RULE 102 HABEAS CORPUS SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends.

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. SEC. 2. Who may grant the writ.The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines; and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Regional Trial Court, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Regional Trial Court, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. SEC. 3. Requisites of application therefor.Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth: (a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended; (c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known; (d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear. SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. SEC. 5. When the writ must be granted and issued.A court or judge authorized to grant the writ must, when a petition therefor is presented and it appears that the writ ought to issue, grant the same forthwith, and immediately thereupon the clerk of the court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of emergency, the judge may issue the writ under his own h and, and may depute any officer or person to serve it. SEC. 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require.In case of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to him, and shall command him to have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he is restrained then and there to appear before said court or judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or restraint. SEC. 7. How prisoner designated and writ served.The person to be produced should be designated in the writ by his name, if known, but if his name is not known he may be otherwise described or identified. The writ may be served in any province by the sheriff or other proper officer, or by a person deputed by the court or judge. Service of the writ shall be made by leaving the original with the person to whom it is directed and preserving a copy on which to make return of service. If that person cannot be found, or has not the prisoner in his custody, then the service shall be made on any other person having or exercising such custody. SEC. 8. How writ executed and returned.The officer to whom the writ is directed shall convey the person so imprisoned or restrained, and named in the writ, before the judge allowing the writ, or, in case of his absence or disability, before some other judge of the same court, on the day specified in the writ, unless, from sickness or infirmity of the person directed to be produced, such person cannot, without danger, be brought before the court or judge; and the officer shall make due return of the writ, together with the day and the cause of the caption and restraint of such person according to the command thereof. SEC. 9. Defect of form.No writ of habeas corpus can be disobeyed for defect of form, if it sufficiently appears therefrom in whose custody or under whose restraint the party imprisoned or restrained is held and the court or judge before whom he is to be brought. SEC. 10 Contents of return.When the person to be produced is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person who makes the return shall state therein, and in other cases the person in whose custody the prisoner is found shall state, in writing to the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable, plainly and unequivocably: (a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under restraint; (b) If he has the party in his- custody or power, or under restraint, the authority and the true and whole cause thereof, set forth at large, with a copy of the writ, order, execution, or other process, if any, upon which the party is held;

(c) If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is not produced, particularly the nature and gravity of the sickness or infirmity of such party by reason of which he cannot, without danger, be brought before the court or judge; (d) If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has transferred such custody or restraint to another, particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer was made. SEC. 11. Return to be signed and sworn to.The return or statement shall be signed by the person who makes it; and shall also be sworn to by him if the prisoner is not produced, and in all other cases unless the return is made and signed by a sworn public officer in his official capacity. SEC. 12. Hearing on return. Adjournments.When the writ is returned before one judge, at a time when the court is in session, he may forthwith adjourn the case into the court, there to be heard and determined. The court or judge before whom the writ is returned or adjourned must immediately proceed to hear and examine the return, and such other matters as are properly submitted for consideration, unless for good cause shown the hearing is adjourned, in which event the court or judge shall make such order for the safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires. If the person imprisoned or restrained is not produced because of his alleged sickness or infirmity, the court or judge must be satisfied that it is so grave that such person cannot be produced without danger, before proceeding to hear and dispose of the matter. On the hearing the court or judge shall disregard matters of form and technicalities in respect to any warrant or order of commitment of a court or officer authorized to commit by law. SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint; but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts. SEC. 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail.If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order or judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement. SEC. 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal.When the court or judge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge from confine-ment, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released. SEC. 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same.A clerk of a court who refuses to issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the command thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, and may also be punished by the court or judge as for contempt. SEC. 17. Person discharged not to be again imprisoned.A person who is set at liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense; and a person who knowingly, contrary to the provisions of this rule, recommits or imprisons, or causes to be committed or imprisoned, for the same offense, or pretended offense, any person so set at liberty, or knowingly aids or assists therein, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, notwithstanding any colorable pretense or variation in the warrant of commitment, and may also be punished by the court or judge granting the writ as for contempt. SEC. 18. When prisoner may be removed from one custody to another.A person committed to prison, or in custody of an officer, for any criminal matter, shall not be removed therefrom into the custody of another officer unless by legal process, or the prisoner be delivered to an inferior officer to carry to jail or by order of the proper court or judge, be removed from one place to another within the Philippines for trial, or in case of fire, epidemic, insurrection, or other necessity or public calamity; and a person who, after such commitment, makes, signs, or countersigns any order for such removal contrary to this section, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action. SEC. 19. Record of writ, fees and costs.The proceedings upon a writ of habeas corpus shall be recorded by the clerk of the court, and upon the final disposition of such proceedings the court or judge shall make such order as to costs as the case requires. The fees of officers and witnesses shall be included in the costs taxed, but no officer or person shall have the right to demand payment in advance of any fees to which he is entitled by virtue of the proceedings. When a person confined under color of proceedings in a criminal case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed against the Republic of the Philippines, and paid out of its Treasury; when a person in custody by virtue or under color of proceedings in a civil case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed against him, or against the person who signed the application for the writ, or both, as the court shall direct.

RULE 103 CHANGE OF NAME SECTION 1. Venue.A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court]. SEC. 2. Contents of petition.A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing; (b) (c) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing.If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. SEC. 4. Hearing.Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic. SEC. 5. Judgment.Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name by changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition. SEC. 6. Service of judgment.Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register. RULE 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizen-ship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings.The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preserva-tion of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. SEC. 7. Order.After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING, Petitioner. AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General 1 Robert Delfin, Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained. The antecedents are as follows: On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial Region. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 3611-1165. Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation. In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order. In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the request of Atty. Danipog, thus: xxx The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge of this Court, who issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest in the herein mentioned case (Criminal Case No. 3674-1187) and per his instruction, accused As[h]raf Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in this case, however considering that the accused is a high security risk, he should be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary security escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper commitment order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by the prosecution. Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court.
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On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG. On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-accused in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 36081164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged. On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNPIG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.1avvphil.net In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kuntings case, citing the same grounds in the previous letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free. On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the

court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved. On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan. Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo for representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as "for safekeeping purposes only." The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled 3 thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the 4 court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings 5 terminate. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or 6 convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court. Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be 7 issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuan ce of a writ of habeas corpus." Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body of petitioner Kunting to the trial court.. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-21194 April 29, 1966

HAW LIONG, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. He testified that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte Asia Trading Company; that he has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years; that he wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that he came to the Philippines in 1925 and since then his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that there is no pending case against him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he is willing to appear and answer the same. After hearing, the court a quo allowed petitioner to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin. The government has appealed. This Court has already had occasion to state the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oao vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-8035, November 29, 1957). The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).1wph1.t Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a change of name other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for the reason that he has always been known by that name by his Filipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of his father which he desires to follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. But this claim which is merely supported by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the name given him from the very beginning as Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate. The fact that he claims to be the son of one Placido Lantin, a Filipino is of no moment because if the same were true it is strange that the name that was given him upon birth is Haw Liong and he had to file a petition for naturalization to become a Filipino citizen. This indirectly belies his claim that the name that should be given him is Alfonso Lantin because that is the family name of his father "to conform with the customs and traditions and also for sentimental reasons." The true situation however is, as was disclosed in his cross examination, that in his business dealings with other people he always signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin; that he came to be called Alfonso by his friends only when during the Japanese occupation his Filipino friends asked him how he was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso, and since then they started calling him by that name; and that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liong and has not contracted with any person under the name of Alfonso Lantin. We find, therefore, no proper or compelling reason that may justify the change of name desired by petitioner for his petition does not come under any of the cases above adverted to. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside. The petition is denied, with costs. Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-32054 May 15, 1974 TERESITA LLANETA (known also as TERESITA LLANETA FERRER and TERESITA FERRER), petitioner, vs. The Honorable CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, as Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, respondent. CASTRO, J.:p From the denial by the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its special proceeding H-00237, of her petition for change of name, Teresita Llaneta has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari. Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-inlaw, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about 20 years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below on March 18, 1969 for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with 1 and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. In her official dealings, this would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her 2 illegitimate birth, to carry on in society without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn. The respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions of this Court, that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship. The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the civil registrar of Irosin, Sorsogon, for this information and proper action. No costs.
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EN BANC G.R. No. 183711 June 22, 2010

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 183712 EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 183713 EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; and Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents. RESOLUTION BRION, J.: On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a decision in the consolidated petitions for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas 2 3 4 Corpus, for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf of her son Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, who was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four men and by a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, on April 28, 5 2007. This CA decision dismissed the petitioners petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. The Antecedents The established facts, as found by the CA, are summarized below:
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The established facts show that at around one oclock in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan (a chapter of the militant peasant organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas) was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On his way out of the restaurant, Jonas told the manager, "Maam aktibista lang po ako!" When a security guard tried to intervene, after he noticed that the group was forcibly dragging a male person out of the restaurant, he was told, "Pare, pulis!" The guard then backed off but was able to see that Jonas was forced into the rear portion of a plain maroon colored Toyota Revo with plate number TAB 194. The guard then noted the plate number and reported the incident to his superiors as well as to the police on duty in the said mall. On April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. It was also later confirmed by employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that Mudlong was arrested and his 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was seized on June 24, 2006 by Cpl. Castro Bugalan and Pfc. Jose Villea of the 56th Infantry Battalion (IB) of the Philippine Army for transporting timber without permit. As agreed upon by the DENR employees and officers of the 56th IB, the vehicle with the license plate no. TAB 194 was impounded in the 56th IB headquarters whose commanding officer at that time was Lt. Col. Noel Clement. The established facts also show that Lt. Col. Clement and the soldiers of the 56th IB went on retraining at the Headquarters of the First Scout Rangers Regiment (Camp Tecson) in Brgy. Tartaro, San Miguel, Bulacan starting November 28, 2006. A "left-behind force" or a squad remained in the camp of the 56th IB to secure the premises and equipment as it awaited the arrival of the 6 9th IB, headed by Lt. Col. Edison Caga, which took over the 56th IBs area of responsibility for the duration of the retraining. The 69th IB arrived at Camp Tecson on December 1, 2006, and remained there until March 7, 2007, when the 56th IB returned. There was no formal turnover or inventory of equipment and vehicles when the 69th IB arrived on December 1, 2006. Meanwhile, on January 17, 2007, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano took command of the 56th IB from Lt. Col. Clement. The actual turnover of command took place at Camp Tecson where the 56th IB was retraining. At the time Jonas was abducted on April 28, 2007, Lt. Col. Feliciano was the 56th IBs commanding officer. Earlier, on March 23, 2007, 2nd Lt. Dick A. Abletes, a member of the 56th IB, was caught on video talking to two persons, a male and a female, at McDonalds Bocaue. In the video, he was seen handing a document to the two persons. On March 26, 2007, 2nd Lt. Abletes was arrested and charges were soon filed against him with the Judge Advocate General for violations of Articles 82, 96 and 97 of the Articles of War.

Prior to Jonas abduction, Mudlongs 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle remained impounded at the 56th IBs Headquarters. In May 2007, right after Jonas abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were "cannibalized." On direct examination, the petitioner testified before the CA that the police was able to generate cartographic sketches of two (one 7 male and one female) of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. The petitioner narrated further that these cartographic sketches were identified by State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the Department of Justice (DOJ); that when she went to see State Prosecutor Velasco personally, he gave her "five names" who were allegedly involved in the abduction of Jonas 8 (namely T/Sgt. Jason Roxas, Cpl. Joana Francisco, M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo, and 1st Lt. Jaime Mendaros); and that the information from 9 State Prosecutor Velascos sources corroborated the same information she received earlier from her own sources. The petitioner also testified that nothing came out of the information given by State Prosecutor Velasco because he was "pulled out from the 10 investigation by the DOJ Secretary," and that the police, particularly P/Supt. Jonnel C. Estomo, failed to investigate and act upon 11 these leads. On August 30, 2007, P/Supt. Estomo (the lead investigator in the investigation conducted by the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group [PNP-CIDG]) testified before the CA that he did not investigate or look into the identities of the 12 cartographic sketches of the two abductors provided by the PNP Criminal Investigation Unit, Quezon City. P/Supt. Estomo testified further that he showed the photos of Cpl. Bugalan and Pfc.Villea to witness Larry Marquez for identification but failed to show any 13 photos of the other officers and men of the 56th IB. Finally, P/Supt. Estomo also testified that he did not propound any clarificatory questions regarding the disappearance of Jonas Burgos to Lt. Cols. Feliciano, Clement, and Caga of the 56th IB who merely 14 voluntarily submitted their statements. On August 29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KA CARLO, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elements of the New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the 15 abduction of Jonas. In his Sworn Statement, Lipio admitted that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)/NPA and that the NPA was behind the abduction of Jonas. Lipio revealed that Jonas is known as @KA RAMON in the communist movement. He claimed further that he and @KA RAMON belonged to the Bulacan Party Committee, assigned to the White Area Committee doing intelligence work for the movement under the leadership of Delfin de Guzman @ KA BASTE, and that 16 @KA RAMON was their political instructor and head of the intelligence unit in the province. Sometime early April of 2007, Lipio was present in a meeting between @KA BASTE and @KA RAMON. At this meeting, the two had a heated argument. For this reason, @KA BASTE instructed Lipio to place @KA RAMON under surveillance as they suspected 17 him of pilfering funds from the party and of acting as a military agent. Lipio further averred that upon instruction of @KA BASTE, he and a certain @KA CARLO proceeded to Ever Gotesco Mall on April 28, 2007 to monitor the reported meeting between @KA RAMON and other party members. At one oclock in the afternoon, Lipio and @KA CARLO (who stationed themselves near the entrance/exit of the mall) saw a man, who they recognized as @KA RAMON, forcibly taken by four men, brought outside of the mall, and shoved inside a Toyota Revo. Lipio further alleged that he recognized 18 two of the abductors as "@KA DANTE" and "@KA ENSO" who he claims to be members of the CPP/NPAs guerilla unit (RYG). In his Sworn Statement, Manuel affirmed and substantiated Lipios statement that @KA RAMON and Jonas are one and the same person and that he is a member of the communist movement in Bulacan. Manuel also corroborated Lipios statement regarding the circumstances of the abduction of @KA RAMON at Ever Gotesco Mall on April 28, 2007; he confirmed that he and @ KA TIBO 19 witnessed the abduction. Reyes, a rebel-returnee, provided in her Sworn Statement additional material information regarding the disappearance of Jonas. Reyes alleged that she was supposed to meet with @KA RAMON and another comrade in the movement (whom she identified as @KA JO) to discuss the possibility of arranging a meeting with a contact in the military. She averred that she met @KA JO at about 11:30 a.m. at the Baliaug Transit Terminal, Cubao enroute to Ever Gotesco mall where they would meet with a certain @KA RAMON. Reyes further narrated that they arrived about noon at Ever Gotesco mall; @KA JO left her at McDonalds and told her to wait while he went to look for @KA RAMON. After an hour, @KA JO arrived without @KA RAMON and told Reyes to go home and 20 just keep in touch through text messaging. Reyes alleged further that she has not heard from @KA JO since. The CA Findings In its July 17, 2008 decision, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. The CA noted that the evidence does not show how license plate number TAB 194 (supposedly attached to the 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle impounded at the 56th IB Headquarters) came to be attached to the getaway Toyota Revo on April 28, 2007, and whether the two license plates are one and the same at all. The CA emphasized that the evidence does not indicate whether the abductors are members of the military or the police or are civilians; if they are civilians, whether they acted on their own or were following orders, and in the latter case, from whom. The CA also found that the investigations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP "leave much to be desired as 21 they did not fully exert their effort to unearth the truth and to bring the real culprits before the bar of justice." The CA held that since

the petitioner has established that the vehicle used in the abduction was linked to a vehicle (with license plate number TAB 194) impounded at the headquarters of the 56th IB, it became the burden of the AFP to exercise extraordinary diligence to determine the why and the wherefore of the loss of the license plate in their custody and its appearance in a vehicle (a maroon Toyota Revo) used 22 in Jonas abduction. The CA also ruled that the AFP has the burden of "connect[ing] certain loose ends" regarding the identity of @Ka Ramon (as referred to by the petitioners witnesses) and the allegation that @Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the "Order of Battle." As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as "rather shallow" and "conducted haphazardly." The CA took note that P/Supt. Estomos investigation merely delved into the administrative liability of Lt. Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano and Lt. Col. Caga of the 56th IB, and failed to consider them as suspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that the PNP-CIDGs investigation should focus on the criminal aspect of the present case pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, which mandates the PNP to "investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." The CA also found P/Supt. Estomos recommendation that appropriate charges be filed against Mauro Mudlong (registered owner of the impounded 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle with plate license no. TAB 194) to be without any factual basis since no evidence was presented to connect the latter to the loss of the license plate as well as to the abduction of Jonas. The CA stressed that it could not find any valid reason why Mudlong should be treated any differently from the three 56th IB colonels whom the PNP-CIDG did not consider as suspects despite the established fact that license plate no. TAB 194 was lost while in their custody. On the PNP-CIDGs new information from Lipio who claimed to have seen Jonas being abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG, and on Marlon Manuel, who corroborated Lipios statements, the CA held that steps should be taken by the PNP-CIDG to verify the veracity of these statements. Notwithstanding the new information, the CA noted that the PNP-CIDG should not discount the possible involvement of members of the AFP. Thus, the CA concluded that the PNP must exert extraordinary diligence in following all possible leads to resolve the crime committed against Jonas. Finally, the CA noted based on the Certification issued by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, DOJ dated March 5, 2008 - that no case has been referred by the PNP to the DOJ for preliminary investigation in relation to the abduction and disappearance of Jonas. This is contrary to PNPs manifest representation that it had already forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against the suspects (i.e., @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO). The CA also held that the petitions for habeas corpus and contempt as against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must be dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity from suit. The CA ruled that the Presidents immunity from suit is a settled doctrine citing 23 David v. Arroyo. Our Ruling Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken. From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation - among them the PNPCIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the petitioner by no less than State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who were possibly involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an 24 alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP. No search and certification were ever made on whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such as the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case. We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation to determine the identities and whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions were aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP has yet to refer any case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ despite its representation before the CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO. Based on these considerations, we conclude that further investigation and monitoring should be undertaken. While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDGs investigation particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. For this reason, we resolve to refer the

present case to the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. We take into consideration in this regard that the CHR is a specialized and independent agency created and empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal 25 measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines. Under this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged abductors as well as their whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP; further proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction that may be necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, the Court RESOLVES to: (1) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors as well as their whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; further proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction, that may be necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; (2) REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws; (3) DIRECT the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution; (4) Further DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution; (5) AUTHORIZE the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and (6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Resolution. In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other respondents who have all been impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from this Court shall also be served on, and be directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. The dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Gloria MacapagalArroyo is hereby AFFIRMED.