Saudi Update

SDSU 2012 1 The California Swing DA Saudi Upgrade
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Even small disputes will torpedo relations tense regional climate magnifies disagreements Murphy 11 (Brian Murphy, August 12, 2011, Mideast upheavals open doors for Saudi strategies, The
Olympian, http://www.theolympian.com/2011/08/12/1758478/mideast-upheavals-open-doors-for.html,) But even small rough patches between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia take on heightened significance in the tense Mideast climate. The Saudi statement on Syria followed White House urging for the
Saudis and their Arab allies to take a sharper stance on Assads government. Days later, the U.S. imposed new sanctions on Syria, and presidential spokesman Jay Carney said Thursday that Syria would be a much better place without Assad in charge. In March, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Bahrain was on the wrong track to allow Saudi-led forces to help crush protests in the island kingdom which is home to the Pentagons main military force in the region, the U.S. Navys 5th Fleet. Rights groups also have called on U.S. officials to take a sharper stance against Saudi Arabias crackdowns on internal dissent, including a proposed law that Amnesty International said would allow authorities to prosecute peaceful protests as a terrorist act. In Iraq, Saudi officials are deeply wary of the U.S.-backed government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite who owes his power to Iranian-allied political groups. Meanwhile, a higher regional profile invites uncomfortable scrutiny about Saudi royal succession with both King Abdullah and Crown Prince Sultan in their mid-80s and undergoing medical treatment this year. Christopher Boucek, who follows Mideast security issues at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, believes Saudi leaders view U.S. policymakers as more
preoccupied with being on the right side of history instead of standing by its friends. Increasingly, it seems that Saudi Arabia looks out into the world and thinks that its foreign policy interests do not overlap with the United States and Washingtons security interests, Boucek said. Saudi Arabia is now in a position to pursue its own interests.
Any deviation from the status quo will upset the Saudis Boucek 2011 (Christopher Boucek, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program- focusing on security
challenges in Arabian Peninsula & Northern Africa, June 21, 2011, U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Shadow of the Arab Spring http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/21/u.s.-saudi-relations-in-shadow-of-arab-spring/1il) Since the onset of the Arab Spring, one of the things weve seen Saudi Arabia do is move to support its friends and allies in the regionEgypt before and after Mubarak and the monarchies in the region and within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the six-nation Arab Gulf state organization. Saudi Arabia is
also on the ground in Bahrain, supporting the Bahraini government as it weathers the protest movement. But Saudi Arabia has also been involved in moving to expand the GCC to include Morocco and Jordan, two other monarchies. Saudi
Arabia typically uses a combination of money and religious ideology to support things or to advance its policies. Weve seen the mobilization of Saudi connected religious networks to deliver the message that protesting is not authorized and that its illegitimate to protest and demonstrate against the government. Preservation of the status quo is the most important thing.
Lack of prior consultation will anger the Saudis perceived as pushing American interests Boucek 2011 (Christopher Boucek, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program- focusing on security
challenges in Arabian Peninsula & Northern Africa, June 21, 2011, U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Shadow of the Arab Spring http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/21/u.s.-saudi-relations-in-shadow-of-arab-spring/1il) Oftentimes, American officials want to go to Saudi Arabia to do things to advance American foreign policy objectives, whether its to help Taliban reconciliation or the peace process. Washington shows up
SDSU 2012 2 The California Swing DA Saudi Upgrade Very rarely do U.S. officials go and say that Saudi Arabia has one set of interests and the United States has the same set of interests so how can the two countries work together on those interests. Thats what happened in the
and wants Riyadh to help the United States achieve the things it wants. 1980s when both countries were working to support the Afghans against Soviet occupationboth countries had interests, both were working to advance those interests, and the relationship worked very well. The United States needs to
move this relationship from one where Washington tries to get the Saudis to do things to help American objectives, to one where both countries work together to reach the same common goal.
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The Arab Spring puts the US and Saudi Arabia on a collision course US support for democratic movements will ruin US-Saudi relations cuts off US oil access. Nasr 2011(Vali, Bloomberg View columnist, Will the Saudis Kill the Arab Spring? Bloomberg,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-23/will-the-saudis-kill-the-arab-spring-.html) In his speech last week on the Middle East, President Barack Obama left little doubt that America stands with the people of the region in their demand for change. This puts the U.S. on a collision course with Saudi Arabia. The kingdom has emerged as the leader of a new rejectionist front that is determined to defeat popular demand for reform. One would have expected Iran to lead
such a front, but instead it is Americas closest Arab ally in the region that is seeking to defeat our policy. Though the president made no mention of Saudi Arabia in his speech, in the near term, dealing with the kingdom is the biggest challenge facing the U.S. in the Middle East. Saudi rulers have made clear that they find U.S. support for democracy naive and dangerous, an existential threat to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. If the U.S. supports democracy, the Saudis are signaling, it can no longer count on its special bond with Riyadh (read: oil). The Saudi threat is intended to present U.S. policymakers with a choice between U.S. values and U.S. interests. The idea is that either Washington stays the course, supporting the Arab peoples demands for reform, and risks a rift with Saudi Arabia, or it protects that relationship and loses the rest of the Middle East. In fact, the choice between U.S. values and interests is a false choice, as the president made clear in his speech. Now, American policy has to reflect this truth. So far, Washington has tried to placate the Saudis. It is time we challenged their words and deeds, instead. Tectonic Shift Its no surprise that the tectonic shift in Arab politics, a popular revolt calling for reform, openness and accountability, worries the Saudi monarchy. The kingdom, like the rest of the Arab world, has a young population that wants jobs, freedom and a say in politics. Thirtynine percent of Saudis ages 20 to 24 are unemployed. Having watched Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak step down amid protests in which Egyptian youths played a key role, Saudi King Abdullah announced $35 billion in new
social benefits to head off demands for reform at home. That bought the monarchy time, but too many dominoes are falling in its direction to allow for complacency. Violent protests on Saudi
Arabias borders, inside Bahrain and Yemen, have been particularly troubling. From the outset, Riyadh encouraged every Arab ruler to resist reform. The more Washington embraced the Arab Spring, the more Riyadh
worried. Saudi rulers took particular exception to Washingtons call for Mubarak to resign, and when the U.S. urged reform in Bahrain, they saw U.S. policy as a direct threat to them.
Saudi-Iran tensions increase oil prices and shocks and cause an arms race Spindle and Coker 2011 (Bill,Maraget, WSJ, 4-16,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704116404576262744106483816.html? mod=WSJ_World_LeadStory) "The cold war is a reality," says one senior Saudi official. "Iran is looking to expand its influence. This
instability over the last few months means that we don't have the luxury of sitting back and watching events unfold." On March 14, the Saudis rolled tanks and troops across a causeway into the island kingdom of Bahrain. The ruling family
there, long a close Saudi ally, appealed for assistance in dealing with increasingly large protests. Enlarge Image Iran's flag Iran Active troops: 523,000 Battle tanks: 1,613 Combat aircraft: 336 Regional allies:
Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas Source: Military Balance Iran soon rattled its own sabers. Iranian parliamentarian Ruhollah Hosseinian urged the Islamic Republic to put its military forces on high alert, reported the website for Press TV, the staterun English-language news agency. "I believe that the Iranian government should not be reluctant to prepare the country's military forces at a time that Saudi Arabia has dispatched its troops to Bahrain," he was quoted as saying. The intensified wrangling across the Persian?or, as the Saudis insist, the Arabian?Gulf has strained relations between the U.S. and important Arab allies, helped to push oil prices into triple digits and tempered U.S. support for some of the popular democracy movements in the Arab world. Indeed, the first casualty of the Gulf showdown has been two
of the liveliest democracy movements in countries right on the fault line, Bahrain and the turbulent frontier state of Yemen. But many worry that the toll could wind up much worse if tensions continue to ratchet upward. They see a heightened possibility of actual military conflict in the Gulf, where one-fifth of the world's oil supplies traverse the shipping lanes between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Growing hostility between the two countries could make it more difficult for the U.S. to exit smoothly from Iraq this year, as planned. And, perhaps most dire, it could exacerbate what many fear is a looming nuclear arms race in the region.
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Only the aff collapses relations UN vote doesnt matter Mutter '11 (Paul, contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and The Arabist "The U.S.-Saudi "Special Relationship"
and the Arab Spring" June 28, 2011, www.arabist.net/blog/2011/6/28/the-us-saudi-special-relationship-and-thearab-spring.html) The Arab Spring is clearly an unsettling development for both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, despite all
the talk in Washington about the democratic aspirations of Arab peoples (as an aside, the Palestinian peoples aspirations, a grave concern for both Israel and the U.S. are noticeably absent from such official plaudits). Protests have already removed pro-U.S. and Saudi-friendly leaders in Tunisia (whose exiled president now resides in the Kingdom) and Egypt (the Saudis, for their part, now fear Egyptian rapprochement with Iran: Der Spiegel reports that the Kingdom has promised the new transitional government US$4 billion) and Syria (though no friend of either power) is becoming a potential flashpoint. Discontent in other Arab monarchies, such as Jordan and Morocco, has caused consternation in the House of Saud even though neither Morocco nor Jordan are Gulf countries, the Saudis have been pressing for their acceptance into the GCC (which, if it is now looking for a new name, ought to consider The Holy Alliance). Red Scares have long since given way to Shia Scares in the region. The reactionary fear in these countries is very real: with growing Shia populations, the minority Sunni monarchies of the Gulf states face increasing pressure from their subjects for change and see an Iranian (meaning, Shia) hand in everything. There is a growing sense of abandonment by the U.S. in Riyadh over the supposed Shia threat, according to Saudi analyst Nawaf Obaid [Ed note: Obaid is in fact an advisor to Prince Turki): As Riyadh fights a cold war with Tehran, Washington has shown itself in recent
months to be an unwilling and unreliable partner against this threat. The emerging political reality is a Saudi-led Arab world facing off against the aggression of Iran and its non-state proxies [Hezbollah, Hamas] and Saudi Arabia will not allow the political unrest in the region to destabilize the Arab monarchies. The Wall Street Journal reports that the Saudis have made overtures to
Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia towards a policy of containment toward Iran. The U.S. shouldn't be counted on to restore stability across the Middle East, Prince Bandar, who served as the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. from 1983 to 2005, is said to have told a group of Pakistani generals recently. Concerns over a reputed Iranian fifth column in Bahrain (Iran supports the protests in this Shia-majority country ruled over by a Sunni royal family) remain pronounced among GCC (and U.S.) officials. The U.S., despite expressing some human rights concerns, has largely praised the actions of the Bahraini monarchy in managing demands for greater democratization and warned against Iranian interference. "The US has not been as supportive of human rights activists in Bahrain as it would be in other circumstances, and it's not putting as much pressure on the Bahraini government as it's putting on Yemen, Syria and other countries where the government is engaged in suppressing protests," Marina Ottaway of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told Al Jazeera. According to her, Saudi pressure is exercising a
significant influence on U.S. politics. The U.S., though, needs no allied pressure to keep its head down over Bahrain. President Obama recently met with Bahrains rulers to discuss the strategic situation in
the region, and with good reason: Bahrain is the base of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. And while Washington has observed this studied silence over human rights violations in Bahrain and (with Saudi help) is now ramping up a drone war in Yemen against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen: A Backstop against al Qaeda One could compare Yemens historic relationship with Saudi Arabia to that of Mexicos with the U.S.: intervention in a 20th century civil war, a discriminatory economic relationship and even a border barrier (purportedly aimed at keeping out illegal immigrants). Saudi involvement is only increasing in response to unrest and pro-democracy demonstrations in Yemen. Though not happy with the content of the pro-democracy protests (and ever worried about al Qaeda and Iranian influence in Yemen), the Saudis are hoping to ease out a besieged President Saleh, while at the same time do what they can to maintain Saudi influence in the country. Although the U.S. publically supports a negotiated solution in Yemen (that will probably result in President Salehs removal), there is much talk in the U.S. of the Yemen becoming another Afghanistan. The rationale for the drone war is that it will prevent al Qaeda from finding a new safe haven. The U.S. blames AQAP for failed attempts to destroy U.S. planes, the (abortive) actions of the Times Square bomber and the Fort Hood shootings. WikiLeaks disclosures reveal the extent of the drone war is larger than previously thought and that the Yemeni government is fully involved in it (in contrast to the drone campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan). It is difficult to tell just how the Arab Spring has affected official U.S. policy in Yemen, but consider this: a secret CIA airbase in the Mideast is reported to be under construction to enable this expanded effort. The AP reports that the U.S. views the new airbase as a backstop, if al-Qaida or other anti-American rebel forces gain control. Charity Begins at Home At home, the Saudis have moved quickly to suppress any stirrings of unrest relating to the Arab Spring. It would be an understatement to suggest that the U.S. looks the other way over Saudi human rights abuses but unfair to say that the Saudis are inherently worse than other allies because they are Arab or Muslim. Strategic importance outweighs such trivialities as human rights when strategic allies are concerned Musharrafs Pakistan, Mubaraks Egypt and Pinochets Chile, for instance (and, of course, in Bahrain). That said, U.S. silence on human rights in Saudi Arabia is deafening (especially when compared to, say, U.S. statements directed at Iran). Whether it is has been on the suppression of public demonstrations (demonstrations by workers have been suppressed for decades, and striking was even made illegal in 1965), lack of religious freedoms (even for Saudi Arabias own Shia Muslim population), the indentured servitude that non-Saudi guest workers endure, or the arrest of women who have protested the countrys ban on female drivers, the U.S. response has been, in the words of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, quiet diplomacy. Domestically, the Saudis have moved quickly to buy off dissent with new social spending programs, reports Foreign Policy. This approach is not new, though, but the scale of it is (US$130 billion this year alone). And that is partly due to ever-increasing discontent within the Kingdom. In addition to financing housing and employment

programs (as well as beefing up the bureaucracy), some of this money will go to the countrys religious establishment. Many Saudis see the extra cash for religious institutions, including the religious police, as a reward for their vocal public stance against potential anti-regime demonstrations, according to Foreign Policy. Indeed, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia founded upon the basis of a religious-royal alliance, religious legitimacy is a vital competent of the House of Sauds legitimacy. Wahhabism, a particularly Puritanical strain of Sunni Islamism, is the ideological glue that has held the country together since its founding in 1932. We are back to the 1950s and the early 1960s We are back to the 1950s and early 1960s, when the Saudis led the opposition to the revolutions at that time, the revolutions of Arabism, according to a Saudi political activist speaking to The Washington Post. The We, of course, is a royal we: it refers to both Saudi Arabia and the U.S., who have maintained a special relationship for decades. The relationship between the two powers animates their responses to the Arab Spring. To understand it, though, we will have to go back before the 1950s. Such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary U.S. involvement with Saudi Arabia began with oil concessions in the 1930s. However, a formal engagement between the two countries had to wait until the closing days of WWII. On February 14, 1945, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met with King Saud on board an American warship in the Red Sea. That meeting established the prenuptial agreement for the two partners: American protection of the Kingdom in exchange for oil access. Since that meeting, the U.S. has increasingly committed itself to defending Saudi sovereignty (Saudi oils sovereignty, to be precise: the U.S. partly managed Saudi oil exports through a consortium called Aramco during much of the Cold War). A succession of early Cold War policies (such as the Eisenhower Doctrine) entrenched the U.S.s postwar presence in the oil-rich Mideast. By 1980, following the Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. President Carter had declared that: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. During the 1980s Tanker War in the Gulf, in which Iran and Iraq attacked each others shipping and that of other nations, the U.S. made good on its word to use force to protect its interests there. The special relationship deepened following the Iran-Iraq War (of which the Tanker War was an extension of) with the first Gulf War. Saudi Arabia, demanding intervention and even giving religious sanction to Coalition forces, subsequently served as a base for the first Gulf War coalition. American subsidization of Saudi Arabias defense (to the tune of US$60 billion in 2010 alone) has long freed up Saudi oil revenues for other uses: modernization programs, foreign investment, extravagant royal lifestyles, a social safety net . . . And financing Islamist terrorists. Support for such organizations, such as al Qaeda, has been the justification (well, one of the justifications) for the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, of Iraq in 2003, the extension of the War on Terror to Yemen, and U.S. opposition to organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. The U.S. has taken Saudi Arabia to task at the urging of the U.S. intelligence: after 9/11, the Bush Administration pressured the Saudis to share more information with them on terrorist suspects and cooperate with investigations of terrorist financiers and the Saudis obliged. But, this pressure was the exception to the norm: over the course of the special relationship, the U.S. had largely ignored active measures that Saudi officials, including members of the royal family, took in financing Islamist organizations. And, during the Cold War, the U.S. aided and abetted these endeavors. We can live with that As noted earlier, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established by a religious-royal alliance. The Wahhabi religious establishment dominates social life, regulating religion, morality and education. As the clergy has gained greater power at home, Wahhabism has increasingly become Saudi Arabias leading export after oil. The U.S. helped this along after 1945. After WWII, U.S. officials naively saw Islam (not really caring about or understanding sectarian differences) as a counterweight to socialism and nationalism. When nationalists could not be cajoled or bought, the U.S. (and its allies), would turn to Islamic organizations to assist in demonizing and undermining them, as was the case in Egypt (under Nasser) and Iran (under Mossadeq). The real religious boom, though, did not begin until 1979. The timing could not have been more opportune because of several factors: the Shah of Iran had been deposed in a popular revolution in 1979, leading to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that year And, most importantly, Saudi Arabia found itself awash in oil revenue and in the midst of an identity crisis. It was a perfect storm that brought the U.S. and the Kingdom closer together than ever before. In the winter of 1979, a group of Saudi radicals took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islams holy of holies. The radicals leader declared himself the Madhi, or savior, of all Islam and called for an overthrow of the tainted House of Saud. With the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (whose very existence challenged the legitimacy of the Saudi Islamic state) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also occurring in 1979, it was a tense year, to say the least, in Saudi Arabia. Though the Madhists were defeated after a bloody siege of the Grand Mosque, the Saudi establishment was deeply shaken by the events of 1979 and looked to advance religious initiatives to regain domestic and international initiative. Support for the Afghan mujahedeen, and increased deference to the Wahhabi clergy at home, was the solution the establishment settled on. Enter the U.S., smarting from its humiliation in Iran, hoping to give the Soviets a taste of Vietnam in Central Asia. The Saudis eagerly became the primary channel for U.S. aid to the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan War. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International, now defunct, was utilized by the CIA to fund the Afghan mujahedeen (and other secret programs). Hundreds of millions of Saudi dollars went to promote Wahhabi-influenced religious schools in Pakistan for young Afghan refugees that engendered the Taliban. The Pakistans military political leadership supported these developments as well, benefitting from Saudi largesse. There was little impetus to step back and ask big uncomfortable questions about whether Saudi charities represented a fundamental threat to American national security, writes Steve Coll in Ghost Wars: American strategy . . . was to contain and frustrate Iran and Iraq. In this mission, Saudi Arabia was an elusive but essential ally. Then, too, there was the crucial importance of Saudi Arabia in the global oil markets. The Taliban received further Saudi support in the form of guidance on implementing a harsh Sha-derived legal system (which included a copy of the Saudi religious police, the mutaween). Before 9/11, though, the U.S. was not overly concerned with such things. In fact, in 1997, Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid reported a U.S. diplomat as saying: The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis. There will be Aramco, pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of Sharia law. We can live with that. Or rather, we could until 9/11. Kernel of Evil Saudi money, from official and unofficial sources, flowed to extremist groups all over the Muslim world. Although this had long been known within policymaking circles, the fact that fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers (and, of course, al Qaeda financier and demagogue Osama bin Laden) were Saudi that prompted a closer look at the Kingdom in the U.S., though the Bush Administration sought to deflect some blame from the Kingdom (and themselves). In 2002, a controversial and widely commented on RAND Corporation study titled Taking Saudi Out of Arabia described Saudi Arabia as: the kernel of evil . . . . active at every level of the terror chain. The Saudis, the Pentagon-commissioned study contended,

sought to spread Wahhabism everywhere and to survive by creating a Wahhabi-friendly environment fundamentalist regimes throughout the Moslem world. The study landed analyst Laurent Murawiec (d. 2009), a French neoconservative, in hot water (he also advocated seizing oil fields and Mecca & Medina), but it was indicative of the mood at the time, reviving old U.S. designs on seizing Saudi oil as a worst-case scenario. Congress began conducting inquiries and referring to the Saudis as state sponsors of terrorism. Before 9/11, U.S. officials often let such Saudi peccadilloes slide. This is not so much the case nowadays. As a result, the special relationship isnt so special anymore. Many in the royal family opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (they were none to happy about the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, either, nor Saudibashing in Congress and FBI pressure to share information on Saudi charities with them). The Saudis asked the U.S. to leave their bases after the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, a request the U.S. complied with by building up its assets in neighboring Qatar. The influential Prince Bandar, who once referred to the U.S.-Saudi alliance as a Catholic marriage, certainly seems to have his doubts these days about the strength of the special relationship. The Saudis have increasingly made overtures to China and Russia since 2003. Chinese and Russian military hardware (as well as diplomatic support) has fewer strings attached. Ultimately, though, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have the same interests they have had for decades: maintaining the status quo in the Gulf. Iran has replaced the USSR as a source of mutual concern, and maintaining internal stability in the Middle East (even at the expense of democratization) has been a plank of the U.S. platform in the region since 1945 (and of the British and French before them). Events at home, once again, helped bring the two closer together, because in 2003, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) first emerged. Arab fighters who had escaped the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan were returning to Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations formed the core of AQAP. A campaign of targeted killings and vehicle bombings tore through the Kingdom before petering out after AQAP relocated to Yemen and al Qaedas central apparatus turned its attention to Iraq. These attacks (which failed to produce an uprising of any sort) led the Saudis to cooperate more closely with the U.S.-led War on Terror. The U.S. praised Saudi efforts to crack down on homegrown terrorism, and cooperation between the two (over such things as terrorist financing and renditions to Guantanamo Bay) increased well, sometimes, that is. In any case, by the mid2000s, the furor over Saudi perfidy had partly subsided as all eyes turned to Irans nuclear program and influence in postSaddam Iraq. As, if not more, indispensable So for all the talk of the Saudis striking out on their own, things are very much business as usual between the U.S. and the Kingdom these days. For instance, an arms deal is on the table involving the Saudi receipt of warships with integrated air and Aegis missile defense systems, as well as helicopters, patrol craft and shore infrastructure and a program to train a new Facilities Security Force (FSF) designed to protect sensitive Saudi oil installations . . . to reach 35,000 strong (although the U.S. bases there are closed, U.S. military trainers continue to work in Saudi Arabia). The Facilities Security Force is rather indicative of the pillars of the relationship: protection of U.S. oil interests, as well as military cooperation against any actors democratic, terroristic or otherwise that threaten the Kingdom and U.S. influence in the region. Even the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is bound up in this oil, as Prince Turki who masterminded the CIA links to the mujahedeen during the Cold War has made clear: American leaders have long called Israel an indispensable ally. They will soon learn that there are other players in the region not least the Arab street who are as, if not more, indispensable. . . . .There will be disastrous consequences for U.S.-Saudi relations if the United States vetoes U.N. recognition of a Palestinian state. One commentator predicts that U.S. support for the
Israeli position on Palestinian statehood will prove to be just not as indispensable as affordable energy. Whether this will hold true for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict remains to be seen, but it has certainly held true for most other issues between the U.S. and the Saudis. Whatever happens at the UN this fall, though, the counterrevolution in the Gulf will continue. Neither the U.S. nor the Kingdom is truly willing to risk upsetting the Persian Gulf over the Palestinians.
Saudis are especially committed to controlling Bahrain US pressure for political reform angers the Saudis it splits them on common interests like Iran Pant 9/4/11 (Harsh, Reader in International Relations, Department of Defence Studies, Kings College London.
A new balance of power in the Middle East. Business Standard, September 4, 2011. http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/harsh-v-pantnew-balancepower-inmiddle-east/447953/ Saudia Arabia sent troops to Bahrain earlier this year where they backed up a violent crackdown on unarmed protesters by Bahrains own security forces. For Saudi Arabia, the issue in Bahrain is less whether Bahrain will attain popular rule than whether Iranian and Shiite influence will grow. Iran and Saudi Arabia
have sparred on many fronts since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 a Shiite Muslim theocracy in Tehran versus a deeply conservative Sunni Muslim monarchy in Riyadh in a struggle for supremacy in the world's most oil-rich region. The animosity was evident in Saudi Arabia's support for Iraq during its war with Iran, and it still shows in Iran's backing for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Now, after a decade that seemed to tilt the regional balance toward Iran, Saudi Arabia
decided that Bahrain was the place to put its thumb more heavily on the scale. It sent troops under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council to help crush pro-democracy demonstrations because most of the protesters were Shiites challenging a Sunni king. The brutal crackdown in Bahrain posed the greatest Middle East democracy dilemma yet for the Obama administration, deepening a rift with its most important Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, while potentially
strengthening the influence of its biggest nemesis, Iran. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have chilled to their coldest since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saudi Arabia was miffed that President Obama had abandoned President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in the face of demonstrations, ignored American requests not to send troops into Bahrain to help crush Shiite-led protests there. The United States has long viewed Saudi Arabia as a last bulwark against an ascendant Iran in a crucial region, and does not want Tehran stepping in to back Shiites in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. But
SDSU 2012 7 The California Swing DA Saudi Upgrade where the United States and the Saudis are split is over how to prevent Iran from gaining traction. While American officials say the Saudi and Bahraini governments can head off trouble by making political reforms, the Saudis believe that political reforms would only open the door to greater instability.
Even mild changes to the SQ would destroy US-Saudi relations Saudis view Bahrain crisis as an existential threat Ghazal '11 (Amal, assistant professor of Middle Eastern History, Dalhousie University, "Saudi Interests Stand
in the Way of Bahrain's Democracy" February 23, 2011, www.themarknews.com/articles/4185-saudi-interestsstand-in-the-way-of-bahrain-s-democracy)
Saudi Arabia looks at Bahrain as a buffer zone between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula and thus between the Shiites and Sunnis and considers the regime of Al-Khalifa to be the buffer zone between Bahraini Shiite and Saudi ones. Saudi Arabia has its own marginalized Shiite community, which is located in the eastern provinces where most of the oil wells are. In simple terms, the Saudis fear that a successful uprising in Bahrain will empower the Shiite community there and, in turn, embolden Saudi Shiites. The Saudi ruling
family is neither ready nor willing to initiate political reforms that may even mildly change the status quo. Thus it is expected that the country will continue to act aggressively to protect the Bahraini regime and ensure its survival at all costs. We can already see evidence of this in the brutal and fatal force that the regime has been using against protesters. Any changes in Bahrain will damage Saudi strategies in the Middle East, not only affecting the way Saudis perceive Iran as a threat,
but also affecting the internal socio-political dynamics of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Saudi ruling elite cannot afford to lose another strategic regional ally. The loss of Mubaraks regime was a serious blow to Saudi interests in the region. This has caused anxiety within the Saudi ruling elite, and has put a strain on Saudi-U.S. relations. It is likely that the Americans will turn a blind eye to the uprising in Bahrain, not only because the stability of the Gulf regimes is crucial for American interests, but also because the Americans fear further upsetting the Saudis (who think the Obama administration scapegoated Mubarak too quickly).
Even if relations are resilient, pre-emption, lashout, and internal instability are all independent of US relations, short-term reactions outweigh Quinn 11 (Andrew, Analysis: Bahrain crisis exposes U.S.-Saudi Arabia rift, March 15, 2011,
http://www.bestgrowthstock.com/stock-market-news/2011/03/15/analysis-bahrain-crisis-exposes-u-s-saudi-arabiarift/) Few suggest that the fundamentals of the U.S.-Saudi relationship built on oil, counterterrorism cooperation and a shared wariness of Iran are under threat. But Saudi Arabias involvement in Bahrain injects an unpredictable new element into the mix that could backfire if the tiny kingdoms political violence escalates. The long-standing pillars of the relationship are still solid, said Frederic Wehrey, a senior policy analyst at the Rand Corporation. But if Bahrain really goes south, there is a serious outbreak of violence and perhaps an overreaction by Saudi security forces, I think it could quickly escalate into a major issue between the two sides. White House spokesman Jay Carney said on Tuesday the United States was aware of Bahrains request for help from its neighbors and regarded Saudi Arabia as an important partner.
Links Egypt
Saudi Arabias biggest fear regarding Egypt is whether the government will ally with Iran or back the Saudis Jacinto 11(Leela Jacinto, August 3, 2011, Will Mubarak face justice? http://www.france24.com/en/20110802egypt-hosni-mubarak-faces-justice-trial-health-speculation-arab-spring-protests) But he added that while the Saudis dont want to see Mubarak on trial, there are other, more threatening issues that the Saudis hope their money can buy, such as Egypts alignment on Arabism and its support on Iran. Shortly after Mubarak was ousted there was a possibility that Egypt would establish normal relations with Iran and this is more threatening for the Saudis. As the global
Shiite powerhouse just across the Persian Gulf, Iran has long been a threat to Saudi Arabias Sunni monarchy.
Saudi Arabia wants a hand in Egypt to counter Iranian influence the Saudis fear that any number of forces sympathetic to Iran will fill the void left by Mubarak. Reuters 11(Reuters, February 7, 2011, Saudi Arabia fears Egypt unrest could bolster Iran's role in region:
analysts, http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_saudi-arabia-fears-egypt-unrest-could-bolster-iran-s-role-in-regionanalysts_1504576) Yet the Saudis may feel that a weakened Mubarak on his way out is no longer an effective bulwark against Shi'ite Iran. They more than share US fears that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons a charge
Tehran denies. "Cut off the head of the snake," the Saudi ambassador to Washington, Adel al-Jubeir, quoted King Abdullah as advising US General David Petraeus in April 2008, according to a US cable released by WikiLeaks in November, referring to Iran. The kingdom, custodian of Islam's holiest sites, sees itself as a bastion of Sunni Islam, so it is also deeply concerned about wider Shi'ite influence in the region having watched the 2003 US-led invasion produce a Shi'ite-led government in Iraq. The Saudis fret that the balance
could tilt further if Mubarak's impending exit leads to prolonged uncertainty in Arab heavyweight Egypt, a staunch foe of Iran. "There will be a vacuum. Egypt was a very important element for Middle Eastern stability. Saudi Arabia will have to carry the burden if there is instability or a vacuum on the political side," said Turad al-Amry, a Saudi political analyst. "What is the
direction of the new regime and new government (in Egypt) and how fast can it perform business?" he asked. SPACE FOR RIVALS Egypt, shaken by anti-Mubarak protests for the past 13 days, will in any case be too focused on its internal crisis to bolster Saudi efforts to counter Iran's sway, analysts say. Diplomats said Riyadh also worries that a diplomatic void left by a preoccupied Egypt will give openings to countries such as Turkey and Qatar, a smaller Gulf rival of Saudi Arabia, which both seek bigger regional roles and are on good terms
with Iran.
Links Egypt Bandar

The US must get Bandar on board with the plan to minimize Saudi Arabias fear of regional power imbalances. The impact is Saudi modernization, proliferation from Pakistan, and conflict with Iran. Hannah 11(John Hannah, April 22, 2011, Bandars Return, Foreign Policy,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/22/bandars_return)
As my friend Simon Henderson has been chronicling, "Bandar is back." Sidelined in recent years by some combination of illness and palace intrigue, Saudi Arabia's legendary former ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, is once again a major presence on the world stage. The Obama administration would be wise to take note. Working in tandem with the United States, Bandar's over-sized talents could prove a huge asset in efforts to shape the Middle East Revolts of 2011 in a direction that serves U.S. interests. Put to other uses, however, those same skills could lead to results that Washington may find, well, much less agreeable. The reason that Bandar has been urgently called back into service is not hard to fathom. While many in the West have seen the promise
of democracy and freedom in the political turmoil roiling Arab lands, the Saudis see little but disaster. They view everything through a single prism: their existential struggle with a menacing Iran that is hell-bent
on collapsing the Middle East's existing order, unseating the House of Saud, and asserting a controlling influence over Islam's holiest sites in Mecca and Medina. For the Kingdom, there really is only one yardstick by which to measure emerging developments: Are they a net plus or minus for the Persian theocracy across the Gulf that seeks to assert its hegemony throughout the region? From that vantage, the scorecard has not been good. The regime of Hosni Mubarak -longtime Saudi ally; pillar of regional stability; stalwart opponent of the mullahs -- is gone. Yemen, on the Kingdom's southern border, teeters on the brink of anarchy. Most threatening of all, just miles off the Saudi coast, in tiny Bahrain -- a virtual protectorate of the Kingdom and the gateway to its oil-rich eastern province -- the Sunni al-Khalifa monarchy was pushed to the brink by Shiite protesters who, cheered on by Iran, dabbled dangerously with the idea of regime change. Brazenly challenged to defend one of their clearest redlines, the Saudis responded predictably, with a large-scale military intervention that underwrote a brutal crackdown to snuff out the escalating crisis. Exacerbating everything for Riyadh has been its overarching loss of confidence in the reliability of American power. Against all Saudi advice, the Obama administration actively worked to help engineer Mubarak's ouster. In Bahrain, senior U.S. officials were publicly pressing the ruling family to make bolder concessions to the protesters -- literally hours before Saudi tanks began to roll. More recently, a tardy and hesitant exercise of U.S. military might has failed to dislodge Libya's Colonel Qaddafi, the man who just a few years ago contracted the assassination of Saudi King Abdullah. And in stark contrast to Washington's very public effort to push aside its longstanding Egyptian ally -- "yesterday," to quote Robert Gibbs -- Team
Obama has kept an embarrassingly low profile in the face of sustained protests and bloodshed in anti-American Syria, a regime that proudly serves as Iran's closest ally in the Arab world.
Facing a situation where the region appears to be spiraling out of control, and its most important outside partner veers between weakness, incompetence, and reckless naivete, the House of Saud has circled the wagons, brought all hands on deck, called in the A Team -- choose your metaphor. But it all leads back to Bandar -- one of the most dynamic, creative, and aggressive statesmen of the past 30 years -- being summoned out of diplomatic purgatory to help the Kingdom cope with what it sees as an unprecedented crisis. Make no mistake, the Saudis now feel themselves very much at war with Iran, albeit by other means, and the stakes
as viewed from Riyadh are nothing less than the future of the Arab Middle East and the survival of the House of Saud. And the force of nature that is Bandar bin Sultan has clearly been placed at the
forefront of the Kingdom's battle plan. I've lost count of how many times people have asked me in recent years, "Whatever happened to Bandar?" Now he's suddenly everywhere. Earlier this month, Secretary of Defense Gates visited Riyadh to see King Abdullah. Bandar was there. Days later, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon followed to deliver a message to Abdullah from President Obama. Again, Bandar was prominently featured in the photo-op. More interestingly -- and undoubtedly more worrisome -- at the end of March, in the wake of the Saudi intervention in Bahrain, Bandar was dispatched to Pakistan, China and India to rally support for the Kingdom's hard line approach to the region's unrest. Bandar's formidable skills in the service of a Saudi Arabia that feels itself increasingly cornered and unable to rely on U.S. protection is a formula for trouble -- made even worse when the likes of Pakistan and China are thrown into the mix. No one should forget that, in the late 1980s, it was Bandar who secretly brokered the delivery of Chinese medium-range missiles to the Kingdom, totally surprising Washington and nearly triggering a major crisis with Israel. The danger today, of course, is that the Saudis feel sufficiently threatened and alone to engage in similar acts of self-help. Would they seek to modernize their ballistic missile force? Even worse, would the Kingdom go shopping for nuclear weapons or, at a minimum, invite Pakistan to deploy part of its nuclear arsenal to the Kingdom? Analysts have long speculated that Saudi money financed the Pakistani nuclear weapons program in exchange for a promise that when it became necessary, its fruits would be put at Riyadh's disposal. As the Middle East convulses and Iran relentlessly inches closer to achieving a nuclear weapons capability, has that time finally arrived? Even short of these extreme scenarios, other troubling possibilities exist. During his trip to Pakistan, Bandar reportedly discussed contingencies under
SDSU 2012 10 The California Swing DA Saudi Upgrade which thousands of additional Pakistani security forces might be dispatched to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia for the purpose of, in effect, cracking Shiite heads. Iran condemned the news, ratcheting
up tensions further and increasing the risk that the situation could erupt into a full-blown Sunni-Shiite war. Additionally, no one can discount the danger that, with its back against the wall, the Kingdom might not once again fire up the old Sunni jihadist network and point it in the general direction of Shiite Iran -- leaving the rest of the world to deal with the nasty, unintended consequences of well-financed takfirists run amok. To minimize the risk that any of these dangers actually comes to pass, the Obama administration would be well advised to focus like a laser beam on repairing its breach of trust with Riyadh. The visits of Gates and Donilon to the Kingdom clearly had that intent and, by most accounts, succeeded in stemming the hemorrhaging in the relationship. But the effort will need to be sustained. The administration would also be smart to re-establish a very strong line of communication to Bandar now that he's again playing a major role in Saudi policy. Bandar working without reference to U.S. interests is clearly cause for concern. But Bandar working as a partner with Washington against a common Iranian enemy is a major strategic asset. Drawing on Saudi resources and prestige, Bandar's ingenuity and bent for bold action could be put to excellent use across the region in ways that reinforce U.S. policy and interests: through economic and political measures that weaken the Iranian mullahs; undermine the Assad regime; support a successful transition in Egypt; facilitate Qaddafi's departure; reintegrate Iraq into the Arab fold; and encourage a negotiated solution in Yemen. Even in Bahrain, if anyone in the Saudi hierarchy is going to understand over time that a stable solution must eventually go beyond repression to include a renewed effort at real reform, it is likely to be Bandar.
Bandar hates the plan he wants Tantawi and the SCAF to have full power Escobar 11 (Pepe Escobar, author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War,
The secret life of Arabia, Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MF03Ak01.html) The House of Saud has its hands full with Egypt as well - now that the Egyptian Military Council has been handed a cool $4 billion by Riyadh. It's enlightening to know that Field Marshall Tantawi - the current, "transitional" strongman in Cairo - was the Egyptian Defense Attache in Pakistan during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s. So Tantawi is an ISI darling, as well as a Saudi Prince Bandar darling. With
Tantawi as a House of Saud Trojan Horse, his bet for Egypt is much more Muslim Brotherhood than secular Tahrir Square. That happens to square off beautifully with Washington's own (not so secret) burning desire: a Pakistani model for Egypt, with the army in the background and a facade civilian government run by Islamic parties who won in the ballot box. But this mildly Islamic regime would only be acceptable if it were to kowtow to neo-liberalism and the Camp David accords with Israel. The House of Saud subscribes to this project for a very simple reason. The House of
Saud knows its supposed hegemony in the Arab world only holds as long as Egypt is kept politically insignificant. And the way to accomplish this is via an islamicization - the Wahhabi way - of the state and politics as a whole. Tahrir Square, hopefully, will fight it to death. At least there may be a few reasons to expect not such a bleak, upcoming Arab Summer.
Links Yemen
Regional spillover Saudi Arabia wants a subservient Yemen to prevent democratic movements throughout the region. Al-Shamahi 11(Abubakr Al-Shamahi, freelance journalist and editor of Comment Middle East, August 8,
2011, Taking a chance on a democratic Yemen, Al Jazeera, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/08/2011847134790380.html)
Then come the two states with the biggest influence in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the US. Saudi
Arabia has two goals in Yemen: to try to retain its influence in the country, and to bring about a stable Yemen without letting Yemen get too strong. Here we can refer to the alleged deathbed advice of King
Abdulaziz: "Keep Yemen weak". While this may not have happened, Saudi policy in the country certainly bears it out. Support for the royalists in the civil war in the 1960s, and for secessionists in the civil war of 1994, are two examples. The youth movement therefore presents a serious problem for Saudi policy in Yemen. The movement has goals that are the antithesis of the way Saudi Arabia is run. Should the movement succeed in
bringing about a civil, democratic state in Yemen, this would present a dangerous model in the eyes of the ruling al-Saud. The youth movement also appears to not have been co-opted by Saudi Arabia yet, which puts the country in the strange position of having a powerful grouping in Yemen not under its sway. Should the youth movement succeed, there is no doubt that there would be a move away from Saudi Arabia, and an attempt to bring about an independent foreign policy. Yemen, the most populous country on the Arabian peninsula, could become a relatively strong, democratic country, in the long term. This would no doubt upset the balance of power in the region.
Saudi Arabia will accept only the GCC proposal they fear a Saleh trial would set a dangerous precedent in the region AND they want to maintain a hand in Yemens politics. They want the transition to occur so General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar can gain power. Shakdam 2011(Catherine Shakdam, July 6, 2011, Foreign Policy Association,
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/07/06/general-ali-mohsen-al-ahmar-opens-cnn%E2%80%A6what-saying/) When asked what he thought should be done in Yemen, Mohsen said: The general public in Yemen is seeking a transfer of power to the vice presidentThis is a principle that we must follow because there are
agreements that sides have signed and it is compulsory that all sides agree on its specifics; not change its points. Interestingly the General is preaching to an implementation of the GCC proposal which was unilaterally signed by the Opposition before President Saleh once again fell short of honoring his promises. Under
the agreement, Saleh would transfer power to its Vice President, Hadi, who would in turn create a coalition government and organize the next presidential elections. President Saleh would
in exchange be granted legal immunity along with his close relatives and aides. What is important here is that rather than advocate an immediate transfer of power under the Yemeni Constitution, Gen. Mohsen wants to return to the pre-Saleh departure proposal. It sounds rather strange given that the Constitution states that if the President is unable to fulfill his executive duties, the VP would act as his replacement and arrange the next elections within 2 weeks. Why choose the longer and unpopular option? Well for a start, Gen. Mohsen is a close friend and ally of Saudi Prince Nayef, the Head of the Yemeni Affairs Council in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi have been from the get go the driving
force behind the GCC proposal. Although the Kingdom recognizes the need for a change, it does not want to set a precedent in the region by allowing Yemen to drag Saleh to Court and trial him for his crimes. Furthermore, by promoting the Saudi plan in the resolve of the Yemeni crisis, the General is proving the Kingdom that he still has a role to play in Yemens political landscape. Well aware that the KSA will have to anoint the next Yemeni President, Mohsen is acting as a
fervent and obedient vassal. The General went on saying: Our friends the Americans and the Europeans and the British and the GCC and Saudi Arabia are guarantors for its implementation. Quite cleverly here, Mohsen is positioning himself as a man of measure and poise, aware of the need of an international partnership in the region.
Links Yemen Oil Module

Saudi Arabia will invade to stop successful democratic revolutions fear of a revolution at home and loss of regional hegemony would jack oil market stability Ahlul Bayt News Agency 2011 (Ahlul Bayt News Agency, July 12, 2011 (Commander: Saudi Regime
Feeling Deeply Intimidated by Arab Spring, http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=252946)) He mentioned that Saudi officials are feeling deep concern for the outcomes of the current revolutions in Bahrain, Yemen and other Arab countries not just because they are fearful of the spread of these uprisings to their country, but also because of the threats that such developments pose to the monarchy's regional clout and influence. "They are concerned about the revolutions and developments which are influenced
by the Islamic awakening in those areas which are connected to their land," Rashid said. He further touched on the possible outcomes and negative impacts of the regional revolutions on Saudi Arabia's regional power and influence, and said, "When they look at the Bahrain revolution, Saudis feel that regions to the East of their country are gone and when they see such a fundamental and revolutionary development in Yemen, they feel that those regions to the South of their country are gone as well." Given the popular uprisings and revolutions sweeping the Middle-East and North of Africa and the growing discontent among the Saudi people, many analysts believe that regional unrests will soon spread to Saudi Arabia. "The reason for the Saudi Army's invasion of Bahrain is that if people's revolutions in Yemen and Bahrain yield results, the Saudi people will certainly follow suit and stage a popular uprising as well," a senior Saudi human rights activist and opposition figure, Seyed Hassan al-Moussavi al-Bahraini, told FNA in May. In similar remarks, a prominent Bahraini politician said in April that the current revolution in his Shiite-majority nation would give rise to a similar uprising among the Shiite minority of Saudi Arabia, who mainly live in oil rich regions of the Arab country. "Adjacency of Bahrain's Shiite-majority population to Saudi Arabia's Shiite region of al-Shortiyah, which is just 25km away from the borders with Bahrain, poses a potential threat to the Saudi regime," Representative of the Bahraini Shiites in Iran Abdullah Daqaq said. "Victory of the Bahraini people's uprising would lead to a similar uprising by the Shiites of the alShortiyah region that has the richest oil resources in Saudi Arabia," Daqaq underscored. He further pointed out that the
deep and grave impact that such an uprising in Saudi Arabia would leave on the world oil market, which would certainly harm the interests of the western countries, is the root cause of the
Saudi occupation of Bahrain and the brutal suppression of the Bahrainis' popular movement by the Al-Khalifa and Al-Saud regimes and the West's support for their crimes.
Even small changes in the Middle Eastern oil market will can price spikes and shocks devastates the economic recovery and spreads globally Newman 11(Rick Newman, February 18, 2011, How Arab Unrest could Harm the World Economy, US News
& World Report, http://www.usnews.com/mobile/blogs/flowchart/2011/2/18/how-arab-unrest-could-harm-theworld-economy.html) Oil, however, is a different story, since it can rapidly transmit Middle East turmoil to many other nations. The Middle East accounts for 30 percent of the world's oil production and a bigger portion of proven reserves,
and even small changes in the supply of petroleum can have an outsized impact on the oil-thirsty economies of the United States, Europe, and Asia. Research firm Roubini Global Economics points out that three of the last five global
recessions have followed some kind of shock in the Middle East that drove oil prices up. "Even regional political turmoil that does not disrupt oil supplies directly can increase prices," writes RGE Chairman Nouriel Roubini in a recent research note. So far, regime change in Tunisia and Egypt and
the increasingly violent protests in Bahrain and Yemen have left the oil markets unscathed. But the same types of socioeconomic problems exist in Libya, Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other major oil producers, and if Egyptian-style revolution hit any of those countries, it could be a game-changer. For now, the overthrow of any Persian Gulf oil monarchies seems unlikely, partly because oil-rich nations are somewhat insulated by their own wealth. When the natives get restless in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, for instance, the government typically boosts the lavish subsidies paid to ordinary citizens, essentially buying their quiescence. Plus, living standards are already much higher in the oil-rich nations than in struggling economies like Egypt or Yemen, where poverty and high unemployment drove protesters into the streets. Still, there's no guarantee that what has worked in the past will keep working. In Bahrain, for instance, the king tried recently to lull protesters by offering every family $2,500 in cash. The protesters only seemed to get angrier. "They're not going to be placated just by money," says Mohsin Khan, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. "There's something more in the air." [See 3 big lies about cutting the deficit.] Water-cooler worst-case scenarios focus on a militant takeover of Saudi Arabia or another big oil nation, similar to the 1979 Iranian revolution. But far lesser shocks
could also send oil prices skyrocketing, which in turn could be enough to torpedo the fragile economic recovery that's underway in many countries. Libya and Algeria, for instance, control
about 4.5 percent of the world's oil production, and rulers in both countries are battling pro-democracy uprisings. If either nation underwent a full-fledged revolution, that wouldn't necessarily mean the oil fields would stop pumping. But there could

be sabotage, strikes, or other measures meant to disrupt the flow of oil, and that could be enough to send prices upward. Iran, with about 4.8 percent of the world's oil production, is another obvious wild card. The theocratic, hard-line regime there has been able to squash pro-democracy movements in the past, but its grip on control seems to be under stress once again. One common assumption is that if political developments impeded the flow of oil in one or two nations, other producersSaudi Arabia, mostlywould pump more, to make up for it. Roubini estimates that the Saudis have up to four million barrels per day of excess capacityroughly equivalent to Iran's total productionwhich seems like a lot of slack in the system. But that doesn't account for the jittery psychology of the oil markets, which at times can be more powerful than the underlying fundamentals. [See how to survive tax hikes and spending cuts.] The world got a primer on that in 2008, when oil prices rose from $95 per barrel to $145 in a mere six months. The causes still aren't completely clear, but it does seem evident that a bubble mentality led traders to bid up oil because they felt prices would go even higher in the future. The bubble burst as the global recession hit, and by the end of 2008, prices had collapsed by nearly 70 percent. On one hand, it's reassuring that oil prices fell back to levels more consistent with real economic activity. But the 2008 spike also revealed the extent to which psychology and fast computerized trading can dominate the market for volatile commodities like oil. "Once there's movement in prices, momentum trading kicks in and people want to lock in future prices," says Khan. "That pushes prices higher and higher. The market can overshoot significantly." If oil prices could surge by 50 percent in 2008when the world was sliding into recession and the Middle East seemed a bit calmer than it does nowthen another bubble is certainly possible if several Middle Eastern capitals are in a state of rebellion. And one clear lesson of the last few years is that despite the expertise of Ph.D.'s trying to predict every possible development, "externalities" able to shock the global economy can still catch everybody by surprise. So it might not be a challenge to the Saudi monarchy or the Iranian ayatollahs that sets off an oil shock, but a series of smaller triggers that nobody foresees right now. In addition to strikes or sabotage by oil workers, Khan says other indicators to watch for include the departure of foreign engineers or other technical experts who help keep the oil fields pumping in many Gulf states. [See 5 reasons to stop fearing China.] The global economy can probably withstand a 10 or 15 percent rise in oil prices, but anything more than that could threaten the recovery. Roubini says that if prices crested $100 and stayed there for a while, it would cut into global consumption and GDP growth, which could lead to a double-dip recession in some countries. If political upheaval actually interrupted the flow of oil, the effect would be more abrupt. "It wouldn't have to be a permanent loss of oil," says Khan. "Even a temporary loss over
six or 12 months would be enough for prices to rise very rapidly. The impact on the world economy would be significant."
Oil wars cause extinction. Heinberg 03 (Richard Heinberg, core faculty member at New College of California, The Partys Over: Oil,
War and the Fate of Industrial Societies, 2003, p. 230) Today the average US citizen uses five times as much energy as the world average. Even citizens
of nations that export oil such as Venezuela and Iran use only a small fraction of the energy US citizens use per capita. The Carter Doctrine, declared in 1980, made it plain that US military might would be applied to the project of dominating the worlds oil wealth: henceforth, any hostile effort to impede the flow of Persian Gulf oil would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. In the past 60 years, the US military and intelligence services have grown to become bureaucracies of unrivaled scope, power, and durability. While the US has not declared war on any nation since 1945, it has nevertheless bombed or invaded a total of 19 countries and stationed troops, or engaged in direct or indirect military action, in dozens of others. During the Cold War, the US military apparatus grew exponentially, ostensibly in response to the threat posed by an archrival: the Soviet Union. But after the end of the Cold War the American military and intelligence establishments did not shrink in scale to any appreciable degree. Rather, their implicit agenda the protection of global resource interests emerged as the semi-explicit justification for their continued existence. With resource hegemony came challenges from nations or sub-national groups opposing that hegemony. But the immensity of US military might ensured that such challenges would be overwhelmingly asymmetrical. US strategists labeled such challenges terrorism a term with a definition malleable enough to be applicable to any threat from any potential enemy, foreign or domestic, while never referring to any violent action on the part of the US, its agents, or its allies. This policy puts the US on a
collision course with the rest of the world. If all-out competition is pursued with the available weapons of awesome power, the result could be the destruction not just of industrial civilization, but of humanity and most of the biosphere.
Links Yemen Backlash Module

Saudis sabotage the plan and backlash they perceive it as a threat to their own regime Democracy Digest '11 ("Saudi Arabia: countervailing power or 'midwives of change' in Yemen?" June 6,
2011, www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/06/saudi-arabia-countervailing-power-or-midwives-of-change-in-yemen/) With Yemen finely poised between transition and regression, some opposition activists expressed cautious optimism today that acting President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi could initiate democratic reform. But the protest movement may face fierce resistance to a genuine transition from Saudi Arabia. We do not have any problem if Hadi takes control of the government. He is
respected by the people, said Tawakkul Karman, (right), the head of Women Journalists Without Chains. Hadi must use this historic moment to enter Yemens history as a leader and revolutionary, she said. But she warned that if he does not conduct immediate reforms, the youth protesters will go against him the same way they did against Saleh. Its Hadis choice to decide which door of history he wants to go through. Karman was one of the most prominent and unlikely faces at the protests amid a sea of men in the early days and she predicted that Yemens transition would be more deadly and prolonged than the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. A prominent member of the opposition Islah party, she has emerged as a leading woman leader of the Arab spring, with her success in bringing so many protesters out, and keeping it largely peaceful [recognized as] a remarkable achievement. Saudi Arabia has emerged as the decisive player in Yemens ongoing conflict, but the prospect of engineering a transition will not appeal to the ruling family. Riyadh is left with the
responsibility of fostering a new political order in a country with democratic aspirations but few working institutions, even as they struggle to beat back the revolutionary currents unleashed by the Arab awakening, observers suggest. Its a real irony: the Saudis usually oppose change, but in Yemen they have become the midwives of change, said Bernard Haykel, a scholar of Middle Eastern studies at Princeton University. Riyadh is Yemens main source of aid and has used funding to extend its influence within the countrys various tribes. It is likely to resist the politically diverse,
youthful protest movements demands for a civil democratic state for fear of its potentially contagious effect. The prospect of a democratic Yemenis likely to make Saudi officials uncomfortable because democratic reforms could put pressure on Gulf states to take similar steps, analysts said. Instability tends to slip over, said Kenneth Katzman, a regional expert at the Congressional Research Center. First and foremost, the Saudis want stability. Over several months of sustained mobilization, the protest movement maintained its insistence on democratic reform. But it will now confront a regime which has emerged as the regions major authoritarian countervailing power to the Arab spring. They dont want to see a systemic change in Yemen, said Sarah Phillips, a Yemen expert at the University of Sydney. A possible roadmap for transition would involve forming a broad-based national council of tribal, military, religious and opposition figures. There is no single institution or individual in Yemen who is capable of exerting control, said analyst Khaled Fattah. Yemens
formal structures such as political parties and government institutions are in no position to shape events. The divided military, on the other hand, is a reflection of tribal coalitions and elite struggle, not state
power, he said. Saudi Arabia has resisted political change in other Arab states and intervened militarily to prop up Bahrains beleaguered Sunni monarchy. But its security interests incline it towards supporting a transition in Yemen, some observers suggest. In the long term, the Saudis are very keen on a stable, economically prosperous Yemeni youth to keep them away from al-Qaeda, said Khaled al-Maeena, editor of Arab News. But it will be difficult to know the Saudi outlook for Yemen in the short or medium term. Inside the Saudi corridors of powers, the priority is to see an end of al-Qaeda terror activities sooner rather than later. Security interests and the prospect of a failed state emerging from the current conflict mean that Yemens transition will be more delicate and tortured than elsewhere in the region.
Saudi Arabia will punish Yemen for breaking ranks will expel migrant workers and cut off aid to Yemen, crippling their economy. Haykel 11(Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, June 14, 2011, Global Public Sphere
CNN Blog, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/14/saudi-arabias-yemen-dilemma/) Riyadh has not hesitated to punish Sana'a whenever it has expressed an independent policy. For example, during the Gulf War, when Saleh sided with Iraq's Saddam Hussein against Kuwait and the Saudiled coalition, Saudi Arabia expelled nearly a million Yemeni migrant workers and cut off official aid to Yemen. (It did not, however, end its handouts to Yemen's tribes.) This moment marked the beginning of the unraveling of Yemen's economy, which today is in tatters. A few years later, in 1994, during Yemen's civil war, Riyadh continued to punish Saleh by supporting the secessionist socialists in southern Yemen. The
Saudi leadership was not bothered by the fact that, in Wahhabi eyes, the socialists were infidels, further underscoring the pragmatic and non-ideological nature of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy.
Saudis backlash against Yemen democratization Knickermeyer '11 (Ellen, "Trouble Down South" July 5, 2011,
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/05/trouble_down_south?page=full) But can Saudi Arabia, among the most risk-adverse of states, tolerate the kind of unruly transition to democracy that demonstrators in Yemen's streets have been demanding for the past five months? Even in Saudi Arabia, many doubt it. "The government has always used this money to control people, silence them. It worked for a long time," Mazin Mutabagani, a scholar
and Yemen expert at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, told me. "If they could give Ali Abdullah Saleh a new life, they would give [it to] him, to go back. They are fond of dictators." Under Saleh, whose rise to the presidency in 1978 was supported by Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has denied Yemen the monopoly of power
and integrity of borders that are the basics of statehood, through payments that blur the allegiances of Yemeni tribes and others, and through cross-border security operations, argues Abdullah
Hamidaddin, a political analyst in Jeddah. "Increasing the autonomy of the tribe always degrades the authority of the central government," Hamidaddin told me, adding, "In what other countries do citizens receive a salary from a foreign government?"
If the Saudis cant influence the choice of the next president theyll cut off financial assistance to Yemen that makes Yemen a new terrorist hotbed. Byman '11 (Daniel, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, "What's Next for Yemen?"
March 22, 2011, www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0322_yemen_byman.aspx) Saudi Arabia may destabilize things even further. Riyadh views Yemen as the kingdom's backyard and worries that instability there could spread north. Saudi Arabia has often tried, and often failed, to play kingmaker in Yemen. Should a new ruler in Sanaa try to hew an independent line from Riyadh, as Saleh did, the Saudis may give financial and other support to his enemies. For the United States, the biggest worry is terrorism. Osama Bin Laden could take advantage of additional instability to channel more
resources to Yemen. No matter what, AQAP will take advantage of any easing of pressure to plan more attacks and build their organization. A new government, like Saleh's, would probably see AQAP as a relatively minor threat and would focus its intelligence services and political energies on its domestic enemies and rivals, leaving counterterrorism a distant second. There is only so much cooperation the United States can buy.
**Brink**
The Arab Spring has changed the paradigm of US-Saudi relations the security alliance is on the brink because Saudi Arabia sees the US as abandoning key allies in the region Richter 11 (Paul Richter, March 15, 2011, U.S. may lose either way in Bahrain crisis, LA Times,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/15/world/la-fg-us-bahrain-20110316) Despite the cautious U.S. language, the crisis comes at a time when the historically close American relationships with the Saudi and Bahraini governments are under stress. Saudi King Abdullah
was angry with the Obama administration for pushing former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign in February.
Saudi officials also have been displeased that the White House has prodded them to accelerate their own reforms, a process they insist cannot be rushed because of the kingdom's change-resistant clergy. The Saudis appear to have again signaled their displeasure this month, cancelling planned visits to the kingdom by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Saudi officials said the king was too ill, but U.S. officials acknowledged that the recent tensions may have prompted the move. The Saudis, like the Bahrainis and other governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council, also are "angry that Washington has let staunch allies such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt be forced from power, while doing little to push Col. Moammar Kadafi of Libya from his position," wrote Simon Henderson, a specialist on the Arabian Peninsula at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Last month, U.S. officials said the Saudis were supportive of their plans for political change in Bahrain, and appeared willing to provide massive financial aid to help relieve the poverty of its Shiite population. But the Saudi government changed course as the protests continued and the opposition's demands increased. On Saturday, Gates had made a public appearance in Bahrain and called for an acceleration of the reform effort, saying "baby steps" weren't enough. Two days later, Bahraini authorities asked the Saudis to send military help
The Arab Spring is a total game changer seen as betrayal of the security alliance its caused relations to be at their tensest point in decades Reuters 11 (Jeff Mason and Richard Mably, June 15, 2011, Saudi, U.S. debated oil reserve swap before OPEC
sources, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/15/uk-saudi-us-crude-idUKTRE75E2JK20110615) The failure of the oil swap idea comes amid the most tense US-Saudi relationship in decades, with Saudis most recently upset at how the United States treated former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a fellow Sunni Arab leader, who had been a strong U.S. ally. "The Saudis are very, very angry at what happened with Egypt. They felt it was a betrayal, that the United States cannot be trusted as an ally," said Gal Luft, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, a Washington-based thinktank focussed on energy security. The Saudis were infuriated by Obama administration criticism of Bahrain's violent crackdown on demonstrators. They saw Bahrain's repressed Shiite Muslims as the
vanguard of attempts by majority-Shiite Iran, Saudi Arabia's long-time adversary, to spread its influence in the Arab heartland. Adding to tensions are concerns about U.S. monetary policy and the value of the U.S. dollar, which have a direct impact on Saudi profits and revenues, Luft said. "They want to make sure that they don't get screwed. On the one hand, they increase production, and on the other hand, the dollar declines, and they lose on both sides. "A few dollars here and there is OK, but $80 a barrel is a big problem now for the Saudis. A really, really big problem," he said. Worried by unrest sweeping the Arab world, the world's top oil exporter has pledged to spend about $130 billion, or around 30 percent of its annual economic output, on social programs to help the poor.
Relations on the brink, plan causes collapse Boucek '11 (Christopher, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program, fmr researcher, ostdoctoral researcher
at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School. He was also previously a media analyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Shadow of the Arab Spring" June 21, 2011, carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/21/u.s.-saudi-relations-in-shadow-of-arab-spring/1il) Saudi Arabia is not immune from the protest movement and it will not be completely spared from the Arab Spring. But Saudi Arabia will weather this Arab Spring better than any other country in the region. The
government is better equipped to manage this season, in large part through its religious community and its financial resources. Saudi Arabia announced $136 billion in new social welfare spending to offset the economic and social drivers. The protests we have seen in Saudi Arabia have been very, very small so farprimarily confined to the eastern province and some other big citiesbut through a very large police presence, the mobilization of the official clerical establishment,

and spending money, the government has been able to contain this. So Saudi Arabia will weather this better than any other country in the region. It is also important to look at what the regional protest movement has done and will do to the price of oil. The new Saudi budget to account for all of the new social welfare spending is fixed at
about $88 per barrel, meaning that this is what the state must earn to break even on the new spending. As a result, we will most likely see Saudi Arabia not working to drive down the price of oil, but instead working to prevent the oil market from becoming overheated. Are U.S.-Saudi relations in decline? We have seen the emergence of greater tensions between Washington and Riyadh as a result of the Arab Spring. This comes in large part because in Saudi Arabia there is a belief that Washington has not managed this process very well, doesnt know what its doing, and is putting issues of political reform
ahead of security and stability in the region. This is a part of the world where personal relationships, friendship, and loyalty are more important than anything else and weve seen the United States support the removal of former friends, Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The Saudis feel that there is a likelihood that this is not going to stop. Saudi Arabia and Saudi foreign policy generally loathe instability or uncertainty and thats exactly what we see right now. Riyadh feels
that the United States is more concerned about being on the right side of history, instead of standing by its friends and working to advance stability in the regionthis is very concerning to the
Saudis. Whereas the United States and Saudi Arabia historically differed over domestic Saudi political issues, the two countries usually agreed on foreign and regional policy issues. But increasingly, this is not the case. Increasingly it
seems that Saudi Arabia looks out into the world and thinks that its foreign policy interests do not overlap with the United States and Washingtons security interests. Saudi Arabia is now in a position to pursue its own interests. All that said, at the end of the day, the relationship remains very strong. In the region, there are several special relationships for the United States and
one of them is with Saudi Arabia. Despite all of the difficulty and tensions, the relationship remains strong and it will remain strong. The two countries need each other and there is no one else who can provide for Saudi Arabia what the United States does and no one that can provide for the United States what Saudi Arabia does.
Plan is perceived as threatening security, kills the whole relationship Fifield '11 (Anna, "Arab spring tests US-Saudi Relationship," June 16, 2011,
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4082dc70-984d-11e0-ae45-00144feab49a.html#axzz1ban9zk5P) Still, Washington and Riyadh could be at a turning point in their 60-year relationship as the Arab spring has laid bare its contradictions. The wave of democracy spreading across the Middle East is widely viewed as good news in America, but the onset of dislocating change in the region is anything but good news for the Saudis. The US support for democratic change means we have become a source of insecurity rather than security for Saudi Arabia, Mr Miller said. The relationship is founded on the core understanding that the US will provide security for Saudi Arabia, which in return will do its part to keep oil prices stable. It has come under strain from the outset, notably when the US recognised the state of
Israel in 1948.
**Impacts** Impact Pakistan Collapse

They also will seek nukes from Pakistan ensuing tensions cause Pakistani state collapse which spreads through the region. Siddiqui 11(Farrukh Siddiqui, Riyadh will build nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, Saudi prince warns, June
30, 2011, http://www.stateofpakistan.org/riyadh-will-build-nuclear-weapons-if-iran-gets-them-saudi-prince-warns)
Today, Australias leading national daily, The Australian published an analysis which confirms the Guardians report. Earlier this month The Wall Street Journal reported another Saudi threat to go nuclear or to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences, should Iran do the same. The Australian said that until recently it appeared that US security guarantees would be a preferred alternative to Riyadhs pursuit of a nuclear option. However, the combination of Irans steady nuclear progress and Riyadhs growing frustration with
Washingtons Arab Spring policies threaten to drive the Saudis in precisely this direction.
The Australian claims that the Saudi Arabia to build 16 nuclear reactors at a cost of more than $US300 billion. It may be notes that the UN nuclear watchdog recently raised new concerns of undisclosed nuclear-related activities in Iran, in the continuing campaign lead by the United States against Irans nuclear program. The growing tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran has the potential to destabilize the entire Gulf region as well as strain Pakistans relationship with Iran. It could also exacebate the shia-sunni relations in certain parts of Pakistan. In light of the instability that is shaking the Arab world and the Saudi royal familys fear of similar riots, especially in the kingdoms Shia areas, Saudi Arabia may have turned to its longstanding ally Pakistan for assistance. According to The Australian that Saudi officials sought the help of
Pakistan and that the latter had placed two divisions on alert to be sent to Saudi Arabia if security there deteriorates. Such co-operation has an important precedent: after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and throughout the 1980s, Pakistan stationed military forces in Saudi Arabia and the two nations co-operated in assisting the Afghani mujaheddin. Saudi-Pakistani cooperation extends to the nuclear realm as well. Over the decades Saudi Arabia has helped finance Pakistans nuclear and missile programs and Saudi Arabia may seek to capitalise on its investment.
Pakistan collapse causes global nuclear war Rosenbaum 7 (Ron Rosenbaum, November 29 2007 Talkin' World War IIIThe return of the repressed,
http://www.slate.com/id/2178792/pagenum/3/)
I don't want to be alarmist (actually I do, or rather I'd like you to share my sense of alarm), but I'm surprised there isn't a greater sense of concern about those Pakistani nukes. Forget Iran and Israel (Bush's hypothetical route to World War III).
Pakistani nukes now represent the quickest shortcut to a regional nuclear war that could escalate to a global nuclear war. The instability of the Musharraf regime and uncertainty about its control of its "Islamic bomb"actually an arsenal of nukes, including, reportedly, the long-range missiles they can be mounted onhas been a particular concern since 9/11. The key "unknown unknown" in the
decision to invade Afghanistan was whether the considerable bloc of radical Islamist Taliban (if not al-Qaida) sympathizers within the Pakistani military and its notorious intelligence service, the ISI (which in fact helped create al-Qaida), would destabilize the Musharraf government. We dodged a bullet then. But now the once-shaky Musharraf regime is on the brink of collapse. Musharraf has survived assassination attempts before, and there is little likelihood that the forces behind those attempts have a diminished appetite for his demise, literal or political. And consider this: In recent years entire regions of Pakistan have become safe havens for al-Qaida and (quite likely) Osama. Is it not possible that instead of pursuing elaborate schemes to buy nukes on the black market or smuggle an improvised radioactive "dirty bomb" into the United States, al-Qaida has been biding its time, burrowing its way into Pakistan, waiting for the Islamic bomb to drop into Bin Laden's lap? (I know: not a great choice of metaphor.) Because he thinks long term, he doesn't have to try to scrounge up some "loose nuke" from the former Soviet "stans"; he can just wait. He's one coupor one bulletaway from being handed the keys to an entire arsenal of nuclear weapons. Those keys: Throughout the years since 9/11, when Pakistan was supposedly our valiant ally against terrorism, various leaks and hints have offered false reassurances that the United States had in some way "secured" the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. That we were virtually in the control rooms with a hand on the switch. But then, in the wake of the new threats to Musharraf's precarious regime, came the New York Times front-pager on Nov. 18 (one month after Bush's "World War III" pronouncement in the White House) on the nature of U.S. "control" over Pakistani nukes. The Times had held this story for more than three years at the behest of the Bush administration. This time, when discussion of the issue in Pakistan became more public in the midst of the crisis and the Times told the administration it wanted to publish, the White House withdrew its request for a hold. If people in the administration withdrew their request because they thought the story would be in any way reassuring, they are, to put it mildly, out of their minds. The rumors circulating that the United States was somehow in Pakistani
SDSU 2012 19 The California Swing DA Saudi Upgrade launch control rooms, presumably exercising some control, turn out to bethe Times story revealedwishful thinking. In fact, the American efforts appear to have been aimed at preventing an "unauthorized" launch, a scenario in which al-Qaida or some terrorist group steals a weapon and tries to use it. But the real danger is not "unauthorized" launches but unwelcome "authorized" ones. The real worry is what happens when Musharraf falls, which seems at least a good possibility. What
happens if the authority to authorize alaunch falls into the hands of either al-Qaida-sympathizer elements in the military and intelligence service or, worst case, al-Qaida itself? After all, polls in Pakistan have consistently shown Bin Laden to be more popular than Musharraf. From a cave to a nuclear control room is not an utterly unforeseeable nightmare.
Impact China War

Saudi Arabia will export more oil to China causes US-China war. Alterman and Garver 2008 (Jon B. Alterman, director and senior fellow of the CSIS Middle East
Program, and John W. Garver, professor of International Affairs at Georgia Tech, member of the editorial boards of the journals China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, Issues and Studies, and Asian Security, and a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East Chapter One Introduction, October 15, 2008, http://www.susris.com/articles/2008/ioi/081015-triangleintro.html)
In the global hunt for oil, the United States had a huge head start. The U.S. government has been intimately involved in developing the oil industry in the Middle East since the 1930s, as U.S. companies (and their British counterparts) carried out the initial prospecting in the barren lands of the Arabian Peninsula. Beginning in 1933, a consortium of U.S. oil companies (starting with Standard Oil of California, which became Chevron, and coming to include the precursors to Exxon, Texaco, and others) established the Arabian-American Oil Company, or Aramco. The company was a joint Saudi-American venture until the Saudi side acquired a 100 percent stake in the company in the 1980s. In its almost half century of binational ownership, Aramco created a park-like campus in Dhahran that not only made Americans feel at home, but also made Saudi managers feel like they were in the United States. As Saudis came to play increasingly large roles in management, they did so largely on American terms. National oil companies arose throughout the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s, and local states took over their operations, yet these companies in many ways remained American operations, even when they ceased to be U.S.-owned. The structure was American, the working language was English, and, most important, the ethos of the institution resonated with U.S. values. For many decades, the Western orientation made immense sense, because the major consuming countries were Western as well. Even growth in Japanese and Korean consumption proceeded smoothly under a Western model, so great were the impacts of the U.S. postwar occupations on each country.
When China became a net importer of oil in 1993, when its Middle Eastern imports quickly skyrocketed, the existing business model seemed less adequate. China had its own needs, its own interests, and its
own ways of doing things, and they did not always fit with the commercial model that had emerged under Western tutelage. As China's oil imports grew in the 1990s, Chinese national companies have sought equity shares in oil projects, hoping that such stakes will be less subject to interruption than oil purchased on the open market. China has a unique approach to the international energy marketplace, in that the government "simultaneously strives to retain control of the industry while encouraging its state oil companies to be aggressively entrepreneurial." China has three major oil and gas companies -- The Chinese National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). In 2000, CNPC established a subsidiary, PetroChina, which is partly financed by private equity with a clear profit orientation. Sinopec alone is engaged in some 120 oil and gas projects in the Middle East, and currently approximately 10 percent of China's oil imports globally come from fields in which China's state-owned oil companies have an equity stake. But as China looks around the world for oil equity holdings, it finds that most of the proven reserves of oil are already spoken for, much of it by the national oil companies of producer nations that control 85 percent of the world's traded oil. About half of China's imported oil, and about 20 percent of China's total oil supply, now comes from the Middle East. In 2005, about 40 percent of China's oil supply was imported. Over the past decade China has tried to diversify its oil imports to include less volatile sources, and these efforts have paid off in increased imports, including from states of the former Soviet Union and Latin America. Sub-Saharan Africa is China's most promising new supplier, having increased its share of total imports from 1.8 percent in 1992 to about 28 percent in 2005. Yet as Figure 1.1 shows,
China's demand for imported oil is growing so rapidly, and Middle Eastern petroleum resources are simply so much richer than those of other regions, that the percentage of China's imported oil coming from the Middle East hardly changed from 1990 (47.8 percent) to 2005
(49.7 percent). In the United States, by contrast, 27.4 percent of imported oil came from the Middle East in 2007, with Canada and Mexico combining to outweigh the Middle East share. The ratio of proven reserves to production in various oilproducing regions suggests that the Middle East will continue to be the dominant source of Chinese oil imports. According to one report, 70 percent of China's imported oil will be coming from the Middle East by the end of 2015. In recent years, other issues in the Middle East have fueled tension between the United States and China. In 2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to events in Darfur as "genocide" and called for concerted international action to force change on the government in Khartoum, to the apparent frustration of China's permanent representative to the United Nations. China has been a reluctant partner on U.S. efforts to tighten international sanctions on Iran as a consequence of its nuclear program, and a new raft of U.S.-imposed secondary sanctions on countries and businesses investing in Iran could have direct implications for Chinese investment there. Further, any hint of Chinese assistance to the Iranian armed forces -- even dual-use materials -- could be highly inflammatory to a U.S. public that is watching American soldiers fighting forces in Iraq that are at least partly backed by Iran and view with concern the prospect of an Iranian-U.S. military confrontation in the Gulf. China's rising concentration on the Middle East as an energy
resource, and the enduring U.S. concentration on the region as a key strategic battleground, creates the possibility of competition or even military conflict that could spill over to other regions of the world. In addition, and perhaps even more troubling to Chinese security professionals, Sino-American
intentions elsewhere in the world could lead to Sino-American conflict in the Middle East. Such an eventuality could cut China off from access to energy, since the United States controls the sea-lanes on which oil to China travels. Although
SDSU 2012 21 The California Swing DA Saudi Upgrade China and the United States have thus far not clashed in the Middle East, the consequences of such conflict are serious enough that they bear prolonged examination.
War with China goes nuclear Straits Times 2k [Jun 25, LEXIS]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to
General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear
is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. MajorGeneral Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there
Impact Food Prices

Oil price spikes creates economic instability and causes food prices to spike Prince 11(Rob Prince, March 6, 2011, The Oil Crisis to Come,
http://robertjprince.wordpress.com/2011/03/06/the-oil-crisis-to-come/) Andthe price of a gallon of gasoline continues to climb. It will continue to cut into the anemic global (and U.S.) economic recovery, will undoubtedly aggravate the Third World debt crisis, now entering its fourth
decade and will inevitably produce the kind of political eruptions in that started in Guadeloupe several years ago and have now extended to the entire Middle East, contributing greatly to what has been called `The Second Arab Awakening. With
its reliance on oil for much of its production, rising food prices will mix with flat (or no) wages to produce an economic witchs brew. U.S. and/or NATO military intervention will only further destabilize and polarize the Middle East region, intensifying all of these tendencies.
Hikes in food prices kill billions
Tampa Tribune, 1-20-96

On a global scale, food supplies - measured by stockpiles of grain - are not abundant. In 1995, world production failed to meet demand for the third consecutive year, said Per Pinstrup-Andersen, director of the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, D.C. As a result, grain stockpiles fell from an average of 17 percent of annual consumption in 1994-1995 to 13 percent at the end of the 1995-1996 season, he said. That's troubling, Pinstrup-Andersen noted, since 13 percent is well below the 17 percent the United Nations considers essential to provide a margin of safety in world food security. During the food crisis of the early 1970s, world grain stocks were at 15 percent. "Even if they are
merely blips, higher international prices can hurt poor countries that import a significant portion of their food," he said. "Rising prices can also quickly put food out of reach of the 1.1 billion people in the developing world who live on a dollar a day or less." He also said many people in lowincome countries already spend more than half of their income on food.
AT: Relations Resilient

Arab Spring is Existential for Saudi Arabia Takeyh '11 (Ray, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "A Post-American Day Dawns in the
Mideast" June 8, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/opinion/09iht-edtakeyh09.html?_r=3) For nearly 60 years, Saudi Arabia predicated its security on its American patron. The pledges of
solidarity always concealed an incongruous relationship between a liberal democracy and a traditional monarchy. The oilfor-security compact, however, was underpinned by a more formidable alliance that worked effectively against common foes ranging from Soviet Communism to Saddam Husseins revisionism. Today, Riyadh and Washington see the
region in starkly different terms. The Arab Spring that has generated hopes in the West for responsive governance in the Middle East is seen in Saudi Arabia as an existential threat. Riyadh is not just questioning the utility of its American alliance, but is moving beyond it. As the Saudi state rethinks its security, it is likely to conclude that it has to rely on its own resources as well as alliances with like-minded states rather than a United States that it increasingly views as unreliable. Alternative external patrons such as China, or a league of conservative Arab monarchies, or even an independent nuclear deterrent, are likely to be seriously contemplated in the House of Saud.
Plan is the core issue for Saudi Arabia, will tank relations Nasr 2011(Vali, Bloomberg View columnist, Will the Saudis Kill the Arab Spring? Bloomberg,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-23/will-the-saudis-kill-the-arab-spring-.html) The kingdom has emerged as the leader of a new rejectionist front that is determined to defeat popular demand for reform. One would have expected Iran to lead such a front, but instead it is Americas
closest Arab ally in the region that is seeking to defeat our policy. Though the president made no mention of Saudi Arabia in his speech, in the near term, dealing with the kingdom is the biggest challenge facing the U.S. in the Middle East. Saudi rulers have made clear that they find U.S. support for democracy naive and dangerous, an existential threat to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. If the U.S. supports democracy, the Saudis are signaling, it can no longer count on its special bond with Riyadh (read: oil). The Saudi threat is intended to present U.S. policymakers with a choice between U.S. values and U.S. interests. The idea is that either Washington stays the course, supporting the Arab peoples demands for reform, and risks a rift with Saudi Arabia, or it protects that relationship and loses the rest of the Middle East. In fact, the choice between U.S. values and interests is a false choice, as the president made clear in his speech. Now, American policy has to reflect this truth. So far, Washington has tried to placate the Saudis. It is time we challenged their words and deeds, instead. Tectonic Shift Its no surprise that the tectonic shift in Arab politics, a popular revolt calling for reform, openness and accountability, worries the Saudi monarchy. The kingdom, like the rest of the Arab world, has a young population that wants jobs, freedom and a say in politics. Thirty-nine percent of Saudis ages 20 to 24 are unemployed. Having watched Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak step down amid protests in which Egyptian youths played a key role, Saudi King Abdullah announced $35 billion in new social benefits to head off demands for reform at home. That bought the monarchy time, but too many dominoes are falling in its direction to allow for complacency. Violent protests
on Saudi Arabias borders, inside Bahrain and Yemen, have been particularly troubling. From the outset, Riyadh encouraged every Arab ruler to resist reform. The more Washington embraced the Arab Spring, the more Riyadh worried. Saudi rulers took particular
exception to Washingtons call for Mubarak to resign, and when the U.S. urged reform in Bahrain, they saw U.S. policy as a direct threat to them. Encouraging Dialog Washington had encouraged Bahrains king, Hamad ibn Isa al- Khalifa, to enter into dialog with the opposition there, and American diplomats were directly involved in mediating talks. An agreement was almost at hand when Riyadh took the rare step of undermining U.S. policy. Saudi rulers persuaded Bahrain to scuttle the talks and bring in troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to suppress the protests. The weak excuse for this clumsy crackdown was that Iran was orchestrating the protests and Iranian expansionism had to be stopped in its tracks. A local protest inspired by popular demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt was transformed into a regional conflict. The Saudi strategy was clear: shift the focus from democracy to
the bogeyman, Iran. Emboldened by the outcome in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia has mounted a regional strategy to defeat the Arab Spring. Riyadh has called for expansion of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a group of Arab countries that are oil-producing and sit on the Persian Gulf, to include Jordan
and Morocco, which qualify on neither count.
Relations not resilient even if they are Saudis will overreact to trigger our impacts Guzansky 11 (Yoel, a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University July
1, 2011 Tehran tests Saudis' nerve on nuclear weapons http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/tehran-testssaudis-nerve-on-nuclear-weapons/story-e6frg6ux-1226085108555) Saudi Arabia, at least for now, has no alternative but to rely on the American defence umbrella. However, it would be contrary to Saudi practice to put all its eggs in one basket. If in Riyadh's view its essential security interests are threatened, it may prefer to engage in a series of even contradictory steps to ensure its security.
Saudis wont repair the relationship Sanger and Schmitt 11 (David, Chief Washington Correspondent for The New York Times, member of
the Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Strategy Group, and Eric, senior writer who covers terrorism and national security issues for The New York Times, March 2011 U.S.-Saudi Tensions Intensify With Mideast Turmoil http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15saudi.html? pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=middleeast) Saudi officials have made no secret of their deep displeasure with how President Obama handled the ouster of the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, charging Washington with abandoning a longtime ally. They show little patience with American messages about embracing what Mr. Obama calls universal values, including peaceful protests. When Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Secretary
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton were forced to cancel visits to the kingdom in recent days, American officials were left wondering whether the cause was King Abdullahs frail health or his pique at the United States. Theyre not in a mode for listening, said one senior administration official, referring to the American exchanges with Saudi officials over the past two months about the need to get ahead of the protests that have engulfed other Arab states, including two of Saudi Arabias neighbors, Bahrain and Yemen. In recent days, Washington has tried to focus on the areas where its strategic interests and those of Saudi Arabia intersect most crucially: counterterrorism, containing Iran and keeping oil flowing. The Americans fear that the unrest sweeping the Middle East is coming at a bad time for the Saudis, and their concerns have increased in recent weeks, partly because of the continued tumult in Bahrain. Many of the issues driving the protests elsewhere are similar to those in Riyadh: an autocratic ruling family resistant to sharing power, surrounded by countries in the midst of upheaval. At the same time, Saudi Arabias leadership is in question. King Abdullah, 87, is, by all accounts, quite ill, as is the crown prince. The latest tensions between Washington and Riyadh began early in the crisis when King Abdullah told President Obama that it was vital for the United States to support Mr. Mubarak, even if he began shooting protesters. Mr. Obama ignored that counsel. Theyve taken it personally, said one senior American familiar with the conversations, because they
question what wed do if they are next.
AT: Palestinian Veto

Its a bluff, the Arab Spring is the real issue, and Saudi Arabia historically fronts this issue Satloff '11 (Robert, executive director of The Washington Institute, "Filling the Strategy Vacuum in the Middle
East" June 14, 2011, www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1652) The first such effort -- the false bravado of former Saudi ambassador to Washington Turki al-Faisal -- is likely to be taken with greater seriousness than it deserves. In a sad and ultimately pathetic attempt to scare Washington into choosing between its partnerships with Israel and Saudi Arabia, Turki threatened a diplomatic apocalypse if President Obama follows through on his pledge to
oppose a Palestinian end-around to negotiations via a UN resolution on statehood this autumn. After noting in a Washington Post op-ed that Saudi leaders "took seriously" the president's call "to embrace democracy" -- whatever that means in one of the world's least democratic states -- Turki prophesied the following: "There will be disastrous consequences for U.S.-Saudi relations if the United States vetoes UN recognition of a Palestinian state. It would mark a nadir in the decades-long relationship as well as irrevocably damage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and America's reputation among Arab nations. The ideological distance between the Muslim world and the West in general would widen, and opportunities for friendship and cooperation between the two could vanish." Recent events, of course, suggest precisely the opposite. In last year's test run for this autumn's diplomatic crisis, there was no visible backlash from
Riyadh after the Obama administration vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement activity. And just this past week, after the president enunciated his clear
opposition to the Palestinians' UN strategy, Saudi leaders put their strategic priorities on display by bucking an anti-Western OPEC decision and helpfully agreeing to increase domestic oil production, thereby denting the continued windfall that Iran has been earning from the recent rise in oil prices. To be sure, U.S.-Saudi relations are in a funk -- but
that has much less to do with Riyadh's exasperation at Obama's alleged pro-Israel bias than with exasperation at what Saudis view as Washington's ill-conceived approach to political change in Arab states, coupled with their longstanding wish for an American deus ex machina to solve
their Iranian problem (e.g., "cut off the head of the snake"). But we have seen this play before. With Bahrain's situation still uncertain, Yemen imploding, and Iran showing its reach by cementing a new Hizballah-friendly government in Lebanon, the notion that Riyadh would chuck what remains of its seventy-year-old strategic relationship with Washington out of pique at one more U.S. veto of a bad idea at the UN is patently absurd.
The Arab Spring is the key issue Joffe '11

(Josef, Marc and Anita Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations "The Arab Spring and the Palestine Distraction" April 26, 2011, www.hoover.org/news/daily-report/76576) In politics, shoddy theories never die. In the Middle East, one of the oldest is that Palestine is the "core" regional issue. This zombie should have been interred at the beginning of the Arab Spring, which has highlighted the real core conflict: the oppressed vs. their oppressors. But the
dead keep walking. "The plight of the Palestinians has been a root cause of unrest and conflict in the region," insisted Turkish President Abdullah Gul in the New York Times last week. "Whether these [recent] uprisings lead to democracy and peace or to tyranny and conflict will depend on forging a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace." Naturally, "the U.S. has a long overdue responsibility" to forge that peace. Writing in the Financial Times, former U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft intoned: "The nature of the new Middle East cannot be known until the festering sore of the occupied territories is removed." Read: The fate of democracy hinges on Palestine. So do "Iran's hegemonic ambitions," he insinuated. This is why Tehran reaches for the bomb? Syria, too, will remain a threat "as long as there is no regional peace agreement." The Assad regime is slaughtering its own people for the sake of Palestine? And unless Riyadh "saw the U.S. as moving in a serious manner" on Palestine, Mr. Scowcroft warned, the Saudis might really sour on their great protector from across the sea. So when they sent troops into Bahrain, were they heading for Jerusalem by way of Manama? Shoddy political theories ideologies, reallynever die because they are immune to the facts. The most glaring is this: These revolutions have unfolded without the usual anti-American and anti-Israeli screaming. It's not that the demonstrators had run out of Stars and Stripes to trample, or were too concerned about the environment to burn Benjamin Netanyahu in effigy. It's that their targets were Hosni Mubarak, Zine el Abidine Ben-Ali, Moammar Gadhafi and the others no stooges of Zionism they. In Benghazi, the slogan was: "America is our friend!" The men and
women of the Arab Spring are not risking their lives for a "core" issue, but for the freedom of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. And of Iran, as the Green revolutionaries did in Tehran in 2009. Every
"Palestine-first" doctrine in the end comes down to that fiendish "Arab Street": The restless monster must be fed with Israeli concessions lest he rise and sweep away our good friendsall those dictators and despots who pretended to stand between us and Armageddon. Free Palestine, the dogma goes, and even Iran and Syria will turn from rabid to responsible. The truth is that the American and Israeli flags were handed out for burning by those regimes themselves. This is how our good friends have stayed in power: Divert attention and energy from oppression and misery at home by rousing the masses

against the enemy abroad. How can we have free elections, runs a classic line, as long as they despoil our sacred Islamic lands? This is why anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are as rampant among our Saudi and Egyptian allies as among the hostile leaders of Iran and Syria. The Palestinians do deserve their own state. But the Palestine-first strategy reverses cause and effect. It is not the core conflict that feeds the despotism; it is the despots who fan the conflict, even as they fondle their U.S.-made F-16s and quietly work with Israel. Their peoples are the victims of this power ploy, not its drivers. This is what the demonstrators of Tahrir Square and the rebels of Benghazi have told us with their silence on the Palestine issue. So Palestine has nothing to do with it? It does, though not in the ways insisted by Messrs. Gul and Scowcroft. The sounds of silence carry a different message: "It's democracy, stupid!" Freedom does not need the enemy at the gate. Despots do, which is why they happily let the Palestinian sore fester for generations. Israel, which has reacted in utter confusion to the fall of Mubarak, might listen up as well. If democracies don't have to "busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels," as Shakespeare has it in Henry IV, then Israel's reformed neighbors might at last be ready for real, not just cold peace. Mr. Mubarak was not. Nor is Mr. Assad of Syria, who has refused every Israeli offer to hand back the Golan Heights. If you rule at the head of a tiny Alawite minority, why take the Heights and give away a conflict that keeps you in power? Peace at homejustice, jobs and consentmakes for peace abroad.
AT: Aid Now

No MENA democracy aid now if there is its small and sluggish now Rosenberg 11 (David , Columnist for the Jerusalem Post, September 13, 2011 Doubts surround aid to Arab
Spring countries http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=237759&R=R3) The latest package of aid and loans offered over the weekend to the economies hardest hit by Arab Spring turmoil may be less help than its extensive new $38 billion total suggests; emergency funds have been slow in coming and the recipients arent in a position to make good use of longterm aid, economists said. The Group of Eight (G-8) finance chiefs nearly doubled the amount of aid they will make available to Middle East governments and expanded the list of recipients to include Morocco, Jordan and maybe Libya. In May, Tunisia and Egypt had been promised $20 billion in aid. RELATED: Al Qaida releases video supporting Arab Spring Turkish PM starts 'Arab Spring' tour in Cairo Counting other institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regional banks and the Arab Monetary Fund, grants and loans that could be made available to the Arab Spring economies may reach nearly $80 billion. The aid is supposed to be delivered over the next
two years, but with the Arab Spring economies buckling under the weight of unrest and political uncertainty, officials and economists said assistance is needed urgently and hasnt arrived. Indeed, as G-8 leaders were meeting Saturday in Marseilles, an Egyptian mob stormed Israels embassy in Cairo
causing Prime Minister Essam Sharaf to offer his resignation and sending Egyptian share prices lower. These countries need economic reform and political reform. They go together. But Im not sure they have a very clear picture of what theyre doing. There is a kind of vacuum, Paul Rivlin, a professor of economics at Tel Aviv University, told The Media Line. The announcement expressing confidence in these countries in itself has economic meaning, but you cant hide that these countries are in a mess. While the ministers welcomed turnaround plans presented by the Arab Spring governments, many of the Middle Easts economies are suffering from low growth, high inflation and rising unemployment even after strikes and protests led to the ouster of dictators and put them on the road to political reform. Growth in the key Arab Spring economies has slowed while government spending has ballooned. In Tunisia, Minister of Planning and International Co-operation Abdel Hamid Triki estimates gross domestic product will grow 1% this year, compared with 3.5% in 2010. Egypt's net foreign reserves have fallen by $11 billion so far this year to $25 billion in August. London-based Capital Economics estimates Egypts GDP grew a scant 1.8% in the fiscal year ended June 30, less than the rate of population growth. Even in countries that have avoided serious unrest or have substantial oil wealth, governments are in acute need of aid. Moroccos GDP growth will probably accelerate this year, the International Monetary Fund says, but government handouts will boost the budget deficit to as much as 6% of GDP. Libya will need help to tide it over until it can bring oil exports to pre-war levels, which could take months. But even as Arab Spring
economies reel, countries like Tunisia and Egypt, which were targeted in the first round of assistance in May, have yet to receive the great majority of the aid pledged by Western and Arab governments. Egypts Finance Minister Hazem el Beblawi, said his country had received only $500 million of
the $7 billion promised by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, although he noted that he is holding discussions and expects an agreement on the disbursement by the end of the year. Tunisia said it was still waiting for assistance; As of today, (we have received) nothing, Finance Minister Jalloul Ayed said during a meeting of Arab finance ministers on Wednesday, Londons Financial Times reported on September 7.
Aff AT: Backlash Link

No backlash Theres a difference between wanting change and dictating it Nelson 10/13 (Soraya Sarhaddi, "Saudi Arabi'as Delciate Dance on the Fate of Yemen" October 13, 2011,
www.wbur.org/npr/141150293/saudi-arabias-delicate-dance-on-the-fate-of-yemen) Saudi Arabia, which places a premium on stability, appears to be sending mixed messages these days on what it wants from its volatile southern neighbor, Yemen. On one hand, the kingdom is demanding that Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh step aside after months of protests against his more than 30 years of rule. On the other hand, Saudi officials did not publicly object when Saleh returned to Yemen last month from Saudi Arabia, where he received three months of medical treatment following a
failed assassination attempt. (Yemen State TV / AP) Saudi officials and experts say King Abdullah had little choice but to let Saleh return home. They note that he's the president of a sovereign country, not a Saudi citizen whom the king has authority over. "Remember there is a big difference between having interest in what happens in a country and dictating what happens in that country," says Usamah al-Kurdi, a member of the king's advisory council. "No way will they prevent a head of state from going back to his country. Otherwise it would have, in my opinion, unbelievable repercussions.
AT: Transition Link

The Saudis care more about security than about maintaining Salehs Regime theyll view the plan as security Black '11 (Ian, Middle East Editor, "Yemen crisis: Saudi Arabis in pole position to influence outcome" June 5,
2011, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/05/yemen-saudi-arabia-influence) Like any country, it worries about instability next door. It faces genuine problems involving alQaida, explosives, illegal immigrants and drugs crossing the 1,100 mile-long border often described as its "soft
underbelly". There was deep shock in 2009 when a Yemeni suicide bomber nearly managed to kill the Saudi counterterrorism chief in Jeddah. "For the Saudis Yemen is not a foreign policy issue but a security one," said historian Madawi Al-Rasheed, of King's College London. In private, the US, Britain and other western governments have been frustrated. "The Saudis put a lot of money into Yemen but like everyone else they have been puzzled about how to handle it," said a former diplomat. "It has tried to influence events but didn't take charge and seemed to lack strategic direction." Part of the problem is uncertainty about who has been in charge since the interior minister, Prince Naif, took over the Yemen "file" from the ailing Crown Prince Sultan. King Abdullah, also in poor health, has been accused of sending "mixed messages" to Saleh. Still, it seems unlikely that the Saudis will try to save the Yemeni president's skin. The fear in Riyadh has been that Saleh would follow the example of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and use his presidential guards against the people and the army, transforming a revolt against the regime into a civil war. "My sense is that the Saudis have had enough of him," said another veteran western Yemenwatcher. "Their patience has finally run out."
(dont read this if youre reading a stability adv) Saudi Arabia realizes they cant manage a transition on their own want US cooperation Johnson '11 (Gregoy, Near East Studies Scholar, Princeton University, Council on Foreign Relations Press,
"Resetting U.S. Poliy Towards Yemen, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 8, September 2011, www.cfr.org/yemen/resetting-us-policy-toward-yemen/p26026) The kingdom is still willing to hedge its bets, but there is a growing realization within Riyadh that despite Salihs return he will never be able to reunite the country. The longer Salih remains president, the worse the situation in Yemen will become. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia broadly agree on the main problems: the lack of a political transition, the danger of AQAP, and the simmering threat of Yemens fragile economy. Neither country can solve the challenge of Yemen unilaterally, but together they can help arrest the countrys downward descent.
Your generic links dont apply Saudi Arabia looks at Yemen differently from the rest of the Arab Spring countries Black '11 (Ian, Middle East Editor, "Yemen crisis: Saudi Arabis in pole position to influence outcome" June 5,
2011, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/05/yemen-saudi-arabia-influence) Saudi Arabia's position on Yemen is distinct from its policies towards Arab spring protests elsewhere. It was furious when the US abandoned Hosni Mubarak in the critical days of the Egyptian revolution. It sent troops to neighbouring Bahrain to crush unrest that pitted the Shia majority against the Sunni al-Khalifa regime, partly out of fear of the "contagion" spreading to its own restive eastern provinces. It also helped Bahrain and Oman pay for expensive new job creation projects echoing its own policy of trying to buy off discontent. It has, however, consistently failed, along with the other wealthy Gulf states, to open its labour markets to Yemenis which would have helped the battered Yemeni economy more than
anything else.
AT: GCC Link

GCC proposal is dead Carapico '11 (Sheila, Professor of political science and International Studies, "No Exit: Yemen's Existential
Crisis" September 28, 2011, blog.richmond.edu/poliscidept/2011/09/28/no-exit/) Whether the drama will end in glory or tragedy remains to be seen. But indications are not promising. Already, President Ali Abdallah Salih has stalled and contrived to avoid signing a late April deal brokered by Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors desperate to restore a semblance of stability in the most populous corner of the Arabian Peninsula. The GCC extracted a verbal promise from Salih to resign the presidency after a period of 30 days. But convincing him to make good on his pledge under conditions satisfactory to Yemeni elites, the pro-democracy movement and interested foreign parties is a gargantuan task, requiring more diplomatic legerdemain than has been brought to bear so far. On April 30, instead of signing onto the proposed agreement, Salih sent tanks firing live ammunition to clear some 1,500 campers from a central square in the Mansoura district of the southern port city of Aden. Abd al-Latif al-Zayani, secretary-general of the six-
nation GCC, who had flown to the Yemeni capital of Sanaa to meet with Salih, returned to Saudi Arabia red-faced and empty-handed.
Saudi Arabia isnt pushing the GCC proposal anymore Carapico '11 (Sheila, Professor of political science and International Studies, "No Exit: Yemen's Existential
Crisis" September 28, 2011, blog.richmond.edu/poliscidept/2011/09/28/no-exit/) The failed GCC push to reach an accord by May 1 turned out to be the opening gambit in a complex negotiation that seems unlikely to be concluded soon. More and more, personalities from
bygone dramas are now weighing in from exile: rebel leader Yahya al-Houthi and former South Yemen leaders Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas, Ali Salim al-Bayd and Ali Nasir Muhammad, to name a few, seek to claim the initiative. If there is to be forward momentum, their views and constituencies, such as they are, will have to be taken into account. And yet these additions to the mix can only complicate matters. Yemen is now in political limbo and not far from the road to hell. No one believes that the president can continue in office or that he will relinquish power. The popular movement has come too far to back off and yet sees no clear path toward social justice. Gulf monarchies and the Obama administration appear to lack the diplomatic wherewithal, the strategic imagination or the humanitarian decency to envision a solution to the impasse. And yet daily the status quo becomes more untenable. Loyalist patrimonial forces are wont to shoot, and may yet provoke either a mutinous response or a full-fledged rebellion by armed citizens. The spirit of Silmiyya, which served Tunisians and Egyptians so well, can persevere only so long in the face of live fire. In March and for part of April, it was possible to envision an orderly transition to a civilian coalition transitional government. The month of May may bring more bloodshed.
US Intervention Now
US already manipulating Saleh Carlstrom '11 (Gregg, "Backing away from Saleh, slowly" April 20, 2011,
english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/04/2011418193643493286.html) The US has slowly been dropping its support for Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, long one of its closest allies in the region - but many in Yemen haven't noticed, or say it hasn't gone far enough. Behind the scenes, the US is increasingly leaning on Saleh to encourage him to step down. The White House has reportedly called his position untenable and pushed for his departure. And the Wall Street Journal reported earlier this month that the United States froze a record $1bn aid package for Yemen shortly after the protests began. The deal would have included not only "counterterrorism assistance,"
which Saleh has reportedly used to bankroll his campaigns against Houthi rebels in the north and separatists in the south, but also development aid, which Saleh points to as one of the benefits of his unpopular relationship with Washington.
Politicians and diplomats in Yemen say these actions have pushed Saleh closer to departure. Even a former member of the ruling party, the General People's Congress (GPC), thinks negotiations on
Saleh's future are largely based on an American proposal. "What is really on the table is the negotiation process started by the US and European Union ambassadors," said Sheikh Mohammed Abu Lahoum, a former senior member of the GPC.
Relations Resilient
Relations are resilient, too many mutual interests and security concerns to break Gawdat '6 (Bahgat, "Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Saudi Arabia" The Middle East Journal 60.3, Summer
2006: 421-443, Proquest)
Three conclusions regarding Saudi-American relations need to be highlighted. First, despite some serious crises and conflicting perceptions, the unofficial alliance between Riyadh and Washington is likely to endure. The two countries need each other. As David Long stresses, the relationship is "like a marriage from which there is no divorce."46 Massive Saudi oil supplies are essential to maintaining stability in global energy markets and prosperity in the international economy. Meanwhile, the United
States has repeatedly proven itself a reliable security partner to the Kingdom against its external enemies. Second, allying with the United States has served Saudi security concerns tremendously, but has also exposed the Saudi regime to domestic criticism and regional condemnation for the
American military presence in the Kingdom and the close relations between the royal family and the United States. Since the mid-1990s, there have been several attacks on military and civilian American personnel in Saudi Arabia. Most noticeable was the 1995 attack in Riyadh, where five Americans were killed, and the 1996 attack in Dhahran. These attacks were responsible, at least in part, for causing the bulk of American troops to be withdrawn from the Kingdom and repositioned in neighboring Qatar in 2003. In other words, the decision to leave Saudi Arabia was made in part to help relieve internal political pressure on the royal family. But neither the US nor Saudi Arabia has any interest in terminating close military relations. Third, despite the extensive military and economic ties between Riyadh and Washington, "there is no strong or vocal pro-Saudi constituency in the United States."47 The close cooperation between the two countries seems to be based only on ties between the elites on both sides. As one analyst suggests, "the Saudi-American relationship has never relied on broadbased public support, on either side of the partnership."48
AT: Saudi Prolif Pakistan

Pakistan wont give Saudi Arabia a nuclear weapon Lippman 2008 (Thomas, former Middle East correspondent and a diplomatic and national security reporter for
The Washington Post, "Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy", http://www.susris.com/articles/2008/ioi/080209lippman-nuclear.html)
There is little doubt that at least until recently Pakistan was pressing ahead with the development of additional nuclear weapons and the missiles by which to deliver them. In May 2002, Pakistan tested a new liquid-fueled missile known as the Haft-V, apparently based on North Korean technology, with a range of about 800 miles. That is less than half the range of the CSS 2s, but still easily enough to reach critical targets in Iran, Iraq, and Israel from Saudi Arabia. Later that year, the Bush administration revealed its concern that Pakistan was paying North Korea for its missile technology not in cash but in assistance to Pyongyangs nuclear program. The CIA reported in January 2003 that Pakistan has continued to acquire nuclear related equipment, some of it dual use, and materials from various sources principally in Western Europe. But times have changed and Pakistan is less likely now to undertake such a risky venture as helping Saudi Arabia develop nuclear weapons. The A.Q. Khan network of off-the-books proliferation, which supplied Libya and other countries, has been exposed and dismantled. Pakistans efforts to block a
nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and India would be undermined by its participation in a new proliferation arrangement. And Pakistan is in such a state of domestic political upheaval that it seems unlikely that anyone including the embattled president, General Pervez Musharraf would be willing or able to authorize such a deal. Some US government
officials believe that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have an understanding by which Pakistans nuclear capabilities would be made available on demand to Saudi Arabia if the Saudis found themselves in extremis, a guarantee purchased, in effect, by Saudi funding of Pakistans nuclear program. No known evidence supports this theory and some experts openly discount it. Among them is GarySamore, a long-time student of Saudi Arabian security policy who was a senior arms control and nonproliferation specialist at the National Security Council in the Clinton Administration.

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Links Generic Oil

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Links Egypt Bandar

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Links Yemen Oil Module

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Links Yemen Backlash Module

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**Impacts** Impact Pakistan Collapse

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Impact China War

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Impact Food Prices

Hikes in food prices kill billions

Tampa Tribune, 1-20-96

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AT: Relations Resilient

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question what wed do if they are next.

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AT: Palestinian Veto

The Arab Spring is the key issue Joffe '11

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AT: Aid Now

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Aff AT: Backlash Link

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AT: Transition Link

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AT: GCC Link

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AT: Saudi Prolif Pakistan

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