Bryan vs.

Eastern & Australian SS (GR 9403, 4 November 1914) En Banc, Moreland (J): 4 concur Facts: On or about the end of December, 1912, Allan A. Bryan, et. al. bought of Eastern & Australian SS Co.Ltd. s agent in Shanghai two first-class tickets for Manila. The tickets delivered to them were in English andbore on their face, in large print, a statement that they were issued subject to the conditions printed on theback. At the time the tickets were delivered to Bryan in Shanghai their attention was not especially drawn tothe provisions on the back of the ticket. Bryan, et. al. put their baggage on the St. Albans (owned by Eastern& Australian) without paying for its transportation as freight and traveled with such baggage to Manila. Thesteamer arrived in Manila on the morning of 7 January 1913. Shortly after its arrival Bryan s baggage wastaken out of the hold of the ship for the purpose of being placed on the dock alongside of which the vesselwas berthed. The baggage was placed in a sling, consisting of a single rope wound once around the trunks,and was swung from the side of the vessel. While still several feet above the wharf, the employee of Eastern& Australian who was operating the winch, by some act or other, permitted the baggage to drop with greatrapidity. in its passage downward it struck the side of the ship with such force as to release it from the slingand it dropped into the water alongside of the ship. The damages are stipulated at P1,188.Bryan filed action to recover damages in the value of P1,915.30 against Eastern & Australian, resulting fromthe negligence of the shipping company in handling Bryan s baggage, whereby it fell into the sea and wasinjured or destroyed. The shipping company, while admitting the damage caused to Bryan s baggage, deniedthat it was the result of the company s negligence and set up as a special defense the limitation of liability established by the contract under which the shipping company undertook to transport the plaintiffs from thecity of Hongkong to Manila. The trial court ruled in favor of Bryan. The shipping company appealed. Issue: Whether or not the defendant company that it is exempt from liability by virtue of the contract appearing on the tickets already referred to and quoted; as that contract was valid in the place where made, namely, the Colony of Hongkong, and that being the case, it will be enforced according to its terms in the Philippine Islands. Held: It is undoubted that the contract found upon the back of the tickets is a contract found upon the back of the tickets is a contract perfectly valid in England and her colonies and one which would be enforced according to its terms? It will be remembered that the contract provides "the company will not hold itself responsible for any loss, or damage to or detention, or overcarriage of luggage, under any circumstances whatsoever, unless it has been booked and paid for a freight." Ordinarily this language would seems to be broad enough to cover every possible contingency, including the negligent act of defendant's servant. To so hold, however, would run counter to the established law of England and the United States on that subject The reasonableness of the strict rule of construction that the courts of England and of the State of New York apply to contracts restricting the liability of carriers with respect to their negligence is apparent when one considers that such contracts are held to be contrary to public policy and invalid in the Federal courts and in most of the State courts of the Union. In this connection, it may not be amiss to state that a critical examination of the deposition of Mr. Ernet Hamilton Sharpe, Master of Arts and Bachelor of Civil Law of the University of Oxford, Barrister at Law of London, Shanghai and Hongkong, and King's Counsel at the latter colony, does not disclose anything contradictory to the rule just stated. Mr. Sharpe's examination was confined to the question of the validity of the contract indorsed upon plaintiffs' ticket exempting the defendant company from liability for damage to their baggage. In view of the accurate answers of the learned witness to the questions put to him as to the validity of the condition in question under English law, there is no reason to suppose that he would not have stated correctly the rule as to theconstruction of the condition had his attention been directed to that point. In any event, this court is not, by

reason of the opinion expressed by an expert witness, precluded from advising itself as to the common law of England PCIB VS. ESCOLIN56 SCRA 266 FACTS:Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should beapplied .ISSUE:Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable .RULING:It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi willhappen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law,that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time.The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisterscould be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper applicationof the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas,it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it canbe held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now,the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these twoissues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the firstinstance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending suchfurther proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyondcavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anywaylegally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugalpartnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estateof Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourthof the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explainedearlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons sincethen, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Codeand applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code

Sabina reyes vs. wells Facts: It is alleged in the complaint: (1) That said J. E. Rader and J. Northcott had installed a maguey stripping machine in the municipality of Burgos, Ilocos Norte, and an International truck in a shed on a lot; that J. E. Rader told plaintiff Saturnino R. Guerrero that he had purchased said articles from Macleod & Co., for the sum of P23,600, and offered to sell them to said plaintiff for P23,000 payable in installments. plaintiff was required to make out two promissory notes; one for P7,000 and the other for P5,000 in favor of said Rader "guaranteed by a mortgage on certain property sufficient to cover said sum of P12,000;" that said mortgage shall be endorsed to some business houses in the City of Manila; that Saturnino Guerrero executed two mortgage deeds J. E. Rader and Saturnino R. Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on June 29, 1922 the former endorsed the mortgage deed for the amount of P5,000; (5) that neither said amount of P5,000 nor any part thereof was delivered to Saturnino R. Guerrero or to any of his coplaintiffs; and the aforementioned Rader and Northcott promised to pay when the latter (Northcott) received some money he had asked for from a certain firm in San Francisco, California; and in consideration of said promise, Saturnino R. Guerrero "obligated himself to pay to

Macleod & Co. in installments, the price of said property, machinery truck, shed, and lot where they are installed," the aforesaid Rader having stated that he had not yet paid Macleod & Co. for said property; They demanded payment of the sum of P5,000 from J. E. Rader, because the periods stipulated by Macleod & Co. fell due. Because of the failure by J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said amount of P12,000, the plaintiff sustained damages. The administrator of the estate of the deceased J. E. Rader filed an answer denying generally and specifically each and every allegation of the complaint. the trial court ordered the cancellation in the registry of deeds of the mortgage credit of P5,000 on the real property assigned by J. E. Rader in favor of Northcott, and the cancellation of the other mortgage deed for P7,000 executed by the plaintiffs in favor of J. Northcott issue: whether or not plaintiff-appellees' allegation that the promissory notes in question have not been paid, is not supported by the evidence, inasmuch as the only witness who testified upon this point, that is, Saturnino Guerrero, is incompetent to testify upon transactions had between himself and the deceased John E. Rader and John Northcott, in accordance with section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure ruling: It is true that Saturnino Guerrero, as an interested party in the case, is incompetent to testify upon transactions had between himself and the deceased Rader and Northcott but the record shows that there is another witness, Eduardo Bustamante, who has no interest in this case, and who testified that he witnessed and heard the conversations between Guerrero and Rader, and Northcott, respecting the delivery of the money represented by the promissory notes in question, and his testimony appears to be corroborated, in so far as it refers to the conversations between Guerrero and Rader, by Marcelino Benito and Apolinar Pasion. The testimony of said witness Eduardo Bustamante is admissible to prove that the defendants never delivered the money which was the consideration of said promissory notes. Section 4604 of the Code of Iowa provides: "No party to any action or proceeding, nor any person interest in the event thereof, nor any person from, through or under whom any such party or interested person derives any interest or title by assignment or otherwise, and no husband or wife of any said party or person, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any personal transaction or communication between such witness and a person at the commencement of such examination deceased, insane or lunatic, against the executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor of such deceased person, or the assignee or guardian of such insane person or lunatic. But this prohibition shall not extend to any transaction or communication as to which any such executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee, survivor or guardian shall be examined on his own behalf, or as to which the testimony of such deceased or insane person or lunatic shall be given in evidence." The prohibition contained in said law against a witness' testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself and a deceased person, is substantially the same as that contained in section 383, No. 7, of our Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2252. And therefore, we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar BANK OF AMERICA VS. AMERICA REALTY CORPORATION

FACTS: Petitioner Bank of America (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, USA

while private respondent American Realty (ARC) is a domestic corporation. On numerous occasions, BANTSA and Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), organized under the laws of England, granted US Dollar loans to certain foreign corporate borrowers. These loans were later restructured, the restructuredloans secured by two real estate mortgages with private respondent ARC as third-party mortgagor. When the corporate borrowers defaulted, BANTSA sued them for collection before foreign courts, without impleading ARC as party-defendant. While these civil suits are still pending before the foreign courts, BANTSA filed an extra-judicial foreclosure ofreal estate mortgage before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines. The properties were sold at public auction, prompting ARC to file this action for damages against BANTSA. The trial court ruled in favour of ARC and this was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreing couts constituted waiver of the remedy of foreclosure

RULING:

In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over its properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another s obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contract loan remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. In the instant case, petitioner s contention that the requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable. PHILIPPINE LAW, NOT ENGLISH LAW, SHALL APPLY: In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the matter. In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption. In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved xxx, said foreign law would still not find applicability. Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,

or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting of a single cause of action. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Clearly then, English Law is not applicable. AZNAR VS. GARCIA FACTS: Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts mustimmediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen? RULING: The Philippine law should be applied. Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the with respect to the intestate succession, the national law of the decedent will apply. The conflict of laws rule in California refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent Quita vs. ca Issue: Whether or not citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Ruling:

No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountrys national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo