
DCOM objects and see what accounts are used to run each of them. Import rules determine which of these
accounts will be managed by Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager (e.g., based on account attributes,
group membership, security IDs, account/service relationship, etc.) and which managed system policies to
assign to each managed account.
Alternatives to Active Directory- or LDAP-driven computer object lists include DNS queries or zone transfers,
IP port scans of specic subnets and data imports from an inventory management system.
Privileged Access Manager also includes an automated mechanism to inform programs that store a copy
of passwords of new password values. A plug-in program is provided to connect to Windows servers after
each password change and automatically update Service Control Manager, Windows Scheduler, IIS or
DCOM with new password values.
The Privileged Access Manager auto-discovery process is massively multi-threaded. It is able to list, classify
and probe over 10,000 systems per hour. The entire process is usually scheduled to run daily.
14 Can Privileged Access Manager assign privileges less than full-
administrator to users?
Yes. For Unix/Linux, please refer to the next question.
For Windows, see below.
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager can be congured to disclose privileged access to systems by tem-
porarily placing an administrative users (normally unprivileged) directory account into a privileged security
group on the target system.
This process works as follows, using an Active Directory domain, a Windows server and an RDP connection
in our example:
1. Administrator A requests privileged access to computer C.
2. The request is approved either because A has been pre-approved for such access (typically via mem-
bership in an AD group) or because some other user, with ownership rights to computer C, approves
the request.
3. Administrator A checks out access to computer C.
4. Privileged Access Manager places As AD account into a privileged group on computer C, such as
(local group) Administrators.
5. A connects to C using RDP. This connection might be mediated by Privileged Access Manager, which
can launch the RDP session directly from its web portal using an Active-X control.
6. Depending on how Privileged Access Manager and C are congured, A may or may not have to type
his personal AD password to establish the RDP connection to C. For example, if C trusts Kerberos-
authenticated RDP sessions or if Privileged Access Manager has an agent on As workstation to
acquire his login password, then no manual authentication step will be required.
7. Eventually A will either check-in the session or the session will time out. When either event happens,
Privileged Access Manager will remove As AD account from the privileged group on C.
This approach of manipulating group memberships rather than disclosing password has the advantage that
audit logs on the target computer (C in the example above) show activity by the individual administrator (A
in the example above) rather than by a generic local administrator account.
The limitations of this approach are:
1. It does not help with access to systems that are not linked to a directory (e.g., Windows in AD, Linux
in LDAP, etc.) since it presupposes that the user can already sign into the system in question.
2. It does not help with systems which are disconnected from the network.
3. Users, once granted elevated privileges, can connect from a different client device and therefore
bypass any client-based or proxy-based session monitoring infrastructure. If there is a desire to
record (keylog, video capture, etc.) user activity, then this approach is not appropriate.
15 Can Privileged Access Manager interoperate with sudo on Unix/Linux?
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager can be congured to disclose privileged access to Unix and Linux
computers by temporarily placing an administrative users personal SSH public key into the trusted keys le
of a functional account on the target computer.
This architecture works as follows:
1. The Privileged Access Manager server gets its own SSH public and private keys.
2. Every user who may require privileged access to Unix/Linux systems must have:
(a) An SSH client package on his PC.
(b) Dened SSH private and public key.
3. A copy of the public SSH key for every user is kept on the Privileged Access Manager server.
4. Each managed Unix/Linux computer is congured with:
(a) An SSHD listener.
(b) The SUDO package.
(c) A set of functional, unprivileged accounts (more on this later).
5. The /etc/sudoers le on each managed Unix/Linux computer is congured to grant a set of prede-
ned privileges to each functional account. For example:
The account dba might be allowed to perform DB-related tasks.
The account backup might be allowed to perform lesystem backups.
The account procmon might be allowed to perform runaway processes.
The account monitor might be allowed to perform stats from /proc.
6. The .ssh/authorized_keys le of each of the functional accounts is congured to trust the public
SSH key of the Privileged Access Manager server.
7. At access checkout time, Privileged Access Manager modies the .ssh/authorized_keys le of
the functional account to which access was granted to include the public key of the user who needs
access to that account.
8. At access checkin or expiry time, Privileged Access Manager modies the .ssh/authorized_keys
le of the relevant functional account to remove the public key of the user who had access to that
account.
The access disclosure process works as follows:
1. Administrator A requests access to functional account F on computer C.
2. The request is approved either because A has been pre-approved for such access (typically via mem-
bership in an AD group) or because some other user, with ownership rights to F@C, approves the
request.
3. Administrator A checks out access to F@C.
4. Privileged Access Manager retrieves a copy of the .ssh/authorized_keys from F@C, adds As
public SSH key to the le and puts the new .ssh/authorized_keys back in F@Cs home directory.
5. A connects to F@C using SSH. This connection is authenticated using an SSH key exchange (not a
password).
6. A may have to type a password to access his own SSH private key, depending on how whether his
SSH key is encrypted with his password.
7. Eventually A will either check-in the session or the session will time out. When either event happens,
Privileged Access Manager will remove As public SSH key from F@Cs .ssh/authorized_keys
le.
16 Can Privileged Access Manager integrate with SIEM systems?
The logging service in Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager can be congured to forward SYSLOG mes-
sages to a network logging system, including services exposed by all popular SIEM applications.
17 How does Privileged Access Manager defend itself against com-
promise of sensitive passwords?
Encryption is used to protect stored Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager data as follows:
Data stored on the Privileged Access Manager server
Data Algorithm Key
Privileged passwords,
used to log into target
systems
128-bit AES 128-bit random
Answers to security
questions
128-bit AES 128-bit random
User old password
history
SHA-1 64-bit random salt
18 How do we protect Privileged Access Manager against data loss?
Once deployed, Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager becomes an essential part of an organizations IT
infrastructure, since it alone has access to privileged passwords for thousands of networked devices. An
interruption to the availability of Privileged Access Manager or its password vault would mean that adminis-
trative access to a range of devices is interrupted a major IT service disruption.
Since servers occasionally break down, Privileged Access Manager supports load balancing and data
replication between multiple physical servers and multiple credential vaults. Any updates written to one
database instance are automatically replicated, in real time, over an encrypted communication path, to all
other Privileged Access Manager servers and all other credential vaults.
In short, Privileged Access Manager incorporates a highly available, replicated, multi-master architecture
for both the application and the credential vault.
To provide out-of-the-box data replication, Privileged Access Manager includes a database service that
replicates updates across multiple database instances. This service can be congured use either Oracle
or Microsoft SQL Server databases for physical storage. Hitachi ID Systems recommends one physical
database per Privileged Access Manager server, normally on the same hardware as the Privileged Access
Manager application.
The Privileged Access Manager data replication system makes it both simple and advisable for organiza-
tions to build a highly-available Privileged Access Manager server cluster, spanning multiple servers, with
each server placed in a different data center. Replication trafc is encrypted, authenticated, bandwidth-
efcient and tolerant of latency, making it suitable for deployment over a WAN.
This multi-site, multi-master replication is congured at no additional cost, beyond that of the hardware for
additional Privileged Access Manager servers, and with minimal manual conguration.
19 Can Privileged Access Manager record what users do while signed
into administrator accounts?
Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager includes a sophisticated infrastructure for monitoring, recording and
playing back privileged account login sessions. This includes capturing:
1. Successive screen shots of the interactive administrator login session (RDP, SSH, vSphere, etc.).
2. Periodic photographs of the user (presumably) if a web-cam is present.
3. Many types of input events, including key presses, mouse clicks, copies and pastes.
4. Process names started and stopped.
5. UI text elements (labels, text input elds, drop-downs, etc.) displayed on the screen.
6. Mapping and disconnecting le shares (currently under development).
7. Initiating le transfers, especially to removable media such as USB ash drives (currently under de-
velopment).
Capture sources can be individually enabled, disabled or congured.
This data is stored in a secure database and can be accessed later:
1. Search by user, target system, time, date or meta data.
2. Play back movies of user interaction.
3. Report on events during the session (copy, paste, transfer le to removable media, etc.).
This data can be extracted, for example for use in a forensic audit or as courtroom evidence.
Two forms of this session monitoring/recording infrastructure are being developed concurrently:
1. One runs when a privileged account login session is initiated via the Privileged Access Manager web
portal, by launching an RDP session, SSH session, SQL Studio, a 3270 emulator, VMWare vSphere,
etc.
2. Another (in Beta release) can be installed on an individual Windows workstation or server (Windows
XP, 2003, Vista, 2008, 2008R2, 7, 8) and can record user interaction during an interactive login
session by a specied user, even if the session was not initiated using Privileged Access Manager at
all.
Recorded sessions are stored in a combination of the Privileged Access Manager database (session meta
data, keyboard input and other text events, etc.) and on server or network lesystems (video captures,
web-cam snapshots, etc.).
Playback data is packaged as a ZIP le with XML les representing textual data, standard MP4 video les
representing screen movies and JPEG les representing web-cam images. These ZIP les are intended to
be suitable as forensic evidence in the context of investigation of improper employee or contractor behavior.
20 How does Privileged Access Manager control access to recorded
login sessions (privacy protection)?
Session monitoring can have serious implications on user privacy and so should be implemented with
great care. The session monitoring infrastructure is subject to strict access control rules and workow
infrastructure. For example, an auditor must rst request the right to perform a given search through session
data. If approved, he can execute the search and may nd sessions of interest. The auditor must then
request the right to playback selected sessions. Only if this second request is approved can the auditor
retrieve session data. Of course, all such requests and searches this is indelibly logged.
Another measure used to protect user privacy in Hitachi IDPrivileged Access Manager is a pattern-matching
censorship process. Hitachi ID Systems customers are encouraged to dene regular expression patterns,
matching passwords, social security numbers, credit card numbers, bank account numbers, etc. A pro-
cess on the Privileged Access Manager server post-processes keystroke and keyword data captured by
the session monitor, searching for matches for these patterns. Matches are deleted from the keystroke and
keyword database.
www.Hitachi-ID.com
500, 1401 - 1 Street SE, Calgary AB Canada T2G 2J3 Tel: 1.403.233.0740 Fax: 1.403.233.0725 E-Mail: sales@Hitachi-ID.com
File: / pub/ wp/ documents/ faq/ hipam/ hipam-faq-1.tex
Date: 2011-07-15

Privileged Access Manager Faq

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Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager

Frequently Asked Questions

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