Soverei

g
n Justice
Sovereign Justice
Global Justice in a World ofNations
Edited by
Diogo P Auflio, Gabriele De Angelis
and Regina Queiroz
ISBN 978-3-11-024573-8
e-ISBN 978-3-11-024574-5
lbmr 0/ Con Clng-in-Pblaon Dat:
Sovcnign justa : gobal juce i a world of natons I ctcd by Diogo P
Aurio, Gabtele Oe A, ad Rina Quciroz.
p.a.
Pcng of a confrcna hed i Nov. 208 in Lisbon, Por.
Includ hibliophic nrncc ad id.
ISBN 978-3-11-024573-8 (hcover : a. par)
1. )uce-C,ongs . 2. Cosmoplitaism--Cngs. 3. Nation-ste
-Cns. I. AurClo, Diogo Pie. 11. De Angelis, Gabrelc. III. Quirz,
Rina
)C578.S68 2011
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2010041720
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Contents
Introducton ...................................................................................... .
I. On Cosmopolitaism
Kok-Chor Tan
Nationalism and Global Justce: A Surey and So me Chalenges 9
Adm Etinson
Cosmopolitanism: Cultura, Moral, and Poltica ................................ 25
Gabriele Oe Angelis
Arguing for Justice. Global Justice ad
Philosophica Argmentation .............................................................. 47
11. Normative Theory
Daiel Kofan
Global and Statist Egalitarianism and Their Woe .............................. 87
RekhaNath
Wat is so Special about the State? ...................................................... 107
Sylvie Loriau
On the Applicbility of the Idea of Equaity of
Opportunity at the Global Level ......................................................... 127
Giaranco Pellegrino
Anst Relational Views ofJutice ad Parental Duties ...................... 145
Reina Queiroz
Cosmopolitanism, Sovereignty and Global Justice ............................... 161
III. On K & Rawls
Jame Garrison
On Kant' s Aethetics and his Progresing T reatent of Peace ............. 177
Paulo Tunhas
Rawls' via media: Beteen Ream and Utopiaism ........................... 197
Milic Trihl ovic
Rawls's The Lw ofPeoples a a Guideline
for the World a We Kow Ir .............................................................. 207
v
IV. Economc J ustic
Heiner Michel
Cntnts
Toward Far Terms of Economic Cooperation ................................... 221
Paulo Barcelos
Wip Cosmopolitaism into Shape: Asesing Thoma Poge's Global
Resourees Dividend as 8 Instrument of Global Jutiee ....................... 241
About the Contributors ...................................................................... 251
Subject Inde ...................................................................................... 253
Index of Names ................................................................................... 257
Introduction
This volwe colects papers presented at the conference on Global Jutice
and the Nation Stte, held in Lisbon in November 2008 with the support
of the Porree Foundation for Science and Technolog. The confer
ence w part of a larger reseach project, still in progress, which trie to
conider the ide of globa justice anst te background of the recent rise
of transnationa terrorism. It ae chefy at pondering on the challenge
that tng about "justice beyond borders", a Simon Caey cals it,
represents to the eting international order.
Bibliography about this mauer ha been increaing over the last 20
yes. Until the end of te 1980s politicias, theorits and scholas
thought of globa justice a if it were an eclusively moral issue. For in
stace, A Theor 0/Justce (1971), the most famous work of John Rawls,
does not dcus the quetion of a fa international distribution of the
world's weth, aswing intead that te principles of jutice ae devel
oped just for a more or less closed space, in whch socia cooperation is
feible ad ca be implemented. Beteen states the author endorsed, at
bet, a respectl relationship, regardless of their regime. So, when the
Cold War ended and the coutrie living under the commut politca
infuence became once again independent nation, Rawl' book, linkng
nationalism and jutice, seemed to preent a very sutable theory.
However, by that time, globalization wa alredy increaing, not only
because of the ne technologie, which made possible a &ee and ft
comunication aong the people of al coutries, but also because of a
deeper awareness of several global problems whose solution wa impossible
to achieve only at a natonal level. In a word, we were facing globa cha
lenges and owning ne means to face them. So, the idea of a cosmopoli
ta government might seem, at let to some people, a feible as the
international trade of agricutural good, technology ad knowedge. De
spite the rebirth of the old nationast feelings in Eatern Europe aer the
end of proletarian internationaism, the cosmopolita ide wa reborn a
wei, both in Politica1 Theory ad in common political discouse. When
the upsurge of nationalisms started spaking new conficts - such as the
was in the Balkns afer the dintegration ofYugoslavia - people looked
at the United Nations, for te frst time in their history, not only a an
international forum with mora authority, but also a a kind of lega and
2 Introduton
political power, which shoud claim re right to rue rhe world and to
punish re rogue states, if necessary militarily. That w rhe time afer
rhe fl of re wall, when rhe European Union w growing quickly, and
rhe world seemed to become just one single globalised space. No wonder
so many article and books have been publihed contending rhat re sov
ereign state, at least a we have known je over rhe last rhree cenries, had
already become useles, even if we do not know yet wich politica form
could flfl rhe fnctions rhat rhe state has been fflling ltil now. How
f is rhis rely tme? This is rhe a around which some of rhe most in
teresting debates in contemporar Politica Theory are being developed, as
weil a rhe main question det wirh in ris book.
In fct, if we agree rhat some knd of universal or global ream will be
possible, we have, from an eirher moral or political point of vie, to fce
ro kinds of problems. The frst one, and cerrinly rhe hardest, is uansfer
ring sovereignt from national states to a so-caled internationa commu
nir: does it mean re end of rhe stte, borh nationa and mutnational, a
some people claim, or siply a change in its fctions, or co male it sub
ject to some kind of super power which will provide rhe back-up for re
enforcement of global justice?
The second kind of problems deals wirh rhe principle according to
which rhat allegedly universa rem shoud be governed: are rhere any
moral principle overcoming re local curure supponing national value,
rights and duties? Can we infer any universal politica res from rhose
hyorheticl moral principles? Besides, who coud indeed decide about rhe
goodnes of each one of such principle: rhe state, j rhey will still exist, or
rhe citizens? In shon, are we tnking of a democratie order whose fol
dation woud lie in re will of rhe individuas or in rhe will of politic
units like nations, federations, etc. ?
In a way, we are deang here wirh some weil known issue in rhe d
sie debate about law and justice, moral and politic. Who doe not re
member Antigone, Sophocles's uagic heroine, uansgressing rhe law of re
cit to obey re law of her conscience? Or, more recenrly, rhe controversy
about natural and positive law? Whenever we try to defne a positive j u
ridcl order, we are fcing a lot of diverging opinions and interest. But
rhere is an iportant diference. In rhe past, rhe necesity of stte powers,
borh national and sovereign, w more or less evident, regardles of re
reime rey adopted. Nowaday, on rhe conuary, economie and socia
globaation sugets rhe idea, or rhe belief, rhat a global power and a
globa government are not only possible, but also more suitable r re
eistng political forms. According to rhis idea, a universal power would be
rhe only way of fostering justice, even dstributive j utice, regadess of rhe
interest at governments would like to presere.
If we consider this problem conceptualy, we have to recognize that
national law should always be just a loe epression of global jutice.
From this poit of view, it would be unavoidable to recognize that na
tional ruers must respect, or are subrtted to, human rights, which
meas, in a radie way, that they are not totally sovereign. Any govern
ment or poltel body ha the right to decide against the uiversal hu
manitarian principle, which are above their own will and even aove the
interest or the cuture of the nation they are supposed to represent. And if
so me of them do not respect those principle, the internation commu
nity should have the right either to prevent ths or to punh them.
But the idea of global justice goe beyond that. Beides condemning
governments and states that act against individual right, it disapprove of
al kinds of unfrnes a weil, and demands the end of extreme poverry
stl existing in many countries all over the world. Unfortnately, the re
cent global progress of democracy did not stop the deepening of the gap
beteen rich and poor countrie. On the contrary, it has been accompa
nied by increaing economic inequlity. How should the wealthiet people
act in order to eliminate thee situations? Shal they simply send humai
taia aid, as Rawls defends in his book The Law 0/Peopl ( 1999), or,
much more tha that, ae they obliged to narow the above-mentioned
gap, until a reaonable and just order is created at a universal leel?
Apparendy, it should be dea: there is no jutice without a fa distri
bution of the eisting econorc ad social good, either within ech coun
try or across countrie; ad there is no justice when the authorities of a
state act, make decisions, or give orders that ae against human rights.
Nevertheless, if we move from the theoretical to the practelevel, jutice
demands more than a difse feeling of sympathy for humanity, even if the
latter seer to be universal. In order to become a practice, global jutice
requires a concrete and particula epression, a politie order, i.e., a sys
tem of socia and juridical institutions. Can that order become a uiversa
one, translating global justice into a set of laws wh ich every country and
eery indvidual would accept? Or is it impossible to go beyond the na
tional level, where ech people remains sovereign and applies its own idea
of justice?
Political consequences of each one of these approache ae, needess to
say, very diferent. Wile the frst demand the etence of an Interna
tional Crimina Court, for instace, as a necessary instrment of justice,
the latter wl refe any intitution whch undermine the state's power to
judge, inside its boundaries, according to its own law. And while an inter
national order, considered a a politiel embodiment of global justice,
would demand institutions guided by universa principles, a juridie order
based on a nationa level demads institutions supporting, frst of all, the
4 Introducion
interest and values of a particular community, even i its supporters claim
it is me bet ad perhaps me only possible way of promoring globa ju
tiee. Ir is true mat the pivotal point c be me sae on bor approach es,
namely me moral duty co attend co me interest of a1l hU beings. Kok
Chor Tan underlines me essentials on mis matter, when he claims mat
norhing in [his] interpretation of cosmopolitanism necesitate me idea of
a world state, because, so he argue, a moral cosmopolitan c a weil
defend national self-determination i he believe mat me idel of equal and
impartial concern for individus is best relizd by repecting meir claims
LO national sovereignty. In short, mere is no necessary confict bereen
mor eosmopolitanism and the idea of nationa self-determation.
However aother, inevitable, question aise if we defend me necesity co
pay attention U me weaest state and people, wherever the latter live:
how is such a neeesity co be met? How shoud governments de, for in
stance, wim imigrants, who claim the right co stay and have a job, when
me eountry does not have enough jobs for me native people? What ae
eactly me reasons, if there ae any, for me latter co be considered frst? In
a more radical way, i me state a politica form still uef ad suitable
enough co aser farly co me challenges me human groups are facing
nowadays? Wat are, in shore, the most efcient rule co reach global ju
tiee?
There are no easy answers co mese questions, eimer in Politic Theory
or in me eurrent activity of rulers. Nevertheless, over me last years some
new meoretic and practical approache have been emerging and stresing
how much even the most realistic policy depends on emical eonsidera
tions. Even if a government wanted co rule only attending co it national
interet wimout cing about what omer countrie d and wish, it
would fa. The economie, Hancial and technic globaliztion, a weil as
me climatie changes or me searcity of several essential goods, like petrol
and water, brought along problems mt ae impossible co solve wmout
leaving me nationa level ad lookng for sustainable international agree
ments. Maybe mis is not eaetly me sae as what cosmopolitanism cls
global justiee. But it demands pacts, whch require at leat some shared
values. Were it impossible to rech a universal law, or ay kind of global
government, men me rational solution co me above mentioned problems
would stil require more ad more partnerships, bor sutainable ad last
ing, among eountrie, despite meir diversity. Nobody c say how far, in
me net decade, even me stronget and most powerfl state will have to
give up several feture of meir sovereignty. However, it is alredy cle
Ta, Kk-Chor (2004). }utce without Bordm, Cosmopolitnism, Natonlim an
Paitm. Cbridge. Cabridge University Press. P. 94.
Introduion 5
that they shall do so if they rely want to presere the lie and te interet
of their own citizens.
This volume deal with some of te most relevant of thee questions,
trying to put them within the teoretical frame in which the have been
debated over the last 20 years. K and Rawls, 8 everybody knows, are
the obligatory background in this debate, and they are preent in this vol
ure, even when they are not eplicitly mentioned. The contributors U
the conference, fa from remaining at the historic level, cover te core
quetions of current debate ad focus chiefy on the most contemporary
ad controversial issues. On behaf of the Institute of Philosophy of Lan
guage I would like to [hank all of tem for their engaement and their
ac[ive paticipation.
Finaly, I would like [0 thak Gabriele De Angelis ad Regina Quei
roz far their work and etreme care in te organiztion of the conference
ad in the co-editig of [his volume.
Diogo Pires Aurelio
I. On Cosmopoliraism
Nationalism and Global Justice:
A Sure
y
of Some Chalenges
Kok-Chor T
A nrst presenter in a volume on global justiee and the nation-state, I see
my role to be that of highlighting some of the main philosophica que
tions and challenges the idel of the nation-state preents for global jutice,
and U identif how thee challenges eould be addresed. No doubt so me
of the quetions I will diseusad the distinetions that I will make will be
traeended by the more sophisticated and detled analyis to come in
this volume. But I hope that in anempting U ofer a tour d'orizn of the
nationalism versus global justee debate, we will have one way of framing
the discusions and debates to folow.
The aspeet of global justiee I will foeus on here is tat of global dis
tributve jutiee or global economic justiee. By global diSributive justice, I
mean the eommitent to reguate eeonomie inequalities beteen persons
in the world as a whole. I leave aide other apeets of global jutice, sueh a
those having to do with individual lbeny and state sovereignty ad inter
vention, and so on. And I asume tat globa justiee at minimum requires
some kind of duty to aleviate severe poveny. The issue of global distribu
tive justice is whether justice also requires some kind of equality with re
speet to the distribution of economic good, apart fom the question of
poverty alleviation. In what folIows, I will use the terms globa jutiee,
globa egalirarianism and like terms to caprre this idea. I will also ue te
term nation-state qute broadly and generally without presupposing any
parieular theory of nationaism (tough I will asume that to be defensi
ble a nation-state mut be at leat decent.)
I will diseuss the chalenges the nation-state poses far global jutice by
eining the diferent stae in the evolution of te eontemporar debate
on global jutice. I idemif tree stages, ech presenting its distinctive
chalenge for globa eirarians. To be sure, ay classifcation of te de
velopment of a idea imo stages c only be schematic - rather than
neacy and tidily sequential, te diferent stages of course overlapped and
cut across ech other in te development of an ide or discourse. But still a
representation of te debate in terms of ree developmental stage will
1 0 Kok-ChorTa
help us better appreciate the distinctiveness of the chlenge the nation
state presents in each.
We might say tat in the very frst stage of the discourse, the nation
stte presented a methodlogcal chalenge for global jutice (we can cal this
methodologie nationalism) . The tak wa to extend argument for global
justice conceived originaly for te confnes of the nation-state U te
global arena, ad the paricular chalenge was to overcome the methodo
logical asuptions found in the inuential constrctions of teorie of
dometic justice, asumptions such a the stte being a closed system and
relatively self-sufcient (e.g. , Rawls, 1971, p. 8).
A I will note briefy later, early defenders of globa jutice argue that
these assuptions ought to be lifed and that arguments for justice apply
as efectively (with slight modication) to te globa arena. This is where
the second stage of the debate enters. We may roughly call ts the patr
otic chalenge. Critics of global justice point out mat even i an independ
ent case could be made for global dtributive obligations, such obligations
would M counter to vaious patriotic commitents and concerns that
ordinary individus have. Given te moral signifcance of such loe
commitments and obligations, and given, a some nationalists argue, te
priacy of nation commitents of justice, global distributive commit
ment i general ought to be limited if not overridden (Miller, 1995,
1999). The task of globa eitarians here is to show how the primacy of
globa justice is sustained in spite of patriotic concerns.
Ir is here where we enter the present ad third stage of the debate. The
form of the criticism now is tat demnd of global jutice aren' t even
valid in the frst place - there isn' t any ce for such commitents to be
gin with. The charge, essentialy, is tat te etension in the frst stage was
not valid - the extenion project failed to see that arguments for distribu
tive justce apply only under circumstaces that obtin nationally but not
globally. This argument holds that te scope of distributive j utice is lim
ited to the borders of nation-states, and the re challenge for global justice
is not simply a methodologica one that can be assumed away. Therefore,
the argument i not that there are competig demands that global jutice
ha U be prioritized against, but that there is siply no basis for global
justice at all. We c call this te challenge of te limited natonal scope of
jutice.
In this brief overie, I wil comment on each of these challenges in
turn. I don't claim that I will fl y respond to thee challenge on te glo
bal egalitia's behalf, especially not in the third and current stage where
debate is still ongoing. But I hope to at leat indicate what acceptable res
ponses shoud look like.
Nationaism ad Gloha ]wtic: A Surc of Some Challengc 1 1
I. The Methodologicl Chalenge
The methodological challenge presented in the frst stage of te debate is
lage!y famiar ad I wil recap only some key points. Wen Rawl pre
sented his A Theor 01Justce ( 1 971 ) - ir wa of course a theory of jutiee
coneeived for the state - he reonably made some simplg assup
tions to get started: that the state is imagined to be a closed system of so
cia coperation ad se!f-sufcient. In rection to Rawls, globalists like
Chales Beit ([1 979] 1 999) and later Thoma Pogge ( 1 989) argue that if
we lil Rawls's methodologic assumptions, a we should if we were to
chnge the subject from that of confned domestic jutice to that of glbal
jutice, then we would efective!y arrive at a "globalized" version ofRawls's
theory of justice. That is, Rawls's to principle of jutice, including hs
distributive principle, would simply take on global scope. The argument is
that once we reject the asumption of the state as a se!f-sufcient and
closed sytem of social cooperation, but recognize state to be in fact inter
acting and even engaing in forr of social cooperation with other states,
the Rawlsian method of reasoning must necessarily t on a globa scope.
Thus Rawls's well-known original position, the initia situation in which
representatives of persons decide on the fst principles of justice, ought
ao to be globazed, and consequendy fctors such a persons' national
membership are also to be seen as arbitrar from the moral point of view.
Onee nationaity is considered a abitrary fctor and to be discounted in
a global origina position, representatives of persons behind the veil of
ignoraee would opt for some globa distributive commitments, anaogou
to the commitments Rawls sa that persons within a singl state would
agree on. These arguments have been adopted and deve!oped more re
cently by cosmopolit such a Sion Caney (2005) and Darre! Moe!
lendorf (2001 ) .
Rawls hire!f lils the methodological asuptions when he extends
his own theory of justice to the internationa real nearly three decade
later ( 1 999) . Ir is imponant to note, however, that he does this via a to
tier proces, frst working out the requirements of dometic justice with
the original methodological asumptions in place, and then only afer, at
the second stage, lifing the asumptions for the pupose of determining
jut relations beteen states. Rawl's theory of internationa justiee ha
been criticized by globalists on variou points, one being that it lacks a
Tere were some rmak on internationa j ustic in A Teor ofJustic (pp. 377-79),
hut te were reetions appende to Rwls' s disussion on cvi dohedience ad
conscientou. ohjecon. For recnt introducons to Rwls, se Freman (2007) and
Poge (2007).
1 2 Kok-ChorTa
distributve egalitari commitment. Some critics tae this fure to be
symptomatc of Rawls's method. They argue tht Rawls's to-step proce
dure for developing an account of justice, one that begins by taing the
state for gra ted in te frst stage, necessaily commits the ftal error from
the very stat of granting citzenship and borders fndamenta moral sig
nifcance when it is part of the role of global justice to evaluate the jutnes
of these status and boundarie. Hence Rawls's to-tiered approach, with
the methodologica asumptions buHt into te frst stage, distons our un
derstandng of what globa justice should rely demad (O'Neil, 2000;
Nussbaum, 2006) .
So the frst tak in the global justice debate w to show how and why
some of te nationalist asumptions c ad ought to be dropped, and
how if we tracend tee asumptions that we cn more or less etend
arguments for distributive justice to the global arena. There appeed to be
a powerf consensus at the early stage of the debate that ti etension of
argments of jutice to the global arena wa entirely legitimate and re
quired. Phiosophers largely sympathetic to Rawls's baic project such a
Scanlon ( 1 975) and Barr ( 1 974) took te globaists' side in this erly par
of the globa jutice debate.
11. Patriotic Concern
The ne wave of chalenge fcing the globalist conists not of criticisms
directed at their extension project a such but of aguments that globa
distributive demads are i tension with more local and special comt
ments tat persons ordinarily have. In particular, the most poignant of
these partial commicent and obligations are demands asociated wth
persons' repective national membershps. f a member of a nation-state,
one has specia concerns and commicments to felow members that one
need not have towads strangers, and globa egaltarianism the risk of
runing rouhshod over thee national or patriotic commicment, the
objection goes.
One might say tt the challenge of patriotism here replicate an issue
fmiliar in mora philosophy: how cn morality conceived as imparia and
universalistic accommodate and philosophically account for the range of
parial and personal pursuits tt are valuable for an ordinary individual
Iife? This chalenge is especialy poignant for utilitarianism given that it
takes the utimate moral end to be that of maimizing utility for the great
est number. But Kntians to, given te ide of universalizabiity central
Nationalism ad Globa }uticc: A Surcy ofSomc C.allcngc 1 3
to me Ktian mora doctrine, have to explain how morality ca alIow
space for partia and persona pusuits.2
Thu philosophers Iike Saud ScheIer who fnd apects of global
justice appealing urge a more modest or moderate understanding of cos
mopolitanism in order to accommodate mese partial commitents
(2001 ) . But me more eeme form of me chalenge come fom national
ist meorists Iike David Miller and Margaret Moore go fmer to hold that
national justice h priority over global or cosmopolitan justice (Miller
1 995, 1 999; Moore, 2001 ) .
The nationalist argue that when mere i s conict beteen dferent
domains or sphere of justice, it is not so straightfotard to say which
domain shoud be supreme. Thus when me demand of global jutice
compete wim me demands of national jutice, one cannot asure mat me
defaut is to grant primacy to global demands. T O me contrary, mere are
good special reons, reson having to do wim me idel of me nation
state, for giving preference to nationa demands (Miller, 1 999) .
Now it is important to note me form of the chalenge here. The patri
otic challenge does not directly deny mat mere are vaid globa distributive
principles. That is, it does not t issue wim me etension project of me
frst stage. Wat it puts forard is what may c a limitation arguent
Qone), in me sense mat while mere coud be good reaons for global dis
tributive principles, mere are alo good (i not more important} reaon for
omer kind of principles mat are in competition wim me globa principles.
The chalenge aims to show mat at me ver leat global distributive com
mitments have to be Iimited if not overridden atogemer by patriotic
commitments.
Understandng me form of me challenge is important becue it shows
what would count as an appropriate respone. Faced wim mis particular
limtation arguent, me globaist need not provide anomer independent
argument for global egalitariaism - that such commitments are vaid is
not challenged. The challenge denies me priority of global jutice over
national jutice, and what the globalist has to do in light of mis chalenge
is to show mat where mere is a confict beteen globa and patriotic
commitments of jutice, globa commtment have priority.
In reply, mus, globaists have argued mat nationa comitments can
not be jutl discharged unles oblgations of globa justice have been met.
For eple, wimin dometic society, specia cooperative groups wimin a
society mat have meir own local distributive principle will not know what
meir respective fair shaes are wim which to distribute aong meir mem-
2 See ScheIer 1 988 ad Herma fr to discusions of this problem fr utilitaiam
ad Kta moraity repectvdy.
14 Kok-ChorTa
bers witout reference ro what domestic distributve justice as a whole
requires of them. In short, it seems that by default, the claims of jutice
reulatg relations in the dominat sphere ha priority over claims of
justice wit any sub-sphere. Members of the sub-sphere would not know
otherise whether they are acting jucly or not (uness tey assue away
the eistence and the jutice-demands of members i the dominant
sphere). The priority of justice in the dominant set simply sters from te
baic idea that individua members of a sub-sphere cnot distributive
among themselves reouces or goods tt are not righcly teirs; ad they
can't know what is righcly theirs unless they frst acknowledge and dis
charge teir obligations ro oter groups within the dominant set.
Some commentarors argue that te ana10gy invoked above beteen
individua pursuits versu dometic justice on te one side, ad domestic
jutice versus globa justice on the other is fawed. They say that whUe
"justice feture only on one side of te balace" in the domestic ce, "it
feture on both sides" in te second ce (Miler, 2000, p. 1 67) . Thus
while it is plausible that justice take precedence over personal pursuits, it
is less cler when tO sets of clam of jutice compere, a in the cae of
domeric versus global justice, which shoud dominate. In reply, the glob
alist points out that even in te domeric contet, there exist competing
clas of jutce, beteen jusrice of the stare (domesric jutce) and justce
within private asociations and groups (loe justice). Yer, we accept thar
dometic justice taes priority in te sense that how private asociations
reate their interna jutice in distribution cannot be at the expense of
the requiements of domestic justice that bind them. So roo, it is not im
plauible tt demads of global justice take precedence over te demands
of dometic justce even if bot are claims of justice (Ta, 2004) .
Now, the priority of global justice does not mean implausibly tar no
nations may look afer its own untU it ha meet all global needs (Miller,
2000, p. 45). The priority claim I am defending presupposes Hume's
eternal circumsrance of justice, that is, the preumption of moderate
scarcity as opposed ro abject scrcity. That is, it asue that we are not in
tieal tet-book desen islad scenaios where we are faced with te tak
of deciding beteen te very baic need of compatriots versus that of
strangers. If we are in such a dire situation, the circumsrance of jutice
does not obtan, ad consequency the priority of global justice thesis sim
ply doesn't kick in. In such a ce, it is plausible that nations are free ro
save te lives of their own over those of stragers i indeed such a trade-of
needs ro be made.
"at te priority of jutice means is tat nation-states under condi
tions of moderate global scacity may engage in a variety of nationalistic
projects and commitments but onl so long a tey do their fir share wirh
Nationaism ad Glohal ]wticc: A Surc of Some Challengc 1 5
repect to the demads o f globa egalitarianism, ad i n context o f the pre
sent world this doe leave ample space for meaningf national pursuits.
So if there ae indeed valid demands of global egaitarian jutice, then
these demands determine the rage of permissible patriotic concerns and
nationalistic pursuits, not the other way aroud. To say that global jutice
ought co be limited by demads ad commitments of nation-state is so
mewhat anaogou co saying that demands of jutice for the domestc state
ought co be liited by commitments ad concerns that variou sub
groups within the state have, which quite clearly gets the relatonship be
teen justce and personal commitments reversed.
III. The National-Scope Challenge
Defenders of global justice however now face a dstinct challenge. The
challenge in the thd and current stage of the dcourse on global jutice
holds that distributive justice applie only in ee special context of the
nation-state and does not extend LO ee global domain. In efect, it says
that the etension anempt in the frst stage wa a serious and fndment
mistep - it wrongly applie reasoning for justice under a specia context co
an inappropriate conte. Aguments for distributive justice take hold only
when certain conditions obtin, and that while these conditions do obtain
in ee contet of ehe nation-state, eey are absent in the global context.
Thus wie regard co distributive jutice, patriotic and national commit
ment are al ee commitments there are. So ee problem, ue in ehe
second stage is not merely a problem of priority, but a problem of estab
lishing the vaidity of global justice in the frst place.
This challenge demands tat ealitarians revisit the reons why d
tributive equalit mauers at all, and co examine whether these reasons are
unique to ehe state or wheeer they obtan in some form globaly a weil.
Ir is not surprising tat ee dscussion on global justice ha become more
abstract recently becaue of the nature of ee investgation. So me promi
nent recent papers nominally on global justice in fact devote more pages co
fndamental quetions of equality raeher ean co global jutice per se. But
this is not a bad thing - it clarife for both side the uderlying basis of
the value of distributive equality ad ee scope of eis concern.
Wat are some of the reons why equality mauers and do thee re
sons limit the scope of equity co the nation-state? Since this is the most
current nationalist challenge, I will devote ee rest of this chapter co it. I
will recount some of the recent prominent aguments that defend the
limited (nationa) scope of equality, and outline possible response co these
arguments on the globalst' s behalf.
1 6 Kok.Chor T M
A. Reciprocity
One argument i that equlity matters becaue of the idea of reciprocity -
tat under a common social system, members ae required to justif to
ech other the shared arrangement tat they ae imposing on each other.
The agument for equaity baed on reciprocity i that any common ar
rangement that allows for abitary inequalities woud violate the ideal of
reciprocity - that is such an arragement could be reaonably rejected -
unIess such inequaitie coud be justifed.
Ir is worth recaling that Rawls himself (when he presented his own
accout of internationa justice) pointed to the argument from reciprocity
in h objection to those who had sought to g10balize his theory to the
global arena. The ideal of reciprocity in the domestic arena require tat
te gap beteen rich and poor canot be too wide; but in the global arena,
Rawl argue, reciprocity can be satisfed witout this egaitarian commit
ment. That is, while reciprocity generates distributive commitments
aong citens of a liberal state, it doe not generate distributive commit
ments among persons globaly.
But one cn ak here: what is the argument that the criterion 0/recip
rocit takes diferent forms when we move fom the domestic to the globa
arena? Wy does reciprocity generate eitaia commitments domesti
caly but not g1obaly? It seems to me tat reciprocity by itself doen't
preent a reason for equality that limits its scope to the nation state. We
need to at leat say sometng more about the specia quality of te state
such tt reciproity aong citen impose demand signifcantly difr
ent fom demads among persons g10baly (Tan, 2007) .
B. Coercion
In this regard, some commentators have stressed that an important difer
ence beteen the state ad the global arena is that the former is a legally
ongoing coercive order. Ir i this fact of law coercion that generates
egalitaria commitments among members of a nation-state; ad because
tere isn't a lawf globa coercive authority, there is no similar reaon for
cing about globa equaity (Blae, 2002; Miller, 1 998) .
One prominent agument, that of Michael Blae's, draws on the ide
of autonomy, in that since lawfl coercion is in the frst instance auton
omy retricting, it mut be jutifable to those being coerced if the lawf
coercion is to be legitimate. Such an arragement would be jutable on
ti account if no arbitrary inequaitie are admitted. That i, such a coer-
Nationalism ad Globa }uticc: A Surcy ofSomc C.allcngc 1 7
cive order is acceptable in spite o f i t retrietions on autonomy if it is tem
pered by some institutiona distributive ealitaria commitments.
Blake's agument h received much anention recently, ad hopefly
wthout doing too much injustiee to Blae's own comple arguments and
the discussion it h elicited, I will point out to possible lines of re
sponse. One is to challenge the belief that coercion is the sine qu non of
egalitarian jutiee. Ir might be the ce that where there is lawfl coercion,
some distributive commitments need to be acknowledged to make that
aragement legitimate in the eye of al subject. But it does not follow
that coercion must be a necesa condition for distributive justice - it is
open to the argument that there are oter reons for cing about dis
tributive inequalities beides that of needing to legitimiz coercion.
The second respone addresse the empirical claim of the coercion ar
gument: that tere isn't a global coercive order. May obserers point out
that tis premise is quetionable. There is, they will say, an ongoig coer
cive global legal order that is both profound ad peraive and hence
autonomy restrieting. Just to take one example, the fact of border regua
tion and immigration retrietions. These are lawf institutional arrange
ments, enacted domesticly, no doubt, but sanctioned by the interna
tional legal order that have profound impact on persons' autonomy.
Thus, if the need to legitimate domestic lawfl coercion is that whieh
generates the egalitarian commitment in the dometic seting, then global
law coercion shoud similarly generate global egalitarian commitments.
One might say that there is something distinct about tose who are
coerced qua members of a state and tose who ae coerced a nonmem
bers. But a reaon for this distinction ha to be given and not jut be as
sumed that membership enjoy a pror special moral standing.
C. Shared-governance
Thoma Nagers already infuentia paper, "The Problem of Global Ju
tiee" (2005), introduces a second element in addition to coercion to draw
out the diference beteen coercion aong members and coercion against
outsiders. If successf, Nagers account will not be vlnerable to the ob
jection ofered above tat tere is ongoing coercion of persons at the glo
bal level.
The additional element Nagel introduces is the notion of shared au
thorship in the laws of one's society, or the implication of one's wll in the
system that one is a panicipating subject of. Unlike the coerced outsiders
wating to get inside, insiders aren't jut uder coercion; they are coerced
under a system in which they also see temselve to be joint authors of a
18 Kok-ChorTa
system whose etablishment and maintenance engage meir will (ie. their
acceptance of mis arrangement). Ir is only aong joint-aumors of a coer
cive arragement, Nagel agues, mat jutifcations for the legitimacy of
that coercive arrangement can be demanded. One necessay condition for
gaining legitimacy is mat no abitrary inequaities be adissible. Thu, me
case for distributive justice is triggered. But since mere is no global coer
cive order mat all persons are seen to be me joint authors of, mere is no
basis for global distributive demand. Objections to global inequaitie do
not gain any foothold, a Nagel puts ir.
Nael's is a chalienging mesis and will continue to be discussed. Let
me here ofer some obserations. I mink that bom core premises of me
argument, me normative and empirica, c be questoned. (i) The em
piric premise mat there isn't a global order that implicates wils of indi
viduals globaly sitated seems questionable. The fact mat we do challenge
so me decisions of global insttutons on me grounds mat mey have ig
nored me view-points of persons afected sugests that we idely conceive
of mese institutions a objects of joint aumorship and epressions of me
wl of persons afected (e.g., Cohen and Sabel, 2006) . So even i we ac
cept mat distributive demands c be made not just among persons af
fected by a comon socia arangement but only by mose who have me
specia status as joint aumors of me system, it doe not follow imediately
that ditributive justice h limted scope.
But the normatve premise itelf c ao be quetioned. A some
commentators have pointed out Ouliu, 2006; Abizdeh, 2007; Caney
2008; Tan 2007) the normative seems a line pererse. Ir sugest that my
coercion of you require no justifcation when you have no say at all about
what I c do to you, whereas if you ae regaded as someone having so me
say, I will need to justi/ the coercion. This removes protection from mose
who are me most vlnerable to our actions and policies - people, outiders
in parculr, who have no say in our policies that impact mem are most in
need of protection and most enttled to demand that we justi/ me mings
that we do where mese impact them. Joint-aumors are by comparion les
vnerable by virue of meir role a collaborators in me design and suste
nance of me system. So me normative premise does seem implausible - it
protects members, but removes proteetion &om non-members who are
also o&en me ones most vulnerable wim repect to uso
D. Social Cooperation
Recently, some philosophers have rerned to me reciprocity idea in de
fense of me limted scope mesis, but this tme me stress me role of pa-
Nationaism ad Glohal ]wticc: A Surc of Some Challengc 1 9
ticula forms of socia! intitutions that i n tn ground the reciprocity
ide. The ide of redprocity that generates distributive commitent
derive utmately fom intitutions of soda! cooperation. That is, pat of
what it me to be partidpats in a scheme of socia cooperation is to
endorse the idea! of reciprodty - that is, the terms of soda! engaement be
those that a!l patidpats c reaonably accept. But because there aren' t
globa! schemes of socia! cooperation, these comentators argue, there is
no globa redprocity of the relevat sort that coud generate distributive
commitments (Sangiovanni, 2007; Freeman, 2006; 2007) .
Again, the aguent ha bot a normative ad a empirica premise:
that distributive justice aises only in the conte of institutions of socia!
cooperation ad that there aren't institutions of socia! cooperation to be
foud globa!ly. To respond to t argment one has to refte either (or
both) of these premises. To refte the empirica1 premise, the globalist ha
to show that there are in fact globa! institutions baed on soda! coopera
tion. The premise denies what seeral globats have argued for a wile
now: that there is a baic globa! structre that reflects the idea! of soda
cooperation (Beitz, [ 1 979] 1 999; Buchanan, 2000) .
The normative premise takes it tat justice kicks in when there is so
da! cooperation; but it leves open the question a to whether jutice itelf
could demand the establishment of institutions of socia! cooperation whe
re none existed. So the globaist may attempt U refte this premise by
presenting an agument that wherea distributive jutice demands socia!
cooperation in the sense that socia cooperation is part of what is ment by
the ide of dstributive jutice, distributive justice commitment don't
presuppose eisting socia! cooperation. That is, demands of justice coud
be made aong person prior to ay cooperative arangements existing
among themselves.
For Cple, one could argue tat in a state of af irs where there is
suf cient interdependence and interaction among aents, these agents
have a duty of justice to ensure that their interaction and independency
are on fair ter. That is, why not hold that thee agent have the duty to
ensue that they in fact cooperate with each other when interaction among
them is unavoidable? Were socia! cooperation requires certain intitu
tiona! arangements, why not say that these agent have the duty of jutice
to create such institutions? Rawls's own remarks that there is te natura!
duty to establh jut institutions where they don't exit supports cis idea
that justice need not rely on exting instittions a a condition of its ap
plicbility (Rawls, 1 971 ) . Rather, the demands of justice c in fact de
mad that institutions of appropriate kinds be put into place.
In other words, the reponse to the agument from socia! cooperation
is to reject the idea that socia! cooperation provide the necessary (rather
20 Kok-ChorTa
tha jut the suf cient) bais for ay commitent to distributive equaity.
If it c be established that distributive eitarian concern are generated
when there is adequate and sutained interaction beteen paties even in
the absence of socia cooperation among ther, then even if te global
arena doe not reerble a socialy cooperative aragement it doe not
imply that globa jutice ha no place tere. The fct of sustained global
interaction, a fact sustained by globaliation, coud be sufcient for
generating globa distributive commitments.
The nationalist challenge of this td stage is perhps the most cha
lenging for it involves the fndaental question of the conditions or cir
cumstances of distributive justice. The debate here is ongoing, and I don't
cla that my brief remaks above have fly addressed te challenge in its
diferent forms. Indeed, the aguments preented by Blake, Nagel, Sangio
vani and Freeman are receiving much attention (e.g., by severa papers in
this volume), and ry discussion above ha only touehed on so me of the
more genera points in ech of thee arguments. These aguments demand
greater attention and deeper analysis. My goal here is merely to indicate
what so me possible responses could look le.
IV. Concludng Remak
A we c see, the current state of the debate on global justice h rerurned
to the baic question a LO whether distributive equity is even a vaue
eonceivable at the globa level. In a sense ten, the globa justice diseourse
is back to where it started: global egalitarians are back in the buines of
trying to show how arguments for equaty do apply LO the global doman.
Yet there has been progress along the way. The philosophical debate and
arguments have become a lot more sophisticted and informed and com
plex; indeed, a we have seen, the eurrent state of the debate ha ignited a
series of ne discussions on why equaity matters, and bot sides of the
debate have benefted and eontributed LO cs quetion. Ou understand
ing of why equality matters has been enriched due U the globa justice
debate, and cs surely can be seen a a progress.
I believe tat the defense of global justice wl (i) require continuing
engaement with te philosophica question a LO why distributive equal
ity matters. In addition to attempt LO show how dominant aecounts of
why equality matters (a discused just above - reciprocity, coercion,
shared governace, etc.) generate global justice obligation, global egai
taians have the potential of moving the debate on equality forard by
introducing or reviving alternative aguments for distributive equality. For
instace, globa egaitaias c try to res(Ore standing LO the luck egata-
Natonalim ad Globa J utic: A Surc of Some Challengc 21
ian ideal - me ideal roughly that persons should not be disadvantaged by
circumsrances not of meir own choosing - ad on me ground of luck
egalitaiaism defend globa egaitariaism. There is potential for new
developmenr on equaity here. Global egalitaias. given meir specia sen
sitivity to distinct problem sets. could be motivated to develop ad ofer
new meorie of equaity that statist meorisrs. given meir lmite problem
domain. ae not attued to.
I also mink mat (ii) global egaitrias will need to say more con
cretely what knd of distributive commirmenr ad principles mey have in
mind. For example. some have posited me idea of a Rawlsia diference
principle. But I mink that more needs to be sad 8 to how mis principle is
to be implemenred and reazed and more attention paid to me possible
implications of irs implementation. For eple. what does mis me for
national distributive commirments? Wil mee risk being subsumed by a
g0balized diference principle? Some of me anti-globaist criticisms have
been felled by a lack of c1arity 8 to what a global distributive comit
menr woud look l and a ce undersrding of ir implications for
national justice (FreC. 2006; 2007). Global egalitaians mu have me
obligation to do more concrete work.
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Cosmopolitaism: Cultura, Mora, and Political
Ada D. Etinson
Introduction
In t paper I tackle me difcult and contested concept of cosmopolta
ism. My task divides into tree parts. First, I distinguish beteen three
mn varieties of cosmopolitanism: cltral, moral, and politcal. Mora
cosmopolitanism's core premise - mat a11 hU beings are owed equa
moral consideration - sits at me very hear of meories of human rights and
globa jutice, and its philosophieal daboration is merefore of great import
to international etc.
This brings me to my second task, which is to bring order and clarity
to me notion of mora cosmopolitanism. I do mis by ofering a general
distinction beteen me concet of moral cosmopolitanism and vious
conceton of me sae. Following Pogge, I mae a fer distinction
beteen instttonl and inteactonal conceptions of moral cosmopolita
ism. I consider me partiaity objection to moral cosmopolitanism, and
argue mat me reources to overcome t objection are most Iikdy to be
found in a conception of moral cosmopolitanism mat takes the impor
tance of bom politica instirtions and human interactions into conidera
tion. In paicular, I argue mat me most plauible conception proposes a
moral division of labour beteen institutions (flling positive duties) on
me one hand, ad individua (ff1ing negative duties) on me omer.
The mird part of my paper argue for a revisionay understanding of
me rdationship bereen moral and political cosmopolitanism. The lauer
ha traditionaly been understood to be an independent meoretic do
mn concerned wim a single politic idel: mat of a world state. Using
Kt as a htorica exple, howeer, I propose to adj ustments to our
understandg of politica cosmopolitanism. Tbe frst is a more devdoped
appreciation of me dependence of political cosmopolit meorizing on
moral cosmopolitan meorizing, and me second is a broadening of me
notion of politica cosmopolitam to include not only me ideal of a
world state but omer strategie instirutional idea a wei. All of mese
cormopolitan political idels (Le. , mat of a voluntary federation of states,
26 Ad D. Etn,on
or a patchwork of international institution dedcted to interpreting ad
enforcing international law) are lnked by their capacity to implement
moral cosmopoltan norms such a huma right. I do not argue for a
paricular cosmopolitan poltc idel; which one we choose, afer aI, may
depend on the conception of moral cosmopoltanism we adopt.
Diogenes of Sinope coined the term cosmopolitn amost tO and a
half thousad yers ago. Wen aked where he cae fom, insted of an
swering that he was fom Sinope or Athens, the ancient Cynic i reported
to have answered: "I am a kosmopolites [a citizen of the world] "l . For us,
the word cosmopolitn is a adjective that ha come to decribe prery
much anything that is 01the worl or worll. A cosmopolitan city is one
in wrch people fom many diferent nations or cultures intermingle. A
cosmopolitan person is worldly-wise, wers a coat of may cultres, feel
unretricted to one, or at hore in many. The English laguage, which is
now the most widely spoken on the planet, is what we might even cal
cosmopolita. Ad if there are in fact values which aI persons, races, na
tion ad cutue share, then they coud righcly be caIed cosmopolita a
weil.
Wat of cosmopolitanim then? The addition of an im here draw at
tention to a philosophy or ideolog. When philosophers today cal them
selves cosmopolitan, they are using the adjective in a new sense. They are
signaling their a1legiance to a particular belief or doctrine. The study of
cosmopolitaism is today a burgeoning feld in acdemic philosophy.
Most works in the ae devote considerable attention to the quetion of
what cosmopolitanism is, trying to delineate the feld of inquiry before
tey delve into it. This paper is, somewhat boringly, priaily intended to
be a contribution to that frst step: the tak of dniton. The clarity, how
ever, that thi efort brings wil aIow U to make some substantive obsera
tion later on.
We c begin by ditingushing beteen three knds of cosmopolita
doctrine: the mora political (or lgal, ad the cltral. In a sense, each
variety represents the impact of the ponderous idea of uiversal member
ship (or world citizenship) on a diferent subject: morality, politca inst
tutions, ad cultural identity.
(DL, V 63) This repon cmes from aother Diogene (Diogenes Lartius) who wrote
duing the Roma Er. His book, Tbe Lives of Einent Philosophers, suveys te life
ad thouht of my acient philosopher, ad indude 2 chpter on Diogene, of Si
nope.
Csmopolitaim: Cultra, Morl, ad Politc 27
1 . Cultura Cosmo
p
olitaism
Ir is perhaps eiest to star with cultral cosmopolitaism, a i t stays c1os
est to te meing of te term in common palace. CulturaI cosmopol
itaism beins by taking the eclectic, idiosyncratic, culturaIly mied-up
(i. e. , cosmopolitan) liestye with wrch we have become so famiar in
modern times, ad afrms this as both a possible and flflling way of life.
By afrming our cpacit a individuas to live weil in the world by form
ing patiche identities that draw from cultures a dsparate or a incongru
ou a we Iike, cultural cosmopolitanism is a chalenge to those strand of
liberal thought that defend the imponce of rootednes in a single cul
ture for individual wel-being ad autonomy.2 Ir envisions huma beings
not a rigidly determined products of culture - irrevocably cast into a
given cultura mold from birth - but a agents fee U roa the eah and
asemble (or reassemble) for themselves a unique cultural concoction by
choice or by chce. Essentia to this idea is the ability of persons to con
verse and connect across cultures; there must be a common human cpac
ity or set of capacitie - for languae, thought, commuction, etc. - tt
fciltates such cultal transaction.
At the same time, cultue itself must be something that ca be ex
chaged, atered, traslated, or combined in idiosyncratic confgurations if
we are to believe in the lifestle of the cosmopolite. Afer remndng us
that this lfestye is a viable option, the cutura cosmopolitan ca't help
but alo remnd us of the ubiquity of cutura change, interchange, and te
reuting indefniteness of cultural boundaries. In this way, culturaI cos
mopolitanism moves from a claim about the self and te good Iife to a
clam about te nature, or fudity, of culture i general.
A ScheIer (2001 ) h noticed, however, there is a more ambitious
claim ofen tied i with these considerations. This is the notion that cu
tural cosmopolirism may be unavoidb/ i modern times, i. e. , that it is
the onl possible and ffling Iife choice we can make. ScheIer cls this
an exeme variant of cutural cosmopoltaism, to be contrated with its
more modrate counterpar - the simple afrmation of te While the lauer
doctrine remains ambivaent, the former looks down on adherence to the
values and traditions of a particular community a an outmoed and im
practicable le-choice.
2 For clasic and infuential aent on te liberal multicururalist side, se Josepb
R ( 1 994) ad Will Kyrcka ( 1 995) . Jeremy Waldron's 1 992 aicle entice "Mi
norir Cuture ad te Csmopolit Alternatve" remans te stock exple of a
cosmoplit chlene to liberal multicutU" .lism.
28 A D. Etnson
Wy hold mis more extreme view? Stated as such, it's surely too e
treme to be acceptable. One way of makng sense of t position would be
to consider Jeremy Wadron's poit mat "Cutures live and grow, change
and sometime wimer away; mey amalgte wim omer cultures, or mey
adapt memselves to geographiea or demographie necesity." (Waldron,
1 992, pp. 787-788); If immersing oneself in me traditions of a paricuar
community (and only mat comunity), today, require arifcially halting
mis process by committing our governments to me preseation of cul
tures, men mere is indeed a sense in whch, a Waldron asserts, anti
cosmopolitism "i like living in a Disneyland and minking mat one's
suroundings epitomze what it is for a culture realy to exist" (aldron,
1 992, p. 763) .
There i anomer way of makng sense of me etreme form of cutura
cosmopolitanism, however, but it involves an adj ustment in our concep
tion of me ideal of me cultal cosmopolit. In a later article, Waldron
elaborates on Kt's notion of iu cosmopoltc - which governs me rela
tions beteen foreign persons and people - to show mat what maes
someone's cutura identity cosmopolit i not so much it hybridity a
me fr 0/ alegance mat person adopt towards me norm and practices
of meir cuture. Since all huma person, according to Knt, are stuck
togemer on me surfce of me em and mus "destined by nature to [de
velop] , mrough mut compusion under laws tht come from mem
selves, into a cosmopolitn societ, " (Kt [ 1 784] 1 99 1 , p. 332) mey must
fhion a universal coercive law for memelves. Given me scope of mis
politica project, it requires people of diferent moral, philosophical, cu
r, ad religiou background to come to terms wim one anomer in a
fee and open-mded manner on deciion about law. According to Wa
dron, mis makes it important to approach one' s cutura traditions not a
btte and non-negotiable aspects of meir identity - worm practicing sim
ply becaue mey are JOur - but a norms and practices fnded by an array
of reaon mat are open to interrogation. This is what makes agreement (or
even debate) about constitutiona essentials possible, and it shows how
adopting such a rational attitude towards one's cultural belief, norms, and
practice, is a matter of accepting me modern conditions of an emerging
global community.
This way of understanding cultal cosmopolitanism ha f more in
common wim ancient Cynie ad Stoic cosmopolitan doctrine of a univer
sal commuty of rational beings. Eiled fom Sinope, men a reident in
Amens and later Corinm, we might mink mat Diogenes me Cynic's mi
gratory lifetyle woud have induced hir to sing me praises of cultura
hyridity. In fact, quite me opposite is rrue. Diogenes w famous for his
complete indifrence and een hostility towards local custom and conven-
C.smopolitaim: Cultra, Mora, ad Politc 29
tion. Much like Socrate, the aecdotes surroundng the life of Diogene
depict h as a consitem, ideologieally-comrned socia dissidem. Wie
this did mae hir wildly idiosyncratc, it did not make h a curural
cosmopolit in the moderate sense of te word: someone who embraces
and at tes wilingly adopts te ways of oters.
Of what is known about aciem Cynicism, one certainty i its insis
tence on life in conformity with universal reon and vire a opposed U
life in accordace with loeal cutom and law. Rather than asemble a coat
of may cultue, te anciem Cynics sought ta purif themselve, so ta
speak, of the morally cormptive infuence of any loe idemity or aflia
tion. The idea of cultral attachmem h a patem moral dimension. Does
cultural attachmem (i. e. , being America, being Inuit, beig Jewih) , for
instance, emai givingprerece ta members of one's culrura group, in the
sae way a one give preference ta the members of one's family? Shoud
this sort of preference-giving be seen a a justifable, even desirable thing?
The aciem Stoic and Cynics thought not. A Nusbaum note: "Clas,
ra, stat, nationa origin and loeton, and even gender ae treated by
the cynic a secondary and moraly irrelevant attributes. The frst form of
moral afliation for te citizen shoud be her afliation wt rational hu
mty; ad this, above all, should defme the purposes of her conduct"
(Nusbaum, 1 997, p. 29) . This brings u to moral cosmopolitaism.
Mora Cosmopolitism
The Stak philosopher Seneca proposed mat each of u belongs ta at leat
[o commonwelths: te loe country of ou birth and te uiversal
commonwealth of reason, which includes a1 human beings regardless of
their origin, clas, or culture (Senee, J oto: 4, quoted in Schofeld 1 99 1 ,
p. 93) . I may stand next to some of you a a foreigner, but I also std
ne ta you as a fellow human being endowed wit al the eapacities that
follow fom our common natre. Stak thinkers fed on the uque ea
pacity for reaon a most worty of praise in individuals, and founded the
fellow citiznshp of humaity on its boundless moral value (Nussbaum,
1 997, p. 30); since we all poses te divine capacity of reaon, the huma
community is one of moral equls. Stak world citizenship, then, has at its
core an ethiea doctrine; it emls frst and foremost te equa ad fnda
mental moral stat of individuals and obliges us ta consider the good of
a1 humankind i our actions (Ibi. , pp. 29-30) . A favourite ad striking
visual exercise of Macu Aureliu' wa ta imagine the whole huma race
a a single body (Ibi. , p. 34); ta disregard one par of huaity i like
30 A D. Etnson
chopping of one's limb. In some such way, Marcus and the 5roic admi
rably refsed to recognize anying huan a alien.
For our purposes, 5toicism is rdevant for its ofering of the core con
cept of moral cosmopolitanism: the equa and fndamental moral statu of
all individuals, regardles of race, creed, ethnicity, origin, or geographie
location. But how eccy is this statu to be understood? There are many
options. Ir might imply some form of globaized consequentialism, where
al actions are asesed according to teir aggregate benef or detriment to
the wdfre of humankind.3 Or it coud imply tat we treat each person
never merdy a a mes to an end but a an end in itself, a an equal
member in a Ktin universal "kingdm ofend"? (Knt [ 1 785] 1 997, pp.
429-434) . Ir h been said to reque te recognition of ech person's
equal dignity, or teir enticement to a set of central human capabilitie
that mae human fourishing possible (Nusbau, 2006, p. 76) . Doe je
require that we treat e person as having equal stading a an addressee
of moral j utifcation (Bein, 2005, p. 1 7) ? Is moral equality about secur
ing individual autonomy or obsering duties generated by the basic inter
ets and wel-being of persons? Or is c rather a theologica doctrine,
grounded in the idea that human beings are morally equal in the eye of
God their cretor?
My asertion is that all of these notions c ft under the rubric of
moral cosmopolitanism. One way of making sense of this is to distinguish,
a Rawls did, beteen the concet of moral equality and variou concetion
thereof (Rawls [ 1 971 ] 1 999, p. 5). We may disagree in our concetions of
cosmopolitaism whe agreeing on the core content of ir concet. The
former devdops, interprets, and add crucial detals to the latter, but je
does not contradict its formulaie content. A concept is surrounded by a
nebula of derivative conceptions, so to speak. In the cae of justice, an
instirutiona vine according to Rawls, the nebula of conceptions sur
rounds the core notions of non-arbitrariness and te fir consideration of
individual claims, which mae up its concept (Ibi. , p. 5). In order to
understand moral cosmopolitanism, we wil want to kow what lies at the
het oHrs concept of equality.
Contemporar theorisrs such a David Miler have located the core of
moral cosmopolitanism in te idea that "we owe all hU beings moral
consideration of some knd . . . and also that in some sense that consideration
must involve treting their claims equally" (2007, p. 27) . Miler, like
may oters, recognizes tat tis core needs fther daboration. He cals
tis the premise of weak cosmopolitanism, to be contrated wt any of irs
strnger counterparts, which add premises that go beyond equal moral
3 Peter Singer (2002) h rendy popuiz ti view (with exrension to aa) .
Csmopolitaim: Cultra, Mora, ad Politc 3 1
conce to argue for a substative view about what son of treatet i t re
quires, Le. , the globaiation of a paticu principle of distributive jutice
(IbM. , 43-44).
One way of isolating the cosmopolitan concept of moral equalit is of
fered by Pogge, who reduce it to tee interrelated cm: individualim,
universalit, and geeralit:
First, indiviulim: me ultimte units of concr ae human brng, or P"sons
- ramer ma, say, fily line, tribes, emnic, cultura, or religiou communi
ties, nations, or state. The later may be units of concer only indireccly, in
vire of their individu members or citizns. Second, univl!raiit: me statu
of ultimate unt of concern attaches to rl living huma being equll - not
merely to some subset, such 3 men, aistocrt, As, white, or Mulims.
Third, gmealit: this speial statu h globa force. Persons ae utiate
ut of concern fr roerone - not ony for meir compatriot, felow religion
it, or suchlike (Pogge [2002] 2008, p. 1 75).
This seems Iike a far rendition of the baic concept of moral cosmopol
itanisr; however, these principles remain too abstract to be meaningf. If
the wrongness of murder is indiferent to borders, race, or ethnicity, tis
must be because ou mora conce is focued on some cros-border fatre
of persons: not simply their humanit, but some more specifc aspect of
their humaty that is violated in the act of murder. "Humanity" seems far
too vague ad trivial an apect of persons to iIIuminate the root of this
mor prohibition. Wat might this apect be then? An, there are
councless way of feshng this feture out (IbM. , pp. 1 75- 1 76) . At the risk
of smugng a conceton of moral equality into its concept, we neverthe
les have to make a decision here. Following Alen Buchanan, I woud
arge that the most plausible a weil a minimal fesh we c put to the
bones of the concept of moral equaty is by focusing on baic human
interst or well-being (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 1 31 - 1 37) .
InJutce, Legtimac, and SelDeterination (2004) , Buchanan argue
that te concept of equal moral regard (what he cals the Mora Equality
Principle) is not only fndamental to any mora theor worth thinkng
about (Buchaa, 2004, p. 88), it also provdes a foundation for the es
tence of baic hua rights (IbM. , pp. 90-9 1 , 1 31 - 1 35) . "One of te most
imponant ways we show equ concern and respect for persons is by ac
knowledging that tere are human rights" (Ibi, 90) ; ad this, via respect
for baic huma iterets. Buchana appes to our intuitions here, agu
ing for t link by Iisting eaples of basic rights tat seem to sere or
protect baic human interests. So for eample, the right not to be tortured,
not to be discriminated aganst on grounds of gender or religion, and te
right to resources for subsistence: these rights are rooted in such basic
interests as avoiding psychological and phyica harm or pan, fnding
32 Ad D. Etn,on
spiritual fllmem, and living a minimally decem life free of crelty and
oppresion (IbM. , p. 1 34- 1 37) .
By itself, this arguent does line to rule our the posibility of other,
non rigts-baed manners of respecting equa human imerets. For in
srce, the mora equality principle stated fady could sere as a basis for
some variant of globaed conequemialism tat rreated individual imer
ests equally but agregatively, permitng grave ham towad some if it
were to led to enough beneft for others.
Regardles of this indeterminacy, for U the main attraction of Bu
chanan's reding of mora equality lies in its ability to accommodte a
variety of conceptions thereof, while at the sme time adding some much
needed specifcity to the original concept. The Kantian emphais on ra
tiona autonomy a a basis for moral equality c now be incorporated as
one of severa imponant ingrediems in most or even al individuals' well
being; so too c the notions of human dgnity and equal capabilities,
which c play a parallel role in conceptions of moral equality.4 In this
way, a conception of moral equity as equal concern for basic human
imerests best mimc ee behviour of a concet of moral equality - a
comon cemre of eonvergence for various concetons of the same.
But if this is our eoncept of moral eosmopolitanism, then ir is even
les determinate than Rawls' coneept of justice (on wh ich all members of a
liberal society c agree) . In the latter cae, we at let ke what the eon
eept applied to: socl intitutons. Moral eosmopolitam, on the other
hand, seems to apply to the whol 0/moralit - al possible mora subject
matters or iudicand, a Poge ha caled them (Pogge 2007, p. 31 2) . In
order to deelop more determate eonception of mora cosmopolr
ism, we need to distinguish beteen it application a a moral standard for
evaluating instittions, on the one hand, and individual or group behav
iour on the other. In other words, we follow Thoma Pogge in treating
moral cosmopolitanism a a doetrine that holds implications for both
inteactional and institutional justiee (Poge [2002] 2008, p. 1 76) .
Onee we relegate the scope of mora cosmopolirnism to a speeic
domain or subject matter, we have already moved away from its eoncept
and imo a conceton of mora cosmopolitanism. We re a more speeife
srnce on what the demads of mora eosmopolitanism ae and on whom
4 It should be noted tat the ver sae notions are those most ofen ud in arg
ments for the eistence of huma rigts (On huma rght and autonomy, se e.g.,
Grfn (2008, eh. 8) T his only bolers the ca for " cnnecon beeen the concept
of moral equr, we have defned it, ad that of huma rght. This aso ft with
Josph R's proposal of a interet-b e teor of right which w intende to il
luinate and explain te entire trdition of politic and mora discourse al)out rights
(R, 1 986, p. 1 66).
Cmopolitaism: Cultrl. Mor. ad Politc 33
they fall. Pogge himself endorses an institutionaI conception of cosmopol
itanism or what he calls socilutce cosmopolitanism (Jbid. , p. 176;
2007, pp. 3 16-321). Socia-justice cosmopolitanism prescribes norms of
socia and economic justice on the basis of which we can asess aternative
instittiona strctures at te domestic and international level. What
mae these norms cosmopolitan is their ultimate concern for the basic
human interests of al persons. Pogge taes te target of such norms to be
the institutional protection of human rights (includng rights to resources
and basic subsistence) via coercive law. for al persons regardess of nation
aity (Poge 2002/2008, p. 176).
Before specifing how a just globa social and economic order c be
practically attained or what it might look like, socia-justice cosmopolitans
oucline the principles of such an order. Thus, Poge ( 1 989 III) , Bein
( [ 1 979] 1 999, p. 170), and Tan (2004, pp. 55-61 ) have claimed that
Rawls' principles of dometic justice, a oucined in A Theor 0/Jutce
( [ 1 971 ] 1 999, pp. 65-73), are te best principles for determning how to
disuibute goo and libertie fiely among a11 members of te woeld
community. Caney (2005, pp. 122-125) ha sugested the validity of a
patchwork of global principles of distributive jutice, and Nussbaum
(2000, Ch.2; 2006, Ch.5) argues for the globalization of a capabilites
approach to disuibutive justice and human rights.
Part of the attraction of tis institutionaI approach to moral cos
mopolitanism is that it focuses the range of demand placed on individuals
to aid the woeld's poor, ailing, hungt, and siek Our duties towards hu
maty are medated by te presence of political instittions, and our pri
ma responsibility is to try ad promote feible reforms in them. Tbe
individual fate of more tan si billion eanhly inhabitants do not direccy
inrrude into te scope of our lateral moral concern. A purely intractionl
approach to mora cosmopolitanism, on the other hand - one that envis
age te mora community of human beings in abstraction fom a11 insti
tutional strucrres - woud make direct and potentialy vet strong de
mads on individuals towrds other individuals, regardess of relations of
geographic proximity, kinshp, race, or nationality. If we ve al human
beings a moral equals to whom we owe direct respect and proper treat
ment of some kind, then we (especialy in the developed world) may be
overhelmed by demads to help tose who are sufering a11 over the
world. This would mae ay consuicted focus of our moral and economic
energie - say to our friends, fmily, or compatriot - seem unjustifed.
But how c suc basic form of partiaity be unjust? The claim that such
impaity is unreaonable and subversive forms te partt objecton to
mora cosmopolitanism.
34 A D. Etnson
Peter Singer, who proposes a comprehensive variant of gobal conse
quentism, ha become an ey target for such objections. He is fmous
for pointing out the drtic and in some respects absud disregard we show
towards the fte of others in our everyday behaviour. In one example
among many, he aks u to imagine that our duties to sufring persons
abroad are a strong a our dutie to save a child drowning in a pond that
we happen to be passing by (Singer, 1 997) . Similarly, the money alocated
to needles luxurie in the developed world is moraly preposterous in light
of the good it could do for the global poor (or een the ear's atmos
phere) (Siger 2002, pp. 1 88- 1 89) . Athough he does not refer to hmself
as a cosmopolitan, Singer clely endorses a conception of mora cos
mopolitanism. Interetingly, the form that he endorses is neither purely
interactional nor institutional, however. Inted, he appears to endorse
what Pogge ha referred to a a monistc or holitic approach to moral cos
mopolitanism (Poge 2007, pp. 32 1 -328). Accordig to this view, inju
tice is primarily a property of stts 0/afir, and only secondarily a matter
of individual and group behaviour (interactions) or institutional design
(institutions) .
A Pogge puts it, "Monistic cosmopolitanism co-ordinate all huan
aents ad all humanly shapeble fctors towards one uitar goal [for al
iuican) : to mae the world a j ust as we c make it" (Ibi. , 32 1 ) . This
fts the consequentialist spirit of Singer's version of mora cosmopolitan
ism. Al actions, institutions, and choice are evaluated with reference to
the overal beneft/harm they produce. Ir is not my purpose to of er a fl
criticism of this conception of moral cosmopolitanism, or any other. Nev
ertheles, there are good grounds for thnking that t conception verges
on impracticability. The difcuJty with such a vie is not simply tt, like
interactional moral cosmopoltanism, it directly chalenge wat we tend
to thnk are j ustifed forms of partiality towrds fiends, fily, corelgion
ists, and co-nationals; in its totaitarian co-option of institutions, individu
as, human cultures, and subcultures towards the goal of maing the world
a better place, it is unable to place a non-arbitrary liit on bot the range
or suength of the obligations owed towads the whole of humanity. Singer
himelf ony demands that each member of a developed country devote a
mnimum of one percent of their annual income to a caue that fghts
world poverty (Ibi. , pp. 1 93- 1 95). We may even interene on his behaf
and propose a maximum - a tehold or target - for this aid in the even
t worldwide protection of baic human right. But the holistic goal of
'making the world a beter place' is too ambitious to properly justif these
bare-minimums and bare-mamums. Any limitations to human sacrifce
apper arbitary, and the many impractical and persona goals that make
life worthwhile are given no free-reign. Singer is surely able to provide
C.smopolitaism: Cultrl, Mor, ad Politic 35
some aswers to these critidsms, but I bdieve we ae better of lookng
toward a conception of moral cosmopolitaism that in spirit is more
repectfl towards huma practice and practicaity.
C an interactional conception of moral cosmopolitanism avoid the
partiaity objection? One instinct might be to refne te doctrine by re
strictg it to merdy negative reponsibiities on the pat of individua not
to harm human beings in certan ways. We can plausibly invoke human
rights here a the appropriate side constraints. According to t variant
then, life c go on a uual, we c act with a much paity a we like,
a long a we don' t violate the baic human rights of other persons (Ibi. ,
pp. 328-330) . Asuming that we in Fct c come up wit a slimed
down list of (primarily negative) hu rights that do not m such
positive demands, we here have a more workable cnception of interac
tiona moral csmopolitam, at let one that appears ahle to fce the
partiaity objection straght-on.
But this adaptation renders the doctrine too anaemic. Surely, the most
valuahle inight of mora cosmopolitanism is tat we do owe something
positive to others, be they strangers, foreigners, or the neighbou net
door, and human rights ae not simply negative right, they indude obli
gations to educate and provide a adequate standard of living for al per
sons. Wat we owe them is certainly more than a policy of simple non
interference or a attempt on our part not to implicte ourselves in any
injustice being perpetrated against them. Pogge's intitutiona cnception
suggest a path aong which we may flfill thee fter obligations, Le. ,
through supporting a more j ust global institutional strucrure. But, on its
own, the institutiona conception is alo lacking. Ir fl to acknowledge
the obvious human dimension of mora cosmopolitanism - that there are
mora constraints on individual and group behaviour that bind us regard
less of the presence of sod institutions and a covering law.
The most plauible conception of mora cosmopolitanism, I would
suggest, one that stil cptures te basic wust of the concept, yet aso
repects the partiaities, normaities, ad inane practices of human l,
ought to incrporate a focu on both interactions and institutions. In this
way, such a doctrine could ackowedge the importance of sodal instit
tions for securing people' s rights ad liberties while also ackowledging
the person-to-person rdevance of the concept of mora equity. In my
eyes, the best way of piecing togeter such a conception would be to call
for something like a globalized division of moral labour beteen persons
or groups on the one hand, ad institutions on the other. Our positive
dutie towards others c be mediated via our support for jut institutional
arrangements ad reforms, wile ou neative duties towards them are
satisfed a long a we repect certan non-negotiable side constrants on
36 A D. Etnson
our conduct. This view, I tae it. c eily ster the paiality objection
by demading only mnimal duties not to harm others at the latera, inter
actiona level (where the patiit objection play out). Watever other
special obligations we wish to take on are up to uso With potentially over
whelming positive duties to humanity removed fom the interactional
domai of moral concern and displaced onto our relationshp with socia
institutions. we have a conception of moral cosmopolitam that maes
ele and sensible demands on individual without abolishing their acr
habits and practices.
This pieceme approach to moral cosmopolitam appers to be that
endorsed by Allen Buchanan. The concept of moral equaty, according to
Buchanan, aso emails wat he calls the Natura Dut of Jutice. Together
these to concept provide us with an oucline of our positive and negative
dutie towards others. The natura duty of justice emerges out of te con
cept of moral equality because it specifes how we ought to make positive
efons to ensure that the baic rights of others are protected.
Tang the Mora Equality Principle seriously commits us to the
Natural Dut of Jutice, becaue a proper understanding of the Moral
Equality Principle implie that to show proper regad for persons we must
help ensure that their baic rights are protected. The Natura Duty of
Justice a I understand it say that equa consideration for persons requires
helping to ensure that tey have access to institutions that protect their
baic human rights. This will sometimes require creating new institutions
and will ofen require reforming existing institutions. (Buchaa 2004,
pp. 87-88) .
5
By focuing positive duties toward others on institutions, we do not
ignore the importance of genuine kindness. generosity, and universa phi
lanthropy. We simply recognie the undeniable Fct that socia institutions
play the single larget role in determining the life chance of human be
ings. The ananment of a jut global order is a mora aim of frst impor
tance for all of uso
Schemer would have done weIl to consider some of these fner distinc
tions in his discusion of moral cosmopolitanism (Schemer 200 1 , eh. 7).
There, Schemer distinguishes beteen moderate moral cosmopolitism
(which give fee-reign to specil obligations beteen conational) and its
extreme counterpat, according to which our fndamenta moral ale
giance is to humanity at large and special obligations to others c only
have derived or instrmental vue (lbi. , pp. 1 1 5- 1 1 6) . These are thus
to variants of interactional moral cosmopolitanism: one that recognies
the utimate value of patial obligations to fiend, fly, or conational,
5 See Bua (2004. 85-98) for 2 more gener dcuson.
Cmopolitaism: Cultrl, Mor, ad Politc 37
and one that poses a challenge to such form of paiaity by denying tem
any vaue beyond teir serice to te whole of humanity. ScheIer would
have had an even eier time defending the former modrate view j he had
kept a piecemea approach to mora cosmopolitanism in mnd. He consid
ers to objections to the coherence of moderate cosmopolitanism that
might force us to retret to the les compromising extreme cosmopolitan
view: one conceptual and the other substantive. The conceptua objection
is that a baic commitment to the equaity of persons entails a principle of
equal treatment, ad tt specia relationships with particular people (i. e. ,
fiends, fmily, and conationas) cannot in temselves j ustif special
treatment (Ibi. , p. 1 20) . The impliction is that a commitment to moral
equality is conceptual y incompatible with the non-intrental jutifca
tion of special responsibilities. The substantive argument is that "equaity
and special responsibilities require policies and practices that are diametri
cal y opposed to one another" (Ibi. , p. 1 20) . ScheIer ha h own an
swers to these objections (Ibid. , pp. 1 21 - 1 24), but the piecemea concep
tion of mora cosmopolitsm tht Buchanan appears to endorse has
good aners to each of these objections that a purely interactiona con
ception coud not frnish.
With regard to the frst objection, Buc c argue that a com
mitment to a principle of equal interactiona treatment does not have to
entail equal treatment in al respect. If we fe the principle of equ
tretment out, as we did above, in terms of a minimu policy of no-harm,
non-interference, or (negatve) respect for baic human rights, then we
leve enough room for special responsibilitie to build up on top of this
minimum level of equal treatment. But Buchanan c go beyond this and
claim commitment to equal positve tretment of individuals under the
glbal intttional order, G which is similarly indiferent to interactional
partiait and highly morally relevat. With red to the second objec
tion, Buchanan c claim to specif in a firly detailed wy how nationa
istic practices might be reconciled with 'cosmopolitan' ethic practices:
citens c act patriotically and form idiosyncratic bond, provided they
reman consistent in taking their natural dut of justice seriously by mak
ing eforts to promote instittional arrangements that wl secure te wel
fe of al human beings.
That a piecemea approach to moral cosmopolitanism c ofer these
aners tetes to it promise a a theory about the demand of j ustice. Ir
is important that matters of instittional jutice are included here. The
6 Note mat such eual tretment need not ental me fttening out of globa resoures
eualy aong a1 ntions. We could accpt a Rawlsia principle of global diributive
jutce. which woud alow fr sme globa inequaitie.
38 Ad D. Etn,on
basic insight that all hwan beings owe each other equa! moral eonsidera
tion ha obvious berings on the shape of dometic ad internariona insri
tutions. Onee we begin ro eonsider nor jut rhe ber mora norms or sran
dad for evauting te global insrirurional order, but the bet polirical
means for implemenring them, we have moved into the rerrirory of polt
cal eosmopolitaism.
Politic Cosmopoliranism
The universal polis imagined by Sroic thiners wa not IH any ordinary
state. This wa a cosmic polity (Le. , kosopolites) thar did not depend for
its estence on human institurional srrueture or on ay mens of self
defenee. Its boundarie were set by " rhe sun" and irs laws were perfet
epressions of the divine norms of reaon. Thu, though je may have been
lke a dr state, or perhaps the only te one (Sehofeld 1 99 1 , pp. 61 -63) ,
i t wa very diferent from any form of government achieable by mortals.
The ethly verion of this eosmopolis - a world state wrought by human
hads and eneompasing al huma beings - is rhe archetype of polirica
eosmopolitaism. Its aerua! achievement woud give very tangible weighr
ro the notion of world drizenship.
Polirical eosmopolitanism h rradirionally been assoeiared wrh the
ideal of a world stare encompassing all persons. I propose thar we amplif
the range of rhee thar c be enterraned under the heading of poltical
eosmopolitanism. I argue for this defnirional amplifcarion not because
the narrower defnition is hisrorically inaecurare, or because there are
mny self-declared polirical y cosmopolitan theses tar have deparred from
the ide of a world republie. Instead, I ague for ir because I believe rhar
politieal eosmopolitanim is best undersrood a a appendix ro moral
eosmopoltanism, something patendy illustrated in the work of Kr.
Given rhat moral eosmopoliranism c be instirutionalized in variou ways
and in vang derees (espedally in vie of the plurality of coneeprions of
mor eosmopolitanism), this gives us good reason ro believe that politieal
eosmopolitaism is a mueh wider ad more interesring feld t ha pre
viously been thouht. We c endorse a theis in polirical cosmopoliran
ism while opposing the ide of a world stare.
A I udersrand it, moral eosmopolitanism provides an aim, by refer
enee ro whieh the queries of politieal eosmopolitanism ean be answered. 7
In the previous seetion, we saw that mora eosmopolitaism ha strong
7 Te dncon be some resemblace to mat of Rawls' Ide/N on idel teor
rstnction (Rawls 1 999, pp. 89-9 1 ) .
Csmopolitaim: Cultra, Morl, ad Politc 39
implications for global and domestic institutions, precribing norms of
institutional justice tat are globa in scope. Such ide moral standards
(i. e. , the protection of human rights, etc. ) provide u with reference points
according to which institutional arangements c be ranked ad assessed,
but they do not by themselves provide aners to the more practical ques
tion of how tey ae to be implemented. The nonideal conditions of te
actual world impose external constraints on what is currendy political y
reizble and what c reasonably be hoped for. Ir i the tak of politicl
cosmopolitanism to oler concrete political solutions which ber these
constraints in mind. Idea of political cosmopolitanism - which may, for
eple, include (a) a world republic, (b) a scattering of independent
global, regional, domestic, and munidpa governace institutions, or (c) 3
voluntary padfc federation of states - receive their ipetu from mora
cosmopolitan theorizing about the universal value of human rights, equa
repect for individual interest, the benefts of perpetual pece, etc. But less
ambitiou cosmopolitan political ideals will replace more ambitious ones if
the luer are conidered to be too urealisticly utopian.8
A Pogge notes, moral cosmopolitan theorizing ca be applied to the
subject mauer of sodal institution in to ways. First, one c move d
recdy from the baic concept of moral equity to the political theis that
"soda institutions ought to be deigned so that they include a human
beings as equals" (Pogge 2007, p. 3 1 3) . Th straghtorard move does
yield the archetypal thesis of political cosmopolitanism: a world republic
encompasing or at leat open to al human beings. Second, one can move
indirecdy by entertaining a conception of moral cosmopolitaism tat
doe not demand any particur institutiona design outright, but that
provides criteria for asessing and ranng alternative institutiona designs
(sodal-justice cosmopolitansm) (Ibi. , p. 3 1 3) .
Despite acknowledging tis dual path of infuence from moral to po
litical cosmopolitanism, Poge defnes po/itical (or a he cls it: lgal
(Poge [2002] 2008, p. 1 57; 2007 l ) cosmopolitanism a "committed to
a concrete political ide of a global order under which a11 person have
equivaent legal rights and duties - are fellow dtizen of 3 universal repub
lic" (Pogge [2002] 2008, p. 1 75) . Surprisingly, while recognizing that
soda-jutice cosmopolitanism c indirecdy endorse a pluaity of intitu
tional arrangements, Poge confnes the topic of political cosmopolitanism
to only one ide: a universal republic. I don't know why Poge endorses
8 K, for insrce, refer to the rdicule dirted at te 'wild ad fcifu' idea of a
world republic @ put fr by Ab Sr Piere ( 1 658- 1 743) ad ROUSe (See Kt
[ 1 784] 1 99 1 , pp. 47-48) . Surely this i part of the reaon why he opts for te suro
gte politica ide of 2 foedu p.cicum, I shall explain below.
40 Ad D. Etn.on
such a narow defnition of the term, apart fom reasons of hitorical
precedence. Conceptual defntions, terms of art, c b quite arbitra
anyhow. My claim is that it is more usef to ampli the defnition of
political cosmopolitaism once we acknowledge te variety of manners in
which moral cosmopoltasm c be instirutionazed or politically im
plemented.
Pogge's defnition runs to distinct idels together: the institutiona
reliztion of equivalent legal rights and duties for every person on the
planet, on the one hand, and te idel of universal eitizenship in a world
republc, on the other. Stated 8 such, neither of these ides (sepaatdy or
together) fl y defnes the enterprise of politieal cosmopolitanism 8 I have
characterized it. But, if we had to choose beteen the to, we should
choose the frst. The second ideal is, aain, too narrow. A I said above, it
contirutes merdy one avenue aong which to pursue the politie imple
mentation of mora cosmopolitnism. On the other hand, the frst ide is
more embraeing, but this depends on how we interpret the range of lega
equivalence. If the complete set of legal right and duties that apply to
every person in the world is to be exaccy the same in a/ respec, ten this
ideal would be too demading. Ir would rule out any speeial lega obliga
tions we mght incur towads loea forms of authority (Le. , our nation of
birth) and thereby rule out the possibility of a multinationa globa politi
ea order that might neerthdes realize certain cosmopolitan idels. If on
the other had, this universal set of euivaent right and duties consti
rute only a minimal set (Le. , of human rights) on top of which we might
pile frther rights and obligations, then this could be one way of capruring
the common project of politiea cosmopoltm, which is concerned
with the concrete implementation of a global order that taes equa ac
count of te interests of all human beings.
Consider Kant's politiel thought, for instance, where a cosmopoltie
union of humankind constirutes something like the overriding tels of
eathly politie undertaings. Wat many commentators ofen udere
timate in reding K is the etent to whch he remans committed to the
ideal of a world republic - what he els a cosmopolitan constirution or
soeiety (aso a civit gentum) - throughout his poltie writings.
9
Kant is
of course famou for rejecting the ideal of a world state in fvour of a pa
eifc league of nations iedus pacifcm) on severa grounds, the most
quoted of which is his professed fe of a globa form of despotism.
'
" But,
9 See Knt ( 1 795) 1 99 1 , pp. 1 05- 1 06.
1 0 Rwls ( 1 999, p. 36) miunderstds Kt unequivocly rejeeting 2 world-stte on
te gouds, quotg the fllowin psin Peretu Peae ( [ 1 795) 1 991 , p. 1 1 4;
Also see Kt [ 1 793) 1 991 , p. 90). Moniqu Cto-Sperber follows Rwls in c re
speet (See CatoSprber, 2006, p. 268).
Cmopolitism: Cultr, Mor, ad Politc 41
Oc h rt_hdy Obscwcd, ths rc]ccttOn u bct rcad stratc_c.
' '
hOu_h a wOrd statc may bc dmcut Or amOst tmgOsstbc tO achcVc tn
gracttcc, K asscrts, `tt ts nOncthccss thc ncttabcOutcOmc OIthc dts-
uc nwhtch mcn nVOVc Onc anOthcr (ant [ 1 784] 1 99 1 . gg. 47-48).
PmOn_ thc stratc_c Obstaccs tO thc tmQcmcntattOn OIa wOrd _OVcrn-
mcm, accOrdn_ tO t, ts thc Iact that thc grcscnt nOnd cOndtOns
OIthc wOrd mc tt such that nattOns c aVcrsc tO mttn_ thctr sOVcr-
c_nty undcr thc cOcrcVc aws OIa wOrd rcgubtc.
'
hus, a gr@mattc
tntcrmcdtum, ant Ogts IOr thc nc_attVc substttutc OI a VOunta but
_raduycxgandtn_gachc hdcrauOn OrcOn_rcss OIstatcs that ts kcy tO
grcVcnt . `hc ancr may chcck thc currcm OI mans ncnattOn tO
dcq thc awd ant@Ontsc hs IcOw, athOu_h thcrcwl away bca ruk
OIttbursttn_ IOnh ancw, (ant, [ 1 795] 1 99 1 , g. 1 05) hcwrttcs. Oc s
r_ht tO su__cst that ant rcay ts cOmmtttcd tO a wOrd rcgubtc thc
h_hcst gOttca d, but thathc `asO undcrstands that a Qacthc _uc s
mOrc y rcachabc IrOm thc sttu qu, d that a wOrd rcgubc s
mOrc cty rchac hOm a gachc c@uc than IrOm thc sttu gu6.
(O__c, Forthcoming 1 ) t h thc dca cOsmOgOttca sOctcty n
st_ht, but undcrsds thatacQucsccncc tO thc nOnd cOndtOns OIthc
wOrd ts an tmQOrtantgcctOIanyVtabcgOttcagrOgOsa.
OrOur gurgOsc, thc chcIVaucOIOOktn_ at antswOrks ts us-
uattOn OI thc tmtmatc rcatOnshg bcwccn thc dOcutncs OI mOra d
gOttt cOsmOgOttantsm. t dcrVcs thc d OIawOrdrcgubtc hOm
h mOra dOcunc OIa gOssbc king dm 0/ed, a untVcrsa mOra cOm-
munq OIwhch cach hum bcn_ s wOnhy OIbcn_ cQua mcmbcr
(ant 1 785/ 1 997, gg. 41 -45) . hc mOra tdca OI a kn_dOm OI cnds
(much I thc btOtcs cosmic gOts) c bccOmc a ]urdtca statc tIa1 gcr-
sOns arc nsttmttOnm y _uarantccd thc ctcrna hccdOm Qrcscrtbcd by
untVcrsa mOra aw undcr a sn_c _Oba sOVcrct_n.
'
' PccOrdtn_ tO ant
hts unVcrsa ]urdca statc ts nOt stmgy awOrthygtrattOn, buta mOra
and QOtca mgcratVc mr thc cmrc hum racc [ant [ 1 798] 2007, Q.
332) . uctOthcgracttca cOndtOns audcd tO abOVc, hOwccr, t ts an
d `cOnstandy thrcatcncd by dtsunOn, d that c Ony bc _raduay
aggrOxtmatcd. ant thu sts Out hOm an dca cOnccgttOn OI mOra
cOsmOgOtantsm tO cOnsdcr ts nOn tdca tmgcmcntatOn nacOnccgtOn
OIgOtttca cOsmOgOtantsm. mcbc_tns by aggytn_thc cOnccgt OImOra
1 1 For a eccllent defence of t strategic reading of Kt' s remak, se Pogge' s
"Knt's Vision of a Just World Order" (Foncming).
12 Kt also mentions te difculty of gveming "too wide a aea of lad" ( 1 797/ 1 99 1 ,
p . 1 71 ) ad the "contradctory" nture o f 2world state ( 1 795/ 1 991 , p . 1 02) .
13 See Pogge (Foncoming. 1 ) . Kt briefy mentions the j uridic: reization of the
kngdom of end in the ( [ 1 785) 1 997, p. 46) .
42 Ad D. Etn,on
cosmopolitaism to re subject maner of social istirutions in a direct a
opposed to indirect manner. From his baic commirment to the moral
cosmopolita idea he straightaway derive re political counterpart-idea
of a world state under which moral equality is institutionally guanteed.
Bur since nonidel conditions do not permit the imminent reaiation of a
world state, he calIs instead for a volum union of nations.
I would ague that Kt's surrogate political ideal of a pacifc federa
tion is no les a resis in political cosmopolitanism c u his positive
idea of a world state, (alrough I understad tat ris claim is somehat
aachronistic when applied U Kant) .
1 4
Bor a world state ad a volumay
society of peoples constitute politica parway along whch re concept of
moral equality can (eventual y, i not immediately) fnd concrete instiru
tiona reaiztion, and ris is Kt's baic motivating aim in considering
re merit of bor proposals. I tn we ought to follow re grain of
Kant's rought in our understanding of political cosmopolitanism. Wir
anchoring in a conception of moral cosmopolitanism, it c embrace not
jut one political ideal, but a rage of ideals tat may be more or less po
Itica1y reaiable but nonereless cosmopolita.
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Gabride De Agdis
Introduction
hc IOOwn

rchcctOns On mc m_ucntatVc statc OImc art n mc dc-

batc On _Ob ]ustcc atm tO h_m_ht hOw mOst OImc mcOrcs aVaabc
cOmatc mOra and gOtca ar_umcnts and subOrdnatc mc ancr tO mc
hrst. bOmc OImc rcasOns mat accOunt IOr mts cOutOn may bc uaccd
backtO a rcatVcy cOncsc ran_c OIsumgtOns abOut mc naturc OImOra
ar_umcntatOn and u Ob]ccts, amOu_h mc Iact mat Vcry Icw schOLs
cntcrtan an cgct rccctOn On mc grOccdurcs and mcmOds OIcnQury
makc ms crtca assOmcnt mOrc dmcut tO undcrtakc. mOwcVcr, mc
mndamcnta umgtOm dn_ mcwOrkOImc mOst rcnOwn schOars n
mcdcbatcOn_Oba]ustccc bcsummcd ugasIOOws:
1 . Lthca mcO

s a ratOna cntcrgrsc that ams tO dtscOVcr tmc

grncgcs and nOrms bymcs OIar_umcntatVc cnQury,
2. Iwc wOrkcd Out, ar_umcnts succ tO dccdc On mOra dcmm
and cOnuOVcrsc,
3. A_umcnu may bc bcd On mc Ob

cctVc mOra Quty OI mc

smtOns addrccd Or mc gcrsOns ahctcd, sO mat such a mOra
Quaty s tO bc smatcd tO mc kOwcd_c OIstatc OIahrs n mc
wOrdand, mcrcIOrc, hcd n tcrmOIuum-ukc catms [mabcrmas,
1 990, gg. 68, 76) . hOsc ar_umcnu mat sucss `mOra ntutOns and
Vaucs makc asO an ag tO sOmcmn_ that s suggOscd tO bc
Ob]cctVc and unVcrsasabc bcyOnd cutura bOundarcs, mc
mOstwtdcgrd mOght cgcrmcntsshOw.
4. bOmc Omcr ar_umcnts rchr ncmcr tO ntutOns nOr tO
nstmtOns. nstcad, mcysccm tO t nOrms andVaucsIOr _rantcd
cxgcctn_ mc rcadcrs tO a_rcc On mcm, mOsc whO IOOw Kws arc
I would IH to thank Kok-Chor Ta /r ring very interesting crtcal rmarl that
hdpd me improve ti paper, athough I don'e tink I coud aswered them a11 . I
a indebted U Paulo Bacelos /r his ver usef comment. Reponsibilir /r the
cntent of my paper i of cuse entirely my own.
48 Gabrde De Agdis
even unlikely co be commned O moral intuitionism.2 This has
consequences, howeer, on te scope of te arguments, for they will
depend on what the audence is redy O accept. With taking vaues
for gran ted and the consequences for philosophical argumentation I
de in the lat section of this essay.
Ir u therefore no wonder that te buk of the theorie mae ue of onto
logical arguents and seek in the natre ad qualitie of objects (huma
beings) or sitations (relations amongst human beings) the reson why
certain morl prindples ad rule shoud apply. At the same time, most of
ther aso cal for a set of potentially unversal mora intuitions that ought
O allow for an interculturally valid moral theory. Thus, political relation
ships amongst persons and people are asimited O moral relation, and
political institutions as well a legal and sodal norms ought not ony to
conform O what is just and right - Le. , moraly "tte" - from the ethica
point of view, but also trslate moral prind
f
les in practice, as they were
jut the consequence of what is mora1y right.
P woud lie O ague in t paper, such a confation of political
ad moral aguentation is misleding. In fct, moral ad politica argu
ment obey O diferent conditions of agency, circumcribe (o diferent
intitutional spheres, and require (o diferent forms of arguent and
practice.
For the sake of c1ariry I will state right away the gist of my argument.
P far a contemporary political philosophy underscores the rational char
acter of the enquiry into ethical prindples, it disregard an import
theoretica ad practic achievement of the modern ae, te core asump
tions of wich have aso entered the logic of democratic institutions. This
achievement conists in repladng mora truth by legal, and in nowadays
Wetern countrie also democratic, authority. With regrd O the point I
anempt O make it w perhaps sufce O point out one key characteristic
of this replacement, a it wa highighted a. o. by K in his theor of
sodal contract. Kt's theory establishe a cntract the adheion and loy
aty O wich u never subject O revision fom the part of the partidpats
{Kt [ 1 793] 1 970, 2).4 Besides the hiscorical resons that have led Knt
to sugest a model in which political authority u irreocable, a dedsive
teoretical reason is tighcly connected wit the fction of sodal contract,
whch is - in the lat instce - O take the interpretation of norms from
2 I 2 indehted to Kok-Chor T a fr this remk
3 This attude is weil exemplifed by Simon Caey: "For people to reeive their entit
lerent it is importat that there b politic insttutons in pla whose role it is U
protec pople's right" (Caney, 2005, pp. 1 20- 1 21 ) .
4 See also Kt ( [ 1 7971 1 996 6), wit some subsrnt dlerenc with regad to the
cten's le sttu in the poliry.
Aing for Jwtic. Globa Jwtic ad Philosophic Aentation 49
the had of those who are af ected by their application ad LO put it in
the hands of a third party. Kant's asumption is that, shoud the interpre
tation of norms Iie by those who have a stak in the controversy that my
aise on their undersranding, then this would be equa to the absence not
only of any poliry, bur of any instirutiona order acogether.s This is the
reaon why Kt's theory - a weI a in genera all those theories that
emphaise the instirution of a poliry a the most necessary uigger of ay
politiel order - c be detached fom its hiscorie context, which is the
establishment of national states a the new, preponderat form of poliry as
the outcome of a politie w insted of tradition or reelation (Kersting,
1 994, p. 23; Burgio, 2006, p. 1 9) , ad generalied co politie phenomena
in general. Likewise, Kt's insight c b generalised beyond the etab
lishment of a poliry, as it applie co m instirtional arrangements that
regulate interactions amongst a plurairy of accors.6
The lesson we c draw from t - a weIl a fom several modern po
Iitie theories from Hobbes onwds - is that ay possible politie order
must be baed on a form of authoriry, Le., on institutional and procedural
aragements, the acknowledgement of which precede any form of sub
srtive "uuth". Te specifc form this arangement takes in today's Wet
ern countrie is democratic procedure. P I will attempt to make dea in
the folowig, the acknowledgement that ay political order mut rest on a
procedura strucrure a weIl a on a division of politieal labour rather tha
on philosopheal or any other source of uuth is what distinguishes the
ream of politics fom etiea refection. Once t is acknowledged, the
strs ad scope of ethe theory is likely co be seen in a diferent light.
This ackowledgement is independent of whether the norm in que
tion are conuoversial or not. Indeed, a politie insrance of deciion
mng would be necessary even j there would be a thorough consensus
on norms. To make this dear, it is iponant co see that in everyday life
norms are understood as generalisations on a socially and historielly em
bedded eperience. In other words, in order to undersrand norms we need
co appeal co caes that illustrate their "application", a the later is what
gives us a due a to the "meaning" of norms. Such a interrelatedness of
norm and appliction ha been deared up within the hermeneutic tadi
tion (Gadamer [ 1 960] 2004), which points out the role of the eaples as
a set of background asumptions the understadig of which must be
presupposed if the norm is co be righdy assessed. T implies that, con-
5 Kt's idea wa moddlcd aCt scvcral prcccding cxaplcs, includg Hobbcs's ad
Pufcndor S.
6 Some bints at tbis generalisaton C be fund in Kt' S wrtn
g
tcmsclvcs, a fr
intancc in tbc Crtue ofPure Reaon ( [ 1 787] 1 998, B 373) .
50 Gabrde De Agdis
tra to common understanding, me formulation of a norm is not so
much a guide to correct moral opinions, but me outcome of me rationai
sation of such opinions, and is merefore tied up wim assuptions whose
plauibility is to be empiriclly assessed by confronting it wim me aree
ment mey c ern in decision-making.
This is to be eaily noticed in me debate on global justice, a me chief
means of argumentation rely eimer on some form of "intuition" or on
what me institutiona shape of me nationa and international society says
about what ha to count a an accepted norm. Inamuch a mey anempt
to ground universa norm (eimer universal in scope or in jutifcation)
(eaney, 2005, p. 27) , bom me appe to pure intuitions and me approach
baed on intitutions encounter a similar difculty: mey assue mat what
is being brought to me fore is a common, potentially universal core of
moral asumptions me universa vaidity of which is granted eimer by me
mought eperiments from which intuitions are worked out or by me wide
acknowledgement mat me eined institutions enjoy. A far a mey
support relativism, me sae meoretical tools are used to highlight me
cultura homogeneity of norms a mey emerge out of a supposedly c10sed
or at lest wel-encompased cultural environment. That mey achieve ei
mer goals c be quetioned in bom cae.
I mink it important to remark tt me following refections on me
forms of arguentation are not to be interpreted a an attempt to take
sides for universaism or relativism. Similarly, the point mat will tty to
mae is neimer in favour of mose who support me pre-emnence of global
norm of justice over national boundaries nor in fvour of me opposite
stance. Inamuch as l address some of me prominent arguments made in
me debate on globa justice, mis is ony meant to highlight some features
mat are common to all, independendy of me normative content mey up
hold. The idea about me mening of norms mat I have mentioned above
is indeed not to b mixed up wim me relativist mesis according to which
rules ripen wimin a given cultura environment and are merefre to be
interpreted wimin a common-sense background mat excludes generalisa
tions fom me vety stat. Amough supporters of relativism have upheld
me same or similar meoretical stances to buttress meir mees, me question
a to which norms c be generalised or universalised is itself empirical,
Le. , politicl, ramer m purely meoretical, and relates back to me role we
wnt to asign to intercultural, internationa, or uansnational agreement
in me formulation of norms of uiversal scope, Le. , to me degree in which
we want to achieve universalism of j utcation. A I wl try to show later
Aing for J wtic. Globa J wtic ad Philosopbic Aentation 5 1
on, such a question cannot be answered on me bais of a purely meoreti
cal, Le. , uum-confdent arguentation eimer. !
It is a wdl important to emphasise mat me position I a going to de
fend is ao to be distinguished fom politcal rea/im. Realim consists in
me asumption mat politics and emic represent to separate, and not
necesarily congrent, spheres of social action, me frst hinging upon what
Haberma ha summaised a "strategie behaviour" (briefy characterised a
orientation to the usefnes of actions for me intended goal, negotiation
on me bais of diverging interests, and sug le in which me co-actor is
seen a an opponent and competitor for me possess of exclusive and indi
vidually distributed goods) (Haberma, 1 984, pp. 292, 329) , me latter
reolving around shared norm that regulate me interaction on me bais of
shared and idealy "aue" convictions. 8 T O complicate me picture, reism
occurs in to versions, me frst being a decriptive meor of political be
haviour baed on anmropological asumptions about me egoistic natre of
mankind, me second insisting on me normative value of me national in
teret and power politic in me international arena. Thu, power a me
"everlating esence" of politic is opposed to regimes buHt in terms of
legitimacy and internationa accountabiliry (Dallmayr, 2002, p. 1 43).
Amough reasm i s less liable to me criticisms I set form in mi s paper t
ethicl globalism, wht fllow i not ment to support realsm neimer in
its decriptive nor in its normative form, and it doe not intend to speak to
me pre-eminence of power politic over emic, nor does it rest on a realt
anmropolog. Insted, it is meant to question me posibiliry of arriving at
"aue" emical principles by mens of philosophica argumentation in gen
eral, independency if its scope and whatever its aim.
Rather man wim reaism or relativism, what follows c be asociated
wim me strand of mouht known a "anti-foundationaism". Amough
me leding supponers of anti-foundationalism have been more akin wim
rdativism man wim universalism, me points I will be making ought to be
distinguished fom rdativism as weI. Indeed, me core question concerns
me rdationship beteen politic and me core asumptions of nowdays
(normtive) political meory. Anti-foundationalism maintains mat moral
norms are a subspecie of social norms, and that a such mey hve to be
justifed by reference to a cultral and historical, Le. , social and - in a way
7 This is te reon why ati-foudation staces C h put to tbe seric of diEe
rent political ad moral views (Brint, Wever Gamon, 1 995).
8 See a summa of te jutosition in the histor of political tought in Croe
( [ 1 931 ] 1 946) ad ia further devdopment in Bobbio ( 1 984, pp. 1 5-6). Se a Coa
dy ( 1 99 1 ) ad Shapiro (2003, pp. 1 -2), who shows the curent refrmulation of the
dsic demma of the choice between ethic ad "plitc" behviour in cntempo
r politica teor.
52 Gabrde Oe Agdis
which is yet to cle better - consensua maner, ramer man resting on a
historical ad a-culra preuppositions. In omer words, a mere is no
procedure mat enables us to ground mem on trum, mey have to be
grounded on procedure me outcome of which is open to contingency,
but me shape of which is limited by what we - in me w of our histori
eperience ad its self-consciou refection - have lened to consider
a belonging to our political society's core convictions and practice. This
come near enough to me asumptions of relativists, and yet bom ap
proaches ae not at all me same. While relativism insists that moral norms
have no universal vaidity, but ae restricted to me borders of a cuture or a
national group, anti-foundationalism contend mat norms cnot be
grounded in memselves, but only made plausible within me boundaries of
culrurally and historically mediated ve of what is right, which doe not
eclude mat meir ackowledged validity c be etended beyond memo
Since no procedure guaatee that valid rules ae arived at wimout rely
ing on asuptions which are memselves not gran ted by any foudation
outside me historically and cultl y sediented morality, me utimate
justifction of norms lie wim a form of decision, a for instance democ
ratic decision-makng. Thus, me diference beteen me approach I will be
defending and trum-baed accounts of emics and morals rets on me role
of politcal dciion. Th dos not say anything a to me scope of me
norm, which c be confned wimin me range of a culrurally or politicaly
defned group or eimer be universal, if a correpondent procedue is avil
able, but sets me limits to me justifcation ad me foundation of me
norm, and has merefore heavy implictions a to me role ad fction of
philosophica enquiry into me defmition of its vaidity.
I. Philosophica Aguments on Globa Justice
This section will be devoted to me discussion of me way in which schol
as attempt to achieve frm ground under meir feet in order to set up a
sound agument. This will help to highlight me assumption mentioned
above mat we best conceive of a norm a an erapolation from, ad a
conceptualisation of, eperience mrough which w attempt to mae me
social world we live in available for interention. To do so, I will start
fom to of me most widespred means to set up moral arguments: me
use of intuitions and me workng out of me normative presuppositions of
legal institutions, men I will move on to me so caled "moral quality" and
me values that scholas suppose to be inherent in a situation, in order to
point out me underlying ontological assumptions. Finaly, I wl juxtapose
mese knds of argument wim wat cn be dubbed "pragmatic aguments",
Aing for J wtic. Globa J wtic ad Philosopbic Aentation 53
which take into account me controversial nate of mora arguments in
general and pave me way to a proceduraI look onto me choices we have at
our disposal to del wim, or in me best cae to smoom out, emical di
agreement.
1. 1 . Intitions and me elementar semtic of morals
Seeral scholars draw meir normative sttements back to meir coherence
wim moral intutions concerning res and norms mat meir interlocutors
are likely to share. To encounter a memodological jutifcation of mis
procedure is rare. Ir seems to be common amongst scholars to take it for
granted wimout questioning its validit or scrtnise it background a
sumptions. From me ue mat numerou scholars make of intuitions, mey
seem to be a son of equivalent of me "elementat sentences" (Ba
siste/Protokollste) of logical positivism (Schlick [ 1 925] 1 974) . They
are meant to deliver a staning point for philosophical arguentation, 8
we need to kow wich asuptions about shared belef are plauible
before elaborating any fmer on our argument. Aguentation baed on
intutions is by f me most common in me literature. 9 Nevermeles, it is
difcult to properly understand what scholars mean by "intuition". A
intuition is uually presented in a statement on me validit of a norm,
iplying mat such a validity c be asumed as buruesed by popular
opinion, and usuly refers to (moscly fctitiou) caes in which we mink
me common opinion is at no loss a to which behaviou is to be consid
ered as morally correct.
The way it is commonly used, me appea to intitions entils an am
biguity. Ir c eimer auempt to remnd u of a moral common sense we
have acquired mroup sociaation, and mus preupposes a culturally
locted moral sense, or it c dig out a supposedly universal moral sen
timent that leds to asuptions made independencly of any cutural te.
Ir is a f a me lauer applies that intuitions fl me role of claing
elementa moral trum, and betray merefore an objectivist attude to
wards mora, for - as Mackie ha pointed out - mey include a commit
ment to "postulating value-entities and value-features of quite a diferent
9 Is ca be exemplifc by statment . "[ . . . ] I ry troughout on a cmmon sense of
dementa farness" (Shue [ 1 993] 2008, p. 21 1 ) .
1 0 In t repe we ca eute wi t one aoter "intuitions" ad te attude to t
some norms or vaues fr grtcd with no frter explaaton, for at tbe end of tbe
dy tbe arguentative eft is tbe se: botb are me to put te agumentaton on
a ground tat is itlf excludc fm justifcaton.
54 Gabrde De Agdis
Ordcr IrOm ythn_ wth Wtch wc arc acQuantcd, mOra tntuttOn
sccms tO rcIcr tO a mcuty `uncry dhcrcnt hOm Our Ordmary way OI
knOwn_ anymtn_ csc (Nackc, 1 977, g. 34) . t s, hOwcVcr, dmcut tO
makc Out whcthcr andwhcn schOars ntcnd thc Onc Or thcOmcr uc, as
an cxgctt rccctOn On ms gOtnt uuay stays Out. LOncusOns c Omy
bc draW IrOm thc ar_umcntatVc cOntc and thc scOgc OI thc nOrms
addrcsscd. hu, cgcs Or `thOu_ht cgcrmcnts such thc bcOVcd
Oncy sand bcsgc aw U m_h_ht unVcrsa mOra sugtOns,
thcy scck tO h_urc Out stuattOns n whch a mc aggtc whcn nO cultura
cOntcxt sccms tO bc grcsuggOscd.
A Iar as thc ancr s thc casc, thnk thcc suguOns grObcmattc
[and ths ndcgcndcndy OIwhcmcr thcy arc brOu_ht n tO suggOn un-
Vcrsasm, whch s usuymc cc, Or rcatVsm) . hcyn mct grcuggOsc
thca_rccmcntOnsOmcmn_whch s OnyaggarcntycOntcxdc, ttwl
bc Ccar whcn OOkn_ ncarcr at thc cOntcnt OIsuch ntuttOm n mc IO-
Own_scctOns.
. . ahcanayss OInsttutOns
Pr_umcntatOns bcd On nsttmtOns arc mOrc cOmgc. hc anys OI
nstttutOns s mnt tO grOVdc aIOundatOn IOra mOra cOmmOn scnsc,
. c., tOwOrkOut mc nOrms thatcVcryOncwhOsharcs thcsacmsttutOna
cnVrOnmcnt ts abc tO acccgt. hcy rct On mc assugtOn that mOra
nOrm arc cncOdcd tn thc msttutOna arr_cmcnts that hamc cVcqday
ntcractOm tn a gOtca cOmmunty. hc mcthOdOO_tca grcmsc ts that
asOctctys mOra cOdc can bcntcrgrctcd accOrdm_ tO aschcmcOra mOdc
that rcsumcs thc mndamcnta mOra nOrm mt arcVad m ttand _Vcs a
_OOddcscrtgttOn OImcmOrayrccVant gccu OIsOca uIc.
buch a knd OI anayss, bct cxcmgmcd by thc wOrk OI KObcn ).
LOOdn, shOws rcmarkabc stmartcs wtth mcgrOccdurcs OIc_a anay-
sts, nmuch t trcats thc nsututOna arr_cmcnts that _Vc shagc tO
sOca ntcractOns thc bs On whch wc c rcy OIwc wt tO wOrk
Out thc mOral cOdcx that thc gaHcgants suggOscdy sharc. hus, tnsttu-
tOns arc undcrstOOd thc cmbOdtmcnt OI gubc mOras, and such
thaOwtO tcst thc cOhcrcnccbcwccn OurmOral thcOrcs and OgtnOns
On thc Onc hd, and thc tact mOra grcmuc On whch cxutn_ nsutu-
tOns sccm tO rcst, On thc Othcr. cn ntcrnatOna mOras arc tO bc m-
Vcsu_atcd LOOdntakctntcrnatOnaawtO bc rcgrcscntatVc OI`what wc
Owc tO suan_crs, whcrc dOmcstc gubc aw s ndcatVc `OIwhat wc
Owc tO cOuntqcn (LOOdn [ 1 988] 2008, p. 259).
Aing for J wtic. Globa J wtic ad Philosophicl Aentation 55
LOOdn atms tOshOw thatwchaVc duttcs tOIOrct_ncrs, d mat mc
duttc wc haVc tOwards Our cO-nattOnas c bc bcst udcrstOOd as mc
sgccmcattOn OIuntVcrsa duttcs mataggy _cncray tO cVcryOnc andbtnd
mamnd tn a stn_c mOra cOmmuntty. LOOdn hOds mat suggOrtcrs OI
mc grc-cmtncncc Or cVcn mc ccustVcncss OInattOna duttc tcnd tO -
sumc a nOn-Vtabc mOdc OI hOw sOctcty wOrks, and haVc mcrcIOrc a
awcd gtcturc OIbOth tntcrnattOna and nattOna duttcs. LOOdns cOmtd-
crattOns cntat a crtttctsm OImc td mat mc `sgccta rcattOnshtgs mat
wc cntcrtatn wtm Our IcOw cOumcn c mc rOn whywc haVc tO-
wards mcm sgccta duttc matwc dO nOthaVc tO dtschar_cwtm rc_ard tO
IOrct_ncrs. buch a mOdc assumc that sOctcttcs rcscmbc mutua bcncht
tnstttuttOns whcr mcy, tn Iact, dO nOt ht mts mOud. nstcad, sgccta
rcattOnshtgs ]ust strcn_mcn mc untVcrsa duttc mat wc haVc tOwds
anyOnc csc. LOOdns _umcntattOnc bcsummcd ug IOOws.
bchOars whO assumc mat mcmbcrs OImc sc gOtttca cOmmuntty
haVcsgccta rcctgrOca duttcs ]usttq mctr mcts by mc sgccta rcattOnshtg
thcy cntcrtmn wtm Onc anOmcr. PccOrdn_y, gOtttca cOmmuntttcs arc
charactcrtscd by strOn_cr gOstttVc duttcs man gantctgants haVc tOwards
Onc anOmcr. Pt mc sac mc, nc_attVc duttc tOwds cO-nattOnas arc
wmcr man mc n@attVc duttc that IOrct_ncrs haVc tOwards Onc Omcr.
cOgc s _mns `hOm haVtn_ Omcrs gOstttVc duttc tOward mcm strcn_m-
cncd ccccds mctr cOsts hOm haVtn_ Omcrs nc_attVc duttc tOward mcm
wccd, and ttts tmgOsstbc IOr mcm tO rtzc mc _atns wtmOut tncur-
rtn_ mc cOsts (Ibi. , g. 266) . hus, mcmbcrs OImc nattOna cOmmuntty
can rcstrtct mctr cOuntrymcns tbcrttcs mOrc man mcy c rcstrtct mc
tbcrttc OIa IOrct_ncr, but mcy asO OwcmOrc tO mc hrst c tO mc at-
tcr. hcrcIOrc, mcOrtcs OIhOw sgccta rcattOnshtgs wOrk cad tO cOncctV-
tn_sOctcttcs mutua bcncht tnstttuttOns.
mOwcVcr, LOOdtn cOntcnd mat mc mutua bcncht mOdc dOc nOt
rywOrk, IOr mc IOrma status OIctttn ts nOt ways cOy rcatcd tO
whO ts bcnchttn_ Orgaytn_ tn mc mum bcncht schcmc. Kctdcnt tcns
cOntrtbutc tO mc schcmc wmc bctn_ cxcudcd IrOm many bcnchts, and
handtcaggcd ctttzcns arc nct bcnchctartcs. LOOdn umcs mat mutua
bcncht schcmc m Ow nO Onc tO draw mOrc man shc gatd tn (`mc aO-
ttOn OI any surgus crcatcd by gcOgcs ]Otnt chOrts may bc ch Ogcn
Ibi. , g. 268) . hcrcIOrc, sOctcty ts nOt acttn_ cOmtstcnty On mc mOra
grcmtsc OImum bcnchtschcmcs, and mcrc mutbc dhcrcnt and mOrc
sutabc mOdcs (Or nOnc). NOrcOVcr, tn mc cc OImc handcaggcd wc
arcOny_admatsOctctydOcs nOtOgcratc amutuabcnchtschcmc.
A mc mutua bcncht mOdc dOcs nOt sccm tO match wtm mc duttcs
wc mattcr-OI-mcty haVc tOwards Our IcOw ctttzcm, LOOdtn su__cu an
atcrnattVc mOdc, accOrdtn_ tO whtch sgccta duttcsarc mcway hOw _cn-
56 Gabrde De Agdis
cra duttcarcdtstrtbutcdamOn_stactOrs, c. , st_ncd tO gttcuara_cnts
Ior mctr tmgcmcntattOn. hu, statc bOudtcs m thc mcttOn OI
r@uattn_ such a dtstrtbuttOn OIduttcs. hcrcIOrc, sgccta duttcs arc dc-
rtVattVc hOm, and subOrdtnatc tO, _cncra duttcs, athOgh LOo cOn-
ccdcs mat mcsgccthcwayhOw thc hrst c dtstrtbutcd cannOt bc dcduccd
hOm thc attcr (Ibi. , g. 269) . hc dtstrtbuttOn OIrcgOmtbttttcs amOn_st
statcs ts mc samc tn mc mutu bcncht mcOry: wtthtn statc gOstttVc
duttc arc strOn_cr d nc_attVc duttc Or tbcrttcs arc wccr, whcrcas
amOn_ ctttzcns OIdthcrcnt statcs thc OgQOsttc aggtcs. LOOdtns mOdc ts
asO abc tO accOmmOatc thc bcnchts rccctVcd by mOsc whO dO nOt cOn-
trtbutc, ]ust bcuc "[ . . . ] wc haVcbccnasst_ncd rcsgOmtbtttyIor cOmga-
trtOts tn away that wc haVc nOt bccn t_ncd any rcgOnstbttty IOr IOr-
ct_ncrs. `btatc arc stuck wtth thc ch_cs t_ncd tO mcm, whcmcr
thOsc gcOQc c a nct bcncht tO mc rct OIsOctcty Or nOt, d mts ts mc
rOn why thcyhaVc tO _rt tstancc tO mc nct bcnchctartcs tn sOmc
ctrcumstanccs [thc handtcaggcd, ctc.) (Ibi. , g. 273) . btmtary, tn cc
sOmcOnc ts ch OutwtmOut a grOtccttOn, Ior tnstancc a statccss gcrsOn
or a gcrsOn whOsc statc f tts duttc, mcn thts gcrsOn ms undcr mc
rctdua rcgOnstbttty OIa (Ibid. , g. 27
_
) .
'

Ir dcsccnds mat a_cnu, tn-

cudtn_ statc, thatarc cOnhOntcd by mts tk Ou_ht tO bc _tVcn cnOgh
rcOurccs tO takc carc OI mc nccds OI mOsc Qut undcr mctr grOtccttOn.
bhOudms bc nOtmc cc, thcn arOcattOnts nccdcd.
hts _umcntattVc stratc ts OQcn tO scVcra crtttctsms. trst OIa,
thc rOn whywc shOud Ogt Ior a cOhcrcnttst mOdc OImOras dcscwc
]ustthttOn.
'
Ir ts nOt at a ObVtOu mt a mOdc tmgOncd hOm @
thcOry andhVtygucttOncdcVcnwtdtnc_a dcbatc (Lrntck, 2001 ;
ctX, 1 998) suts thc nccds OI cthcs. POmtn_tmgcdc matwc grOcccd
by addn_ rucs d cxccgttOns and IOr_O y attcmgt tO butd a cOhcrcnt
whOc Out OI thc currcnty acccgtcd mOra nOrms, mc Ort_tn OIwhtch
usum y dOc nOtbctrayanya-cncOmgstn_ cOhcrcnttst dct_n. hc r-
sOnwhyarattOna rccOnstructtOn shOuddcctc mc htstOrtca cOnttn_cncy
OIruc-maktn_nccds]ustthcattOn and ts nOtncccstybOund tO succcs.
hts shOws uQ tn mc cgcs guOtcd abOVc, Ior thc mOdc that LOOdtn
sg_csu ts Iormuatcd a-hoc tO tncudc sOmc nOrms thc ctstcncc OI
whtch wc can attcst, but ts nctmcr thc Ony gOsstbc mOdc nor mc mOst
1 1 For a aternative, but equally univer, j ustifcton of special duties a subspeies
of univers or csmopolitan dutie se Nuobau ( [2002] 2008, p. 31 1 ) .
1 2 In the prent contet, "coherentist" doe not mea that te juction of belief
abut norms decend from their coherenc with the ret of ou belief, in epie
mologc cherentm, but indicte only the asuption !t we O make sense of
leg norm by fmding OUt a single model of mors from whlch they all descend a9 a
comequence.
Aing foe ]wtic. Globa ]wtic ad Philosophic Amentation 57
plauible in itself. Instead, it seems apt LO convince only mose who already
aim at a universal justifction of norms, and rase no claim a LO its corre
spondence to common-sense asumptions about me origin of acknowl
edged norms. 1 3
Moreover, one of me main difcultie inherent i n intirutional analy
sis becomes apparent when compared wim the opposite strateg, which
consists in criticising eting instirtions on me grounds that they fl LO
match me inrition we hve wm regard LO me moral qualty of a given
situation. 1 4 A sima procedure consists in etablishig an analog beteen
society (or international society, or internation relations) and an organ
isatonal model whose gener mies are better known LO u and merefore
more manageable as a term of comparison. Scholars have used ts reverse
strateg on several occions, a hghlighted by the following eample,
ren from the debate on me ownership of narural reources. T O ground
his meis mat me world's natural resources must be me joint possession of
manind, Brian Barr parallels me distribution of me peoples on erm LO
a lottery, i. e. , LO a mechanism of casual allocation of goods deprived of any
"mor quality" (Bary [ 1 982] 2008, p. 1 97) . The gist of his argument
consists men in rejecting possible objections to this comparison. 1 5
The point i n such an argumentative strateg i L Odisregad me current
instirutional codifcton of me ownership of natural resource in order LO
compare it wim "intuitions" mat appea to our moral sentiment and tell
us, a in Barr' s cae, mat everhing which i equal LO a lottery produces
morally unacceptable outcomes ad ought merefore LO be redresed. This
is a reason not LO accept instirutional codifcations. Ir speaks ramer U the
opposite assumption: instirutional arrangements (like internatonally valid
rules of ownership and disposa) c refect a morally quetionable state of
afr.
1 3 For a deeper discusion se T an (2004, pp. 1 77-8) .
1 4 Thoma Hurk ( [ 1 997] 2008, p. 380) invite us fr intace to understnd natona
partiality by similaity with other forms of paity wh ich may b e0ser to our com
mon udertding; so we ca ak wheer nationa partiality i more siilar U fi
Ha or to rcial partialit a tO epressions of te se attitude that we ae beuer ac
quted wit.
15 T he remaining p= of his argument is then pratie, a his premise do not gt
te detaled cneusion he wat< to cJw. In f.ct, he sug tat te principle of glo
hal ownership be satsfe by me of a ta on te goverent< of rieh countrie pro
poniona to GOP per cpit such a ta ought 10 b dributed among poor cutries
a a MN of negative income l, and cmpuded by a severace l on exction of
natur reourc ad a shaow ta on the vaue of land (Barry [ 1 982] 2008, p. 200) .
These ae of curse poHtic ded<ions that ca b hacked hy the genera priciple he
State<, hut do not de<cnd from it a an immeate consequenc.
58 Gabrde Oe Agdis
hc ar_mcntatVc strat@cs uuatcd abOVc sccm tO sharc a cOm-
mOn, mOu_h mOsdy tact, grcmtsc, accOrdn_ tO whch any aucmgt tO
rccOnstmct ]ut arran_cmcnu mut rcy On mc cOhcrcncc OIa `mOra u-
Vcrsum, c. , On mccOhcrcncc matOur]ugcmcnts cntcrtan wm nstm-
tOnaycOdhcd mc Or mOra grc-]ud_cmcnts Or `nmtOns. mOwcVcr,
such a cOhcrcncc can Ony bc mc Ob]cct OIageement, IOr wc nnOt rcy
On any mcd ghOsOghca grOccdurc tO wOrk t Out. hc mOrc sO, 8 Our
mOra grc-]ud_cmcnts cnOt b cgcctcd tO bc cnttrcy cOnststcnt wm
mcsOcagractccswc Vc n.
1. 2. hcmOra QutyOIastuatOn
AOn_sdc ntutOns and nstmtOns, a sccOnd mndamcnta dstnctOn
cOnccrm mc Ob]ccts OIar_mcntattOn. bchOars can aucmgt tO h_hu_ht
natral dutes, valus mat gcOgc arc suggOscd tO suggOrt, Or mc moral
q
ua/tes mat arc sumcd tO bc mcrcnt tO ntcractOns wc cntcrtan wm
Onc anOmcr.
bchOms whO scck Mcr mc moral
q
ualites mt arcsuggOscd tO bc tn-
hcrcnt n astutOn OrrcmtOnshg matOccurs amOn_a_Vcn sctOIactOrs
haVc tO sumc mat nOrms arc tO bc dscOVcrcd ramcr m stguatcd Or
@rccd ugOn.
'

ndccd, Ia ccrtan mOra guaty ucs at mc cOrc OIa _Vcn

rcmtOnshg, mcn tu ndcgcndcntOImcw OImcgartcgants. hscan
bc _rOundcd On wO dstnct rcOns: cmcr dOc mc nOrm mgct n mc
rcmtOn arcady bcOn_ tO mc cOmmOny sharcd mOra cOdc, Or t cI in
itei IOr a ccrtatn mOra cOnduct, ndcgcndcnUy OIwhcmcr mc gantc-
ganu haVc cVcr a_rccd mat t bcOn_s tO mc acknOwcd_cd mOra cOdc
mcya shc. n mcattcr cc,whch sccms tO bc mc mOrcwdcgrcad n
mc tcraturc, ms ar_umcnt takcs mcIOrmOIanont% gca/ arment, 8 t
u mcVcry naturc OIa rcmtOn Or a stuatOn mat cnms mcVadty OIa
mOra nOrm. hs ktnd OIar_umcnu may bc ttcd ug wm natura duttcs,
8 mc aucr arc shOwn tO cmcr_c Out OIa stuatOn mt mgOsc On mc
actOrs mc ac_ancc tO ccrmn nOrms tO whch mat haVc ncVcr cxgcdy
submttcdmcmscVcs.
'

1 6 This latter Stateg C be sad U b "cognitive" inamueb a it DS morl clam a

sttcmcnt abut matters of f a dstncton tat ha been claifcd by Haberma
( 1 990) .
1 7 "Thu. if tbc baic strure of soie is jut. or a ju a it i reanablc to Cpect in
tc circumcs. evcrone h a natur duty to do his pa in tbe eg seeme.
E i bound to t intution indcpendent of his volut aas. perormativc or
oterisc" (Rwls. 1 971 . p. 1 1 5) .
Aing for Jwtic. Globa Jwtic ad Philosophicl Aentation 59
In the debate on globa justice, tis kind of aguments is reorted to in
order to avoid "morals by consent" a a source of obligation. The mora
quay of te interaction i ofen seen a an aternative to areement, and
is terefore akin to natural duties, vaues, etc. A to the paticular uses of
this knd of argument, one of the most frequent forms in which they occur
aims to show how a certain relation mat people ae asumed to asociate
with a moraI reponsibility in the national or local community also applies
among the inhabitants of the eth. The agument taes therefore the
form: " applie at the nationa or loca levd, and it entals - as such, not
due to the local scope of its application - a given mora responsibility to
wd a certan das of actors; but X also applies at the globa or interna
tional levd, so that it then, too, entals the same responsibility". Such an
argument is usually set up in order to show that there is indeed a globaI
responsibility (to hdp foreign poor, to share one's nation heth, to relieve
fine, to introduce a globa ownership of natral resources, etc.) . Ir goes
for instace Iike this: Insofar a we participate in the system of interna
tional tretise ad institutions that regulate global trade "and share some
responsibility for it design, we are morally implicted in any contribution
it makes to ever-increaing globa economic inequaity". Therefore, na
tiona borders no longer work a "moral watersheds" (Poge, 2008a, pp.
xii, xi) . Being the moral rdevance of national borders one of the most
intensdy discussed cases of an object's moral rdevance, ws will be the
case mat I stake out here for fther discussion.
Charle Bein argues that wethy countries have an obligation to re
structre the world economic sytem and to devolve part of their income
to devdoping countrie. If there is a globaI scheme of socia cooperation,
then states' boundaries have no moral signifcance and do not mak the
limits of socia obligations (Bein [ 1 975] 2008, p. 34) . There is a threshold
of interdependence "above which distibutive requirements such a the
global diference principle are valid, but bdow which signifcancy weer
principles hold" (Ibi. , p. 38) . "Wat cannot be argued is that a wealthy
nation's genera right to retan its domestic product [to support domestic
welfre progFe] a1way overrides its obligation to advance the wdfre
of the lesser-advantaed groups dsehere" (Ibi. , p. 42) .
A simil arguentative strcture ha been uphdd by Simon Caney:
"T O etablish that principles of jutice apply only within the state ad not
at the globa levd one would have to supply an account of how the domes
tic realm difers from the globa relm in a moraly signifcnt way. More
precisdy, one must show that ( 1 ) a11 principles of distributive justice apply
only when some property (or set of propertie) is present; (2) that property
(or set of properties) ests at the domestic levd; and fmaly (3) that prop
erty (or set of properties) does not eist at the global levd" (Caney, 2008,
60 Gabrde Oe Agdi.
p. 488) . The moral quaity of the international arena, whch c be either
homogeneous or heterogeneous wt the nationl arena, is te bais ac
cording to which it must be possible to assert that a responibility applies
or does not apply internatonally or g1obally.
This is the core of te diatribe beteen Simon eaey and Michael
Blae. The argument of the later goe a such: (4) The state is a coercive
actor; (5) State have a duty to j utif their polieies to those whom tey
coerce; (6) A commitment to justifcation entails a comtment to 'rela
tive' principle of distributive justice; (7) States should adopt 'reltive'
principles of distributive jutiee in their domestic policy; (8) The global
order is not coercive; (9) 'Relative' principles of distributive jutice do not
apply at the globa level (Blake [2001 ] 2008, pp. 665-76; Cey, 2008, p.
499) .
In such a cae te dispute will set of right fom the stt when it h
to be decided whether there is coercion at the global level and wether rs
is such a to allow for or to require a cetn commitment. 1 H In this case
the controversy is not about the normative bais, for the contetants shae
the same normative asumption according to whch coercion, j ustfcation
ad obligation ae somehow related (altough Caney refses to retriet
obligation to cases of coercion ad admt of a brighter concept of coer
cion than Blacke's) , but rather about whether a certan state of afrs sub
sits or not. Indeed, both scholars accept the morally relevant premise
according to whch coercion implie a certain moral commitent (x) ad
then discuss wheter y (the international arena) is or is not a cse of x.
A fer critical point concerns the meaning 0/ the ter ued. Caney
evidendy equals coercion with whatever afects people's Iife a a conse
quence of somebody else's behaviour, whereas Blake contents hirelf with
direct coercion a eercied by political institution.
The interpretaton of the mora quality of nationa boundaries de
pends on frther asumptions tt scholas make wit regad to te na
tiona political space. Those who embrace an interactionl approach speil
it out as a relation of phyica proximty and distace to others, wheres
18 Blas er ape to be tbat wher the domec rm dircdy coerc indivi
du the global rm doe not. Tbe problem witb this line of arguent is that it is
not cle to me why it matters i internatona lega institutions diredy coerc indivi
du. Why is tis a motly relevat dilrence? Suppose, fr exple, that instituti
ons exercise coercion over entte lile corporaton ad that, a a conseuenc of tis,
they coerce individua ad in doing so jeopadise their stadad of living. In the c
s A is cercing B who in tu corc C. On Blake's acount ter is no need fr A
to ju his or her cndua U C beu his or her cercion is indiret. But t is
cuter-intuitve: te saient point is that A ha led to a disadvate hing cercively
imposed on C. Tbe frst objetion tu sd: Blake ha not idente a morally
signifcat dfrenc htwen the domestic ad globa rea1ms" (Cey, 2008, p. 500) .
Aing foe ]wticc. Globa ] wticc ad Philosophic Amentation 61
those who highlight the political constitution of a national cammuity,
i . e. , its institutions, highlight the politica obligations that citizens have
towads one another.
The frst approach stas from the general asumption that there is a
duty to help the needy if this ca be achieved at a reonable cast on the
side of the person who give aid. Thus, assistace is required if it' s urgently
needed by one of the paie and if the other c give it without incurring
ecessive costs (azer [ 1 981 ] 2008, p. 1 49) . 1 Such a duty is also ad
dresed a a duty to behave huaely: "If it's in our power to preent
something very bad from happening without thereby sacrifcing anythng
of campaable importance, we ought, mo rally, to do it" (Singer [ 1 972]
2008) . Nagel makes this attitde explicit when he maintins that help is
due to the try impoverished because of their humanity (Nagel [ 1 977]
2008, p. 56) . If we agree on that, then we recognize general duties of hu
manity. Furthermore, those who assue that phyica distance does not
afect moral relations also conclude that such duties apply globaly, and
that there is therefore a globa duty of aid.
More problematic is to ground this dut on generalisable resons. E
pecially controversial is if such a duty rests on reciprocity, in whch cae
we had to acknowledge a duty of mutl aid, or if it subsists without this
condition. Thus, Barry distinguishes beteen a duty bound up with
norms tat are vaid within the rage of a certain comunity ad norms
that apply generally, without being tied up with epectations of reciproc
ity. Adopting the widespread example of recuing a person (ofen a child)
in danger, Bart puts forard the following eple: "Perhaps what moti
vate us in agreeig tat there is an obligation U rescue the [drowning]
chld is that is an uaiculated contetual asumption tat the child be
longs to our cammuty [ . . . ] and that tere are norms [ . . . ] calling for
low-cost rescue from which we stand to gain i ever we fnd ourselve in
need of rescue". If there is a world community, then there is a globa obli
gation of mutua aid. But we had an obligation to rescue someone in da
ger even if we had no reaonable expectation to be reciprocated in cse of
need (i we were tave1ng in a foreign countr ad saw someone down
ing. Barry conclude that obligations of jutice are diferent from obliga
tions of huanity (Bary [ 1 982] 2008, pp. 1 88-9) . The fst apply within
a given political community wose members nuture legitimate and insti
tutionaly codifed expectations toward one aother, the latter apply
19 See also Miller's Principle of Nearby Rescue: "One h a dury to recue someone
encuntered e0seby who is cur ency in danger of severe ham and whom one O
help to reeue wit mea al bad, if te sacrifc of rescue doe not ilelf involve a
grave risk of ham of similr seriouness or of sedou physica h, and doe not in
volve wrongdoing" ( [2004] 2008, p. 521 ) .
62 Gabrde Oe Agdis
wherever a cenn situation is given, a it descends from me mere ability
to hdp at a reonable cost. In mis cse, proximity is a positive reon to
help, a it is imediatdy connected wim me practic chace to interene.
The presuppositon is that such an interenton belng t a moral cod ever
one i eected t agee upon. In such a cae, the moral
q
ualit 0/ a sitton
goes alng with a recogised value, i. e. , the value ohuman li and the conse
q
uet obligaton to save it whenever thi i possibk and reaonabk.
The second rdevant application of me rue of proximity or distance
concerns me relief of economicly caued suferings worldwide. Scholars
who have delt wim me matter have attempted to show me moral irrde
vace of physical proximity. A fvourite application i faine. Several
scholars who have stressed a duty to relieve fine have engaed in me
attempt to highlight dircct consequences of orgised and institutionally
backed actions whose direct consequences result in people of less well-of
countries sufering severe detriments to meir le-conditions or even death
for fine. Such a statg i baed on the asumpton that we are resonsibk
Jr everthing that stnd in a dirct caual reltonhip with our course 0/
acton. Stg fom me asumption mat persons have a right not to be
kled unjutifably, and merefore a duty not to kill unjustifably, Onora
O'Neill has shown how me unequal control of reource worldwide di
rcctly results in unacceptable outcome. Even j a actor legitimatdy eer
cises her property rights, mese cannot override anomer's right not to be
kled unjustifably. Such a cse is for instance given if a compay invests
abroad, but repatriate most of me proft, leving me labourers wim les
man necessay to live on in such a way mat meir survval expectation is
lower ma "might have been" (O'Neill [ 1 975] 2008, p. 1 0) had me com
pany not invested mere. The invetors are activdy doing someming for
somebody dse to die, which is equa to killing her. "Foreign invetment
mat rases living stadards, even to a stll abysmlevd, could not be hdd
to kill, for it cues no additional deams, uess mere are special circum
stances [ . . . ] (Ibi. , p. 1 1 ) . Such specia circumstances could be given if me
invetor rases me living standard at me epenses of other people in a de
vdoping country, for intance by escaping her duty to give her fr contri
bution to local devdopment due to me eternaisation of transaction costs.
To a similar concluion comes Nagel ( [ 1 977] 2008, p. 52), who starts
fom me asumption mat mere must be sometg morally wrong wim a
system tt allows economic actors to ec goods in such a way that
me price of what is fndaenta for surival rase above me levd at which
people from less-devdoped coutries ca aford memo A me critica point
lies wim me entitements and property rights tat allow for trasactions to
take such a dynaic, he maintains mat such a system must be subjccted to
moral scrtiny, a it tns out to be a system wim moral characteristic.
Aing foe ]wticc. Gloha ]wticc ad Philosophic Amentation 63
Evidently, the success of al of these arguments depend on fnding an
areement on what is moraly relevant. 5everal autors seem to agree on
the fact that moral y relevant is everyting that c be drawn back to hu
ma intentional action. Accordingly, we ought to shouder responsibility
for anything we contribute to bring about through ou actons or omis
sions, and the degree of ou responsibility is asesed on the bais of the
values or good that we either frther or damage, the cusa relationships
we are able to mae out, and the chain and the degrees of responsibilities
we feel we crry towards others.
On the other hand, the opposite attitde i also widespred according
to which situations are morally relevant independently of ay kind of
agency. Thus, Nagel thinks a social minimu standad of Iiving morally
justifed inamuch a morally arbitrary factors have an infuence on the
distibution of wealth. Development, hitory, populaton, etc. ae morally
arbitrary "a f a the people ivolved are concerned" (Nael [ 1 977]
2008, p. 55) . The not obvious consequence that severa scholars attempt
to draw is that situations tat subsit in the absenc of any intentional
action, Le. , not being a consequence of anyone's intentiona behaviour,
may have to be Ifed as "moraly arbitrry" . 50 contends Brian Barry that
een if pat acts or omisions of the population or the government have
led to famine etc. , the one who sufers t death or sration is not to be
held reponsible for it (Barry [ 1 982] 2008, p. 1 8 1 ) . Liewise, scholars
usualy consider the place where a person w born a equally accidental,
which implies that the consequences of being born in a place blesed with
economic and social advantage or rater fraught with grievances ought to
be somehow re-baanced (Nussbaum [2002] 2008, p. 308).
A it emerge out of the precedng example, rather m being rooted
in the "objective" characteristic of a situation the assessment of the occur
rences that set of our moral concern depends on the assumptions we
make a to the rules that govern reponsibility. In the above mentioned
eple these relate to the relationship beteen power (understood as
limitation of an otherise unretricted individual freedom) ad jutifca
tion; agency, causation and retitution; moral worth, vaue of human Iife,
and personal responsibility in one's own plight, etc. Evidently, all argu
ments preented above mae appeal to the coherence beteen so me prin
ciple that the readers are supposed to share and their appliction to caes
that transcend their usual scope. This is epecially the case when the issue
revolves around internationa or global jutice, for scholas intend then to
show that what i relevant witn the nationa sphere is aso relevant in
sittions tat tae place outside these borders. However, such a relevance
can only be asessed on the bais of shared assumptions: i proximity is
held irreleant to moral behaviour, then it should indeed be irrelevant in
64 Gabrde Oe Agdis
general. if responsibilty depends on causation. and cauation only. and
cauation connect events across borders. men responsibilty should eend
across borders alo. etc.
Thus. all me examples illusuated above rest fnal y on me coherence of
a set of mora rules given some general principle mat etablish a lk be
teen ac and responibilty. The underlying epectation is mat me
audience c be convinced of me valdity of certain norms mat represent
me application of general principles to more specifc cae. and such ex
pectation is (implicicly) justifed by me fct mat mose principle are
mought to belong to an aready etablishe mora code. A f a me a
suptions are accepted. mey c sere a me bais for fher conclusions
as long a me specifc caes c be subsumed under memo In omer words.
me positions presented above star from me assumption mat me coher
ence wim some general principle i enough to motivate an audience to
accept certain norms. This implies mat a consensus c be achieved on:
me premises - Le . me general principles -. me description of me sit
tions to which mey should apply - Le. . me characterisation of what i
moraly releant to it a well as me empirical asumption mat j ustif me
causa nexus -. and (implcicy) on me absence of any limiting conditions
and rules (wich onen remains implicit or not imediately memtic) . In
no cae is me asumption j utifed mat me moral quaity of a sittion is
inherent in me sittion itself (besides. such an agreement does not mean
mat me norms are stipuated. but mat mey are acknowkded. whatever
meir source) . That me allegiace to a (supposedly anterior) mora code is
essentia to mora argumentation is particully evident when values are
discussed.
1. 3. Vaues and inrtions
Starting from meir defnition. va/ues. a frther premise of most moral
arguments. are in memselves conuoversia. A a frst approximation mey
c be spelled out a a concern tt we have for something or somebody.20
They c also defne wt is worth suiving for and are addressed in me
20 So deHne Pog diferent mor attitudes towad omers acording D me scpe of
our mor concrn: individum i mu chaacerse by our "utimate cncern" wim
"hums being ramer ma fle. trbe. emnic. cutu. or religious cmmui
tie"; uiverity by our "utimate concern" wim "ever living hu being qt y"
rather ma wim member of spei Hc groups; ad gnerity by me "glob fr" mat
uiverts aribe to the later aritude. so mat everone shoud be cncemed wim
everyone e. not jut wim mends. cutrymen. etc. (Poge [ 1 992] 2008b. p. 356.
Aing foe ]wticc. Globa ]wticc ad Philosophic Amentation 65
literature in the form of belief. 21 In the literatre on global justice, values
tend to be understood as a ten which i meant to dscrbe a widl shared
atitud tward what is ofimporance in individual Li. A value i an intr
pretton ofwhat peopl chersh G belngng to the fundtons oftheir Li
proect. A frther strategy consists therefore in tang a vaue for gra ted
ad to show how its coherent pusuit implies certain norms of moral con
duct. The frst pat of Blake's agument quoted in the former secton can
illutrate cs:
( 1 ) Autonomy is valuable; (2) Each person is enticed to anain a de
cent standard of living (where t is defned in absolute terms)/ech per
son is enticed to the materia reouces necessary for autonomous action;
(3) A commitment to autonomy entails that a coercive politica system
which restrict persons' autonomy needs to be justifed to those whom it
coerces; (4) The state is a coercive actor; (5) State have a duty to justf
their policies to those whom they coerce; (6) A commitment to j ustifca
tion entails a commitment to 'relative' principle of distributive justice; (7)
States should adopt 'reltive' principles of distributive justice in their do
mestic policy (Blake [200 1 ] 2008, pp. 678, 686; eaney, 2008, pp. 498-9) .
The vaue caled on here is "autonomy", understood a the ability to
shape one's own existence according to one's own preferences by eploit
ing the resources available to the person, ad is then speled out a, or boil
down to, a limitation on publc taation ad a duty U j ustif whatever
amout the government wants to eact from the citien. Consider also the
following example.
Wen developing his argment for te global ownership of natral re
source, Steiner contends that people have rights prior to any distribution
of good, and theorie of equal distribution must identi i thee rights
what is to be equal &om te stat. To these rights belongs also the right to
untraformed and untrasferred things alotted in equa domains towads
which all others have a duty of forbearance. These things ae our bodie
and raw natral resource, a access to things externa to our bodie "is a
necesary condition to the occurrence of ay action" (Steiner [ 1 999] 2008,
p. 640) . The bais of such a argument are theories of social contract,
which presuppose the original, pre-socia ownershp of, Le. , the prior right
to, what is object of contract or restitution (posterior rights) (Ibi. , 2008,
p. 639) . A person owes restitution i she received more than her initial
shae. All earh resource constitute a globa fnd. Therefore, "liabilities U
21 In order to simpllte mater, I will fcu excluively on how val ue< are deRne ad
dsusse in te lirerature on globa jutic, but we need D be i mid tt philo
sophic and sodologic dscussions of vaue uuly go weil byond t. On te so
dologic ttions see Hechter ( 1 992), Aexder Smit ( 1 993), ad Powers
(2000) .
66 Gabrde De Agdis
pay into me fnd accrue to owners of territoria sites ad ae equal to me
value of the site mey own, ad claims to equal shares of that fnd ae
vested in everyone" (Ibi, p. 641 ) .
A stronger version of me alegiance t o vaues subordinates me scope of
the validity of narms to some goods that are to be presered within a cer
tain politie or curral comunity. In the debate on global jutice, some
schols subject narms mat are to be ackowleded a valid among a
community larger man me national one to me maintenace of loe cus
toms ad conditions of culra integrity.
Michael Walzer h argued in these terms when defending me norma
tive priority of the national sphere over internationa or global duties. He
maintns mat, in order to increae me likelihood of a peacefl co
estence of national communitie whHe preservng meir internal cultural
difrence, state barders are to work a a shield that defect the cultural
and social presure mat may come from abroad: "Neighbourhoods c be
open only if countries are closed, ar rather, only if countries ae potentialy
closed" (Wazr [ 1 981 ] 2008, p. 1 53) . It is uder mis condition only that
states c grat loyalty, security, ad welfare, and ony then c
neighbourhoods be indiferent associations buHt according to market ca
pacities ad personal preference, in whch people ae able to overcome or
do without rigid parochialism towards one anomer: "To tear down me
wals of me state [ . . . ] is not to crete a world wimout walls, but ramer to
create a thousand perry fortresses" (p. 1 53) . The distinctiveness of cultures
and groups is a value most people believe in, Walzer concludes, and in
arder to safegurd mem closue must be permined somehere else.
One of me principa difcuties wim value-asumptions is that the in
fct already presuppose, rather than grounding, a specifc appliction a
wei a a historica, institutional, ad culra frame. Thus, me frst dif
culty mat argumentation baed on shared value encounter consists in me
assessment and defnition of the vaues themselves. Values are ofen tacit
and culturally rooted, as is me understanding of me fndaental concepts
scholars make use of a weil a me taken-far-granted character of the as
sumptions mey rely on. This knd of biae is well known at leat since me
communitaia critique of liberal morality.
A a marer of fact, me interpretation of me concepts ued in me a
gumentation h an impact on me cutural scope of the !arter. To illusrrate
this we can take up once more me Blake-eaney controversy. A point of
convergence beteen me to is me idea mat coercion ad individua
autonomy generally stand opposite one aomer. This is (he reson why
bom scholas require mat power be justifed, a opposed to power is me
private sphere, especially intended a (he individua property owned by
(hose who could be af ec(ed by me enforcement of (he norm (ha( me po-
Aing for Jwtic. Globa Jwtic ad Philosophicl Aentation 67
Iitical community agrees upon. A distributive justice obviouly afects
individual property (eimer positivdy or negatively, but what needs to be
justifed is especially its negative incidence), me datribe boils down to
paying taxes, how much and in order to achieve what.
Ir is imponant to remak mat mis is a specifcally norm-Aericn ap
proach to me matter, me underlying asumption being tat me individu
asigns to political aumority j ust so much legitimacy a it is produced by a
universaist moral argument stating eimer what evetone owes to omers or
what is due to political aumorit (bom argumentative stategies cn con
verge) . Willingly or not, AngloSaxon (ad increingly Europea scholas
a wdl) tend to asign to me political system only a residual role: me state
or me international arena are not a (fcr, hyometical or possible) space
of collective political responsibility in which me people concerned by me
consequences of me decisions ought to be at me sae time recognised a
meir aumors, but a a sort of provider of service mat charges u wim costs
for which we demand an account.
Thus, when Miller speils out me foundation of right ad wrong in
appaently fnctional way a someming mat satisfes a social demand he
does in fct noming eie ma sofenig up the liberal principle of individ
ual autonomy - understood a a right to personal, unshaed posession of
private goods - mrough a principle of unversal mur respect: "Tbe
term of self-governace in vine of which someone conduct hersdf in a
morally reponsible way ae terms mat she could want all to shae whle
repecting al. [ . . . ] a act is wrong j ust in cae it violates evet code mat all
could sdf-respectlly shae" (Miller [2004] 2008, pp. 5 1 0-5 1 1 ) . Thus,
what acrl y is an ad-hoc solution to accommodate bom me supremacy
of individual needs and me universal duty to hdp me needy appers to be
a consequence mat descends fom to more abstract principles on which
people are supposed to agree. However, a it becomes dear when it comes
to spelling out what is meant by "self-governance" and "equal respect for
al", mese principles are in fact but me distillation of a historical experi
ence, and are merefore "void" wimout me eple ad applications mat
illustrate meir consequence. In mis respect, it is the "consequences" of
meir "application" mat - pramatically - daif bom meir mening and
me degree of agreement me are Ily to encounter aong me audience.
The culrra bia of moral argumentation h been addresed in a syn
metic and impresive way by Maclntyre, who points out how actors len
meir mora code in a specifc cultura contet. A highlighted above,
norm have to be illustrated by reference to moral goods, vet much Iike
me debate on global justice is replete wim caes and exaple mat are sup
posed to immediatdy speak to our moral conscience, as in me ce of me
drowning child or the starving poor. However, me moral goo by refer-
68 Gabrde De Agdis
ence O which moral rule are to b jutifed are tied up wie a paticua
kd of socia life. relationships. etc. A a consequence. MacIntye high
light how even ehe moral irrelevance of my birehplace a weil a of ehe le
conditions I found in ehe society I w born into i an ultimately poor
argument. In fct. ehe hyoehetica1 assumption tat if I were born some
where eise I would also enjoy some oeher goods does not diminish ehe
culrural specifcity of what I acrly enjoy and of ehe person I am. for
goods only eist a particularised one. Therefore. "detached fom my
community. I will be apt to loose my hold upon all genuine standard of
judgement" (MacIntyre [ 1 984] 2008. p. 1 28).
Such a conclusion c be understood in to diferent ways: a a pled
for relativism and 10ca1ism or as ehe claim eat whatever meaning we a
cribe to a "value". ehe eple ehat we need O make in order to iIIusuate
it will uually be accessible only or preferentially to people who share wieh
us a cerrain "moral" and institutional history. and eherefore cherish so me
mora good. are receptive to determinate asociations. and grap ee terms
in which we fe ehe debate idelly wiehout any freher eforr. How fa
ehis is ehe cae is. however. a purely empirica1 question.
1. 5. Pragmatic arguments
A feer kd of arguments. ehat deeres O be ca1ed "pramatic". is
woreh special conideration. Pragmatic arguments respond to a problem
ehat arise in practica1 controversies on a given isue. and a to encounter
a solution even in ehe absence of a shaed justifction in order O ensure
some goods. To do so, pragmatic arguments attempt O tae into account
ehe distribution of mora opiions wiehin a politica communty or across
diferent communitie. and ak how ehe distance beteen ehe conficting
culrura convictions c be bridged in order to acreve certain results. a
for instance ehe securement of environmenta standad or ehe protection
of fndamenta rights. Thus. ehee arguments are goa-oriented and ad
ho. Aeough ehey may rely on value-orientations and eu reemble
some arguments treated before (1. 3. ). eheir specifc diference consists in
eheir forfeiting any asumption about ehe philosophica justifction or ehe
culrura generalisabiity of ehe goods ehey aim to secure. For instance. in
defending specifc duties amongst co-national a part of a politica1 "col
lective project" in which all participants are supposed O engage. Miller
sets up a multifaceted argument a central element of which concern ehe
relationship beteen specia duties and ehe stabilit of nationa govern
ments. Accordingly. compatriots are part of a "Iife-determining colective
project" in which I have a dut to participate; if a government' s stability
Aing for Jwtic. Globa Jwtic ad Philosopbic Aentation 69
and chccttVcncss dcgcnd On mc ctttzcns garttctgattOn tn a cOmmOn `th-
dctcrmtntn_ cOccttVc grO]cct, mcn cVcry gttctgant has tO shOw a1
Omcrs sgccta Oyaty, mc cact cOst OIwhtch ts tO bc wct_hcd @nst
Omcr cOmmttmcnu (c. _. , mtt) d Omcr grO]ccu (Ntcr [2004]
2008, g. 5 1 4) . NtcrQuathc mcscdcmds `gOtttca, andI takc mts
tO mcan mat mcy dcgcnd On gOtttca dcctstOn ramcr man On grOgcry
mOra nOrms. hcy tn mct _O back tO mc dcstrabtttyOIa ccrtatn gOutt
arran_cmcnt, mc mmntcnancc OI whch dcgcnds On mc sattsmcttOn OI
sOmc_tVcn cmgtrtcacOndtttOns tO whch mOradcmdsarctO bcsubOr-
dtnatcd. bOmc uttmatc _Oas dcctdc mcrcIOrc On mc scOgc OImOra ar-
_ucnts. mc mcs uc OIa stmtar ar_umcnt tn IaVOur OImc duty tO
hcg mc nccdywOrdwtdc, whtchwOud dcsccnd hOm mc mt matwcarc
tky nOt tO want tO Vctn awOrd tn whch mc rcabttty OItntcrnattOna
nOrms dcgcnds On Ir OIrctaattOn (OImc gOOra_atnstmc rtch) , but On
sc-rcgcctm OyatybcdOncOnccrn IOrOmcrs(Ibil . , g. 5 1 6) .
Lharcs ayOr ar_uc tn a gra_mattc waywhcn hc cOntcnd mat nO
`adcQuatc tcrms IOrwhatcVcr untVcrsas wc dwc maydtsccrn bcwccn
dthcrcntcuturc arcatgrcscntaVatac tO us. Pdyct, mtswOuld nOtbc
an tmurmOuntabc htndrancc tO ctabtshtn_ sOmc untVcrsay ackOw-
cd_cd d cnIOrccd ms tO grOtcct hum l and tIc-cOndtttOns,
Watwc nccd tO IOrmulatc IOr an OVcraggtn_cOnscnsus arc ccnn nOrms
OIcOnduct. " [ . . .] Lnc c grcsuby hnd i al culturcs cOndcmnattOm
OI_cnOctdc, mudcr, tOnurc, and saVcry, wc OI, say, `duaggc-
ancc and mc shOOttn_ OI tnnOccnt dcmOnstratOrs [ayOr [ 1 999] 2008,
g. 407) . 23 hc cOntct OIayOrs rcmark ts mc dcbatc On whcmcr mcrc
arc mOra untVcrsas, whcmcr tt i gOsstbc tO dctcct Or achtcVc a crOss-
cultura a_rccmcnt On mcm, and whcmcr mc cOntcnt Or mc IOrm OIhu-
man rt_hu arc such tO bc cOnVtnctn_yaggtcd tn al cuturc _cncray.
mts stratc_y cOnstsu tn Mrmtn_ mc suggOscdly umVcrsa aVcrstOn hOm
ccnatn cOnducu tndcgcndcnty OImc c_a IOrm Or mc cact ghtOsOght-
c ]ustthttOn OImc ban wcwtsh tO gut On mcm. hc rcadtncs tO stcg
back IrOm mc adcstOn tO ctmcr ghtOsOghtca-cultura cOnVtcttOns Or
tnstttuttOna IOrms whcn tt cOmc tO dtscusstn_ mc gOtbc wOrdwtdc
grOtccttOn OIhuman tIc rcgrcscnts a gra_mattc attttudc mat OOks at mc
cOncrctc rcsuu tn tcrm OIIactua stdards OIgcrsOna scty d tnt@-
22 This does not re out tbat tbe politc projet may itf be dned in moral terms,
Miller doe when he mainrns tat we must be cncemed wit oters persns
(ramer m in te pay-l of my paticipaton) ad ouht tberefore to help oter e
ven in ce tbey ae not able to cnuibute U te common projet (Miller [200]
2008, pp. 507, 5 1 5) .
23 For a simila accout of "fudaent hua intere" U be prorected by huma
right see Buc, (2004, pp. 1 34-7).
70 Gabrde De Agdis
rity rather c takng for gran ted the comple of doctrines and institu
tions tht made the history of human rights in Wetern countries. A
though Taylor wants Ws thesis to be understood as the quest for an "over
lapping consensu", his sugetion is a a mauer of fact not to be eiy
distingished fom a "modu vivend", inamuch a both the mode of
justifcation ad te ethical form of the results he aims to achieve are lef
to the political imagination of the people involved.
A frcer remarkble attempt to a1low for pragmatic arguments to win
out over more fndamenta opinions is sugeted by Charle Bein (2001 ) ,
who weds hirself t o a position that echoes the reaist interest i n uilatera
ism when he maintns that the fction of international law is to con
suain the states' behaviou in the international arena. Universaist human
rights are thus supposed to set a standard that doe not necesaily corre
spond to the lowest common denominator of a11 cutre. Inted, Bein
sees huma rights a "a political construction intended for cenn politica
purpose", which "is to be uderstood aganst the background of a rage
of general asumptions about the chaacter of the contemporary interna
tiona environment" (Bein, 200 1 , p. 276) . A such, human rights ouht to
fl three fnctions: puning a consuaint on domestic constitutions of
states and the rue of internationa organisations, describing goal of de
velopment applicable to al contempora societie, and fnally frnishing
ground for poltica criticism on the part of international and transna
tiona actors, including NGOs and citizens of global civil society. If such a
pragmatic and unilateral approach i taken, neither a doctrine of nata
rights nor ay comprehensive doctrine is needed, athough in accepting
the doctrine we might be moved by such beliefs (Ibi. , p. 277) .2
This kind of arguments forsake a general philosophical account of
norms and opt for a convergence on resuts on the bais of some fnc
tiona considerations. They frthermore give diferent weight to coment a
a preupposition for vaid norms and - what is more impouant - mae
thertic the auience to which they address their claims (national com
munitie in MiIer's, the world popuations in Taylor's, liberas a te
ideal-type of the common poltica opinion in afuent counuie in Ta's,
ad tat part of the international commuity that suese human right in
24 Al in al, Bei t,', thee ae fa fom being puely "prtic", a9 his sttement about
the unaccptilit of genocide re. Tl', if we were to da hua righL' accor
ding to te cuturaly ,pecifc mor cd of te diferent societies, we might tun out
aowing genocide if we encounterd into a raeist ad violent soie. This i, not ac
cptalle inmuc we asue !t " [ . . . 1 the ground of ou belief !t genocide i a
great wrong h to do not wit te fatat other pople agree it i so, but wit the
nature ad conseuencs of gnocide itselr' (Beit, 2001 , p. 274; Beit quote Sclon
1 998, pp. 337-8).
Aing for J wtic. Globa J wtic ad Philosophic Aentation 71
Beit's cae) . A I hope to make dear in what folows, almough both ele
ments may seem peripheral to any "pure" normative interest, mey are
indeed of me utmost importance for argumentation in general.
11. Mora arguments and politica decisions
The former overiew of me most common kinds of arguments used in me
debate on global justice cts light on me fact mat me allegiance to a
shaed moral code, ramer man me inherent ontological quaity of moral
occurrence, is a (uual y utated and in most caes underestimated) pre
supposition of argumentation. Furmermore, me former refections draw
our attention to me following, also a a rule unstated, asumptions mat I
mink Iie at me bais of me attitude of most scholars towrds moral que
tions. First of al, politica decision is seen a a subspecie of moral judge
ment: it must be led by knowledge of what is right. Mora judgement, a
philosophicaly informed judgement, state me conditions at which politi
cal decisions are leitimate. Politic ought to be at let in accordance wim
moral principle.
The lat asumption is not at al obviou. In fact, in me history of de
mocratic theory legitimacy ha been conceived of eimer a me reisation
of a set of emical principles which ought to inform decision-making proc
esses or a a procedue me correct application of which grants me legiti
macy of me outcome. The philosophical arguments mentioned in me
previous paragraphs seem to support me fst stance, inamuch a mey aim
to retran me range of posible outcomes while bindng meir legitimacy
to moral conditions mat are apparently independent of any procedure. P
a matter of fct, democratic meory h also attempted to trace me limits
mat encompas democratic legitimacy, for istance in that it tries to defne
me concept of frness mat politica decision-maing is to stf.
In me light of mis widepread attitude toward political institutions, it
is wormwile to remind of me eistence of a le of mought mat draws a
shaper distction beteen me scope of moral arguments and democratic
decision-making. Several eples c be made, but I wll sketch just
mree of the most relevant, delivered by Ernst Tugendhat, John Rawls, and
Richard Rorty.
11. 1 . Tugendhat
Tugendhat's emica meory moves fom me assuption mat moral and
legal norms, and customs, are to be interpreted a restraint on me search
72 Gabrde De Agdis
for one's own good (likewse Rawls [ 1 989] 1 999, p. 449) . Thus, he eplic
idy purs his theory in the context of a society in wrch individual auton
omy is understood as the aility U decide one' s own course of Iife accord
ing to a rue a actor prescribe to herself. Such a actor give priority to
her ow judgement rather m to inherited norms, and subjecrs the lauer
to her own scrutiny and interpretation or is at leat epected and h a
concrete chance of doing so. In such a context, whilst in the case of lega
norms and customs the question a to what the ring norm is ca be de
cided on purely empiric grounds, mora norms address the quetion a to
whether a given ruling norm i alo right. "Right" can a norm be either
with reference to one's own persona good, in wrch ce we are con
&onted with a subjective preference, or in genera, in wrch ce we ae
fcing a claim of generalisabity. Aan, it is an empirica quetion which
one of the to is the cae in actal interactions. The decision depends on
the form of the sentence, i . e. , on the degree of generalisability epresed by
the ue of the copula and i rs possible restrictions within the sentence. The
rationale of a norm in itel as opposed to the judgement a to whether the
validity of a norm i good Jr me, consists then in its generalisability. The
caonica form of a moral judement is then "Ir is good that the norm x is
valid". This stage of mora judgement, in wrch the convergence of indi
vidual preferences on the validity of a norm is to be sought, depends on a
preceding stage in which everone is called to decide whether she subjec
tively approve of the norm. f a correct and thorough asessment of the
individual preferences throuh third paties is uikely to be delivered, the
participation of a actors intereted in, or af ected by, the valdity of the
norm is an indispensable condtion of mora dalogue. f Tuendat hi
self concedes, c is, however, a political choke rather that a direct output
of his reoning, for his agument goes j ust a f a to show that individ
ual preferences play a role in the defnition of a norm's validity, i the
validity is intended a generaisability. Nevertheless, he h good reon to
see the latter as gran ted by the understandng and the curent use of moral
statements (Tugendhat, 1 992, pp. 285-308) .
A weak point in Tugendat's analysis consists in the nuerou pre
suppositions he has U make, chiefy the asumption that there is as a mat
ter of fact a discursive procedure that enjoys the confdence of a partici
pats in the (vrtal or factual) dilogue through which we c decide on
the generaliability of a norm. However, Tugendat's point is to show
how moral sentence c be delt with in a certan historicaly and institu
tionally given context of deision, ad he does not intend to ground in
ay way the faness of the procedure itself, a1though the political prefer
ence for an incluive decision-making somehow descends &om the condi
tions of generalisability he lnguistically mas out.
Aing for J wtic. Globa J wtic ad Philosophic Aentation 73
Wat is of interest for my current purposes is Tugendhat's point on
the undecidability of moral sentence beyond the joint expression and
harmonisation of individual preference, whenever te indivdualistic e
pectations he illustrates are at work in collective moral Iife. A f a this is
the cae Tugendht's conclusion suppors the priority of procedue over
philosophical retrictions to legitimacy and validity of norms. Moreover,
his teory takes into account a model of the politicl and cultural envi
ronment in which ethical claims have to be disentangled, and shows how
the moral principles that work a an arguentative premise have to refect
what c be presupposed a a self-understanding of the people who share a
certan social space. So is for instance the individualism that lies at the
bonom of Tugendat's asumptions a sociat fc rather m an eticl
option, and such a fct poses certain quetions to ethica theory - for in
stance a to the way to solve ethic confict amongt people who share a
certain self-understanding. Tugendht also highlights what it mes to
m appea to a certain knd of consensu when argue on ethical que
tions: the argumentative premises must be such a to refect te assump
tions that our potential or factual audience maes on the bais of a certain
social eperience. This should also clarif that consensu is not to be seen
primarily as a source of normativity, but a a premise for the untanding
of mora claims.
11. 2. Rory and Rawls
Ir may weil be said that the importance of John Rawls's ide of a priority
of democracy over philosophy (Rawls, 1 985) ha been underrated in
scholaly debate until Richard Rorty took it up and painted its mn fea
ture with brighter colours. This idea's general point ha been widely u
derstood, and since then addressed, a the neutrality of democratic institu
tions to conficting conceptions of the good Iife. Acknowleing that the
political communitie of te Wet are characterised by the Fct of value
pluralism, Rawls's teory is intended to answer the question as to "how we
[cn] design our defence [of a constitutional democratic regime] so a to
achieve a sufcienty wide support for such a regime" (Rawls [ 1 989] 1 999,
pp. 471 -2) . Rawls's idea of "justice as fairness" is fmed in such a way
that those who already support the constittional, democratic regime
should aso be able to endorse te politica conception. Justice a frness
speils out what ha a concrete chance of tning into an overlapping con
sensu. Thus, the intuitive idea that lies at the foundation of this concep
tion, which consists in "idea of society a a fair stem of cooperation", is
meant not so much a an unquestioned staning point that h its roots in
74 Gabrde De Agdis
any intuition about the just or the right, but as an idea of which we can
hope that it "ca be pan of a overlapping conensus" (Ibi. , p. 472) .
In makng this asumption ad formulating this practica programe
Rawls move from the empirica1 asumption that "[ . . . ] a a practica politi
cal matter no general moral conception c provde the bais for a public
conception of justice in a modern democratic society". The historica1 con
ditions that have brouht to democratic politica1 institutions a an out
come of the European relgiou wars through the principle of toleration
and the estalshment of constitutional governments has brought to bea
the idea that a currenrly afordable conception of political justice "must
allow for a dversity of doctrines and the plurality of conicting, and in
deed incommensurable conceptions of the good" (Rawls, 1 985, p. 225) .
Rawls's ide air to trasform a "modus vivendi", i. e. , a politica practice
and an intitutional tradtion that produce a certain form of politica1 le
without mang it eplicit, into a "overlapping consensus", i. e. , into a
consciously formulated ad acknowledged phlosophy of public life. Such
a mutation woud allow the citizen of a liberal polity not ony to share the
enjoyment of certain goods - which they do anyhow -, but to epress
their allegiace to the corresponding value ad institutions and to con
sciously manage their development (Rwls [ 1 989] 1 999, p. 471 ) . Thus,
Rawls acknowledge the dference beteen a political practice and the
eplicit formulation of its moral and political premises, so much so, that
his appeal to the principles we live by is fa fom being a appeal to so me
thing alredy enclosed in the mnd of the participants in the polity. The
principles he formulate ae rather an attempt to establish a link beteen
what we think we know about our colective political life given the intitu
tions we live in and what we are able to systematise and teoretically but
tres in order to make it to a coherent whole.
However, Rorty gave Rawls's thesis a frther tist by pointing out an
apparenry weker, but a a matter of fact even stronger version of it,
which consists in spelling out this conclusion about the historical condi
tions for democratic communitie as the necesity to come U an "accom
modation" amongst citizens instead of relyig on the truth of moral cer
tainties. Likewise, rather than being a philosophica epedient to come to
well-balanced conclusions, Rawl's "refective equilibrium" ought to be
intended a a substitute for philosophica accounts of the morality of
norr - Rorty dubs tem a accounts of sel or ratonality. In this point
Rorty depas fom a stricdy interpretive understanding of Rawls's ideas
ad downplays the role of "public reaon" as faed by Rawl: if we ac
knowledge that, given the current state of ethical pluralism in contempo
rary Wetern societie, no knock-down argument is epectable in moral
argumentation, it becomes eident that what we need to achieve is not so
Aing for Jwtic. Globa Jwtic ad Philosopbic Aentation 75
much a srdard of philosophical decision, but a form of public con
sciounes and discussion such a it allows us to cee to feel me need for
general principle and philosophical accouts ad give way to a pragmatic
attitude of reciprocal accommodation (Rony, 1 991 ) . 25 Wim regad to
cross-cutura encounters wim interlocutors wo do not shae such a
pragmatist attitude Rorty j ust sugests to consciously draw a cultl y
biaed limit to me acceptability of arguments: "We have to insist mat not
every arguent needs to be met in terms in which it is presented. Ac
comodation and tolerance must stop short of a willingness to work
wimin any given vocabulary mat one's interlocutor wishes to ue, to take
seriously any topk mt he puts forard for discussion". If we dscad me
ide mat mere is a single "moral vocabuay" ad a single "set of moral
beliefs" sutable "for every hua community", men me conequence to
be daw relate much more to me limits of discusion ma to me scope
of universa arguments (Jbid. , p. 1 90).
11. 5. The priority of democracy over philosophy
A I hope to have made cler mus f, mora arguents are rooted in a
cutal environment on which we have to reIy if our premises ad goals
have to be understood. Before going ay deeper into me concluions mat
we c draw fom me above considerations, it is worthwhile to consider
some objections commonly rased against so cled "anti-foundationalist
srces". I will focu on mree of mem and show why I mink mat me ap
proach illutrated so f c efectively fend mem of. So contends Simon
Caney mat "[ . . . ] people do not construe meir meir mora convictions a
valid becaue mey conform to meir community's way of life. Ramer, mey
believe mat mese convictions [ . . . ] ae valid becue mey are supponed by
cogent aents" (Caney, 2005, p. 43) .
However, me point is mat argument are not raised in a cultal void,
but need to be illutrated by means of exples mat make cle me conse
quences mat mey woud have for social behaviour. Incidentaly, mis still
say noming a to meir acceprce, a mey c still hope to achieve a uni
versal scope of justifcation, but says someming a to me way I have to
25 Cacy come to a similar asessment of te role of autority (Le., institutions) when
we Fa disagrement in te ce of tbe deciion over a "ju wa": " [ . . . ] we need to ha
ve a legitimate autborit be tere i ofen dipute aout whetber a wa is j usti
fed" (2005, p. 206) . It is not immediately intelligible why such an i n do not af
fee b views of oter, botb domestic ad interationa, questions of j ustic. I ,
an, indehted to Kok-Chor Ta for encourging me U draw a shaper distnction
heccn Rony ad Rawl.
76 Gabrde De Agdis
deal wim my interlocutors if I want to interact wim mem: I need to rely
on instuments that be able to secure areement. A fmer claim of
Caney's concerns me supposed culral insensitivity of universalism: "A
universaist moral meor can be sensitive to context i it factors mee into
the application of its principles" (Ibi. , p. 40) . For sue, mis is likely to be
me cae, but not for the reon he adduce, a me distinction beteen a
norm ad its appliction is fnally untenable. If me norm reds: "Do not
kill", wimout ay frther, men mere is a a matter of fact noming to add
to it, but when it come to more comple norms, its possible outcomes
will irremediably enter me process of jutication.
A frther, frequendy raised objecton to anti-foundational positions
contend mat mey be self-refting. Summarising me most efectve, Caney
conclude that claiming tat uversal moral norms canot eist becuse
mey cnot be jutifed to a1l is equal U claiming a trascutural norma
tive principle, Le. , that it is wrong to impose a principle on somebody
wthout her areement or wimout the principle being justed to her
(Ibi. , p. 50) . The arguent, so conclude Caey, is therefore self
refting. However, beide me fct that agreement is an option me alter
native U which consists in confict a a frther option, whether a norm
ca be justifed to anyone is an empirical question ramer man a normative
one. Wemer we should strive for mat and at which conditions is a dfer
ent maner. Those who stress me importance of agreement usuly do so a
an alternative to violence, and invite omers to share mis preference. Ir
turns into a norm once people aree mat areement is preferable to vio
lence. I don't see why such a argument shoud be self-refting.
This implies that me quest for a certain sort of agreement is implicit in
every aguentation - even mough we may a to set up an argument
that brackets out consensu a a source of normativity, a several scholas
seek U achee. Wat ca replace mis latter kind of consensus, wim which
we are acquinted from meories of socia contract, is noming but a difer
ent kind of agreement, Le. , an agreement on me premise on which we
pur the normative conclusions we want to draw, if we wat coherence to
govern ou moral behaviour. Indeed, me source of normativity that we
make appel to in such a cae is determied by me force of me norms mat
we and ou audence have aready accepted a inherited by our collective
history or me social environment in which we gre Up.26 This opens up a
frther question a to the assessment of such a agreement a wei as of me
26 Some schols acknowled the importace of such a aeement, highlighted by
their efort ro make sure tt teir clams comhine wit other cutur sees of va
l ue. See for intace (.ey (2005, pp. 46, 74), Vincent ( 1 986), Walzer ( 1 994) , ad
Ta (2004, p. 1 35) .
Aing foe ]wtic. Globa ]wtic ad Phlosophic Amentation 77
consequences that we wat to draw from the premise on whch we agree.
Ir is eccy at this point that a procedural concern comes in, the more so,
the less we can take such an agreement for gran ted. Thu, the question
that we have to awer i order to mae any headway in moral argumen
tation relates to the political structure that alows us to check out or create
such a agreement, and to traform it into collectively binding decisions.
The pre-eminence of the institutiona side of politics ha a long-standing
tradition in political thought. A in the contet of the present esay I can
hardly give a satisfactory account of it, 27 I wil present te following theis
a hypothees for fnher research.
If we take seriously the idea that procedural tools are what we need in
order to asess scope and content of the agreement on norms that may be
present amongst the audience to which we address our cam, then we
shoud also conclude that, contrary to most scolars' racit asumption,
political procedure h a prioriry over whatever theoretica criterion of
legitimacy. In other words, any concern with legitimacy ought to presup
pose the panicipation in collectively binding decision-making the out
come of which h pre-emnence over the theoreticl concern. Especially
a long a ethica positions ae controversial, philosophically informed
opinion turns out not to go beyond a political opinion to be publicly dis
cussed and fed into the process rather that being an external instance U
test poltica legitimacy. A illustrated above, this is fndaental y Raws's
and Rony' s point.2'
27 In order to encmpos the scope of te theories I preency refer to, it ml sule to
menron tat the cntempory trdition h a pe with !t's ide of a "state of de
vils" (!t [ 1 796] 1 992), h been impresivdy cnrnued by Hanah Aendt ( 1 993,
Fragment I), and ho dominated demor . rc thery both /om within te Anglo
Saon tition that se at te turn of the century (Sendey [ 1 908] 1 967) and /om
the cntriburon that Gera schols brought in the afermath of te Nai weover
(se Schupeter [ 1 942] 1 996, pp. 242, 250, 269; and De Agelis, 2009 with red
to Ha Kelsen's pliric theory in te context of the Weima Republic), also in
fuencing contempora "pluralist" teore.
28 Sader cmes tD a simila concluion with regd tD national fdaenta controveries
on values. He sugst to fer "te dure of civUiry, such o the dur tD explain po
sirons in publicly understadale laguge, the willingness to listen tO other, fr
mindeess, ad readines tD acpt reanale accommodations or aterarons i n O
ne's own view" ( 1 999, p. 61 4) , and epre<es /msel at alattempt to regulte
'philosophicly" what bdongs tD publc reon or what does not (however, he u
demad. his posiron o a objeron tD, rather tha o a development of, Rwls' s the
sis).
A a matter of fct, some of te schols !t parrcipate in te debate on gobal
j uce we pai at osesing te role of mora argument in plitic debates ad in
the context of democratic legitmacy. However, te prioriry of politic deciion over
moral agumentation Stys ofen in te background, which might accunt for te
78 Gabrde De Ageli,
The conclusion thar so me scholars have drawn afer acknowledging
this stare of afairs privilege the eforr ro consrrue our curural and politi
cal his(Ory as coherencly a possible in order LO estblish rhe largesr possible
consensus on the erca foudrions of our societies. For sure, this "our"
is irself difculr LO narrow down LO an eily identifable ser of careorie
or reference groups. However, be ir the nation, one's own fellow-citizns, a
social ds or miieu, ir is importr LO remark thar such a identifction
is not relared U whar wthin the debare on global justice is discussed a the
moral signifcance of national or culrural boundaries. Insread, the efor LO
cler up the curural and polirical his(Ory in which we grow up is usualy
aimed ar choosing the course of acrion mosr apr LO presere whar we have
learned LO value. Unforrunarely, the eforr LO picrure our culral and po
lirical his(Ory as a coherent whole underrares the source of rension a weil
a the ideological and politic srrugle thar characrerise all groups, coun
nie, or nations. 2
However, as far a moral argenttion highlights either "institu
tional erc" or widespred "imutons" or principle we expect eery
rational agent LO agre upon, it works a a facilita(Or of public discussion.
This is the public tak achievable by working out te poliricl conceptions
that seem LO be implicit in the poltcal environment we live in. However,
insted of relying on such an analysis for appointng unquerionably valid
norms, this operation can reaonably a LO sorr out the his(Oricaly sedi
mented normative and mora contem in order LO identi wht is most
likely LO yield a widespread agreement, and then submit it LO rational
proof3 With regard LO the debare on globa justice, this should aso help
LO remind us of the his(Oric origin of the bulk of our moral concepts as
well a of their rootedness in a (or even several) polirical culture(s) .
seemingly skmpy conideration tat sola aford democratic insttuton. Ne
vertheless, mor aguments may suppor an eplicit cl fr a lager incluion of de
mocratc procdure on global j uce L<Ue. So afrms Poge that te utimte
reponsibilir for the deciion to be correct "shoud lie with te persons concerned"
( [ 1 992] 2008b, p. 372) .
29 Te tempttion to emphaie the cmmonary of value ad cutural cde is com
mon to politc studies in general, ad espeially to the brch spei fcly devoted to
"plitc culture" (ildvsky, 1 989, p. 21 ) . Ad ye literature on demorcy a
"culture of cnict" is aso weU prent in the b.tory of social sciences. See for instn
c Schwart(2007, pp. 1 32-) for a skrch of dferent cncepts of slidaty and mo
del of soial securiry in cntemporar USo
30 MacInrre belongs to the scholas who have emphaied t later apc of mora
aalysi: "One of the cent r of the mora philosopher i to articte te cnvic
tions of the socery in which he or she live so tar tee convictions may beome avai
lable for rtiona scrutiny" ( [ 1 984] 2008, p. 1 1 9) .
Aing for J wtice. Globa J wtic ad Philosopbic Aentation 79
nOrdcr tO dO sO, mOraar_umcntatOn shOud asO ccary dcntq ts
addrcsscc. & gOntcd Out abOVc, ndcgcndcndyOIwhcmcr mcr scOgc s
untVcrsa Orgartcular, mOral grcmtscs mgtctyt_ct acuturaly dchncd
audcncc. O mc ms cr n scnn_ ug mc ar_umcnt IrOm mc Vcry
start ( IOr nstancc u_cndhat cxgcdy dOcs) hcgs tO bcncr Orcnt Our
cgcctatOn tO mc@rccmcnt matwc maycgcrcncc. '
'
A mmcr cOnscgucncc rcatcs tO Our mcmOdOO_ca grcsuggOstOns.
& m as ar_umcnu arc gut IOwd untVcrsay Vad duc tO mc OntO-
O_ca namc OImcr Ob]cct, such a gubc mcttOn OIghOsOghtca ar-
_umcntatOn s dcut tO m, IOr wc OOsc s_ht OImc cOntct wmn
whch Our ar_ucnt C rcasOnaby _ct sOmc hcarn_. & KOrty h
gOntcd Out, tO rcgacc mc gucsttOn abOut mc naturc OI mtn_s (IOr n-
scc hU bcn_s) wm mc guctOn abOut mc gurgOscs wcwant tO
suggOrt ms tO abandOn mcOO_ca, sccnthc, Or mctaghyscal dcscrg-
tOns [KOrty [ 1 996] 2008, g. 3 1 6 n mVOu OIa rchccttOn On hOw tO rc-
cOmtmctwhatwc mtnkwc haVc carncd hOm Our cOcctVc hutOr and
cutura cxgcrcncc nOrdcr tO mc t aVadabc IOr m hcr dtscussOn wm
gcOgc WO cOmc hOm a dthcrcntback_rOund (may mcy bc cO-cttzcns Or
IOrc_ncrs) . hs gaVcs mc way tO scssn_ mc hstOrca Vauc OI mc
nOrm and nsttuttOnswc haVc _Vcn Our a@ancc tO and tO Orcnt Our-
scVcs at _Oas wc wsh tO achcVc bOm n mc natOna and thc ntcrna-
ttOna arcna. buch a_Oa-OrcntcdcOnccgtOn OImOrashOwsmrOu_h mc
gra_matcar_ucnts skctchcd abOVc.
& On_ as mc gubtc mncttOn OIghlOsOghca ar_umcntatOn mcs
mc IOrm OIa rchccttOn On mc cutura grcsuggOstOns and gOtcal hs-
tOryOIOursOcctcs, mc_Oamat tC mOrc cyachtcVc s tO tnhucncc
Our natOna nsttmtOns and dccsOn-mcrs. buch a _Oa shOws mrOu_h
mc chOru OI mOsc whO gca IOr a _Obal rcdstrbuttOn OI ncOmc and
wcIarc, mcy rcOnaby cnOgh scck tO nhucncc mOsc whO dctan thc
bukOImcwOrdsWm.
mOwcVcr, mOscschOarswhOstrVc IOra@Oba dtaO_ucOnnOrmand
Vaucs arc usum y mr wOrsc Oh. rst OIaI, a dcctsVc hndancc n gayn_
3 1 Some scholars makc this attude explicit in tat tcy addrs political cmmi tments
inide their own plitc communit ad cultural environment. So state T a (20M,
pp. 7) tat whocver accpt eitaia liheralism in it gneral frm, which stes that
aI prons descrve eual r
pc
and concn, ought also to be a cosmopolita libe
ra".
32 Tcorcly, such a preference O be clarfcd by pointing OUt the role of hypotheti
c imperatives - i. e. , of goa-ependent nors mat cxplicitly preupps a st of pre
ferenc ad (cultUtal, persona, or political) choic - in the cntucon of moral a
gument (Foot, 1 978) . For a aalysis of hypotec imperative se Grice (200 1 , p.
52).
80 Gabrde De Ageli,
a role in democratic institutions on issues of global justice evdency con
sists in the absence of ay such institutions in the international arena. A
f a theories of democratic decision - making are addressed, the rather
support claims about the specia responsibility towads feUow-citizens and
the mora and politie relevance of nationa borders (Miller [ 1 988] 2008,
p. 248; Miller [2004] 2008, pp. 5 1 3-5) .33 Howeer, research on transna
tiona social movements and civil society higights the worldwide efort
to promote forms of democratic incluion in international ad supraa
tional decision-making a weU a attempts to forge a worldwide dialogue
on globa ethics and politic. Although reerch on globa civil society
emphasises once more the importance of shated value ad poltie cu
ture, ad thus tows us back into the dilemma of how we can have insti
tutions if we do not fnd out the "right" norms in the frst place, there is
still a remarkable line of thought tat set tis alternative aide, forgoe the
pre-eminence of "normative", i. e. , philosophieal, legitimation and points
out a chance of intertning a giobaI dialogue without giving priority
neither to uiversal nor to "Ioe" principle. This line of thought has been
sketched out above under the heding of "pragmatic arguments" and is
weil present especially beyond academic boundarie amongst the so eled
actors of "global civi society". This is a promising feld of research if we
want to asess the degree of intercu!tural normatve agreement.
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11. Normative Theor
y
Global ad Statist Egalitarianism ad Their Woes
Daiel Kofman
Introducion
A vies proliferate about both the nature and scope of distibutve jutice,
so doe te complety of implications of one for the other. Egaltarian
vie aone dif er on whether the equalisand should be an apect of out
come or some prior advantage - and whether income, resource, weath,
welfe, primary goods, access to advantage, or opponity; and whether
justice shoud equalise the efect of bete luck. Others reject egaIitarian
ism in fvour of prioritarianism, sufcientarianism, or a hyrid or pluraist
approach, and then mutiply an on the question of the appropriate
distribuend. The question of scope of distributve justice is not unafected
by the substantive view one adopts. Generaly speng, the weker the
requirements of a conception U reditribute the pattern-upsetting efects
of Iiberty or choice, or the more reponsibility attributed to individuals for
their own welfae, the less problematic to consider the scope a globaly
wide (or aIternatvely, the less relevant or important the quetion of
scope) . One c think of theories on a rouh continuum: at one end a
Iibertaian entitlement doctrine that shuns pattern-sensitve distribution
outright, then a sociaI minimum or guaranteed subsitence doctrine, next
a sufcientarian requirement that a more substantiaI level of welfare or
reources be secured for al, then approaching the other end a prioritarian
concern aIways to benef the worst of, and at the m end various egalitar
ian doctrines. The Iibertarian etreme renders the question of scope irrele
vat, since any redistribution for the sake of aItering an emergent pattern,
even in the dometic arena, is euled out; socia minimum ad sufcien
taria doctrine c perhaps rely on universal humatarian ground and
fnese the debate about asociationaI grounds of justice, while prioritarian
and egalitaian doctrine land squrely in the midst of such debates.
88 Daid Kfa
The rival positions on scope ae statism 1 and globalism. It is philoso
phical y easier to be a globalist, I have jut sug eted, me fher one is
fom me egaitaia end of me spectruI. 2 One c readily see wy: me
weer me distributive duties, me more plauible mat humitaian con
siderations aone, a opposed to relationl or asociational one, c ac
count for mem. 3 Even associational meories - which hold mat distributive
jutice i grounded in me participation by members in a common asocia
tion, whemer becuse me asociation ue coercion anst rue-breers, is
self-ring, mutuly benefts member, or some combination4 of mese -
usual y grant mat rich countries or individuals have humaitaian dutie
to t to raise everyone globally to a minimum level of baic healm and
subsistence.s Thus it i widely accepted tt such dutie ae justifable by
non-asociationa considerations alone. A higher sufciency mreshold may
be somewhat more vlnerable to controversy; yet it is difcut to see how a
statist egalitaria who accept humanitarian duties to rse everyone to a
Sagiovani (2007) weirdly laels tis te 'internationali' view. Wle one C
imagine what he mes by mentlly inserting a hyphen ever time the word come up,
I prefer a less aduou ter.
2 I have no me in mag t point D literally. I redily accpt that it is pssible for
some docine X to b more eitaia in sme imponat sene m aoter de
y, but less problematicly globaist. The specrum is in ay C rough, the notion of
being phiosphicaly problematic vage, ad the point about implictions rr scope
merdy sug stive at t point. I shall tr U show, however, !at cn objetions to
globaist egaitaianim actually tdl ant te domec application a wdl; ! is,
what SDlike a scpe problem is rely a problem for the dotrine per s.
3 Of curse this does not men, if te weaker theor i corret, ! asociation
grounds have been refuted; merdy !t tey will hve been rendeted supruou; it is
still posible that the we duties i n te dometc cae ae overjustifed. I use ' asci
tiona' for common institutiona arangement, while 'rdationa' include both aso
cationa a weil a mere cau relation. Pog, for insce, justifes g10baism by a-
leg that rich coutre ae (in par) cually responible for oter cuntries' poven,
ad a beneft from it. T cau relational C be more (a wit Poge, 2008) or
lessysterc, depending on one' s view of globa ecnomic retions.
4 Na (2005), rr ince, hold tat the cmbination of bing slf-ruling ad coer
cve accunt rr asocationa duties of j utce tat do not obtn toward non
members of the asocation.
5 Thus Sagiovanni writ !t he will "asue ! a1 plauible critria of diributive
juce, whether natonl, internatona, or globa, mut at let require rasing a1 hu
ma being U a minima threhold deftned in ten of accs to baic good, includ
ing clothing, sheter, food, ad saitation . . . . aI of the major rrms of ' i nternaton
ism' [Le., statism] ... acept it a a starting pint" (Sagiovani, 2007, p. 4, fn. 5). He
ge on to obsre !t this i les"controversial" aong phiosphers, while the "phi
losophicly more dilcult ad cnuoversia queon is how U identf the level or
domn to which we shoud asign euity a a demad of juce, ad, mor impor
tady, why. " The awer defnde in this paper is that we shouldn't b egaitaria ei
ther g10baly or domesticly.
Globa ad Stast Egitaism ad Tbcir Wo 89
lnlUm mreshold can consistency resist a fmer demnd to enable
people to be at a level where mey could reaise reaonable aspirations to
led a decent life. Wy should humanitaian concerns require provisions
for subsistence and baic heam, but not a chance to live a decent life (no
matter how rich me would-be benefctor) ? Since me egaitarian recognises
me intrinsic moral worm of eimer dstributed outcomes or distributed
opporrnities co outcomes (a me enticlement libertarian does not) and
since mey frther acknowlede humanitarian duties of provision to
achieve globa baic mreholds, Hing me mreshold of concern at a level
sufcient for people to led decent lives would seem fairly compelling.
The rea controversy begins, it would men seem, frmer across me
spectrum toward me egalitarian extreme. For purposes of mis esay I shall
generaly ignore me diference beteen prioritarian and egaitarian meo
ries and focu on me question of whemer me associational aspect of state
grounds duties beyond sufcientarian ones. I begin, however, wim some
remarks about justice and firness in order to undermine the belief mat
one can draw sustenance for statm mrough an analysis of me concept of
justice. I men move to my main argument: that statist egalitaianism faces
a dilemma: eimer its associational justiHction of statism is too wek, in
mat it cannot eplain distributive duties to unproductive co-citizen such
as me disabled, or it is too strong and cannot contain itelf to state borders
as proponents would wish. I examine four arguments for statism. The
most persuaive is that societies be a lage responsibility for me welfre
of meir own members becuse me decisions mey make wim repect to
invetment, controlling corruption, and efciency have far greater and
more direct efects man anying outsiders do. But an egaitarian wo
accepts mis consideration a a reaon to limt me external scope of dis
tributive justice cannot men consistency reist limiting me internal strin
gency; tt is, mey cnot object to me claim mat individuals wimin a
society bea large responsibility for meir level of welfae. The objection to
eternal scope mus carrie over to a objection to internal stringency, or to
me subsrce of me meory, and points toward a less stringent redistribu
tive goa. I men argue, in part following Goodin, mat duties of jutice are
genera and mat practica statism is j ustiHed only insofr as mere is a tacit
global agreement to divide global responsibility aong state lines to execute
dutie of justice. This eplains state reponsibilitie for unproductive
members, wimout eleting state to me halowed status of an independ
ent mora source of justice. I end wim some brief remarks about how me
subsrance of justice shoud be conceived in light of me preceding consid
eration of bom me global and domestic caes. I shall argue mat sufcien
tarianism cannot, despite its self-understading, entirely avoid interper
sonal comparison of welfre, but that its real attraction is its aspiration to
90 Daid Kofa
increase the reponsibility of agems - both individua ad states - for
their own welfare, including far the pursuit of rewarding and satisfing
Iives under circumtances not entirely chosen by themselves.
The concept of j utice
I begin with some general remarks about jutice. Since Rawls distin
guished beteen a concept ad a conception, and then defended his 'con
ception' of justice a fairness, mny have used these with the same critie
caution 8 culrral revolution Maoists incating from the line red book. I
do not deny that a concept-conception distinction c be usef, but it is
not hard and fat. If one trie to draw it on the basis of what is not comro
versial (the concept) ad what is (the conception) coumerintuitive resulrs
quickly folow. Nar should this be surprising, since controversy is a con
tingem social phenomenon. A very detailed feshing out of a concept
mght lack comroversy because no one ha bothered to callenge it, whie
even a thin constr of a concept might stil be 'cometed' for any num
ber of reaons. The poim far currem purposes i that discussions of the
scope of justice seem invariably to preuppose a consensu about te con
cept, 8 if al controversy about substance is at some other level: the con
ception. But the question of whether jutice holds beteen non-relational
individuals is very much a quetion of what one thinks (the concept of
justice is.
G
Those inclined towad statism &equencly hold that to indi
vduals sepaately stranded on the same islad be no duties of j utice
towd each other. f course i this were merely a stipulation, there could
be no quarel with it. But then, i one fnher h a concption of justice
a fairnes, it is certainly not the case that j utice exhauts frness, for
there i no reon to suppose that farnes beteen the islad's to inhabi
tant ought not to obtain.
6 Nozck ( 1 974) raise me pit tt me ver concpt of 'dtrbutive juce' is biad
toward a paterne view, which he rejects. One mht mink mere i still a mi n con
cpt of justic shed even by a entclement merit ad a Rawlian, since even me
former is awering me que<ton of how gods ouht b dtributed, naely, by how
ever me fee traons of peple contnually re<tribute memo But even this for
mulation i stil mileadg, since mere i no Iibertian prescripton mat pople ought
however feely to dribute goods c patcua way rmer ma mat. The thin fr
mulation, merefore, purchae (me appe.lc 01 commonalir at me prce of abi
gr. One might men sek a fay reemblac accut, but it sufc merely to tr
Iisrng me semtic propertie some of which me cncept mut have to realis how
'cntele' me concept, not jUt me 'conception', really iso
Globa ad Stast Egaitaism ad Tbcir Wo 91
Let u dweil on this longer. I r seems intuitively obvious, at leat to mis
writer, mat if Mr Greedy quickly seized me island's bet land by placing a
fence around me perimeter, leaving 'enough' but not nearly 'a good' or
'a much' to Mr Decent, men mis would be uair, alI the more so if De
cent had good-naturedy presued mat me to woud share equaly, or
according to need, bor land and produce. Some might go a10ng wim mis
but nevenheless argue mat me uairness sters from cs being a zero sum
gae, where Greedy's seizure wa Decent's privation. Wat if, on me
omer hand, me land was divided equaly in qutity and quity, but one
produced far more by his greter indutriounes? Here, it i held, dutie
of justice do not aise since mere i no comon associaton beteen me
to people.
But mis analysis misinterprets me issue at had. If, on me one hand,
the greater indutriounes merited me greter share, why should it not do
so were mey in common asociation? On me omer hand, if me industri
ounes wa not merited, say because one taes a hard determinist vie of
the mauer (a Rawls seems to have) men how does me greater indutri
ounes difer morally from me greter piece of land seized? Or put an
omer way, what shoud be me baeline of fairnes admitted in me frst
instance with respect to land? Wy presume it uair mat Greedy take
more than hal me island (jf mis time we asume uniform qulity) , but fair
that he take fy half A ff-ff division is arbitrary wim respect both to
the partie' natra endowments ad needs, so if one doe mink mere is an
issue of firnes, why not count eeryching mat mauers, including en
dowment bor externa and interna? One canot distinguh beteen me
to cses by sayng mat the frst i zro su: so is the second, since on me
hard determnist denial of deert for indutriouness and it products, me
relevant sum is me land plu its total produce given me diferential pro
ductivity of ech. One might, I suppose, deny me original intuition mat
the greedy land seizue is unr in me asence of a prior areement or
comon asociation, but if mat is so I must confess not to know wat is
fairness. Rather, I supect mat such a vie would be alIowng me value of
autonomy and consent to food me space of omer values - a not uncom
mon foible in libera writing - in this ce frness.?
7 David Heyd explict denm mt fmes obtins beyond a conrr.u communit.
But te question remans wheter ti is mere stipulaton (or asrtion). Aer al, te
intution lingers tat Greedy' s land sizur is wrong. C te 1<ue relate to the judg
ment shaiTJ. Ir Greedy is wrong becaue ushmair (touh not uor) - mt is,
acting grediy by tng a lager shae ta ayone ese in a non-ontractual situation
- te eica pint remans. (nshmamess would resemble te Greek pleiota) .
David Heyd (2007).
92 Daid Kfa
A temptation might persist to aaogise to a scenario that is not zero
suo Aer all, my rejection of me relevace of indusuiousnesto markng
me diference beteen asociationa ad non-asociational farnes w
baed on me djunction mat eimer indutriounes merits a greter share,
whemer within or wimout an asociation, or that it is wimin a zro sum
game where fairness should preva. But wat if me game wa not zero
su and me diferences mat arose were not baed on industriousness?
Suppose, for instace, that mere were to islad, ech wim a sole inhbi
ct. On Abundance Mr Lucky h a better lving for less efon man on
Infertile, were Unluck h to work arduously ad consccly to e out
bare subsistence. One might wish to say mat j me to were unawe of
each other, jutice eidency coud not be implemented, ad since 'no c'
implies 'no ought' (me Modu Tollens version of Kt's dictum) mere are
no inter-island demands of justice. Bur even if mis is uue, it ofers no
support to me idea mat justice mut be associational. All it shows is mat
justice must be implementable, and mat sometimes a separation beteen
people or asociations prevents implementation. Suppose mat one or bom
of me islanders buHt a boat and discovered me omer island. If Lucky in
sists that Abundance is b ad his alone, ad he need not alleiate
Unluck's predieent on Inferile, it is difcut to see a morally relevant
diference beteen mis ad me single islad seizure by Greedy. The ony
new element of possible moral iteret is that bom have enuenched cpec
tation and adaptations; indeed it might weI be tt mis ought to be fc
tored in, but mat doen't show mat justice does not apply, nor mat mose
sors of factors need not be considered when determining justice wimin a
association. In all mee caes one mut be cef not to vacillate in a way
biaed toward me asociationa view. Just as industriousness raise a cha
lenge for any egalitatian meory, so does me possibiliry mat cpectations
ad adaptations afect justice (to which I later return). Ir begs me question
of whemer me scope of egaitatian justice is asociationa to rase mese
objections aganst egaitarian justice only in non-asociationa contcts
such as dissociated hyometical islands.
If questions of firnes c arise beyond asociation, an asociationalist
vie of justice obviously fce a problem. One might persist in holding
that justice, even justice a frness, is still dferent fom firnes beyond
justice.8 The 'circumtaces of justice', according to Hume and folowing
hir Rawls, include common asociation. The trouble is that whHe Hume
8 Alternatvely one ca spe of diferent levels of jutic, each with its own demd,
Murphy (2007) , Nael (2005), ad Sagiovani (2007) do. The suhstace, not the
terminolog, i importnt. I wish only to estblih here tat considerations of frnes
C obtan witout asciationa relations, whatever one choose to call te ensung
dute.
Globa ad Stast Egaitaism ad Tbcir Wo 93
didn' t think of justice a fairnes (or if he did, didn't think of fairnes as
equaity) Rawls ad his followers do. So Hume can plausibly argue that
the island cae might weil be one of unfairness but not of injustice, since
justice in any case doe not require equal distribution. Hume can thu say
with Nozick: Sure it's unfair; so i Iife - Wat h that to do with justice?
(Recall Nozick's anaog beteen maket distributions and maital choices
that deprive some of equaly attractive conjuga options: unfir maybe, but
not unj ust.) Rawls and other asociationa statists, on the other hand,
wowd have either to deny that Greedy is being unfair, which I have su
geted seer implausible, or else to concede that justice does not exhaust
frness. But then, why showd jutce a fairnes not extend to cases of
frness outside associational bounds? In Rawls' ce, unlie Hume's, a
separation of justice a fairnes from non-asociational firness wowd seem
to require a specia defense; otherise it wowd be in danger of appearing
to be merely a stipwation. One can see that the problem here is to get a
grip on the very concept of justice. If te scope of the concept were de
cided merely by stpwation, obviously that could come only at the price of
depriving the quetion of any lingering interest; the interesting normative
quetion wowd be displaced to the nature and scope of other duties, such
a (ea-justicia) firness and huanitarian benencence.
Statism
I tn now to a eination of specinc arguments in favour of a statist
conception of justce. f mentioned previouly, I shall argue that jutca
tions of statism face a dilemma of being either too wek to account for
state dutes to non-contributig citizens, or, if they do manae U account
for them, too strong to contain duties within state boundaie. The di
lemma arises natural y by the presence witin state boudries of people
who stand in a crucial respect in relation to their working ad producing
cocitizns a do people outside the state boudarie: a non-participants in
the productive Iife of the partcwar citizenry. Some egalitarians bite the
bullet ad deny that dutie of justice obtain beteen contributing and
non-contributng citizens. But embarrased by the juxaposition of such
demanding content (their egalitarianism) net to seeming callounes, they
then asen tat duties of humaity explan why these people should be
cared for. One problem for such a view is to explain why such duties
showd be borne by the state in quetion, a opposed to anyone else, or
perhaps the richest state (util no longer the richet, at wich point the
new richet state would crry on, etc. ); I shalhave more to say about this
below. The second problem, however, is a variation on the second horn of
94 Daid Kfa
the dilemma, or perhaps a third horn of a uilemma, for it now appers
aain that huaitaian dutie are poised to go far enouh a O render the
quetion of the scope of justice uninteresting. Aer aI, egalitaian and
prioritaia are unIike1y O say that duties to the disabled shoud be e
hausted at subsistence, while everyone else should be raised O the bench
mak of equality. If thee duties are to provide the disabled with more
than a bae minimum, and i they are duties of humanity rather than j u
tice, then duties of humaity beyond borders are presumably robust
enough O render the scope of dutie of justice irrelevant.
Let u consider more dosely what seem O be the four main arguments
for statism. I shall argue that three risk goring by the frst horn above: they
fce difcuty accounting for state dutie O non-contributing citizen. The
fouth is the most plausible, or contains the most plauible elements, but
u1timately at te price of undermining the ce for eitaianism even
dometically. The four are ( 1 ) non-volunr membership of a coercive
politico-Iegal system; (2) participation in a common cooperative system
engendering reciprocity in the mutua provision of domestic public goods;
(3) a Nagel-Rousseauean agument from the will being engaged a both
author ad subject of te laws; (4) membership in a single cenualised
system of power and decision-making.
( 1 ) Non-voluntr memberhip o a coecive politico-lgal sstem
The prevalence of this argument is somewhat surprising. The ide is that
since the system is coercive - punishing those who fal to comply with its
laws - and membership in it is non-volunta, so that one cannot eily
remove oneself fom its coercive purie becue of the burdens involved,
it is incumbent on such a system to uet it coerced members frly. The
argument is suprising given how much the contract uadition fom
Hobbes to Rawls h uied to conceptualise the jut polity a being, in the
latter's word, "a dose a a society c to being a voluntary scheme" . For
Rawls justice is intimately boud up with the society being a volunry
cooperative scheme. Coercion is adopted O prevent freeriding ad O
demonstrate publidy one' s commitment; there is a direct line here aI the
way back to Hobbes' dictum tat word without sword are but empty.
But the coercion is itself chosen, on c conception, and in order O but
tres the aredy areed scheme; it is not itself a jutifcation of adherence
to principles of justice.
The point can be eemplifed by imaining people in a conuactu
situation before they have deided to add coercion aainst freeriders. They
have areed principles of justice, and now someone who h gained an
unfr advatage refe O give it up. He woud have no moral leg to
stad on if he replied that the system is not (yet) coercive so he is not
Globa ad Stast Egaitaism ad Tbci. Wo 95
bound by principle of jutice. If he were to repond honecly, he would
have co say that the other members were suckers for not yet having en
forced their principle with coercion, ad that he wa now going LO te
advantage of cs while he could still get away with it. The reason one
needs coercion is co prevent violations of justice; coercion is not the reaon
why one needs justice.
There is a persitent misunderstanding about this point that is worth
aaysing frther. Michael Blake, who develops the coercion argument for
statism, might reply co the above a folIows: the actua social contract is a
myh, while the hypothetical contract, a Dworkin obsered, is not jut a
pale form of an actua1 contract; it is no contract at al. Rel societies have
re laws and rel enforcement. Sinc a citizen is coerced co pay her taes,
she has a right that the taation system be jutifable by principle that, if
she is reaonable, she c accept a jusr. Ir may weil b rhat some version
of Rawlsian constcuctivism c identiI what those principles shoud be.
Bur it is the Fct that thee or so me other principle ae being coercively
imposed on people that cretes the requrement that they had better be
jusr. If the system is working co the unfr advatage of some over others,
the fther fact that members of it have no choice in the matter gives them
legitimate grounds far complaint.
This posible reaoning mistakes what c be a additiona reon for
being just - rt coercion is being applied - for a necessary reon: rhat
without coercion jutice need not apply. My invocation of the contract
tradition wa not intended a a endarsement of the vie that contractual
ism is the correct approach co determining principle; only that it is one
infuential approach rhat illutrate that duties of justice obtain prior to
(and independencly of coercion. The fact that someone is coerced into
complying wth a principle could be althe more reon co tret her jucly,
al the more reaon for her co complain if treated unjuscly. But it is cer
tainly not necesary for there LO be duties LO tret her jucy, nor necesary
for her to have legitimate grounds for complaint.9
Sangiovani seer on the verge of mang this point, ad indeed
make it in part with repect LO coercion. In his counterfactual thouht
eperiment, a coercive state with progressive taation - presuably on
ground of justice - suddenly cees LO b corcive, but people continue
voluntarily to comply with state laws. Ir is counterintuitive, Sagiovanni
sugets, rhat durie of justice no longer obtain simply because the sytem
9 Imaine a eld being stoppe from playing somewhere by 2 adut. The rc<on given
by te adut ought to be a god one, given tat the child U bing cerced. However, if
it is a go one, it presumably ought to be complie wit wheter Ot not cercion is
employed; presumably it is bter tat it be complie with for a good rea<on, ad i
the adult'. i a necsad sufcient reon it had beter be that one.
Daid Kofa
ha ceed to b coercive. Ths would seem just a complement co my point
above mat it is counterinritive co say there ae no duties of justke before
coercion is used. But Sagiovanni then shifs O me claim that non
voluntar membership i me sociery - underscood a me inabilir of peo
pIe to leave wimout undue burden - avoids cs objection.
I would mae to points i n reply. First, mere is an element of aum in
me claim, but it is a trivia one mat does not suppon statism. In mis sense
of non-voluntaines, everyone gobaly is in a non-voluntary situation not
only wich respect co their ow societies but wim repect co global divisions
into societies ad polities, and me globa distributions of goods mat ensue.
There does seem someming intuitive in me claim mat if someone could
pick therelve up wimout any burden co memselves ad reinstal mem
selve in aomer socier, one might be jutifed in saying co mem: if you
don't like the way mings are done here, why don' t you move co X1 1 The
fact mat me cnot do so defeats the force of me taunt. But this se
point applie co me non-asociated islanders discussed above. Bom Decent
and Unlucky c say co Greedy and Lucky repectively, 'If I could get
eily back co civisation I would make no claim ainst you; in fact I
would be happy co leave your entire island co you. I have no choke in me
matter of my being here, yet mere is a choice about how we divide me
avaable goods. But secondly, mere is a deeper misunderstanding in me
non-volunc membership justifction of statism mat resembles me
problem wim me coercion-baed justifction. Sangiovani constres me
non-voluntaines of residency (probably following Rawl, who in turn
wa probably following Hume's critique of Locke's tacit consent) in terms
of the deree of burden mat would be incurred by someone who tried to
leave. What exaccy constitutes mis burden? In part, no doubt, being de
racinated, leving one's attachents ad filiar environment of eperi
ences, possibly language ad culture, ad so form. So why not impose mis
burden on whoever dislikes me loe disuibution? Preuably becaue
10 Sagiovan (2007) doe<n't endorse this positon; in fa he thins it is uhimtely
uperuive ad prers a rprociry-baed argument to be dused bdow. My cri
ticim i j Ut rt he tinks non-volunta reidency a cherent defense of sratism that
is immue to the criticism j ust made of cereion. But both ae subject to te sae
objecton: that they either presupps te dutes of justic they claim to make
nec<ar, or tey gene .. ate entrely counter-ituitive eaples of reaon U apply ju
tic.
1 1 T his wa a farunt in te Cold War, where X wa te questioner's f.vourite
cmmunit enemy. This cud be understood at the bud of a diferent i
sue, rhat of the rdativism of j utce. Diferent sociee might have diferent stndards
or values, e of which is defensible on genera ground, and t cud give rie to
diferent prineiples of jutce in e <oeier. I cnot pusue this here, except bridy
below.
Globa ad Stast Egaitaism ad Tbcir Wo 97
doing so would be unfir. So it is presupposed that considerations of fair
ness alredy apply co the person in quetion. This c be seen in the fol
lowing eple. Suppose a person had no attachment co her country or
anyone in it, ad would be quite wiling co try somecng ne by emigrat
ing if a sutable place could be found. Bur suppose te only available place
w a barren deert like Infertile where, instead of having available co her
the condtions of a modern industial society, she would have co strugle
like Unlucky just for subsistence. Would it be fair to tell this person, If
you don't like te way tings are done here, why don' t you move co Infer
tile? Preumably the decline of living standard here would itself be an u
fir burden tat it would be wrong co impose on her. If that is carrect,
then the concept of non-volutines of membership is itself paasitic on
an atecedent conception of justice, ar at any rate fairnes. Suppose, for
instance, that one was a sufcientarian. If the person were, a stated above,
wilg to emigrate co a suitable place, and tere w one that enabled her
to have 'enough' far a decent life, then her frst residency would be volu
tary and justice need not apply. Bur tat is ony because justice has aready
been applied; the person will be getting 'enough' no matter what. Or sup
pose one wa an egalitarian. Then if the ony available alternative wa a
place where her life would be signifcantly worse of, even if meeting stan
dard of sufciency, from the standpoint of egataianism it should still be
unfr co force her to accept being worse of; hence it would be an unac
ceptable buden, hence her residency would be non-voluntary, hence ju
tice beteen her and her origina society should apply. Non-voluntariness
is terefore not an independent necessary and sufcient condition far the
need for justice to apply, but in fct circuarly presuppose te application
of justice co determine non-voluntarines. (There is an afnity here with
Hume's discusion of coercion) .
(2) parteipaton in a eommon eooperatve sstem mgmdring recprocit in
the mutl provision ofdomeste publie good
Sagiovanni, and arguably Kw, adopt cis reciprocity-baed defense of
statism. Justice is owed beteen members of a common cooperative sys
tem because each beneft from the contribution of all te oter members
in the joint production of public good. I have already suggested, with the
eple of isolated isladers, tat it is counter-inttive that dute of
justice require this asociationa basis. A close reading of Sangiovanni
shows that it is not the association per se, but the degree each benents
fom te contriburions of the others, tt ground the duties of justice;
that is why he cl h a reciprocity-based view. Bur tere ae to ques
tions that c be raised about this account. First, why should only jointly
produced public goods ground durie of jutice? Sangiovani's aswer is
98 Daid Kofa
that only thee put ech in everyone else's debt. But whie this might pro
vide a motivation for each, ad especialy te better of, to comply with
distributive principles, that cannot be the only reaon for considerations of
justice to apply, uess one wishes to reduce justice to a Hobbeia
Gauthierian scheme of mutual advantage. Ths leads to a second point,
mentioned at te beginning of this section. The reciprocity-baed view ha
difculty accounting for obligations towad non-working residents such a
the disabled. Sagiovani hadles those who ae willngly unemployed by
saying that arguably nothing is owed ther (Sagiovann, 2007, p. 28 fn.
45), but the dabled ae obviouly in a diferent category. His anser is
that if they ae still, say, la-abiding, voting, ta-paying, and otherise
involved in their community, then they are still contributing to the public
goods that enable een a wealty entrepreneur to pursue her life-plan. But
this seems strained to the point of implausibility. Suppose someone wa so
disabled tat she dd't vote or pacipate in the community. She doesn' t
work so doesn't contribute taes. She may not brek the law, but coudn' t
even if she wated to. Her only interaction with society is a a recipient of
ad from helth and ce agencies. Ir strains credulity to tel an entrepre
neur or anyone else tat they owe her aid because of her contribution to
the production of public good. In ces lie this, Sangiovani says that
such people "do not have any claims deriving fom a conception of d
tributive equality", but tey do "have claims deriving fom teir equ
mora wort and dgnity a hU beings, which include claims to te
aleviation of suf ering ad pain" (Sangiovani, 2007, p. 3 1 f. 50) .
This argument is deeply problematic in the contet of reciprocity
baed statism. If te suggestion is that the more disabled someone is, the
les they shoud receive, ad that someone prevented fom maing any
usef contribution should receive the barest subsistence and mediction
to aleviate pain, the view wl seem counterintuitive to al but the most
tough-minded libertarians and Gauthierias. If that was not te intended
position, but rater that the humaitaian duty shoud be ahle to account
for why te severely disabled mght receive a much or more t the less
severely disabled or the able-bodied, the chalenge will now have been
displaced to the quetion of why reciprocity supports statism. For now (o
more questions arise: (a) if humaitaria concerns aone c account for
dutie to rase a severely disabled person to levels compaable to those of
members of a reciprocity-based system, h not the cae for statism j ust
gone by te boads? Aer all, what m the severely disabled an object
of humanitaian concern is that they Cot help being in the state they
are in. That is the moral y releant apect of their situation tat does te
work of grounding dutie U them, but te globa poor ae equaly in a
state of poverty not of their choosing, a globalist luck-egalitaria obsere.
Globa ad Stast Egitaism ad Tbcir W m 99
(b) If me dury to me severdy disabled is purdy humanitarian, why is
me political state mat mey are in me aency mat must assume me dury to
help memo Oddly, in me sae foomote where Sangiovani explains duties
to me severdy dabled as based on humanitaian considerations, he cites
Robere Goodin's essay "Wat is So Special About Our Fellow Country
men?". But Goodin ues mis exaple precisdy to argue tat al duties of
justice wmin state ae derivative of universa mora dutie - which San
giovani's associationa statism denies - ad mat omerise one cnnot
eplan why state are responsible for meir own (severely) disabled resi
dents. Tbe alternative that Gooin sugts now appears entirely convinc
ing: mat mere is a globa dvision of responsibiliry aong state line to carry
out universa duties of justice, such mat each state asumes responsibilry
for its citizens and residents. 1 2 Tbis division of reponsibilir makes sense
up to a point: states ae unrivaled concentrations of power and agencie of
conuol, and mey are consequendy me most appropriate agents to imple
ment j utice aong meir citizens. But when states fal to do so, whemer
because meir governments are corrupt ad unjut, simply incompetent, or
because me poverty of meir state is beyond meir control due to globa
economic fctors or bad luck, men mere is reon to consider omer states
and individuals secondarily reponsible. The vie is aalogou to one
wich holds paents primarily responsible for meir childen's welre and
upbringing. Wen me paents f to discharge mis dury for whatever
reaon - deam, incompetence, neglect, or abuse - me dury must be a
sumed by someone eise. The right of me child is not diminished by me
falure of me primary dury-bearer, nor should it be automatically me cae
mat me rights of me global poor be diminished by me flure of meir
governments.
The difculr of accounting for duties to me disabled also is fced by
me frst vie dcused above, me coercion-baed account. Ir again seems
implauible to sugest mat someone who is bed-ridden and not paying
taxes (so not coerced in any signifcnt way) should be caed for by me
state becaue she is still in me puriew of a coercive system.
Luck egalitarias would of course have no difculry accounting for
obligations to me disabled. But men it is dfcult to see why mis view
should be contaned wmin nationa borders; afer all, being born in an
impoverished country is bad brute luck of vat signifcance in terms of
one's prospects for well-being (Bein, 1 983). Bom man vie exained
mus fa face me dilemma delineated above: eimer mey cannot adequatdy
12 I indebted to Re Nam fr pointing out tO me me similarity be Goodin'.
view ad my own, ad I have rec t scon to attribute me view to Goodn
( 1 988).
1 00 Daid Kofa
account for duties of states to meir non-contributing residents. or in ac
counting for mem mey cannot then contain me duties so justifed co me
boundaries of me state. but must on pain of inconsistency extend mem co
the world' s needy.
(3) Nagels Rouseauean arment that cities are both author and subect
ofthe lws.
This argument I thin c be det wim briefy. Being subject to me law
ha aredy been addressed in me seetion on coercion. for what else doe
being subject co law men? The novelty in the argument is me claim that
citizns make me law. But while one right think jointly making laws can
create special asociationa duties. there seems norg in me argument to
show mat mis i necessary for mere being duties of justice. Moreover, me
notion mat citiens make the Iw. even in democracies. i somewhat ide
alised. Whatever mora weight the notion h seems derived fom good
old actua contract meory. People who consent to govern themselves in a
certan way should perhaps. wir some reaonable bounds, be so gov
erned; what else c joincly mng the laws moraly amount to? But even
among mose who rely did cnsent (and putting aide whether unairity
would be required) mis doen't real y show what the content of the laws
should be. If consent is doing work here - ad if not I do not see what is
signifcant about joincly making laws - men it would seem mat a range of
content-options fom across me spectmm. including indvidual-risky utili
tariaism, should be permissible. With respect co coercion - being
' merely' subject co law - it maes sense co say that one ought to be able U
j ustif me law to me worst of. But wim respect co maers of the law fa
les need co be j utifed: if someone complain that he is badly of one
need only ak hir why in heaven he consented to such an arangement.
and whether he should not thin tice about it me ne time. If. on me
omer had. non-unaimity is presumed, men me relevance of joincy
mng me Iaw disappers. And co reiterate, een if I have misconstmed
Naers agument and joint aumorship of me laws i sufcient to crete
so me special dutie of justice, mis give no support co a cla mat joint
aumorship i necssar for justice to obtain.
(4) membership in a singl centalised sstem ofpower and rciion-making
This argument, versions of which can be found in David Miller's version
of statism, has I think to related elements: mat the welfre of citizns is
afected primarily by me policie (ad genera character) of meir state, and
that merefore mora reponsibility for ensuring justice foe people lie pri
mariy wim meir states. There is some merit, I tink. to mis agument. If
a state's poor invetment policie led to its being bady of. it seems
Globa ad Stast Egaitaism ad Tbcir Wo 1 01
wrong t o hold other state primarily responsible for redressing the inequal
ity. Miller himself draw attention to the palels beteen holding state
a collectivities ad individuas within societies responible for self
inficted predicents. He is aware, a weil, that individuals within socie
ties ae not equaly responsible, ad many not reponsible at all, for poli
cie of their state. This is evident with dictatorships, but is arguably to
some etent true with democracies a wel: so me people might have op
posed the sitting government, and in ay cae governance is nowhere by
referendum. But the point I wish to emphaise is the other side of the
coin: if responsibility c defeat the applicaility of egalitaiaist j utice
globally it should do so dometically a weil.
No doubt it is impottant to clarif what is now meant by egalitaian
ism. Luck egalitaianism, afer al, aim precisely to render justice respon
sibility-sensitive. Reponsibility, however, can me my things. It can
refer to the control one exercises over the acquisition and use of weth,
income, resources, or primary goods. But it c also denote the control
one ha over the signifcance one attributes in one's lie to diferent goods.
This is a senitive point. A long-standing criticism of utilitarianism is that
it seems to count adaptive preferences to various levels of privation equaly
with other preferences, and tat is tought to be one of the ways it is at
odds with considerations of justice (Elster, 1 982) . On te other had,
there is a wel-known phenomenon of eemplary adaptation - not solely
of preference, but an entire reorientation of value ad lifestyle - to ex
treme hardship or deprivation (what Saul Smask calls 'fortunate mis
fortue' : where a tragic situation or very diHut condition that befalls
someone - a deth of a loved one, a nea-fatal diseae, loss of limb, dsabil
ity - or more morally troubleome cae of man-made sufering such a
wrongf imprisonment, racist persecution, tore or een incarceration
in a concentration camp - leads to a radical transformation in their life
and te fnding of new 'meaning' (Smilask, 2007) . Thin, for example,
of a Helen Keller, Elie Weisel, Stephen Hawking. What stance should
justice take in the face of such situations?
On the one hand it seems obvious that one ouht to continue to con
demn mistreatment, wrongf incarceration, persecution, in short injustice
in general, however much there remaned a chace that a victim might
ultimately and indireccy beneft from the wong. Simaly, adaptations to
injustic and eploitation of the 'fase-consciousnes' variety must be dis
couraged, insofar a tey encourage actions that ae wrong in themselves.
Finally, dability, suf ering, diseae, loss of livelihood, and other disadvan
tages of the sort that woud likely prevent one from leadng a normal life,
woud seem to be grounds for compensation with the aim of enabling a
1 02 Daid Kfa
normal and decent a lfe a possible. 1 3 Poveny that w severe enough
would fl into this category a wl For one thing, succesf adaptations
to such signifcnt adversiry are rare and unpredictable; for aother, even
many who adapt brillantly to adversiry might have sufered needlesly.
(Might Stephen Hawkng have done a wel or beuer witout sufering
diabiliry?)
Al the above is on the side of compensating for severe disadvantage.
But a for adaptation to merely unequal shares of paticular good or bun
dles of goods, it would seem undesirable to adopt principle for the sae of
dicouraging them. That is, it is desirable that j utice not undermie the
incentive for individuals ad distinct societies to pursue a satisfing and
wormwhile life in the non-ideal circumstances (ad unequal advatages)
that the compleities of real life normaly generate. In other word, adap
tations to inequair shoud not be automatical y asimilated to fase con
sciousness, as egaitarian conceptions would encourage one to thin Thus
te notion of responsibilir to which jutice should be sensitive ought to
include a wide range of control the individual should retain for fnding a
mengfl life within the vat and posibly infnite comple of circum
stance and value. There are reaons to wish to avoid too much interference
by government institutions in this individua control, not leat of which is
te old worry of undermining self-reliance. And similarly, tere is a degree
of paallel responsibilry tat governments and their respective societies
should assue in the face of inequalities bereen nations. A conception of
globa justice that placed the onus on the welthiest nations aways to raise
poorer nations to their level would have a perncious efect on the adop
tion of sound deelopment polcies. 1 4
Sufcienc
y
Some of Frank's strictures anst the egalitai ethos meh with the
thrt of the previou paragraph. But it is not ony the encouragement of
envy, of lookng over one's shouder at how oters are doing, that is a
13 'Noral' is admity bt vague ad subject U vaiou kinds of relativity. Neverte
les, I tink in te context of t bre accut suldent sense ca be made of it:
someone cnfned to a wheelchair, sugling with leukemia, or possibly having be
psychologically sared by seriou abu, would be a typical ce of a pron prevented
from leing a noral life witout material ad oter belp.
14 A burgning literture of development studies m this point. Dabisa Moyo
identifes a "ad cur" simila U DUO cure Ac coutrie. Dabisa Moyo
(201 0), Dea Ai": W AM Is Not Wo"ing an How Tle Is a Bem Way fr Aca.
See alo Willia Eaerly (2006), ad Stephen K (2001 ) .
Globa ad Stast Egitaism ad Tbcir W m 1 03
pererse incentive of mis emos. In fct, implementation of a sufciency
doctrie might require considerable comparison, pace Frankrt ( 1 987;
1 997; 2000) , Crisp (2003) , and een sypametic crities such as C
(2007) . This is for to reaons: frst, becue raiing up to me sufcient
mreshold mose bdow requires tation of mose above, and some fmer
principle, preumably, to determine whom to t more and whom les.
Secndy, sufciency woud seem at leat panially rdative to me general
agregate of available good, services, and technolog. A cenr ago what
might have been mought to be sufcient to led a decent Iife could be
considered poveny today, and mis is an inherendy 'comparative' point: a
poor person today mut compare herself to her contemporarie, or at any
rate me contemporary technologicl cpacir and agregate wem, to
kow j she ha sufcient opportunities and sufcient wdfare generally. If
medical breoughs led to a to hundred yer averae Iife epectancy
for me mny who c af ord access to me rdevant tretment, omers wim
an eighr or even one hundred ye Iife expectancy would not have
enough.
Thus me merit of sufciency doctrines is not mat mey repudite
comparative judement encouraed or required by egalitarian and priori
tarian minking, ad hence me morally valudess envy such judgements
aIegedly engender. Rmer, meir merit, ad what perhaps in pan moti
vates meir proponents wimout mem fy recognising it, is meir atempt
to increase me scope of responsibilir of people for meir own general weJ
being (whemer or not mose people are envious of mose better of man
mem) .
The earlier point about adaptation is mat an egalitaian emos would
seem to encourage people to look to governent to mae meir Iives beter,
instead of striving memsdves to discover from me multitudinou available
Iife pats one mat woud be satifing and meaningf. Ae you ugIy?
(Nietche might say to Socrates) . Then become a phlosopher. Ae you
bad at sports? Lrn to play an instrment. Neimer of mese succeed? Try
being eceptionally kind - surdy anyone c do mat.
The imponce of sdf-reliance is jut a acute wim regard to me col
lectivities kown a states. Miller' s emphais on responsibilir is no doubt
heightened by an awarenes of how me Aian tigers, more importady
China and India, and foJowing mem Pastan, Vietnam, BangIadesh and
omers are beinning to achieve for meir citizens decent levels of income
and wdfre. But some degree of adaptation should liky alo be accepted
and encuraged here. Societies wim scarce resources at let have me po
tentia to beome industrious; me icentive to do so should not be un
dermined.
1 04 Daid Kfa
These remarks tae justice in an opposite direction from where me
late Jerry Cohen woud have ren it. Ir is of course possible to uet ju
tice 8 an abstract idel mat approaches equalir, but i me remarks above
have merit, me resut woud be me frther normative principle mat jutice
shoud never be implemented. Whemer t 'recues' jutice or condemns
it to relative irrdevace i an open question. Dne might mink it rescue its
pristine purity at me cost of irrdeance. The alternative ve I have been
proposing is a conception of justice mat incorporates psychologica Fcts,
circustances of me plurality of avenues of meanines and satisfc
tion, and incentive efect. Cohen woud c1 me principles mat emerge
fom conideration of mee factors principles of reguation, not jutice.
For preent purposes I a happy mat mose in agreement wim Cohen treat
my entire discussion 8 acrly about principles of reguation and not
justice.
To return to me case of me island refgees wim which I began, it
seems intutive mat issue of firness aise beteen mem even if mey do
not share a asociation, and it fmer seems arbitrar to hold mat mese
considerations of frness are irrdevant to jutice. But me indusuiousness
of one 8 against me lines of me omer is arguably not arbitrary, ad
while me determinist question of reponsibility ad desen is debatable, me
genera value of encouraging 'compatibilist' responsibilty - even if some
ming Iike determinism is uue - is not. Aain, even a Coheni wo
wouId reject ' tanting' justice wim considerations of it incentive efect
mght aree wim principles of reulation taking mese into account. The
incentive efect of a scheme of justice is itsdf a consideration in fvour of
or against mat scheme, and I have uied to sugest in mis paper mat at
bom a gIobaI and a national scale mere are important reerations about
adopting any egalitarian conception.
References
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Beit, C. ( 1 979). Politcal Theor and Interatonal Reltons. Princeton. Princeton
University Pres) .
Beit, C. ( 1 983) . "Csmopolita Ides ad Natonal Senrent". TheJoural o/
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What is so Special about the State?
Reka Nath
Introduction
For many, justce, or at leat an important sub-specie of justice, is con
cerned wim what we owe to others wim whom we share an asociation. In
this spirit, J ohn Rawls ( 1 999a, p. 3) called justice me 'frst virtue of social
institutions' ad for Hue ( 1 966 [ 1 777] , p. 25) the bounds of j utice
grow in accordance wim me bouds of interaction. In light of ws connec
tion beteen jutce and asociations, me state ha come to occupy a cen
tral role in politica phosophy a the primary asociation U which a
sessments of justice apply. Claims of justice, a a result, ae onen phraed
in terms of what ctz ramer man simply individul are owed. Wimout
any doubt, me state i an import asociation for most individuas in
mis world, and ws fct is unlikely to change any time soon. Yet, tang
seriously me relatonship beteen jutice and interaction requires mat we
pay anention ao U me normative implications of globa interdepend
ence. In paticua, we ought to ak how the hig level of interaction
mrough transnationa institutions Iike me World Trade Organiztion
(O) ad me Internationa Monetay Fund (IMF) infuence our moral
obligatons U individua outside of our ow state.
A view mat ha been frequendy defended bom in public discourse and
politica phosophy drive a wee beteen me normative relevace of
states and me global order wim respect to what i owed U individuals in
each doman. On this vie, which I folow omers in calig 'statism', me
state plays a special role in generatng duties of justice mat apply eclu
sively among citizns. 1 Citiens of a state are in a specia reIationship mat
The fUowing are a representatve sampie of statist views: Ricad Miler ( 1 998), John
Rawls (i 999b), Micel Blae (1001), Thoma Nal (1005), and Ad.J Sagio
vani (1007). For eae of laguge I, ad mos of ce Sttt, ue ce term 'citn'
rcher losely. For aI intents ad puse, cenain groups of non-citizns like long
term ad perment reidents are icluded i n the scop of satists' egaitai concrn.
See Blae (1002, p. 26n8) ad Sagiovani (1007) te Iatter of whom use the
phe ' citns and reident' throughout his defen of statm.
1 08 Rca Nam
gives mem claims of egaitaria justice upon ech omer. That egaitarian
jutice should be restricted U the state is driven by the claim mat inequa
ity is morally troubleome ony when atached to certain forms of intitu
tional interaction. In mis way, duties of egitarian justice are generated as
a result of the unique relationship aong citizens. And although global
interaction is recognizd a infuential ad ever-growng, it is nonemeles
rearded a markedly df erent in chaacter from me interaction aong
state citizens. Conequently, sttists oppose extendg priciples of egali
tarian jutice, whch are suted for me state, to me global domain. 2
This paper is devoted to examining me merits of me statist position. It
proceeds a folIows. In me frst section, I discuss me mree main strategie
employed by statits in defense of restricting the scope of meir meorie to
me state. The second section criticizes c scope retriction on me
grounds of me statists' reliace upon a fulty empirical characterization of
me intitutional relationships mat trancend state borders. In me third
section, I tn to me statists' normative claims that me parcular intitu
tional relationships claimed to be unique to me state are capable of gener
ating claim of egalitarian justice. I suget mat me Statsts fail to provide a
satisfactory account of why, and consequently where, inequalities generate
claims of justice. I conclude, men, mat the restriction of eglitarian jutice
to me state, at leat accordng to me explanations considered, is unjusti
fed.
I: The Statist View
In c section, examine me statist argument for retricting duties of
egalitarian justice to me state. Essentially, me statist clams mat the pa
ticular form of instirutional interaction found in me state generate mu
ral dutie of egalitarian justice among citizens. The statist frher argue
mat mee sae tyes of dutie are not owed to foreigners because the
global domain lacks me requisite chracteristic to generate concern for
inequalitie beteen indviduals from diferent state. The ide mat citi
zns are in a unique relationship wim one aomer mat generate member
specifc clams of justice is to-part (Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 8) . First, is the
empirical claim mat some particular tye of instirtional relationship mat
is found among citizens does not eist outside of me state. Second, is me
normative claim mat me given form of interaction unque to me state
2 Some stt, panculaly Nagel (2005) age mt h0 prnciple of j utic whatever
obtain beyond stte border. Inste, only humaitria dutie, mat t indviduals'
absolute levels of deprivaton apply outide of me stte.
Wat i so Specia about Ic Stte? 1 09
generate obligations of egalitaria jutice. Consequendy, individuals owe
dutie of egalitaian jutice to, ad onl U their fellow citizens. f such,
for the statist to maintain that inequalities require anention only within
the state they must successfly defend the following to claims: ( 1 ) a
releant empirica disanalogy exists beteen the state and the global do
main, and (2) this disanaog entails that certain fOrI of dometic ine
quality are unjut while tose sae form of global inequality ae not.
In what folows, I explore tee competing eplaation for retricting
dutie of egalitia justice U the state that have recendy been put for
ward. Each of thee focuses on a diferent apect of te state's institutional
structre to support the claim that it uniquely trigers concern for equa
ity. Thee diferent apects of the state that act a 'trigers' (that is, they
triger cm of egalitarian justice among those bound up in the given
type of institutiona relationship) ae: ( 1 ) the coercive apparatu of the
state; (2) citizen' co-authorship of the state's coercive regime; ad, (3) and
the state's provision of baic goods.
First, according to te coercion arment, egaitarian dutie are eclu
sively owed to citizens of the state due to their subjection to the state' s
coercive reguations that signifcady violate their autonomy (Blae, 2002;
see ao Miler, 1 998). Through both criminal ad civil law, the state regu
lates numerou ae of citiens' live. Moreover, it possesse a unrivalled
capacity to enforce its lega reguations trough punitive meures, such a
fne and imprisonment. State coercion is distinct not ony in it magni
tude, but also for the domain of citizen' lives over which it governs.
Through its legl apparatus, the state plays a signifct role in defning
property entidements and regulating tation. 3 From a liberal perspective,
Blake claims that we ought to be concerned by state coercion precisely
becaue it violate citizens' autonomy. Not aI tes of coercion or auton
omy-violation stad in need of the same justifction a that which the
state enforce over its citizens. Rther that the state subjects its citizens to a
regime of private law, and is thu in the busines of defning and main
taining a predictable system of distributve holdings for its members dis
tincdy give rise to the special jutifcation they are owed. Drawing on
Rwls's hypothetical contract reoning, Blake agues that the ony form
of justifction that will sufce is the implementation of the df erence
principle. Aer discusing the other to statist arguments, which also
3 Blake ues Ie term 'private Iw' (i contrat to 'crimna law') to cefer to a11 legJ
ptotections of private entitlement, indudng ' tbe law of contract, UH, ad prp
erty' which a cllective body 'defne how propery will be udertood ad held,
and what sons of activities will produce wht son of ecnomic holding' (Ble, 2002,
p. 28 1 ) .
1 1 0 Rca Nat
draw on Rawlsian reaonig U justif the need for egaitaria dutie in the
state, I wl say a bit more about this tye of argument.
A second account of statism also focuses on state coercion, but it
draws on something diferent from autonomy-violation to ground the
need for justifction through egaitarian duties. Its focus is on the role of
citizns as joint authors of the terms they coercively impose upon one
another. Cal cs the co-authorhip arment. In addition to the mora
signifcce of citizen' subecton to state coercion, it is emphasized tat
they are also the joint author of tose terms since they have political au
thority over ter (agel, 2005, pp. 1 28- 1 30) . Due to their tin role a
subjects and authors of the state' s coercive terms, al citizens share a colec
tive reponsibility for them. It doesn't matter for c account that some
states are not democratic or that many citizns even in democratic states
vehemendy oppose particula policies adopted by their governments.
4
Instead, insofar a the state asociation is largely inescapable, what matters
is that citizens cannot help but uphold ad consequency perpetuate its
coercive terms throuh teir compliance therewith and t contributions.
Each citizen thus inherits the duty to bis fellow compatriots to only coer
cively impose upon tem terms that they would reonably fnd accept
able, both as recipients of such treatment ad in teir role as joint authors
of the sae.
Despite both focusing on state coercion, there is a signifcat difer
ence beteen how c account and the previou one explain how egaita
ian dutie are generated within the state. Blae's coercion argument fo
cuses on te ways in which stte coercion thwats individual' autonory,
and it claims that equaity among citizens is needed to justif this in
&ingement of auconomy. The co-authorsbp argument, by contrat, draws
on citizns' reponsibility for the rules that they unavoidably play a role in
enforcing in their co-citizns' names. Only if the state adopt egalitarian
principles of distributive j utice ca this project be justifed co its rerbers
in vrte of this specia relationhip. A third agument for Iiriting eita
ian concern to the state difers &or the preious to in its focus on what
the state doe fr its members in benefcia terms a opposed to what it
does to them a a burden. According co this account, which we can cal the
baic good proviion ar
g
ment, the state uniquely provides its members
with the esential good they need to live autonomous Iives. ' Citizens in
4 This much is clea fom Nage!'s (2005, p. 1 29n1 4) stement mat even eolonial
powers ad oeeupying forees give cs to this frm of eollective authoci:ton sinee
uder these reime subjec ae epec to uphold the laws mt ae enforcd, which
are at let punedy enacted to serve meir iteret.
5 A Saiovani (2007, p. 4) pUlS it: Citens of a stte provide ane aother with ' a
cntr css af eollecve goad." nady mose goods necssary fr devdoping ad aet-
Wat u '0 Specia about me Stte? I I I
the state enjoy, or typicaly expect to enjoy, such goods a phyica secu
rit, legally protected right, and a stable market and propert rights sy
tem (Sangiovanni, 2007, pp. 20-2 1 ) . Since the state provision of these
goods depends on citizens' legal compliance and their fnacial and social
support, it can be said that indireccly citiens vitaly depend on one an
other. A a result of ech citizen's role in sutaining the state, she h a
claim on her fellow citizns to be treated with reciprocit for her contribu
tions. Ad, in c way, a11 citizns of the state owe another duties of egali
tarian justice in return for their mutual eforu to uphold the state. Unlike
Blake and Nagel's accounts, egaitarian justice is not seen as a form of
compensation for the burdensome aspects of the state but rater is owed as
a form of fair reciprocity for mang possible the very conditions that
enable members of society to fourish. 6 Since the distribution and the ac
cumulation of wealth generally within the stte are made possible by the
cooperation of aI citizens, the are a11 owed an explanation fr the relative
distributive shae that ensue.
Despite the dif erent focal points of statists - on coercion, co
authorship, and baic goods provision - these accounts nonetheless arrive
at the same concluion: that egalitaria justice applies eclusively in the
state. This may come a a surprise. For one thing, what does ech of these
diferent triggers have to do with equality? Funhermore, how is it that the
same requirement, egalitarian dutie of justice, follows fom such diferent
types of institutionaI relationships?7 These questions c be ansered by
pointing out that regardess of the impont df erence beteen these
accounts, they shae an underlying normative rationale. None of these
trigers actually h much to do wit equality per se. Instead, the demand
for egaitarian claims among citizens is generated by te following to
pan arguent:
( 1 ) The given trigger X demarctes the group of persons to whom some
form of special jutifcation is owed. In paticular, te triger gives rise to
ing on a pla of Iife'. Thcy 'constitute ad mantain me state trough rtion,
mtou patcipaton in vaiou forms of politiel acvil, and trough simple cm
pliac, whic indudcs me f rg of our everday, lcgly rcgulated acvity' (p.
20) .
6 Sagiovani (2007, p. 26) wrre tat 'Your talents, eEon, ad skHs, t is, have
ben ahle to win you socl advat only tbrough te coopcrton ad contrihu
tions of omer citns ad rcidents'. Due to recptocity, 'oter ae owed a fr retun
for what mcy have given you, jut you ae owed a f retur for what you have gi
yen others'.
7 Of cu, none of me ptponent of te dfrent acounts ague fr te mut
cmpatihility of tcir accut, but the & tt tcy a11 seek to derive me sae nor
mative requirement fom df erent sourcs is intercstng.
1 1 2 Rca Nat
the need for disuibutive justice within the state since the state play a sig
nif role in regulating distributive holdings through property rights
and taxation schemes.
(2) The preumption toward equit is cahed out in Rawlian terms
drawing on what distributive principles would be chosen in a hyothetical
contract. From this reoning we get the diference principle. which stipu
late that the state's baic structure only permit inequalitie tat maximize
the position of the representative worse-of group.
In grounding his egaitaian account. Rawls focuse on how distributive
inequalities c have harmf efect on citzens' socia and political rela
tions with one anoter. a weil a (and argualy to a leser degree) the
mora arbitrariness of permitting luck-derived inequitie (Freeman.
2007. chapter 4: Schefer. 2003) . Tbe statist considered aove defend
their endorsement of the diference principle amost eclusively on the
bais that inequalitie traceble to moral y arbitrary factors are unjustifale
in the stte context. while mosdy ignoring the impacts of inequitie on
relationhips.8 Sangiovanni (2007. pp. 22-29) points out tat citizens'
joint provision of goods Iike education and a stable properry rights system
enables tose with favored morally arbitrary characteristics I taent to
make greater returns t tcir les tlented compatriots. Insofar a te
ability of the beter-of to do so weil depends on their fellow citizns' con
tributions to the state sytem. te luck egaitarian impulse only applie in
such goods-providing system Iike the state. Proponents of the coercion
ad co-authorship account clam that state coercion c only be justifed
by hypothetical consent if it doe not alow morally arbitrary ftors to
a1low the tented and the Iik to beneft more fom the coercive system
t others (Blke. 2002. p. 283: Nagel 2005. pp. 1 27- 1 29). 1 " In sumo
tese diferent arguent repectively claim that perive coercion. joint
authorship of peraive coercion. and the provision of baic goods trigger
claim of egalitarian jutice to j ustif the given form of institutiona inter
action to patticipants of the state.
8 The one minor exeeption to ti is Bl. Atough he give most of b attenton U
this ide of hypotetic eonsent. he menton a aternatve consideration in suppor
of retricting egaitaia cnideraton to te srte: 'Those who shae liaility to a c
ercive government. afer aI. mut have reltvdy equ ailites to infuence tat gv
ernment's policie under ay plausible theor of liber jutic' (2002. p. 284).
9 Taent is JUt one exple aong a nuber of difrent moraly abitr fetors tat
C b cahed in upon to tate into eonomic gains. Se Sangiovani (2007. pp.
25-29) .
10 It may seem !t tere is a missing link here - naely. why qt is te only way U
ju such a system. I agree tat it is not obvious ad develop this eriticm in te fol
lowing secton.
War u so Specia abour mc Stre? 1 1 3
11. Chalenging the Statists' Empirica Claims
Having ouclined so me of me recent arguments mat have been put ford
in defense of retricting egatian concern to me state, I now conider
whemer mis retriction is juted. Bor me statists' empirica and norma
tive premises must be correct for meir claim mat egalitarian jutice is con
fned to state boundaries to hold. Rejecting eimer meir empirica or nor
mative claims woud sufce to refte me sratists' claim about me scope of
egalirarianism. In what folIows, I show that me statist accounts c be
challenged on bor fronts. Turning frsr to me empirical claim, we can
conider me accuacy of me depiction of me srate a a unique domain of
institutional interaction. In a number of respects, ir is glaringly obvious
thar the srare is a unique form of asociation; but my concern in mis sec
tion is limited ro rhe empirica claim mat me globa domain lacks me
paricular tiggers - coercion, co-aumorship, and baic goods provision -
a clamed by me respective statist accounts.
Proponents of me sratist approache conidered in the lar secton all
redily adir mar rhe incidence of each of rhee triger, in so me form or
anomer, is not limired to me stre. However, mey qualif in the folow
ing fou way mat me intitution interaction found in me srare versus in
me global domain possess some mo raly relevat ad unque characreris
tie. 1 2 The frst point, which applies only to me coercion and co
aumorship arguents, srate that whereas me state compels ad thretens
irs citizens to behave in paricula way, wat apper to be insrance of
globa coercion ae in actality action-guiding incentve mat indvidua
ae free U abide by or to reject. In rhis way, me inuence of me global
order is volunr, whle state inuence is coercive. Second, me state is
mout to be special insofar a ir is necessary for me reiztion of irs citi
zns' autonomy while me globa order is not. Thrd, me global order h
an indirect relationship wim indvidual, a its inuence is mediated
mrough states. A relevant feature of mis indirecmes is that me globa
1 1 Blae (2002, p. 265), for instace, appreciates that exploitatve intertiona tmde
relations might be coercive. Se aso Sagiovani (2007, p. 21 ) ad Nal (2005, pp.
1 37- 1 39) for sttements of the apredaton tt Iimil relationships exist g0baly a
to in the stte.
1 2 The empirical disaalog between te stte ad the globa order ha been widely
discusso - both by sttr ad teir critic. A such, muc of what I say in tis se
tion rehee objections t have alrey ben m by others. In partcua, te four
point I discus here tht seek U show te uniquenes of te stte have been cnid
ered by Matthia Ris (2006, pp. 679-68 1) in whic he critdre Blake' s acout.
Oter critiques of srtism tat infrm my own ae Jo.hua Cohen ad Charles Sael
(2006), A J. Julius (2006), ad Aah Abizdeh (2007) .
1 1 4 Rca Nat
order dped crucially on state for bom coercive enforcement and goods
provision such tat me globa order's infuence on indvduals is reducible
to me inuence of individuals' own states and does not stad in need of
independent justicaton. The foum point concerns me unique domain
of indvidua' live over which me state regulates in comparison to mat of
the global order.
Turning to me frst claim, me global order is alleged to be a voluntary
asociation in conuat to me state, which i coercively imposed and colec
tively aumorized by al of its members. The releant diference beteen
the to domains, according to mis clam, relates to global order lacking
the me to compel individuals to obey (Blake, 2002, p. 265, 280, ad
293; Nagel, 2005, pp. 1 38- 1 40) . Unle state, global istitution do not
have sanction-based enforcement scheme (based eimer on fnancial sanc
tion or omer puitive meure) that have aumority over individuas.
Wim regads to international organztions l me United Nation and
the WO, mey rely on states for me domestic enforcement of meir
rules. 1 3 Oue to meir lack of coercive intrents, me globa order' s ipo
sition of any rules or reulations does not seem to require the same son of
jutifcation mat the state' s res do to meir members.
Wile it is uue that state voluntariy sign up to international agree
ments and have the formal option of eit, individuas with mose states
mat asent to mese organations are nonemeles non-voluntarily subject
to me terms that follow this initia sign_up. 1 4 The statist might respond
mat state have &eely signed up to orgaizations like me WO, wherea
individual have had no such choice in joining their state. But, mis point
i irrelevat a me statists do not rely on claim about me htoric origins
of me state a to whether the formation of ay given state asociation wa
volunry (Cohen and Sabel, 2006, pp. 1 57- 1 58). But, in a simil fah
ion, once a state has signed up to international organizations, it canot
uualy abadon it newfound intitutional commiuent wth ease be
caue me term of me relationship entered set up incentive strucrure that
make me cost of et increasingly higher for me state. A such, entire
13 To mae this point Nal says 'politc insti tutions ae diferent, hrue aerence
to tem is not voluty: Emigration aide, one is not perited to decla oneself not
a memhr of one' s socier and henc not subjeC tO its rue, ad other members my
coerce one' s cmpliace j one ties to rde. A inttuton tht one h a , no choice
abut joinin must of er ters of membership tat met a higher stndrd' (2005, p.
1 33) .
1 4 One might claim tt since indviduals ae represented by teir stes they do have
some say over teir subjetion to vaou global reatons. Tis ngt be the ce for
some indviduals, but a get nuhr of oters bot in undemocrtic stes or tose
whos interests ae underrepresented within democratic state, will h f. ce wit non
voluntary subjecron to globa rule,.
War u so Specia about Tc Stre? 1 1 5
populations and fne generations of individuas within states face term
dictated by the global order that defne rany of the options open co ther.
Once locked inco the terms of many globa asociations, citizens of srate
that volunr sign up co such agreements hardly have a meaningf exit
opton. There is still a diference bereen 'non-volutar' and 'coercive'
infuence - even if it i clear that te infuence of the global order is hardy
voluntary for individuals - and through the reraining points in this sec
tion I examine the relevance of this diference.
Turnig ten to the second claim, the srate is regarded as unique inso
f a it enables its members co live auconomou lives while the global
order lacks the role of being necesary for individuals' auconomy
preseration (Blake, 2002, p. 280; Sagiovanni, 2007, pp. 34-35) . 1 5 Due
co this role, citzen have a unique dependenc on their srate. Undoubt
edly, many state play an import role in the auconomy preseration of
their citizens. But, not all srate do SO. 1 6 For some individuals in srates that
are unahle co or choose not to provide the condtions for auconomy U
citizns, this cpacity is instead sometime made possible by the United
Nations, or through loans administered by the World Bak, or in some
caes through private means (Rsse, 2006, p. 68 1 ) . These obserations
reve that not only is it the cae that srates sometimes fail co provide their
citizns with conditions for autonomou eistence, but moreover there are
other bodes beides srates that can and do step in co fll this role. For this
dsanog co hold, the sratist rust be ahle co show that there is actly
something special about the specifc clas of autonomy-enahlg goods
that only state provide for their citizens, which wl be considered in the
fourth poit below. The general point, though, that srates eclusively pro
vide individuas wth the conditions for autonomous life seems patencly
fase.
According co the third claim, the globa domain does not trigger du
tes of egalitarian jutice because it is not direcdy imposed upon indvidu
als (Blae, 2002, p. 280; Nagel, 2005, pp. 1 39- 1 40; Sangiovani, 2007,
pp. 21 -22) . What is relevant about this indirectness is that the global order
depends upon state for both fnancial suppon and le enforcement, and
1 5 Blae says, 'Ony tbe stte U botb cercive of individuals ad requred fr indvidus
to live autonomou lives. Witout some sort of ste coercion, te vet aity to au
tonomouly purue ou project and plas sems impossible' (p. 280) . This objection
doe not apply tO Na's agment sinc he doe not draw on tbe stare's provision of
autonomy-enling goods for citilen.
16 Sagiovanni (2007, p. 4, 20, ad 2 1 ) mentons ocupie, wea, ad fJed stte
exceptions to his acount. He says, 'citirns ad resident, in al but te most eueme
ce, provide te fnacial ad sociologic support requre to sutan te State' (p.
20) .
1 1 6 Rca Nam
so wharever ir does O and for indivdua aroud me world is moughr O
be reducible U stare' actions. If me global order cannor coerce individuals
or provide mem wim baic goods wirhout me help of srare, men ir would
nor seem ro srand in need of independenr justifcation for me reasons mar
rhe srare doe.
To ases wemer rhe mediared narure of me relation mauers in de
rermning me boundarie of egalirrian jusrice, ir makes sense O consider
rhe rationale for me statisr claims mar coercion or basic good provision
rriger a special demand for j usrifction. Turning frsr O Blake's accounr,
rhe reason he minks rhat srate coercion stad in need of justifction is
thar it violates individus' au(Onomy. According O this rationae, how
ever, we should oppose subjection O global terms mar infinge au(Onomy
regardles of rheir medated and/or ucoercive narre (Rsse, 2006, p.
68 1 ) . 1 7 Ths is becuse one's au(Onomy may be reduced bor by indirecr
and drect forces thar have similar efects on reducing me reonable
choices avalable O an individual.
Lr us turn men O see how me co-aumorship arguenr deals wm me
facr of medation. Citizns' collective aumorization of meir state' s instiru
tional srture mrough meir compliance wim irs laws generates a claim
on beha of each citizen for jutifcation for mose specifc rerms. If she
fnd me state's ter U be unjustifed, men she ha a complainr aginst
her fellow citizns. By conrrasr, Nagel's poinr ahout me indirectnes of me
global order is rat i individuals have a complainr about me way mat
global rles infuence meir live men ir should be rargered O meir own
government. In such ces despite me enormous porenrial infuence of me
global order on individuas' lives, it is seen as up O states ultimarely O
conrrol the infuence upon meir own citizens rhar reults fom cross
border interaction. Any seemingly coercive global infuenc c, on rhis
view, b seen a a product of coercive state infuence since me stare h at
leasr some say in how open it is O rransnational inreraction. Aer all, srare
governments and indireccly their citizens give aumoriry O global rule,
ad i states ae unable O bring about me change in global rues thar rhe
desire men they are fee ro abandon mar particular instirutional commir
menr. Now, mis poinr is only plauible i we reard global organizations
like me wo and IMF as one mar c eaily be lef - but mis is not
17 Ryan Pevnick (2008, pp. 40609), in illuation of mis point, shows mat me two
mai n reons mat coercion is opposd ae for impeding autonomy ad epresing ds
repee. Bom of me<e objeconahle betors reut &om omer, non-cercive, behavior
mat shoud aso by me logic of me cercion agument give rise to me need for justif
ction. He discus es me ways in which state' policie (for instanees, regadng immi
gation or aeutural subsidie) C be shown to infringe me autonomy of foreigner,
ad aguably show dsrepe for memo
War u so Specia about tc Stre? 1 1 7
tme, a once state j oin these organization the costs of leavng are very
high. Moreover, the inuence of globa rles is not fly reducible U
one's own state's coercive enorcement. To eplain: atough the global
order may not have its own coercive apparatus ad must a a reult rely on
its member state' for domestic enforcement of its regulation, in addition
ofen state other than one's own use their internal mechanisms to enforce
global rules (like intellectual propeny rights or trde penalties) against
other state. In this way, through citizens' fnacial support of their respec
tive state ad compliance wit global rule, individuas world-wide do
collectively authoriz those terms that would not be perpetuated without
their support . l Through this authorization, according to Nagel's logic
they woud owe justifction for those terms to foreigners and compatrior
alike.
We can turn, then, to the relevance of Sangiovanni's claim about the
indirect nature of te global order's provision of baic goods. He notes
that the globa order cannot provide any good without working through
states. This has to do with both the lack of a giobaI coercive authority and
of an independent revenue-generating body (Sagiovanni, 2007, p. 21 ) .
Two points can be made i n reply. First, states' ability to provide citizens
with basic good depend on compliance with cern global res and
norms. These include res that ae ofen taken for granted but ae cer
tainly not natural or necesary fcts, like each state enjoyng sovereignty
over the natural resource in ir territory and being able to exercise fll
control over its borders thus dictating who may enter and under what
circumstances. These res, and global compliance with them contribute
greacly to enablig state to provide basic goods for their own citizens. A
state's very ability U provide its citizens with a stable property rights sys
tem depends on the global order' s prior recogni tion of what een cour a
that state's propeny. Second, setting aside this relationship of dependency
beteen states ad the globa order that is invere to the one claimed by
Sangiovanni, it is frthermore uncler why the global order's provsion of
18 eohen ad Sabel 2006, p. 1 68) forcefuly epress t poim foUows: 'Optng out
is not a real opton (te wo i a "te it or leave it" aragement, without even tbe
forma option of pickg ad coosing te part U cmply with), ad given that it is
not, ad tat everyone kows it i not, there i a diret rue-maing relationship b
teen the global bdie ad te cruns of diferent star'.
19 If we lok at real-world exple of indviduas' dissarsfaion with globa rue<, it
appars tat in some ce cirens have drected teir complnt U teir own gov
ernments whle i others individu have directed cmplant of fres at interna
tional inturon temselve. Conider reent Sout Kore proteSts upon te gOY
ernment to rejet impon freign bef (whic would violate wo rue) fr heth
and saety reons; i contt, the fou 1 999 Sette tde protets indicate tat in
dividus do see global institutions responsible to the.
1 1 8 Rca Nam
certain goods is dinished by it partial dependence on state. Even i the
enforcement of an international property rights system like the Trade
relared Aspects of International Property Righrs (TRPs) regime depended
on srare for fnancial suppor and legal implementaton, nonetheles new
forms of reciprocity-based good provision thar cross stare borders come
about rhrough ir. Throuh rheir compliace wirh global rule and through
rheir fnancial support tereof (even if both occur ar the stare level) , indi
viduls gain importanr baic goods from this activity thar depend in
on the cooperarion of both compatriots and foreigners.
A fn posited diference beteen rhe stre ad the global dorain
brings attention [0 the diferent domans of indviduals' live over which
each reguare. In particular, to excluive role of the srare are high
lighred: ( 1 ) it maintains a stable system of property holdings and entitle
ment (Blake, 2002, p. 28 1 ; Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 2W" ad (2) it pro
vide security from physica attack (IbM. , p. 1 9) . 21 With regard [0 both of
these domains, globa anaogues can be found. Intellecral property rights
are regulated internationally through rhe TRPs system; frthermore, the
' international reource privege' and ' internationa borrowing privilege'
repectively reognize those who seize government power (by whateer
means) a the rightl owners of the natural resource witn that state' s
terri[Ory, ad these individuals are able to borrow money on behalf of the
given state' s citizenry (Pogge 2002, pp. 1 1 3- 1 1 5) . Thee ae clear em
pie of global mie thar determine the distributive property holdings and
entidements of individus. Turnig to the claim rhar the state uniquely
protects its citizns againsr physical attack, we fmd counter-example of
tranational milirar alliance such as NATO mt Hl this role, a weil as
Unired Nation pece-keeping forces that protecr individuas from physi
cal harm in ces where their srare fl [0 do so. In defense of the statist
position, one mighr note that states ticaUy crry out these role for their
citizns, and their inuence in these domains is more peraive and pro
found m that of the global order. This ide, wh ich aserts that the dif
ference beteen the state and the globa order is a matter of degree rather
than a categorica dference, i not endorsed by any of te sratisrs whose
20 Blake ad Sangiovanni disagree on what about the ste system of property righL' and
entitlement mter. For Blake, it con natue a backed by pnaties is key,
wherea fr Sangiovani it i me fct tt cituns' cnributions suppn this auton
omy-enablng system. Se Saiovanni (2007, pp. \ 3- \ 4n0) for crtcism of Blake's
aoerton tht this domain of activity is excuively reulted by me Ste.
2 \ The point abut diferent domains of acivit is connected to me asrtion above that
only me state provide ciruns wim autonomy-enahling conditions. Yet, redesof
meir cnnecron wim autonomy, we C septely elline wheer these tpe of
goo ae provided only hy the stte.
Wat i '0 Specia about me Stte? 1 1 9
vie are under consideration.22 The points made above have challenged
me statists' empirical claims by showing mat global instantiations of me
df erent institutional relationships mouht to be unique to me state c
be located.
III. Chalenging the Statists' Normative Claims
In addition to me empirical challenges of me previou section, our ei
nation of me statists' arguments mut also consider whemer mey provide a
sound normative account of why eitarian concern obtains only among
individus Iinked in mese particular wy. A difcult mat appes to
confont all mree of me statist arguments conidered above rdate to how
mey establish me connection beteen me given instirutiona rdationship
and egalitarian dutie. Against aI of mese account, we might ak, 'Wy
does violating someone's autonomy, or collectivdy aumorizing a sytem of
coercion, or benefting from a system of baic goods provision give rise to
concern for inequalities among mose so connected?' The ft beteen mese
trigers and justifction via egalitarianism is not obvious, at least not ini
tially. My main tk in mis seetion is to understand how egalitarian duties
follow fom mee specifc trigers. I conclude that even i statist c mae
me cae mat me rdationship beteen citizens generates concern for equa
ity, mey fl to show mat onl mis rdationship doe so.
I will begin by considering why egaitaian duties are mought to apply
among mose bound by institutional coercion before rrning to me omer
trigers. Wt is moral y problematic about coercion is mat je violate me
autonomy of me coerced. According to me coercion argument associated
wm Blake, j ustifcation of me state's large-scale violation of its citizens'
autonomy requres mat mey enjoy egalitarian shares of some good. This
view requires some investigation into why egaitarianism would be me
appropriate response to me violation of individual' autonomy. Instead it
seems that eimer coercion is j ustifed by ' its results and rationale' or mat it
is simply unjuted. 2' T O expln mis point, we might mink O[ on me
one hand, frms of 'idel stte coercion' , in which me stte engages in
coercive practices mat c be jutifed by meir benefts for citizens. Exam
pIe include state laws regulating trafc violations or me criminaliztion of
asaut. In mat me good of safe trafc and lower crime rates sere me
22 See Rse (2006, pp. 683-89) for development of mis arguent.
23 See Pevnick (2008, pp. 402-403) on use of mi phrae. This and me rest of me discu
sion in mis pph closely daws on Pevnick's understading of ide ad non-ideal
state coerion - aso fraed a critque of the coercion arguent.
1 20 Rca Nam
publlc beneft, citizens should not regard their auto no my a unjuscly vio
lated by thee regulations - indeed, their autonomy is likely to be in
creased overal by such rule. On the other hand, 'non-idea state coercion'
refers to those coercive practices that can neither be justifed by their re
sults nor rationale. For instance, Penick provides an eple in which a
state government conscripts its citizens to fght in an unjust . Extend
ing egalitarian concern towards aI citizen would be a misguided form of
compenstion for this particu intance of autonomy-violation. Even
worse, a Pevnick sugests in this ce, egalitaiaism would seem to be a
bribe for forced participation in what is an unjustifed form of coerced
activity.
For most instances of state coercion, I think t point aout coercive
policie requring a buHt-in justifcation holds. Principle of egalitarian
justice are an iIIeitimate reponse to many of the diferent forms of coer
cion that the state could potentially eert upon its citizens. Distributive
egalitarianism simply canot jutif the autonomy infringement of such
things a unjust conscription, racist policies, or cmd and unusual
punishment. Conversely, egalitaian principles are unnecessar to j ustif
goods llke the state's tax-fnded provision of a heth-care sytem or pub
lic roads. If we focu jut on one nrow domain of state coercion - the
coercively imposed laws that determine property rights and enticements -
the coercion argument gains some plausibHity. In coercing individuas to
abide by a sytem that predictably controls the disuibution of benefts and
burdens among them, it makes sense that concern for ditributive jutice
obtains. The argument for egalitran shares, then, does not sere a a
justifcation of autonomy-violation generally, but inste to justif more
specifcal y the coercivdy enforced ditributive scheme by whic aI citi
zens must abide. In response to this way of understanding how the cI for
equality would folow from state coercion in this domain, it shoud be
noted tt there is nothing about coercion over the domain of disuibution
that stands in favor of any given sceme of disuibutive jutice. Coercive
reulation of this domain simply gives rise O the need O justif the reut
ing distributive pattern to those upon whom it is imposed, but plausibly
this justifcation can be cahed out in any number of w
y
. A such, the
paricular cal to e1iminate the infuence of morally arbitrary factors on
individuals' relative share requires an independent argument (which the
use of Rawls's original position provide, but we should note that it does
not folow direccly from coercion itself. In sum, then, the coercion argu
ment can b partially recued from Pevnick's worry about incoherency by
specifing that only a coerced sytem of property right and enticlements
mut be justifed to aI individuals who are epected at risk of penaty to
abide by it. But, as we c recal &om the points made in the frst and
Wat u so Specia about Ic Stte? 1 2 1
fourth objections IO the statists' empirica characterization of the globa
order above, we fnd te non-voluntary existence of a prapeny rights and
distributive enticlement scheme internationally IOo. Insofar as the efects
of this imposition ad the domain of activiry over which it regulates are
compaable to that of the state's such system, this understading of the
coerdon agument gives rise Io global dutie of egaitaian justice. More Io
the point, though, there is reaon Io doubt that the imposition of these
globa rules is simply non-voluntay rather than coerdve. Border contral is
backed by force, ad so i ownership of natural resource found wit a
state's territory. In response, one might note tat that the unique prapeny
of state coerdon is its enforcement by 3 le system that is accountable Io
those over wom it asures jurisdiction, wherea international properry
rights schemes ad immigrations rules are not enforced traugh ay such
lega system. 24 Thi line of argument leds Io the following perersiry seen
in Arash Abizadeh's (2007, p. 35 1 ) ironically posed explanation Io a for
eigner for why she ha no claims Io egalitarian justice upon us: 'We not
only coerce you, but we coerce you without subjecting our ongoing coer
don Io the contraints of a legal system ad the rule of law, and therefore
we have no responibilities of comparative distributive jutice Io you?5
Not only is it pererse to deny the unlawly coerced any justincation,
but it is moreover inconsistent wit te underlying rationae of concern
for autonomy-volation.
This point about perersir, athouh it ha so m been developed in
response Io Blake's accounr, aso highlght precisely what it problematic
about te normative premie of Nagel' s co-authorship accout. Excluding
foreigners from having a say in te conditions tat they are subjected to
bot by other state and global rue, i the very action that sere to justif
their frther excluion &om the scope of justifction (via egalitaian or
other dutie of justice) . In this way, the need for a justifcation of te
terms we play a role i imposing upon others depends entirely on the
eistence of formal lega intitutions tat regad bot us ad them a its
members. Yet, tese accounts make no attempt Io conider the prior issue
24 Blake (2002, p. 280n30) sug esrs mis point briefy in a foorote: He sys, me j ustiA
ction for ' me cerdve e"clusion of woud-be immigrnr [ . . . ] would be sigictly
dferent from tht ofered to a present member for me web of lega cerdon wimin
which sbe currently Hve. ' Se a Nagel (2005, pp. 1 29- 1 30), who write mat 'Im
migrton poHde< ae simply enrcd anst me nationas of omer sttes; me laws
ae not impsd in their nae'.
25 On mis pint aut me pcrersir of ecludng mose ml subjet tO lawfu cercion
from me scope of egata j uce, se Juliu (2006, pp. 1 79- 1 84) who argue mat
mis view en tt a ryrat owe les justiAcaton to mose he rule over ma doe a
leder who attempr to be acountable U his ctenr.
1 22 Rca Nat
of te conditions uder which bringing about such institutions ae neces
sar in virtue of te paticuar tyes of interacrion thar eisr aong the
concerned individuls. Insted, individus fom wdl-of countries main
tain mr tey owe no j utifcarion O worse-of foreigners becue tey
choose nor to crere the inrirutions necessa O give rise to such justifca
rion, ad ir is at the same time only in their power ro bring them abour.26
Ler u turn now ro the ce of the baic goods provision agumenr and
how ir atempts ro j usrif egalirarian duties. A wit te coercion and C
authorship argumenrs, the connection be[een the rrigger of reciprocity i
good provision ad the normative requiremenr of egairaiasm stad in
need of eplanarion. If I contribure ro the collective provision of baic
good for my comparriots, isn'r whar I am owed in return simply te en
joyment of tose same baic goods? Reciprocity, the normative ideal cen
tral to te baic goods provision argument, doe nor seem O frther re
quire mat all members of the srare ae owed egalitaian shares above and
beyond ech enjoying the baic goods provided by the srare (mar are made
posible by their joint contributions) . Take the cae of security from
physical arrack - which is a key good that Sangiovanni emphaizs is pro
vided onl by the stare. Al cirizens contribure through te C sysrem ro
support te stare provision of security; certainly, some individuls fre
beter t others within te srare, bur te facr thar every citizen enjoys
physicl security appes ro sere a sufcient justifcarion for each mem
bels contribution O the sysrem. To convincingly defend egairarian share
a a normative requement sremmig fom colective baic good provi
sion, someting more is needed. Such an eplanation for why reciprocity
requires egaliraian duties rather than jur te mut provision of the
sae baic goods for all cirizns is available. Yer, a I go on ro show, tis
eplanation comes ar the cost of sacrifcing the claim mr only the stare
gives rise ro this special rdationship. To udersrand how egalirarian claims
ae derived fom baic goods provision, we need ro think abour [o difer
ent apects of baic goods. In one repecr, enjoying phyica security ad
access to decem healt-care and education are valuale things in ad of
themsdve. In a second respect, enjoying thee goo h instrumental
value in enabling individuas ro achieve may oter end that would not
otherise be possible. The good of educarion, for example, endows its
holder with the ability ro paricipare in a comperitive work-force and ro
en a grerer income tha woud oterise be possible.
26 See Pevnick (2008, pp. 403-406) on the ide mat the ability to bring abut a giobaI
cercive autorit depehlmosdy on te willingness of weil-of state actors, and inso
fa it is in teir power tO blok te formation of such a authority the wore-of ae
doubly disadvated if we restrict claims ofj utce to corive domains.
Wat i '0 Specia about me Stte? 1 23
That me state's provision of basic goods for its citizens gives rise to
egalitarian duties draws on me second cpacity of mee goods - to enable
diferent relative gains beteen individuals - ramer m me frst capacity
in which ech citizen cn be sad to enjoy me goods for meir own sake. In
this way, weil-of citizens wimin me state acrly owe D0Mman just me
provision of baic goods to meir worse-of compatriots in me spirit of
reciprocity. The baic goods provided by me state - like a heam-care sys
tem, a stable property rights sytem, a system of education, a stable mar
ket, and a le order - enable al of its citizens to pursue meir goals and
fourish in ways mat would not be possible in me absence of mee good
(Sangiovanni, 2007, pp. 25-29) . A a reut, mose wim talent and omer
fvorable natura abilities are enabled to m higher returns man omers
in society. The ability of me talented to make comparative gains in me
market depends crucially on me contributions of al members of society in
providing mem, mrough meir government, wim mese importat basic
good. The underlying rationale for obligations of egalitarian j utice spe
cifcly is mat cooperation gives rise to j utifcation for me distribution of
benefts and burdens mat follow from it among al individuals subject to
me scheme.
Understanding why reciprocity in me context of mutual basic goods
provision triggers egalitarianism in mis way, however, makes it difcult to
maintain me cm mat me state is a unique contet of reciprocity. Recl,
Sangiovanni claims mat global inequality should not be considered prob
lematic insof a individua world-wide do not contribute to a common
institutiona stem mat provides baic goOd.
27
Yet, ws seems odd since
regardess of whemer global institutions provide baic goods, mey cenainly
provide a number of omer (non-baic) goods mat enable individuals to
mae ue of meir moraly abitrary characteristic. According to me ra
tionale of me baic goods account, me global provision of goods that allow
some to make greter returns man omers shoud give rise to egaitarian
claims on the pan of al those individuas world-wide who contribute to
maintaning mat system. Consider me following eple to demonstrate
t point. In me cae of a welmy Aerican CEO, the baic goods provi
sion argument cm tat he ha eitarian duties toward h worse-of
compatriot becuse wimout meir support of me state system he woud
not be able to achieve mee hgh levels of fnancial success. Asure fnher
that it c be shown that me CEO would not be able to amas such gret
weath were it not also for me enforcement of international intelectua
27 For me moment, we C st aide my sugestion to me contrar fm me lat section
ad tentativcly grat me empirica premise endorsd by Sagiovani t only sttes
provide individu wim baic god.
1 24 Rca Nat
property rights regulations and tade agreements mat allow hir access co
developing country mkets. Thu bor me contribution of his compatri
ot and of foreigners allow me CEO to make use of moraly arbirrary
characteristics in order to make relative moneta gains. A such, it proves
inconsistent co maintain that me CEO has egalitarian obligations only to
his compatriots insofar a the conditions that enable h relative benefts
depend on me compliance of members of h own state and of foreigners.
In bor domains, regardless of me provision of baic good, we stil fnd
the provision of some good mat allow me naturally wel-endowed co
secure higher returns man omers. Ir is true tat the globa order does not
in most caes direccly provide a nuber of intrinsicly valuble goods mat
are necessary co live an auconomous life, like me fflment of basic needs,
access U helth-cae, and a system of education. 2H Yet, me globa order
does provide a wide range of good that enable individus to mae use of
moral y abitary characteristics for personal gain. International regime
mat defne and seek co protect intellectual property rights ad trade regu
lations are good eples of such global public goods. Esentially, men,
for me normative claim of me baic goods provision argument co make
sense, it mut dop its focus on the provision of baic goods and instead
focu on mose goos mat enable diferentia benef. In doing so, however,
egalitarian duties cannot be retricted co me state.
Concusion
In mi paper, I have asessed me reons ofered in fvor of retricting me
scope of egalitarian concern co me state and have concluded that mis
scope restriction is unjusted on to independent grouds. First, wim
red co me statist' empirical claims, it has been shown mat me global
doman possese me features that are mought co be excluive co me state
and uniquely capable of trigering egaitarian concern. Second, I have
28 A in te cae of fale or we stte considered abve, ter ae import excptions
to tis rule. One interesting question that requires frer exmination concerns sttes
that (for whatever rean) beome unahle to provide teir ciins wit baic goods,
and whether ts vitiate citizen' prior egalitan cmmitments to one aoter.
Witout ofring a defri tive agument for this cnduion. it sems pervere that ine
quties in this circumce should be permi<ible among te member of te stte
who continue copelting wit one aother tough they ae unale to fully seue
mutual baic good provision. A frther puz lin questions concr te relationhip
beeen bodies (lie the United Nation) that sometmes provide individuas with ba
sic god when their stare ae unable to - doe tis reationship aso trger eg.itaia
dute<, ad i so aong whom?
Wat u so Specia about mc Stre? 1 25
argued that we have reason to doubt that the repective factors that gener
ate egalitarian concern. according to the arguments considered (fom coer
don. co-autorship. and baic goods provision) are acrl y able to show
U where. or only where. inequaty is problematic. I conclude. ten. that
we should reject te statist claim that the scope of egatian justice ought
to be lited to the state.
References
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1 26 Ra Nam
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On the Applicabilit of the Ideal of Eualit of
Opportunit at the Global Level
S
y
lvie Loriau
Introduction
Recent contributions in the feld of global justice have ro a large extent
been attempts ro determine whether, in vine of the profound changes
that have occured in the world over the lat decade, lohn Rawls's difer
ence principle should apply globally or not. Two specic and critical issues
in this debate have been 1 ) to specir why RawI views te baic strcture
of society a the primay subject of jutice (normative issue) and 2) U
establsh whether a baic stucte can be said ro eist at the globa level
(empiric isue), the underlying asumption being that the scope of the
diference principle is primarily a fnction of the scope of the baic strc
ture (Abizdeh, 2007) .
Surprisingly, however, compaatively litte atention ha been paid ro
anoter, paricuarly attractive global egalitaria principle: globa equaity
of opportity. In its most general form, this principle demands that
equally tented and motivated persons should have a rouhly equal
chance of attaining socia advantages, no matter the society ro which they
belong. Wen interpreted in a substantive way, it also requires that per
sons be given a fair chance of becoming talented and motivated, irrespec
tive of the society to which they belong. A such, it may be epected ro
have signifcant implications for human development and global inequal
it but insofar as it dsplays no special concern for the plight of the untal
ented or unmotivated, it may also be epected ro authorize inequities
more tan woud some other global egalitaria principle (e. g. , a gIobaI
diference principle) . The principle of global equlity of opportity has
therefore the apparent advantage of being considerably demadng, but
not roo demanding. Yet, the few attempts made U defend it have been
etemely cutious, sometmes even quite vague (Cey, 200 1 ; Mollen
dorf, 2002; Pogge, 1 994, pp. 1 96, 1 98, 22 1 -222), and no concluive
couterargents have been ofered U defeat the criticisms of its most
radcal opponents (Boxill, 1 987; Brock, 2005; Miller, 2005).
1 28 Syvc lorau
Admitedly, the principle of globa equality of opponnity c be at
tacked from variou angle. Some criticisms c be directed to te idel of
equality of opponnity as such. It c, for instace, be objected that
global equaity of opponnity - j ust as its domestic counterpart -
aounts to rewarding persons for characteristic that are to some degree
attributable to brte luck (namely, their talent and motivation) and there
fore morally arbitrary (Arneson, 1 989; Cohen, 1 989, pp. 9 1 6-9 1 7; Roe
mer, 1 998). On t view, which is sometimes called "responibility
sensitive egatarianism" or "Iuck egaitarianism", it is morally unaccept
able tat agent be a1lowed to beneft fom apccts of their person for
which they cannot be held reponsible. 1 Another worry concerns the im
plementation of a principle of (globa) equaity of opponity: if equal y
talented ad motivated persons ae to have an equ chance of attaining
given advantages, then it seems to folow that aI fctors that c afect the
development of their taents ad their wilngness to make efon must be
equaized, including the transmsion of an af ective, cognitive, cultural or
materia heritae through the fmily, the nation, the state or else.
(Chaet, 1 969; Fishkin, 1 983, pp. 44-82; Uoyd Thoma, 1 977; Rawls,
1 999, p. 6). Thi raise the question of whether equaity of opportuty
does not, by its very nature, jeopadize important personal and social
commitments, and i ye, whether this is morally permissible. Other criti
cisms are specifclly related to te global appliction of the ideal of equal
ity of opponnity. So it c be agued tat, insofr a persons are to some
atent responible for the political decisions made in their society a weil a
for the belief and values aticulated in its public culture, their member
ship of a particular society cnnot be seen as a moraly arbitray feature,
but should be aIowed to infuence the nate and atent of their opportu
nities (Miler, 2005, pp. 67-70) . Neutraizing the diferential efccts of
these political decisions, belief ad values on their opportuties would
amount to undermining te principles of politicl responsibility and na
tional self-determination. Finally, it c also be doubted whether the idea
of equaity of opponnity c m sense in such a cultually diverse
world as ours (Boxll, 1 987; Miler, 2005, pp. 59-64; Walzer, 1 983). The
Adew Maon dgishe becn two views of "equity of opporunity": 1) the
trditional idea of "avatage open to talent ad motivation", whic is the view !at
I will aopt in t paper, ad 2) what he c the "ncw" vic of equity of opportu
nity", which is a view supported by "responibility-senitive egaitaians" or "lud
egalitais" (Maon, 2001 ) . Tc man dilrence btween bth is !at the former is
merit-baed and hold that acess to advates mut depend on some "relevat" at
tribut, wheer or not people C be hdd responsible fr them, while te latter i de
sert-based and holds tat access to advats mut a r a possible depend on at
tribut fr which people C be hdd responsible.
On te Applicailit of te Idea of Euait of Opprit at tc Globa Leel 1 29
reon is that in order for opporrities to be equalized rhey must at leat
be comparable, and it might not be possible to compare rem where peo
pIe deeply dsagree on rhe meing and relative importance of particuar
socia advantae.
My aim in rs paper is not to develop a complete conception of
global equalit of opporty. To be sure, I will propose a specifc (com
petitive) principle of global equality of opporty - rhat i, a principle
whose agent, goal and obstacles are specifed. However, my primary con
cern wl be to show that some principle of global equaity of opporty
is cald fr given re design of re esting global economic order, can
make seme in a cultural y dverse world, ad can be moraUy accetabl if
supplemented wirh some orher moral principle. More specifcally, I wil
defend the folowing three cm:
1) We should not abandon egalitarian commiuent at rhe global
level, for doing so would aount to leaving the potentia urness of
globa market competitions unaddresed.
2a) A "moraUy arbitrar fatre o a person " is not necessaiy a "atre
fr which a person cannot be hel responibl", but is frst ad foremost a
fene rhat is of no relevance given rhe nature of rhe goal of rhe stipulated
opponnity. 2b) Insofr a rhe goal under consideration is to beneft from
the global economic order, it is reonable to hold rhat agents' talents and
motivation may, but rat reir membership of a particur society should
not, be allowed to af ect rheir chce of success.
3) Wen adequately specifed, a principle of global equality of oppor
tunity can (at let to a certain extent) avoid the charge rhat no standard
can be found for comparing opportunities across culture.
Clim 1 - We shoul not abandn egaltrn commitment at the global
lvel fr ding so woul amount t laving the potetial unfiress of global
market compettons unadressed.
In spite of its apparent simplicity, re stadard defnition of globa
equity of opportunit is too vague and indeterminate to be of ay sig
nifcant guidance. Ir hold rhat persons of similar talent and motivaton
should have a rougy equ chnce of attaining socia advantages, irre
spective of rhe societ to which rhey belong. Yet, it does not fnher spec
if rhe goal(s) to which it is directed (persons of similar talent and motiva
tion should have a roughly equal chance of doing, having or being what?),
nor does it tei u how re requirement of e
q
ulit wirh regard to opportu
nity sets is exaccly U be understood. A we will see in rhis section, this
requirement might be taen to men that all equally talented and moti
vated persons in rhe world shoud have idntical opporritie, or rhat
the should all have e
q
uivalnt opportunities (Miller, 2005).
1 30 Syvc Lorau
Accordng to te frst interpretation, gobal equaicy of opporrunicy
demands that equly taented and motivated persons should have eactl
the same opportuicy sets - mt is, an equa chance of attaining ecrly the
same bunde of advantage - no matter the sociecy to wrch tey belong.
In this vein, DarreI Moellendorf teis us, for instance, that "If equacy of
opporrnicy were reaized, a child growing up in rural Mozambique would
be statistcaly as likely a the child of a senior eecutive at a Swiss bank to
rech the position of the latter's parent" (Moellendorf, 2002, p. 49). If
what he h in mind are identical opporrunicy sets, ten he could just as
wei have claimed that "If equalicy of opporticy were realised, a child
growing up in Switerland woud be statistically as likely a the child of a
tribe's chief in rural Mozbique to rech the position of the latter's pa
ent". For saying that equly talented and motivated members of diferent
societies should have identical opporrunicy set is another way for saying
that they should have an equl chance of attaining exacdy te same set of
advantage, no matter how tese advantages are valued witin teir own
sociecy.
This requirement, however, is too strong to be ever fflled: the fact
that diferent societie endorse diferent value and scaes of value makes it
highy unkely that all equally talented and motivated persons in the
world could ever fnd it equally ey to atin the same bundle of advan
tage. A person's interets, apirations and behaviour ae to a large etent
shaped by - and evaluated in the light of - te "ethos" of her sociecy, tat
is, a specifc range of cutor, belef, understandings, shared eperiences,
etc. In order for her to be "succesfl", she will have to exhibit the sklls
and character traits that ae most valued withn her sociecy. So, if diferent
societies have a dif erent "ethos", then they will alo defne diferent stan
dd of success and so not al advantages valued and pursued in one soci
ety wl be valued and pursued in another sociecy. This is nicely ilusrrated
by Bernad Boxill: ''The bright girl in New York is inevitably going to
have better prospects of becoming a busines woman in New York tan
the equaly bright boy in Hindu sociecy; and he will have better prospects
than she of becoming a priest in his soiecy. Trs is only partly becue the
eduction needed to be a succes in business in New York is diferent
fom, and probably incompatible with, te education needed to be a priet
in Hindu sociecy. Even if schools ofering both educations existed in both
societies, the ethos of ech sociec would ensure that the inequicy re
mained" (Boxil, 1 987, pp. 1 48- 1 49) .
The second interpretation avoids this difculcy by somewhat relaxing
the requirement of equalicy. Globa equalicy of opporrunity is now a
sumed to demand that persons of similar talent and motivation be given
e
q
uly va/uab/e opporrunicy set - that is, an equal chance of attaining
On te Applicailit of te Idea of Euait of Opprit at tc Globa Leel 1 31
equally vauable (though diferent) bundle of advantages - whatever te
society to which they belong. This is te option favoured by Simon
Caney: "global equality of oppartnity requires that people of equal talent
have acces to positions of an equal stadard of livng ( . . . ) equlity of
oppartunity does not require equal opportunity to identical token it c
be met where people have equal opportity to positions of the se tpe"
(Caey, 2001 , p. 1 2 1 ) . More specincally, h strateg conists i reducing
opportnities to a common denominator of "baic cpailties" - Le. ,
capacities to fnction in cerain ways tat are deemed to be valued in al
culture - ad in specifing tat equally talented and motivated persons
enjoy equa opportnities when they have a equal chance of attaining
positions enabling a similar achievement of baic huma fctionings
(e.g. , being well-fed, being free from avoidble disee, beig educated,
taking part in the life of the community). Th alows hir to avoid the
difculty raised by Boxll, since it is in principle possible for members of
diferent societies - and in paticular, societies embodying a df erent ethos
- to enjoy an equivalent standard of living without their having an equal
chace, or even a chance, of attaining the same particuar advatage.
However, &om the moment "equ" opportuities are uderstood a
"equvalent" (instead of "identical") opportunitie, the quetion mut aise
of how to assess and compare the value of df erent opportnity sets. Here
aain, the magnitude of cutural diversity found at the global level might
be thought to represent a serious obstade. Ir might indeed be wondered
whether the fct that societies difer both with repect to the meing and
wth repect to the relative importace they attach to paticula basic hu
O fnctionings does not prevent U from compaing ad a friori
equaizing opportuties globally (Miller, 2005, pp. 60-64; Walzer, 1 995,
pp. 292-293) . What it meas, far instance, to be "educated" will vay
&om one society to aother: the one will pm the emphais on the devel
opment of intellect skils, while the other wll pay more attention to the
provision of a religiou intrction. Whether one society ca be said to
ofer its members a better opportunity to achiee ts baic huan fnc
tioning than another will depend on which understanding of "being edu
cated" is ren a the benchmark far compaison. The trouble is that,
when applied to a setting in which there are no common understadings
of ths baic hua fctioning, equlity of opportity requires that a
benchark for comparison be chosen ad t choice might aount to
arbitrarily fvouring the understadings shared in some societie over
those shed in other societes. This difculty is frther accentated when
we broaden the scope of comparison &om a single baic huma fnction
ing to a "standrd of living" a a whole. For to the difculty of nnding a
stdard of comparion for each opportunity separately there must be
1 32 Syvc lorau
added me difcuty of fnding a standad of comparison for an entire set
of opponnities, kowing mt diferent societies ao var wim respect to
me hierarchy mey establish among various baic huan fnctionings.
In view of me difculties fced by me uual interpretations of me
principle of global equality of opporrity, some have argued mat insted
of ttng to equaize opportunities global y, we shoud only see to it mat
some standard opponunities or cpabities are available to eeryone. So,
Gilian Brock has fcused on me provision of a "decent set of opportuni
ties", and more paricularly, on me remova of "barriers to developing a
rage of ski11s and capacities mt would be uefl no mater what goals
people set memsdve" (Brock, 2005, p. 350). Similarly, David Miller ha
taled of me satisfction of an "internationa decency standard" and has
ackowledged an obligation to hdp people who cannot engae in me
rage of core huan activities mat w fnd recurring across cultural y
varied societies (Miler, 2004, pp. 1 30- 1 3 1 ) . Wat meir approaches have
in common is a scepticism about me very meaning of global equity of
opportunity: equaizing opportunities mak sense only beteen agents
who share enough cutra understandings wim respect to me meaning
and rdative importance of paricular socia goods: yet, me requisite levd of
shared understandings is not to b found at me world levd. Therefore,
global equity op opporrunity should give way to global decency.
Yet, me giving up of global egalitaia cominents has a price. Ob
viously, a world in which decency standards are satisfed for al can stl be
characterizd by huge inequities of resource. By memselves, such ine
qualities need not be objectionable, but mey certainly become so if mey
translate into unfair (dis)advantages. A GA Cohen has pointed out, "a
person's efective share depends on what he c do wim what he has, and
mat depends not only on how much he ha but on what omers have and
on how what omers have is distibuted" (Cohen, 1 978, p. 252). Resources
are power; when mey are too unevenly disttibuted, they c cl into ques
tion me farness of institutiona processes and arangements. Th is ly
to happen in a globalized economy, where members of diferent societies
are competing against one anomer for me same advantages: meir chance
of success will lagdy depend on me amount and kind of resources made
available in meir respective society. Th is illusttated by me fo11owing to
obserations.
( 1 ) A f a globa economic negotiations are concerned, it c hardly
be denied mat gross inequaities of resource tend to translate into ine
qualities of bagaining power, which caue me interests of me monger
parties to be weighed much more heavily cn mose of weer parties,
mereby reinforcing initial inequaities (Beitz, 200 1 , pp. 1 07- 1 08).
On me Applieailit ofme Ide of Eualitof Opprit at me Global Leel 1 33
(2) Takig into consideration me kind and me level of educational re
sources avlable in wtern soieties, members of mese societies c be
epected to enjoy a better opponunity to attain positions mat require
superior training and inteleerual skills man members of developing socie
des. Yet, a remaked by me Human Develpment Ror 2005, " [s] uccess
in global makets depend increaingly on me development of industrial
capabilitie. In a knowlede-baed global economy cheap labour and ex
ports of primary commoditie or simple assembled goods are insufcient
to support rising living standards. Climbing me value chain depends on
maing me processe of adapting and of improving new techologies"
(United Nations Development Programme 2005, pp. 1 20- 1 2 1 ) .
Wat mese obserations sugest i mat gross global inequaities of re
sources ae likely to undermine me firness of globa market competitions:
members of wemy societie are likely to have a better opportunity to
beneft from me global economic order c members of poor societies.
Now, me frnes of competitions is at me het of what is called
"competitive equaity of opportunity". This te of equaity of opportu
nity applies to eisting competitions and maes meir frnes conditiona
upon me satisfction of me following [o requirerents: () sucs in me
competition must be determied by qualmcation, in accordance wim
relevat criteria, and (2) all competitors must have had a far chace of
becoming so qualifed. Tbe frst requirement is a requirerent of frl
firess: it is concerned wim me res governing a competition and de
mad me remova of mose lega or quai-le barriers which arbitrarily
prevent some aents from succeeding in me competition. The second
requirement, for its part, is a requirement of substntve fires: it is con
cerned wim competirors' starting positions and demads me redres of
those background disadvare whch abitraily prevent mer from ac
quiring me qualifcations mat predict success in me competition.
Now, nobody will deny mat today global makets exist, which fe
don a sites of competition for desirable socia and economic advantaes.
Ir belongs to me very esence of economic globaliztion that transnational
fow of goods, serices, cpita, technology and persons are fciltated in
order to encourage globa competition, and mereby incree economic
growh ad enhance huan welfare. But a in ay competition, mere will
be winners ad losers: some will enjoy me advantages at stae, while om
ers wl eimer not enjoy mem at al or only in a muc more limted way
than omers. What i needed, merefore, is a procedure tat teils us how to
disuibute me advatages ad burdens of economic globaliztion in a wy
that is far.
Accordig to competitive equality of opponunity, me fairnes of
global maket competitions is secured when no competitor is prevented
1 34 Syvc lorau
fom anning te advantages at stake becaue of moraly arbitra fctors.
From a formal point of view, the main concern wl be with the represen
tativeness of global economic mes. Because internationa tade areements
are to a large eent baed on the norm of strict reciprocity - according to
which the concesions made by each party should be of roughly equal
value -, those paties that have linie to ofer that is of interest to other
parties are Iikely to be given reiatively lnie voice in the negotiation process
(ad, for insrance, not to obtan liberalisation in the sectors that are most
imponant to them) . The chalenge wil be to see to it that parties' capacity
to infuence ad to beneft fom the globa economic mes is not impaired
by a lack of weath or powr. In the frst place, it wl b important to
suengten the bargaining skiIIs of the weer paie - Le. , their capacity
for understanding and anaying te negotiations tang place -, be it by
fcilitating their acces to top level education or by providing them with
qualifed personneI, having epertise in internationa trade law ad in
multilateral trading system. In the second place, it will aso prove nece
sa to provide weer parties with benefts that they cannot fly recipro
cate and to constrain the freedom of action of the stronger parties accord
ingly. In this conte, Etha Kpstein ha sugeted that gret powers
might exchange the principle of "suict" reciprocity for that of "dife"
reciprocity ad renounce some speci6c advatage now (e. g. , by efectively
integrating wer societies into the international trade regime) in order to
obtain some more general advantages in the fture (e. g. , the guaantee that
potentiay dissatisfed societies do not t to detabilize the global eco
nomic order) (Kapstein, 2006, pp. 3 1 -38) . Wether or not suonger par
ties may be expected to adopt a principle of "dife" reciprocity is a con
troversial issue, but the imponant point is that somethng I this
principle mut be at work if formal frness is to be achieved in te global
economic order. From a substantive point of view, competitive equalit of
opponnity is concerned with competitors' capacity to acquire the rele
vant quaifctions. A a1redy suggeted. inequaities in the cpacity to use
and to beneft fom te global marketlace c persist becaue of initial
inequaities in social and economic reources. The chalenge will be to see
to it that paicipants' capacity to develop ad exercise the talent that
predict success in the global economy is not impaired by a lack of such
reources. This, of course, is likely to involve masive invetment in hu
O development, trade-reiated inratrcrures and governance structures,
socia safety nets, tranings, etc.
Clim 2 - A "mo raly arbitrar fature 0/ a peron n i not necessarl a
"atre fr which a peron cannot be hel reonsibl" but i frt and fr
most a fatre that i o no relvance gve the nature 0/ the goal o the stpu
lted opportunit. Insofr G the goal untr consiraton i t benet fm the
On me Applieailit ofme Ide of Eualitof Opprit at me Global Leel 1 35
glbal economic ordr, i t i reaonable t hol that agent' tlt may, but
that their membehip 0/a parculr socet shoul not be alwed to afct
their chance 0/success.
At the core of any ide of equality of opponunity i the compeIling
intuition that access to socia advantages should not be governed by mor
ally arbitrary factors. Yet there is Iikdy to be disagreement about how
ectly the phrae "morally arbitrary fctor" should be understood. More
specifcly, to (closdy related) objections c be raised to the proposed
principle of global equalty of opponnity. On the one hand, it c be
claimed that one's membershp of a particular society i not a moral y
arbitrar fctor and tt persons should terefore not be compensated for
the global competitive disadvantages they may suf er a a result of their
being members of a particu society. On the other hand, it c be
claimed that talents are udeered and that they should terefore not be
allowed to afect persons' access to advantages, including their succes in
the global economy.
My answer to these objections wl proceed in to steps. In the frst
place, I wl argue tht, insofr as competitive equaity of opportunity is
concerned, whether an attribute of a person is to be considered moral y
arbitrary or not depends on the nature of the goal(s) at stake, and not on
the person's responsibility for possessing this atribute. In the second
place, I wl argue that, insofr a the goal at stake i to beneft from the
globa economic order, it is reasonable to hold tt persons' taents may,
but that teir membership of a particular society shoud not, be alowed to
afect their chance of success.
a) Morall arbitar fature and undsered fatres.
For global egaitarians Iike eaney and Moellendorf, te primary re
son wy a person's membership of a particu society is morally arbitrary
and thus not alowed to afect her access to advantages is tat it is und
sered. In keeping with the tradition of "responsibility-sensitive egaitarian
ism", tey assue that persons should be compensated for al those cir
cumstances for which they cannot be held responsible and which
negativdy afect their acces to advantages. What they add, or at let pre
suppose, is that persons are not reponsible for those apects of their soci
ety which impede their attainment of variou social and economic advan
tages.
But if this is their rationale for etending the idea of equality of op
portunity to the global levd, why do they keep talkng in terms of "equaly
talented and motivated persons"? Put another wy: if a feature of a person
is moraly arbitrary whenever it is undesered, why then should one's pos
session of talents, but not one's membership of a particular society, be
allowed to afect one' s acces to advantages? If Cey and Moelendorf
1 36 Syvc Lorau
wat to ground their principle of global equality of opportunity in the
tenets of "reponsibility-sensitive egaitarianm" they have no oter alter
native but to provide a argument to the efect that one's possession of
talents, unlike one's membership of a particuar society, is deered. This
may be done by arguing that te devdopment ad mantenace of taents
most ohen preuppose a certain aount of voluntay choice and efort,
and tat therefore, the distribution of taents is not a1ways or completdy
the result of a nata lottery (Green, 1 989, p. 14) . More particularly, it
might be pointed out that in such a comple and highly specialized world
economy a ours, it is very unlikdy that competitors will owe teir succes
only to teir possession of natural endowments, without having taen
some risks, made some sacrifce and spent a considerable amount of time
and energ. Ad if the talents needed for success in te global economy
mut for a !arge part b voluntarily acqured, then the "winners" of eco
nomic g1obalizton cnot be said to be benefting on moral y arbitrary
grounds.
But there are severa difcultie with this kind of argent. Firt, ex
accy the sae line of reaoning can b ued to support the opposite con
clusion. So it might be said that talents are aways to some degree the
product of fortunate circustance, and that therefore alowing them to
af ect te distribution of social and economic advantages aounts to re
warding people for fetres tat are not due to any credit on their par.
On this view, unequally talented persons could legitimatdy enjoy equa
access to social and economic advantages.
Scondy, there might also be some sense in which persons are repon
sible for the opportunties tat are available to them a a resut of their
bdonging to a paticuar society. So Miller ha aued that persons ae to
some degree responible not ooly for the political decision in which they
have a voice, but aso for the bdiefs and values aticuated in the public
cutue of their socier and tat they should therefore aso be hdd respon
sible for te impact of tese politca decisions, beliefs ad values on their
oppornites.
Third and more fndaentaly, it is quetionable whether persons'
"undesered fetes" ca so eily be equated with "moraly arbitray
fetres". There are indeed many cae in which undesered attributes like
nationality, age or gender may legitmatdy be alowed to inuence a per
son's chace of attaning some kind of advantages. In order, for instance,
to quif for a post of obstetrician in a hospita with a high proportion of
Muslim patients, applicants may be required to be female. The sae holds
for one' s talents and membership of a paticular society. So, having the
requisite physical skills for being a professional football player can hardy
be dicounted a a good reaon for being appointed in a nationa footbal
On me Applieailit ofme Ide of Eualitof Opprit at me Global Leel 1 37
team. Simily, being a French citen may be considered a neesary
condition for qualifing for me preidency of France. And conversely, we
rght consider mat a person's talents and membership of a particua
society are on bace desered, and stil deny mat mey should aways be
al owed to af ect her access to advantaes. So we might acknowledge mat a
young pupil ha developed, aer a lot of training and renunciations, an
eceptiona talent for moving her es, while at me sae time denying mat
she should merefore gain higer mk in rmematic. Or we rght be
lieve mat persons who have voluntarily acquired me Belgan nationaity
shoud not be treated diferency in me Belgian electora system man per
sons who did not choose to be born wim me Belgian nationaity.
This all suggests mat whemer some feature of a person should be con
sidered a morally abiuary feature and shoud mus not be al owed to af ect
her access to advataes depends on me nature of me advantaes at stake.
Or put anomer way: whemer a aent's lack of taents or membership of a
particular society shoud be considered an obstaele mat "must" be re
moved depends on me nature of me goal of me stipuated opportunity.
The net quetion is merefore: "Doe me nature of me goal of me oppor
tunity considered in mis paper - namely, to beneft from me global eco
nomic order -justi mat aents' chance of succes be a fnction of meir
talent, but not of meir membership of a particular society?"
b ) Tat and memberhip 0/ a parc/r societ
1 ) Saying mat me goa of me stipuated opportunity is to benet fom
me globa economic order is anomer way for saying mat its aents must
have a fair cance of "actvel paticipating" in mis order. The point is to
ensure mat all paticipants in me globa economic order cn conuibute in
a signifcant way to globa economic exchges and rep me benefts mat
fow fom meir contribution. Saying fmer mat me goal of me stipulated
oppornity is to beneft from the global economic orde amount to saying
mat its agents should have a fr chance of benefting fom a specifc set of
institutions, namely, existing global economic institutions. The focus is,
on me one hand, on "global economic" institutions and, on me omer
hand, on me form mt mee institutions "currencly" take. To be sure, me
working of domestic and non-economic institutions is also of interest to
me proposed principle of globa equaity of opportunity, but ony indi
reccly, insofar a mey are af ected by global econorc institutions and
insofar as mey have an impact on persons' efective paticipation in mese
institutions.
Ir is also worm emphasising mat me proposed principle of global
equality of opportity maes sense only where globa market competi
tions are tang place. It is becuse members of diferent societie are today
encouraged to compete for me sae socia and economic advantages and
1 38 Syvc lorau
because all panicipants in a competitive proces have an equal srdng a
such participant, mat egaitarian requrements of formal and substantive
firness are activated at me global levd. That is to say, me applicability of
me proposed principle of global equalty of opponnity i intinsical y
rdated to me current proces of economic globalization.
Economic globaliztion is a specic wy of organizing me world econ
omy: at its heart is me wilingness to remove barriers to me free movement
of goo, serices, persons and cpital, and to mereby encouage global
market competitions. Ir fnd its raion dee precisdy in me gains mat
mght resut fom me eploirtion of relative diferences in productive
reources (mat is, fom me exploitation of comparative advantages) on a
globa scae. Ir bdongs to its very nature mat mose who c suppon mar
ket presures by being more productive t others or by diferentiating
memsdves fom omers are also more likdy to be appreciated by me global
buying publc and to care for memselves a place wimin me globa econ
omy. Ir is merefore very ulikdy mat me posesion of talents like a sense
of entrepreneurship, good (oral and wrinen) communication skills (espe
cially in English), an innovative mind, matery of modern technology, etc.
mght be ranged among fctors not allowed to count in me determination
of persons' success in global market competitions.
Ir i irporrnt to note mat me proposed principle of global equalty of
opponnity applies to me eisting global economic order and aks what
mut be done in order for mis order - in me liberazed form it currently
takes - to be fair, or at leat firer; but it does not question me firness of
me choice of such a liberaized economic order itself.2 Put anomer way: i t
aks what mut be done in order for global market competitions to be fir,
but not whemer it is fir mat such competitions be promoted in me frst
place. Yet, success in competitions of t kind presupposes an array of
comple skills (e.g. , sophisticated literacy and mamematical skils, under
standing of comple legal and economic rule, matery of new technolo
gies like me internet, computer programmes, etc. ), wich some person
may be unable to acquire, even if efective meaures for improving me
formal and substantive firnes of mese competitions are implemente.
The proposed principle of global equality of opporrunity is mus no guar
antee aginst eclusion: it is compatible wm a considerable part of me
world population being denied active panicipation in global economic
echanges. This maner of Fct is al me more problematic mat wht de
termine a person's success in an economic order is not simply a fnction
of her talents, but is more fndamentally a fnction of how her talents are
2 On the choke of 2 dominat copcrative scheme a important quction of jutice,
S. Alen Buc ( 1 990) .
On te Applicailit of te Idea of Euait of Opprit at tc Globa Leel 1 39
valued wthin this order. In a comple knowledge-based world economy,
individuals ae excluded fom active participation who might be included
in a diferent economic setting.
Ir might therefore be wondered whether current global economic in
stttions - and in particuar, the rules that defme the current global eco
nomic ge - should not themselves be modifed so a to become more
inclusive. Asuming that all persons who paticipate in the globa economy
are to be treted a e
q
ul paricipants: should a just global economic order
not also aim at promoting and rewarding a "wider" rage of talents, that
is, tents that da not maximize the globa output? And would this re
quirement still be part of the ideal of equality of opporrunity or would it
rather epress independent mora consideratons, like for intance a can
cern for persons' life prospects a hU beings (instead of a concern for
their chance of succes in a given competition a competitors) ?
2) The second issue that needs to be invetigated is wheter a person's
membership of a particu society should be seen a a moral y arbitraty
fete. 5hould we not follow David Miller in admitting that persons are,
to same etent, responsible for the politca decisions made by their society
a weil as for the vaues and beliefs conveyed by its public culture, and that
the should terefore not be compensated for the worse opporrunities they
mght suf er a a result? On this account, trying U achieve globa equality
of opportuity would lead U undermning both the principle of political
reponsibility and the principle of national self-determination. Not only
would dometic societies not have to be the cost of their decisions (they
would in fact be compensated for teir "bad" choices), but they would also
be denied any control over their own fate, since te diferential efects of
their policy decisions on the opporrunitie of their members would have to
be sytematicaly neutralizd. 50 why, it might be aked, would it be ob
jectionable that persons have a unequal opportunity to succeed in the
global economy becue of their being members of diferent societies?
A frst thg to note is that Miller's line of argumentation, wit its fo
cus on (individual and political) responsibility, remans signifcancly
within the famework of luck egalitrianism. Yet, a we have seen, this
famework is problematic: a far a her membership of a paticuar society
is concerned, there is away a certain etent to which a person can be held
reponsible and a certain extent to which she cnot. And even if she
could, on baace, be held reponsible for her membership of a particuar
society, tis would stl not entil that c fact has relevance in any contet
whatsoever.
In a globalized economy, the prima criteria of succes include difer
entiation, efciency, innovation, entrepreneurship, and so forth. Wile
these talents c in principle be acquied by aent regardes of their na-
1 40 Syvc lorau
tionality or citenship, some societie may lack the resources necessary to
foster teir devdopment. Yet, just a it is unfair to deny agents form
access to global market competitions on the ground that their society lacks
bargaining power, so too is it uir to deny tem active paricipation in
these competitions on te ground tat their society lacks the resources
needed to provide tem with the necesary quaifcations. If their society
epresses the willingness to promote their incluion in the global econ
omy, then it should receive adequate assistance fom other societie. If
their society doe not express this wJgnes, then it might be up to other
societies to aford them the chce of acquiring the talents that predict
success in the global economy (by fcilitating access to their own educa
tiona system, for instance), a chance which they would remain free not to
seize.
Clim 3 - When ad
q
utl specied a prncpl o glbal e
q
ualit % p
pornit can (at least to a cerin etnt) avoid the chare that no stntrd
can be fund fr comparng oppornites acros cultures.
Ir is important to see how, in addition to addresing the potentia un
firness of the global economic order, the principle of globa equality of
opponnity proposed in this paper c aso escape (at let to a certain
etent) the problem of cross-cultura metric raised by Brock and by Miller.
A we have seen, Caney's interpretation of "equal opporties" in terms
of "an equivalent standard of Iiving" is problematic - not because the con
cept of "standard of Iiving" would b too subjective to aIow any compari
son (remember that he thinks of a person's "standad of Iiving" in tens of
her "baic capabiitie", that is, in ten of her capacities to fnction in
variou wy deemed to be obectvel valuable) , but because, given the
diferent meaning and importance given to a se baic human fnction
ing in diferent societies, it might not be possible to decide whether the
standard of Iiving to which members of diferent societies have access are
equivalent or not.
This "compaison" problem arise to a lesser extent with the proposed
principle of global equaity of opportunity. The frst thing to note is that
this principle is confned to one singl opporrunity. Ir i not concrned
wth persons' prospect for succes in li a human beings, but only with
their chance of success in a gven compettion a competitors. In paricular,
its goal is not, Iike in Caney, to attain an equivalent standard of Iiving, but
to beneft fom the cuerent process of economic globasation. Ir i satisfed
when aI those who participate in the global economic order are equal with
repect to ws single opportity, however unequal they may be with
respect to other opponunities. The fct that diferent societies will rank
opponnities diferently may therefore not be an insurmountable obstacle
to it iplementation.
On tc Applicailit of tc Ide of Euat of Opprit at tc Globa Leel 1 41
To be sure, me proposed principle of globa equaity of opportunity is
not completely indiferent to persons' standards of Iiving: me occaions
created by economic globaiztion for mose who seil meir labour, buy
goods and serices, develop idea and rase capita, are in me lat instace
occaions to advance meir welfae. However, the fact that me attainent
of me goal of a given opportunity is accompanied wim an incree in wel
fre doe not mae mis increase in welre me goa of me oppority.
Saying mat persons of similar talent and motivation must have an equal
chance of winning me Roland Garros tennis cournaent irrepective of
their nationality is not equivalent to saying mat persons of simi taent
and motivation must have a equal chance of advancing meir welfre
irrespective of meir nationality, even mough me winning of mis courna
ment is Iikely to be accompanied wim an advance in welre. The difer
ence lies in me Fct mat me opportunity to wn me Roland Garros tour
naent - jut a me opporrunity to beneft from me global economy - is
but one element of me broader opportit to advance one's welre, and
not even a necessary element a welfre might be increaed in omer way
to.
The second ming to note is mat me proposed principle of globa
equality of opportuity is Iimited not simply to one single opportunity,
but to one single secied opporrunity. Ir h aready been noted how
problematic it is to compare and G frtori to eualie an oppority
whose goal (e.g. , "to b educated") mens someming diferent in diferent
societies. But what about an opporrunity wose goa is "to beneft fom
the globa economic order"? Isn't it me case that je c aso be understood
in diferent way ad c merefore not be equaed at me globa level?
The principle of globa equality of opportunity proposed here tends to
avoid mis difcut by fing me mening of me opportunity under consid
eration, and in particular, by giving a defnite content to its goal. In doing
so, je tends co etablish a unique standard of compaison.
But of course, cis poses several difcuties. A frst difcuty concerns
the legitimacy of me chosen understading of me goal under considera
tion. By establishing what it mens "to beneft from me global economic
order", one runs me risk mat omer wormwhile understadings b over
shadowed. A second difculty concerns me desirability of me goa under
consideration. Once global equait of opportunity is conceived of in
term of a single specifed and mus identica opportunity, it is vnerable
to Boxll's objection mat "me emos of each society woud ensure mat me
inequality remained" . Even if mere is a areement on me content of its
goal. mere might still b broad disareement on whemer c goal is worth
pursuing: some societies might praise ad promote an active participation
in economic g1obaliztion. while omer societie might instil diferent.
1 42 Syvc Lorau
sometimes conflicting, apirations i their members. If so, some persons
might be prevented &om succeeding in the global economy because of
their belonging to a society, which inculctes tem wth "unfvourable"
kd of apirations. The proposed principle of global equality of oppor
tunity cannot but enta a homogeniztion of stadards of success and
ambitions.
By way of conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that the point of the
proposed principle of global equality of opponuity is not to prae free
trade, but to show that those who support free trade are by the same token
bound to undertake signifct global institutional reforms and redistribu
tive meure. f such, tis principle represents an imponat component
of global justice. Yet, it doe obviously not constitute the whole of global
justice. f indicated, it sufers from ro imponant limitations: not only
does it permit cenain forms of objectionale excluion, but it also has
difcuty accommodating cuta diferences. The moral acceptabiity of
its implementation wil therefore be a fnction of the room it alows for
the expression of independent moral considerations.
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Aainst Relational Views of Justice
ad Parenta Duties1
Giananco Pelegrino
Introduction
In the relm of morality, several kind of obligation and dutf are clearly
limited in thcir scope. Professional duties of phyicians, teachers, ad sol
diers are closely retricted to te agents playng these role. Moreover,
thee dutie are contingent on the agent's wl to perform her role, and on
the specifc occions in which she acts in her ofcia capacity. Hippo
cratic oats, for instance, may be considered 8 holding only intermit
tently. A surgeon in her holiday is not obliged to treat patients - een
thouh she is obliged to tret a suddenly broken leg, at leat if no other
physician is around. Lewise, obligations creted by promise bind pro
misers only. T O give a promise is a moral y relevant relation that not only
does limit the addresee of the connected obligation, but aso create the
obligation itself. Had no promise been made, no duty would have been
A (now) rmote aceor of this paer wa cmmented by Michde Bocchiol, Eter
KoIL, MicheIe Li, Sebato MaJuone ad Rfe Machet. That papr wa
preenred at te Workhop on Equal Repect held at te University of Genoa in De
cmher 2007 ad to the 10t Sympsium "Conrmpor PhUosophical Issues:
Truth, Juice, ad Beuty" at te University of Riek Elvio Baccaini, Bora Berie,
la C, Emuda Ca Sergio Cremachi, Ee Gaetti, Valeria Ouonelli,
ad Mau Pir rad vet insigtul ad acure questions and sug estions. A larer
verion wa dus in te Gradute ad F acu1ty Seminar of te PhD Progn in
Political Thet (us "Gudo Carli" Univerity of Rome), ad I benelte from
queon ad sugon fom Mrcello Di Paola, Volker Kaul, Domenico Melidoro,
A Singh, Daiele Satoro, ad Ivaa Trkuja Finaly, aother verion wa pre
sented at te confrenc "Global Jutice ad te Naton Stre", at the University of
Lisbon, where I recived helpful queions fom Daid Kofa, Ma Moore,
R Nath ad Kok Chor T an. I vet grateful to a1 of them ad deeply indebted
to teir sug estions. I aso wish to thak Michde Bocchiola rr sustatial eting of
this text ad Gabride De Ang rr may uful queion, comments ad sug e
tions concerng te present version. Responsibility for the views expres ed here is
only Mne, though.
2 From now onwards, "duty" ad "obligation" wil be ud a synonymou.
1 46 Gia&co PcUcgino
establshed. Another instance of Iimited obligations are parental duties. Ir
is uncontroversial that the dutie of cing fr children are Iited to teir
parents only.
A common account of tese duties and teir limits relies on what we
might cl a reltonal analysis. 3 The general ide is tt a) the limited
scope of certain duties originates in the morally relevant relations that link
the holders with their targets, and, hence, b) te duties themselve arise
from thee very relations (Schemer, 1 997, 2001 , 2004) . Thus, te caring
relationship Iinkng physician and patient, parents and chidren is bot
the source of the special dutie of medical practitioners and parents and
what estblishe their limits. Likewise, promising - regarded a a reltion -
both produce and limits te duty to keep the promise Geske, 2008, eh.
4). To put it shortly, those obligations are reltional or asociatve in kind.
In recent times, inspiration w taen fom the general notion of aso
ciative obligation in order to etablish and justit the Iimited scope of te
duties of egalitarian justice. The main ide in te so-caled reltionl ar
g
ment Jr the limit ofjutice is tt the requrements of justice are to be
considered a relational obligations: such requirements are connected wth
specifc relation among members of a political community, and their
lits coincide with te boundaries of the community. In particular, jus
tice is viewed as connected with relations obtaining within the boudarie
of state. Accordingly, the boundaies of states coincide with the limits of
obligations of jutice (Sangiovanni, 2007 provides a detailed decription of
this vie) . Nagel (2005) voiced tis sttist view of jutice in the cleret
way:
Ever state ha the boune and population it ha fr alsort of accidenta
and hstoric reons; but given tat it eercises sovereign power over it eiti
zens and in their nae, tose eitizens have a duty of justce toward one a
other through the legal, socia and economic institutions that sovereign power
maes possible. This duty is t; gm, and is not owed to eeryone in the
world, nor is an indirect consequence of any other duty that may be owed to
eeryone in the world, such a a duty of huity. Jutice is something w
owe through our shaed institutions ooy to those with whom we stnd in a
stong political rdation. Ir is, in the stndad terminology, an as odtve obli
gation. [ . . . ) Ir depends on positive rights that we do not have againt all other
person or groups, rgt that as only becaue we ae joined togeter with
crn other in a political society under strong centralized conta!. Ir is only
3 The relator aysis i amed aso at showing mat tose obligations objectively
agent-relative ones, not reducible to, ad with a cteris paibu prioril over, oter
knd of obligations (ese, 2008, chaps. 2 ad 3). Here, I will not ru on thee f
tu. However, to show tat the rdational aysis canot accunt fr the limit of
those oblitions might be the premise &om which to ague t a oter fatures of
those dute ae not acounted fr by this aalysis.
Anst Reltona Vi""of Jutiee ad Paenta Dutes 1 47
fom such a system. and fom our fellow members throuh its institutions.
that we ca clam a right D democracy. equl dtzenship. non
discrination. equaity of oppornity. ad the aelioraton though public
policy of unfrnes in the distbuton of sodal ad eonomic goods (pp.
1 2 1 . 1 26) '
-
In diferent versions of relational aguments. j utice ha been vewed a
connected with relations of cooperation. coercon. common resonibilit Jr.
or joint authorship of a shared soeia and lega sytem. and reciprocit the
larter interpreted in various way (Nagel. 2005; Tan, 2006; Julius. 2006;
Sagiovanni. 2007; Abizadeh. 2007) . Moreover. the diferent implictions
ensuing fom the fact that the releant relations may be voluntar or not.
benefeia or not to the partieipat have been discused Oulius. 2006;
Tan. 2006) . Typicaly. objections to thee relational arguents have con
cerned the specifc nature of the mentioned relations. and have anempted
to show eiter that those speeifc relations obtain global y or that j utice is
not connected to those relations in a way able to set limits to our duties of
justice.
Here. I take a partially diferent path. I a going to consider the gen
era argumentative scheme that is common to several relationa aguments
for the limit of egalitaria jutice. In oter words. I shal focus on the
relational analyis of the duties of j utice. without considering speeifc
issues about the nature of the relations that originate requirements of jus
tice.
Moreover. I a going to raise a diferent knd of objection to the rela
tional views of justice. I endorse both the preme (justice is somehow
connected with certain relations) ad the conclusion (our dutie of jutice
are Iimited in scope) of the relational argments. However, I shall show
that bot the premise and the conclusion mght be true even if there i no
correspondence beteen the limits of the dutie of justice and the bounda
ries of the corresponding relations. and indeed in certain caes duties of
justce hold even though te relevat relation doe not obtain. Accord
ingly. the relational anayis is false. at least if considered a a claim about
the liits of certn duties and teir sources i certan relevat relation. If
I a correct. the conclusion of this paper will be that jutice ad certain
relations are connected in signifct way. and that in certain cases our
dutie of jutice might be srrengthened by our involvement in those rela
tions. However. c doe not men that te limits of justice srricdy coin
eide with the boundaies of those relations. There indeed are signifcant
4 Ealitai j uce ha been vieo a 2 asoiatve duty by ,ever amhor! aong
ome. Tair ( 1 993). Maorick ( 1 982). Rawls ( 1 999). Dworkin (2000). Bla
(2001 ) .
1 48 Gia&.co PoUc:ino
caes in which such relations subsist wmout entailing duties of jutice,
and vice versa. Therefore, me relational anaysis cannot account for me
limits of our dutie of jutice.
In some now historical versions of reltional arguments for me limit
of justice, jutice is likened O parenmood. Edmund Burke advocated mis
view in its cleest form:
Parent may not be consenting to their mor relaton, but, consenting or
not, tey are bound to a long train of burdensome dutes towards those wth
wom tey have neer made a conventon of any son. Children are not con
senting to their relaton: but their relation, without their actu cnsent,
binds them to it dutes. [ . . . ] So, without ay stipuaton on ou ow pan, are
we boud by tat reltion called our countr. [ . . . ] The place that determines
our duty to our coutry is a social, civil reltion. [ . . . ] The place of ever D
determines bis duty (quoted in 5immons, 1 996, p. 247) .
This analogy h been recently revive by Nagel (2005), who claimed that
justice is contingent on me eistence of co-citizenship relations j ust 8
certain parental obligations are contingent on relations of parenmood:
Fuermore, though the obligaton of jutic ase 3 a resut of a speial re
lation, there i no obligation to enter into that relation with those to whom
W do not yet have it, thereby acquiring those obligatons toward tem. If we
fnd ourselves in suc a relation, then W must accpt the obligations, but we
do not have to seek them out, and may even tr to avoid incurring them, 3
wth other contingent obligations of a more personal kind: one de not hve
to marry and have chidren, fr eple (p. 1 2 1 ) .
Unfortunately, mis analogy i s f fom reinforcing me relational views of
justice, for even parental duties in some cases f t o behave 8 relational
obligations. Accordingly, wile possibly correct for some kinds of obliga
tions - such 8 pro mise, friendship and professional dutie -, me relational
analysi fls to accout for deeply entrenched intuitions concerning omer
sors of obligation - such 8 parenta duties and justice. Or at least this is
what I claim here.
The Relational Aa
y
sis
The argumentative pattern mat is common to many relational arguments
for me liits of jutice and parental duties might be speled OUt i me
following way. First, me following premises are posited:
A. Morall valuabl reltons. In normal lives, certai relations (such 8
mose bereen parents and children and ou relations tO our co-nationa)
be a distctive moral import.
Anst Reltona ViC of Jlstiee ad Paenta Dutes 1 49
B. Morall valuable reltons and connected obligations. Pa of the moral
signifcce of certain relations might be reized in, ad signifed by,
cenan connected obligations. Pa of me moral import of being a paent
lie in parental duties of care. Likewise, part of me moral signifcnce of
being a member of a political community might lie in egalitaria obliga
tions toward other members. On the other had, an understading of me
mora signifcce and vaue of certain relations may be required in order
to grasp me connected duties, or even in order to begin me specifcation
of mose dutie that is requested in paticular cases. No doubt, mis hap
pens in the cae of promises. To grap what a promise is amounts to un
derstanding me obligations connected to promising. Likeise, to appreci
ate me duties of friendhip is pan and parcel of uderstanding what
&iendship iso Possibly, even to understad me point of parenta duties,
one should grap me mora signifcance of parenmood. The sae may
hold for distributive justice and citizenship. Hence, justice ad parent
hood may share pat of me eplanatory ad justifcatory pattern of me
kind of obligations involved in promising, or of me duties of &iendship.
Thee premises might be assued a a ground to deny ay reductionist
view of me mora point of me relation mentioned in mem. Attempts U
reduce situations such as promising ad &iendship to non-relational facts
or premises (to wit, to facts or premises obtaining outside me relevant
relation) misinterpret their very nature, ad will possibly fil to properly
guide our behaviour. For instance, someone who take me point of friend
ship as entirel reducible to its instrument value risks to be inauthentic to
her friends, failing to behave as a &iend when this conduct is no longer
benefcial (Scanon, 1 998, pp. 88-90; Schefer, 200 1 , chap. 6; Tan,
2006) . These ati-reductionist claims hold also for co-citizenship ad
parenthood.
More positively, me above premises might be iterpreted a leding to
me following view about me connection beteen morally vauable rela
tions ad obligations:
C. The source clim. Certain mo rally valuable relations act a sources of me
conected obligations, at least because teir value is a source of resons to
act, or, to put it omerise, vauing mose relations is to have specia reasons
to act in a paticua way, i. e. , reaons to flfl certan relationa obligtions
(Scefer, 200 1 , 2004) .
The source claim is more ma a positive counterpart of me anti
reductionsr clams about moraly valuable relations. Arguably, it might be
the ce thar me signicace ad vaue of certain relations is a primitive
fctor, becuse it is not reducible to non-relational facts, even mough
mose relations ae not sources of reasons to comply wim certain obliga-
1 50 Gianfraco PcUcgino
tions. In other words, it might be that even though the moral value of
cenain relations is primitive, the connected obligations are roote in non
relational fcts. For instace, even though friendhip cnot be reduced to
the social beneft of the practice it reaze, the duties of fiendship bring
about social benefts and this might be the reon of their bindingness.
Be that a it may, the source clam makes a step fner, and asumes
that the premise A. and B. authorize U claim tat the morally valuable
relation act as sources of the connected obligations; accordingly, those
obligations ae reltonal one, and hence the canot be reduced to non
relational fctors. The source claim allows to set limits to relational obliga
tions only if it is interpreted in a specifc way. In particular, it should be
rearded a including the following claims:
Cl . Co-varaton. Moraly valuable relations co-vary with the connected
obligations: when the relation doe not hold or disappes, then the con
nected obligation vanishes as weil. The contrary also hold. Wen those
obligations are in force, then the connected relations obtain.
C2. Selced ad ressees. Moreover, since these co-variant obligations are
incumbent only upon the agents involved in the relevant relations, these
relations appear to be able to select the specifc addresees of the connected
obligations. In some caes, the same obligation is incumbent on both sides
(e.g. , the dutie of justice equally concern ay citizen involved in the co
citiznshp relation) , in other case only one side is obliged, even though
the other side ray be subject to a diferent but related obligation {parents
only have parental dutie, but sons and daughters have flial obligations} .
From Cl . ad C2. , the folowing conclusion on the limits of cenain knds
of obligation decend:
D. Limit 0/obligaton. Certain kind of obligation connected in various
ways with morally valuable relations are limited i their scope; in panicu
lar, the scope of the obligation co-extends with the scope of the relevant
relation.
Wen the above scheme is applied to justice and parental obligtion, a
reltonal ve of the obligations of j utice and parenthood is obtained.
According to this ve, obligations of j utice and parenthood have limits,
since they are contngent on the existence of certain mora relations and
addressed only to the people connected by those relations. If l am a pa
ent, I have duties toward my children, not towad others' of spring. The
limits of my parental relation - the fct that it embraces my childen and
me only - set the limits of my parental obligations. Duties of distributive
justice beteen co-nationals behave in the same way. The do not exist
independently of the releat relation of co-citizenship, and the hold
Ann Rdatona Vic of Juic< ad Paenta Dutes 1 5 1
only among co-citizns. Accordingly, mere is no such ming a global jus
tice.
In what follow. I am not going to deny me prerises A. and B., or me
conclusion D. To be rrue. I shall not reject even C., me source claim. I
merely argue mat c claim i fse, or egerated, i applied to justice
and parental obligations. That it might out to be a suitable account
of omer knd of obligation is not a possibility mat will be considered in
mis paper.
Notice mat rejecting me vie of jutice implied by me source claim
does not necesarily produce fl-fedged cosmopolitanism. Even mose
who argue for a double standard of justice (namely. global and social j u
tice) grant me fct that mere is some justice outside me State. Aso me
claim mat we hve milder duties of justice toward foreigners amount to a
denial mat me limit of jutice are set by state boundaries. Supponers of a
statist conception of justice typicaly claim mat we have no dutes ofjutice
whatoever toward foreigners. Some of mem (such a Nagel. 2005) allow
mat we have baic humanitarian duties. Thus, in arguing agaist c view
of justice, I am providing suppon to a cluster of diferent positions. rang
ing from absolute cosmopolitanim (a single standard of justice, in me do
mestic a weil as in me globa arena) to liberal theores ofjutice (to or
more standards of j utice, vg according to me contet) . By contrat, I
am denying a single specifc vie, namely sttum.
Aainst the Source Claim: Parenta Duties
The source claim mght have an initial plausibility. Aer al, it seems mat
in several ces many morally impont relations bom co-vary wim cer
tain obligations and select me proper addressees of me !ater. Plainly, mere
are parental duties when mere are parents. and parents are me obvious
holders of mose obligations.
However, notice mat me source view requires tt co-variance be
teen me source-relations and me conected obligations i wimout ecep
tion and bi-conditional. In omer word, me derivation of me limits of
cenain duties fom meir roots in morally impont relations i valid if
and only j mere are neimer cases where me relevant relations obtain but
me connected obligations do not hold, nor situtions were me relationa
obligations hold but me aleged source-relations are not in place. Better.
me relationa analyis assume mat mere are no ces of non-alignment
where bom me relations and me connected duties are clerly graped and
picked out. Accordingly, me bet, and siplest, objection agnst any
relational analyis of parental dutie and me obligation of justice i to
1 52 Gianfraco PcUcgino
menton ce in wich the required alignment of relations and obligations
fail to occur. Thi is a general objection to the aalysis, since it does not
rely on any peculiar conception of the relevant relations. Moreover, it
difer &om uual the aguments, since it doe not aim at showing either
that the relations conidered etend globally, and therefore certain duties
have a globaI scope, or that these relations and their allegedy correspond
ing duties are systematically disconnected. There are connectons beteen
cenan morally relevant relations and certain duties. Simply, those connec
tions do not behave a the source claim woud require.
I shall consider paenta dutie fust. Their limits seem to mismatch
paenthood in several imporrant sitations. For instance, there is no doubt
that cing attention is due to children below their lega age of majority,
but there ae no setded views eicer on what c require or on how this
duty evolves aer children have come of age. On the other hand, it is
clerly felt that some boundaies are in place to delimit thee oblgations.
Ir seems over-demanding to ak parents unlimited care towards their cil
dren, no matter their age. Plainly, there are limits on the self-sacrifce that
the ce for one's ofpring might justif - especial y for women. Now,
those limits do not sem U be accounted for by the preence of the rela
tion of parenthood. When they come in, there are no relevant chage in
the backround relation. In other words, when a point of hardship comes
where it seems sensible that a mocer is to be exempted from extreme
sacrifces in favour of her child, it is not the ce that her relaton wth te
ld ha changed in some way. That relation keeps it mora signifcance,
een though it no longer issues moral demads. A mother who avoids
etreme sacrifce in favour of her child doe not lose or ween her mor
ally signifcr relation with that child. The natual regret (and even de
spar) that could follow the decision not to sacrifce herself signals that te
relation is keeping its deep moral signifcce. Accordngly, the boundaies
of the relation do not overlap wich, and do not eplain, the boundaries of
the obligation.
Likewise, ir seer thar merely being i n the age of majority does not re
lieve parents of any obligtion to their of spring. Of course, it is not the
cae tt the dy afer their eighteenth binhday, children lose any right to
rely on their parents. Howeer, parental obligations should not be a
sumed a eternally bindig. There is a moment when a parent is righdy
eempted &om any frrher ce toward her adut sons ad daughters.
Stl, the moral signifcance of parenthood as a relaton, ad the relation
itself, cn be everlating. Very old paents might plausibly keep on fnding
their relations wich their adut sons ad daughters moraly signifct ad
valuable. Obviously enough, then, ar a given moment this moral signif
cace and thee relations are no longer souces of dut.
Ann Rdatona Vic of Juic< ad Paenta Dutes 1 53
These remarks show mat parenthood and parenta obligations ae not
perfectly a1igned. a me relationa aalyis asumed. Therefore. mis aaly
sis is inaccurate. at leat wim respect to parental obligations. Sometimes.
paenmood a a moraly signict relation co-occurs wim parental obli
gations; but c is not away me case. Accordingly. we do not have deci
sive grounds to clam mat parenmood a a rdation constitutes me norma
tive source of parenta obligations.
Aanst the Source Cla: Duties ofJustice
Some more complictions shoud be fced j one uies to address me sae
line of reftation to me relational analysis of distributive justice - at leat.
if (a i Na. 2005) justice is identifed wim disuibutive equaity or
socio-economic frness. a contrated to mere benefcence or humanita
ian dutie. Applied to justice. me rdational aaysis takes co-citizenship a
a relation mat co-vaies wim me demands of disuibutive equality. Nagd
supports rs cm mrough a complex daboration of me underlying a
sumptions of co-citizenship. Roughly. his idea is that each ad evet citi
zen is jointly aumor of. ad subject to. me legal sytem imposed on her
and her co-citizens. For c reason. each citizen is responsible towards her
fdlow citizens for any of me inequalitie ensuing from mis lega sytem.
Therefore. me demands of jutice (conceived of a requirement of equal
ity) bind citizens. ad ony mem. on account of meir mut rdation a
joint aumors and subjects of me legal ad political sytem mey live in
(Nagd. 2005. pp. 1 21 . 1 28- 1 30. 1 38. 1 40) . Ir seer. men. mat co
citizenshp a a rdation and me duties of ditributive justice are perfecty
a1igned. unlike paenmood and parenta obligations.
However. c view of jutice c b questioned a10ng me same Ines I
have followed i me ce of parenta obligations. Justice ad cocitizenship
ca be shown to diverge in some caes. A Frt ( 1 987) fouly
agued. conideration concerning equaity might be dismissed a irrde
vat. and substituted by standard focuing on absolute levds of provi
sions. Frt's mn contention is mat what is moraly importat. at
let in me cae of resource ad meir alocation. is not me rdative levd at
which ay individua is placed. but ramer her being beyond a given levd
of subsistence. Le . me led where indivdual baic interests and needs are
apty satisfed. Frt cl rs "me docuine of sufciency." and con
trats it wim resource egalitarim. In paticula. Frankfrt maintains
mat. due to its fcus on relative ad compaative leds of provision. egali
tarianism dangerouly distracts our concern fom me mora relece of
me absolute levels of satisfction of people's needs and interests (a wdl as
1 54 Gianfraco PcUcgino
&om the concepr tools required to appreciare tem) , ad cs is harm
flly "alienating", contributing as it does "to rhe moral disorientation ad
shallowness of our time" (Ibi. , pp. 22-24) .
Frankfrt claims aso tat in several caes equal distributions fail to ac
cout for the moral releace of cerrain thresholds of goods or asets in
people's life ad choices. In other words, cerrn good or achievements
become good, or morally relevant, beyond a given absolute threhold, ad
below te threhold no equal disrribution i able to guaantee the mora
value one could achiee by placing herself beyond rhar threshold. Indeed,
equal dirributions to people below the threshold can preent some indi
viduals &om achieving te threhold, withour benefting anybody else.
Accordingly, Frakfrt concludes, consideratons about equity fail to
track what is morally relevat in alternative choices among diferent op
tions i which people coud be placed below certain relevanr threholds of
allocated goods. In those caes, Frar clams, what is morally objec
tionable are not inequalities among individus, but rather the fact that
"rhose wth les have ro litle" (Ibi. , p. 32).
In his argument, Frakfrr cnsiders [o egalitarian claims applied to
the condition where evetone is below te threshold of sufcient provi
sions. He shows tt these seemingly plausible claims ae borh mistaen,
becuse eiraia distributions may led to various kinds of disaters.
The claims ae that "no one shoud have more than anyone eie" and tat
"no one should have more tha enough" (Ibi. , pp. 30-32) . Frankfrt's
general line of reasoning is tat egaitaria distributions, when unable to
raise each ad eery individua beyond the treshold, do nor produce ay
improvement, bur rather worsen te situation of some individua (those
placed ar levels that are not too inferior to the treshold, who lose the
resources apr to bring tem beyond te threshold) without improving the
stats of orhers (those being so far from te threhold thar any etra re
source does not constitute a improvement of their state) .
Moreover, when people are weil beyond rhe tehold of sufciency,
inequalities are not morally objectionable. Diferences in levels of re
source, i placed very hig over te level of sufciency, are not reistered
a mo rally chalenging in te common phenomenology therefore, equality
is nor a independent, or absolute, moral factor:
We tend to he quite umoved, afer a, by inequalites heteen me well-to
do and me rieh; our awarenes mat me former ae suhstatialy worse of
ma me later doe not disturh U morally at at. Ad if we helieve of some
person that hi Iife is richly ffling, mat he hisel is genunely rontent
wm his eonomic situaton, ad that he sufers no reentment or sorows
which more money rould asuge, we are not ordinarily muc intereted -
fom a moral point of view - in me quetion of how me aout of money he
Ann Rdatona Vic of Juic< ad Paenta Dutes 1 55
ha compares with te amounr possesed by othen. [ . . . ] The ft tht some
people have much les tha oters i mot1y undisturbing when it is de
tht they have plent (lbi . pp. 32-33) .
crc, rankn i attracttng Out attcnttOn tO mc mct matwc bcyOnd mc
mrcshOd Osumctcncy (hOwcVcr dchncd), cQuatztng mOVcs sccm nOt tO
bc rcQutrcd, Orat cast nOt mOra y rccVant. PccOrdtngy, ms Vtcw
tncudcs mc OOwtngcatms:
1. cOw thc mrcshOd O adcQuatc tVtng, cQuatzatOns arc mOr y
rcQutrcd tnsOar mcy rcgrcscnt substantt tmgrOVcmcnts tOwards mc
suhctcnt cVc, d much mOrcsO tmcy gcrmtt tOachtcVcsuctcncy.
2. Owccr, bcOw mc thrchOd, mtnOr cQuatttOns arc nOt rcQurO,
cOntrap tO what cga:tartans hOd, tndccd, mcy c asO bc mtschcVOus,
grcVcnttng tndVtduas tn cOsc grOxmtty tO mc mrchOd rOm achtcVng
suhctcncy.
3. cyOnd mc mrcshOd, any cQuaattOn ts mOry tnstgnuct.
crc, sha nOt cndOrsc rats Vtc cOmgctcy. n gattcuar,
wOud tkc tO caVc tdc hts cOntrOVcrsta tdca mat, belw the threshol.
mcrc arc cQuatzattOm matarc ctmcr untmgOrtt Or cVcn gcrntctOus rOm
mcmOra gOtntOVtcw t.c. catms 1. and2. abOVc. ndccd, ttsccmsmat
mcsccatmsarctndcgcndcnt rOm mc csscOntrOVcrsta gOtnt madc tn 3 .
abOutOur tnmttOns cOnccrntnggcOgcgaccdwc beon the threshol O
an adcQuatc smdatdOuVtng. nOmcrwOrds, I suggcst mat, cVcn mOugh
cQutty h an tndcgcndcnt mOra Vuc bcOw mc mrcshOd Oa dcccnt
tVtng, and mOrc sO amOng gcOgchaVtng]ut mc rcsOurcc Or mat tVtng,
tt mtght bc mc casc mat tt Osc tD rccVccwcB bcyOnd mc mrchOd.
hnd unaVOtdabc mc tntutOn accOrdtng tO whtch, tn a VcQ rtch sOctcty
whcrc abundancc Och grtma gOOd ts dtmcd acrOss mc whOc cttt-
zcnQ,cVcntwtm dthcrcnt cVcs OgOscstOn, astrtcdycgttartangOtcy
ts nOt mOry rcQu:rcd. t sccms mat manyknds Ocgttaram Or tn-
stancc, gcOgc suggOrttng grtnctgc smtar tO Kaws dhcrcncc grtnctgc
c acccgt mts wtmOut any grOtcst. Ottcc mat Pagc (2005) rcgards
mc `dhcrcncc bcmccn rtch d gOOr tn a rtch but un]ust sOctcty as
htghy arbttraty (g. 1 26) . crc, nOt dcnytng mts. stmgy
catng tht dthcrcncc bcmccn the reh an the lss rieh. but stl wei of
citis tna rtch but un]ust sOctcty arc nOt arbttrarytn matway. NOrcOVcr,
I cOntcnd that, tt i mc casc, mcn mc rcatOnaVtcwO]uttcc atcrs.
O bc tmc, mrcc Ob]ccttOns c bc ratscd agatnst mts tntuttOn. trst,
rankns argumcnt cOnccrns may cQutty O resourees. t abOut
cQutq OOmcr gOOds, such as sc-rcsgcct t sccms mat tn mOsc ccs
Our tnmtOns abOut mc rtch sOctcty arc nOt sO tndthcrcnt tO cQualty.
bccOnd, tt ts nOt sO ccar mat Kawstan ]uttcc cOnccrns mc zOttOn O
1 56 Giafaco PcUc:ino
gOOs. Or KaWs, ] uttcc ts mOrc gautby dcgtctcd a ar dcstgn d
r@uattOn Omc sytcm Obastc tnstttuttOns and nOrms mat makc aOca-
ttOn OgOOds tn ttsVartOus Orms (grOucttOn, cchangc, dtstrtbuttOn)
tc gacc. htrd, what abOut mc so-cacd gOstttOna gOOds tsccms mat
tnmtscc cQutqhas amOrc rObutrOc m rankmtacknOwO.
O dc wtm mcc Ob]ccttOns wOuld rcQutrc a Vcry Ong dtscusstOn.
Ormc grcscntgurgOscs, haVc mc OOwtnganswcrs. trst, tsc-rcsgcct
ts Onc Omc gOOds O bc cQutzcd, mts ratscs a grObcm cVcn Or a rca-
ttOna Vtcw O]usttcc. tdOcs nOtsccm matwc c tmttOu rcsgcct O Our
cOw ctttzcns Ony, and m( wc can rOOt rcsgcct tn mc rcattOn O CO
ctttzcnshtg. uman bcmgs as such ac wOrmy O rcsgcct. NOrcOVcr, rc-
sgcct rOm Omcrs ts Onc Omc mn cOndtttOns Or sc-rcsgcct ( Kaws,
1 999 g. 388 cmcd). PccOrdtngy, tn tmtttng my dscustOn Ony O
cQuttyOrcsOurcc, am rcytng On an sumgttOn mat ts sharO sO by
mc suggOncrs Oa rcattOna ayts OsOctO-ccOnOmtc]usttcc. t ts gau-
stbc O say, mcn, mat cQualtty OrcOurccs ts nOt strtcty rcQutrcd at ccr-
tatn cVcs abOVc mc mrcshOd, cVcn mOugh cQuatty Orcsgcct cOud bc
stt rcQutrcd. OwcVcr, mts dOcs nOt amOunt O an Ob]ccttOn O my ar-
gumcnt, stncc a cOmtdcrtng Ony cQuatq O rcOurccs, whtch ts mc
Ocus OrcattOnaVtC O]usttcc.
bccOnd, mc dsttncttOn bcmccn]usttcc a grObcm OaOcattOn and
]usttcc a rcQutrcmcnt tmgOscd On a bastc structmc dOc nOt sccm O
mttcr hcrc. rankns cOntcnttOn i mat mcrc arc sttuattOns whcrc mc
mOra stgnthccc OcQuatq adcs away, and at mc cnd Vantshc at a.
hts sccms tmc Or mc mO dhcrcnt cOnccgttOns OcQutq. LVcr a ccr-
tatn mrcshOd, mmcr ad]usmcnts Omc mstttuttOna arrangcmcntOmc
btcstmcturc sccm QuttcgOtntcss.
my, tn mc cc OgOstttOn gOOds whOsc cn]Oymcnt dcgcnds On
Our rcmttVc gOstttOn OggOscd O mc gOstttOn OOthcrs, sOmc cVc O
tncQuatq, tnstcad Ostrtct cQuatq, ts rcQutrcd O mc rOOm Or mcm.
PccOrdngy, a gOtcy whcrc sOmc mcQutttc arc Owcd, at t wc
bcyOnd mc mrcshOd Oa dccnt d cOmOrtabctc, sccms O bca ncccs-
sa stcg tn acknOwcdgtng mc rOc O gOstttOna goOds. Latm 3. tn
rankmns argumcnt, mcn, cannOt b cha cngcd tn mc nac O mc rcc-
Vcc OgOstttOna gOOds, ramcr, tts gautbttty i rctnOrccd i Onc wts
O mc rOOm Or mOscgOOds.
Ny tntcrcst hcrc cOnccrns mc cOnscQucnccs Omc Vanshtng Vauc O
cQutty bcyOnd mc mrcshOd Osumctcncy On a rcattOn Vtcw OsOct
]usttcc. t scc mat mc ctttzcns Oa rtch sOctcq, whOsc mcmbcrs arc a
bOnd mc cVc Osuhctcncy, ac S(i1 tnVOVcd tn mc rcattOn O L
ctttDnshtg mcnttOncd byPagc (2005). hcy arc bOm aumOrs Oand
sub]ccD O a cOmmOn cg sytcm, d mat sytcm brtngs Out ccrtatn
Anst Reltona Vi""of Jutiee ad Paenta Dutes 1 57
ncQutcs amOng thcm. PcVcrthccss, thc nmtOn cgrcsscd n rank-
mns t cam |ca 3. abOVc) hOds that cQuatOn mOVcs ac nOt
rcQurcd at mat cc O grOVsOns. hcrcOrc, thc gOwcr mat mc cO-
ctzcnshg rcatOn had tO gVc rsc tO rcQurcmcnts O]utcc sccms tO
Vanuh n ms cc. OwcVcr, i sO, a susgcOn cOmc n namcy, thatat
thOsc cVcs that wcrc cOscr tO thc thrcshOd rcQurcmcnts O]ustcc haVc
nOt bccn crcatcd by cO-ctzcnshg a rcatOn, sncc cVcn at thOsc cVcs
whcrc] utcc s nOt bmdngsuch a rcatOn Obtans and s unchangcd. hs
s cnOugh tO cast dOubD On thc sOucc cam. cn gcrcct cO-Varancc s
nOt Occutrng, t sccms that wc haVc nO dccsVc grOund tO sumc that
cO-ctzcnshg a rcatOn s thcsOutccOthc dcmands OsOcO-ccOnOmc
]ustcc. PccOrdngy, sO cOnccrnng sOca]ustcc thc rcatOnanayss s
naccuratc.
Conclusions: A Piece of Moral Geograph
y
hc mOr gcOgraghywc arc mcng i OlOws. |ustcc d garcnta Ob-
gatOnshaVc mD, but thOsc mD dO nOt OVcrag wth thc bOundarcs O
cO-ctzcnshg and garcnmOOd. n sOmcccsmOsc rcatOns hOd, but thc
ObgatOns dO nOt. crhags, cVcn thc rcVcrsc s truc. P gOsbc, but su
nOt dccsVc, rcOn tO bccVc that ths s thc cc i that garcnthOOd and
cO-ctzcnshg c strcngthcn thc rcsgOnsbty Or thcsc dutc, but n
sOmc ccs rcgOnsbty s transcrrcd tO Othcr mOra@cntswmOut any
cOnncctOn wth thc rccVant rcatOm. n cc O suddcn dth O bOth
garcnts, Or nstancc, thc suVng cmdtcn dO nOt ccc tO bcwOrthy O
carc. bmgy, thc rcgOnsbty O Othcr agcnts tOwads thcm ncrcc.
bOmctmcs, thc mcrc act O bcng grcscnt, Or ncaby, may shh thc rc-
sgOnsbutyOnanOthcr@cnt. P unccVngncabymaybcthc hOdcrO
thc mOst sttngcnt duty tO cc Or thOsc chdrcn. Lthcr rcatVcs may
haVc ncrngyOwcr cVcs OrcgOnsbty, dcgcndng On thcr ncrc-
ng dstcc wth rcsgcct tO bOth dcgrccs O knshg and gurcy gcO-
graghcadstancc.
n ms knd Ocascs, rcsgOnsbty sccms U ncrc ndcgcndcndy O
rcatOns. LOntrap tO what tmayaggcar, Our]udgmcnts OrcsgOnsbq
dO nOt bchaVc n a gurcy rcatOna way. ruc, wc crbc mc grcatcst
rcgOnsbty tO gacnts, and ths may d tO d that rcsgOnsbty s
cOnncctcd tO grOxmty and knshg. OwcVcr, grcVOuy sad, suddcn
dcath Ogacnts dOcs nOt crc thc duq t smgy shm rcsgOnsbty On
rcatVcs. Vcn n ms cc, t sccms that nrncss Wch c h cOn-
strucd as a rcatOn trggcrs rcgOnsbty, sncc a rcatVc nbysccms
tO bc mOrc rcsgOmbc man a dstant Onc. cVcrthccss, i thc rcatVc
1 58 Gia&co PcUcgino
Iiving nearby fil to comply with their dutie, distance doe not ecuse
oter potentia carers. Ever available adult may be demed responsible for
needy chidren, no matter her geographcal and biologicl stance. In this
cae, mere availbility or possibility might shi responsibilitie.
The same might hold for dutie of general benefcence and j utice. In
condition of (even partial) compliance, reponsibility may be graduated
according to certain relations, such a co-citizenship. Therefore, it seems
appropriate to held Itaia more responsible for jutice and benefcence in
Itay, Americans in \bP, ad so on. Nevertheless, if a genera fure to
fl those duties on behf of Itians obtans, other individuals abroad
my see teir levels of responsibility rapidly increaed. This i our situation
a Weterners with respect to justice ad benefcence in the Third World.
Therefore, the scope of parental obligation and dutie of jutice (Le. , their
addressees) is inuenced by certain relent relations, but tis infuence is
not m. Even people not involved in the relevant relations migt be
addressees of tese oblgations in certan ce (ad people involved mght
be fee from any of those duties in oter ces). Reponibility i a weil
infuenced by relations, becaue thee relations c suengthen it. Even in
this ce, however, this doe not mean mat cern relations c crete
responsibilitie on their own. In cae involving orphans, aylum-seekers,
and te like, mere nearness, and aso non-compliance, might shif respon
sibilitie in somehat unexpected wy. The claim mt parenthood and
co-citizenip a relation are te ony source of parenta obligations and
justice - Le. , te source claim mat is embedded in the relationa analysis of
parental obligations and justice requirements - i not able to account for
the above intuitions.
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Cosmopolitanism, Sovereignt
y
and Globa Justice
Regina Queiroz `
Introduction
In "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" ( 1 992, pp. 48-75) Pogge sutains
that a global order founded on sovereign states thwart the equal right to
justice of eery citizen, independenty of religious, linguistic, ethnic or
historical diference, wh ich ae morally irreleant in a cosmopolitan per
spective (Ibi. , p. 68) . Thu, it is necesary to reallcate te politica au
thority, that iso to e1iminate the prevalence of nation-states in the global
order. Th must be replaced by the equa mora consideration of indi
viduals, by the abandonment of the concentration of governmental au
thority, and by the institutionaiztion of globa justice
Despite te above mentioned theory of vertica dispersion of sover
eignty Poge doe not abandon the idea of global institutions to relize
economic jutice at a global level - the uavoidable concretization of that
justice results from the existence of those institutions - and to decide the
conficts beteen the diferent political units. Such dspersion does not
eclude the idea of a global state. The idea of global intitutions is not
surprising, for states privilege the interets of their compatriots, ad there
fore they will not be able, contraily to global institutions, to distribute
economic goods aong global citizen with fairnes and impatialty. The
ide of a world state is more unexpected, mainy becuse his theory of
dispersion of sovereignty trie to overcome the Westphalia international
order. In this order, among other characteristic, the world is divided into
sovereign states, wrch do not recognize any superior authority. The proc
ess of legislation, the solving of disputes and the law of coercion are
largely in the hands of the state ad recurring U force 8 a lt resort sol
ves the conficts among states. International laws do not ofer any minimal
guarantee to eliminate the primacy of state in the internatonal sphere.
Te presentation rt lie at the bi of te preent paper W made possible by the
Fundacao Pa a Cienca e a Tecnologia, Scolaship SFRH/BPD/2007.
1 62 Regina Queiro
However, amough Pogge's argumentation aims to overcome me interna
tiona order establhed by me Wetphaia Treaty I sustain that his refec
tion, seems to misuderstand me principle of sovereignty, and mat mis
misunderstanding c have devatating consequences simil to mose of
me Wetphalian order mat he rejects. Thus, I criticie his cosmopolitan
meory of a vertica dispersion of sovereignty and men I compare i t wim
Knt's cosmopolitan conception. Amough Knt's cosmopolitanism is not
related wim me disuibutive issues of globa justice, will tty to show mat
it seems more consitent m Pog's.
Despite mis criticism, I do not aim to give up me cosmopolitan ide
of globa jutice. The eistence of transnationa institutions and me crea
tion of a global markt do not aIow us to ignore me ditribution of eco
nomic goods, that is, me issue of global justice. However, me shif from a
world order baed on states to a globa one reconfgures me nature of po
litical institutions and require me stipulation of political principles, dif
ferent from political sovereignty in order to reaize me global justice ideal.
1 . Dispersion of soverei
g
t ad d
Globaliztion, characterized by deterritoriaization, interconnection and
multidimensionaity, moved ou attention fom dometic to globa. If
wimin me national arena we face not only diferent conceptions of dome
tic justice, but aso it rejection by conseratives and libertarians, aso
global justice has several interpretations. Aong mem a cosmopolitan
interpretation stads out, which claims globa principles of jutice - in
cludng huan rights, and individual cpabilities. Cosmopolrm
claims in paricular a) individuism: me fndamental politicl unt are
not fmilies, tribes, ethicities, cultue, commutie, nations or state,
but individus or persons; b) universality: me statu of mose units equally
refers to every human being and not only to aristocrats, Ars and
white; c) generality: mi statu h a global suength and it not only ap
plie to compatriots or inhabitants of me same region (Poge, 1 992, pp.
48-9) .
Even mough some supporters of socia domestic justice do not believe
mat primy goods must ony be disuibuted by me state, mey recognize
its important role in mat distribution (Cf Rawls, 1 971 ; Wazer, 1 983). At
a global level we do not have a consensu about me role of me state in me
disuibution of goods, not only becuse globalization h brought about a
reconfguration of state power, but also because cosmopolitans identif
individuals a me main units of moral and political concern, and disagree
Csmopolitaim, Sovcrcignr ad Global Jusc 1 63
abOut mc tmgOrtancc Othc statc and tts cOngcntta Quatty, sOVcrctgnty,
tn achtcVtnggOb]usttcc (cttz, 2005; ussbau, 2006; Oc, 1 992) .
Grosso mot sOVcrctgnty ts mc gOwcr O mc smtc tO mc dcctstOns
wtm uttmatc aumOrtty and, a t rcOrt, tO wagc (hOmgsOn,
1 995, g. 21 3) . btatcs arc dcmcd by mc cxtstcncc Oan anOnymOusgOttt-
c aggaratus Organtscd On mc bts OrOc tnstcad Obctng bOund ug
wtm mc gcrsOn O mc rucr, ac mrthcrmOrc charactcrtscd by sugrcmc
]urtsdtcttOn OVcr mctr tcrrttOp, by a mOnOgOy O cOcrctVc gOwcr d
cOntrO Omms OVtOcncc, by mc tntrOducttOn Oa stcadyarmydby
a nOn gcrsOna strucmrc OgOwcr, wtth nO rcgard tO sOurccs Ocgtttmacy
such as rctgtOn and grtVtcgcdgrOugs.
PccOrdtng tO Oc, sOVcrctgn statcs dtsgutc naturarcsOurcc Ong
thcmscVcs, bcausc tO gOsscss thcm ahccD mc dtstrtbuttOn OgOwcr tn
tntcrnattOna bagatntng (ccOnOmc and gOtttc), d bccausc mc mOst
gOwcrm sO try tO tntcrgOsc hOnttcrs bcmccn mcm and mc gOOrcst tn
Ordcr tO ctrcumVcnt mc duttc O]uttcc tOward tts cOmgatrtOts (Oggc,
1 992, gg. 70- 1 ) . bO, mc cstab:shmcnt OsOct gOtctc at a gOba cVc
tmgOsc thc rmOcattOn O gOtttca aumOrtty (IbM. , g. 62). hts mcans
thc cmtnattOn Omc grcdOmtncc OnattOn-statcs tn agOb Ordcr d
tts rcgaccmcnt by tndtVtduas, wc thcabandOnmcnt Othc cOnccn-
trattOn OgOVcrnmcn authOrtty, d cOnscQucnty thc tnstttuttOnaza-
ttOn OgOba ]usttcc.
hc dsgcrstOn O sOVcrctgnty ts OOwcd by mc sttgulattOn O thc
grtnctgc O gOstttVc tntcwcnttOn tn mc cc O mc VtOattOn O human
rtghts. Oc acccgts, tn mncttOn Omc grtnctgc Ochccks and banccs,
that ty untty ts tyrntca d OggrcsstVc wc wm aways haVc Othcr
whtchwt grOtcct mc Oggrcsscd and gubtctD mc abuscs and j ncccsay
hght agatnst mc OggrcssOrs (IbM, p. 63) . Owccr, mc sttguattOn Omc
grtnctgc O gOstttVc tntcwcnttOn tn mc cc O mc VtOattOn O human
rtghts ctmtnatc Onc Omc mOrc rccVt grtnctgc OmOdcrn sOVcrctgn
statc and ipso fcto mc grtnctgc mOnOgOy O VtOcncc, brOadcntng tO
gOtttca untts. ut, j mc sma gOttca untts abOVc mc statc haVc gOwcr
tO tntcwcnc, tO rcmtc mc nOn-dtVtstbttty and mc absOutc naturc Omctr
sOVcrctgnty dOcs nOt mgch us rOm aurtbuttng mcm thc statcs gOwcr
tO makcwar.
:
NOrcOVcr, nOt Ony ts mc grtnctgc OtcrrttOrta ] urtsdtcttOn
sO asOctatcd wtm thOsc untts, but asO thc attrtbuuOn O ctttzcnshtg
(IbM. , gg. 69-70) . hcrcOrc, mc Vcrttca dtsgcrstOn O sOVcrctgnty OVcr
gOttca untts mat hght Onc anOmcr Or mc tmgcmcntattOn O human
rtghts, cxtcnds cOnhtcD bcmccn statc tO mrmcr gOtttc utD, and dOcs
2 Te dspersion of sovereigr into I i tte unit doe not protec tem from tyrany
(C.brera 2005, p. 1 98) .
1 6 Regina Quciro
nOt dccrc mc tntcnstty O cOnhtcts acrOss hOnttcrs. buch dtsgcrstOn
mnhcrs thc dstrust Ong statcs, whtch ts cOmmOn tn thc ctghat
Ordcr. cn Oggc suts thc rtght OgOtttc utD tO tntcwcnc tn thc
tntcrna Mrs OOthcr gOtttca untts, that rt@t dctrOys thc rccOgnttOn
OgOtttc sOVcrctgnty, whtc, undcrstOOd thc uttmatc authOrtty, can
hatdybcVtOatcd bythctntcrcrcncc OOmcrstatc|s) wtmOut unaVOtdaby
dng tO armcd cOnhtct. hc rtght OgOttc untts tO tntcrcnc cads
tO dcVtattng cOnscQucncc such thc cstghaan Ordcr that Oggc
rc]ccts.
Oggcs thcOry cOud gOsstby aVOtd thts cOmcQucncc i hs rccrcncc
gOtntw nOt thc ctgha cOnccgttOn OtntcrnattOna Ordcr (tnsgtrcd
by LrOttus, as ussbaum hght@D) . hts ctabtshc a sOctcty Ostatcs,
y Onc Owhtch rcgccts sOmc gOuc grtnctgcs and cOnstdcrs Othcr
statcscQumOraandgOtttcaactOrs.
Vcn thOugh dts cOnccgttOnadmts thc cstcnccOtrans-statc mOr
grtnctgcs d sttguatc matstatc arcObtgcd tO OOwasystcmOnOrms
stmtwr tO thOsc aggtcd amOn_ tndVtduas tn a statc Onaturc, tt cstab-
tshcs that statcs and nOt gcrsOns arc cntttcd tO rt@D d duttc tn thc
tntcrnatOna sghcrc.PccOrdtng tO thts grtnctgc, thOsc statcs mutgtVcug
hghttng Or rcsOurcc and tcrrttOrtcs. bO, t thc rchccttOn abOut gOba
]usttcc tn :ght Othc cOncgttOn Othc mOr sOctctyOstatcsaOws us tO
cOncctVc thc ctstcncc O tntcrnattOna gOttca grtnctgcs cOmgattbc
wtth mc tdca OgOtttca sOVcrctgnty, tt dOcs nOt dmtntsh thc gOwcr O
thc statcs tn tts achtcVcmcnt. t ts nOt y tO subsumc mat rchcctOn by
thc cOsmOgOtt tdc d at thc samc ttmc tnsurc thc tmgarttattyOthc
dtstrtbuttOn OgOOd at agOb cVc.
2. World state ad globa injustice
csgttc thc act that Oggcdccnds thc dsgcrstOn OsOVcrctgnty h grO-
gOsa:
a) rccwcs statcs thcy arc rccrcncc mcasurcs OgOtttca untts bc-
Ow mc rcgtOns and mc wOrd and abOVc mc nctghbOurhOOd, ctty d
grOVtncc (Ibi. , g. 69) ;
b) scOmgattbcwtth thc crcattOn Occntracd mcchtsms mcant tO
sOVc that grObcms that cmcrgc bcmccn thc Oc and gOba cc such
mcchantsm dO nOt ccudc mc garttctgattOn OgcOgc tn thc grOccss O
dcctstOn mtng wtth rcgard tO grObcms that M cct cVcrybOdy, such as
ccOO@, d aOws Or sOVtng cOnHtcts bcmccn thc dtcrcnt gOtttca
untts (Ibi, g. 65);
C.smopolitim, Sovrignt ad Globa Jun 1 65
c) Does not give up on globa institutions to reaiz economie justice
at a global level and to dedde issues about me distribution of goods
among diferent politica units (Jbi. , p. 71 ) . The existence of globa prob
lems mat require me patidpation of every dten for a solution to be
found - would presuppose mee institutions bom in order to resolve con
fiets among local units ad in order to ensure me partidpation of every
human being in a sole global institutional scheme. Even if we had no
global institutions, me confiets resulting &om me fact mat me loca units
had me right to interene in cae of violation of human rights and me
divergences aong loca units about me globa distribution of economc
good woud require globa sovereign institutions, which woud men have
me right to deliberate on mese issue. Nevermeless, me vertica dpersion
of sovereignty ought to b understood in aogy wim me absolute and
indivisible sovereignty of me states, for me globa institutions still have me
fna aumority to dedde me issue of justice in diferent political unit.
Indeed, solving confiets of soda justiee depends on mose globa institu
tions.
d) FinaIy, me vertica dispersion does not necessarily imply me refsa
of me hypomesis of a worId democratic state. Despite me critica argu
ments aganst a world state (it woud not respect sodal and cutural diver
sity and alow for me coordination of politica units at diferent levels of
sovereignty) (Ibi. , p. 63) me hyomesis of dispersion of sovereignty
seems to presuppose that me acievement of global jutice doe not ex
c1ude me etence of an impartial worId state, which woud have me fna
authority to solve confiets concerning me distribution of economie goods
among me political uits. So, almough Pogge reftes me hypomesis of a
worId state, whose emergence coud only resut in a revolution or global
catatrophe (Ibi. , p. 63), b meory of dispersion of sovereignty does not
e1iminate mat possibility, whieh is justifed by me eistence of global
problems, such a ecologieal ones. In fct, when Pogge tries to j ustif me
need of me dispersion of sovereignty and mentions ecological problem
mat transcend me nationa &ontiers, he adds mat people ae not free to
choose to live in a unpolluted environment and are merefore prevented
fom saying what mey mink about mis question. In me current state
centrie model me environment is unilateraIy rled upon by nationa gov
ernment mrough inter-governmenta barganing deeply infuenced by
huge economie and miltary diferences. T O addres t issue Poge sus
rains that ecology must be replaced by democracy, mat is, by me right of
people to an institutional order which is afcted by political decisions and
in which people have equal opportunity to take infuence upon, eimer
directly or mrough repreentatives or delegate (Pogge, 1 992, pp. 63-64).
The reference to me worId state appes i n t context when Poge su-
1 66 Regina Quciro
tains that, if the right to political participation supports his model of insti
tutional dspersion, it also supports a greter autonomy in loeal issue, a it
happens in the majoriry of arent state ad coud also happen in a de
mocratic world state (IbM. , p. 64) . So, rs teory of dispersion of sover
eignry does not e1iminate that possibiiry, wrch is juted by the eis
tence of global problems and by the fact that a1 hwan beings live in a
single and global institutional scheme. The latter implies nowadays the
eistence of intitutions such a the territorial state, a system ad interna
tional diplomacy, and a globa market of capitals, goods ad serice (I
bM. , p. 5 1 ) .3 Athough Pogge maimas the polemieal idea tat a global
state is still a version of the Westphalian conception of the state (Poge,
1 992, p. 58) ad denie in his proposal the sovereignry of state, he still
safeuards its principle. Indeed, his sugetion forcibly leads to fguring
out a world state, however democratic, for in cae of conficts with regad
to te distibution of economic goods among the diferent sovereign levels
the claims rased by te divided and relatively sovereignry entitie would
require a fn authoriry. In other words, global institutions baed on the
checks and balances exercised by dferem political entitie canot impar
the right of each intitution to a fnal decision about poltie disputes.
The defence of te dispersion of sovereignry falls then victim of the ide
of a fna authoriry. Ir is not by chance that K, one of the greatet sup
porrers of te cosmopolitan idel, when conceiving a international rigt,
heitate in sepaating it from the sovereignry of state. Wen in Zum
eigen Friedn. Ein philosophicher EntwiK tie up the idea of a fee
federation with the right of peoples to a contract among states stipulating
coercive laws and a State of Peoples (civita gentum) (K, 1 796/96, B
35, 36) , he also recognizes the state' power to reject the ide of a world
republic (B, 37, 38) . K's politie realim leds to a pecefl federation
of state, in which the sovereign state, witout alienating their fnal au
thoriry, accept to panicipate in international federation, which allows
them to go out from transcend the state of nature. Contrarily to the idea
of a world republic, the peace federation does not locate the sovereignry in
a supra-state institution, but in the mutipliciry of sovereign state. The
cosmopolitaism of K renounces to a ideal stipulation (which at is
correct in thesi (IbM. , B 37) , that of a world republic, and defends a less
wanted solution, tat is more practical, te peacefl federation. This re
nunciation is baed on the preliminy principles to perpetua pece
3 Even if we didn't Mve 2 intitutiona global seme, tbe conAics r,ting from tbe
right to interene when we had tbe violation of human rights or divergence aout tbe
global ditrbuton of eonomic goo cm for sovereign global insttUtons, wit tbe
right to delbelte about tbese isues reported above.
C.smopolitaim, Sovcrcignr ad Globa Jusc 1 67
amOng thc btatcs, ts aumcd tn such as thc arttcc 2 and 4, whtch -
hrm, rcgccttVcy. PO tndcgcndcnt statc (. . . ) cOud bc acQurcd by an-
Omcr mrOugh tnhcrttancc, cxchangc, guchcOr dOnattOn and `PO btatc
shOud tntcrcnc by Orcc tn thc cOnstttutOn d gOVcrnmcnt O Othcr
btatc (Ibi. , , 6 c and 1 1 ) .
ants mOdc OcOsmOgOttantsm sccms mOrc cOnststcnt th Oggcs
nOt Ony bcuc tt bcttcr cuatc thc naturc O thc grtnctgc OsOVcr-
ctgnty and mc ctrcmtancc undcr whtch tt c b rccVant t. c. , tn mc
cOntcxt O a guaty O sOVcrctgn statcs but asO bcuc tt aVOtds thc
cOmcQucncc O Oggcs mOdc. n act, tn mc hamc O mc mcOry O
dtsgcrstOn OsOVcrctgnty thc hygOthcc Oa wOrd statc dOc nOt hndcr
thc cOnhOntattOn bcmccn mc dcmOcrattc statc and thc gOtttca untts that
tt h tO rulc On. bO, tsuch a dsgcrstOn admtts mc tncVttabttty OgOttt-
cacOnHtct by ctmtnatng thc suggOstttOn that thc wOrd statcwOud bc
gacmc Oggc cxg:ctty suggcsts (Ibi. , g. 63) thc sOuttOn Ound
tmgtcs dtsOttng thc cgtttmacy OVtOcncc tn a dcmOcrattcwOrdstatc,
wthOut ctmtnattng thc cOnHtct amOng sOVcrctgn tnstancc. J tn mc na-
mc O human rtghts, thc grtnctgc OntcwcnttOn ts cstabtshcd, mcn tt
sccms dmcult tO aVOtd a sgrcad Owar d VtOcncc. t sccms tkcwtsc
dtmcut that gOba tnsttuttOns may tc On thcmncttOnsOthc sOVcrctgn
statc wtthOut any tmttauOn Otts cOcrctVc Orcc. n thts cc, mc ctstcncc
Oa wOrd dcmOcratc statc dOc nOt tmgcdc that mc cOsmOgO:tan cOn-
ccgtOn Odtsgcrscd sOVcrctgnty gcrgctuatc thc sttuattOns that tt utc, tn
mct, tO ctmtnatc, Or thc gOba Ordcr wOuld tcnd tO dcgcncratc tntO a
statc Owar.
thc wOrd dcmOcrattc statc h nO mOnOgOy OVtOcncc, mc mct
that tt dOcnt cxtst Omcr stmta statc uansOrms tt tntO absOutc
statc.
gucss that Oggchghtghts thc tmgOrtancc Othc ganctgattOn Oct-
ttDns tn thc dctbcrattOn Oa gOba dcmOcrattc statc tn Ordcr tO sucst
that mc tyramtc charactcr Oa wOrd statc, acady sustancd by ht
( 1 793, P 278) , cOud bc OVcrrun by thc rattOna d mOra dctbcrattOn O
tts ctttzcns. hc way Oc dcgtcts thts statc cOud bc tnsgtrcd by mc
Kt tdca O mc kmgdOm O cnd. n ms kngdOm thc strcngth O
rOn cOud ctabtsh a gacmc d dcmOcrattc Ordcr. OwcVcr, t mts
h_Othcsts suggOsc an tmmcdtatc rcattOnsh:g bcmccn ctttzcns, tt wl
ctmtnatc mc nccd Oy tnsututtOn and gtVc ug thc ]usuhcattOn Oy
wOrd statc.
PccOrdtng tO Oc tO htndcr thc VtOattOn Ohum rtghts rcQutrcs
cOcrctOn. hts ts maybc mc rcOnwhy hccnVtsagcs awOrd statc bya-
Ogy wtth thc antan KtngdOm Ocnds. ut by cOnccdng sOVcrctgnty tO
matwOrd dcmOcratcstatc hcughOds a cOntradtctOry hstOrtca and Ogt-
1 68 Rcgina Quciro
ca conception of it. conrradictory becuse it presupposes recogni tion by
the other states. thus implying the plurality of states. Therefore. the ide of
a fma authority acknowledge the plurality of state's authorities. Even
though they can be in an eminent situation of , doe not imply the
refsal recogni tion of the sovereign right. een if violated. of other states.
In this cae. te states bargn. fght. and etablish contracts. This implies
that there i alo a dispersion of sovereignty not only in federa regime but
aso among diferent state. But when Poge defends that the disrribution
of economic goods is dependent on a globa institution. which can reallo
cate the resources beides the irrdevant fct of religion. Iguage. ethnic
ity. and history. Pogge exdudes the reuirement of inherent recognition of
the principle of sovereignty (Ibi. p. 68) .
Ir is de that in Pogge's refection the multiplicity of sovereign uts
rues out the udivded ad absolute sovereignty of a world state. Instead.
there seems to est reciproca recognition of authority among these units
and therefore an acknowledgement of the plurality of sovereign units.
However. on the one hand this establishment violates the principle of
equality among states. since such a kind of global institutiona order does
not instate equa units but diferent hierarchical levds of sovereignty. On
the other hand. even tough the global democratic state doe not have the
monopoly of violence. such a state would devdop into an absolute state.
This stands opposite to what happens in a Westphaian internationa or
der. in which states accept to negotiate teir externa sovereignty. fght and
sign contracts. Therefore. I c afrm that. at leat in teory. such a sy
tem ao foreees a dispersion of sovereignty among the diferent states.
This world state. f fom ensuring the concretiztion of global j utice.
can be dominated by particuar interets. which insted of aIowing the
decreae of economic and political inequaitie intensif oppression and
global injustice. The management of some international institutions such
as te IMF and the World Bank. eposed by the Nobd Prize. Stiglit
(2002) . gives enough empirica evidence.
I assume tat thee consequence resut from conceiving the globa or
der in terms of a principle of sovereignty. Therefore. I aso disagree with
Beit wen. in questioning the democracy of global institutions. he afrms
that te srrength of cosmopolitanism consist in it ability to quetion the
rationality of i nternational and rranslationa regime responsible by criteria
of politic j ustice simila to those applied to the state institutions (Beit.
2005. p. 25) . Independendy of whether or not democracy i an inrrinsic
quality of state. the ransnationa institutions cannot be understood by
anaog to the state. Indeed. a Bein recognizs. te globa order is organ
ised according to the same institutiona strcture of nation states. for the
latter is characterised by coercive institutions wit the capacity of tang
C.smopolitaim, Sovcrcignr ad Globa Jusc 1 69
gOtttca dcctstOns that tncudc thc rcOr@ttOn Omc dcctstOn maktng
grOccs and sOmc cOnstra:nD On thc gOwcr tO usc cgtttmatc VOcncc tO
cnOrcc gOtttca dcctstOns. Lontrary tO mat, mc gObal tnstttuttOn Ordcr
ts nOt cndOwcd wtm an cxccuttVc sOVcrctgn gOwcr, nOr dOcs tt haVc any
chccttVc cga Or gO:tt cagactty (IbM. , g. 24) . urmcrmOrc, transna-
ttOna gOtttcal tnstttuttOns cnOt bc undcrstOOd tn anaO@ U mc Ound-
tng and cOnsttutVc gOtttca grtnctgc Omc statcs, t . c. , sOVcrctgnty. crc
thcy cndOwcd wtm a sOVcrctgnty mus ar rcstrtctcd tO mc statcs, mcsc
tnsttuttOns wOud transOrm tntO sOVcrcgn, sc-tntcrcstcd cntttc, whtch
wOud mcrcOrc bc unablc tO makc dcctstOn On gOba grObcms wtm tm-
gantatty. n c rcsgcct wOuld draw attcnttOn tO mc argumcnts OLus
Labrcra n `hc LosmOgOttan mgcrattVc (2005) tn rclattOn tO mc tcn-
stOns bcwccn nOrms OsOVcrctgntyand mc mOra cOsmOgOttan aggrOach.
Labrcra rccOgntzc mat mc garttcuartsttc cthtc s OudattOn m act-
ghaltan systcm and tn mc systcm OmOra sOVcrctgnty (IbM, gg. 1 83 and
1 89).
OwcVcr, i Or Oc mc dcmOcrattc Qua:tyOa gOba btatc ts gran-
tcd by mc dctbcrattOn OgOba ctttzcns, mcn can tncr that ctttzcns arc
suggOscd tO hnd mcmcVc undcr a Vct OgOb tgnOrancc, Wtch c:mt-
natcs ccry gOtttca garttcuartsm tncudtng rctgtOn, anguagc and
nattOnatty wtm rcgard tO thc dc:bcrattOns mat gOVcrn gOb tnstttu-
ttOns. hts ts mc cOndtttOn Or mcm tO ruc tmgarttalysuch a wOrd dc-
mOcrattc statc.
Pccrthccs, mts t suggOstttOn ts Vcry cOntrOVcrsta, nOt Ony bc-
cauc ttc:mtnatc mc cOnstdcrattOn Omc gattcuartty Omc statcs, gcO-
gc, nattOns, cuturcs wc as OcVcry gOtttcal dtcrcncc, but alsO bc-
causc tt ts bcd On mc tndtVtdutsttc grcmtscs Ohts cmtca-tnstttuttOna
cOsmOgO:ttsm. hts sugcrgOsc mc rtght O tndtVtduas, Organ:zcd tn
tnsttmtOns, tO mcgOwcrOsOVcrctgn untts, amOn_whchwc c tncudc
mc statcs. hts sO gtVcs tndtVtduaL, ramcr m tnstttuttOns, ccntr tm-
gOrtancc tn dctbcrattOn. hc hrst mOra rcsgOnstbttty and thc t gOttt-
cchOtccarcbascdOn tndtVtdual gcrsOns (Oggc, 1 992, g. 64) .
O Ocus mc gOtttca dctbcrattOn On gcOgc whch dcnOtcs a rug-
turc wtm mc tmgcrsOnatty Ostatc tnstttuttOns sccms U dcgcnd On thc
httan tdca O mc kngdOm O cnd. mc tmgcrsOnaty, tn mOdcrn
gOtttc mOught, Omc sOVcrctgn, arttct gcrsOn, wtthOut y rcattOn-
sh:g tO tts gcrsOna btOgraghy ts dtsttngutshcd hOm thc gcrsOnatty O
gOwcr tn mc ktngdOm OmcNtddcfc, mcn mtnkng abOut mc gOba
cOmuntty thrOugh mc tdca Oa kngdOm Ocnds can cad tO wO cOn-
clutOns. Ln mc Onc hd ttsccm tO rctc mc gcrsOnal charactcrOmc
sOVcrctgn tn mcdtcVa agc, and On thc Omcr hd, cOntrary tO tnts tdca,
tt mtxcs ug cmtc and gOtttcal-]urdtca cgtsattOn. hc hrst ts tntcrna
1 70 Regina Queir
and c be reiated to a non-institutiona moral world, becaue its legisla
tion is "intimate". On me conua me second, related to a eterna
legislation, is transformed in politica institution, ad me performance of
its ofcials require impersonalit and imparialit. The impatiality of me
instittions mat Pogge depicts is dependent on me judgements of me
citizens. In omer words, men he is not only superposing me internal legis
lation to me external, but also defending a popula model of global sover
eignty. He fhermore determines me global order by me democratic
libera ides. In The Lw 0/Peopls Rawls presents categorica arguments
about me emical and poltic risks of me universalization of mose ideals
(Cf. Rawls, 1 999) .
Neermeless, despite me fct mat we do not have any frer clarifca
tion of me institutiona globa strcture, a is for exaple defended by
David Held in his project of global democracy,
4
Poge's refection about
me concept of sovereignty in
d
e context of his claim of global justice doe
not elimnate me institutional dimension. His meory is developed within
me fe of a emica-political cosmopolita perspective, in which he
asociates his political concern wim me emica one. If emics is referred to
a legisation, which, a Kt defended, obliges fro inteo, wimout any
need of institutionalisation, when we envisae a poltica perspective we
need to include me institutional dimension in me refection on global
justice. However, if me refection about global jutice is reduce to me
ethica interactionism or to pure cosmopolitanism, which attributes direct
responsibilty for me concretization of huma rights to me omers, indi
vidualy or collectively (Poge, 1 992, p. 50) , men such a cosmopolitan
clim is reduced to a vote of piet, wimout any politica consistencys.
Indeed, it lacks me institutions mat are able to endorse and enforce me
emical principle of global jutice. It is not by chace mat Poge's etca-
4 Te refrmation of te Secuity Council of the United Natons (0 give to the devel
oped countrie a meaingf voic ad a decve deciion cpacty); te creaton of a
second chaber U the UN (in accordc wit an ioternational cnsttutona con
venton); U deepen politcal regionali:ton (EU ad oter); the usage of uana
tional refrendums; cmpulsive juisdicton previou U Interationa Court; creation
of a new Cut to Huma Right; fundtion of a new eonomic coordinaton agenc
wit a regional, loca and global scpe ad elishment of an dfective intertional
milit amy (Cf Held, 1 995).
5 Beit highlight !t mor csmoplitnism i aostic about the cntent of politcal
global j utic becaue it i commiu neither fr nor agn the propositon that it
shoud have a global sovereign sate. It ha not an auoomatcaly interrence of cos
mopolitaism aout te csmoplit j ustifcton about te iostitutions (Beit
2005, p. 1 8) . Tis lack of cmmitment queon how we must awer this praccal
indetermintion (/bi. ) , ad igore that a global thet of j uce mut have a princi
pa concrn the defnition of the baic strcure of ioterationa socety (/bi. , p. 24) .
Csmopolitaim, Sovcrcignr ad Global Jusc 1 71
institutional refection on global jutice focues on me principle of sover
eignty. Thus, me fct that U move &om a international to a global order
afects immediatdy me faunding principle of modern state. This shows
that Pogges' s refection on global justice is right in associating me issue of
global justice to me politica1 conditions of global institutions.
Neverthdes, his cosmopolitan meory of sovereignty, presered i n me
&ae of its sepaation of power aong political ut, implie an inconsis
tent conception of sovereignty ad compromise Poge's aim. This incon
sistency is not a paicular characteristic of his sovereignty's meory, but it
epresse a deeper tension beteen cis principle and individuaistic cos
mopolitanism - me congenital particularism of sovereignty is not com
patible wm me uiversalism of moral and institutional cosmopolitanism.
Ir is mis incompatible principle mat renders Poge' s meory difcut to
accept, and leds to me impossibility of realizing me claim of global ju
tice.
Pogge's refection shows me lmits of a conception of a global and im
paial institution for me dstribution of economic goods, but suf ers at
me sae time &om the limits of a cosmopolita conception of sovereignty
contrary, for example, to me Ktian one. Even mough Kt doe not
include in hs refection questions of globa jutice, he sustains a cosmo
politan idel that doe not aienate me principle of state sovereignty (Kt,
1 795/96, 37, 38, 1 793, A, 278) .
Conclusion
Even mough Pogge' s meory of individualistic cosmopoltanm highly
problematic a far as sovereignty i concerned, mis does not me that we
must give up me ideal of global justice. Firsdy, I agree wim Poge mat we
already have a sole global institutional scheme, due to me existence of
trans national institutions such as me IFM, wo, W, U ad a world
maket. And, secondly, me current world fnancial crisis claims for global
solutions.
However, if we abandon the internationa state order, me conceptuali
ztion of this ideal presupposes me stipulation of a politica principle dif
ferent from politic1 sovereignty. Amough me progresive erosion of every
county's internal ad eernal sovereignty does not allow us to decide if
we have a cndidate to replace it or i me end of me state-centred order
will be founded on a single principle, it deign must be done in me emi
ca-institutional sphere. If in me tradition of Wolfand Vatell, so me cn-
1 72 Regina Queir
thinkers defend a mora society of states
6
, whose political orgaization
shoud i ntegrate the concern with the global order ad in which sover
eignt is not only limited to the domestic sphere, but also related to the
sphere of international relations. Tese sugestions do not eliminate the
pre-emnence of the interet of the citizens. In such a way they do not run
the risk of transforming the idel of global justice into a utopia, whch is
impoverishe, oppresive ad unir from an economic and political
standpoint.
References
Beitz, C. (2005): "Cosmopolitanism ad Globa }utce". Curnt Debatn in
G/ba/]uce. Brack. Gilia ad Darel Moellendorf (eds.) . Berln. Sprnger.
Pp. 1 1 -27.
Cabrra, L. (2005). "The Cosmopolit Imperatve: Global }utice rhraugh Ac
countble Inteation". Curnt Debats in Globa/]umce. Brock, GiUian ad
Darel MoeUendorf (eds.) Berlin. Sprnger. Pp. 1 71 - 1 99.
Held, D. ( 1 995). Democrac ant te GlobaI Ord". Frm the Modr StU t Cos
mopolitn Govaance. Cabridge. Polity.
Kt, I. ( [ 1 793] 1 968. ) "

ber der Gemeinspruch. Da m in der Theorie richtg

sein, taugt aber nicht rr die Prais". "Immanuel Kt Scn ZU Antro
pologie, Gechichtphilosophie, Politk und Pdagogk". Vol. 1 . lmmanuel
Knt Werkaugabe Bad X. We1m Weischedel (ed.) . Frankr 3 Ma.
Suhrkamp. Pp. 1 27- 1 72-
Kt, I. ( [ 1 795] 1 968) . "Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Ent.
"Immanuel Kt Schrien ZU Atropologie, Gechichtsphilosophie, Polit
ud Pdagog". Vol. 1 . lmmanuel Knt W"kugabe Band X. WUelm
Weischedel (ed.) . Fr 8 Main. Surkp. Pp. 1 95-25 1 .
Nussbau, M. C. (2006) . Frnter of]utc: Diabilit, Nationlit, Specks
Mebehi. Cambridge. M. Belknap Pres of Haard University Press.
Poge, T. ( 1 992) . "Cosmopolitanim and Sovereignty". Ethics. Vol. 1 03. No. 1 .
Pp. 48-75.
Rawls, }. ( 1 97 1 ). A Theor of]utc. Ord. Ord University Pres.
Rawls, }. ( 1 999). The Lw ofPeoples. Cabridge. M Haard University Pres.
Stglitz, }. E. (2002). G/ba/iaton ant it Dicontmt. New Vork. W. W. Noron
& Company. Inc.
6 Acording to Beiu te Mn ideal of a moraI societ of state: state ad not persns
the privUeged of rit ad duties; the srtes obliged U IUow a norative sys
tem aalogous U tat applied bereen the indvidual in te stte of nature; te equ
ir value is ept i a principle whic rqur that the oter stte treat the oten
equal moral person. (Bei!L, 205, p. 1 6) .
Cmopolitism, Sovrignt ad Global Jusc 1 73
Thompson, J. ( 1 995). "Srte Sovereignty i Intertional rdations: Bridging the
Gap Beteen Theory ad Empitc Reeach". Intetonal Stis Quar
t"l. Vol. 39. No. 2. Pp. 2 1 3-233.
Waer, M. ( 1 983). Spheres offutc. A Dence ofPluralism & Equit, Ord.
Blackell.
IH. On Knt & Rwls
On Knt's Aesthetic ad his Progressing Treatment
of Peace
Jae Garison
Introduction
Many reders fte on Kt' s ([ 1 795] 1 9 1 0) intriguingly ticed work To
ward Peretual Peace ad tae it to be his defnitive statement on geopo
litical teory. However, in that esay and hs !ater work, The Mhysic 0/
Moral ([ 1 797] 1 9 1 0) , Kant ofers to related, though substantively dif
ferent geopolitical ideas of peace. Both works include a notion of aree
ment, which hearkens back to Kt's notion of taste and its role in brid
ing te gap beteen subjective intuition ad objective ideals. The
vocabuary of tate and beuty that Kt develops in his Crt
q
ue 0/ Judg
ment ([ 1 790] 1 9 1 0) sheds light on his ethic and aesthetic ideas of peace,
both in teir points of convergence and divergence. Specicaly, Kant's
aethetic philosophy relates to peace tough its discussion of wheter
beutifl objects necesarily relate to human taste (as a matter of rety) or
if the connection is merely contingent (and tus idea) . For Kt ony the
!atter option cohere with tate, for it maintains tat the subject' s refec
tion on the artork is free and undetermined by caual strctures. By the
sae token, the nature of beauty cnot be determined and presumed rel
for all rationa aents prior to experience. Hence, matters of tate come
down to agreement and not formal demonstration. Th schema alows
fee autonomous subjects to converge ever indeterminately on a question
with objective force - what shoud other rational aents fnd beutifl?
With cis in mind, it appes strange tat Kant's later treatment of
simil issues of areement, subjective opinion, and objective cm in
Toward Peretl Peace argue contrarily that pece is a real end of na
tre's will. I believe tat, on some level, Kt trie to rectif this award
position by amending it to yers later in his Metphsics 0/ Moral. There
he argues for a rational ide of peace while avoiding any ca about em
pirically deducing its purposiveness. My position is tt these to discu
sions should not be seen a complimentar remarks on peace by Kant, but
rather a a fust attempt and a subsequent revision of his theory of peace.
1 78 Jaa Garson
From this perspective, I shal aalye the reults of t shif in Kant's
thinking by lookng at how an idea purposivenes of pece force hir to
subsequency deemphaiz the possibility of pece being genuinely perpet
u. A a result, it will be shown that Kant's work on peace relates very
strongly to his aethetic and mt perhaps Ktian geopolitic should be
red on those terms, if his revisions are to be ren seriously. This will ao
give a bais for evaluating contemporary post-Kantian politica philoso
phies in terms of how tey vaiouly incorporate Kant's aethetic and
theory in j udgments in teir diferent theories of peace and international
right.
Quarreling Over the Beautif
Judging beauty ha both subjective and objective apects. It is subjective
insofa a common experience shows that people c difer wildly in their
opinions of whether a given thing is beautif. On the other hand, every
day eperience not only shows tat there are some things mat many hu
m judge a beautif, but that there ae things that one shoul fnd
beutif, giving a normative, pseudo-objective force to claims about
beuty.
Kant eplains ts apparent contradiction through his notion of tate.
For hir, aesthetic experience, I eperience in general, stars with sensa
tion. Thee sensations are by necesity subjective, for tey are te subject's
immediate sensory information of the object in question. Thu, the sub
ject exists in special, private relation to the sensory impressions and ay
subsequent intuitions. This subjectivity, however, is mitigated by te ft
that aetetic judgments rest on an idea or archetye of beauty.
Here ideas properly refer to rational concepts (Kant [ 1 7901 1 9 1 0, p.
232) arising fom the objective conditions of eperience. Ide thus have
objective valdity even though tey lack objects. More precisely, they are
efects of reaon conditioned neither by the senible world' s cauaity, nor
by the form of understanding. A such, these idea escpe determinate
cognition, for they lack a appropriately determined object. However,
ide (Iden) c stil be thought indeterminately in terms of ideas (Ida
l), which only approximate the missing object of cognition (Ibi. , p.
232).
Consequency, beuty is an idel and refers to an unreachable maxi
mum state of sensible intution (idea) presented to the subject (Ibi. , p.
232) . Judgment of beuty therefore bridges subjectivity ad objectivity by
considering subjective toughts in terms of a objectively rel, though
On Kt' s Ahcc ad his Progrcsing T rcocnt of Pccc 1 79
indeterminate concept. A a result mere eists a basis for common dis
course and disagreement about mauers of beuty.
Judgment of beuty mus pairs objectivity wm indeterminacy, a1
while not minimizing me imponance of subjective experience. The objec
tive component of judgment explan why aesmetic involves a normative
component. There eists a rea, yet indeterminate concept of reason be
longing to a1 humans, which grounds aemetic eperience and give wa
rant to me view mat one oght to fnd a given artork beautif. However,
in me indeterminacy of me imaginative ide, mere aso ests me fc
space in minking mat a1lows for to rationa people to hold to diferent
opinions of an object's beauty.
Thus, me "shoud" in aesmetic, while weay objective, i not me
"shoud" of physical science, which says mat Occurrence absolutely
shoud foJow Occurrence A (al mings being equa) . Nor is me "should"
in question me "should" of moraity, for judgment in mat sphere involve
me practical faculty and not me imaginative. For K, bom of mese are
muers of "dspute [diputeren] " (Jbid. , p. 338), wich reaonable people
c settle by demonstrative proof. However, aesmetic judgment is similar
to claims from mese sphere in mat mere is a clim of objective validity.
Judgments of beuty mu may be mought of as intersubjective, since mey
tranmute private impresions into claims mat c and should have an
objective hold on a rational subjects.
This more or les is Kant's notion of tate, about which humas c
quarrel (steitn)
1
due to beuty's indeterminacy and me objective hold of
me ide on imaiation. Tate mu include wim it me possibility of
communiction ad me possibility of reolving aumentic disareements
on mauers mat involve a comunity of subject. If one abstract mese
apects of tste and judgement away from panicu appliction in me
sphere of beuty and an, it is quite e to see how mey have social ad
politica implications. Furmermore, j one takes up mese political conno
tations i me widest possible contet, it is e to see how mey c lead to
a meory of international relations. believe mat Kant does eaccy mis in
constructng his notion of peace, mereby giving his political minking a
aesmetic fourish.
However, before moving to consider Kant's notion of pece vis-a-vis
his work on aesmetic it is wonh minkng mrough me relation of human
ity to beauty in term of purpose. Doing so wl yield a vocbulary wim
which to assess me progress of pecef relations and investgate Kant' s
view on me inevitability of world pece. This wl show mat Kant's geopo-
Here quareling (meiten) i mct in dnction tO holdng proof-iven dputes
(dputeren) over mrter of scienc or monit.
1 80 Jaa Garson
Iitical ide is related to his idea of beuty and mat his progressing work
on peace can be red as a attempt to strengthen te anaog beteen the
to idea in teir formal characteristic.
The Puosiveness ofTate
T O understand how purpose works with taste and beuty, K looks at
whether or not the objective nature of taste concerns some re purpose
etant in nature or if its purposiveness (Zweckmigkeit) is ide in a way
that ha no necessay bearing on te cusal strcture of te sensible world.
This debate relate to an issue in the Crit
q
ue 0/Pure Reaon and its fnd
ing (Kt [ 1 787] 1 91 0, p. 366) that there are to apects of culity, one
which determines sequence in nature and one which orders tought for
fee, rationa beings. Considering beauty through the frst vieoint yields
the notion that nate ha a actual purpose agned wim huan judg
ment (Knt [ 1 790] 1 91 0, p. 347) . Meanwhile, lookng at it in terms of
me latter leds to me mesis mat judgments of beuty ae freely related to
objects in nature, which only concern one's refection on me object in
terms of me imaginative ide.
Accordig to me frst perspective, me natural patterns such a me
mmematica precision of etstalline stuctue (Jbid. , p. 348) or me aa
beque-Iike inticacy of a pheaants' plurage which people deer beautl
would b a matter of design (Ibid. , p. 347) . A a result, te fct mat phe
nomena like mese appeal to hU tate would be completely natra.
The subject's moughts woud mereby relate to apprehensions of beauty
necesarily, ad not contingently.
Kant, merefore, dismisses me frst option mat would reduce aetetic
judgment down to me level of occurrences in nature and me empiric
law of cause and efect. Such law ae determinate in chaacter and deny
me sort of genuine quarrel mat Kant sees a crucial for aesmetic experi
ence. If mis perspective were vald, it would be possible to have a science,
in me proper meaning of me term, of beauty, since objects could be clasi
fed a determinately wim regad to a concept, and not an ide, of beuty.
This woud mae it so mat one coud prove an object's beauty by showing
mat it beas me identing marks of te concept (Kant [ 1 787] 1 1 91 0, p.
477) . For Kant, beuty cannot annihilate me feedom of me subject, since
doing so would also determinately confne me imaination in a wy anti
metica to its autonomou natre. Beond mis, me reaist belief in peace' s
purposivenes ends up uncorortably nea in spirit to a physico
meologic proof of God (Ibid. , p. 41 4) , which Kant dismise a impossi
ble (Jbid, p. 41 9) . A a result, me absurdity of insisting on a rel purpose
On Knt's Acsthctia ad his Progrc,ing Trcncnt ofPcec 1 8 1
i n nature as regard taste shows ramer that its purpose must be ideal in
nature.
Toward Peretl Peace see K consider a meory of international
relations mat heavily trade upon the views advanced in his Crt
q
u of
Jugent. Toward Peretl Peace most notably borrows from his aesmet
ics in its attempt to reconcile competig claims in a commuity of moral
agent (here nation-states) a of whom are subject to an objective notion
of pece mat huanity will certainy achiee. However, me symetry
beteen me to works is lacking in certain apects. Accordgly, me les
bold tone and formal revision of pece in Kt's later work The Metaphys
ic ofMoral can be red as an attempt to remedy this lack of symetr.
Thus, Kt shifs his geopolitic to be in alnment wm his ametic me
ory.
A Ktian Framework for International Relations
Toward Peetal Peace begins by laying out a loosely-utopian frework
for international relations ad &ee trade. It precepts include a respect for
national sovereignty (Kt [ 1 795J 1 9 1 0 l . l and 1 . 5) described wim a
legal stricture (Ibid, p. 347) mat seems linked to respect for rational
aents a a matter of duty (Kt [ 1 785J 1 9 1 0, p. 428 & pp. 462-3) ;
[ 1 788J 1 91 0, p. 76) . The type of sovereign nation that interests Knt is a
republic one, which separate legislative power from eecutive (Knt
[ 1 795J 1 91 0, p. 352), becuse mis subjects citizens to law in accordance
wim the principles of freedom (Ibi. , pp. 349-50) that follow from "me
pure source of me concept of right" (Ibi. , p. 351 ) . One reon for his
endorsement of republicism wm respect to pece is that shaed interest
ad consent of a citizenry tends to curb impulse (Ibid. , p. 35 1 ) toward
what Knt (Ibi. , p. 348), echoing Hobbes, deers to be me natural state
ofwar.
International relation, however, are not like mose mat occu wimin
sovereign republics. Inside the contet of a nation, leg aumority deter
mne citizen action wm respect to me pure concept of right, mereby
mng me nation-state me conte for moral reoning. For Knt (Ibi. ,
p. 354), etending cis to me iternationa would contradictorily make "a
nation consisting of nations" ad requre a uniform moral/legal strcture
for all of humaity. Rmer, Kt (Ibi. , p. 354) holds that international
relations are best carried out via a federalism of nations subject to plural
aumoritie opposed to martial inclination.
This suggests three conclusions. Firsdy, international relations, since
mey lack a republica form like sovereign nations, do not similarly follow
1 82 Jaa Gar.on
solely fom me pure concept of right, if at all. Secondly, international
relations concern paties wose quarrels (steitn) may be mediated and
not panies whose disputes ae determined by a single legal source (dis
tieen) . Thirdy ad fnally, t federalism, like beuty, is a merely "ade
quate" idea (Idal (K [ 1 790
f
1 91 0, p. 232) , insofar as Kant beliees it
to be a negative surrogate to me positive ide (Ide) of an all-encompassing
nation (Kant [ 1 795] 1 1 91 0, p. 357) .
2
At frst glance mis vocbular links
vet direccly wim me notion of tate mat Kat ly out in his clier Cr
t'ue o/Judgent.
The Idea of Peretua Peace
The similarity to, ad eventual departure from, me tenet of tate intro
duced in The Crit'ue 0/Judent become all me more strikng as Kant
trasitions into explaning me acr idea of perpetua peace. Peace is a
ide (Ida) of practical reson, which does not est in me sensible world
ad its cusa stlUcture, but is ramer a matrer of autonomous reaon (Kant
[ 1 788
f
1 91 0, p. 43). The rationa idea of pece conceptualizes nature a
a achetype mat is subject to practic reon's moral law ramer man
phyicl cusality (Ibi. , p. 43). Thu me idea of peace fnishes a deter
mining ground for me wl (Ibi. , p. 43), which alrational agents she a
a formal ecte (Ibi. , p. 43), ad wich refers to an imagined world to
taUy shaped by good will.
The idea correpondent to me idea of perperal pece is one of pub
lidinternationa right, which, while not conforming to me idea of interna
tional pece, does addess me rights of sovereign nation states wim com
plex historie rooted in me phenomena world. According to Kant mis
ide should direct international relations towads a federa strcture a
discussed caclier. Ir is worm askng mouh, what is me narure of mis pro
gress towad diplomacy? What, i aything, would drive huanity to
wads a state of pece, especially if its strting point is a Hobbeian state of
nature? Would such progress be borne of idea ad rational autonomy or
instead does a drive toward a state of peace relly est a a necesary end
of me nata world?
This line of questioning coincides wim me dilemma mat Kant con
fonts in h Crit
q
ue 0/ Judgent concerning me purposiveness of beuty.
There Kant put forard mat beuty's purposivenes is not to be found i n
2 It i imprt to note !at Kt view. te idea of suc a worldwide ntion posible
if approached trough meur (non revolutoru) action (Kt, [ 1 795) 1 9 1 0, p.
357).
On Kt's Acsthctia ad his Progrc,ing Trcncnt ofPccc 1 83
the empirical world, a if nane were designed so as ro aouse huma
sentiments. Rather, beauty's puposiveness reides in a idea of the imagi
nation and the &ee play of unconditioned thinking. Thu, if international
right is Iike beauty in its relation of private interest ro public quarrel, it roo
should be indeterminate in its purposivenes.
However, Toward Peretl Peace leads to a opposite concluion.
(K [ 1 790] 1 91 0, p. 360) identine peace a sometg guaranteed by
nature's will, "whose mechanica course iIIuminates puposivenes
[Zweckmigkeit] , " which is directed rowad globa hamony. Kant, (IbM. ,
pp. 362-3) , in a long footnote, distances this perspectve &om a belief in
Providence a predetermination, which would make unwarated assump
tions about God's will. In a footnote Knt (IbM. , p. 363) make it clear
that appeals to the wl of nane ae efective only in grounding human
striving toward the good, and not a pat of any explanarory schema. In
any case, c footnote shows that Kt (IbM. , p. 363) believes that a tele
ology of pece is a genune component of nature, whch higights a major
diference beteen the idels of beuty and of international right.
For Kant (IbM. , pp. 365-6) the progres of humaity &om a general
state of war to one of pece is guaranteed by nature becue proximity U
others ad a natural inclination ro self-preseration bid humaity ro estab
Iish legal relations and engage in free trade, independent of mora reaon
ing. Rather than the dictate of pure moraty leading ro peace, Kat
(IbM. , pp. 366-7) believes that it is nature which nullines opposig drive
and necesarily led ro a concept of international right prevailing over
time.
However, nature does keep humaity apart in ways that preclude one
nation &om adjudicating for a, Iike a one-world government. Kt be
Iieve that the main difrentae ae language and religion. However, in a
footnote he denies (quite troublingly) that the diferentiaton of religions
is anything other tha historical accident, since they alae religions ro the
degree that they have the form of his transcendenta theology (Ibi, p.
367) . Moreover, he implies that Iinguistic barriers can be overcome by the
spred of culrure ad mutual understanding (IbM. , p. 367) . However,
borders beteen peoples ae u1timately necessary for Kat due to his pos
tulate that states of Iimited siz are needed so that law C be enforced
(IbM. , p. 367) .
Hence, in Toward Peretual Peace Kant tae it a an operating prem
ise that such nanal separation is the condition of having meaningfl laws.
A a means ro overcoming what coud be a world made of fracned na
tiona interests, Kant (IbM. , p. 367) argues on behalf of a federative union,
not u the United Nations in form, ad wth it a legal &ework for
&ee trade mildly siila to the World Trade Organization, a a means ro
1 84 Jacs Gason
guad ant confct. The notion of a federative union is connected to a
rationa idea of peace. The legal strcture for trade mewhile folows
hor nare's guaatee that the ideal will come to pas through its power
to reolve competing interets (Ibi. , p. 368) . In fct, K (Ibi. , p. 368)
unabahedly puts ford that the spirit for hee trade "sooner or later
dominate eery people" ad that it progress and its abatement of belli
cose impulses owe no thing to reaon, but rather to the will of narre.
Therefore, even though international right is an ide of reon, Kant's
Toward Peretl Peace mantais that pece is acrual y a necessary efect
of the order of the natura world.
International relations ae thu like judgments of beauty insofar as
both trarute private concerns (national interest ad sense data respec
tively) into objective one in terms of an ideal (pece in the frst case and
beuty in the second), a the means for mediating genuine quarrels. How
eer, Toward Peretl Peace cheerfly holds that international disaree
ment will be reolved eternally because of nare' s intention, which seer
to make international right so me thing involving disputation and its de
terminate form, thereby sepaating it hor aestetic concerns.
"hen considered in terms of the language of purpose, ee contrat be
teen the eponymous ideal of Toward Peretal Peace and the ide of
beuty becomes even staker. For Kant, the ideal of beauty cannot belong
to the empirica chn of cause ad efect a an object, but rather must
belong to the auto no my of reon. Hence a gulf exists beteen the ideals
of beauty ad internationa right in their forma moments, the reult of
which leds Kant to an exceedingly optistic theor of internationa rela
tions.
Peace in The Metaphyics of Morals
"eeer to sofen the incautious optimism of h earlier work on the sub
j ect or to more closely match it to his idel of beaut, The Metphsics of
Mora/' argument for peace sees Kant reverse course and adopt a somber
oucook that is more consistent with his thinng in genera. Here, insted
of coloring his languge of pece with lof words like "perperua", Kant is
les bold, employing words Uke "unachievable" and "approximation". He
thu throws cold water on the hyothesis of Toward Peretl Peace that a
federation of al nations will come U pas. Specical y, Kant hold (with
out, it is worth noting, cle jutifcation) that a asociation of states
necesarily implodes if it extends too fa (Kant [ 1 797] 1 9 1 0, p. 350), a
though international asociations require bounds for consensu to occur
j ust a nations need borders to foe laws so that they mght have mean-
On K' s Ahcc ad his Progrcsing T rcocnt of Pccc 1 85
ingfl sanction. Also, he argue mat plura super-state organiztions would
merely lead to me same discord and eventual (K Ibil . , p. 350).
Kant merefore claims mat international right requires a congress of state,
mereby departing fom his optimistic advocacy of an internationa federa
tion. Even mough he describes it as "permanent" (Ibil . , p. 350), me con
gress of states described in h later work is arbitrar and as capable of
being dissolved at any time (Ibil . , p. 35 1 ) . Thu, he concludes mat, while
me ide of perpetua peace may be practically impossible, its principles
(me idea approximated by reson, as an idel) let huty at least strive
to approximte it (Ibil . , p. 350).
Kant more suongly repudiates hi s eler view of me idea of peace a
perpetual in his later Metaphsics 0/ Moral, where he writes:
[If complete etablishment of perpetua pece and ending wa] also a1ways
should remain a piou wish, W certainly do not thu He to ourselve with
adopton of the mam to work unceingly towads it; fr this i duty (Ibi. ,
pp. 354-5) .
Kant (Ibil . , p. 355) goes on to say mat even j mis impulse were deep
tive, it is f beter to take it up m "to see its baic principle la] mrown
in wim me omer anial species to me same mechanism of nature. " This
language strongly rejects, uing similar terms, me fim in nate mat Knt
display in Toward Peretl Peace, in which he does in f regard peace,
not only a being mrown into nature's arangements, but in fct a its
necesa end. Thus it is clear mat Kant's minkng on peace changes as he
moves to chapion peace a an efect of reaon's autonomy in imaining
ide and to disavow its purpose a rea in me sensible, natal world.
Kant's rejection of me inevitability of perpetual peace frther aligns
wim me notion mat peace's puposivenes is ideal in chaacter, where he
continue:
[Iis very idea a10ne of an apror idea of a le asociaton of humas un
der public lawsl "i . . . attempted and accomplishe trough meued refr
according to a steady constttion, C led into continual approxmation to
the highet poHtical good, to perper peace" (Ibi. , p. 355).
Here pece is not a determined end of nature, but ramer it idel of inter
national right is purposive only in accord wm me autonomy of reason.
The politica good is someming mat c be reched only mrough ap
proximation (much like me objective ideal of taste, mrough which com
muiction about beuty is possible, ony adequately represent beauty) . Ir
is not someming mat will occur, absolutely. Thu, me idea espoused in
The Metaphsics 0/ Moral ha no connection to any end of natue, in cle
repudiation of mat from Toward Peretl Peace.
Hary van der Lden's reding of duty and international right show
mat by aiming at mirroring, ramer man determinately replicating, me
1 86 Jacs Gason
tdca Ogcc, K ts abc tO cOhcrcndy Oh cr a grOgm Or gcacc that
accOums Or tmgcrcct cgtsatOrs (Vandcr Ltndcn, 1 995, g. 75). 3 Nan dcr
Ltndcn (Ibi) gOcs On tO say that thc mtrrOrtng aggrOach hOm The Met
phsics 0/ Moral ts bcnchcta, stncc t aOws Or gOuuca tmcwcnttOn d
tsnOtburdcncdwtth thcgrObcmOgtVngflrcgccttO thcautOnOmyO
tmgcrcct @cnts. hu, thc acthcttc mn hcgs hts thcOry O gcc
bcttcr dmwtth gOuttc sccnattOs whcrc tt ts dtmcut tO absOutcy rcsgcct
natOn autOnOmy, tkc tn rcsgOnsc U gcnOctdc Or gOb watmtng.
unhcrmOrc, thc tdc OtmcrnattOna rtght hOm The Metphsics 0/
Moral, ts much mOrc tkc that O butyth thatrOm Toward Peretal
Peace, stncc thc atcr ht hOds that gcaccs gutgOstVc gcct ts thOught a
priori and that ttts nOt cncOumcrcd a rca Ob]cct Othc cmgtrtcawOrd.
hts atcr wOrk thus cOsc thc gag bcmccn hts Vtcw OtmcrnattOn
mcOrks Or rtght andmtcrsub]ccttVc@rccmcmabOutbuty.
K
, te World-Obserer
Larcm attcmtOn U thc tdm OtmcrnattOna rtght ht dcVcOgs tt tn
hts atcrwOrKs shOws a dccg cOnnccttOn tO hts tdca Obcauty. hc cc
Or Vcwtng thc mO tn thc samc ught ts mOOd. trsty, thc tdcs O
buty and tmcrnattOn rtght atc atkc tn that thcy mncttOn an Ob]cc-
ttVc grOund Or tndtVtdual gartcs tO cOmmunttc abOut thctr grtVatc
tmcrcsD. bccOndy, thc tttttOn bcmccn thc gcOgOuttc tdca dcVc-
Ogcd tn Toward Peretal Peae and The Metphsics 0/ Moral rcsgccttVcy
tndcatc an attcmgt, whcthcr cOnsctOus Or uncOnsctOus, tO mc that
tdm cOrrcgOnd tO thc tdm O buty tn tcrms O aggtOXtmattOn and
tmgctcct gurgOstVcncss. hts sccOnd gOtm O argumcm Vndttcs thc
htst, stncc ttshOws that thc stmtattty tn thctr cOmmunttymcdattng mnc-
ttOn ts nOt sugcrhct, but rathcr sOmcthtng that ht aggrccatcs mOrc
and mOrcwtth thcg@c Ottmc.
hctranstttOnwhch dntU agcOgOuttca tdmthatharmOntzcs
wth hu dca OmcbcauttD bcgcts many tmcrcsttng QucsttOns. s hts
mOrc cauuOus anguagc tn The Metphsic 0/ Moral duc tO gcrcctVcd
thcOrcttc shOrtcOmtngs hc mcrcy tqng tO tn]cct sOmc atbttsm
tmO hts mcOry as ant tntcntOny trytng tO mc hts tmcrnattOna
3 Va der Lden ( 1 995, p. 75) ft with te ide there ae [o dc approache to
pe, toug he ultimately cllapse the dtncon asesed here. This les hi U
deae dsstisfacon wit !t'S approach to interention (Ibid., p. 7). I beleve
that evalutng !t in term of ealier ad later approaces to pe woud help a,u
age some of va der Unden's concr.
On Kt's Acscta ad his Progrc,ing Trcncnt ofPcec 1 87
rcattOns OOk mOrc tkc hts acsthcttC hts rcgrct, i any, sgccthCy
kcycd tO hts su y tOnc tn Peretl Peace Or ramcr ts tncOnststcncywth
r@d tO tccOO@ Lrwas hts shU tn tOnc thc rcut OgOtttca changc
tn thc rca wOrd, tkc thc trtas and trtbuatOns Othc rcnch rcOutOn,
whtch shOOk al Oatc ctghtccnth ccnturyurOgc, tncudtng ant!
n nAcndtsVcw, cVcn Mcr undcrgOtng a grcat dm OntrO-
sgccttOn duttng rcnch rcOuttOn, ht stt cOnststcntyaggtcs grcccgts
hOm hs thcOry O]udgmcnt, cmchy thc grtmacy Othc ]udgtng Obscwcr
OVcr thc Obscwcd tn sctdng QucstOns Orght. Kcgardtng tts umc-tkc
chcct On hs gOtttca ghtOsOghy, Prcndt wrttc that thc rcVOutOn
awakcd ant| , sO tO sgc, rOm hts gOtttca sumbcr ( 1 982, g. 1 7) .
hOgh ants thOu_hts On thc rcVOuttOn arc cOmgcx, Prcndt dtsccrm
mO cca and cndurtng OgtntOns, v. a htgh rcgad Or thc grdcur O
thc rcVOuttOn wch as a cOndcmnattOn Othc garttctganU (Ibi. , g. 45).
hts aggarcnt cOntradcttOn stcms hOm ht s cndOrscmcnt O struggcs
agamst dcmOnstraby wrOng dcsgOttc rcgtmc, On thc Onc hd, and a
stmtar rc]ccttOn O rcbctOn, On thc Othcr (1. , g. 49) . Or ant ([ 1 795]
1 91 0, g. 382), tt c tkcwsc bc dcmOnstratcd, wtthtn thchcwOrk O
thccatcgOrca tmgcrattVc, that mc mtms ugOn whtch rcbcL act cOt
bc gubtcy aVOwcd wmOut dcttng mctr Orma gurgOsc Oscwtng as
mtms Or gOOd wt. hat, Or ant, gubtctty d gOtttca rtght sharc a
bastc tnk ndcatcs hOw ]udgmcnt and acsmcttc anguagc mcttOn tn
tcrms Otdcas Ogcacc thc sOca|gOttca tc u a sgcctacc d u Ogcn
tO obseraton.
Or ant, rtght, by tts Vcp naturc, tts cOmmutbc mtm-Orm, s
gubuc tn scOgc. Pd sO mcrc s a transccndcnt OrmuatOn O gubc
rtght, curOusyghrcd tn thc n@attVc that acttOns rcattng tO thc rtghts
OOthcrs arc wrOng, t thcy cannOt bcar gubtctty (Ibi. , g. 38 1 ) . hts
gubtc rtght, wh:ch n hts Vtc Orbds tnsutrccttOn and rcVOuttOn On
thc bts Othc unsgcaKabc trcachcrtcs nVOVcd (IbM. , g. 382) , ncVcrthc-
cs grOunds tntcrnauOna rght wm gubtcty mc bts Or cOmmOn
wt (IbM. , g. 383). hts OcOursc crcatc y numbcr OgrObcms cOn-
ccrntng dcsgOttsm, tntcrnatOn rght, and mtcwcnttOn ma tO ant-
tan schOars and, sady, tO OOwcrs OwOrdahatrs.4
Prcndt sccs ant Ogcrattng On thc bts OcOrOhary grcmtscs, namcy
that matctOu tntcnt must ctst tn grtVatc and that thc gOOwl ts aways
4 In a fomote Kt ( [ 1 788] 1 91 0, p. 373) explicidy cls public rigt (d, fendice
Recht) a ide (Ide). Te related term "rigt of peple" (d, Vlkerrecht, trala
te ofen "international riht") refers later to suc a free asociation, tbough
witbout te terinolog of a idel per M (Iid., p. 383). Despite te lak of obvious
terminologc dues, I believe that publicfinternational rigt is relted 10 prpetua
p= 2 idea 10 a ide.
1 88 Jacs Garson
ar ler poremially public. She srares mar for K "publicness i already
rhe crirerion of righress in his mora philosophy" ( 1 982, p. 1 8) wim mo
raliry being "rhe coincidence of me privare ad me publc" (IbU. , p. 49) .
Moreover, if righr is [0 be public, men irs progres, like rhar of peace,
oughr U be obserable in me world ar !ge. For Arendr, Krian judg
mem relie on ro key idea, me commonaliry of judgmems [0 humairy
(me possibiliry of genuine quarrel) , and me ide of purposiveness in ob
jecr in rhe world, bom in artisric approximation and narural phenomena
(IbU. , p. 76) . Wen me objecr becomes rhe huma specracle irelf, me
idel srriven for and purpose of publiclimernationa righr is peace. Th is
ro say mar in Kr's minking mere is a implicir link among rhe nature of
righr, irs publiciry, ad rhe possibiliry of obsering (and judging) human
progress [Owad peace.
Arendr (Ibi, p. 61 ) keenly obseres mar for Kanr judgmem musr be
eplained in rerms of me obserer ad nor me objecr. This me rhar me
world-obserer, and nor me obsered human specracle, is me prime fac[Or
in progres. To undersrand Arendr's well-honed appropriation of Kanr's
polirical/aesmetic sensibiliry, consider Daa Rchad Villa's disjuncrive
formulation ( 1 996, p. 1 02):
What Nietehe specically hold again; K - namely, that he, "Iike al
philosophers, insted of enviaing the aethetc problem from the point of
vie of the artist (the creator) considered 3 and the beutif purely fom
the point of vie of the spectator" (GM IIl, 6 [ 1 887] 1 998, III, 6] ) - is the
priry reaon that Aendt holds that his astetic theor h politca1 rele
vance.
Jusr a Kanr subordinare spirired genius [0 ime1ecrua rare, Arendr
( 1 982, pp. 61 -62) believes mar he similarly dminishe rhe specracle of
hU progres ad promores me obserer's perspecrive. Hence, rhe ob
serarion of human progres in deeds and acrs of par icula self-legisla[Ors
is where rhe idel of peace fcrions. This preseres rhe aesmetic schema
whereby me ideal of beaury and irs guidace of me rare of obsering sub
j ecr is primary and me relation ro rhe momem of genius is secondy, j
nor incidenrl. This norion mar me obsering perspective is paaoum
may be me reon for believing in me progress of me human species and
rhe possibiliry of peace, even if irs reliry canor be proven. Arendr purs
her own gloss on r "world-a-srage" idea where she wrires rhar "me
alrernarives for Kanr are eimer regres, which would produce despair, or
erernal saeness, which would bore us ro deam" (IbU. , p. 5 1 ) . Ir is a
rhough a condirion of me possibiliry of obsering hua af airs is me
belief in progres, for [0 do omerwse would be contrary [0 me obserer's
relarionhip [0 rhe objecr specracle. Jf me world is a srage, ad humaniry is
rhe specracle, men ir worrh asking whemer huma af airs, lie arork,
On K' s Ahcc ad his Progrcsing T rcocnt of Pccc 1 89
are a1 subject to me son of non-demonstrable, quarrelsome mode of
judgment tat rets solely in me eye of me beholder.
Questions of Kntian Lega
c
This inquiry mus boils down co me question as to what degree should
Kt's politica tng be red a aesmetic. The issue mters down to me
present day. In fct, Lrry Krasnof ( 1 995, pp. 62-4) claims mat me
schism in Ktia constructivism beteen Rawls and Haberma on me
topic of j utice c be understood respectively in terms faiar to readers
of me Crti
q
ue 0/ Judent - naely, a a division beteen agumentation
(diuteren) from me premises of a Rawlsian original position and me
mode of discusion (streiten) underlying me communictive rationaliry of
Haberma.
Rawls ditinguishe beteen what he terms "me Iw of peoples,"
which eists on me bais of liberal societies afrming siilar modes of
government, and international law, which is incomplete and wimout me
sanction of law in me domestic sphere ( 1 993, p. 43). This leads hm to
clam mat me former seres a content to me form of me Iatter. Henee,
even mough he states a wilingness to dea wim me Iaw of people in ways
mat do not preume a global original position, Raw still takes me origi
na position in its domestic guise a that which gives content to me murky
form of internationa law (Ibi. , pp. 42-43) . In c regard, mere is Ieense
to claim tat Rawls' notion of international law still relie on argumenta
tion to secure good and rights for people whose circumstances are cloaked
by a veil of ignoranee. If me only content to Rawian international right
come from me original position, men it follows mat it is a sytem of situ
ation-independent principles, wich, a Aessandro Ferrara note (Ibid. , p.
395), sets formal or eerna limits to me will of peoples.
By contrat, Habermas' idea of communicative rationality fts much
more closely wim me notion of discussion advanced by Kt in h work
on aesmetics. Most crucia here i Haberma' denial mat me vei of igno
ranee c bring about impatia judgement on me part of legislators, a
intersubjective arbiters of someming akin to Kt's categorical imperative
( 1 995, p. 1 1 6) . In Haberma' view me common perspective presumed by
Rawls' original position comes at me price of diminishing particulaity to
me point of uniformty. Indeed for Haberma, Rawls "imposes" mis
common perspective. Habermas, meanwhile see his own discouse emic
a a mode of discussion which enlarges individua perspectives to arrive at
universaity (Ibi. , p. 1 1 7) . Th mode of discussion, which taes subjec
tive clams seriously a a foundation for workng towards objective aree-
1 90 Jaa Gason
ment, h strong reonancs with Kant's understanding of how j udge
ments of beuty operate in aesthetic discourse. Therefore, i weight is
given to Kant' s later treatment of pec and its increaing concord wit his
notion of aesthetic quarrd, it would lend credence to Haberma' particuar
appropriation of Kantian thought and his heavy emphais on intersubjec
tive agreement in the mode of steiten.
However, many people sympathetic to Haberma' project and its
merger of Kantian aetetic and politica philosophies point out mat it too
is lackng. For exaple, Villa ( 1 9%, pp. 70- 1 ) taes issue with Habermas'
notion of discourse ethics, particularly a the commonaity of discourse
fattens all action and turns it into "speech" and allows for a hegemonie
preference mat the "right" knd of discourse prevail. He lauds Aendt over
Haberma for givng serious attention to the performative apect of politi
ca action, which goe over and above discourse in search of agreement.
Villa weites, "Aendt hopes to preere the political dimensions of per
formance and persuaion, deliberation and initiation, agonism an agree
ment" (IbM. , p. 71 ) . This line of thought is at work where Arendt holds
the opinion that understanding Kant's thought on peace require taking
seriously the role judgment plays in syntesizing the obserations of the
world citizen and the aetions of the individua subject ( 1 982, p. 54).
Wen Haberma collapse the distinction beteen political aency
and political discourse, he turns his attention away from te detached
world-obserer perspective so integra to Kant's account of progress and
Arendt's account of hope and imagination. In fact, by drawing personal
aency and discourse so close togeter Haberma imaination no longer
works a it does i Kt's schema, a mes of overcoming the gap be
teen private judgement and public reason, for the gap simply does not
est. Imanation cees to draw together the concerns of the individual
hU and the concerns of sociable human communitie in the providen
tia quest of progress for te entire specie. Hence, though there may be
reon to claim, per Kranof, that Kant' s emphasis on quarrd over dipute
in matters international right suppors Habermaian rather than Rawlsian
interpretations of Kant, this does not give any warrant to asert that Ha
bermas corners the maket on insights into the aethetic underpinnings of
Kntian political philosophy. Setting aside what is likdy to be a fte
attempt to legitimate intelleerlegacy, it is clear that there is a genuine
similarity beteen Kant's aethetics and his geopolitics and mat this con
nection only grows stronger as he revises b thinking on peace. Moreover,
it is certain that contemporary thinkers must contend with this conver
gence beteen aestetic and political concerns in workg through thor
oughly Kantian notions of autonomy and intersubjeetivity in proseeuting
the question of international right.
On K' s Ahcc ad his Progrcsing T rcucnt of Pccc 1 9 1
A the work of other post-Kantians Iike Ferrara shows, Haberma' ap
propriation of Kantia politic theory ad aesthetie philosophy may not
only commit the petr crime of diverging from Kant's ow approach to
these topics, but it may led to its unsening consequences, including a
non-pluralistie (Ferrara 2003, p. 399) ad perhaps hegemonie discourse
on right (Villa 1 996, p. 71 ) arising from an inensitivity to what is action
able in context for the involved panies (Ferrara 2003, pp. 397-8) . The
work of Ferraa on judgment, which wresces with some of te limit of
Haberma' tng, is instructive here. Wile adopting a view that he
identifes a akin to Haberma a regards the publicit of right, Ferrara
ameliorates it by not reacting wit the conventiona skepticism about
cross-cultural meing ever since Wngenstein's insights into the diversity
amongst languages and their "games". Instead of promoting the ide of a
context-free normative discourse of right, which might seem natura post
Wittgenstein, he sees the need for public reon to be uansconte
( 1 998, p. 39) in a manner which goes above deing with a plurality of
fee-foating acontextua Rawlsia or a pluralit of diverse subject in a
singula Habermaian discourse. Ferrara prefers to tae on the diversit of
culture, hstorie, ad interets tat abound in te world in terms of a
trascontetuaity which fnds uut and bais for right in the coherence of
judgement ( 1 998, p. x) . This coherence woud bind together the widest
possible rg of subjects in the world; ech freely relating to idels, Iike
that of international right, in a myriad of diferent way; each authentie
with regard to contexts Iike culture and not subserient to the truth values
of any single overarching discourse or set of rationa principles.
For Ferraa, it maes sense to "ground j ustiee no longer on principles
of right but on j udment or, more specifcal y, on 'oriented refective
judgment'" (2003, p. 393) . This mes abadoning the notion that inter
nationa right contains principles independent of human events in fvor
"the situated cogenc" (Ibi. , p. 393) of a "normative idea of humanit,"
in which the "eudaemonistic self-refection of the actor [woud bel con
ducted in postmetaphyical terms" (Ibid. , p. 403). Such a normtive ide
of humaity, open to ongoing revision, would not fanen human difer
ence ad reduce the variet of huma plights dow to one archetye with
one set of rights (Ibi. , p. 405) , nor even to the contempora scope of
agenc and action (Ibid. , p. 407) . Ferrara (Ibi. , p. 406) believes that this
is of beneft, since "when considering international or globa j utice, the
judgment perspective ofrs te advantage of not forcing us to choose, Iike
both Rawls's ad Haberm's perspectives do, one paticular unit of analy
sis ("individuals" or "peoples") as the ide addressee of j ustiee". Even
discourses on internationa right could not be contained, a Habermas
woud have it, within te forma principles of any one paradigm of discu-
1 92 Jacs Gason
sive ratonaity, in Ferrara's estimation. Rther international right and its
ideals woud b the topic of an array of, presumably coherent, context
sensitive dcourse. Justice (and preumably the ideal of peace of interna
tional right) would then bea a sort of exemplary validity for humanity,
with paries fee to approximate the exemplar ideal, not in terms of so me
universally demonstrable form, but in terms of imagination (Ibi. , p. 401 ) .
This coherence notion of uuth, clearly and by its own admission, re
ject preoccupation with metaphysics and embraces the doubt and relatv
ism about laguae so chracteritic of philosophy in the wake ofWittgen
stein (Ferraa, 1 998, p. 39) . And so by dispensing with the basic notion
that logicl principles exist beyond the coherence of judgments, Ferrara's
project is at odds with many of the most basic tenets of Ktianism,
adopting ony selectively Knt's insights into judgement, agreement, ad
intersubjectivity. Beyond his subversion of Ktian orthodoxy, frther,
much deeper problems eist. Ferrara's plural dscourse paradigm still relies
on a single "standpoint of huanity," (2003, p. 409) and a Axel Hon
neth points out (2004, pp. l 3-4) , it falto de with the dangerous possi
bility that these uanscontetual dscourses would not lapse into hegemony
(which would be much like the discourse of communicative rationait
championed by Haberma) . Even though Ferrara voice his opposition to
this (2003, p. 409), he does not actualy guad against eemplar ideas
fling uder majority control in such a way that " [ . . . ] minority cultures
posess no more chance to bring their own practice and convictions to
publc representation". (Honneth 2004, p. 1 4) . This is to say no thing of
the broader problems with such a vie, well-identwed by Charles Lrmore
(2004, p. 8) ocurring where Ferrara ( 1 ) reject any universal precept, (2)
rejects any notion of autonomy which woud operate according to such
precept, and (3) identife wholly intersubjective authenticity a an all
encompasing idea in an unatura maner which doe not "expres
when we are just being ourselves". Aong much the same lines, Ael Hon
neth (2004, p. 1 5) says that rather than concentrating solely on intersub
jective authenticity he would "like rather to start from a profound tension
beteen demands of autonomy and claims for authenticity - a tension
that cannot be mediated in the framework of our cultura aims. "
Conclusion
Wile the topic of steitn vs. disutieren in Kt's thinking on political
right might support the Habermaian platform communicative rationality
over Rawls ad his notion of justice proceeding fom the origina position
along a demonstrable course, other concerns est. Perhaps more than
On K' s Ahcc ad his Progrcsing T rcucnt of Pccc 1 93
cating dispute and quarrel a an eimer/or proposition, me best wy is to
accept bom. Wm mat me isue become fguring out what to do wim me
frm dictates accompanying principled autonomous personhood an me
diversity of aumentic judging worId-obserers who comprise me huma
community. lust a quarel and dispute deepen understanding, so do
autonomy and aumenticity broaden eperience, even if me implications of
mese fcet of huanity are veingly contradictory. Tbe conuadictions of
autonomous self and me intersubjective judging self are nonemeless pro
ductive, impelling imagination in its approximation of ideals which lack
any determinate object, Iike me of peace.
I believe mat Honnem and Lmore are right in meir similar appraisal
of Ferrara's work and in each pointing to genuine, and perhaps ineradica
ble, tensions beteen autonomy and intersubjective aumenticity. Wm me
principles of autonomy being given to determinable dispute and me
judgments of aumenticity being quarrels of taste, incommensurabilit is
only natura, providing a fher level of quarrel and deepening me af mi
ties beteen aesmetic and political mode of judgment. I also believe mat
wim mee views mey each recognize something very clerly seen by Aendt
as Knt's major insight. Simply put, mere is a distance beteen me judg
ing world-obserer and me autonomou self-Ieislator which imagination
works continuously (and unsuccessfy) to bridge. Knt's statements on
international right in me Metphsic 0/Moral point to such a tension.
Beond fdelit to Ktianism mough, mere is something, I believe, to me
notion mat imagination bridge gaps beteen reaon ad representation,
subject and object, self and omer, in a way mat brings a wholenes to ex
perience. Wen it comes to internationa right, I applaud Arendt for not
shying away from me paradox beteen me a-temporal dignity of auto no
mous beings and temporal progress of human communities and me atten
dant implication mat such progress might g on for a awy only ap
proximating its goal (Aendt 1 982, p. 77) . Though he perhaps errs in
focusing too much on intersubjective judgment at me epense of omer
fcets of cognition Iike autonomous rationalit, maybe Ferrara ( 1 998, p.
43) is right in claiming afer Gadamer mat Kt puts too much stress on
me worId-obsering judge and not enough on me cpacit for genius
which might give purpose to me human spectacle. Tbis and simil points
are debatable, and may aso conuibute to post-Ktian discussions of
internationa right. In any cae, to bring about hU progress we would
do weil to foIJow me various suggestions of Arendt, Honnem, and Lr
more to investigate me tension beteen autonomy and aumenticity, espe
cialy as it plays out in imagination and human endeavors which main
toward ideas such a peace.
1 94 lac Gar.on
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Chco Pres.
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New York. Roucledge.
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Rawls' via media: Beteen Reaism ad Utopiaism
Pauo Tuhal
I begin with a very general remak on the topic of relations, from a meta
physical point of view. Its signilcance to what I intend to say will be, I
hope, dea in a moment. According to the AutraHan philosopher David
Maet Armstrong, "T wo or more paculars ae eteall related if and
only j tere ae no properties of the particulars which logically necessitate
that te relation, or ay relation which is pat of the relation, hold"; and
"Two or more paniculas are intraly related if and only if there exist
propertie of the particulars which logiclly necessitate that the relation
hold"; Armstrong aso spea of "mixed relations", "patially itern al and
paially eerna" (Armstrong, 1 980, 11, p. 85; see aso Tun, 2009) .
Wen redg tebook on internatona relations, such a Contmding
Theories 01Interatonal Reltons, by Dougherty and Pfaltgraf (Dough
erty ad PfatzgrafJr., 2001 ) , it i easy to see tat the problem of contin
gency ad te modalities of te integration of contingency in a stable sys
tem He at the heat of internationa relations theory.
Irrespective of te schools of tought - realist, neorealist, utopian,
neoHberal (see Keohae, 1 986; Baldwin, 1 993; Spegele, 1 996) -, the main
concern seems to be double: to determine the most relevat factors of
instability; and to fnd the best way of eradcating them, by their integra
tion in a comprehensive order. In other word, U prevent the transforma
tion of contingency into risk and of risk into disorder, by adopting te
most efcient stabilizing mechanism.
Stability also means equilibrium. And it is not difcut to fd here, in
a diferent context, certain ide that belong to Talcon Pasons's strctura
fnctionaism (Pason, 1 991 ) ad to Nikas Luman's systemic ap
proach to societie (Luan, 1 995).
Reism, naely in Morgenthau' s version (Morgenthau, [ 1 948 J
1 973) , postulating, a Hobbes had done, anachy at the foundation of
international relations, sees in the baance of power te process of obtain
ing a precarious but reaonably efectve stability. The organizig principle
Tis investgtion W suppono by a scolaship grtoo by the Fuo paa a
Ciencia e a T ecnologia.
1 98 Pauo T uha
seems to be here a principle of accommodton of contingency. This prin
ciple draw its legitimacy from ehe asumption of ehe eternality reigning
in the relations beteen ehe individuals, ehe unties, ehat states are, and
fom ehe power relations established among eer. Various particulars are
etemaiy related; ehere ae no properties of ehe particulars wich logically
necesitate eat an internal relation holds beteen ehose paticulars. This
doctrine lie at ehe co re of ehe scepticism Charle R. Beit determined as
essential to classical reaism of Morgenehau's or Keenan's tye (Beit,
[ 1 979] 1 999, pp. 1 85 f.
Utopianism - "ehe legalistic-moralistic approach", to use George Kee
nan's phrae (Kennan, [ 1 95 1 ] 1 984, p. 95) -, in its trn, shares ehe same
assumption of a reigning externality beteen ehe states, but ehe moral here
is diferent: such externality would be someehing contra NMf. The
organizing device sugeted by utopiasm obey a principle of sur
mountng contingency. This principle supposes that relations amongst ehe
individus, ehe state, should be conceived a interna relations, as rela
tions beteen parts of a wole which is posited. at least ideally. fom ehe
beginning. Variou particulars are inteall related: ehe re ae propertie of
the particulas which logically necesitate eat ehe relation holds. Ad cs
holding must absolurely come to light. It i a defnite characteristic of
utopia to conclude. from ehe imagined perfetion. to the necesity of its
reiztion. A in ehe ontological argument.
Neoreaism and neoclasical reasm. but aso neo-liberasm. seem to
poit. aehough in diferent ways. to an intermediar position, defned by
Armstrong's "mixed relations". "partialy internal and partial y eternaI ".
Such position may be characterized by a conjunction of ehe accommoda
tion and sumouting principles. its bais being a relationa model difer
ing both fom the perfect externality defended by ehe realists - al relations
are contingent - and the extreme internality posited by ehe utopians - all
relations ae logically necesitated by ehe nate of ehe particulars. A lot of
the pesirsm and scepticism specifc to clasical reism is rejected. and
the role of international institutions in ee cooperation beteen ehe states
is not eplaied away. The kind of eternal/internal relations. which be
longs properly to c model. seems to be the one ehat best succeeds in
integrating contingency.
Let us take Kenneeh E. Walt's Theor ofIntetonal Politics (Waltz.
1 979) a an eaple of c approach. Anachy, ehe major sign of rela
tional externality. remains. according to ehe systemic approach. someehing
not quite surmounted. but ehe systemic, or structra. level - a distinct
fom ehat of ehe interaction aongst simple uities - partially absorbs, so
to say, ehis very sae eternalty or. to pur it another way. make sense our
of it.
Raw) wmda: bccn rcism ad utopiaism 1 99
The 'balace of power' - which exists whenever to, ad only to,
requisite preail: aarchie order and me existence of unitie who strive
to survive - is me frame of such sense. The active unities, me States, me
"unita actors", a Wall els mem, cee to be me only agents ad also -
Hegel woud cenanly approve of mis development - are no longer
thought a posesors of a self-consdous and transparent intentionaity:
their actions are loose, disordered. Contingency is conceived through rs
blending of externality - states eist a baic paticulars, wim no propenies
logiely necesitating mat me relation holds - and internality - mere ae
properties of me states whch, at me sytemc level, logicaly necessitate
that the relation holds -, which distinguishe international relations from
foreign policy.
At another level, John Rawls's "Iaw of peoples" seems equally to point
to a middIe way beteen externality and internality. (Thomas Nagel's
position (see Nagel, 1 99 1 , Chapter X is, in many aspects, similar to
Rawls's. ) Before discussing The Lw 0/ Peoples (Rawl, 2002) ad me pre
vious 1 993 article wim me same tide (Rawls, 200 1 , Chapter X, some
remarks seem, notittanding, to be appropriate.
A it is weil known, me Third Part of A Theor 0/ Jutce (Rawls,
( 1 971 ] 1 989) deal with me question of me conditions under wh ich jus
tice a faness ca be realized. Rawls shows mat justice a farness - being
itself a stable conception of jutice, generating a great sene of justice, ob
tained mrough refexive equlibriu (IbM. , pp. 48 f) - is capable of guar
anteeig a greater sodal stability than its riyal conceptions. (Ir is important
that sodal stabilit shoud be distinguished fom me simple regulation of
conicting situations, which would be merely a modu vivendi contngent
upon drcumstance (Rawls, 2005, p. 1 57) . A dedsive fnction of me veil
of ignorance in me original position i nulifing me efects of me knowl
edge of individu contingendes (Rawls, [ 1 971 ] 1 989, p. 1 36)) .
The vet possibility of reaization of justice a fairness ( a problem which is
linked to the frat of politie instttions and of me remedies U rs
failty) gain a greater importace in Rawls' later work, from his 1 985
article "Jutice a Farness: Politieal, not Metaphysie" (Rawls, 2001 ,
Chapter XIII) onwads, leading to me views of Political Liberalim
(Rawl, 2005). In me search for an overlapping consensus - which is a
preconditon for stabiity - Rawl discards any comprehensive concepton
of j utice. Coherendy, Rawls' Kantianism become more mitigated - or, if
you prefer, it become anaogical - ad me original universalism is par
tially substituted by me consideraton of loe paticuarities: it is for our
sodeties, for me liberal democratic sodeties, that j utice a frness sere
a a model. Ir seems fair to say mat the negative action of contingency is
more eily tamed i its eistence is accepted fom me ver beginning.
200 Pauo T uha
Ir is i the contet of this evolution - ad supponed by some ide al
redy expresed in pararaph 58 of A Theor 0/Justice (Rawls, [ 1 971 J
1 989, pp. 377 f - that Rawls tns to the iu gentum, the law of peoples,
a somethng distinct from international law. The law of people - which,
by its very nature, supposes some kind of internaity of relations - "pro
vides the bais for judging the conduct of any eisting regime, liberal a
weil as non-liberal" (Rawls, 200 1 , p. 562) .
This immediately begs the quetion as to whether the dece of the o
rigina position ad the fction of the contract also apply in this case. The
answer - I will omit the detals - is: yes. With an important diference: the
repreentatives, hypothetically asembled, don' t represent individua a
nyore, but peoples. There is an objection - wich ha been put forad
by Peter Singer (2002) , Thoma Pogge ( 1 990) ad Chales Beit ( [ 1 979J
1 999), among others - according to which the law of people should begin
with repreentative of individuals, and not with representatives of peoples
with their traditiona attributes of sovereignty (an objection whch clely
is formulated against the externality principle, from the standpoint of
radica internasm) . Rawls' aswer to this objection proceeds in a number
of steps: First, the repreented peoples must obey cenn conditions, some
of them restrictive of their sovereignty a habitually understood (Rawls,
2002, pp. 26-27; 2001 , pp. 534-535) (Ir is maybe usefl to recall that one
of the gretest proponents of a restrictive conception of sovereignty wa
Leibniz, who, both in the Caesarinus Frteneriu ( 1 677) ad in the Pref
ace to the Cod Iuri Gentium ( 1 693), defended - against Bodn ad
Hobbe - that sovereignty implied only a high degree of independence
and internal supremacy, not absolute independence ad absolute intern
supremacy) (Riley, 1 972, pp. 1 1 1 f and 1 65 f. Secondly, it woud be to
take utopianism too far to suppose the non-etence of peoples a they
eist nowadays (Rawls, 200 1 , p. 536) - the utopia mut be relistic
(Raw, 2002, p. 1 1 f. In third place, following K, Rawls points to the
fct that the law of peoples should not, in any ce, led us toward a Uni
versal State (Ibi. , p. 36; Rwls, 200 1 , p. 539) . Finally, the eistence of
fontiers favours the individual responsibilitie concernng what appers to
the state's citizen somehow a their own property (in ecological mauers,
for eple) (Ibi. , pp. 8, 38-39; Rawls, 200 1 , p. 54 1 ) . (A similar argu
ment can be found in Roger Scruton (2002, pp. 24-25). ) Rawls' anser
combine elements of internality (the frst step) and eternality (the three
other steps, nely the defence of the existence of frontiers) .
Rawls begins, accordingly, with a "faily of societies". This "famy of
societies" doesn' t include, however, only the liberal societies, but ao the
knd of societies Rawls cl "hierarchica societies" (I will retun to them
later) . From c fct it follows that "liberal ad hierarchcal societies can
Raw) wmda: bccn rcism ad utopiaism 201
aree on the sae law of people, and thus this law does not depend on
apect peculiar to the Western tradition" (Rawl, 200 1 , p. 534) , it is not
"ethnocentric" (Rwls, 2002, pp. 1 21 - 1 22) . Ir doen't depend, for exam
pie, on the excluivity of a "politica conception of the person rooted in
the public re of a liberal society" (Rwl, 200 1 , p. 549) . A with ju
tice a fainess in the interior of each society, the law of peoples suppose
no comprehensive doctrine, be it of a religiou, phiosophical or moral
kind. A agreement concerning the law of people, which guaratees the
repect of human rights is not an agreement that can ony be accepted by
liberal societies.
General conditions for the etension of liberal ide to the law of peo
pie are lesdemading than those, discused in A Theor ofJutice, which
are required for paricular societie. They include some baic right, &ee
doms and opportunitie; a high priority concerning baic freedom; and
so me mesure that c ensure citizens the necesary me to the acr
practice of those &eedom.
The extension of jutice as fairness to the law of people includes [o
stage - "ide theory" (Rawls, 2002, Parts I and II) and "non-idel the
or" (IbM. , Par III) -, each of them being composed of [o steps.
Let us begi with "idel, or strict compliace, theory" . In accordance
with it, a the participant (liberal, a weil a hierarchica societies) repect
the baic requirements for the appliction of the law of people. The [o
steps consist in the elucidation of those quetions related to the general
organisation, frst, of liberal societie, and, secondly, of hierarchical socie
ties, "societes which are well-ordered and jut, o&en religiou in nature
and not characterized by the sepaation of church and state" (Rawls, 200 1 ,
p. 537) . I n the original position, under the veil o f ignorance, "te repre
sentatives of well-ordered hierachical societies would adopt the same law
of peoples that te representative of liberal societies do" (IbM. , p. 544; cp.
Rawls, 2002, p. 63) .
The society of democratic people must obey the good stability afore
mentioned, it mut be stable in what concerns justice - and it should be
noted once again that such stbility is not identical to a mere equilibrium
reulting from the balace of power (a pure externalist deice) . Concern
ing war, for emple, Rawls underlines the &equency mentioned fact that
liberal societie raely go to war with one another, a fact that is "a dose as
anying we know to a simple empirica regularity in relations among
societies" (IbM. , pp. 52-53; cp. Rawls, 2002, pp. 8, 1 6, 44 f; Rawls, 2001 ,
p. 543) .
Turning now to hierarchical societies. What is it that makes them
wel-ordered societies, what is it tt qualifes them for the law of peoples?
First, they must be peacef societies, relating to other societie by diplo-
202 Pauo T uha
macy and rrade, and tey musr nor be gded by some son of religious
epansionism; rhey musr pracrice religious roleration. Secondly, rhey musr
be socieries where a legal sysrem, guided by a common conceprion of ju
rice, prevai and tar sysrem musr be pur in pracrice by judges and other
ofcials. Even i te persons living in hierarchica socieries are nor - in
comparison with those living in liberal socieries - cirizens, they musr be
reponsible members of such socieries. In the thrd place, the members of
rhese socieries musr have cerrain minimu righrs ro means of subsisrence
and securiry, ro feedom ad privare properry, and ro some formal equal
iry; rhar is, hierchicl socierie musr repecr basic human righrs (Rawls,
2002, Parr II; Rawls, 200 1 , pp. 544 f.
The problem of human rights, " a specia das of righrs" (IbU. , p. 560;
Rawls, 2002, p. 78 f, and an imernalizing facror, so ro say, is obviouly a
fndamema problem, delr with exrensively, aongsr may orhers, by R.
J. Vincem, who, in Human Rght and Interatonal &ltiom (Vincem,
1 986) , insisred on the primacy of subsisrence rights. According ro the law
of peoples, "thee right do nor depend on any parricular comprehensive
mor docrine or philosophical conceprion of human natre" (Rawls,
2002, p. 68; Rawl, 200 1 , p. 55 1 ) , rhey epres "a minimum srandard of
wel-ordered polirical insriturions for al people who belong, as members
in good sranding, ro a j usr polirica sociery of people", tey are "poliricl y
neurr" (Rawls, 200 1 , p. 552) (poliric neurraliry, excluding ideological
confromation, is a sign of imernaliztion) . They represem "the ourer
bound of admissible domesric law of societies in good sranding in a j usr
sociery of people" (IbU. , p. 554). Their respecr defnes the legirimacy of a
regime, and edudes any righr ro imernal imeremion by other srare (in
te form of economic sancrions or by mility force); they esrablish a limir
ro pluam aongsr people, in the sense thar they derermine (in con
j uncrion with the non-expansionm and a legal sysrem which enjoys le
girimacy in the eyes of irs own people) "the limits of roleration in a rea
sonable sociery of people" (IbU. , p. 561 ) . Concern foe human righrs
"shoud be a fxed parr of the foreign policy of liberal ad herarchical
socieries" (IbU. , p. 562) . Ide rheor is reaonably imernalisr in irs srance.
The "ourer bounda of admissible domeric law of socieries in good sran
ding in a j usr sociery of people" (Ibid. , p. 554) defnes rhe space where
people are imernally relared in vie of a common end.
Ler u now move ro the second ste, which will confrom us, ar lesr
paially, with the opposire view. The second stage - the "nonide rheory"
- des with a diferem siruation; ir des wit "the highly non-ideal condi
tions of our world" (Ibi. , p. 555) and with the possibiliry of the achieve
mem of the ide theory. The frsr srep - the noncompliance rheor -
regards the relation bereen jusr societie (liberal or hierachical) wirh
Raw' vm ma: bcn r.m ad utopiai.m 203
states mat "refse to comply wim a reonable law of people" (Rwls,
200 1 , p. 537) , me "outaw regimes" (Ibi. , p. 555) . The second step poses
me problem of "unvourable conditions" (poverty, poor technologic
development, etc.) which prevent certain people of attaining a sitation
where fir intitutions (liberal or hierarchical) could be established.
A to outlaw regies, evething mat liberal and hierachical societies
c do is to etablish wim mem a modu vivend founded on me bace of
power - a externaist device -, because me relation beteen j ust societies
and outw regimes "et in a state of nature" (Ibi. , p. 556) . The legiti
macy of aainst such regime is limited: limited to self-defence, and,
"in grave cae, of innocent person subject to outlaw regimes and me
protection of meir hU rights" (Ibi. , p. 556). (Rawls seems to share
some of Michael Walzer's asumption in Jut and Unjut Wan (azer,
1 977) . ) We are no longer - a we were in idea meory - in a space where
individuals are internaly related: me brte fct of baic eternaity defnes
me context of nonidea meory. At me same time, democratic and hierar
chica societies share me obligation, mrough external policy and wim help
fom political wisdom and good luck, of promoting me integration of
omer societies in me law of people. Theirs must be an "existential utopi
anism", to ue Roben Nozick's phrae, not an "imperialist" one (Nozick,
[ 1 974] 2006, pp. 3 1 9-320) . For such projet, me creation of a "federative
centre", representing "me aliance of well-ordered peoples" (Rawls, 200 1 ,
p. 557), is posibly a helpfl device, ad its efect could be of greater con
sequences man usualy believed, a even outlaw reimes are not immune
to a certan type of arguments. (These to points are aredy evident in
K) The very idea of a federative centre (a opposed to me proposa of a
universal state) joins internal and external relations.
The ce of peoples living under unfvourable condtions is substan
tial y diferent fom me one of outw reimes. The main reaons for mose
unfvourable conditions lie in me politica tradition ad in a certain
nuber of connected factors which should be atered "before a reasonable
law of people can be accepted and supported" (Ibi. , p. 557) . In me pro
L of changing unfavourable conditions it is impossible to ask for
immediate trasformations concerning me adoption of principles of ds
uibutive justice (which are sine
q
ua non conditions for me etence of
liberal societie) . The main point lies in me f mat unvourable condi
tions reside, a said before, in me pecuiar politica traditions of mose so
cieties and very rarely, if at all, in me efective absence of natural resources.
Symmeuically, me main welm of well-ordered societies lies in meir po
litical ad cultua tradtions and, coherently, me eforts of me community
of well-ordered societies must consist in trying to put an end to "oppre-
204 Pauo T uha
sive government" and "corrupt elites". The emphais on hU right is
once aain instrmental.
Two shon comments ad a concluion. First, me law of peoples ac
cording to Rwls - even more man me revised version of justice a fair
ness, political liberalism - gives pride of place to contingency. Bom at me
level of ideal meory (we deal wim dissimila societies, liberal and hiera
chical) and at me level of non-ideal meory (we ae confronted, from me
beginning, wim outlaw state and wim societies which, on me account of
their politica1 ad cultural traditions, live under unfavourable conditions) .
There is no immediate decisional mechanism whch determine u to ac
tion - whatever that action may consist of, economica1 sactions or me
use of miltary force - in a siruation of criis. Decisions, idely resuting
&om me common will of well-ordered societie uited through a federa
tive centre, are hevily dependent upon me situation ad will of diferent
people.
Secondly, me very structure of me im gentum proposed by Rawls is,
under many apects, similar to me point of convergence of neoreism and
neoliberaism I mentioned in me beginning. Rawls' "reist utopia", a he
calls it, signifcantly joining me to key-words, also looks for a conjunc
tion of the accommodation ad surmounting principle, based on a rela
tional model which is neimer one of perfect realist eternality nor one of
etreme utopian internality. People accommodte each omer: me law of
people does not impose moral, or philosophica, or religious visions of a
comprehensive kind. Each people ha a right to its own individuality. But,
at the same time, a globa politica1 consensus is looked for, someming ain
to a rtited conquest of plurality, fndamentally exhibited in the re
spect for human rights, which woud count a me &ontier of toleration
accepted by well-ordered societie. From me point of ve of me law of
people, a prudent blending of realist eternality and utopia internality
seems to be me bet of solutions.
I do not pretend, of couse, mat the metaphysica1 distinction beteen
internal ad eernal relations is capable of rendering justice U all me
subtleties ad intricacie of international relations meory nor of Rawls's
fw 0/peop/es. My a wa only to underline it descriptive potential.
Wat I have caled me accommodation principle at the core of me realt
position c only be understood, I suppose, by reference to me eternality
of relations and, correspondingly, me sumounting principle proper to
utopianism is only conceivable mrough me supposition of some kind of
necesitation of an organie - mat is, internal - relation beteen peoples
(or, in its more radica formulation, mrough an absolute internaliztion
which would dmiss me states as illegitimate entitie) . Finally, me integra
tion of contingency - me proper aim of ay meory of international rela-
Raw' vm 1a: bn rism ad utopiaism 205
tions - depends, I sugest, upon a mixture of internal and external rela
tions, a miture that would be able to deal wim what K called me "un
sodal sodability" of manknd (K, 1 973, p. 9)- or, perhaps, to coin a
new phrae, me unrdational rdationality of people.
References
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Cabridge University Pres.
Baldwn, D. A. (00.) ( 1 993) . Neorealm and Nelberalim. The Conteporar
Debat. New York. Colubia University Pres.
Beit, C. R. ( [ 1 979] 1 999) . Po/itca/ Theor and Inttonal &ltons. Princeton.
Princeton University Press.
Dougbert, J. E, and PfafJr. , R. 1. (2001 ) . Contmng Theores ofInte
tona/ Relton, Harlow. Addison Wesley Langman.
Kt, I. ( 1 973) . Keine Schrf zur Geschichtphilosophie, Ethik und Politk.
Hambur. Felix Meiner Verlag.
Kenan, G. F. ( [ 1 95 1 ] 1 984) . Ammcan Diwmac. 1900-1950. Chicao. The
University of Chicgo Press.
Kohae, R O. (ed.) . ( 1 986). Neoralim and It Crtcs. New York. Columbia
U niversity Pres.
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Rawls, J. ( [ 1 971 ] 1 989) . A Theor offuu. Oxord. Oxfrd University Pres.
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Pres.
Rawls, J. (2005). Poltcal Libealm ( 1 993) . New York. Columbia University
Pres.
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U niversity Pres.
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Pres.
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SpegdC, R. D. ( 1 996) . Poltcal Real in Int(atonl Theor. Cabridge.
Cabridge Universit Pres.
Tunha, P. (2009) . "Belief Rdations". Antopo/gca. Vol. 1 1 . Pp. 205-223.
VincCnt, R. J. ( 1 986) . Human Rigt and Inttonl Rekton. Cabridge.
Cabridge Unversit Pres.
Wan, K N. ( 1 979). Theoroflnteratonal Politc. NeYork. McGrw-Hil.
War, M. ( 1 977) . Jusand Unjut WaT. New York. Baic Books.
Rwls's The Law 01 Peo
p
les as a Guideline
for te World as We Know Ir
Milica T rinovic
Introduction
John Rawls opens The Lw 0/ Peopks wim me claim mat his meory is ro
be seen a "realisticaly utopian" (Raws, 2002) . Being me serant of ro
maters, me ideaistic ad reatic one, the ide of a " reistic utopia" has
raised several criticims. Rawls's concept of international law is considered
eimer as too idealistic or a too realistic. Those who consider it ro be roo
idelistic lament mat it does not tae into account current problertic
political issues, such as poverty and me fair global distribution of re
source; mose who consider it to be roo realistic clai mat it tend ro be
roo accommodating wim illiberal societie, narowing the list of human
rights ro be protected (Bucha, 2006) . In mis paper I wl t ro demon
strate that mee criticisr miss Rwl' s point.
I will frst of aIeplan Rawls's key term peopks. Then I w briefy
eplain how Rawl constuct his meory of internationa relations. I will
point out me wekneses of t project by aing some weil know
objections, namely the ones advanced by Thoma Pogge. Finaly, I shal
present my reinterpretation of Rawls' s argument. If I succeed in defendng
Rawls fom mose objections, it should become apparent how his project
might support a meory of globa justice.
The Idea of ' Peoples'
The term peopk stands for ro diferent kinds of dometic societie: liberal
democracies as we know them from Politcal Liberalism and dcent peo
pIe, which Rawls also calls "decent consultation hierarchies", eemplifed
by the imaginary Kistan.
Libera peoples are - institutionally speng - constitutiona democ
racies, organized around a political conception of jutice a a "free
srding vie", specifed by me ro principles of jutice: The frst sas that
208 Milic Trnoic
each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal
baic liberties compatible with a siilar scheme of Iiberties for others and
the second deas with soci and eonomic inequalitie. These ae to be
arranged so that:
a) ofces and positon mut be open to eerone un conditon ofair
equity of opponit
b) they are to be of the greatest beneft to the let-advantaged mem
bers of society (the dif eence prnciple) (Rawls, 1 971 , p. 303).
The to principle are chosen among many other options by represen
tatives of the indvduas in the "original position" fom behnd a "veil of
ignorance".
A politica conception of j utice a1lows comprehensive doctrines to
play a role only in non-politicl sphere. Only tose issues fall under the
domain of "the politica", and are therefore to be considered in public
debates, tat ae neutral with regard to comprehensive doctrines.
Libera democracie are also supposed to have a certain common cul
rre, due to the shared histot, common language and tradition. This
shoud be expressed through the citizens' "common sympathies" for ech
other, which are to be developed while building and Iiving together in a
politica sytem a a historical entity. Co-citizens are to respect the culrre
of one anoter and to work together to suppon the political system that
they share. The mora character of peoples ha its root in the moral char
acter of its citizens, who tet their co-citizens reonably, Le. , with repect
for their rational interests that may be diferent fom one's owo. The same
resonable conduct is expected from the peoples when they enter the in
ternationa arena, j ust a reaonable pluralism within domestic society
aIows the coexistence of diversity among co-citizens. Now, not until lib
era democracie become foreign policy-actors doe Raws use for liberal
democracies the term peopls. Why?
One answer is that Rawls wants to distance his theot from principles
of Ralolitk, which advocate that nation-states pursue their rational in
terests at any cost. This confnes foreign policy to a modus viveMi. Rawls,
on the contrat, wants a stable, durable peace and pece for the right rea
sons. Thus, Rawlsian peoples difer fom the csi concept of state
becuse they lack the taditional sovereignty, which consist in the right to
declare in pursuit of state policie and the right to an absolute auton
omy in dealing with the state's citizens. Reaonable people fght j ust
for sdf-defense or in the name of huma right.
Further guarantee of peace for the right reons i the fct that liberal
democratic regimes ae administrated by perfeccy resonable statesmen.
The idea of a politician who is at the serice of the people and "sdfes in
Raw', The 1 ofPrp/ a Guiddinc fr tc Worfd Wc Kow It 209
judgig his society's need" (Raw, 2002, p. 97) deepens the gap beteen
fcr state and the ide of people.
Consequency, Rawls's peopls are a ideized version of modern mu
tinationa states.
Decent Hierarchical Peoples
Decent hierarchic people are not liberal. Their iterna strcture w
not modifed trouh the frst origina position. Their legal and cultura
systems ae shaped by a certain comprehensive religious doctrine in which
they all believe and that provides a common good. They ae not aggre
sive. They respect baic hu rights. However, members of thee socie
ties are viewed in public Iife not 8 individuals but 8 members of groups.
Rawls calls tis society asoeitonit. Ech group should b fther repre
sented in a hierachicl le system. In this kind of society there is no
such a thg 8 a Wetern public sphere in which people c practice what
Rawls cI publie reaon. However, there are for of eonultton in
which members of soci groups discus their common aims. In tis con
tet individuals ae allowed to oppose to, or to depart from, the ofcia
opinion, ad judges ad other ofcis must addres the objections.
The political body that makes the fnal decisions - the rers of a de
cent hierarchcl society - are to weigh view and claims of ech of the
conuted groups ad, in that way, consult the opinion of the wole peo
pIe. Thus, societies Iike Kisran ae also enticed to be called peoples,
ideized non-libera cast-Iike societies.
To conclude, "peoples", both lberal and hierachicl, do not exist 8
rel world politica entities. Instead, they ae normative ide, guidelines
for our world. A such, the peoples' primay interest is to take resonable
care of thcir co-citizens' conception of jutice ad the good.
Second Original Position
The second origina position builds on an analog with the domestic cse.
Ir dels frst of aIwith decent liberal peoples. and then with decent hiera
chica peoples.
In the ce of decent libera peoples the parties are representatives
whose interest i to m sure that their citizens c keep their compre
hensive doctrines. acknowledging at the same time the politicl conception
of jutice 8 a internal order of society. In oter words. their interet is to
ensure security and saety of tcir citizens and to presere their free politi-
21 0 Miic Trfovie
cal intitutions. Furtherrore, each people wlwant to preere self-respect
and woud wat others to repect eer, their culte and territoria integ
rit. Peoples need to fmd a "public bais of justifcation" (Rawls 2002, p.
32) for their interests in terms of law of peoples.
Now, for a law among peoples to be fair, ee paies are going U be
put behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know "ehe siz of their terri
tor, or ehe popuation or relative stenge of ehe people whose fndamen
tal interest ehey represent" (Rawls 2002, p. 32) . Under such condtions
Rawls state the eight principles of ehe "Iaw of peoples" whle refecting on
history ad usages of international law ad practice, wehout sugesting
any alternatve, wherea in ehe doretic ce ehe paie in the original
position were ofere numerous alternative principle of j utice for
which eey were to chose.
This list of eight principles is not by ay means camplete ad its ir
plerentaton may take diferent forms. Rawls mentions instittions that
woud be simila to GT rounds, World Bank or Uni ted Nations,
Euopean Union or Soviet Union. However, a more detaled decripton
of their instittional interpretation is absent.
The second pat of ehe second original positions des wieh decent hi
erachical societies. The procedure is ehe same, but since ehe internal or
ganiztion of liberal ad hierarchical people difers ad the model of rep
reentation requires equality of ee representatives, ehe people have to be
repreented in to separate origina positions.
Boeh decent and libera people aree on ehe followng eight Princi
pIe:
1 . "People ae free and independent, and eheir freedor and idependence
is U be respected by oeher peoples.
2. People are to obsere treaties and udergs.
3. People are equa and are paies to ehe agreement eat bind eher.
4. People are to obsere a duty of non-interention.
5. People have ehe right of self-defense but no right to instgate war for
reons oeher eha self-defense.
6. People are to honor huan rights.
7. People are to obsere specifed retrictions in ehe conduct of .
8. People have a dut to assist oeher peoples living under unfavorable
conditions that prevent eheir having a just or decent political ad social
regime" (Rwls 2002, p. 37) .
The most disputable points ae 6. and 8. Rawls (2002 1 0) explan ehat
in ehe law of peoples a specia das of urgent human right i expressed,
such a feedom from slavery and serfdom, lberty (but not equal libert)
of conscience, and securit of eenic groups fom mas muder and geno-
Rawl's T. lw ofPrp/ a Guidclinc for tc World Wc Know Ir 21 1
eide. The enumerated right are compatible with those fom Aide 3
throug Atide 1 8 of the Univera Dedaration of Human Rghts. The
violation of this das of rights is equally condemned by liberal ad decent
people. The prineiple of asistce is met to help burdened soeietie to
become decent and then they are on their own.
Lackng a fly adequate sceme of human rights and a globalized ver
sion of the diference prineiple, the law of people seer not to be a0-
gous to the dometic order. Howeer, Rawls notices that it i very impor
tant on this stae that we, the eitizns of current liberal soeieties, defend
the principle and judgment of the law of people. It is important for
Rawls that his theory is realitic a well a utopian and in that sense his
reoning ha to be confrmed by the real people living in the reiry of
current internationa relations.
Poge's Obj ections
A stated in the introduction, I intend to focus on te objections preented
by Thoma Poge (2006) . Pogge deals with the rejection of normative
individuaism in Rawls's ve of international relations, with the aymme
tries beteen Rawls's dometic and internationa theory of j ustice, with
the defnition of the term peopls, and with Rawls's advocating "eplana
tory nationalism", the notion according to which each state ha sole re
sponsibiry for it level of development.
Pogge's bigget concern is about te fact that Rawls doesn' t have a
global diference prineiple, a it would be the case i the law of people were
analogou to the domestic order. Pogge acribe to Rawls to theories of
j ustice: one that applies to the dometic cae and another that applie to
the internationa aen. Pogge critieizes this second theory for neglecting
the need of hierachical soeietie and rejecting normative individualm.
In particular Poge raises the following objections:
1 . Rawls accommodates the opponents of liberalism in his theory of inter
nationa relations by tolerating other non-liberal, but reaonable ways of
ordering soeiery, but he does not accept the sae prineiple of toleraton
in his dometic teory. This needs to be explained.
2. Rwls is too accommodating wit non-libera soeieties, as he requires
no concesions fom decent hierarchica1 soeieties.
3. By not envisioning more liberal global arangements, Rawls assumes
that the accommodation of decent hierarcic societies is needed for
ever. This aso need to be j utifed. However, as Pogge sugets, it is
uncenain whether a well-ordered herarchica soeiery such a Kstan
21 2 Miic Trfovie
coud ever exist. Should this be not me cae, this accommodtion could
actual y end up accomodating no lving person at all (Poge, 2006,
pp. 208-209) .
In addtion, Poge criticizes me vaguenes of me nation of peoples. In
Pogge's view, it i not cler which groups ae to be counted a peoples, and
whemer "peoples" are ay groups who live on a certain territory or nations
that tracend state borders. Ir is also not clear how mese people ae to be
identifed: by meir paspon, culture, descent, choice, or combination of
those CRwls, 2002, p. 2 1 1 ) .
Futhermore, Pogge fnds structural asmetries i n the to meories.
Domestic meory takes into account partie who choose me to principle
of jutice ad men apply mem to the baic structures in such a way that
the principle ca ft any empirie context. In me international cae, the
parties are preented with me baic structure and me endorsement of eight
principle of me law of people doe not foresee corretive mesue for
any possible misfortate empirie ce: bad negotiations of former gen
eration or uucky natural condition are of no interest for this theory.
The global economic order of Rawls's utopia is shaped by "fee bargain
ing" without ay principles mat coud prevent stronger societie fom
shaping me term of international interaction in their favor. Here Pogge's
notion of "eplanatory nationaism" comes into play.
Pogge vehemency argues mat the wel-being of a country canot have
only loe cues. Rich countries and me global institutional arangement
they deign ad impose are contributing to paar countries' deprivation.
Rich countrie da not shy away from negotiating trade agreements wim
unlawl rlers or even from encouraging civi wars or opportunistic mili
tary interentions. According to Poge, me global order is gravely unjust
and "mose who cooperate in its imposition are harming mose whose hu
man rights avoidably reman unlflled" (Pogge, 2006, p. 21 7) . Pogge
sees no reaon wy me parties in me origina position woud not consider
an aternative to me Rawlsia law of people that woud da wimout "ex
plaatory nationalism" and support same kind of globa diference princi
pie inted of me principl 0/assitnce.
The Reinterpretation
There are indeed in Rawls's The Lws 0/Peopl to theorie of jutice
operating at diferent levels of abstraction. Although intertined, mose
levels should be held apart in order to avoid confsion.
Raw's T. lw ofPrp/ a Guidclinc for tc World Wc Kow Ir 21 3
We start again with distinguishing to theories: a theory of j ustice for
the domestic society and the law of peoples for the internation arena.
Both theorie have to be ren a guideline, the former for a just domestic
society and the laner for the j ust international society. Accordngly, both
theorie could be interpreted a dsciptive idal theores (Bug, 1 997, pp.
89-99) , i . e. , as theories that shoud give us a detled elaboration of a par
ticular ideal. In other words, Rwls's to principle describe a domestic
society, whereas Rawls's eight principles decribe the internationa society.
The proces of coming to life of any descriptive theory paallel the
proces of formuating an idea. Ides are motivated by the dissatisfaction
with the rel world (Burg, 1 997, pp. 23-24) , e.g. , in te dometic ce,
with social injustice. The tool we use to mediate beteen ideal and rea
world is refective equilibrium. In the cae of domestic society it is Rwl,
you and me who use it. We are the citizns of a non-ide world who are
going back and forth beteen te principles ad conidered judgments,
decidng on a fair strate that should lead to the fll description of an
idea.
Rwl, You and I create the original position as a mens of representing
an ideal situation, and we ue the method of refective equilibrium to af
frm its fairnes. The same method is then used by the partie in the origi
nal position to afrm the principles of j utice and is constandy in ue by
the citizens of the well-ordered society that we envision. When refective
equilibriu is reached the theory is considered a j ustifed, though not for
ever. Refection is constandy in action. Considered judments a weil as
the principles of justice are equally subject to reision. A good Cple of
that is Rawls's shi from advocating a comprehenive theory in A Theor
offustce to the political free-stadng view of Politcal Liberalism.
However, at the domestic leel Rawl goes beyond te decriptive the
ory and introduces a norative ideal theor, which teis us which paricular
principles should guide our political action in that ideal context, e.g. ,
Rawls's elaboration of the institut ion of the basic structure or his empha
sis on the importace of public reason.
Now, in The Laws of Peopl we fnd a dscrptve idal theor. The the
ory decribes precondtions for peoples' coexistence and their cooperation.
However, it says litde about the institutional arangement that should
support the law of people, tt is, tere is no nortve ial theor.
Rawls' theory of international relations starts already from a descriptive
idea theor of dometic afairs. In the laner we, Rwl, you and me, were
creating the hypothetical subjects of the original position, those who will
become the citizen of libera people once the veil of ignorance is lifed.
In the second origina position the parties are either the citizens of a weil-
21 4 Milic Trnoic
ordered society mat we hypomeize or completely ne entitie wo do not
owe meir existence to me frst original position.
In order not to cut me law of peoples completely out of relity, Rawls,
a a member of a re world, is presenting a list of principles to me paies
of me original position. They are to sere a an idel for me meory of
international relations ad originate in our refection and our dissatisfc
tion: "These filiar and largely uaditional principles I take fom htory
and uage of internationa iaw ad practice" (Rawls, 2002, p. 41 ) . Such
principle are by no mes concluive. In me light of new event mey may
change, but for me time being mey are accepted a reasonable by me citi
zens of rel world libera and some non-liberal counuie.
The problem stat when me eight principle are to be interpreted,
implemented and supported by instittions. To do so, we need a norma
tive ideal meory for me international arena. However, fom a real-world
perspective it woud be too demanding to formulate a normative idel
meor, almough Raw briefy mentions what kind of institutions he w
imagining "Suppose mere are tree such orgaizations: one fraed to
ensure fr trade among peoples; anomer to alow peoples to borrow fom
a cooperative banking sytem; ad mird an organization wim a role similar
to mat of me United Nation, which I would now refer to a Confedera
tion of Peoples (not State)" (Rawls, 2002, p. 42) .
Two questions should be considered here:
Wy doen't Rawl ue individual a me paties in me second original
position, me same ones he ued in me frst original position in order to
tacke me above mentioned problem?
C a descriptive ide meory of international relations b of any use
a a normative real-world meory?
For me second origina position to be enacted by individuals Rawls
would need to completely give up his meory of justice for a domestic soci
ety, since me country borders woud play no role at all . Ir would mae
even bigger idealistic cm on me rea world c Rawls's dscptve idal
theor for me global aena, which, mough idea, has a reistic touch.
Rawls hyomesizes a possible ftre ideal society of peoples, and in order
to do so he relies on his considered judgments, in wich nation state, a
centra actors of me current international aena, stl play an import
role.
Therefore. me question a to whemer a decriptive idel meory of in
ternationa relations c be of any use for a normative meory of real world
is to be aered afrmatively. Rawls claims that political philosophy has
four distnctive roles, one of which is orientation. Using our reaon we
should fnd our bearings in me concepr space of al possible ends: indi
vidual, asociationa, politica. socia (Rawls. 2003, p. 3) .
Raw's T. lw ofPrp/ a Guidclinc for tc World Wc Know Ir 2 1 5
Hence, descriptive idel teor is O have an orientational role i n ad
vacing a politica1 culture and developing poltica conscience is a long
proces:
[ . . . ] te groune of constitutiona democrac ad the bais of it rights and
duties need to be continuly discussed in a the many asociatons of civl
society a pa of citin' understding ad educaton prior to tng part in
political life. Thee maters need to be par of the politic cutre; they
should not dominate dy-to-day content of ordinay politic, but mut be
presupposed ad operating in a bacground (Rwls, 2002, p. 1 02) .
Aser to Poge
Pogge' s argument about how the law of people alows rich count ries U
msue global institutions, or even te objection about Rawls's nelect of
individualism, fails at the level of a dcriptive ial theor. If Rawls had
been more precise about how the globa institutions were to work, then
Pogge's objection would stand. Poge's complains about globa inequaity,
etc. , ae imply criticisms of politicians and politic of nowadays, and re
quire normative theory for justifcation.
A to Poge's quetion a O why we have O come O terms with teo
rie that oppose O Iiberaism in the international arena, I would anser
that Rawl' s approach is not at al accommodating with ay non-liberal
theorie, but ony decent theories, which we c include in our refective
equilibrium. without immediately rejecting them. The conclusions that we
draw a a consequence of our refection modif what we have etablished
in the domestic case, which doe not men that such conclusions cnot
be modifed again in order to fvour liberaism completely. Th woud be
an ultimate wish of Rawls' s.
The objection that hierarchcal societies do not mae any concesion is
aso incorrect. Hierarchica1 societies start a dialogue with societie that do
not share their comprehensive doctrine.
Finally, do we hve to accept non-liberal societies indefnitely? Since
Rawls's main goal is peace - established on reaonable ground -, then I
do not see why our acceptance of non-libera societies should not lat for
eer, provided that such an arragement brings peace and staility, and
decent people behave a decribed in Kstan.
Furthermore, whie criticizing the vagueness of te term peopls, Pogge
states that Rawls make no efon O show that his concept of people re
fects "general ad entrenched fcts in the contemporary world" (Rawl,
2002, p. 21 0) . In my vie, the term peopls doe mirror the state of ou
world's afairs inamuch a peoples are an ideaied version of relly est-
21 6 Milic Trnoic
ing societies. We get co such an ideaised conception as a reaction to me
disstisfaction mat we fed regarding our world, and me ide of peopls is
merefore a guideline for me frther devdopment of me state-entities mat
popuate me world mat we live in.
However, by lettig me ideised versions of me states interact wim
one another on a vn international arena will not hdp solve me specifc
problems of me real world, at let not in me pramatic and striccy em
pirical sense mat Poge epects. Poge is mixing to diferent levels of
agumentation. The same is tre for Poge's concerns wim Rawls's "e
planatory nationalism". Complans about "eplanator nationalism" are all
pan of our considered judgments: Poge's dissatisfaction wim current
globa organisations and ttade areements, his statisticl data about me
world poveny and need for its alleviation, etc. , need to fnd meir place in
normative meory, not in descriptive idea meory.
Pogge's idea for a global meory of justice takes place at me levd of
our considered judgments about me current state of our world's afs.
Thus, Pogge looks for principle tt would have a normative rdevace
for a global meory of justice mat be able to have an impact on me people'
conditions of eistence. In so doing, Pogge fl to see mat Rawls's meory
is of a lager scope. Pogge's dilemma is how to prevent me eisting, and
obviously unreaonable, afuent coutie from eploitng globa institu
tions in order to fmer meir interests, wherea Rawls asks "how would a
world of well-ordered societies look like?" Rawl goes beyond me liits of
what is possible here and now ad in tt way is relistically utopian.
Concusion
If we bear in mind me distinction beteen normative and descriptive parts
of idea meorie we become able to organize ou mouhts about me prob
lems of me rea world and me possibilities for its devdopment. Omerise,
inste of epanding me "limits of practical political possibility" we run
me risk of looking for answers in me wrong concepr domain. In my
view, mis is eaccy what Poge doe. Wimout questioning his objections
to me current state of me world - objections tt I hold to be completdy
right -, my point is mat he fl to see tt Rawls is giving a guideline for a
possible, mough in ne-term maye not achievable societ of peoples.
Ramer man a ter-book on international law, Rawls is giving u a philoso
phica account of global justice.
Raw', Th l DfP"p/ a Guieinc fr tc Worfe Wc Kow Ir 21 7
References
Buchanan, A (2006). "Taking the Human out of HU Rights". RwL' Lw 0/
Popl. A Ralitc Utopia? R Mai and David A. Reidy (ed). New York.
Blackwell. Pp. 1 50- 1 59.
Burg, W. V der ( 1 997). "he Impotance of Ideas". Joural 0/ Valu Inquir.
Vol. 3 1 . No. 1 . Pp. 23-37.
Pog, T. (2006) . "00 Rawls's Two terie of 'Jutice Fir Together?". RwL'
Lw 0/ Popls. A Ra/itc Utpi? Re Main and David A. Reidy. (e) .
New York. Blackell. Pp. 206-225.
RawIs, J. (2002) . Th Lw 0/ Popl. Cambrid M. Hard University
Pres.Bug, W. V der ( 1 998) . "Ide and Idea Ter". Rctv Equilb
rum. Es I in Honour 0/ Rbm Hag". Wirben V der Burg und The van
WUUgenburg (eds. ). BerUn. Heiddberg. Sprnger-Verlag. Pp. 89-99.
RawIs, J. (2003). Juc a Fairs. Cambrid M. Hard Univerity Pres.
I Economic Justice
Towards Fair Terms of Economic Cooperation
Heiner Michel
Introduction
Tang into account me dramatic progres in productive technolog and
me considetable incree of global trade. one might expect mat human
knd is living in something dose to an economic paadise. In fact. we are a
very far cry from it. Far too many people are living in profound misery.
largely eduded fom me benefts of economic progres. and even rich
countries are subject to severe economic constraints. There is no doubt
mat me current fnancial and economic crisis has severdy agravated eco
nomic shortcomings. but me situation w not rosy before. Apparency.
economic progres does not translate direccy into huma devdopment.
There are many reons why economic progress fl short of its poten
tial. This paper concentrate on to isues of frness in trade: frst. me
unfir distribution of burdens due to systematic shoncomings of free
trade. and. second. unfir shae of globa economic cooperation. Wm
repect to (un)fr shares. me paper sugets a baic principle: everyone
who contributes to me increingly global division of labour should derive
a fr return fom it. The concern of me paper. j ustice wimin me eco
nomic sphere. is not a substitute for. but a complement to omet ap
proaches to global j ustice. In me terminolog of Philippe Van Parijs me
scope of me paper fl wimin me realm of peripheral globa j ustice (Van
Parijs. 2007) .
A eination of frness in trade cannot do wimout some econom
ics. Becuse me panicular vie of economics which provides me back
ground of mis paper difers from me libera view. which will be filiar to
most fom public debates and economic tetbooks. some remarks might
be hdpf by way of darifction. The paper adopt me approach of old
sryle institutional economics. wich holds mat. j you want to know wht
me economy is. you have to te a dose look at its institutions. fom me
oldest market reguation to me most recent Financia Serices Act.
Institutional economic is a moroughly normative approach: it is not
concerned wim fnctoning economic institutions alone. but also wim fir
222 Heincr Michel
economic institutions. Institutional economics tie LO overcome me eu
rent problematic division of labour bereen economic, which is eclu
sively concerned wim a efdent economy, and philosophy, which is
eclusively concerned wim isue of fairness and justice. Institutional eco
nomics considers economic instittions a me which allow sodety co
infuence and U steer economic afairs. It belong U me lager family of
political economic approache, which regad economics a a technque or
a 3 of steering me economy. libera or mainste economics, by con
trat, depicts me economic sphere as governed by eterna economic law,
similar to laws of nature, and it never tires of wang against interering
wim mee economic laws.
The paper works wim a wide notion of liberal or mainstream econom
ics, encompasing vaious classical and contemporay schools of economic
thought. Ir cnsiders a liberal any approach in economics, which em
brace four basic preuppositions:
( 1 ) Methodlogcal individulism: every economic phenomenon is
eplained a me reult of me rational behaviour of individual economic
aent.
(2) Superior ef eenc 0/fe market: me spontaneous self-organisation
of makets is assumed co ensue superior efdency.
(3) Seentim: liberal economic considers itself co be a branch of socia
sdence in search of economic laws, which ae considered as analogous co
me laws of nate.
(4) Value-eedm: libera economics operates wim a fact-value dchot
omy and depicts itelf a being exclusively concerned wim fcts.
The four preuppositions ae spelled out for reasons of clarifcation ad by
way of contrast wim institutional economic. We will encouter ad cha
lenge only me frst and me second preupposition direccy - namely,
memodologie individualism and the superior efdency of fee market.
I. Towards Fairness in Trade
liberal economics cm co have a eure for me insufdent traslation of
economic progres imo human development. For most reders, me sug
geted solution will come a no surprise: it is free trade. Watever prob
lems mere may be with economic globalisation, free trade is not co blame.
Wen confronted wim the patent discontent with economic globalisation,
libera economics rshes co accuse fccors omer c free trade, such as
incompetent and corrupt government, me lack of loea infratrctre,
armed conicts, global monopolie, me persistence of trde barriers, ad
so on.
T owd.Far T cs of Economic Copcraron 223
There is no doubt mat liberal economics is right to emphaise mese
causes of global poverty and insufcient human development. In partieu
lar, it is right to blame me persistence of trade barriers. Tarif, quota, and
subsidies haper trade and its posible benefts. Even worse, rieh countries
md to rig the res of trade in meir fvour. There are numerous e
amples of mis: rieh countries subsidise agriculrral products for expon
heavily, mus ruining markets on whieh developing countries woud om
erwise be competitive. Wat is more, some of meir taation polieie are
pererse: rieh coutries place higher tif on products from poor coun
trie man on mose fom meir felow rieh countrie, wim pea tif on
manucrured goods where poor countrie could proft most (Stiglitz,
2006, p. 1 8; UDP, 2005, Ch. 4).
Having acknowledged mat liberal economics i s right to blame mese
causes of globa poverty, one key problem reman to be mentioned,
naely me fe trade doctrine itsel Free trade does not work. Ir is not
enough to remove trade barriers. Fair terms of global economie coopera
tion call for more. The paper eallenge mree major arguments commonly
presented in favour of fee trade - the economies 0/ scal arment, me
superior ecienc arment and me comparative advantge arment - and
draw attention to four drawbacks of fee trade: inufcient protection for
inft industries, eternalities, unemployment, and unir shares.
1. 1 . The Economies of Scae Argument
The economies 0/ scal arment holds mat me production of a commodty
become more efcient a me amount of me commodity produced in
creaes. Etending supply beyond me boundaries of me domestie market
would aIow for even larger scales of production, so mat production on a
global scae woud be even more efcient.
The economies of scae aent is sound for many commoditie, in
paticula indutrial commodties. However, in a contet of economie
development me economie of scae argument becomes problematic. In
cenain caes, economes of scae even turn into an arguent againt free
trade. T O reaeh me scae necessary for globa competitivenes, productive
enterprises may require some initial protection from foreign competition
(Stiglit & Charlton, 2005, p. 27) . This is a version of me infant indusrry
argument, whieh holds mat new industrie require a temporary period of
trade protection in order to become etablished (Kugman & Wells, 2006,
p. 424). Of course, me policy of protecting new industries ha to be
weighed aainst its costs, for example aainst me welfe losses of domestie
224 Heincr Michel
consumers who have to pay higer priee far producrs of possibly inferior
quary.
Neerreless, it i an argument for 'aymmetrie' liberaisation, where
the asymmetry, of course, has to be re exact reverse of rhe actual confgu
ration. T oay, liberalation is reguarly forced upon developing countries,
while developed countries uphold reir trade barriers (Stigit, 2006, p.
20) .
I. 2. The Superior Efciency of F ree Markets-Argument
Since Ad Smirh, liberal economies ha been keen to stres the superior
efciency of free markers. Accarding to re liberal vie, &ee markets pro
vide a maimaly efcient mechanism for the coordation of economie
activiry. Competition on free marker force producers to ofer best qualiry
at bet prices. Only rose who are innovative a regards re product or rhe
proces of production are able to of er best producrs at bet prices and will
have market success. In orer words, free makets eercise a imperatve to
innovation: "Innovate or perish!" (an Parijs, 1 995, p. 1 89) .
Unfomately, the argument of re superior efciency of &ee markers
is sound only in pan. Apan from innovation rere is a second, dk route
to market success, whieh is weil known in economics but is frequencly
ignared in public debates. The dak route to market success leads rrough
eternalisation. Producers who shif re cosrs of production onto orhers,
onto workers, onto the communiry or onto re environment, are aso ahle
to sel at the lowet priee. Even worse, in arder to keep up, competing
producers are ofen forced U pusue re sae route of externalisaton. A a
conequence, eernalisation is a notorious plague of &ee markers.
Wirin re domestie economie contet of developed economie, un
wanted eternaties - work far a pittnce, early industrial working condi
tions, child labour, re destuction of re environment, and so on - have
been mare ar less efectively brided by appropriate institutions, such a
lahour leislation, collective bargning rigrs, environmental legislation, a
social welfre system, and innumerahle orers. Today, rhe race to rhe bot
tom has been trigered anew, only rhis time on a globa scae. Unbrided
&ee trade is eroding formerly efective politica1-economie institutions, and
it is preventing rhe founding of new efective intitutions. Globalisation in
the mode of free trade force developing countrie in paieular to increae
economie competitiveness by tolerating externalitie.
There are to reaons far demanding a ban on externalisations, a
moral one ad a politiea-economic one. Fist, rhere are weil kown moral
resons for banning chd labour, for protecting rhe he1th of workers, re
T owd Far Tens of Economic Coperron 225
environment, the sfety of consumers, and so on. Second, there is the
political-economic norm underlying the reaonablenes of price informa
tion and therefore te reaonableness of market themselves: prices shoud
refect the re costs of production, otherise the price information is dis
torted and the distortion underrne the reonablenes of price signal.
Both reons call for a ban on externalisation and for retricting competi
tion to the real of innovation. Best prices and bet qulity should be
reched by innovation only ad never by externaizing costs on the envi
ronment, on the workforce, or on sodety a a whole. The tk today is to
design politica-economic institutions, blockng externaation in eco
nomicaly deeloped countries and, most urgency, in economically devel
oping countrie.
1. 3. The Comparative Advantage-Aguent
David Rcado is credited wth formulating the agment of comparative
advantage, which remains to this day a major tool of economic thought.
Applied to trade it states that international trade i mutully benefdal
provided tat evety count spedae in producing those goods which it
produces comparativel te best. International trade would even be benef
dal for econorcaly less efdent countries, becuse trade enable ech
coutry to transfer it domestic productive resource into comparatively
more efdent sectors of the economy and to draw other goods &om
abroad. Thus, international trade enhances global economic efdency,
enlarge the global economic cake and realie welfre gains even for non
competitive countrie.
P eple already used by Ricdo may sere a an illustration.
There are to countrie, England and Portugal, both of which produce
the same to goods, wine and cloth (Ricardo, 1 973, Ch. 7):
(A) Producton bere intetonal tae (if not stated otherise, numbers signif
producton cost. Ricardo's unit i manpower per year e.g. , in order to produce
1 00 bae of cloth, PonugaI ha to employ 90 workers) :
Porgal
100 bals o/clth 90
100 baml 0/wine 80
Englnd
1 00
1 20
Total producton
200 baIes
200 barrels
226 Heincr Michel
Note eat Engand is less efcient at producing boeh goods. Nevereeless,
concentration on domestic compaative advantage will prove advanta
geous.
(B) Prdudon afr tad and dmtstc specialisaton on sector 0/comparatvt ad
vantge, according t the fel tade idal:
Porgal Englnd Total producton Increae
Clth X 220 220 baes 1 0%
Wne 1 70 X 21 2, 5 barels 6. 25%
A c eaily be seen, ehe model of compaative advantage predcts signif
cant welfre gains due to international trade. What is les easy U see is that
there are so me problematic asumptions and blnd spots in eis model,
to of which shall be discussed in eis paper: unemployment and, in ehe
followng section, unfai shares.
11. Unemplo
y
ment
Wat, if for some reaon demand does not keep up we ee increase of
efciency? Should, for Cple, total demad remain on ee pre-trade
level, ehe resut would be unemployment. A we al know, unemployment
is a al too real sirtion in contemporar economies ad especial y so in
the developing world. Stagnating demand h considerable negative efects
on employment in internationally less competitive countries. To show
this, I wl take up Ricado's eaple onee an. When demand is stag
nating on ee pre-trade level, ehe producer which is more efcient in abso
lute terms, Portugal, Cot redeploy its entire labour force to the sector
in which it is comparatively more efcient. Portuese workers remaining
in ehe comparatively less efcient sector ae in competition wieh ehe Eng
lish workforce and, sinee ehey are producing absolutely more efciency,
drive a certain percentage of English workers out of their jobs.
T owd Far T cs of Economic Copcraton 227
(C) Poducton afr ta and dmstc spcliaton: raI worl conomic with
stgatng dmand (numbe rundd):
Porgal Englnd Totl producton
Cot 1 0 1 89 200 baes
Wim 1 60 X 200 bar els
Unplmmt X 31 ( 1 4 %) 8 % uemployent
There ae to obviou conequence for uemployment cused by insuf
dem demand: frst, in contrat to liberal predictions, mere will be no wel
fre gains in internationally non-competitive economies, but instead an
increae in unemployent and, merefore, welf ae loses. The liberal ar
gument of compaative advantage presupposes mat demand keeps pace
wim me increse in productivity. Baed on me frm belief in me optimal
spontaneous sel-regulation of markers, liberals preuppose fl employ
ment, a condition rarely met wimin me re world. On me contrary, per
sistencly high rates of unemployment plae developing countries. Instead
of an efdency-increaing redeployent of meir dometic workforce, mey
are in need of more employment i me frst place (Stiglit & Chalton,
2005, p. 25). Second, i me real world more men one country is plagued
by uemployment. Ech country stricken by unemployent wl look for
relief. A apparencly e way to overcome domestic unemployment is to
opt for a strateg of eport in an artempt to compensate for me lack of
loca demand by amacting foreign demad. Unfonnately, me epor
srrateg h to seriou repercusions:
(a) Since unemployent i perive, omer coutrie wl adopt me
sae strateg, mereby trigering ferce global competition. Thus, me eist
ence of unemployment eacerbates me problems of protectionism ad of
eternaliztion mentione above.
(b) Even when one country manages to be on me winning side wim
irs expor strateg, mis will merely displace me burden of unemployment
onto omers. On a gIobaI scale, me problem of unemployment remains and
mere wl be no welfre gains.
A brief aside on Kene for me economical y minded reder: Keyne
had a dea view of me repercussions which unemployment is bound to
have on fee trade. We c merefore reject me daim mat h meory i
outdated since it would not - or even could not - take account of eco
nomic globaisation. In his dea and resolute language Keye emphaiz
me malign efecrs of unemployment, which pererts fee trade into "a
desperate expedient to mantan employment at hore by fordng sales on
228 Heincr Michd
foreign markets . . . , which, if succesfl, will merely shin the problem of
unemployment to te neighbour which is worsted in te strg le"
(Keynes, 1 953, pp. 382, 383) .
The ideologica suength of liberal orthodoxy h blocked Keyneian
policies thus f, thouh te ferocity of the current fnancial and economic
crisis appears to have cused some rifs in the frm belief in the superior
self-regulatory capacity of markets, and it ha compelled governments to
flback on demand management by defcit spending, an economic policy
commony, tough perhaps not altogether correctly (Pfefer, 2007, pp. 67-
68), asociated with the name of Keyne.
For the time being we are len with a non-ide world plagued by mass
unemployment. Wat to do? If the Keynesian insight is correct and the
teue cause of unemployment is macro-economic maadjustment, it makes
no sense to blame individual economic actors. That is to say, economic
anaysis prevents us from makng inappropriate acriptions of responsibili
ties.
A tentative solution for a world plagued by persistent mas unem
ployment appels to a principle of fair disuibution of the burdens of
trade-derived unemployment. Unemployent should be borne in solidar
ity, which means that suong shoulders shoud crry more weight. Since
peraive unemployent aggravates the global race to te bouom, addi
tional areements on uade re have to be reched which block externai
sation by defning minimal environmental, labour and wage standards.
III. A Fair Share of the Globa Cooperative Product
111. 1 . Problematic Notions of Productivity
Apart fom eernalisation and unemployment, there is another major
problem with fee uade: what if there are unir shares of uade? Some
economists apper to entern the supicion tat there might indeed be
something like ufair shares of uade, although they fame the problem in
somehat diferent terms. Acknowledging that many developing countrie
derive only tiny revenue fom uade, they advise counuies to climb the
value-added ladder (Stiglit & Charlton, 2005, p. 307; Stiglit, 2006, p.
1 8) . Developing counuies should concentrate on more proftable produc
tion, not on agricultural products but on manuactured products.
The economic advice revels a decidedly afrmative view of market
prices and wages. In the liberal view wages refect the tee productivity of
labour and prices refect the tee eonomic value of a commodity. But is
T owr far Tens of Economic Copcraron 229
the productvity view of wages tenable? Two counterailing eples
mght give rise to frst doubts.
If market wages were to refect the tme vaue of labour, we would have
to conclude that the labour of an eductor cring for children or te work
of a nuse caring for the il is rather worthless by comparison with playing
football in the nationa league. To be sure, liberal economics ofers epla
nations of te huge wage diferences we obsere, for example, by referring
to diferences in distributiona infrastructures. Bur an economic eplana
tion is not a mora j ustifcation. There are considerable doubts that play
ing footbal in the national leue is so many times more important tan
educting children or caring for the il. Judged from a normative point of
view, the reerse is suely the case. The labour of educators and of nurse is
more valuable than playing footbal. That waes do not refect te rel
imponance of labour raises doubts abour the productivity view prevalent
in liberal economics.
The second example: a Congolese physicia immigrating to New
York, where she fnds employment a a raxi diver. In her ne occupation
she eans more than before when she worked a a physician in Congo.
Should we conclude from cs that driving New Yorkers around the city is
more productive and more valuble than saving the lives of Congolee?
Many economists ae prepared to bite the bullet and maintain eactly that.
They conclude from the obsered wage incree that a productive rede
ployment of labour must have occured. They might lend their conclusion
a veneer of plausibility by appeing to the higher human capital of New
Yorkers in general and the lower human cpita of Congolese in general.
Bur most people would arrive at precisely the opposite conclusion. Saving
life is more important t driving people aroud. In mauers of life and
death it is simply imoral to take considerations of asumed individual
productivity into account. Thus, thee to examples suggest that the no
tion that wage refect the productivity of labou is problematic. To be
fir, they do not consttute decisive arguments against the wae productiv
ity theis; however, they do ct considerable doubt upon it. The net
section tries to sketch the fdamentals of a more systematic account of
fir economic returns.
III. 2. The Globa Diviion of Labour
In developed economies, the production of commodties is orgaized as a
large-scae division of labour. A a result of the process of economic globa
isation, the initialy societal division of labour is increingly being trans-
formed into a global division of labour. The large-scale division of labour
ha importat taonomie and normative consequence.
a. The myth ofindiviul productvit Wen a large-scale division of
lahour is in place, individu contributions cannot be eily acribed and
asessed. To elucidate the difculty, I want to distnguish beteen to
diferent knds of contributions to the economic whole. The frst knd is
immediate and relates to a specwc product. The production of a bicycle
provides a good eample: one worker designs the bike, another welds the
fe, a third asembles the gears, ad so on. Wen thinking about eco
nomic cooperation, what frst come to mind is undoubtedy imedate
contributions to specifc products. But there i a more indirect kind of
contributon. The bicycle producers just mentioned rely on the produc
tion of innumerable other workers. They need steel and aluminium for the
bike, bred and banana to satisE their huger, a roof over their hed,
medical care in times of illness, lega advice to enforce their contracts, and
so on. Because of this complexity, when a large-scale division of labou is
in place, ay attempt to ascribe and asess idividua contributions to the
value of specifc products turns out to be a hopeless endeavour. Ir is i
posible to determine how much of the vaue of the bicycle ha been con
tributed by the weIder, how much by the asembly line worker, how much
by the lawyer enforcing their contracts, how much by the teachers wo
have taught them their metier, and how much by the baker baking the
bread for them a1 (Schmoller. I 923. p. 426; Feinberg. 1 973. pp. 1 1 5f;
Shaw, 1 982, pp. 55-6) .
b. The isue offir shares ha H be discssed at the level ofthe economic
whole ad not at the level of individuals, companies or nations. Ir is an
issue of how to dis tribute the product of the social - ad increaingly
globa - cooperation.
Discusing the issue of fair shaes merely at the level of the compay
neglects the fact that companie might have drawn unfir shae. The
revenues of cleaning contractors, for example, ae dwarfed by the revenue
of internatonal invetment bans, ad it is by no means cle that ech
company got its far share. Discusing fir share at the level of companies
fail to take account of te fct that economic cooperation entails more
tha immediate contributions to a specifc product. The same holds for
retricting discussions of fr shares to the nationa level. There is no gua
antee that the national share i a fr share. So me countries mght reap
unfir gans from global economic cooperaton while others lose out.
Together with the dvision of labour, the scope of the principles under
lying economic cooperation now eceed national boundarie. Ir would be
simply arbitrar to man that principle of fair economc cooperation
T owd.Far T cs of Economic Copcraton 23 1
shoud b confned to me nation-state while me cooperation h uan
scended it.
c. The economic reciprcit dmand: A demand of reciprocity underlies
economic cooperation. Everyone who contribute to me social and in
creasingly global product should receive a fir return for meir contribu
tion. Giving and tang should stand in a reciprocal relation to each omer.
The economic reciprocity demnd needs to be fehed out. We nced
criteria i n terms of which fr retuns c be determined. The following
section ais to clif me reciprocity demand by employing a pluralist
approach. Ir preents three principles as promising cdidate for eplicat
ing economic reciprocity. Note mat me tee principle establish a norma
tive bonom Ue for fair returns, while leaving ample room for me frce play
of supply and demand above t Une.
III. 3. Wat is a Fair Return for One's Lbou?
Wen discussing me issue of a fair return for one' s contributions, me pro
posed argument concentrate on a particular kd of economic contribu
tion, namely me contribution of labour. In omer words, me argument
raise the old and morny issue of jut wages. Ir leve unened me ques
tion of whemer mere are omer kd of productive conuibution, most
prominendy me supply of capital.
a. The Artelin Prncipk: A Living Wag fr Al
In me Nicomachean Ethic Aristode voices a fndamental political
economic principle. He maintains tt commodities have to be exchanged
in a proportion which supports me reproduction of me economy as a
whole and, in particu, provides producers wim an adequate material
status (Aistode, 1 1 33a7 f) . To put it diferendy, in a wel-organized
economy everyone's economic contribution should be rerded suf
ciendy for mem to live weil. Aam Smim takes up me Aistotelian de
mnd in his Wealth 0/ Nations and elaborates upon it fmer:
A man mut aways live by his werk, and his wage must at leat be sufcient
to maintain hir. . . . . No society C surely b fourishing and happy, of
which the f greter par of the members [te worken] are poor and ms
able. Ir is but equity, beides, mat they who feed, doath and lodge the whole
boy of te peple, sboud have such a share of the produce of their O la
bour a to b themselves tolerably weU fed, doathed and loded (Srith,
1 99 1 , pp. 72, 83).
232 Heiner Michd
Granted, me frst part of me quote c also be red in merely fnctional
terms. The sustainable reproduction of labour power cls for a living
wage. The second part is explicitly normative, however, and echoes me
Aristotelia and Scholastic legacy of a j ust w. The quote appeas to to
norms, in panicular: frst. labour. in Smim's view me only productive
economic factor. is entitled to a fair share of its product; second, me
meaure of a fir shae is me material bais of a decent and even fourish
ing huan life. Rea wages below t bottom line ae unjust. They are
noming more t work for a pittance.
b. The Smithian Prncil: To Bah Accorng to Their Toil and Troubl
"The real price of every tng, what every ming rely rosts me m who
wats to acquire it, is me toH and trouble of acquiring it. " (Smim, 1 99 1 ,
p. 36) .
This quotation is taken from a chapter of me Wealth 0/Naton in
which Smim develops an argument in support of what economists call me
labour meory of value. Leving technical details of me labour meory of
value aside, me quote c aso be given a normative reading. If toH and
trouble are me rel rosts of production, reciprocity demand mat everyone
shoud be compenated for meir re costs. Everyone should receive com
pensation for me objectve hardhips of meir work.
The principle focues on me 'input side' of economic contributions. Ir
refers to mose characteristic of a tak which are hardous, harsh or j ust
dull ad boring for everyone. Liberal economics preents compensation
for me hardshps of labour a a key fctor in explaining acr wage difer
ence. In me liberal view, only me amenities of money induce people to
endure me hardships of labour. In order to explain me huge wage of cer
tain economic position. liberal economic refers to me specia hardships
of prolonged period of education and me eraordiary burdens of great
reponsibilitie.
Here libera economic is informed by a normatively sound inight -
me hardships of labour should be recompensed. However, when it comes
to asesing me rel hardships of labour, me asumption of liberal econom
ics is mistaken. Pasing of prolonged periods of education or special re
sponsibility a me rea hardships of work is misleading. The education of
talent is largely self-rewarding and responsibility is not a mere buden but
aso a valuable opportunity to shape huma afairs.
fen, me re economic world doe not ronform to me principle of
compensation. SkilIed labour generally beneft from a double advantage -
satisfing taks ad high remuneration - were unskilled labour gener
ay sufers fom a double disadvantage - low pay for dull and upleaant
T owd.Far T cs of Economic Copcraron 233
labour, especialy so in the set shops of the developing world. Apart
fom the normative principle of compensation, there is a politica
economie reon which support the compensation of the hardships of
labour. Compensating hardhips increae the rationaity of price by mak
ing the re costs of production visible. Today, the toH and trouble of
sweatshop labour are disguised by low priee.
C. To Bah What Th Dsre
" To ach what sh drs T endency of those who are comfonably of to
believe that this is what is actually happening." (Shaw, 1 982, p. 60) .
The principle of desert refers mainly to the output side of economie
contributions and elucidates an important dimension of economic recip
rocit. There is a vat array ofliterare dealing with the principle of deert
(Pojman & MacLeod, 1 999) . For the purposes of this paper, I would sug
gest that deert has a tofold bais. Everyone who demonstrates out
standing commitnt or special achiemt in their work is owed a due
reard. Examples of special achievements are contributions to the ad
vancement of human well-being, such a the discovery of new remedie for
diseases p\aguing huanknd, the development of new macro-economie
devices which enable u to eradicate the evil of underemployment, or the
creation of ne forms of musica and poetical expression.
Wit respect to the commitmmt with whieh a tak is performed, deert
becomes democratic. Everone is cpable of acquiring desen a a result of
special commitent. The dedicted techer who a1ways h an open ear
for the problems of her students and successfly encourae them to
elaborate their skills, deseres a reward for her eforts. The same hold for
the conscientiou street sweeper who does not use every opportunity to
dode work. There appears to be a connection beteen the commitment
bais of desert and the economie interdependence which arises fom the
lage-scale division of Iabour. If everyone reHes on the contribution of
innuerable others, everyone relies on a certain level of performance. Ths
constitutes a political-economie reson for providing incentive for a cer
tain level of commitment and performance.
There is a puzle concerning the bais of deert. On the one had,
outstanding contributions to the welfre of others - in other words, to
their subjective utility - apper to constitute a suitable bais of desen and
reciprocit. People apper to desere economie reward 'for the contribu
tion they m to the welfre of others by providing goods and serices
that others want' (Miller, 1 999, p. 1 84). On the other hand, there are
cenain problems with this view. Apart from the taxonomie problem of
assessing who ha contributed how much to the utHit of a product, the
234 Hcincr Michel
yards tick of subjective utWty is inherencly problematic. Grappling with
the issue of jut prices, Thoma Aquia alredy pointed out that opting
for the metric of subjective utility entail unwelcome consequences. Ir
woud legitimise tang advantage of people who are detitute. A seiler, for
eple, would be allowed to seil a botde of water to a person who is
parched in the desert for an absurdly high sumo And according to the
yads tick of subjective utWty, a pharmacist woud be jutifed in charging
fntay prices for cheaply produced, but life-saving antibiotic. Because of
these unwelcome consequences, Thoma dmisse the yardstick of subjec
tive utility atogether. On a closer examination, he puts forard a general
principle for his rejection: people should not charge others for something
they have not brought about themselves. Since seilers do not bring about
the advantage of buyers, they are not justifed to charge tem for their
subjective utility (Thoma Aquina, 2. 2, q. 77, at. 1 ) .
Thoma i s right to reject taing advantage of the unorrnate circ
stances of others. Desperte exchages have to be blocked (alzer, 1 983,
p. 1 02) . Hi s agument also successfl y reftes subjective utility a a yad
stick of fair returns. Ir would be absurd to demad rewarding pharmacists
or physicias exacdy according to te subjective utility of teir goods and
serice. Neerteless, there ae strong inri tions wich sugest tat sub
j ective utility should be refected to a certain erent in remuneration.
Those who contribute to the welfre of others, however welfae is U be
understood, desere some reard. This suggests a tentative concluion: fair
returns should refect eceptional contribution to the welfare and, more
broady, to te fourishing life of others to a certain extent.
III. 4. The Unemployment Objection of Libera Economics
There is a host of objections against far shaes. This section aims to fend
of jut the most prominent objection leelled ainst far retuns, namely
the unemployment-objection of libera economics. For libera economists,
any reisation of fir returns constitutes a textbook eple of well
meaning but ill-conceived economic ' interentionism'. According to lib
eral economic, fair wages sere only to increae unemployment and U
decreae the total economic cake. Downward wage-fexibility is seen a a
indispensable meure for clearing the labour market (Stigler, 1 946) .
However, we shoud refrain fom embracing the liberal unemployment
objection too rahy. A brief consideration of the real economic world
inspire initia doubts concerning te aleged caus connection bereen
the fudty of wages and employment. Depite allowing for lowest wages
and een work for a pittance, deeloping countries are commony plagued
T owd Par Tens of Economic Copcrron 235
by persistencly high rates of unemployment. But if low wage advace
employment, how come that meir rate of uemployment ae so persi
tencly hig?
Wimout doubt, unemployment exerr presure on wages. According
[0 economic orthodoxy, mis is a blesing becaue wages fall unt the ma
ket-clering price for labour is reached. How is this supposed to occur? Ir
is asumed mat a single employer would employ more workers, if wages
were fling. However, she wl employ more workers only under one con
dition, namely i she epecrs that demand for her goods wl be stimulated
by reduced price, which she is able U oler becaue of her reduced labour
cosr. In order [0 seil more goods at reduced price, aggregate or macro
economic demand h [0 remain at leat COltant. But if we go beyond me
narow perspective of the microeconomic level ad take account of me
wider perspective of me macro-economic level, we must acknowledge mat
what hold on me micro-Ievel of a single employer does not hold for me
macro-Ievel of all employers. If all workers have [0 put up wim lower
wages, agregate demand canot be asumed [0 remain constt. Ramer it
is going to shrink and the desired positive elect on employment wl fal
[0 materialise. Keynes raise c objection anst a core asumption of
libera economics:
The argment simply is that a reducton in money-wages wiu Cl. par. stimu
Iate demad by diminishng the price of the fnihe product, and wl tere
fore increae output ad employment up to te point where te reduction
wich labour agreed to accpt in its money-wage is jut ofset by the dmin
ihng magina efdency of Imour a output (fom a given eupment) is in
creaed. [ . . . ] Jf thi is the groundwork of the agument (and if it i not, J do
not kow what it is) , surely it is fadou. Ir i invaid [ . . . ] to transfer the ar
gment to indutr a a wole unless we also trafer ou asumption that the
agegate efective demad i fxed (Keynes, 1 953, pp. 257, 259).
On account of me direct repercusions of wages on agregate demand, me
wage level LGNN0 fnction a a market-clering price for labour. The result
of falling wages is defation, not a eradcation of uemployment. Only by
putting on microeconomic blinkers c me unemployment objection of
libera economics be sustained.
Should the Keynesia argument hold, the reisation of me normative
idel of giving a fr slice of me global economic cake [0 everyone - in
paicular, to mose at me lower and me lowest end of me wage sce -
does not reult in incree unemployment. Instead, me prices of com
moditie would incorporate me needs, the [O and trouble, ad me deert
of producers. Readers who are reluctant [0 embrace Keyness agument on
me spot might be more eaily convnced by a second, empirical argument.
In genera, me wages of workers in me developing world aount [0
236 Heiner Michd
merely a tiny faction of me rerl price of products in rieh counuies. Even
multiplying wages would resut in only small increase in me fmal prices
and, merefore, in negligible efect on consumer behaviour; but it woud
signifcantly improve me Iving conditions of workers and boost me epor
revenues of poor coutries.
N. A Political-Economic Ouclook
We have discovered four major sytematie shorcomings of fee trade. Free
trade provide no protection for innt induuies in developing countries,
it does not block externaitie, it enrls me risk of merely increaing un
employent, and it does not guarantee fair shares. Wim repect to me
remaining shortcomings, me fna section dismisse an individualist ap
proach which bet on me morality of consumers and argues for fr and
efective economic institutions.
a. The Moral Saint Approach
Theorists dose to libera economics and grasroots activist sugest mat
conumers should exert meir economie power and buy emicaIy. This
suate ha one major disadvantage: consuers do not bomer. At me cah
point, consumers behave a libera economic predicts, namely Iike ra
tional egoists. Their only concern is me lowet priee. There is ample em
pirica evidence of mis. The globa share of fir trade is negligible, j ust
0. 01 per cent of trade. The averae Germa, mrify a ever, currently
spends about 1 . 70 Euro per year on fr uade product; me averae
Aeric, hdy more generous, spends about 2. 50 Euro. Wile me aver
ae Briton spends at let around 1 2 Euro, mey are a1 put to shae by me
average Swis who consumes fair trade product worm almost 2 1 Euro per
yer. In Germany, me market share of one of me bet-known fair uade
product, cofee, which is redily available in major supermarkets, is about
1 . 5 percent (all data fom 2007; see Ma Havelaa-Stifung, 2008). There
is a lesson to be lened from mis empirica fnding: in a market economy,
it is betrer not to rely on mora sants. Amough it is in line wim me indi
vidualist paradgm of liberal economics, relying on benevolent consumers
is bound to fil.
The empirical data are aso unfvouable to me preferred solution of
business emics, namely relying on corporate socia responsibiity. If con
sumers do not cae, mis hpers substantive eforrs of corporate social
reponsibility. Avoiding harmf externaation and eploitation simply
T owd Par Tens of Economic Copcrron 237
does not pay. This is why we are still waiting for fairly produced conumer
electronics and why early industrial working conditions are still te norm,
and not the exception, in developing countrie.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, let me state clearly that this ref
tation of the moral saint approach is not intended a a criticism of fair
trade organisations. They are thoroughly admirable orgaations which
secure decent standards of work and remuneration for millons of workers
in the deeloping world. I just doubt whether one shoud rely on benevo
lent consumers a a genera strategy for relising fair terms of gobal eco
nomic cooperation. There are simply too few of them. So the question is:
how to block harmf externaisation and unfair shaes? I want to sketch
briefy an intermediate and a long-term strateg.
a. Te Interediate Strateg: Fair Import Policies 01Developed Countries
Developing countries woud be iII advised to esrablish eernaity-blocking
institutions and substantive minimum we legislation unilateraly, be
caue they would tereby merely price temelve out of the maket. They
are i competition wth too may other coutrie whic are ready to e
ploit their own desperate workforce. This eplains why minimum wage
legislation, i it ets at aI, is generaly not very abitious, oten requiring
wages even below the level of domestic Iiving wages, and why tere is a
coniderable lack of enthusiam for enorcing miimum wages and other
lega standard. Ir fthermore eplains the popularity of special eport
zones which undercut even the low domestic environmenta, !abou and
remuneration stadrds.
Forrnately, aother strateg is available. Developed countries, on
their part, should waive the gains they derive &om exploitative labour and
environental destruction in developing countrie. Insted, they should
turn U fair import policie by isisting on minima standards of remu
neration, labour law, collective bargaining rights, and environmental pro
tection. A promising example links import quota with compliance with
labour standds (Sibbel & Borrmann, 2007) .
Needless to say, there is a danger that fair import policies wl be per
verted into new forms of protectionism. Thu the policies shoud be set up
in cooperation with NGOs, dometic unions, ad te ILO.
b. The Long- Ter Strateg: Fair and Efective Global Intitutions
There eists one suirable remedy for deling with te shortcomings of free
trade. They should be dealt with in te same way in wh ich the shortcom
ings of &ee markets have been det with from the very beginng, namely
238 Heiner Michd
by designing appropriate politica-economic institutions which block e
ternalities efectively, which retrict competition to the feld of innovation,
which gtee fir shares and protect inft industrie in deeloping
countrie, and so on. In pursuit of these goals we have to ramp up national
institutions or to set up entirely new institutions. T ag a c10ser look at
the poltical-economic institutions developed by the Europen Union and
their potentia for being extended to the global leel might prove to be
panicularly rewarding in this regard.
Conclusion
This paper has been dedicated to a systematic analysis of te weaesse of
the doctrine of free trade. There is no need to emphasise mat the critique
of free trade is not a criticism of trade or markets a such. Market are
efcient instrent for coordinating economic activity, also on a global
scale. The paper ha aimed to provide systemtic arguments for establsh
ing appropriate economic institutions, for blockng unwelcome conse
quences of economic activity and for securing fr terms of global eco
nomic cooperation. Anst the background of a deepened fnancia and
economic crisis, fir and efective institutions of trade appear to acquire
panicula importance and urgency.
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Whip Cosmopolitanism into Shape: Asessing Thoma
Pogge's Globa Resources Dividend a an Instrument
of Globa Justice
Paulo Barclos
Ad who is my neigbor?
Lue, 1 0:29
A! if we would t les of being huane ad calcate more, reaone,
and took a conscienoou attirude to our dutie!
Aton Cheko, "Te Wie"
I
I will address Thoma Pogge's Glbal Rsources Dividn (GRD) in a [o
fold way: as an illustration and a a pretet. On the one had, a way of
defending a distributive conception of global jutice from [o major criti
cisms: that wich ct doubt upon the practical feasibility of such a
scheme, and tat which contest its moral reonableness. I will tty to
acertain both the mora justifction and the viability of the GRD, even
in the Westphalia state system.
On the other hand, I will employ the GRD a a pretext for advancing
a principle of globa distribution that sythesizes and the global egalitarian
position and te statist scepticism towards such a stance - that is, to su
tain that within a cosmopolitan perspective there is room for the eistence
of special distributive duties aong co-citizens. Using a a conceptu
fameork some terms of Herben Hat' s taxonomy of right I shal seek to
propose, contra Pogge, the eminencly dual chacter of the individu's
dutie facing others, comprising an univeral duty towards humaty at
large ad a equaly vaid set of specifc duties towads those with whom
he has some son of special rdationship .
I shal start by following Thoma Nagd i n h statement that a dis
tibutive conception of globa jutice is uuly fced wit [o common
I indebled tO Gabride Oe AngeHs fr bis helpful cmment on my paper ad
overl euemely cf editing of te volume.
242 Paulo Bacdos
objecrions (Nage!, 2005). These call into question the very possibility of
estence of such a criterion of evaluaton and reformuarion of global
socio-economic sytems ad institutions as a way of recting aganst world
poverty and inequaity.
The frst agument opposed to global jutice cats doubt on its practi
cal feasibility. Ir derives &om the understading of every consideration of
jusrice as being congenitaly bound to te existence of a sovereign state.
Moral rues c, certainly, be achieved by intelection alone, but teir
coming into being a polirica norms that regulate social insrturions and
practice depends on its insertion on a juridical system backed by an au
thority which, disposing of the monopoly on the legitimate use of phyical
force (Weber, 2002), might compe! obedience to the laws. In short, the
efectuation of justice in a social contet depends on the existence of a
state. Given te fct that the global order doe not constitute such a politi
ca body nor ay other where there is an ulrimate sovereign that might put
laws to practice, adherents of the global jusrice theis disregad one of te
basic dictates of modern polirics. decreed by Hobbes in the chapter 26 of
his "Leviathan": Auetorta, non vert, fah lege.
Aong wit this argument, that devaluates a firness-based global ju
tice as an impracticble utopian chimera. there i a second chalenge.
which quetions its philosophical j ustifcarion. A distributive conception
of globa jusrice. deriving as it doe from te principle of moral cos
mopolitanism. must start fom the premise of the uversal statu of every
hU being a the utimate uit of moral concern and. therefore. of the
equal right of every person, irrespective of their national origin. to have a
stake in the allocation of social goods. The critic of t approach claim
that such distributive design of baic institrons may only legitiate!y be
brought into play where there is a strong polirical bond aong individu
als. One may establish a duty of charity or humaitarian asistance to
wads peoples outside our societ. but if we are to think of distributive
priciple there is no point in extending it scope beond the group of
people with whom we share a scheme of cooperation comprised of legal
and economic rules and polirical institutions. ]utice iso thus. an asociative
obligaton. ad it is morally unjustifed to extend it beyond the borders of
the State, which constitute a scheme of cooperation tat deeply shape
the citiens' lve and upon wh ich the colective weil being is dependent
on.
This said. my aim in cs paper wil be tofold. Firsty. 1' 11 briefy ex
pose Thoma Poge's Glbal Resourees Dividnd (GRD) and t to prove
that it consritutes an instrument of a cosmopolitan economic justice that
succeeds in overcoming the above mentioned criricisms. tat is both mor
ally justied and viable in the Westphaian state system. Secondly. I shall
Wip Cosmopolitnism into Sha 243
apply me GR a a illusuation, a a pretext for developing a proposition
for a principle of globa distribution mat seeks to synmesize me statist ad
me globa egalitian clams, mat is, to sustan mat witn a cosmopolitan
perspective mere is room for me existence of special ditributive dutie
aong co-citizens.
11
Pogge advances me moral justifction of me GR mrough me enuncia
tion of mree baic ad interoven asumptions about poveny and ine
quaity. First of all, he itroduces a shif in me way me moral obligation of
me well-of towad me poor is uually conceived. Ir h traditionally been
asued mat, if such an obligation w to be conceived, it shoud rest
upon a positive duty on me side of me weH-of to asist mose in acute
distres. This duty to help when fced wim suferig is what underlies
charity and humanitarian aid, but it leve room for individuals to ignore
hams mey feel have not been brought about by meir direct action, espe
cialy if such harms happen to distat omers in me opposite part of me
world. To Poge, anchoring me obligation towads distant omers merely
on a positive duty to help woud, merefore, not be enough. Wat he en
deavours i, insted, to shif me attitude towads poveny fom me feld of
charity to me sphere of justice, and mus he advances me plea for "radica
inequity a an injustice mat involves violation of a negative duty by me
better-of (Poge, 2002) . This negative duty require u "not to uphold
injustice, not to conuibute to or proft fom me unjust impoverishent of
omers" (Poge, 2008, p. 40) . What he sustains when he enunciates mis
duty a being violated by me weH-of i mat me stat of me impoverished
is dependent on me action of me former, whose wem is correlated wim
me poveny of me lauer, since they bom share an order of instittional
practice mat place individus in a scheme of deep economic interde
pendence. They shae, in brief, what Rawls ha termed me "baic strcture
of society", or more eactly, "me way in which me major soci intitu
tions distribute fndamenta rights ad dutie ad determine me division
of advantae from socia cooperation" (Rawls, 1 971 , p. ?) . In concuion,
ayone who pasively contributes to me maintaning of a unr soci
suucture is violating a negative duty ad merefore harming me poor.
This clm opens me way to me second asuption, pertaing to me
scope of me baic suucte. Pogge sustains mat mis scheme of interde
pendence mat consuains individual choices and posibilities - me frst ad
foremost feld of application of me principle of justice, according to
Rawls - is not merely preent at me level of me domestic society embodied
24 Paulo Bacdos
by the Nation-state, but has an imernational equivalem. Societies, in fact,
are nm cosed self-sufciem entitie, and te reons for their poverty (and
conequently for the poverty of their citizns) are not merely endogenous.
A Poge convincingly demonstrates, states ae imerconnected through a
globa netark of market trade and diplomacy mt subjects poor societies
O the mIe of the world economy deigned by the afuem coumrie in
virtue of teir vasrly superior mlitary and economic strengt. Thee me
and practices contitute a globa basic stmcture analogous O the domestic
one, wrch is naturally iplicted in the reproduction of the esting radi
cal inequaity beteen people and individus. Trs is frther reinforced
by the fact that in imernational economic competition the state do not
share te same starting positions, since some peoples - usualy those which
remain poor - were subjected O a history of coloniztion peraded by
grievous wrongs that severely traumatized teir cultures and institutions
and consequently prevemed tem &om accomplishing welfre.
Thee sources of global injutice auet Poge's third assumption,
which is te corollary of the to mat preceded it. State boundaie, he
sustans, ae morally irrelevant in a distributive j utice reasoning. In the
words of Chales Bein, who share this asumption wit Pogge, "since
boundaries ae nm coextensive wit the scope of sodal cooperation, tey
do nm mark the limits of social obligations" (Bein, 1 979, p. 1 5 1 ) . Ir is,
thus, through such argumemation that both Poge and Beitz respond O
and surmoum te second baic criticism of egalitarian global justice con
ceptions I aluded O in the beginning of the tet. Even if we conceive te
principle of justice as being stricty associative obligatons, deigned O
regulate the societie' baic stmcture, then, far the same reaons, tey will
also have O be applied imernational y, since tere is a second-Ievel baic
structure at the globa level.
Surmoumed that second instance of criticism of cosmopolitan teo
rie, Poge's conception stil has O face the frst one, which doubts of teir
practical feaibility. This shall be done by advandng the terms of the dis
tributive mechanism Poge proposes for te redesign of te world eco
nomic ground mies: the Glbal Resources Dividn.
Irs purpose and method follow &om a not yet mentioned source of
global injustice that Poge additionaly considers: the uncompensted
eclusion of the world poar from the use of natural resource. He cm
that tere is an inerem unevenness in the currem appropriation of goods
&om the world's resere. They are, in te vat majority, consumed by te
popuation from the afuem state withoUl giving an equitahle compen
sation O te global y leat wei-of for their disproportionate conump
tion, since what those wethy state pay far the importation of resources
Iike oll goe O te produdng countrie' national elite ad not O te peo-
Wip Cosmopolitism into Shapc 245
pie at the bottom of the economic chan. Those people are, nevenhdess,
entitled to a fair share of the lited natural supplies. Ir is to advanee a
frer re-equilibriu of the distribution of the world's reourees that Pogge
proposes a dividend that "modifes conventiona propeny rights so a to
give legal efect to a inaienable moral right of the poor" (Poge, 2005, p.
52) .
The GR takes the form of a tax on consumption, to be applied on
the eaction of any kind of resource on the territory of every state. To
guaatee the reaonablenes of the ley, not eery resouree would be
taed and there would be a diferentiation on the standard of tation
according to ech good: the GR, for instance, should not be imposed on
the land used for cultivation of basic agricutural commodities (Pogge,
1 994, p. 203) . Ir will, conversdy, be baed on reources ad pollutats
with high resource content and whose discouragement of ue seem espe
cialy desirable for the sake of fture generatons, emde oil etraction be
ing the clasic exaple. Poge estimates that a modest taxation - corre
spondent to 1 % of gross world product, for instance - would be sufient
to prevent the devdopment of ecessive inequates and hence to guaran
tee the presertion of globa background justice.
One of the strength of this modd is the compatbility wth the mod
ern state system: it does not need to postulate a profound erosion of sover
eignty or a latent devdopment of a cosmopolita global democracy to be
operative. This adequacy to the world current ititutionaI order c be
acertained by takng to fact into consideration. On the one hand, the
GR does not interfere with each state's sovereign control over the re
sources within its national territory. Every individua ha a stae in al
limited natura resources, but that right doe not allow them to participate
in decisions about whether or how those resourees are to b used i they
are part of the territory of a foreign state, a that i a prerogative bdonging
to the autochthonou people (Pogge, 2008, p. 439). The people might
therefore decide whether or not to etract wat their territory has con
ceded them; the condition is that if they do so they wl have to pay a pro
portional ta on what wa extracted. This t, Poge clams, i enacted on
behalf of humanity, a an actuaization of the Lockean proviso, devdoped
in the chapter 27 of the Second Treatie ofGovement, stting that a
individua might only eclude the common right of all men from the
good he collects a long a he leaves "enough, ad a good lef i common
for others".
On the oter hand, ad more importantly, the fnctioning of the
GR doe not demand the establhment of aything like a world gov
ernent. A decentraized structe rdying on an intitution analogous to
the United Natons or the World Ba would be enough to asure the
246 Paulo Bacdos
application of mIes and sanctions. National governments would be re
sponsible for the uansfer of the GRD amounts through cs fcilitatng
organization (Poge, 1 994, p. 202) , which woud also superise the mea
urement of the amount of fnds each state had U alocate. In cae of non
compliance Pogge proposes economic saction co be imposed against the
defeccor: levie on imports from and eports co that country until the sum
it owes to the GRD is attained. The Fd collected will be disbursed co
impoverished countrie' governents. If the Fnd are rsused there are
other ways of canalizing fnds to the improvement of the condition of te
domestic poor: by making c payments direcdy co them or by adminis
tering development programes through existing United Nations agencies
or through suitable Non-Government Organizations (Poge, Ibi. ;
2008, p. 446) .
III
Considering these man oudine of Thoma Poge's GRD, one ca per
haps conclude that Pogge, in h propos, ha not crried cosmopolitan
ism departure asumptions co their ultimate consequence. If, indeed, one
is co conceive indviduals a the ultimate unit of moral concern and, faced
with global radical inequality, co believe the international realm co consti
tute a global basic suucture flly aaogous co the domestic one, ten the
logical corollary of thee premie woud be that the sae principle of
j ustce enforced domestically must be integrally uansferred co the globa
sphere. That would mean, co an egalitarian thinker, co defend the univer
saiztion of Rawls's diference principle. Poge's GRD stands however co
a much more, in his words, "modet" proposal. He does so deliberately,
since what he is uying co achieve is a concepton of globa jutice which is
workable, which might gan the support necessary co be implemented ad
co sutain itself in the world a we know it (Ibi. ). A conception that, in
shor, may convincingly overcome the stated criticisms cosmopolitanism is
usuly faced with.
Aong wit feibility, what this modet proposition operates by ad
vancing a rtigated way of working wth cosmopolita asumptions is also
the opening of a possibility for a conciliation of that normative genera
edifce with something which only apparendy may arise a antithetic. We
may direcdy reefer co Pogge' s word co clarif this issue. In his aticle "A
Egalitarian Law of People" he sustan that:
Ir is perfecy perissible for U and our government, i a spirit of patriotic
feUow-feeling to concentate on promotig the interer of our own sociery
and cmpator, een if foreigers ae muc worse of I need not deny this
Wip Cosmopolitism into Shapc 247
clm, only to qualif it: Paniality is legitmate only in the contat of a fir
competition (Poge, 1 994, p. 221 ) .
Asuming that preservng the fairnes of international competition might
be asured by te adoption of a corrective meehanism like the GRD, I
shall try to radicise Pogge's assertion and suget something whieh he
perhaps would not accept: te eminendy dual chacter of the individual's
dutie facing others, comprising a univeral duty towards humity at
lage ad a equaly valid set of speclc duties towards those wit whom
he ha some son of special relationsrp. Poge doe not share this claim.
He, as a strong egalitarian, faced with the existence of what he alleges to be
a global seheme of socia cooperation that mirrors the baic strcture of a
dometic society, claims for the adoption of the same egaitia distribu
tive principles that ae ofen considered for the domestic sphere, in par
ticular the Rawlsia principle of "justice a frness" (the GR deice
woud not be sufcient in an idealy fair world, but it i proposed a an
instrument, immediately operative in the nowaday interational sphere,
to guatee a minimal standad of equality among people) . I, on the
contray, wl t to defend tat, if it is true that there is a uiversal di
tributive obligation (diferent, a he have seen, fom mere eaity or hu
manitarian asistce) that comprises all men as individuals, there mght
also be a second-leel obligation specifcaly binding the members of ech
social body. This dualism, I sustain, sters from a fdaent disaalogy
beteen the dometic ad the global sphere, ad I will seek to j ustif it -
and therefore contest te validity of the alleed mora irreleance of state
borders - without abdicating te cosmopolita basic assumption of the
individual a the ultimate unit of moral concern.
For that I shall ue as a conceptua framework so me terms of Herben
Hars taxonomy of rights. In his "Are tere any Natural Rights?" Hart
stat by answering afrmatively to the tided question asserting tat there
is one absolute natural right, wrch is not created by men's voluntay ac
tion, like other mora rights are, but derives its source from te ontologica
constituton of men qu men - it is the equ right of all men U be free.
Wat cs right prescribes, in h word, is that
in the absence of certn special conditons which are consistent with te
right being an eul right, any adut human being cpable of choice ( 1 ) h
the rght to forberace on the pan of aI others 10m the ue of crcion or
resnaint ast hir sve to hinder coercion or retnt ad (2) is at Ibeny
to ( . . . ) ay action which is not one coercing or restraning or designed to in
jure other person (Ha, 1 984, p. 7S).
A we c see 10m te initial pat of the quoted sentence, this natural
right, being universal in its scope, is alo conditional. In the presence of
cenain special circumstances the enforcement of a second class of rights,
248 Paulo Bacdos
speciaL right, i alowed, which permits a coercive interference wim me
autonomous sphere of individual feedom. Wat rights are mese, ad in
which condtions do mey emerge? Hart postulates mat mese rights aise
out of "special transactions" beteen individua or out of some "specia
relationship" in which mey stad to ech omer (Hart, 1 984, p. 84) . One
of me instances that tif mis special relation among individuals is politi
cal obligaton. In a common social environment, me specic politica
condtion shared by indviduals mat allows for me mutua constranng of
each omers' lbery is what Har terms me "mutulity of restrictions".
This, in his words, designate me fact mat "when a number of people
conduct ay joit enterprise according to rules and mus retrict meir lib
erty, mose who have submined to mee retriction when required have a
right to a sima submssion from mose who have benefred by their sub
mission" (Hat, 1 984, p. 85) .
This indicate mat individus ae placed wim meir compatriots i n a
paicular arragement of obligations and benents which is not shared
wim humanity at large but is specinc U meir social condition. In mis way,
compatriots rake priority over foreigners in a number of ce, including
some where the natural right of all men to be free is dectivated, some
thing which c only exist among those whose special relations of co
citizenshp might permir exceptions to me genera moraity. Examples of
these situations are supplied by Roben Goodin. Only in a domestic soci
ety, for instance, can we rake me property of our fellow citizens for public
purpose, and only men can we sub mir mem to pay res or conscript
them for serice in our armed force (Goodin, 1 988, p. 668) .
What we c discern from this perspective is mat, whie me negative
durie (mat is, me duties not to harm omers) are contant ad unchange
able towad foreigners, mey are substantially lowered i me domestic
dimension: we may legitimately impose burdens upon compatriots that
may not be imposed upon outsiders. This is compensated by a substantia
increae in me dutes to provide positve asistance towards one another.
Exaple of what is rendered to constitents of a politica body such a
the state (ore, more ectly, what me constituents provide each omer)
include protection againt aracks to meir physical integrity, acces to a
legally regulated market, establihment of a system of property rights ad
entirlements (Sagiovanni, 2007, p. 20) , or the senng of political partici
pation rights ad opporrunities. This is because me socia institut ions mat
compose a state are maintained by the ensemble of it citizens in tt mey
surrender on a equ bais a cerran amout of moral autonomy, equaly
submining to me sae set of civil obligations and practices, and thus be
ing entitled to a commensurate shae of rights.
Wip Cosmopolitnism into Sha 249
My endevour here is to suggest that if egaitaian principles are to be
established as a demand of justice, it is not reonable to sustain the radical
cosmopolitan asumption that they should be etended global y, in an
integra and univocal way. What jutice requires canot be the same for
both the domestic and the global sphere since tey ae not morally over
lapping; there i a diferentiated impact of each one on the life of indi
viduas. It is undeniable that the globa realm h a deep repercusion on
people's life conditions and opportnities. That circumstance, a we have
seen, is what justifes the ple for international principles of distributive
justice. The supranational sphere, however, does not synthesize the social
and instittional conditions of a polity: there is not a world demos, there
are not mecms of participatory global democracy, and the instance
that provide each individual the basic conditions and gtee to act on
a pla of life continues to be the domestic one.
Justice is not a strictly asociative imperative. Distributive equaity, on
the contrary, if it i to be declared a an obligation derivtive of jutic,
might only be regarded, a Adre Sangiovani sustains (2007) , as a re
quirement of reciprocity, binding exelusivdy those who share the aluded
elas of special political rights and obligations. This does not mean that
the international standard of justice shoud be a marginal one. Ir should,
on the contrary, be sufciently robust to gtee the integral fflment
of what Hart stated to be the natural right of every man: that no economic
condition should be so severe as to deprive the individual of his equal
liberty to be free, or, as Rousseau fmouly stated in the second book
(chapter deven) of the "Socia Contract", that no citizen shal ever be so
poor "that he is compelled to sdl himsdf.
The Globa Resource Dividend seems to be the distributive mecha
nism that could fl ts requirement. What it would achieve in terms of
weth distribution is perfectly consonant with the application of Hart's
baic right. In Pogge's terms, the GRD seeks to ensure "that all human
beings c meet their own basic needs with dignity", which could a wdl
be seen a a abbreviated formulation of the Atiele 25( 1 ) of the Universal
Deeation of Huan Rights.
In fct, and in conelusion, if the GRD proves to be a philosophicaly
sound argument, it woud importantly advance the scope of what, in John
Rawls terms, might constitute an achievle rea/ite utopi.
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Aout the Contributors
Diogo P. AureIio. IFUFCSH. Universidade Nova. Lisbon.
Pauo Barcelos. IFUFCSH. Universidade Nova, Lisbon.
Gabriele De Angelis. IFUFCSH. Universidade Nova. Lisbon.
Ada D. Etinson. New Colege. University of Oxford.
Daniel Kofan. Department of Philosophy U niversity of Ottawa
James Garrison. University of Hawai' i, at Manoa.
Sylvie Loriau. Depanment of Le Phosophy, Radboud University
Nijmeen (NL) and Centre for Lw and Cosmopolitan Vaue. Uni
versit of Anterp (Belgium).
Heiner Michel, Center for T eacher Education and School and Clasroom
Reech. Goeche-University. Frt am Main.
Rekha Nach. Depanment of Philosophy, University of Aabama.
Gianfraco Pellegrino. LUISS. Rome.
Regina Queiroz. IFUFCSH. Universidade Nova. Lisbon.
Kok-Chor Tan. Department of Phiosophy. University of Pennsylvania.
Milic Trifnovic. University of Aachen.
Pauo Tuas, University of Porto.
Subject Index
Aid 3, 33, 34, 61 , 98, 1 02, 243
Autonomy 1 6, 1 7, 27, 30, 32, 65,
66, 67, 72, 9 1 , 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 \ 3,
1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 20, 1 66,
1 82, 1 84, 1 85, 1 86, 1 90, 1 92,
1 93, 208, 248
Baic stcre 58, 1 1 2, 1 27, 1 56,
1 70, 2 1 2, 2\ 3, 243, 244, 246,
247
Citizenship 1 2, 26, 29, 38, 40, 1 40,
1 47, 148, 1 49, 1 50, 1 53, 1 56,
1 57, 1 58, 1 63, 248
Coercion 1 6, 1 7, 1 8, 20, 60, 66, 88,
94, 95, 96, 99, 1 00, 1 09, 1 1 0,
1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 9,
1 20, 1 21 , 1 22, 1 25, 1 47, 1 61 ,
1 67, 247
cercive 1 6, 1 7, 1 8, 28, 33, 41 ,
60, 65, 88, 94, 95, 99, 1 09, 1 1 0,
1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 7,
1 1 9, 1 20, 1 21 , 1 22, 1 63, 1 66,
1 67, 168, 248
Coherentism 56
cherentist 56
Cmmunity 2, 3, 4, 27, 28, 29, 33,
41 , 54, 55, 59, 61 , 66, 67, 68,
70, 75, 79, 91 , 98, 1 3 1 , 1 46,
1 49, 1 69, 1 79, 1 8 1 , 1 86, 1 93,
203, 224
cmmunita 66
Cntrat 48, 65, 76, 94, 95, 1 00,
1 09, 1 1 2, 1 66, 200
contcua 91 , 94
Contratim 95
Cosmopoltism 4, \ 3, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31 , 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 , 42, 1 5 1 ,
1 62, 1 66, 1 67, 1 68, 1 69, 1 70,
1 71 , 242, 246
cosmopolitn 1 , 4, 1 3, 25, 26,
27, 28, 31 , 33, 34, 37, 38, 39,
40, 42, 56, 79, 1 61 , 1 62, 1 64,
1 66, 1 67, 1 69, 1 70, 1 71 , 241 ,
242, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249
Decision-mang 49, 52, 71 , 72, 77,
80, 94, 1 00
Dif erence principle 21 , 59, 1 09,
1 1 2, 1 27, 1 55, 208, 2 1 1 , 21 2,
246
Distribution I , 3, 9, 1 4, 56, 57, 63,
65, 68, 87, 92, 96, 1 1 1 , 1 20,
1 23, 1 36, 1 47, 1 54, 1 56, 1 62,
1 63, 1 64, 1 65, 1 66, 1 68, 1 71 ,
207, 221 , 228, 241 , 243, 245,
249
redistribution 79, 87
Duty 4, 9, 1 9, 36, 37, 58, 60, 61 ,
62, 65, 67, 68, 77, 98, 1 1 0, 1 45,
1 46, 1 47, 1 48, 1 52, 1 57, 1 8 1 ,
1 85, 21 0, 241 , 242, 243, 247
254 Sujc Ind
Educton 1 1 2, 1 22, 1 23, 1 24, 1 30,
1 34, 21 5, 232
Egalitaiism 9, 1 2, 1 3, 1 5, 2 1 , 87,
88, 89, 93, 94, 97, 1 01 , 1 1 3,
1 1 9, 1 20, 1 22, 1 23, 1 28, 1 35,
1 36, 1 39, 1 53
globa 1 , 2, 3, 4, 9, 1 0, 1 1 , 1 2,
1 3, 1 4, 1 5, 16, 1 7, 1 8, 1 9, 20,
2 1 , 25, 28, 3 1 , 33, 34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40, 41 , 47, 50, 57,
59, 60, 61 , 63, 64, 65, 66, 67,
70, 7 1 , 77, 78, 79, 80, 88, 89,
96, 98, 99, 1 02, 1 04, 1 07, 108,
1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 7, 1 1 8,
1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 23, 1 24, 1 27, 1 28,
1 29, 1 30, 1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 33, 1 35,
1 37, 1 38, 1 39, 1 40, 1 41 , 1 42,
1 5 1 , 1 52, 1 61 , 1 62, 1 63, 1 64,
1 65, 1 66, 1 67, 1 68, 1 69, 1 70,
1 71 , 1 72, 1 83, 1 86, 1 89, 1 9 1 ,
204, 207, 21 1 , 21 2, 21 4, 2 1 5,
21 6, 221 , 222, 223, 224, 225,
227, 228, 230, 23 1 , 235, 236,
237, 238, 241 , 242, 243, 244,
245, 246, 247, 249
luck 20, 87, 98, 99, 1 1 2, 1 28,
1 39, 203
Eglitaria 1 0, 1 2, 1 5, 1 6, 1 7, 20,
22, 79, 87, 88, 89, 92, 97, 1 02,
1 03, 1 04, 1 07, 1 08, 1 09, 1 1 0,
1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 9,
1 20, 1 21 , 1 22, 1 23, 1 24, 1 27,
1 29, 1 32, 1 38, 1 46, 1 47, 1 49,
1 54, 1 55, 241 , 243, 244, 246,
247, 249
Equlity 9, 1 5, 1 6, 20, 30, 3 1 , 32,
35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 88, 92, 94,
98, 1 03, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2,
1 1 9, 1 20, 1 27, 1 28, 1 29, 1 30,
1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 33, 1 35, 1 37, 1 38,
1 39, 1 40, 1 41 , 1 42, 147, 1 53,
1 54, 1 55, 1 56, 1 68, 172, 202,
208, 2 1 0, 247, 249
- of opponunity 1 27, 1 28, 1 29,
1 30, 1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 33, 1 35, 1 37,
1 38, 1 39, 1 40, 1 41 , 1 42, 1 47,
208
Fares 53, 71 , 72, 73, 89, 90, 91 ,
92, 96, 1 04, 1 1 7, 1 32, 1 33, 1 38,
1 53, 1 61 , 1 99, 201 , 204, 21 3,
221 , 222, 242, 247
Financial Serics Ac 221
Foudatonaism 5 1
at- 5 1
GDP 57
Globa order 1 8, 36, 39, 40, 60,
1 07, 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 7,
1 1 8, 1 21 , 1 24, 1 61 , 1 63, 1 67,
1 68, 1 70, 1 71 , 1 72, 2 1 2, 242
Globa Resource Divdend (GRD)
241 , 242, 243, 244, 245, 246,
247, 249
Globaism 5 1 , 88
Globaiaton 1, 2, 4, 20, 3 1 , 33,
1 33, 1 36, 1 38, 1 41 , 1 62
Het 59, 88, 98, 1 1 7, 1 20, 1 22,
1 23, 1 24, 224
HUitaia 3, 87, 88, 93, 98,
1 08, 1 5 1 , 1 53, 242, 243, 247
HUity 3, 29, 3 1 , 33, 34, 36, 6 1 ,
93, 1 46, 1 79, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 183,
1 85, 1 88, 1 9 1 , 1 92, 1 93, 241 ,
245, 247, 248
Inequality 3, 59, 1 00, 1 02, 1 08,
1 09, 1 23, 1 25, 1 27, 1 30, 1 41 ,
1 56, 2 1 5, 242, 243, 244, 246
Intuitionism 48
IMF (Interational Moneta Fud)
1 07, 1 1 6, 1 68
Sujc Ind 255
Jusce I , 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 1 1 , 1 2, 13,
1 4, 1 5, 1 6, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25,
30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 47, 50,
59, 60, 61 , 63, 65, 66, 67, 71 ,
73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 87, 88,
89, 90, 9 1 , 92, 93, 94, 95, 96,
97, 99, 1 00, 1 01 , 1 02, 1 03, 1 04,
1 07, 1 08, 1 09, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3,
1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 20, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 23,
1 25, 1 27, 1 38, 1 42, 1 46, 1 47,
1 48, 1 49, 1 50, 1 5 1 , 1 53, 1 55,
1 56, 1 58, 1 61 , 1 62, 1 63, 1 64,
1 65, 1 68, 1 70, 1 71 , 1 72, 1 89,
1 91 , 1 92, 1 99, 201 , 202, 204,
207, 208, 209, 21 0, 2 1 1 , 21 2,
21 3, 21 4, 2 1 6, 221 , 222, 241 ,
242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247,
249
ditributive 2, 9, 1 0, 1 2, 1 4, 1 5,
1 7, 1 8, 1 9, 20, 3 1 , 33, 37, 59,
60, 65, 67, 87, 88, 89, 90, 1 1 0,
1 1 2, 1 20, 1 49, 1 50, 1 53, 203,
24, 249
economic 9, 33, 1 56, 1 57, 1 61 ,
1 65, 242
dometic 1 0, 1 1 , 14, 33, 1 62
Lu 25, 35, 49, 1 33, 1 41 , 22 1 ,
222, 224, 226, 228, 229, 230,
23 1 , 232, 233, 234, 235, 237
Legitimac 1 8, 5 1 , 67, 71 , 73, 77,
1 41 , 1 63, 1 67, 1 98, 202, 203
legitimate 1 2, 1 6, 1 7, 61 , 71 ,
75, 95, 1 69, 1 90, 242, 247
Uberalism 79, 204, 2 1 1 , 2 1 5
libera 1 6, 27, 32, 66, 67, 74,
79, 91 , 1 09, 1 1 2, 1 5 1 , 1 70, 1 89,
1 99, 200, 201 , 202, 203, 204,
207, 208, 209, 21 0, 2 1 1 , 21 3,
21 4, 2 1 5, 22 1 , 222, 223, 224,
227, 228, 229, 232, 234, 235,
236
Uberria 87, 89, 90
Make 66, 93, 1 1 1 , 1 23, 1 38, 1 71 ,
1 90, 221 , 223, 224, 228, 229,
234, 235, 236, 237, 244, 248
global 1 29, 1 33, 1 37, 1 38, 1 40,
1 62, 1 66
Nationalism 1 , 9, 1 0, 2 1 1 , 21 2, 21 6
Nation-state 9 , 1 0, 1 2, 1 3 , 14, 1 5,
1 6, 1 61 , 1 63, 1 8 1 , 208, 23 1
NATO 1 1 8
Neo-liberalim 1 98
neolibera 1 98
Obligaton 2 1 , 59, 60, 61 , 1 32, 1 45,
1 46, 1 48, 1 50, 1 5 1 , 1 52, 203,
242, 243, 247, 248, 249
Patotc 10, 1 2, 1 3, 1 5 , 246
Patotsm 1 2, 250
Pece 39, 82, 1 1 8, 1 66, 1 77, 1 79,
1 80, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 1 83, 1 84, 1 85,
1 86, 1 87, 1 88, 1 90, 1 92, 1 93,
208, 2 1 5
Poverty 3 , 9 , 34, 44, 88, 98, 99,
1 03, 203, 207, 21 6, 223, 242,
243, 24
Power 2, 3, 5 1 , 61 , 63, 66, 94, 99,
1 00, 1 1 8, 1 22, 1 32, 1 34, 1 40,
1 46, 1 57, 1 62, 1 63, 1 64, 1 66,
1 69, 1 71 , 1 8 1 , 1 84, 1 97, 1 99,
201 , 203, 232, 236
Property rigts 62, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 7,
1 1 8, 1 20, 1 23, 1 24, 245, 248
Reism 5 1 , 1 66, 1 98
reaist 5 1 , 70, 1 80, 1 97, 204
Reciprocity 1 6, 1 8, 20, 61 , 94, 96,
97, 98, 1 1 1 , 1 1 8, 1 22, 1 23, 1 34,
1 47, 23 1 , 232, 233, 249
reciprocal 55, 75, 1 68, 23 1
256 Sujc Ind
Sovereignty 2, 4, 9, 41 , 1 1 7, 1 61 ,
1 62, 1 63, 1 64, 165, 1 67, 1 68,
1 70, 1 71 , 1 8 1 , 200, 208, 245
Stte 2, 3, 9, 1 0, 1 1 , 1 2, 1 4, 1 5, 1 6,
1 7, 1 9, 20, 25, 38, 40, 41 , 42,
47, 48, 56, 57, 59, 60, 65, 66,
67, 74, 77, 78, 89, 93, 94, 95,
98, 99, 1 00, 1 07, 1 08, 1 09, 1 1 0,
1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 6,
1 1 7, 1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 20, 1 22, 1 23,
1 24, 1 28, 14, 1 5 1 , 1 54, 1 61 ,
1 62, 1 63, 1 64, 1 65, 1 67, 1 68,
1 69, 1 70, 1 71 , 1 72, 178, 1 8 1 ,
1 82, 1 83, 1 85, 200, 20 1 , 203,
208, 2 1 1 , 21 2, 2 1 5, 21 6, 237,
241 , 242, 244, 245, 246, 247,
248
Statism 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 95, 96,
97, 98, 99, 1 00, 1 07, 1 1 0, 1 1 3,
1 5 1
sttist 2 1 , 88, 89, 93, 1 07, 1 08,
1 09, 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 8,
1 1 9, 1 25, 1 46, 1 5 1 , 241 , 243
Stoicism 30
stoic 28, 29, 30, 38, 4 1
Sufcientaranim 87, 89
sufcientaan 87, 89, 97
Ta 57, 98, 1 03, 1 1 0, 1 20, 1 22, 245
Taaton 65, 95, 103, 1 09, 1 1 1 ,
1 1 2, 223, 245
Trade I , 1 4, 59, 1 1 3, 1 1 7, 1 24, 1 34,
1 42, 1 8 1 , 1 83, 202, 21 2, 21 6,
221 , 222, 223, 224, 225, 226,
227, 228, 236, 237, 238, 244
fr 21 4, 236, 237
TRIPs (Trade-related Apects of In
ternatonal Proper Righr) 1 1 8
Utilitarianism 1 2, 1 3, 1 00, 1 01
utilitian 44
Utopianism 1 98, 200, 203, 204
utopia 39, 1 8 1 , 1 97, 204, 207,
2 1 1 , 21 6, 242
Wa 41 , 75, 1 20, 1 62, 1 63, 1 67,
1 68, 1 8 1 , 1 83, 185, 201 , 203,
208, 21 0
cld 1
Wele 30, 37, 59, 66, 79, 87, 89,
99, 1 00, 1 03, 1 33, 1 41 , 223,
224, 225, 226, 227, 233, 234,
244
WO (World Trde Orgaition)
1 07, 1 1 4, 1 1 6, 1 71 , 1 83
World Ba 1 1 5, 1 68, 21 0, 245
Index of Naes
Abizdeh, Aah 1 8, 2 1 , 1 1 3, 1 2 1 ,
1 25, 1 27, 1 42, 1 47, 1 58
Arendt, Hana 77, 80, 1 87, 1 88,
1 90, 1 93, 1 94, 1 95
Aritotle 23 1 , 238
Armstong, Davd 1 97, 1 98, 205
Barry, Brian 1 2, 2 1 , 57, 61 , 63, 80,
1 25
Bein, Chales 1 1 , 1 9, 2 1 , 30, 33, 42,
59, 70, 7 1 , 80, 8 1 , 99, 1 04, 1 32,
1 42, 1 63, 1 68, 1 70, 1 72, 1 98,
200, 205, 244, 249, 250
Bl a, Michad 1 6, 1 7, 20, 21 , 60,
65, 66, 8 1 , 95, 1 07, 1 09, 1 1 0,
1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 8,
1 1 9, 1 2 1 , 1 25, 1 47, 1 58
Bobbio, Norbeno 5 1 , 8 1
Boxl, Berd 1 27, 1 28, 1 30, 1 3 1 ,
1 41 , 1 42
Brock, Gillian 42, 1 27, 1 32, 1 40,
1 42, 1 72
Bucha, Alen 1 9, 21 , 31 , 32, 36,
37, 43, 69, 8 1 , 1 38, 1 42, 207,
21 7
Cabrera, Lu 1 63, 1 69, 1 72
Caney, Simon 1 , 1 1 , 1 8, 21 , 33, 43,
48, 50, 59, 60, 65, 66, 75, 76,
8 1 , 1 27, 1 3 1 , 1 35, 1 40, 1 42, 250
Canto-Sperber, Monique 40, 43
Croce, Benedeto 5 1 , 8 1
Diogenes of Sinope 26
Dorkin, RonaId 22, 95, 1 47, 1 58
Ferrara, A1esadro 1 89, 1 9 1 , 1 92,
1 93, 1 94
Frankrt, Harry 1 53, 1 54, 1 55,
1 56, 1 57
Frem, Samuel 1 1 , 1 9, 20, 2 1 , 22,
83, 1 1 2, 1 25
Goodn, Roben J. 4, 54, 55, 56,
8 1 , 89, 99, 1 05, 1 25, 239, 248,
250
Grotus, Hugo 1 64
Haberma, Jgen 47, 5 1 , 58, 8 1 ,
82, 1 89, 1 90, 1 91 , 1 92, 1 94
Habermaian 1 90, 1 91 , 1 92
Hau, Herben 241 , 247, 248, 249,
250
Held, David 1 70
Heyd, David 9 1 , 1 05
Hobb, Thom 49, 94, 1 8 1 , 1 97,
200, 242, 250
Hume, David 1 4, 92, 96, 1 07, 1 25,
1 87
Hurk, Thoma 57, 82
K, Immuel v, 22, 25, 28, 30,
38, 39, 40, 41 , 42, 43, 4, 48,
49, 77, 82, 92, 1 62, 1 66, 1 67,
1 69, 1 70, 1 71 , 1 72, 1 75, 1 77,
1 78, 1 79, 1 80, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 1 83,
1 84, 1 85, 1 86, 1 87, 1 88, 1 89,
258 I ndc of N C8
1 90, 1 9 1 , 1 92, 1 93, 1 94, 200,
203, 205
Ktia 1 3, 30, 32, 1 67, 1 69,
1 7 1 , 1 78, 1 8 1 , 1 87, 1 88, 1 89,
1 90, 1 9 1 , 1 92, 1 93
Kapstein, Ethan 1 34, 1 43
Keenan, George 1 98, 205
KeIen, Hans 77, 8 1
Keynes, John Maynad 227, 228,
235, 238
Keynesia 228, 235
Ktanof, Lrry 1 89, 1 90, 1 94
Kymlicka, Wil 27
Larmore, Chales 1 92, 193, 1 94
Leibniz, Gottried Wldm 200,
205
Liden Va der, Harr 1 85, 1 86,
1 94
Locke, John 96, 250
Luhman, Nikla 1 97, 205
Maclntyre, Aadair 67, 78, 82
Marr Aurdiu 29
Maon, Ade 1 28, 1 43
Miller, Davd 1 3, 30, 1 00, 1 32, 1 39
Miller, Richrd 1 07
Moellendorf, Dard 1 1 , 22, 42, 80,
8 1 , 82, 83, 84, 1 05, 1 27, 1 30,
1 35, 1 43, 1 72
Moore, Margaret 1 3, 22, 1 45
Nagel, Thoma 1 7, 1 8, 20, 22, 6 1 ,
62, 63, 82, 88, 92, 94, 1 00, 1 05,
1 07, 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3,
1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 2 1 , 1 25, 1 46,
1 47, 148, 1 5 1 , 1 53, 1 55, 1 56,
1 58, 1 59, 1 99, 205, 241 , 250
Nietzche, Frierich 1 03, 1 88, 1 95
Nozick, Roben 90, 93, 1 05, 1 42,
203, 205
Nusbaum, Martha 1 2, 22, 29, 30,
33, 44, 56, 63, 82, 1 63, 1 64,
1 72, 250
O'Neill, Onora 1 2, 62
Patjs Van, Philippe 22 1 , 224, 239
Paons, Tact 1 97, 205
Pevnick, Ryan 1 1 6, 1 1 9, 1 20, 1 22,
1 25
Poge, Thomas vi, 1 1 , 22, 25, 3 1 ,
32, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 4 1 , 44,
59, 64, 78, 80, 8 1 , 82, 83, 84,
88, 1 05, 1 06, 1 1 8, 1 25, 1 27,
1 43, 1 61 , 1 62, 1 63, 1 64, 1 65,
1 67, 1 68, 1 69, 1 70, 1 71 , 1 72,
200, 205, 207, 21 1 , 2 1 2, 2 1 5,
21 6, 2 17, 239, 241 , 242, 243,
244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250
Pufendorf, Samuel 49
Rwls, Joh v, 1 , 3, 5, 10, 1 1 , 1 2,
1 6, 1 9, 21 , 22, 23, 30, 32, 33,
38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 47, 58, 7 1 ,
72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 83, 90, 9 1 ,
92, 94, 96, 97, 1 05, 1 07, 1 09,
1 1 2, 1 20, 1 25, 1 27, 1 28, 1 43,
1 47, 1 55, 1 56, 1 59, 1 62, 1 70,
1 72, 175, 1 89, 1 9 1 , 1 92, 1 94,
1 95, 1 97, 1 99, 200, 201 , 202,
203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209,
21 0, 2 1 1 , 21 2, 21 3, 2 1 4, 2 1 5,
21 6, 2 1 7, 243, 246, 249, 250
Rwlsian 1 1 , 2 1 , 37, 90, 95, 1 1 0,
1 1 2, 125, 1 55, 1 89, 1 90, 1 9 1 ,
208, 2 1 2, 247
R, Joseph 27, 32, 44, 1 59
Rcdo, David 225
Rsse, Matia 1 1 3
Rony, Richad 44, 71 , 73, 74, 75,
77, 79, 83
Rouseu, Jea-Jacues 39, 249, 250
Rouseaea 94
Inde ofNaos 259
Sagovan, Adre 1 9, 20, 23, 88,
92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 1 05, 1 07,
1 08, 1 1 0, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 5,
1 1 7, 1 1 8, 1 22, 1 23, 1 25, 1 46,
1 47, 1 59, 248, 249, 250
Sclon, Thoma 1 2, 23, 70, 83,
1 49, 1 59
ScheIer, Samuel 1 3, 23, 27, 36, 44,
1 05, 1 1 2, 1 26, 1 46, 1 49, 1 59
Singer, Peter 30, 34, 44, 61 , 8 1 , 83,
200, 205
Srlansky, Sau! 1 01 , 105
Srt, A 65, 82, 1 59, 224, 23 1 ,
232, 239
Stiglit, Joseph 1 68, 1 72, 223, 224,
227, 228, 239
Ta, Kk-Chor 4, 9, 47, 48, 75, 25 1
Taylor, Chales 69
Thoma Aquina 234, 239
Tugendat, Et 71 , 72, 73, 79, 84
Wadon, Jeremy 27, 28, 45, 80, 84,
250
Wat, Kne 198, 1 99, 206
Waer, Michael 61 , 66, 76, 84, 1 06,
1 28, 1 3 1 , 1 43, 1 62, 1 73, 203,
206, 234, 239
Wittenstein, Ludwg 1 91 , 1 92