WYLIE V RARANG GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992 FACTS Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative

officer and commanding officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard. Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the Plan of the Day a daily publication that featured among others, an action line inquiry . On Feb. 3, 1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain Auring was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.) She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved. Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country can t be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed. ISSUES 1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune from suit. 2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit? HELD 1. Yes, they are immune. Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions. Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 constitution provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But even without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties. The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,

commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication. It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. 2. No. Ratio. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent.

PASCUAL V SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS DEC 29, 1960 In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. "In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals." Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

AYTONA V CASTILLO BENGZON; January 19, 1962 FACTS - December 29, 1961 Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took his oath of office on that day. - December 30, 1961 President-elect Diosdado Macapagal took his oath of office - December 31, 1961 Macapagal issued Administrative Order # 2 recalling, withdrawing and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the date Macapagal was proclaimed as the elected president by Congress) - January 1, 1962 Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim governor of the Central Bank - January 2, 1962 Both Aytona and Castillo exercised the powers of their office but Castillo informed Aytona of his appointment. The next day, Aytona was prevented from holding office - Aytona instituted a quo warranto which challenged Castillo's right to exercise the powers of Governor of Central bank. Aytona claims he was: 1. validly appointed 2. qualified for the post 3. and that the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void because the occupation was occupied by him - Castillo argued that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by AO 2. ISSUE WON the new President (Macapagal) had the power to issue the order of the cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past President (Garcia) even after the appointees had already qualified. HELD Castillo is the rightful governor of the Central Bank. - December 29, 1961 Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments (not yet in session) a communication submitting for confirmation ad interim appointments of several officials including the Central Bank Governor in the person of Aytona. There were three other communications regarding the same matter submitted on the same day. - All in all there were 350 midnight appointments by Garcia. - In revoking the appointments, Macapagal acted based on the following reasons: 1)outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new President the opportunity to consider names in the light of new policies 2)Scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments 3)Appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust because they were issued only upon the condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall by the incoming President which would result to those deserving the appointment of the new President to be declined and by-passed 4)Abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President to merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration - Many of the persons mentioned in the December 29 communication did not qualify. - It is Malacanang's practice to submit ad interim appointments only when the Committee on Appointments is in session so that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. - It is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of Macapagal, Garcia's administration was no more than a caretaker administration. He was supposed to

prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. - The appointment of 350 people in one night could be regarded as abuse of Presidential prerogatives. - When the President makes appointments with theconsent of the Commission of Appointments, he has the benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for such selection. - But in this case Garcia should have been doubly careful because: the Commission that would consider the appointments is different from the one existing during the time the appointments were made the names are to be submitted by his successor who may not fully approve of the appointments - The Court chose not to disregard Administrative Order 2 and cancelled the midnight appointments. There are precedents that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered. But none of the precedents have involved mass ad interim appointments.