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ACEBEDO OPTICAL v CA supra

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POWERS, DUTIES (Sangguniang Bayan)

MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS V LIBANGANG MALOLOS, INC. 159 SCRA 525 MELENCIO-HERRERO; April 8, 1988
NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari to reverse the decision of the CA. FACTS - Respondent Libangang Malolos, Inc. (LIBANGANG) has been operating the "Malolos Cockpit Arena" at Sitio Canlapan, Barangay Sto. Rosario, Malolos, Bulacan, since 1914. - Before the expiration of its license, Libangang sought its renewal for 1985 but the Acting Mayor of Malolos denied renewal predicated on Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions Nos. 6 & 9 disallowing its operation since it was within a prohibited area. - Because of the non-renewal, and pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802-A, Libangang filed with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) a complaint seeking a review of the action taken by the Mayor and the Council. Libangang also sought authority to resume operations pending hearing on the merits of the case. - PGC in a resolution allowed Libangang to resume operation. This prompted Municipality of Malolos (MALOLOS) to file a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with the Regional Trial Court. - February 22, 1985: PGC filed a Motion to Dismiss the Injunction Case on the ground that, under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review orders of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions is vested in the CA. - After hearing, the RTC, through Judge Manuel E. Yuzon, issued an Order, dated August 20, 1985, dismissing the Injunction Case for lack of merit and for want of jurisdiction. - MALOLOS filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This time, RTC Judge Felipe Villajuan, Jr. granted reconsideration and directed LIBANGANG to desist from operating its cockpit pending trial of the case. - PGC and Libangang filed with the CA a Petition to annul the Orders issued by RTC Judge Villajuan, Jr. CA reversed the RTC, and denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE(S)

WON the RTC has jurisdiction to review the Orders of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission; WON the Municipal Mayor's authority to issue a license to operate a cockpit is subject to review and supervision by PGC.

HELD 1. YES Reasoning Jurisdiction was lodged in the CA by virtue of BP 129. Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decision, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (B.P. Blg. 129) - Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission provides: Section 1. Appeals from the Commission. Parties aggrieved by ruling, award, order, decision or judgment of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, may appeal therefrom to the Intermediate Appellate Court, within the period and in the manner hereto provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. xxx - The PGC being statutorily at par with the RTC, applying by analogy the rule that a Court has no power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a Court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction so also must it be held that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the PGC and the subject matter of this controversy. 2. NO Ratio It is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. - The PGCs power to license is limited only to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over ordinary cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review and supervision. Reasoning It is clear that the PGC cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the municipal authorities in determining the applicant to

which a permit or license to operate a cockpit should be issued. - Reliance by the Appellate Court and the Solicitor General on Section 4, P.D. No. 1802-A is misplaced; "review and supervision" have their own peculiar meanings and are not synonymous with control. - As thus defined, the power of supervision does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate, for that comes under the power of control. What it can do only is to see to it that the subordinate performs his duties in accordance with law. The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the instrumentality of the cockpits of justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review over him. - Neither can the PGC derive its authority to issue the order authorizing the resumption of the operation of the Libangang Cockpit from Sec. 2, Rule IX of the Rules of Procedure of the PGC, stating that (t)he Commission may grant a temporary operation or closure of a cockpit xxx. clearly relates to temporary operation or closure upon violation of cockfighting laws and of the rules and regulations of the Commission, but not in respect of a license or permit to operate, the grant of which, as heretofore stated, appertains to the local authorities. DISPOSITION The judgment under review is REVERSED in so far as it holds that the power of City and Municipal Mayors to grant a license to operate a cockpit is subject to review and supervision by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, but AFFIRMED as regards the ruling that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and the subject matter of this case.

LTO V CITY OF BUTUAN 322 SCRA 805 VITUG, J.; January 20, 2000
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC FACTS - The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Butuan passed SP Ordinance 916-92 providing for, among other things,

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the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. The City of Butuan filed with the trial court a petition seeking the declaration of the validity of the SP Ordinance and the prohibition of the registration of tricycles-for-hire and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof by the LTO. LTO opposed. - The RTC of Butuan City held that the authority to register tricycles, the grant of the corresponding franchise, the issuance of tricycle drivers' license, and the collection of fees therefor had all been vested in the LGUs. Accordingly, it issued a permanent writ of injunction prohibiting and enjoining LTO from registering tricycles and issuing licenses to drivers of tricycles. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. LTO filed the instant petition. - Respondent asserts that the Local Government Code allows LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along with the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles. Petitioner explains that one of the functions of the national government that has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the LTFRB but not the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons licenses to drive such vehicles. ISSUE/S 1. WON the power of the LTO to register tricycles as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof has devolved to local government units HELD 1. NO Ratio The powers of LTO under RA 4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the country is clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code. Reasoning Registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory responsibilities are vested in the LTFRB. Under the Local Government Code, certain functions of the DOTC were transferred to the LGUs, which now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. Nevertheless, the power of LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles and to grant franchises for the operation thereof is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. The newly delegated powers pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO. Disposition The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

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damages.

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THE CITY Requisites for Creation Territorial Jurisdiction by Metes and bounds
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, v. CA 466 SCRA 78 2005 MARIANO JR V COMELEC 242 SCRA 211

ISSUE WON the abolition of the S.M. Lao Memorial City Emergency Hospital which reportedly resulted in the abolition of the positions held by the employees therein is valid. HELD YES Ratio The power of City Council of Ozamiz to abolish the hospital and the different positions therein under the factual ambience of the case is indisputable. The rule is well settled that the power to create an office carries the consequent prerogative to abolish it. Further, the abolition of an office neither means the removal nor separation therefrom of the occupant who is not accordingly covered by the protection of the security of tenure clause of the Constitution. However, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Reasoning There was no bad faith in this case. The hospitals opening, with the avowed purpose of specializing in maternity and children's cases, was dictated by circumstances beyond the control of respondents. The land where hospital is constructed is donated property. The donation is subj. to condition that once land is not used for a hospital, same will revert to the donor or his successors in interest. So, in order to prevent reversion of the property, to the prejudice of the city, the opening of the hospital was imperative and necessary in order to serve the interests of city residents. - By the subsequent opening of the hospital, it cannot be said that the reasons advanced for its previous abolition were untrue and constituted a mere subterfuge for the removal without cause of herein petitioners. The indubitable fact is that with the opening of the hospital, structural changes were made in order to attain economy, efficiency and prevent further losses, which were the very purposes sought to be attained by its prior abolition. The hospital is no longer rendering general but only limited medical services specializing in maternity and children's cases, and the number of officials and employees was reduced from 34 to only 11 - By reason of structural reorganization and changes in the operational objectives, the present hospital cannot be considered as the same hospital that was abolished. Substantial differences now exist between the old and the new hospital, altho the name remains the same in honor of the late Dr. Santiago Lao, predecessor in interest of donors, such being a condition of the donation. So, its opening alone, w/ proof that the positions created carried exactly the

Officials of the City Government

ANDRES MAMA JR. v CA G.R. No. 86517 REGALADO; April 30, 1991
NATURE Petition for Review of CA decision FACTS - Petitioners, with the exception of Mama, Jr., were either doctors, nurses, midwives or employees of the S.M. Lao Memorial City Emergency Hospital of Ozamiz City which was then engaged in rendering general medical services to the city residents. - On Feb. 2, 1988, respondent Jesus Sanciangco, Jr. and his co- respondents herein assumed office as the newly elected local officials of the City of Ozamiz. Sanciangco, was elected mayor, along with Caballero as vice-mayor, and Cortes, Roa, Tapayan, Neri, Pactolin and Ortega as city councilors. - On March 10, 1988, the city council passed its Resolution No. 61 abolishing the S.M. Lao Memorial City Emergency Hospital of Ozamiz City allegedly due to losses incurred and poor services rendered to the constituents. - Said resolution was duly approved on March 15, 1988 by respondent mayor and vice-mayor. Parenthetically, the city treasurer certified in writing that as of Dec. 31, 1987, the Ozamiz City General Fund had incurred a cash overdraft of P267,141.90 and its Retained Earnings Account reflected a deficit of P3,133,151.91. Hence this petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and

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same functions and duties as those abolished, is not sufficient basis for a finding of bad faith. - It is within the legal competence of the City Council of Ozamiz, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to create such other offices as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the city government, or consolidate the functions of any one of such offices with another in the interest of efficiency and economy. It may also create, consolidate, and reorganize city offices and positions wholly supported by local funds. The city council has no obligation to keep a useless office or a position that is neither needed nor in the public interest by reason of, as in this case, financial losses and incapacity to render adequate public services. - The city council may take such course as it may deem necessary, expedient or conducive to the public good. In the exercise of its discretionary functions, good faith is always presumed, and on the party alleging bad faith lies the burden of proof. Failure of petitioners to present evidence to prove bad faith of respondents leaves Disposition CA decision AFFIRMED.

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Chief Executive Powers Power to Enforce Laws and Ordinances

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, CABIGAO AND TUMBOKON V ATIENZA GR 156052 CORONA; March 7, 2007
FACTS -Nov 20, 2001: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor approved it on Nov 28, 2001. It became effective Dec 28, 2001, after publication. -Ord. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to LGUs, a principle described as the power inherent in a govt to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society. This is evident from Sec 1 and 3 thereof which state:

SEC 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of those portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west, PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the northeast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. xxx xxx xxx SEC 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under Sec 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of 6 months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed. -Among the businesses situated in the area are the socalled "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Phils), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. -However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following: Sec 1. Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, immediate removal/decommissioning process of 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx Sec 2. Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.

Sec 3. The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES. -The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following: Sec 1. The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof. Sec 2. The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program. Sec 3. The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES compliance with the provisions of this MOU. Sec 4. The CITY OF MANILA and the natl government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties. -The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of 6 months from July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on Jan 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution 13 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. -Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on Dec 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ord. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. ISSUES 1. WON respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance 8027 and order removal of the Pandacan Terminals HELD 1. YES. Ratio Reasoning Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b2) of the LGC (RA 7160), to enforce Ord. 8027. Instead, he allowed them to stay. Respondents defense is that Ord. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions. However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and

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MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation. A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a welldefined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila (SJS -political party registered with the COMELEC; has its offices in Manila; many members from Manila), petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the citys ordinances. The LGC imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ord. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ord. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr: These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

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The question now is whether the MOU and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondents duty to enforce Ord. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the 2nd issue raised by petitioners, that is, WON the MOU and the Resolutions of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ord. 8027. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ord. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ord. 8027. Ord. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the Sep 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

Issuance of Permits and Licenses

GORDON VS. VERIDIANO II 167 SCRA 51 CRUZ; November 8, 1988
FACTS - The San Sebastian Drug Store (SSDS) and the Olongapo City Drug Store (OCDS), both owned by respondent Rosalinda Yambao, are located a few meters from each other in the same building in Olongapo City. They were covered by Mayor's Permits issued for the year 1980 and licenses to operate issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the same year. - In 1980, a joint team of agents from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a "test buy" at SSDS and was sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. worth P410 without a doctor's prescription. A report on the operation was submitted to Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City. He issued a letter summarily revoking the stores

Mayor's Permit of SSDS "for rampant violation of the Pharmacy Law and the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." - Acting on the same investigation report of the "testbuy," and after hearing, FDA Administrator Arsenio Regala directed the closure of the drug store for 3 days and its payment of a P100 fine for violation of R.A. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to Yambao against a repetition of the infraction. Later, the FDA lifted its closure order after noting that the penalties imposed had already been discharged and allowed the drug store to resume operations. Valium is not a prohibited drug, which is why the penalty imposed was only a 3-day closure and a fine of P100. - Yambao wrote a letter to Mayor Gordon seeking reconsideration of the revocation of the Mayor's Permit. Having received no reply, she filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus and damages, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, against Mayor Gordon. On the same day, Yambao requested permission from the FDA to exchange the locations of the two stores for reasons of "business preference." The request was granted but Mayor Gordon disapproved the transfers and suspended the Mayor's Permit for the OCDS. The CFI issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against Mayor Gordon. ISSUE WON Mayor Gordon may, in the exercise of his power, prevent the operation of the drug stores previously permitted by the FDA. HELD NO (SSDS) and YES (OCDS). Ratio The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place. Reasoning If the FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the requirements of the general laws and the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon his ascertainment that the conditions as applied particularly to Olongapo City have been complied with, it is only for the violation of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.

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- In this case, the closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store was ordered by the FDA for violation of its own conditions, which it had the primary power to enforce. By revoking the mayor's permit on the same ground for which the SSDS had already been penalized by the FDA, the mayor was in effect reversing the decision of the latter on a matter that came under its jurisdiction. As the infraction involved the pharmacy and drug laws which the FDA had the direct responsibility to execute, the mayor had no authority to interpose his own findings on the matter and substitute them for the decision already made by the FDA. - It would have been different if the offense condoned by the FDA was a violation of a city ordinance. The city executive may ignore such condonation and revoke the mayor's permit just the same. In this situation, he would be acting properly because the enforcement of the city ordinance is his own prerogative. In this case, the condition allegedly violated related to a national law, not to a matter of merely local concern, and so came under the jurisdiction of the FDA. - Factual findings of administrative authorities are accorded great respect because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this Court, are concluded by such findings in the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present in the case at bar. For all his experience in the enforcement of city ordinances, Mayor Gordon cannot claim the superior aptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement of the pharmacy and drug addiction laws. He should therefore also be prepared, like the courts of justice themselves, to accept its decisions on this matter. - It is also worth noting that the San Sebastian Drug Store was penalized by the FDA only after a hearing at which Yambao appeared and testified. By contrast, the revocation of the mayor's permit was merely communicated to her in a letter without any hearing. If only for the violation of due process, the mayor's arbitrary action can be annulled. - The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit for Olongapo City Drug Store was based on its transfer to the site of the SSDS as approved by the FDA but without permission from the mayor. On this matter, the Court believes that the final decision rested with the mayor. The condition violated related more to the location in Olongapo City of business establishments in general than to the regulation of drug stores in particular. It therefore came under Mayor Gordon's jurisdiction.

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- The reason for disapproving the transfer was the violation of the Mayor's Permit which by its terms was valid only at the place stated therein. We find that that reason was valid enough. The permit clearly allowed the drug store to operate in the address given and not elsewhere. No hearing was necessary because the transfer without the mayor's permission is not disputed and was in fact impliedly admitted by Yambao. The Mayor's Permit for SSDS could also have been validly suspended for the same reason were it not for the fact that such permit was revoked on the more serious ground of violation of the Pharmacy Law and the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. - It is understood, however, that the suspension should be deemed valid only as the two drug stores have not returned to their original sites as specified in their respective permits. Indefinite suspension will amount to a permanent revocation, which will not be a commensurate penalty with the degree of the violation being penalized. The Court adds that the request for transfer, if properly made, may not be validly denied in the absence of a clear showing that the transfer sought will prejudice the residents of the city. As the two drug stores are only a few meters from each other, and in the same building, there would seem to be no reason why the mere exchange of their locations should not be permitted. Dispositive Orders of the CFI MODIFIED in the sense that suspension of Mayor's Permit for OCDS considered valid but only until the two drug stores return to their original sites as specified in the FDA licenses and the mayor's permits or until the request for transfer, if made, is approved by the petitioner. The rest of the said Orders are AFFIRMED.

Authority to File Suits

CITY OF CALOOCAN v CA (GOTESCO) G.R. No. 145004 TINGA; May 3, 2006
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City passed Ordinance No. 068 authorizing the city mayor to negotiate and enter into a contract of sale of a certain patrimonial property of the city.

-Thereafter, Mayor Asistio and Jose C. Go of Ever Gotesco executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said property. - COA disapproved the sale. Later, COA approved on condition that the selling price is pegged at P8,926.39/sq.meter. - Sanggunian passed an ordinance amending Ord. No. 068, directing that an amended deed of absolute sale be executed, the terms and conditions of which be pursuant to the COA decision. The ordinance was initially vetoed by then incumbent mayor Malonzo, on the ground that since the earlier deed of sale was valid and subsisting it was not incumbent upon him to execute an amended deed of sale over the same property; the Sanggunian, however, passed Resolution No. 0609 overriding the veto. - Gotesco executed an "Express Consent to the Novation of the Deed of Absolute Sale" with an "Amended Deed of Absolute Sale". Malonzo received the documents but refused to sign. - Gotesco tendered the payment for the property, as well as transfer tax and real estate tax to the City Treasurer and to Malonzo but these payments were refused. - Gotesco filed a civil case seeking the consignation of the purchase price and tax payments. (C-18274) - Meanwhile, the LRA allowed the registration of the deed of sale with the Register of Deeds. A TCT was issued in Gotescos name. - Caloocan City filed a petition for prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order before the RTC of Caloocan (C-18337). During the pendency of this suit, another case was filed for annulment of sale and cancellation of title (C-18308). - Gotesco moved for the dismissal of the C-18337 on the ground of forum shopping, but its motion was denied by the trial court. - Gotesco filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA reversed its earlier ruling and ordered the dismissal of C-18337. ISSUES 1. WON the mayor has authority to file cases on behalf of his city 2. WON there was forum shopping HELD 1. YES - Sec. 455, LGC provides the powers and duties of a city mayor. - From the provision, it is clear that the mayor has the authority to file suits "for the recovery of funds and property" on behalf of the city, even without the prior authorization from the Sanggunian.

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- Being the proper party to file such suits, the mayor must necessarily be the one to sign the certification against forum-shopping, and not the City Legal Officer, who, despite being an official of the City, was merely its counsel and not a party to the case. Thus, the certification against forum-shopping in C-18337 is defective for having been signed by the City Legal Officer. 2.YES Ratio There is forum-shopping where a litigant sues the same party against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending. The defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other/s; and, a final judgment is one that would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Reasoning - The cases involve the same principal parties: Caloocan City and Gotesco Investments, while the other parties were merely impleaded as nominal parties. Absolute identity of parties is not required. It is enough that there is substantial identity of parties. - There is identity of causes of action if the same evidence will sustain the second action. The principle applies even if the relief sought in the two cases may be different. C-18337 and C-18308 are based on the same set of facts, that is, the failure to execute an Amended Deed of Sale pursuant to City Ordinance No. 068. On the other hand, C-18308 and C-18274 question the nature of, and the procedure undertaken in the transfer of ownership of the subject land. Basically, the same set of evidence will have to be presented to support the causes of action in the 3 cases, which as indicated earlier is characterized by singularity. Thus, a finding in one will sustain a finding in the other. The causes of action in C-18337 being similarly subject of judicial inquiry in C-18274 and C18308, C-18337 is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia. Moreover, the cases are intimately related and/or intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. Dispositive The petition is DISMISSED.

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To All Municipalities, Provinces

Cities

Appointment, Qualifications (Treasurer)

MACALINCAG AND CARLOS V. CHANG GR 96058 May 6, 1992
FACTS - Macalincag approved a formal administrative charge for dishonesty, neglect of duty & acts prejudicial to best interest of service, against Chang (ie disbursing an amt during election ban period, disbursing an amt as financial assistance to bereaved families, for merienda of municipal employees, etc) - The basis of the charge was the COA Report and complaints of Councilor Brillante. - Macalincag issued Order of preventive suspension against Chang. - OIC furnished Chang by mail, w/ copy of the order. - Chang filed petition for prohibition w/ writ of prelim injunction. - Court issued order denying Changs application. MFR was filed by Chang. TC issued an order reconsidering and setting aside its previous order. - TC rendered decision in favor of Chang. Hence this petition. ISSUES WON Sec of Finance (Macalincag) has jurisdiction to issue Order of Preventive Suspension against acting municipal treasurer of Makati (Chang) HELD YES. - Under PD 807 or Civil Service law, designation of replacement isnt a requirement to give effect to preventive suspension. - LGC provides for automatic assumption of asst municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of municipal treasurer. - Order of Prev. Susp. became effective upon Changs receipt, w/c is presumed when he filed complaint in

TC. Designation of OIC to replace Chang is immaterial to effectivity of latters suspension. - Power to discipline is vested under PD 8007 in heads of depts, instrumentalities, etc. Office of Municipal Treas is under Dept of Finance. Sec of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue Order of Prev. Susp. Acting Sec Macalincag acted w/in his jurisdiction.

Qualifications, Powers, Duties (The Budget Officer)

EDITHA L. LIRA v. CSC[BRENDA JARANILLA]
G.R. No. L-62133 FERNAN;September 30, 1986

Appointive Local Officials Common

Nature: Certiorari FACTS: -Editha L. Lira, an employee of the city government of Iloilo City holding the position of Barangay Field Coordinator, was detailed in the Budget, Fiscal Management and Fiscal Research Division of the Office of the City Mayor until her appointment to the position of Budget Officer of Iloilo City. -Jaranilla, on the other hand, was the Chief, Budget Operations Division, Office of the City Treasurer, Iloilo City until her appointment as Internal Auditor in the Office of the City Treasurer. -When the City Government of Iloilo adopted in 1979 a Position Classification and Pay Plan [PCPP] pursuant to PD No. 1136, otherwise known as "The Local Government Personnel Administration and Compensation Plan Decree of 1977", the local body tasked with the classification of city government's positions reclassified, among others, the position of Barangay Field Coordinator to Budget Officer while the position of Chief, Budget Operations Divisions of the City Treasurer's Office was reclassified to Internal Auditor. -Upon approval of the PCPP of Iloilo City by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration, the Mayor of Iloilo City appointed Lira as Budget Officer effective January 1, 1979. -Jaranilla, on the other hand, was appointed as Internal Auditor under the PCPP of Iloilo City on February 18, 1980 effective January 1, 1979.

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-6 months later, the City Mayor sent to Lira a Notice of Salary Adjustment increasing her salary as "Budget Officer in the City Budget Office" from P18,316.80 to P35,532.00 per annum pursuant to LOI No. 1039 -Jaranilla filed a protest with the Civil Service Regional Office No. VI, Iloilo City contesting the issuance of the Notice of Salary Adjustment to Lira, claiming, among others, that the position of Budget Officer, as reclassified from Barangay Field Coordinator, and Lira's appointment thereto were not in implementation of PDNo. 1375 and its implementing letter of instruction, LOI No. 1039. Thus, Jaranilla concluded, said appointment was null and void for lack of legal basis, and she prayed that she instead be appointed as City Budget Officer. -Jaranilla's protest was referred to the Office of City Mayor Luis C. Herrera, who in an undated decision dismissed said protest of Jaranilla for lack of merit. -Jaranilla appealed to the Merit System Board of the CSC which in a decision declared as null and void the notice of salary adjustment for the position of City Budget Officer of Iloilo City issued to Lira, and ordered that Jaranilla, who appears fully qualified and held the highest position in the Budget Operations Division of the City Treasurer's Office should be appointed as City Budget Officer of Iloilo City. -Lira filed an MR but the Merit System Board of the Civil Service Commission denied said motion. -On appeal, the CSC likewise dismissed the appeal and ordered the immediate appointment of Jaranilla as City Budget Officer of Iloilo City- declaring that Jaranilla's qualification exceed those of Lira in terms of experience and potential considering her previous position as Chief of the Budget Operations Division in the City Treasurer's Office which pursuant to PD 477 is the Local Budget Staff whose qualified personnel should have been transferred to the new Budget Office upon its establishment in accordance with PD 1375. * -Lira filed a MFR but was also denied. ISSUE: WON the appointment of Lira to the reclassified position of Budget Officer in the Office of the City Mayor pursuant to the Position Classification and Pay Plan of Iloilo City was in substantial compliance with the requirements of appointment to the position of City Budget Officer a new position created under. PD No. 1375 and its implementing letter of instruction LOI NO. 1039 as a result of the transfer of the local government budget administration from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of the Budget. HELD: NO. -With the enactment of PD No. 1375, the local government budget administration was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of the Budget through the creation of a Budget Office in each local government unit. In other words, any office,

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section, division or unit in the Office of the Mayor other than the Local Budget Staff of the Treasurer's Office performing budgetary functions before the transfer of the local government budget administration to the Ministry of the Budget is but a budget policy- determining arm of the local chief executive. -In the instant case, the Budget, Fiscal Mgmt and Fiscal Research Division of the Office of the City Mayor of Iloilo City where petitioner was temporarily detailed falls in this category. Otherwise, the said division would be performing functions which duplicate, if not overlap, the functions of the Local Budget Staff of the City Treasurer's Office mandated under Sec 24 of PD No. 477 to provide technical and staff services to the Local Chief Executive. -The contested position of City Budget Officer under PD No. 1375 is a new position created as a result of the transfer of the local government budget administration from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of the Budget. Consequently, no particular employee could claim that he or she is the incumbent Budget Officer. Such being the case, the contested position of City Budget Officer is open to all applicants provided that they are qualified and eligible. -Basically, in addition to the three [3]-year experience in the treasury service or its equivalent number of years of service in budgeting or in any related field or its substitute as provided under Local Budget Circular No. 6, any prospective appointee to the position of City Budget Officer must meet the minimum qualification requirements for provincial, city and municipal treasurers, and his/her appointment by the local government head shall be subject to civil service law and approval of the Commissioner of the Budget, now Minister of the Budget. While it is true that a local chief executive is granted wide discretion and prerogative in his choice of an appointee to a new office, and in determining who possesses the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgment, the appointing officer's exercise of discretion is circumscribed in that he is duty-bound to consider only those who are qualified and eligible. -It is not disputed that Lira was appointed as Budget Officer by the Iloilo City Mayor on February 1, 1980, but it must be recalled however, that her appointment as Budget Officer was the result of the reclassification of her previous position as Barangay Field Coordinator while she was temporarily detailed in the Budget, Fiscal Management and Fiscal Research Division of the Office of the City Mayor pursuant to the PCPP of Iloilo City. It cannot, TF be said that said appointment was in implementation of the provisions of LOI No. 1039 pursuant to the mandate of PD No. 1375 regarding the

creation of a regular Budget Office in each local government unit. -Extending appointments to an office in the guise of complying with the requirements of P.D. 1375 on the creation of the City Budget Office is repugnant not only to its enabling statute but to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations as well. Section 19 par. III of the Civil Service Law provides that opportunity for government employment shall be open to all qualified citizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service. This may be implemented effectively only through the judicious exercise of the best judgment and discretion of the appointing authority. The issuance of the notice of salary adjustment increasing the salary of the Budget Officer from P18,316.80 to P35,532.00-the salary of a regular City Budget Officer equivalent to the rank and salary of a Department Head- cannot justifiably cure the defect of lack of the minimum qualification requirements of petitioner Lira to assume the office of the regular City Budget Officer as envisioned by P.D. 1375 aside from the non-compliance with the procedural requirements before a valid appointment is issued as required by the civil service rules and regulations. -It is interesting to note that Local Budget Circular No. 8 dated November 20, 1980 require that "In case a Local Budget Officer has been appointed as such prior to June 19, 1980 pursuant to Local Budget Circular No. 2 as amended by Local Budget Circular No. 6, he shall be issued a new appointment to the position as elevated in rank and salary under LOI No. 1039 with the position title of Provincial, City, Municipal Budget Officer, effective June 19, 1980." Records reveal that she was not issued a new appointment. Even if she was issued a new appointment, still she cannot validly claim the contested position of City Budget Officer since it was not approved by the Budget Commissioner, now the Minister of Budget. Appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed. Worse, there is no showing at all that the City Mayor of Iloilo City has reported to the Minister of the Budget his compliance with the requirements for the creation of the local budget office as imposed by LOI No. 1039, par. 5. Dispositive: Petition is DISMISSED. The appointment of private respondent Brenda R. Jaranilla as City Budget Officer of Iloilo City as ordered by the Civil Service Merit System Board and the Civil Service Commission should be effected immediately. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. * The Commission noted the following:

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Jaranilla holds the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce from the Far Eastern University. She is a Certified Public Accountant [RA 1080] with more than six [6] years experience in budgeting work having served as Tax Examiner from January 16, 1974 to June 1, 1975 and a Chief, Budget Operations Division in the City Treasurer's Office, Iloilo City, from June 2, 1975 until said position was reclassified to Internal Auditor effective in 1979. She is a Director of the Government Association of Certified Public Accountants and a member of the Philippine Association for Government Budget Administration, Local and National Taxation Consumer's Cooperative, and Institute on Civil Service. On her part, Lira is also a graduate of Bachelor of Science in Commerce [Accounting major] from the University of San Agustin Iloilo City; a Career Service Professional [Local Government] eligible, with budgeting experience of a little over two [2] years as of the effectivity of her appointment as Budget Officer on January 1, 1979. She was an Accounting Aide from April 1, 1976 to September 30, 1976 or about six [6] months; Statistician from December 1, 1976 to January 1, 1978 or for one [1] year and two [2] months; and Barangay Field Coordinator from August 7, 1978 to December 31, 1978 or for more than four [4] months. She acquired her budgeting experience when she was detailed in the Budget, Fiscal Research and Fiscal Management Division in the Office of the City Mayor. Except the orientation course on management on September 4-7, 1977 at Cebu City, all other seminars/workshops attended by Lira were subsequent to her appointment as Budget Officer. xxx xxx xxx Significantly, we credited the two [2] years of relevant experience gained by Lira when she was detailed in 1979 to the Budget, Fiscal Research and Fiscal Management Division, Office of the City Mayor. However, we found that she lacks the required budgeting experience of three years at the inception of the protest case on November 8, 1980 while Jaranilla has already gained more than the minimum of three years relevant experience. Jaranilla's appointment as Division Chief of Budget Operations before it was reclassified to Internal Auditor will attest to her potential in contrast to the position of Barangay Field Coordinator.

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- A civil case was filed by spouses Genoblazo on a claim of ownership by extraordinary acquisitive prescription of 2 lots in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and the improvements thereon. They also sought to enjoin the de los Reyeses from further demolishing or destroying the remnants of the structures built on the land, sought recovery damages, and determination of the issue of ownership over the land. - The de los Reyeses claimed absolute ownership of the lots in question as evidenced by TCT No. 160694 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, and relied on the regularity and lawful issuance of the Demolition Order No. 014 S-1984 dated June 11, 1984 issued by the City Engineers' Office, Lands and Building Official. - The RTC judge ordered the Reyeses to stop doing acts that will disposses the Genoblazos of their shelter, and the Genoblazos to not introduce any improvements. Despite the order of the court, the Genoblazos added improvements on their barongbarong. Genoblazos asked the court for writ of preliminary injunction to stop the demolition. A hearing was conducted. - The RTC found in favor of the Reyeses, upholding the validity of the TCT and the Demolition Order as being validly issued by the City Engr and Bldg Official under the National Bldg Code. ISSUE WON the Demolition Order was valid (WON the Bldg Official had authority to issue such order, considering that under the CC, it is the Health Officer that determines the abatement of nuisances) RULING YES. - The issue presented before the court a quo is not really whether the structures can be considered a nuisance under the Civil Code but whether there has been a violation of the National Building Code so as to warrant an order for the demolition of said structure. Here, the Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned demolition order in view of his finding that the disputed structures are dangerous buildings and -structures within the meaning of the National Building Code. - The fact that the buildings in question could also constitute nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official from issuing the assailed demolition order. Indeed, the National Building Code itself provides that: When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the Provisions of articles 482 and 484 to

707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines [Section 214, par 2].

PATAGOC V CSC 185 SCRA 411 Cortes; May 14, 1990

FACTS -Petitioner was appointed City Engineer by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan on December 1, 1988, to take the place of the deceased city engineer, Dionisio Esperat. -On December 6, 1988, private respondent, the incumbent Assistant City Engineer, filed a protest against petitioner's appointment with the Civil Service Regional Office on the ground that he was next-inrank. -The Civil Service Regional Director, in a decision dated January 6, 1989, ruled against petitioner, and revoked his appointment -Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission, but it was dismissed -Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied -Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the Commission's action on petitioner's appointment. ISSUE WON the CSC may disapprove the appointment of a City Engineer by the City Mayor and order the appointment of someone else HELD No. -The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code are very clear and need not be interpreted. Petitioner's appointment is subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. And, under the provisions of P.D. No. 807, the position belongs to the career service. -Section 185 of the Local Government Code provides that "[n]o person shall be appointed city engineer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a licensed civil engineer, and has been an assistant city engineer or has engaged in the practice of his profession for at least five years." -It is not disputed that both petitioner and private respondent are qualified for the position. But the Commission is of the view that it can disapprove petitioner's appointment and direct the appointment of private respondent to the disputed position, considering that the latter is next-in-rank.

Qualifications, Powers, Duties (The Engineer)

GENOBLAZO V CA 174 SCRA 124 CORTES
FACTS

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-It must again be emphasized that the power of appointment is essentially discretionary and that the Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointment power. The Commission, under P.D. No. 807, may only approve or disapprove the appointment after determining whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. It cannot order or direct the appointment of a successful protestant. -In the case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court said: Appointment is an essentially dictionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should have the qualifications required by law. If he does, then he cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified whose appointment should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. -All the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on an appointment made by the proper authorities. -Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor. -In Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, it was held that: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.

Page 34 Qualifications, Powers, Duties (Health officer)

ALBA V PEREZ G.R. No. L-65917 PARAS; September 24, 1987

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NATURE Petition for review by certiorari from the decision rendered by respondent judge granting the petition for mandamus filed by Dr. Francisco A. Perez, City Health Officer of San Pablo City FACTS -Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health Worker for 1980 by the Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an awardee, Dr. Perez was granted by the Ministry of Health a twostep salary increase in accordance with the merit increase program as enunciated in Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 562. - Ministry of Health requested the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, which is paying Dr. Perez' salary in full to appropriate the amount corresponding to the merit increase in its current budget. For lack of legal basis, the Bureau of Local Government opposed the proposed merit increase because the provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only to officials/employees in the national government, and consequently, awardee Dr. Perez was not entitled thereto, since he is an employee of the local government as provided for in the charter of San Pablo City. -This prompted Dr. Perez to request the Ministry of Health to make the corresponding allocation to issue a notice of salary adjustment effective January 1, 1981. The Minister of Justice, upon a query made by the Ministry of Health, dated November 20, 1981, acknowledged that the merit increase program applies only to the officials/employees of the national government but declared Dr. Perez as one such official or employee and concluded that the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase to him. -Relying on such opinion, the Ministry of Health issued to respondent Dr. Perez on Dec 1, 1981 a notice of salary adjustment which release of the amount was denied by the Office of the Budget and Management. Dr. Perez made his appeal to the Ministry of Health who forwarded it, recommending favorable action thereon to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The latter referred the appeal to the Minister of the Budget who affirmed his earlier

decision of disallowing the merit increase and reiterating the same reasons. -A petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Budget and Management to pay the merit increase was then filed by Dr. Perez before the lower court which granted it. Petitioners Arguments 1. The position of private respondent as the City Health Officer of San Pablo City is embraced in Sec. 7 of Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 1136 which states among other things that the salary plan provided for in Sec. 8 of the same decree shall cover the City Officer, among other officials, whose salary shall be paid out of city funds and therefore a local government employee whose position does not appear in the list of national government employees defined under another law (P.D. 985). 2. The constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such appropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the payment of the merit salary increase because such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus. 3. The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an employee of the national government would have far reaching effects such that all other city health officers and local officials similarly situated would also be so entitled to an personal benefits given to national employee. Dr. Perez's exemplary accomplishment which merited for him the grant to a two-step increase must yield to the overriding economic consideration of availability of funds which the government must set aside for the purpose. ISSUE WON Dr. Perez, City Health Officer is a national official (thereby entitling him to the salary increase) HELD YES -Art. IV of the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA #5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940) states that the position of a City Health Officer is not included among the heads of the regular departments of the city but included among the national officials performing municipal functions under the direct control of the Health Minister and not the city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the same charter. -Such principle is reiterated in the Decentralization Act of 1967 which shows that the appointing authority is the Health Minister and not the local officials. Petitioner Minister of the Budget admitted thru the testimony of its representative, Alice S. Torres, chief

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of the Compensation and Position Classification and a specialist thereon that the City Health Officer is under the administrative and technical supervision of the Ministry of Health. Be it noted that, Section 7 of PD 1136 relied upon by petitioners provides that the basic salary of the City Health Officer is paid from city funds. However, the last paragraph of the same Sec. 7, excludes the city health officer from the classification of local government official as can be gathered from the phrase "... except those occupied by (a) officials whose compensation is fixed in the constitution, Presidential Decrees and other laws and (b) officials and employees who are under the direct supervision and control of the National Government or its agencies and who are paid wholly or partially from national funds." -Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. -Private respondent Dr. Perez is a career official of the Ministry of Health and not of San Pablo. Promotions in the Ministry are covered by a Merit Promotion Plan of postgraduate studies and academic qualifications, extensive training, experience, and highly satisfactory performances. -There is no basis in petitioner's allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Respondent Dr. Perez has been proven to be a national government official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health Ministry wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus. Disposition Petition is hereby DENIED.

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designated Dr. Sani (then the Provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH) to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office. - September 15, 1993: Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor issued Office Order NO. 07 designating Dr. Saber as the OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. -Dr. Sani challenged the Memorandum transferring him in a complaint filed with the RTC claiming therein that he was appointed as provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH in a permanent capacity. -Dr. Saber filed a petitioner for quo warranto with a prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is lawfully designated OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The CA issued a TRO enjoining Pandi from further discharging his functions as OIC of the IPHO-APGH. -Dr. Sani filed a Motion for Intervention. - November 6, 1993: After President Ramos issued E.O. 133 transferring the powers & functions of he DOH in the region to the Regional Government of ARMM, Dr. Macacua (as DOH-ARMM Sec.-Designate) issued a 2nd Memorandum reiterating the designation of Dr. Pandi as OIC of the IPHOAPGH and the detail of Dr. Sani to the Regional office in Cotabato City. -Drs. Pandi & Macacua sought the dismissal of Dr. Sabers petitioner on the ground that the issues therein had become moot & academic because of the enactment of the ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the execution of the Memo of agreement between the DOH-National Government and the ARMM Regional Government. -CA: designation of Dr. Saber as OIC of IPHO-APGH upheld; the Provincial Governor has the power to appoint the provincial health officer under the LGC of 1991; Dr. Sani cannot claim to have permanent designation as provincial health officer because he was not appointed by the Provincial Governor. ISSUE WON the Provincial Governor can designate the OIC of the IPHO-APGH (WON the appointment of Saber is valid) at that time HELD (NOTE: MAY MAHABANG HISTORY PART SA ORIGINAL CASE. Just see the case) NO. Reasoning. When Saber was appointed by the provincial governor on September 15, 1993, the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the

PANDI V. CA 380 SCRA 436 CARPIO, April 11, 2002

NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 FACTS - August 9, 1993: Dr. Macacua, Regional Director & Sec. of Health of the DOH-ARMM issued a Memorandum designating Dr. Pandi (then DOHARMM Assistant Regional Secretary), as OIC of the IPHO-APGH in Lanao del Sur. Dr. Macacua also

official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void. - The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial health office. -on reliance on Section 478, LGC: misplaced; not a grant of powers to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers but simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so; LGC did not amend the Organic Act of 1989 -as regards SANI: his first appointment was void. When he was detailed in Cotabato City, the powers and functions of the DOH were not yet transferred to the Regional Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM. Thus, the regional Director/ARMM Secretary of Healths directive assigning Sani to Regional Office in Cotabato City is void. As regards the November 6, 1993 Memorandum reiterating Sanis detail, since it was issued after the issuance of EO 133 which expressly transferred supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Regional Department of Health to the Head of the Regional Department of Health, and since it is within the authority of the ARMM Secretary of Health, it is valid. -as regards Pandi: August 9, 1993 designation by the ARMM Secretary of Health is VOID since at that time, the latter did not exercise yet supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, November 6, 1993 designation is valid. The designation of Pandi as OIC, however, while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is made. -As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the

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administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation. -Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the first an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to "exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government." Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor. From then on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 15, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SET ASIDE. The designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr. Amer A. Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur is declared void. On the other hand, the designation on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur, and the assignment on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Mamasao Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, are declared valid. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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GRIO v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 91602 February 26, 1991; Gancayco
FACTS - Upon Sixto Demaisips resignation as Provincial Attorney of Iloilo, OIC Governor Licurgo Tirador decided to appoint, among others, Arandela as the Provincial Attorney. - In February 1988, Simplicio Grio assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One month later, he informed Arandela and all the legal officers at the Provincial Attorney's Office about his decision to terminate their services. In his letter, Grio made mention of an article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the Provincial Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and which "undermined that trust and confidence" that he reposed on them. Demaisip was reappointed by Governor Grio as the Provincial Attorney; the latter, on the other hand, arranged the replacements of the other legal officers. - In March 1988, Governor Grio formally terminated the services of the respondents on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. This action taken by the governor was appealed by respondents to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission. - In March 1989, the Merit Systems Board issued an Order declaring the respondents' termination illegal and ordering that they be immediately restored to their positions with back salaries and other emoluments due them. This was appealed by petitioner Grio to the CSC. - In a Resolution, the Civil Service Commission affirmed the Order of the Merit Systems Protection Board, and directed that the respondents be restored to their former legal positions and be paid back salaries and other benefits. Petitioners MR denied. ISSUE WON the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates are primarily confidential in nature so that the services of those holding the said items can be terminated upon loss of confidence. HELD YES. Cadiente vs. Santos: The position of a City Legal Officer is one which is "primarily confidential." The position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be extended to said officer. The relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the counsel selected. The phrase "primarily confidential" "denotes not only confidence in the

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Note sa class: d ko rin mabura ung break (by compiler)

Qualifications, Powers, Duties (Legal Officer)

aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state. - The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endure; and thus their cessation involves no removal. When such confidence is lost and the officer holding such position is separated from the service, such cessation entails no removal but an expiration of his term. Officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers. - When an incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and the pleasure turns into a displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office, his term merely expires, in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon expiration of said term. The main difference between the former, the primary confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely expired. - Should the ruling in Cadiente be made applicable to a provincial attorney? YES. Cadiente must be applied because by the nature of the functions of a provincial attorney and a city legal officer, their positions are both primarily confidential. A city legal officer appointed by a city mayor to work for and in behalf of the city has for its counterpart in the province a provincial attorney appointed by the provincial governor. In the same vein, a municipality may have a municipal attorney who is to be named by the appointing power. The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under RA No. 5185 which categorized them together as positions of "trust"; both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser and legal officer for

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the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services are precisely categorized by law to be "trusted services." - The fact that the position of respondent Arandela as provincial attorney has already been classified as one under the career service and certified as permanent by the CSC cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential nature. As in Cadiente where the position of the city legal officer was duly attested as permanent by the CSC before this Court declared that the same was primarily confidential, this Court holds that the position of Arandela as the provincial attorney of Iloilo is also a primarily confidential position. To rule otherwise would be tantamount to classifying two positions with the same nature and functions in two incompatible categories. This being the case, and following the principle that the tenure of an official holding a primarily confidential position ends upon loss of confidence, the Court finds that private respondent Arandela was not dismissed or removed from office when his services were terminated. His term merely expired. - The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person or a government functionary. The personal character of the relationship prohibits its delegation in favor of another attorney without the client's consent. - However, the legal work involved, as distinguished from the relationship, can be delegated. The practice of delegating work of a counsel to his subordinates is apparent in the Office of the Provincial Attorney wherein it can be gleaned from the power granted to such officer to exercise administrative supervision and control over the acts and decision of his subordinates. - It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in the civil service where lawyers act as counsel in confidential and non-confidential positions by simply looking at the proximity of the position in question in relation to that of the appointing authority. Occupants of such positions would be considered confidential employees if the predominant reason they were chosen by the appointing authority is the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which measures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of state. - This implies that positions in the civil service of such nature would be limited to those not separated from the position of the appointing authority by an intervening public officer, or series of public officers, in the bureaucratic hierarchy. This is an additional reason why the positions of "City Legal Officer" and "Private Secretary to the President" were considered primarily confidential by the Court. On the other hand, a customs policeman serving in the Harbor Patrol, in relation to the Commissioner of Customs,

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and an executive assistant, stenographer, or clerk in the Office of the President, were not considered so by the Court.

RAMOS V CA 269 SCRA 34

OTHER PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO LGUs Settlement of Boundary Dispute

THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD vs. ROSAL MEDIALDEA; September 24, 1991 Athe
NATURE Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court FACTS - On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc, formerly a barrio of the municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios. - A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the municipality of Sogod with the latter claiming that the former exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios abovementioned but also over other ten (10) barrios allegedly belonging to Sogod. - The Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing the holding of a plebiscite to determine whether the people in these barrios would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc. The plebiscite was conducted on August 1, 1952, and the results thereof show that more votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those in favor of Bontoc. - On April 4, 1959, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to the President of the Philippines and/or to the Congress of the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be amended so as to include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc, the following barrios claimed by Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not included in said law, namely: Baugo, Himakilo, Esperanza, Hibagwan,

Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab The Board also recommended that a law be enacted annexing to the municipality of Sogod the following barrios which are very near Sogod and are claimed by the latter but are included in the law creating Bontoc, namely: Laogawan, Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and Pangi he board further recommended that the boundary line between the two municipalities be placed at Granada Creek. - On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines, promulgated Executive Order No. 368, which approved the recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and sitios which shall compose the municipalities of Bontoc and Sogod. The executive order also specified Granada Creek as the boundary line separating Bontoc and Sogod. - However the President of the Philippines sent a telegram to the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte suspending the implementation of EO 368. - The Provincial Board of Southern Leyte passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the implementation of Executive Order 368. The Board also created a committee to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in the barrios and sitios affected by Executive Order 368 and to finally settle the boundary dispute. - The municipality of Sogod filed two civil cases: 1. Certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the provincial board and provincial governor from taking cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between the two municipalities and to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercising territorial jurisdiction over the barrios allegedly belonging to the municipality of Sogod. 2. For recovery of taxes with receivership against the municipality of Bontoc alleging that the municipality of Bontoc, without any legal basis, exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios enumerated in Republic Act No. 522 but also over ten (10) barrios belonging to the complainant municipality of Sogod. The complaint prayed that the municipality of Bontoc be ordered to pay Sogod one half of the total amount of taxes collected by the former from the inhabitants of the aforesaid barrios during the period from 1950 to 1959. - The trial court issued an order dismissing the two civil cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. MR denied. ISSUE WON the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the two cases for lack of jurisdiction. HELD NO. The law vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities on the provincial

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board pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code, which reads: SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. ? How settled ? Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided by the province boards of the provinces in which such municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior (now the Office of the Executive Secretary), whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior (Executive Secretary), whose decision shall be final. (Municipality of Hinabangan v. Municipality of Wright, 107 Phil. 394). Reasoning It is clear from the aforestated legal provision that the authority to hear and resolve municipal boundary disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not to the trial courts. The decisions of the boards are then appealable to the Executive Secretary. Records in the instant case show that when petitioner municipality filed the civil actions in 1970 before the trial court, the provincial board of Southern Leyte had not yet conducted a plebiscite as ordered by the Executive Department in 1960 or rendered any order settling the dispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter of delay to the then Secretary of Interior (now Executive Secretary) for action instead of bringing it to the trial court. Although existing laws then vested on the provincial board the power to determine or even alter municipal boundaries, the Secretary of Interior or the Executive Department for that matter, was not precluded during that time from taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the boundary dispute. In Pelaez v. Auditor General, No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569, which applied Republic Act No. 2370, known as the Barrio Charter, We held that the power to fix common boundaries in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities may also partake of an administrative nature that can be decided by the administrative department, involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the laws creating said municipalities. DISPOSITION The petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the respondent judge are AFFIRMED.

Page 38 LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM Limitations Upon Sanggunians Initaiative and Referendum

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SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY V COMELEC 262 SCRA 429

PEOPLE AND STRUCTURES IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT Qualifications

ABELLA V COMELEC supra CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 199 SCRA 692 GUTIERREZ; July 30, 1991
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. - Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. - Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. - The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. - The HRET found for the private respondent. - The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar where he was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

- The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. - Jose Ong Chuan married met a natural born-Filipina, Agripina Lao. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948. - The father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar of application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. After trial, CFI declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. - During this time, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned. - For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections. ISSUE WON in making the determination that Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. HELD - NO. - There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. - Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. - To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

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- We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process. - The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. - The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons. - An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). - The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. - To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. - As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession. There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi. Disposition The petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the house of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

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disqualification and denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation in relation to her claim of that she was a bona fide resident of Agoo. They claim that she was a registered voter and a resident of Naguilian, La Union. Petitioner submitted several affidavits from her neighbors in Agoo attesting to the fact of her being a resident therein. She also submitted a deed of sale over a house and lot located in Agoo to further evidence her being a resident therein. - COMELEC ruled in favor of the respondents and held that Dumpit-Michelena was disqualified to run for the position. A motion for reconsideration was dismissed by the COMELEC EnBanc was dismissed. -Hence this petition for certiorari with the SC ISSUE/S WON petitioner satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991. (this is aside from the procedural issues) HELD 1. NO. Prior to her transfer, Dumpit-Michelena was a resident and registered voter of Ambaracao North, Naguilian, La Union. She claims that she has already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West and is thus qualified to run for the position of mayor. She transferred her registration as a voter of San Julian West on 24 October 2003. Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing her acquisition of a parcel of land in San Julian West where she eventually built a house. However, property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for an office. Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues. To effect change, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. We considered the affidavits submitted by DumpitMichelena where the affiants retracted their previous

affidavits stating that Dumpit-Michelena was not a resident of San Julian West. The affiants alleged that they signed the first affidavits without knowing their contents. However, the COMELEC Second Division pointed out that Boado, et al. also submitted affidavits with the affiants repudiating their previous affidavits that Dumpit-Michelena was a resident of San Julian West. The Court is inclined to give more weight to the joint affidavit of all the barangay officials of San Julian West attesting that Dumpit-Michelena is not a resident of their barangay. Disposition Petition is dismissed..

Disqualifications
GREGO V COMELEC (BASCO) 274 SCRA 481 ROMERO; June 19, 1997
FACTS - Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff of the City Court of Manila by the Supreme Court due to serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. SC held: > dismissed from the service > with forfeiture of all retirement benefits > with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations. - Basco ran, won and assumed office as Councilor in the 2nd District of Manila during the 1988 local elections. He sought re-election and won in 1992. But, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position. Petition for quo warranto before COMELEC was filed by Ronquillo, another candidate, who alleged Basco's ineligibility based on the Tordesillas ruling. Lopez filed a case before the Office of the Ombudsman and DILG. But, all these cases were dismissed. - Basco ran again and won as councilor in 1995 local elections for a third and final term. But, his right to office was again contested. Grego, claiming to be a registered voter filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor. On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a copy of the petition. The other

Dumpit-Michelena vs Boardo 475 SCRA 290 Carpio, J; November 17, 2005

NATURE Petition for certiorari Re COMELEC resolution FACTS - Tess Dumpit-Michelena filed her candidacy for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Agoo, La Union during the May 10, 2004 election. Respondents filed a

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members of the BOC learned about this petition only two days later. - COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case where it ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. Before the parties could comply, Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor and Basco took his oath of office. Grego filed an Urgent Motion seeking to annul the illegal and hasty proclamation made by the Manila City BOC. - Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss since he cannot be disqualified on the ground of (1) Section 40 Par b of LGC because the Tordesillas decision is barred by laches, prescription, res judicata, lis pendens, bar by prior judgment, law of the case and stare decisis (2) Section 40 Par b of LGC may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity because to do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights (3) already been proclaimed and petition being a preproclamation contest under the Marquez v. Comelec should be dismissed by virtue of said pronouncement (4) three-time election as candidate for councilor constitutes implied pardon by the people of previous misconduct (Aguinaldo v. Comelec, Rice v. State , Montgomery v. Newell, People v Bashaw) (5) petition to nullify certificate of candidacy has prescribed; premature as an election protest; and not brought by a proper party in interest - COMELEC: dismissed petition for disqualification as the administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme Court on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected him and on account of Basco's proclamation as the sixth duly elected councilor, petition would no longer be viable; MFR denied ISSUES 1. WON Section 40 (b) of LGC applies retroactively those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992 2. WON Bascos election in 1988, 1992 and in 1995 as City Councilor of Manila wiped away and condoned the administrative penalty against him 3. WON Bascos proclamation while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC is void ab initio 4. WON Maranan, who placed seventh, may be declared a winner pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646. HELD 1. NO - SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

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(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case - Aguinaldo v. COMELEC; Reyes v. COMELEC; Salalima v. Guingona, Jr > Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. 2. NO - There is nothing to condone since Sec 40 is not retroactive and Tordesillas decision only applies to appointed positions not elective positions - Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. As can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision, the Court couched the prohibition in this wise: ". . . AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS." In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term "reinstatement." Under the former Civil Service Decree, the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Thus: ARTICLE VIII SEC. 24 (d) Reinstatement. Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified. RULE VI. OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS. SEC. 7. Reinstatement is the REAPPOINTMENT of a person who was previously separated from the service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified. 3. NO - RA 7166 SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. (i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party.

Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. - The inapplicability of the abovementioned provision to the present case is very much patent on its face considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate. - RA 6646 SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. - The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. - Duremdes, Benito and Aguam cases misplaced: Duremdes: proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same was made contrary to the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested election returns Benito: proclamation of Benito was rendered ineffective due to the Board of Canvassers' violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes and pave the way to succession in office. In said case, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes for the mayoralty position died but the Board of Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner, declared Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor. Aguam: nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that it was based only on advanced copies of election returns which, under the law then prevailing, could not have been a proper and legal basis for proclamation. 4. NO - In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our disquisition above.

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Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in sixth place. - Labo v. COMELEC > where we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Disposition Petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit

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MORENO V COMELEC GR 168550 TINGA; August 10, 2006

NATURE Petition for review resolution of COMELEC disqualifying Moreno from running for elective office of Punong Brgy of Cabugao, Daram, Samar FACTS - Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Brgy on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention (4 mos. 1 day to 2 yrs 4 mos. Imprisonment). This was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for prelim hearing. The hearing officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running. This was adopted by COMELEC Basis of petition: Sec. 40 of LGC: The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence xxx - Morenos contentions: petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of RTC on Dec. 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the 2002 elections. Disqualification under the LGC applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the

adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the LGC because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Brgy allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct. COMELEC: considering Sec.40(a) and fact that Moreno was released from probation on Dec. 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end 2 years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. LGC takes precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is a later law and a special law setting forth the dis/qualifications of elective local officials. ISSUE 1. WON Moreno has served sentence that will take his case within the operation of the disqualification provision ( within 2 years after serving sentence) HELD 1. NO Ratio Those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the 2-yr period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of LGC does not even begin to run. Reasoning The phrase service of sentence, understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. This seemingly clear and unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy because the COMELEC, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation. Baclayon v. Mutia: an order of probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. The grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. - Applying this doctrine here, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty imposed upon Moreno were

similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. During the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. - Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Probation Law (sec.4) specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. - Sec. 40(a) of the LGC unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of 1yr or more, within 2yrs after serving sentence. - When Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office. - LGC was enacted in 1991, 7yrs after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the disqualifications under Sec. 40(a), it is presumed to have knowledge of the ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers. - Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the LGC. While LGC is a later law which gives the dis/qualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. A later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. - Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Brgy. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people of Brgy Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant words of Chief Justice Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec: it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Obiter: there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention, the crime of which Moreno was convicted, involves moral turpitude. This issue was never raised in the petition for disqualification because the ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the COMELEC used, is his alleged disqualification from running for a local

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elective office within 2 years from his discharge from probation after having been convicted. Besides, a determination this issue is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue being whether Morenos sentence was in fact served. Disposition Petition is granted. Decision of COMELEC annulled.

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HELD NO. RATIO "fugitive from justice": "x x x includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. REASONING Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 and June 26 of 1995, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made the. same analysis in its "x x x COMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, other observations consistent with such analysis made by the poll body that are equally formidable so as to merit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit: It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to show Rodriguez' intent to evade the law. This was done by offering for admission a voluminous copy of an investigation report (Exhibits I to I-17 and J to J-87 inclusive) on the alleged crimes committed which led to the filing of the charges against petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose of establishing the fact that it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads because investigations of this nature, no

MERCADO V MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ VS. COMELEC AND BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., 259 SCRA 296 FRANCISCO, J.: 1996
FACTS Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC (EPC No. 92-28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in a resolution of February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof. Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court via petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him (as previously mentioned). ISSUE Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice and therefore disqualified.

matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of the investigation would be nothing short of a wellpublicized announcement to the perpetrators of the imminent filing of charges against them. And having been forewarned, every effort to sabotage the investigation may be resorted to by its intended objects. But if private respondent's attempt to show Rodriguez' intent to evade the law at the time he left the United States has any legal consequence at all, it will be nothing more than proof that even private respondent accepts that intent to evade the law is a material element in the definition of a fugitive. "The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. In fact, the evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country, the upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in Philippine history. The EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres. Marcos and precipitated changes in the political climate. And being a figure in these developments, petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos government, then for the governorship. And serving the people of Quezon province as such, the position entails absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the office.

MARQUEZ VS COMELEC 239 SCRA 11 April 18,1995 ; Vitug

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NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. A petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition. Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent. The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. Since the private respondent had already been proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petition below for disqualification has ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification suit in a separate proceeding (lower court dismissed petition). Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a reconsideration of the resolution.
ISSUE

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disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office. HELD: NO RATIO The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment When there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. DISPOSITION The questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission

NATURE This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent COMELEC of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only 1 legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in Metro Manila for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted, and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. FACTS - Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila. He prays for reversal of the position of COMELEC insofar as it affects the municipality of Paraaque and all the other municipalities in Metro Manila. - R.A. 7166 is "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." - Sec. 3 thereof provides: Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan. The elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows: (a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . . (b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . . (c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan . . . . and,

WON private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore,

Manner of Elections
GUIA VS COMELEC 208 SCRA 420

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(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . . - Petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque and the other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all singledistrict municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections. - In the Project of Apportionment, Paraaque together with the other 12 municipalities in the Metro Manila Area was divided into 2 districts with 6 elective councilors for each district. - COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion by stating that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the 13 municipalities in Metro Manila shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections. - Petitioner filed the instant petition. He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), which requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections. - De Guia therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque fall under this category so that they should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections. ISSUES 1. WON De Guia has locus standi. 2. WON the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections. HELD 1. NO De Guia does not allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paraaque. As such, he does not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by respondent. He does not appear to have any cause of action. - However, considering the importance of the issue involved, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent, the question of procedural infirmity shall be brushed aside. 2. NO - To pursue De Guias interpretation would lead to an absurd conclusion because then there would have

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been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the singledistrict provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into 2 districts each if the members of their respective sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections. - No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. - The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part: Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by district... - COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent as reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to its Resolution No. 2379: WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats; - This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3. Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the singledistrict cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise singledistricts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to

apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area. - As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: 1. for provinces with 2 or more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; 2. for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into 2 districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; 3. for cities with 2 or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and 4. for the 13 municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned into 2 districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992. DISPOSITIVE DISMISSED

Term of Office
BORJA, JR. v COMELEC (CAPCO, JR.) G.R. No. 133495 MENDOZA; Sept. 3, 1998
FACTS: - Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on Jan 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On Sept. 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of 3 years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of 3 years ending June 30, 1998. - On March 27, 1998, Capco Jr. filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco Jr.'s disqualification on the theory that Capco Jr. would have already served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would thus be ineligible to serve for another term. - COMELEC (2nd Division) disqualified Capco Jr. from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco Jr. eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. It stated: In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the

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three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Capco was not elected Mayor in the Jan. 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the unexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. - Capco Jr. won in the 1998 elections. - In this petition for certiorari, Borja Jr. contends that Capco Jr.'s service as mayor from Sept 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, sec 8 of the Constitution and sec 43(b) of the Local Government Code. He argues that it is irrelevant that Capco Jr. became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power. ISSUE: WON a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit. HELD: NO. Relative provisions are Art X sec 8 of the Constitution1 and sec 43(b) of LGC (RA 7160)2 The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. A: Aside from the prevention of establishment of political dynasties, the other policy embodied in the constitutional provision is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider,
1

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The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
2

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. . . .

therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard such purpose. - The Constitutional Commission rejected Com. Garcias proposal that after serving 3 consecutive terms there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted Com. Monsods proposal that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Com. Ople said: . we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. (T)hat is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of the people or politiciansunder a perpetual disqualification, we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice. (other Commissioners comments omitted) - Two ideas emerge from this consideration: service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office, and election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. - In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. B: Textual analysis reveals that Art. X, sec 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term

notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. - In the case of Senators or Representatives, those elected to serve the unexpired term of another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office, no matter how short, will be considered to have served for one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. The Senator of Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. It is different in the case of a vice-mayor, however, as he succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. - Petitioner argues that the case of a Vice President should be applied by analogy to the case of a vice mayor. In the case of the VP who succeeds to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office, Constitution provides that he shall not be qualified for election to the same office at any time if he has served for more than years. This provision was included as without it, the VP, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession, would be qualified to run President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art X sec 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purposes of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession. - Another reason why the VP who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President is that the VP is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latter's death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation. He may also be considered to seek the Presidency. Electors likewise choose as VP the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. - It is different for the vice mayor, as under the LGC, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that, in running for vicemayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

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-Illustrations Disposition Petition dismissed.
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ONG V ALEGRE 479 SCRA 481 GARCIA; January 23, 2006

FACTS - Alegre and Francis Ong filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May
3

1. A is vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of death of incumbent. 6 months before next election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run for mayor in the next election? Yes. Although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is only completing service of the term of the deceased and was not elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term. 2. B is elected mayor and, during his first term, is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. In 1&2, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred: that he has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms. 3. Vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, sec 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election? Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. To consider C to have served the first term in full and ineligible to run a third time would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the view that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly

10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. - January 9, 2004 - Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis on the ground that Francis had violated the three-term rule, having run for mayor in 1995, 1998 and 2001 and had assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties for 3 consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. - In the 1998 elections, Alegre and Francis also ran against each other for mayor. Francis won but Alegre filed an election protest. The RTC eventually declared Alegre as the mayor but the decision came out in July 2001 after Francis had served the 1998-2001 term and was already serving as mayor for the 2001-2004 term. - The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed Alegres petition to disqualify Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 2004 elections, saying that: One of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is not present. Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of Daet, Camarines Norte has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Stanley Alegre was the legally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte. - May 7, 2004 After Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc overturned the First Divisions resolution and declared Francis ineligible for candidacy in the 2004 elections. - May 8, 2004 Francis received a fax copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution. His older brother Rommel Ong was immediately nominated as candidate and at 5:05 PM, past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis. - May 9, 2004 (a day before the May 10 elections) Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Rommel Ong. - Counsel for the Ongs addressed a letter to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Camarines Cario and Acting Election Officer Basilonia in which he appealed that, owing to the COMELECs inaction on Alegre's petition to cancel Rommels certificate of candidacy, the name Rommel Ong be included in the official certified list of candidates for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by the PES.

- May 10, 2004 Alegre wrote COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano (why, hello again Garci! ) seeking clarification on the legality of Carios actions. Garcillano ordered Cario to implement the COMELECs May 7 resolution which stated that substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied due course. It was also added that it was the COMELECs policy not to include the name of a substitute candidate in the certified list of candidates unless the substitution is approved by the Commission. - The Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that Board. - May 11, 2004 Alegre was eventually proclaimed the winner. - May 12, 2004 Francis filed before the Court a petition for certiorari. Rommels petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for injunctive relief followed and both petitions were consolidated. ISSUE WON Francis assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. HELD YES Reasoning - The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. - For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. - The disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. - There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections

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and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. - Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 19982001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The Court holds that that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term", and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position. - Even if the Daet RTC proclaimed that Alegre won the election, the disposition was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. - The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would, under the three-term rule, be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. Dispositive Petitions dismissed.

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