Cognitive Emergence Author(s): Fritz Rohrlich Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, Supplement.

Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (Dec., 1997), pp. S346-S358 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188416 . Accessed: 07/12/2011 21:16
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Cognitive Emergence
Fritz Rohrlichtt
Syracuse University

Examinationof attemptsat theory reduction(S to T) shows that a process of cognitive emergenceis involved in which concepts of S, Cs, emerge from T. This permits the of 'bridgelaws' to be stated. These are not in conflict with incommensurability the Cs with the CT. Cognitive emergencemay occur asymptoticallyor because of similarities of mathematicalexpressions;it is not necessarilyholistic. Mereologicallyand nonmereologically relatedtheory pairs are considered.Examplesare chosen from physics. An importantdistinctionis made between 'theory reduction'and 'reductiveexplanation'.

1. Introduction.The notion of 'emergence'is often considered with skepticismbecause of the conceptualgap it seems to imply:the absence of a rational transition seems to shroud the matter in metaphysical mysticism. However, one must distinguishbetween two very different situations. If 'emergence'refers to a naturalprocess (in physics, chemistry,or biology, say) such as is the case in 'emergentevolution' as suggested, for example, by Lloyd Morgan (1923), the above skepticismis indeed justified. Continuity of natural processes (within nomological limitations such as occur in phase transitions, quantum phenomena, and elementaryparticlephysics) is a basic assumptionof rational scientific understanding.In the case of emergentevolution, the discoveryof mutations twenty years later went a long way to clarify that issue. In the presentinvestigation,however, 'emergence'arisesin a different context:the relationshipbetweendifferentcognitivelevels of knowing. Since 'cognitivelevels' are basic to the presentpaper, I shall begin with their brief characterization.

t'Departmentof Physics, SyracuseUniversity,Syracuse,NY 13244-1130;e-mail: rohrlich@syr.edu. :The author is gratefulto severalunknown refereesfor helpful suggestions.
Philosophy of Science, 64 (Proceedings) pp. S346-S358. 0031-8248/97/64supp-0032$0.00 Copyright 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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2. CognitiveLevels. The ontology of our 'everydayworld' (EW) leads to our knowledge of abstractconcepts such as: table, red, and cat. But our knowledge extends well beyond our immediate experiencein the EW; we also know about hydrogenmolecules and uraniumatoms, and about black holes and red giants. It follows, that our knowledgeof the world falls naturallyinto different 'levels'. These can be crudelycharacterized by orders of magnitude of size, time intervals, energy, etc.; they clearly have no sharp boundariesbetween them. But the scientific fields on each of these levels (Newtonian physics, atomic physics, astronomy, as well as botany, cell biology, molecularbiology, etc.), make our knowledge on each level much more precise. And the validity domains of these scientificfields provide an accuratecharacterization of each level. For example, Newtonian physics is valid only when all the energies are small compared to the rest energy of the smallest mass involved; this provides also a partial characterizationof the EW level. Various branches of physics and their relationshipshave been studied in this context by Dresden (1974). When we compare entities (objects, properties,processes)from two
different levels, we are concerned not only with technical terms; our perception of the world involves many nontechnical concepts. A silver

spoon (from the EW level) and a silveratom (from the level of quantum mechanics) both refer to 'silver', but that word has entirely different meaningsin the two cases. Concepts and termsarisefrom our cognitive understandingof a given level and are not limited to perception.I shall thereforeuse the term 'cognitivelevels'. The above may give the misleading impression that differencesin levels are necessarily due to the compositeness of objects; however, both mereologically1and nonmereologicallyrelated theories exist on different levels. Gravitation, for example, can be understood on the Newtonian level (described by a force) or on the Einsteinian level (described by spacetime curvature.)These two theories are not mereologically related, but do belong to entirelydifferentcognitive levels. Correspondingly,they have differentvaliditylimits:the Newtonian descriptionis limited to energiesmany orders of magnitudesmallerthan the Einsteinianone. I conclude this brief explication of 'cognitive levels' with an epistemological issue: it is often stated that a theory on a higher level is wrong, and that it is to be replacedby the lower level theory to which it reduces.Thus, Newton's gravitationtheory is sometimesclaimed to be wrong while Einstein'sgives the correctdescription.In my view, this
1. This termis derivedfrom the Greekword 'meros'meaning'part'and shouldtherefore (contraryto usage) be 'merological'.

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is an unfortunate heritage from logical positivism: S is reduced to T, and then T is accepted as the 'true'description;it also occurs in Kuhn (1962) when he chooses a paradigm on the basis of its larger domain (it solves more problems). But is not Einstein'stheory also wrong since the new theory of quantum gravity (to which it will be reduced) is being developed on a still lower level?When this argumentis carriedto its logical conclusions,all our scientifictheories are wrong until we find 'the ultimate theory'. If I am correct,each theory expressesin an optimalway our understanding of the world on that particularlevel given our humancapabilities.These imply that theories are neededon everylevel and enjoy a certainautonomy on each level. The absurdityof the view that higher-leveldescriptions are necessarilywrong and are to be replacedby lower-levelones is demonstratedby a simpleexample:we speak of tables and chairswhen we should 'really'speak of aggregatesof atoms and molecules. The acceptance of each level in its own right is preliminaryto my argumentbelow that reductiondoes not carry through. 3. Reduction.Closely associatedwith our human understandingof the world is the distinctionbetween the vocabulariesused on differentlevels. There is no 'translation'of one to the other. Even if the same word is used, its meaning changes from one level to the next. The word 'silver'used above is a good example. The issue of untranslatabilitygoes to the heart of the matter:how, indeed, is one to express'table'in termsof atoms and molecules?While everyone will agree on its practicalimpossibility,there is the question of translatability'in principle'.Here I can only quote Shimony: The special epistemological problems concerning the relation between parts and wholes in physics arise just because humans are debarredby their intellectuallimitationsfrom taking an Olympian point of view. If there is not a satisfactorysurrogatefor Olympian deduction, then human beings are not entitled to assert that macrophysics is reduced to microphysics,no matter how matters appear to the deities. (1993, v.2, 213)

The claim has been widely made that the vocabularies of two theories on differentlevels are indeed at least in part incommensurable (for example, Kuhn 1962, 148 and elsewhere).Whetherthis meansuntranslatability but not incomparability(Sankey 1994) is not relevant here. Rather, the problem is that incommensurability preventsa logical derivationof theory S (on a higher level) from theory T (on a lower level), view from being coherent.2 and thus preventsthe reductionist
2. That reduction of S to T by definition requires a logical derivation of S from T

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Note that this problem does not exist in the reductionof a law from a theory because such laws are on the same cognitive level as the corresponding theories (for example:Kepler's laws reduce to Newtonian gravitation theory). Conflation of laws and theories is quite common (see, for example, Sklar 1993, 335). But how do reductionists seem to succeed?Based on earlierwork by Nagel (1961), reductionists postulate suitable 'bridge laws', and when these are accepted as auxiliaryto a rational deduction of S from T, the reductionistclaim carriesthrough. We shall ignore here the facts that reduction often requiresmodifications in the reducedtheory S as has been noticed long ago by Schaffner (1967), as well as that reduction has often not been completely successful in view of the very great complexity of the subject matter, such as in statisticalmechanics(Brush 1976, Sklar 1993). The bridge law best known to philosophers is probably the identification of heat with kinetic energy as it occurs in the very special case of ideal gases (which hardly touches on the complexity of statistical mechanics).But even here one relatestwo termsthat have conceptually nothing to do with one another. Physicistswere forced to relate them ad hoc because the comparison of thermodynamicsand statisticalmechanics of gases demands it. But historically it was a struggle (Brush had much to do with it. 1976) and incommensurability Note that there is no tension between that notion and the existence of bridge laws: the latter do not constitute a translationof concepts. Bridge laws are neither empiricaldiscoveriesnor analyticalidentities. They are postulates necessary in order to relate conceptually incommensurable structures (theories) to one another. In the following, I shall show that bridge laws are based on the 'cognitive emergence'of concepts of S arisingin the attemptedderivationof S from T. 4. CognitiveEmergence.Jumping from one perception to a different one is best known in the 'gestalt switch' encountered in viewing the same drawingin two differentways. But this switch of perceptiontakes place without change of cognitive level. A well-known example of such a switch between differentkinds of 'gestalt'is the seeminglyrandomdistributionof largerand smallerdots on a piece of paper which, when viewed from a distance suddenlyreveals (causes the emergenceof) the face of Abraham Lincoln. Examples of a cognitive switch based on scientific knowledge and involving differentlevels are: the switch from an assemblageof atoms
togetherwith various conditions can be found in many places. See, for example,Suppe 1977, 55.

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and moleculesto the furniturein a room, or the switchfrom a collection of suitably arrangedand interactingcells to a cat. Definition:'Cognitiveemergence'of a concept X is a mental process in which, starting on a given cognitive level, (a) X is unexpectedlyrecalled, (b) X belongs to a higher cognitive level, and (c) X is incommensurablewith the startinglevel. A fine distinction exists here between the expected recall of something (say, the phone number of a friend that I want to contact), and the unexpectedrecall triggeredby circumstances(say, the recall of a particularevent when hearing a certain melody). The former recall is a rational process, the latter is a process of emergencein the sense used here. In the case of attemptedtheory reduction the recall may be triggered, as will be shown below, by the similarityof two equations belonging to differentcognitive levels, or by an asymptoticprocess. 'Cognitive emergence' of a concept X has the three characteristic features of emergence(compare Humphreys 1997): being new, being qualitativelydifferent,and being not logically deduciblefrom T. All of these properties are necessary for the incommensurabilityof X with the concepts of T. "Emergence"without further qualificationsis sometimes meant to imply that a holistic concept arises(Humphreys1997).Cognitiveemergence of X as defined above does not necessarilyimply that X is a holistic concept. 5. AsymptoticEmergence. Asymptotic (cognitive)emergencecan be defined as follows: X is called "asymptoticallyemergent"just in case (a) X is recalledas fittingthe limit of a convergentinfinitesequence of instances, and with those instances. (b) X is incommensurable An exampleof asymptoticemergenceoccursin the reductionof crystallography to the atomic theory of crystal structure. Start with the surface of an atomic crystal lattice. Atoms have no sharply defined boundaries,and have certain averagepositions in the lattice that yield average distances between them. The macroscopic concept of a (perfectly) smooth crystalsurfaceis thereforeentirelyforeign to the atomic world. But a transitionfrom one to the other can be conceptualizedby means of an asymptotic process. Picture a plane layer of atoms which constitutesthe outermostlayer of the lattice;use 'sphere'as a metaphor from macroscopic physics (this metaphor ignores the lack of sharp boundaries of atoms); picture this layer as a layer of regularlyspaced spheres,i.e., a "bumpy"surface.When one views such a surfacewhen

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its dimensions are very large relative to the size of the spheres, the bumpiness is barely noticeable. Assume an infinite sequence of such planes in which the size of a sphere is smaller and smaller relative to the dimensions of the surface. In the limit, and only in the limit, does the bumpinessdisappearcompletely, and there emergesthe concept of an (ideally) smooth plane surface. Thus, by means of this asymptotic process, one recoversthe familiarmacroscopicconcept of smooth flatness from the atomic level on which it does not exist. Nor can it be constructed from the atomic level by a finite number of steps. A new and qualitativelydifferent concept thus emerges from this infinite sequence. Note that this asymptoticprocess is conceptuallynecessaryin order to reduce crystallographyto atomic crystal structure. One can call this emergenceasymptoticholism. Asymptotic emergencedoes not occur for all macroscopic properties: not all concepts in the EW can be reached asymptoticallyfrom the microscopiclevel. That is a consequenceof the way our sense perceptions function. Examples of such propertiesare 'being wet', 'being red', or 'being cold'. Asymptotic emergence can also arise through the mathematical structureof a theory. Starting with such a structurein theory T, one makes an expansion of a suitable function in terms of a small dimensionless parameterp. Asymptotically, when higher orders can be ignored, the equations of theory T take on a new form. When this form triggers a recall of an equation of theory S because 'it looks like it', one can say that this equation of S 'has emerged'.The mathematical so symbols of the T equation must then be reinterpreted as to refer to S. In this asymptotic limit, the equations of T then become the theory equations of S. This is the 'cognitiveswitch'from T to S. The emergenceof concepts of S is triggeredby the similarityof appearanceof the asymptoticform of an equation of T to a (previously known) equation of S. With it of goes necessarilythe reinterpretation mathematicalsymbols. such an expansion is a perturbationexpansion in Mathematically, a small parameter,p. Two cases must be distinguished.It may be of the regular type; in that case there exists a limit, p -> 0, in which the new equations exist. Or, the expansion may be of the singulartype; in that case there is no limit, but in the approximation in which p is negligible, new equations result. The implicationsof the differencebetween the two expansions has recently been elaboratedby Batterman
(1995).

Mathematical asymptotics thus falls into the two types of regular and singularasymptotics.Examplesare the limit in whichthe equations of Newtonian gravitationtheory (NGT) result from those of Einstein-

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ian gravitationtheory (EGT) (regularperturbationexpansion;see below) and the limit in which the equations of geometricaloptics result from those of wave optics (singularperturbationexpansion; see Batterman 1995). The case of EGT leading to NGT is a nonmereologicalcase. These two theories are cognitively entirely different: EGT provides a geometric interpretation of gravity; masses produce curvaturesin fourdimensionalspacetime.The curvatureproducedby all the massesother than m then determinesthe trajectoryof m. A test mass would follow a geodesic for that particularcurvature.On the other hand, in NGT, massesfind themselvesin a flat spacetimeand attractone anotheralong which a straightline; this attractionis characterized a universalforce by is a vector in three-dimensionalEuclidean space acting at a distance on m. The actual motion of m is determinedby the Newtonian equations of motion with the force being the vector resultantof all the forces acting on m. Specifically,we concentrateon two fundamentalconcepts of EGT and NGT, curvatureand force, respectively,which are incommensurable.One notes that, in the pure forms of these theories,'spacetime curvature'is not a concept in NGT (after all, it was developed long before non-Euclidean geometry), and 'force' is not a concept in EGT. Of course, one can easily construct 'hybrids';but we want to examine the fundamentalissues. The question thereforearises:exactly how is it possible, by starting from EGT, to derive NGT? How does one bridge the cognitive gap of incommensurableterms such as curvatureand force (and other differences in their ontologies)? Physicists are able to do this and have no difficultyjumping back and forth between these two cognitively very differenttheories as the need arises. A standardprocedureto 'deduce'NGT from EGT proceeds as follows (see, for example, Rohrlich 1989). EGT has two fundamentalsets of equations, the field equations (which determinethe spacetimecurvature from the distribution of masses), and the geodesic equation NGT (whichdeterminesthe motion of a test mass in a given curvature). also has two fundamentalequations, the equation for the gravitational potential, mathematicallyknown as a Poisson equation (which determines that potential for a given distributionof masses), and the equation of motion (which determinesthe motion of a mass under a given gravitational force.) The link between these two equations is a very simple one: in NGT the gravitationalforce follows from the gravitational potential by differentiation: Fk =
- mdkd.

One now proceedsin the attemptto deduceNGT from EGT without any input from the NGT theory. In this mathematicaldeduction one assumesthat all energiesinvolvedaresmallcomparedto the restenergies

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of the masses. (That ratio is the small parameterp, here called y.) This assumptionimplies that curvedspacetimediffersonly slightlyfrom flat spacetime.y is simplyrelatedto the small differencebetweenthe metric tensors of curved spacetime and flat spacetime.Mathematicalasymptotics then proceedsby making a perturbationexpansionin y. When the EGT field equations are thus approximated,they yield a Poisson equation that reads (we assume here for simplicity a static source), V2y = -167Gp. (1) In this equation G is the universalgravitationalconstant and p is the mass density. This equation triggersin the mind of every physicistthe well known equation for the potential in NGT which is also a Poisson equation:
V2, = -4i4Gp.

(2)

Here (bis the gravitationalpotential. At this point, the reductionistsuddenlyrealizesthat she has derived an equation of NGT from one of EGT: a cognitive emergencetakes
place because of the obvious similarity between equations (1) and (2).

But a new interpretationof y now becomes necessary:

The quantity y in the EGT equation (1) must be identified with four times the gravitationalpotential b of equation (2), y = 44.

This identificationis completelyad hoc. It postulates that a quantity of geometricsignificance,y, which characterizes differencebetween the a curved and a flat space, is to be the same (except for a trivial factor 4) as the gravitational potential of Newtonian dynamics. This is an example of asymptotic cognitive emergence. In the reductionist terminology, the above identificationwould be called a 'bridgelaw'. We next turn to the second set of equations: one wants to deduce the Newtonian equations of motion from the geodesic equation of EGT. Using the same approximationfor small energiesas before, the geodesic equation becomes
d2Xk d2Xk

dt2

]Fk =
00(3

(3)

where k runs over 1, 2, and 3. Here, Fk (k = 1,2,3) are three of the 40 components of the Christoffelsymbol, a quantity by which the spacetime curvaturetensor is expressed.The other components of the Christoffel symbol are negligiblein this approximation. The appearance of the above equation (3) now triggers in the reductionist'smind that there exists a very similarequation in NGT,

S354

FRITZ ROHRLICH d2xk

mt dt2 = Fk

(4)

where Fk is the k-component of force. This emergence suggests the identificationof these two equations.The concomitantreinterpretation of symbols requiresthe identificationof the ChristoffelsymbolF0k with the Newtonian force per unit mass, Fk/m. Again, one has an ad hoc identificationthat bridgestwo incommensurable concepts. Of course, force and potential are only two of the concepts of Newtonian physics that emerge here; a full discussion of NGT requires others as well. But the exampledemonstratesthat 'reduction',a process that is supposed to lead rationallyfrom a lower- to a higher-leveltheory, requiresat some point of that process that two incommensurable concepts be identified, one of which belongs to the theory yet to be derived. This is what is hidden in the bridge laws, and what is objectionable in the reductionprocess. A 6. Nonasymptotic Emergence. good exampleof nonasymptoticemerof emergence that does not arise from an asymptotic segence, i.e., quence, is the 'deduction'of the first law of thermodynamicsfrom statistical mechanics. First, one makes the technicalassumptionthat one deals with a microcanonicalensemble;this will be assured if the total energy, E, and the volume, V, of the system change sufficientlyslowly (see Huang 1963, 148). Then, one starts with the concept of entropy, S, which is a fundamentalconcept in statisticalmechanics.It depends
on E and V, S = f(E,V).

The picture underlyingstatistical mechanics is that of a number of molecules, N, contained in a volume, V, so that in equilibriumthere exists an average state which corresponds to the macroscopicallyknown phenomena. To this end, both N and V must be sufficiently large. Assuming this to be the case, the large numberof moleculescan have very many different distributionsof the positions and momenta which make up 'phase space'. The probabilityof having a distribution in phase space that has the desired E for a given V is W(E,V). The nature of this function need not concern us furtherhere; but we must note that the entropy S in statistical mechanics is definedin terms of W by the famous formula based on Boltzmann'swork,
S = k log W(E,V). (5)

In differentialform, it reads dS(E, V) = () dE

Ev T)E

dV

(6)

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This is where the deduction of thermodynamics from statistical mechanicsmakes a jump: faced with this formula, the physicistrecalls a very similar formula from thermodynamics.There emerges in the physicist's mind the first law of thermodynamicswhich in differential
form is

dS' =

dE +

dV

(7)

where S' is the entropy of thermodynamics,and T and P are absolute temperatureand pressure. This cognitiveemergenceof an equation from the higherlevel theory suggests identification of equations (6) and (7) with the concomitant identificationof S from the lower level theory with S' from the higher level theory, even though these are incommensurable: the entropy S', process, while S is defined in terms of a probabilityin phase space by (5). Of course, it is now also necessaryto prove that this identification is consistent with the empiricalevidencewhich is indeed the case. Note that the physicist'sderivationof thermodynamicsfrom statistical mechanics ignores the switch in concepts; she is satisfied with the of thermodynamics, is defined as a measure of the reversibility of a

mathematicalderivationignoringthe switchof meaningof the symbols. Once the identificationof the two differententropieshas been made, the identificationof the coefficientsof dE and dV yields
1 / Si p / aS

9E v

avJE

(8)

This provides the identification of two more symbols from thermodynamics, T and P, with two from statistical mechanicswith very different meanings. The absolute temperature,T, and the total pressure, P, are primaryconcepts in thermodynamicsbut not so in statistical mechanics. Obviously, the temperatureof a single molecule has no meaning. Similarly,the entropy S' is a derivedquantity in thermodynamics,while S is a primaryquantity in statisticalmechanics. The above is of course only a part of the 'reduction'of thermodynamics to statisticalmechanics. The relationshipbetween the full theories of statisticalmechanicsand thermodynamics considerablymore is complex. In fact, a 'reduction'in full generalityhas not been carried out despite long years of effort by some of the best scientists (Sklar 1993). The simplicityof the above example should not be misleading.
7. Reductive Explanations. Having thus argued that the claim of re-

ductionistsis flawed,why is it they are so successfulin explainingprop-

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erties and phenomena on a given level by recourse to a lower level? This question cannot be fully answeredin the space availablehere. But since it is an obvious question raised by supportersof reductionism, and since it has led to a great deal of confusion, at least a brief answer is desirablehere. The confusion can be traced to the widely accepted conflationof
theory reduction with reductive explanation (Wimsatt 1997). This con-

flation can already be found in Nagel 1961; he claims that deduction of S from T both, reduces S to T as well as explains it. I shall argue against the latter: I hold that a scientifictheory cannot be explained, and that only properties,phenomena, or laws can. The argumentis simple. Given a proposition P, then 'why P' is an appropriatequestion for which an explanation can be sought. But a theory is much more than a proposition or set of propositions:it involves in addition to a set of propositions (postulates, fundamental laws) also a set of technicaltermswith specificmeanings(a semantics), a mathematicalstructure(in many cases), an ontology, and an epistemology. All these components differ from one level to the next. As a consequence of cognitive emergence,there is a discontinuous switch from the semantics of one level to that of another, and that switch defiesrational 'explanation'.Similarly,the holistic natureof the ontology of a higher level relativeto a lower one cannot be explained; the closest one can come to that is to point to the asymptotic holism mentioned in ?4. On the other hand, the explanation of laws or specificphenomena (or sets of phenomena) in S in terms of the lower level theory T is not only common, but an essential part of scientificactivity in every field of science. While many laws and phenomena on a given level can be explainedby the theories on that level, others cannot. Consider a specific case, such as the transition of a ferromagnetic state to a nonferromagneticone by heating beyond a criticaltemperature (Curie point). This is a phenomenon first discoveredon the macroscopic level, a phenomenological law on that level. There is no on understanding that level why this happens.On the atomic level, however, that phenomenon can be explained:the alignment of the microscopic magneticmomentsis destroyedbecausethe addedheat increases the energy of the molecules. This can be called a reductive explanation because it is done by means of a lower-leveltheory. But it is obviously quite differentfrom a 'theory reduction'which requiresa derivationof
the complete macroscopic theory including all its abovementioned com-

ponents, such as its semanticsand ontology. As a furtherclarificationof the differencebetweentheory reduction and reductive explanation, consider the way bridge laws enter in the

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two cases. In theory reductionone works up, from a given and known theory T to an assumedlyunknown theoryS on a higherlevel. The steps that lead there are crucial:how much is logical derivation,how much is 'emergence'? The bridge laws are here under careful scrutiny. In a reductive explanation, on the other hand, both theory S and theoryT are givenbut S is useless for the explanationof that particular "why P?" question asked on the S level. Thereupon one steps down to the explanatory theory T. One then reveals of T only those laws (propositions) that are necessary for the purpose of explaining the "why P?" question, and one explains it using for example a deductivenomological scheme. The bridge laws are not under scrutinyhere, and are used in the opposite direction:one uses them to state the concepts of T that correspondto the concepts occurringin P, and one does so dogmatically.A conception of explanation that goes beyond the covering law reasoning can be useful here (Rohrlich 1994). There are no flaws in reductiveexplanation,and we do not rejectit the way we reject theory reduction. Inspiredby the recentgreat success in explainingpropertiesof composite systems, Shimony (1993, v.2, 191-217) suggested the name "methodology of synthesis." This name thus becomes a way of chartheacterizingkinds of reductiveexplanations;it does not characterize ory reduction. The basic assumptionunderlyingthe presentwork is the claim that the study of our world leads to a natural separation into cognitive levels. It is our human intellectuallimitations (cited by Shimony in ?2 above) which makes each level a necessity. The levels thereforeenjoy a certain autonomy and complement one another (cumulativityof scientific knowledge). In this way, one is led to a pluralisticdescriptionof nature (Rohrlich 1988).
REFERENCES Batterman, R. W. (1995), "Theories Between Theories: Asymptotic Limiting Intertheoretic Relations", Synthese 103: 171-201. Brush, S. (1976), "Statistical Mechanics and Philosophy of Science: Some Historical Notes", in F. Suppe and P. D. Asquith (eds.), PSA 1976, v.2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, pp 551-584. Dresden, M. (1974), "Reflections on Fundamentality and Complexity", in C. Enz and J. Mehra (eds.), Physical Reality and Mathematical Description. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 133-166. Huang, K. (1963), Statistical Mechanics. New York: John Wiley. Humphreys, P. (1997), "Emergence, Not Supervenience", Philosophy of Science 64 (Proceedings): this issue. Kuhn, T. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Morgan, L. (1923), Emergent Evolution. New York: Henry Holt. Nagel, E. (1961), The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

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Rohrlich, F. (1988), "Pluralistic Ontology and Theory Reduction in the Physical Sciences", British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science 39: 295-312. . (1989), "The Logic of Reduction: The Case of Gravitation", Foundationsof Physics 19: 1151-1170. . (1994), "Scientific Explanation: From Covering Law to Covering Theory", in D. Hull, M. Forbes, and R. M. Burian (eds.), PSA 1994, v. 1. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 69-77. Sankey, H. (1994), The IncommensurabilityThesis. Aldershot: Avebury. Schaffner, K. F. (1967), "Approaches to Reduction", Philosophy of Science 34: 137-147. Shimony, A. (1993), Search for a Naturalistic World View, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sklar, L. (1993), Physics and Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Suppe, F. (1977), The Structure of Scientific Theories. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Wimsatt, W. C. (1997), "Emergence as Non-Aggregativity and the Biases of Reductionism", in P. J. Taylor and J. Haila (eds.), Natural Contradictions:Perspectives on Ecology and Change. Albany: State University of New York Press, in press.