PositioningASEANbetweenGlobalPowers

CarlyleA.Thayer

14thRegionalOutlookForum2012 InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies ShangriLaHotel,Singapore January5,2012

Paperpresentedtothe

PositioningASEANbetweenGlobalPowers CarlyleA.Thayer*
Introduction
ThispaperconsiderstheimpactofChinasmilitaryriseoninternationalrelations andsecuritycooperationinSoutheastAsia.Thispaperisdividedintofiveparts.Part1 assessesChinasmilitarybuildupanditsimplicationsforSoutheastAsia.Part2reviews ChinaASEANsecuritycooperation.Part3addressesUnitedStatesregionalengagement with ASEAN member states. Part 4 assesses ASEANcentric security cooperation as a meansofmanagingitsrelationswiththegreatpowers.Finally,Part5,advocatesaCode of Conduct for Southeast Asias Maritime Domain as a means of positioning ASEAN betweentheglobalpowers.

1.Chinasmilitarybuildup
Chinas military transformation is the product of several factors. First, Chinas spectacular economic rise has provided the basis for increased defence spending that hasledinturntothemodernizationofallmilitaryservices.Second,Chinaisfixatedon Taiwan and national reunification and therefore seeks to develop antiaccess/area denialcapabilitiesbeyondthefirsttothesecondislandchain1toforestallintervention bytheUnitedStatesinTaiwancontingencies.Third,Chinasrisehasraisedthesalience ofprotectingitsmajorsealinesofcommunication(SLOC)fromtheGulfofArabiatoits eastern seaboard. Fourth, Chinese resource nationalism has raised the importance of the South China Sea with respect to oil, gas and mineral resources and sovereignty claims.Fifth,asChinabecomesaglobalpowerwithwidespreadeconomicandpolitical interests,itwillneedtodevelopabluewaternavytoprotectitsinterestsfurtherafield. Several of the factors promoting Chinas military buildup intersect with respect to Southeast Asias maritime domain and the South China Sea in particular. This is most evident in the modernization of the South Seas Fleet and the construction of a major naval baseat Yalong Bay on Hainan Island. Yalong is located on the southern coast of Hainan on the upper reaches of the South China Sea. The South Seas Fleet has the important mission of securing the Strait of Qiongzhou to protect southern China and HainanIsland.

Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.Email:c.thayer@adfa.edu.au
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The first island chain refers to the line of islands that runs northsouth from the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The second island chain extends further east of Chinas coast and includes a line running northsouth from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia. The first second island chain embraces an area 1,800 nautical milesfromChinascoastandincludesmostoftheEastChinaSeaandEastAsianSLOCs.

ThefacilitiesatYalongBayincludepiers,docksandundergroundsubmarinepens.The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) stations several major surface combatants, amphibious landing craft, conventional submarines, and a single nuclear submarine at Yalong. Continued construction indicates that Yalong will be able to accommodate larger surface combatants such as assault ships and eventually one or more aircraft carriers. Chinaregularlyconductsmajornavalexercisestoshowcasethegrowingprowessofthe PLAN.Chinaconductedthreemajornavalexercisesin2010andonemajorexercisein 2011relatedtotheSouthChinaSea.2ThefirstexercisewasheldinearlyApril2010and involvedthelongrangedeploymentofsixteenwarshipsfromthePLANdrawnfromthe NorthSea,EastSeaandSouthSeaFleets.ThePLANflotillasailedpastOkinawathrough the Bashi Channel and conducted live firing exercises north of the Philippines before steamingtowardtheMalaccaStraits.UpuntilthisexerciseChinasSouthSeaFleetwas theonlyfleettooperateintheSouthChinaSea. ThesecondnavalexercisewasconductedinlateJuly2010.Itwasthelargestofitskind and once again involved ships from the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets. At leastadozenwarshipstookpartincludingallfourSovremennydestroyersfromtheEast SeaFleet,aswellasthemostmodernshipsinthePLANorderofbattlesuchastheType 051CLuzhou,Type052BLuyangI,Type052CLuyangII,Type054AJiangkaiII,andKilo classsubmarines.JH7/7Afighterbombersprovidedaircover.Thisexercisewasnotable for the Chinese media coverage of live missile firings and the presence of senior commandersfromtheCentralMilitaryCommissionandthePLAChiefofStaff,General ChenBingde.3 InNovember2010thePLAMarineCorpsheldthethirdmajorexercise,Jiaolong2010,in the South China Sea. This exercise involved more than 100 ships, submarines and aircraft and 1,800 marines. According to military analyst Li Jie, the exercises were conductedpartlyinresponsetotheinterventionofunnamedcountriesinrecenttimes, soitstimetoopposethoseinterventionswithpowerpolitics.4 More recently, in November 2011, China conducted naval exercises in the Western Pacific. Japanese defence sources reported that six ships an intelligence collector,

The PLAN conducted a naval exercise in early July 2010 in response to a combined United States RepublicofKoreanavalexerciseintheYellowSea.

PLA Navy Conducts liveammunition training in South China Sea, Xinhua, July 29, 2010 and China conductsnavaldrillinSouthChinaSea,AgenceFrancePresse,July30,2010.InAugust2010,aChinese submersiblevesselplantedaChineseflagatbottomofSouthChinaSeatodemonstratesovereignty.
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MichaelWines,ChinaStagesNavalExercises,TheNewYorkTimes,November3,2010.

threeguidedmissilefrigatesandtwosupplyshipspassedthroughthewatersbetween OkinawaandMiyakoislandson2223November.5 These four PLAN exercises were viewed as a demonstration by China that it was now capable of deploying beyond the first island chain to the second. The implications are clear:ChinaisdevelopingthecapacitytosustainlargernavaldeploymentsintheSpratly archipelagoandfurthersouthforlongerperiods. ThedevelopmentofanavalbaseinYalongBayhasstrategicimplicationsforthebalance of power in the region. Analysis of construction activities indicates Yalong will be capable of housing nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. Portions of the base are being built underground to provide facilities that cannotbeeasilymonitored.WhenthesefacilitiesarecompletedtheywillprovideChina withthepotentialcapabilitytostationasubstantialproportionofitssubmarinebased nucleardeterrentcapabilitiesthere. Satellite imagery has confirmed the presence of a single Chinese Type 094 Jinclass nuclear submarine since late 2007. The Type094 is a secondgeneration nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and represents Chinas most lethal naval strikeweapon.UpuntilnowallnuclearsubmarineswereunderthecommandofChinas NorthSeaFleet.ThismarksthefirstpermanentdeploymenttoChinasSouthSeaFleet. According to the U.S. Defense Department five more Chinese SSBNs are expected to becomeoperationalincomingyears.YalongBayisexpectedtobecomethehomebase forChinasJinclasssubmarineforce.ThereisevenspeculationthatChinamightcreate afourthfleetbasedinHainan. Chinasmostmodernstrategicnuclearsubmarineisnotyetfullyoperationalbutwhenit isthesubmarineisexpectedtocarrytwelveSeaLaunchedBallisticMissiles.Thisclassof submarine will be even more potent if China succeeds in equipping the missiles with multiplewarheads.Chinesenuclearsubswillbeabletopatrolandfirefromconcealed positions in deep waters off Hainan island if China can develop the necessary operationalskills. At the same time, China has extended the airfield on Woody Island in the Paracel islands, consolidated its facilities at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly archipelago, and maintains a continuing naval presence at Mischief Reef off the west coast of the Philippines. In sum, China has developed an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereigntyclaims overtheSouthChinaSeaandprotectitsvitalSLOCsthroughtheMalaccaandSingapore Straits as well as the capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South China Sea
Xinhua,ChinaannouncesnavaldrillsamidSouthChinaSeatensions,TheEconomicTimes,November 23,2011;CameronStewart,ChinaraisestensionwithPacificwargames,TheAustralian,November25, 2011;andWuZhong,ChinasnavydeliversThanksgivingspoiler,AsiaTimesOnline,November29,2011.
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from these bases with a considerably shortened logistics tail. By extension, China will alsohavethecapacitytointerdictthesameSLOCsonwhichJapan,TaiwanandSouth Koreaaredependent.ThesedevelopmentsportendagreaterChinesecapacitytoassert regionalleadershipandtochallengeU.S.militarysupremacy. The deployment of nuclear submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, has introduced a new geostrategic dimension to the regional balance of power. Chinese nuclearsubmarinedeploymentswillattractthecontinuingattentionoftheU.S.Navyin conducting military survey/intelligence gathering in the waters off Hainan.6 New developmentsinU.S.militarytechnologywillseetheintroductionofmoresophisticated underseadronesandunmannedsystemsforintelligencegathering,reconnaissanceand surveillance such as Large Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Persistent LittoralUnderseaSurveillanceSystems.AccordingtoMarkValencia,thedeploymentof thesenewsystemswillgeneratetensionsandmorefrequentcrises;theywillproduce defensive reactions and escalatory dynamics; and they will lead to less stability in the mostaffectedregions,especiallyinAsia.7

2.ChinaASEANsecuritycooperation
Since1997ChinahaspromoteditssocallednewconceptofsecuritytoallaySoutheast AsianconcernsabouttheChinathreat.Chinasstrategyistoundermineanddisplace the alliance and security network developed by the United States since the Second World War. China seeks to shape an exclusivist East Asian order focused on transnational or nontraditional security challenges. China has promoted security cooperation with Southeast Asia both on a bilateral and multilateral basis in order to achievethisgoal.
Bilateral security and defence cooperation.BetweenFebruary1999andDecember2000,

China negotiated longterm cooperative framework arrangements with all ten ASEAN members. Seven of Chinas agreements included a clause on security cooperation (Thailand,Malaysia,Vietnam,Brunei,Singapore,thePhilippines,andLaos).Sincethen China has also initiated defence cooperation with Cambodia and Indonesia. Chinas defence cooperation ties with Myanmar predate these developments. By 2006 China and ASEAN had concluded twentyeight cooperation framework mechanisms related tosecurityanddeferencecooperationincludingregularconsultationsonstrategicand securitycooperationbyseniorofficials,anannualmeetingofforeignministers,andan annualsummitofheadsofgovernment.
MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 24.

MarkJ.Valencia,TheSouthChinaSea,MilitaryActivitiesandtheLawoftheSea,Paperpresentedto the International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and AmericanPerspectives,cosponsoredbytheInstituteofEuropeanandAmericanStudiesandtheCenter forAsiaPacificStudies,AcademiaSinica,Taipei,Taiwan,October78,2011.

Chinahasemployeddefencediplomacytoopenupchannelsofinfluencebetweenthe PLA and regional armed forces. This has taken the form of defence cooperation agreements, highlevel visits, security consultations, naval port visits, professional military education and training, defence industry cooperation, arms and equipment sales,technologytransferandminornavalexercises. During the period 20012009, for example, China and nine ASEAN states conducted twentyone naval goodwill visits.8 Chinese warships visited Vietnam (on three occasions), Singapore and Thailand (twice each) and Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, MalaysiaandthePhilippines.Inturn,ChinahostedportvisitsfromMalaysia,Singapore, ThailandandVietnam(twiceeach),andIndonesiaandthePhilippines(onceeach). As early as 2002, China invited the Philippines to participate in a naval exercise. This suggestion was reiterated in May 2005 at the first ChinaPhilippines defense and security dialogue. China proposed that the Philippines conduct joint maritime security exerciseswiththePLANfocusingonsearchandrescue.Manilahasnotyettakenupthe offer. In June 2005, China proposed extending PLAN port visits to Thailand to include bilateral exercises. Bangkok responded that it would prefer to participate in a multilateralexercisethatincludedotherASEANstates.Nevertheless,inDecemberthat year,theRoyalThaiNavyconducteditsfirstcombinedexercisewiththePLANinvolving searchandrescue andescort. In late 2006, China approached individual ASEAN states withitssuggestionforacombinedmultilateralnavalexercise.Thisproposalreportedly remainsunderactiveconsideration. InApril2006,ChinaandVietnamcommencedbiannualjointnavalpatrolsintheGulfof Tonkin.Thiswasafirstforbothnavies.ByJune2011,atotalofelevenjointnavalpatrols hadbeenconductedintheGulfofTonkin.9InNovember2008,afteragapofseventeen years, PLAN vessels resumed goodwill port visits to Vietnam. The PLAN subsequently visitedinDecember2009andOctober2010.VietnammadeitsfirstportcalltoChinain June2009anditssecondinJune2011.10
Multilateral security cooperation. In November 2002, in order to allay Southeast Asian

concerns about Chinese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN states signed a Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). In October the following year, China acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and China and ASEAN established a strategic partnership. The strategic
Laosislandlocked.InDecember2011,Chinesesecurityforcesbegantoconductjointpatrolswiththeir counterpartsfromMyanmar,LaosandThailandontheMekongRivertosuppressarmedcriminalactivity directed at commercial vessels. Kavi Chongkittavorn, China leads new security scheme on upper Mekong,TheNation,December26,2011. MargieMason,VietnamandChinaholdjointnavalpatrolamidspat,AssociatedPress,June21,2011 andAgenceFrancePresse,China,VietnamholdjointseapatrolsneardisputedSpratlys,June23,2011. VietnamesenavalshipsonfriendlyvisittoChina,QuanDoiNhanDanOnline,June22,2011;China, VietnamengageinJointnavalpatrols,PeoplesDailyOnline,June22,2011andVietnamesenavalships wrapupvisittoChina,QuanDoiNhanDanOnline,June27,2011.
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partnershipwasthefirstformalagreementofthistypebetweenChinaandaregional organization as well as a first for ASEAN itself. The strategic partnership was wide rangingandincludedaprovisionfortheinitiationofanewsecuritydialogueaswellas generalcooperationinpoliticalmatters.11 InJuly2004,atChinassuggestion,ASEANandChinaraisedtheirrelationshiptooneof enhanced strategic relations. This took the form of a fiveyear Plan of Action (2005 2010)thatsetoutthefollowingobjectives:
Promotemutualconfidenceandtrustindefenseandmilitaryfieldswithaviewtomaintaining peaceandstabilityintheregion; Conductdialogues,consultationsandseminarsonsecurityanddefenseissues; Strengthencooperationonmilitarypersonneltraining; Consider observing each others military exercises and explore the possibility of conducting bilateralormultilateraljointmilitaryexercises;and Exploreandenhancecooperationinthefieldofpeacekeeping.12

ChinahasalsosoughttopromoteitsinfluenceinSoutheastAsiathroughparticipationin the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China has given priority to supporting the ARFs program of confidence building measures (CBMs) but has been less supportive of the ARFsshiftoffocusfromCBMstopreventivediplomacy.Chinahasalsogivenpriorityto transnational security issues over traditional security. China successfully proposed the inauguration of the ARF Security Policy Conference but has been less successful in promotingaregionalsecuritytreaty. Chinasstressonexclusivistsecurityarrangementsisexemplifiedbyitssupportforthe ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit process. China has successfully promoted the importanceofaddressingtransnationalsecurityissuessuchaspandemicsanddisaster relief. In sum, Chinas engagement with ASEAN members, both bilaterally and multilaterally, was a successful demonstration of Chinas soft power diplomacy over the decade 19972007 in deflating regional concerns about the China threat and raising Chinas prestige and influence. Chinas promotion of nontraditional security issues found resonance in the region. But Chinas attempt to bind ASEAN states to a structure of exclusive East Asia regional security cooperation as an alternative to the U.S.led securitynetworkfailedtogaintraction.Thelackoftransparencythathasaccompanied Chinas rapid military modernization and transformation has raised regional concerns and resulted in defence selfhelp efforts by several states. Renewed Chinese assertivenessintheSouthChinaSeain2007,andparticularlyheavyhandedbehaviour
JointDeclarationoftheHeadsofState/GovernmentoftheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNationsand the Peoples Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, October 8, 2003, http://www.aseansec.org/15265.htm.
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PlanofActiontoImplementtheJointDeclarationofASEANChinaStrategicPartnershipforPeaceand Prosperity,October8,2003,http://www.aseansec.org/16805.htm.

in2010,underminedChinasstanding,raisedrenewedconcernsaboutaChinathreat, andledseveralregionalstatestoencouragetheUnitedStatestoplayagreaterrolein maritimesecurity.

3.UnitedStatesregionalengagement
On coming to office in 2009, the Obama Administration quickly declared that the UnitedStatesisbackinAsia.ItaccededtotheASEANTreatyofAmityandCooperation, appointed a permanent ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat and revived the annual ASEANUnitedStatesleadersmeeting.WhenChineseassertivenessintheSouthChina Searaisedregionalsecurityconcerns,boththeU.S.SecretaryofStateandSecretaryof DefencedeclaredthattheUnitedStateshadanationalinterestinsafetyofnavigation and over flight in the South China Sea. More recently, the United States also has announced that with its withdrawal from Iraq and eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan, it will pivot to the AsiaPacific and quarantine defence cuts from the PacificCommandsAreaofResponsibility. The United States has responded to Chinas naval buildup and development of anti access/area denial capabilities by strengthening its posture on Guam, stepping up weapons and equipment sales to the Philippines, negotiating new arrangements with Australia giving the U.S. greater access to training facilities near Darwin, and basing CombatLittoralShipsinSingapore.13 InresponsetoChinasnavalmodernization,theU.S.hasdeployedthirtyoneofitsfifty three fast attack submarines to the Pacific and stepped up its antisubmarine warfare program. Eighteen of the U.S. subs are homeported in Pearl Harbor; the others are based in Guam.14 The United States has also deployed three Ohioclass nuclear submarines to the AsiaPacific Indian Ocean region. Each has been modified to carry 154conventionalTomahawkcruisemissiles.InlateJuneearlyJuly2010,inacalculated demonstration of naval power, the USS Florida, USS Michigan, and USS Ohio submarines, simultaneously surfaced in Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean), Busan (South Korea) and Subic Bay (the Philippines), respectively.15 The United States has stationed thefifthgenerationRaptoraircraftinHawaii.Finally,theUnitedStatesisdevelopingan airsea battle concept to counter Chinas development of areadenial/antiaccess capabilities.TheairseabattleconceptisbeingdrawnuptoenabletheUnitedStatesto prevailinconflictswhereareadenial/antiaccesscapabilitiesarewelldeveloped.

CraigWhitlock,NavysnextstopinAsiawillsetChinaonedge,CheckpointWashington,November18, 2011
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OyaolNgirainki,GuamGetsNewSubBuildings,NavyTimes,July21,2010.

U.S. Posts Pictures of Nuclear Sub in Show of Force, The Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 2010 and Mark Thompson,U.S.MissilesDeployedNearChinaSendaMessage,TimeMagazine,July8,2010.

At the same time the United States has repeatedly sought to engage with China to manage their relations. The U.S. and China currently have in place fortyeight mechanismsforcoordinationandcollaborationonstrategicpolicyissues.16TheObama AdministrationhassoughttomanageitsrelationswithChinathroughnewmechanisms suchastheStrategicandEconomicDialogueandtherecentlyestablishedConsultations on AsiaPacific Affairs. The Pentagon consistently has sought to keep channels of communication open with China through their joint Military Maritime Consultative Council(established1998,suspendedbyChinain2001andresumedinFebruary2009). Nevertheless it is clear that continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and U.S. intelligence gathering in Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone remain major irritants. In addition, U.S. diplomatic intervention in the South China Sea issue has provoked a negative if not hostilereactionbyChina.ChinaviewstheU.S.asanoutsidepowerwhoseintervention willonlycomplicatematters. Tensions in ChinaU.S. relations have been transmitted to Southeast Asia. Manila and Washingtonhavebreathednewlifeintotheir1951MutualSecurityTreatythrougharms and equipment sales and military exercises. The United States and Vietnam have stepped up defence cooperation activities to include a new senior leaders dialogue, signingofaMemorandumofUnderstandingondefencecooperationandtheinitiation of lowlevel naval exchange activities. China has criticized U.S.Philippines naval exercisesasuntimelyandwarnedbothManilaandHanoithattheyareplayingwithfire byencouragingU.S.intervention.

4.ASEANcentricsecuritycooperation
Since its establishment in 1967 ASEAN has sought to promote the twin goals of Southeast Asia autonomy and ASEANs centrality in the regions security affairs. As an illustrationoftheformer,ASEANadoptedtheZoneofPeace,FreedomandNeutralityin 1971, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976 and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty in 1995. As an example of the latter, ASEAN initiated the ASEANRegionalForumin1994,theEastAsiaSummitin2005toincludeIndia,Australia andNewZealand(andlaterRussiaandtheUnitedStates)andtheADMMPlusin2010. ASEANsattempttopromoteSoutheastAsianautonomyanditscentralroleinsecurity affairs often comes under pressure by the centrifugal forces of the engagement strategiespursuedbyChinaandtheUnitedStates.Nowhereisthismoreapparentthan inthemaritimedomainwheretensionsinChinaU.S.relationhavebeentransmittedto Southeast Asia and overlay tensions in relations between China and ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea. Maritime security has now emerged as the main issue facingASEANanditsrelationswiththemajorpowers. Although ASEAN has set itself the goal of becoming an ASEAN Community by 2015
Bonnie Glasser and Brittany Billingsley, USChina Relations: Friction and Cooperation Coexist Uneasily,ComparativeConnections,September2011.
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composed of three pillars (PoliticalSecurity Cooperation, Economic Cooperation and SocioCultural Cooperation) it is highly unlikely that ASEAN will develop a common foreign policy or common security and defence policy by that deadline. The reality of ASEANcentric security cooperation is that it coexists and overlays the security alignments of its individual members. Thailand and the Philippines are treaty allies of the United States, Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements, while Singapore is a close strategic partner of the U.S. ASEAN is also divided on South China Sea issues between the four claimant states (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei) and the nonclaimant states. Even among the four claimantstatestherearedifferencesbetweenthePhilippinesandVietnamontheone handandMalaysiaandBruneiontheother.Theformeraremoreproactiveinresisting Chineseassertiveness,whilethelattermaintainaverylowkeyprofile. Chinas military modernisation and transformation, especially naval modernisation, coupled with increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, has created a securitydilemmaforSoutheastAsiasstates.Chinaseffortstosafeguarditssecurityby developingwhatitconsidersareasonableforcestructuretodetertheUnitedStateshas created insecurity in several ASEAN states due to Chinas lack of transparency. ASEAN stateshavebeencircumspectinpublicstatementsbuttheirconcernscanbediscerned in the significant rise in defence expenditures and the kinds of weapon systems and platformsthattheyhaveacquired.SoutheastAsiasarmsprocurementsgobeyondforce modernisationandincludetheintroductionofnewcapabilitiesthatcanbeoperatedat extendedranges.Itshouldberecognized,however,thatnotallofthesenewcapabilities havebeenacquiredinresponsetoChinasmilitarybuildup. In Southeast Asia the conventional submarine has been the new hallmark of naval acquisitions.17 Singapore recently modernised its submarine fleet. Malaysia has taken deliveryoftwoScorpeneclasssubmarines.VietnamhasorderedsixconventionalKilo class submarines. Indonesia, Thailand and even the Philippines are reportedly in the market for submarines. Nearby Australia has recently called for tenders to construct twelvelargeconventionalsubmarines.Inaddition,Australia,Malaysia,thePhilippines, Singapore and the United States are stepping up investment in their antisubmarine warfarecapabilities. Securityanalystswarnthattheproliferationofsubmarinefleetsmaybedestabilizingin timesoftensionsandcrisesduetothecomplexitiesofcommandandcontrol.Inother words, Southeast Asias arms buying spree, although largely intended for defensive purposes,mayhaveadestabilisingimpactonregionalsecurity.18Sofartherehavebeen
Defenceanalystsestimatethat86submarineswillbeaddedtofleetsintheAsiaPacificby2020of which30willbeChinese.See:IHSJanesquotedbySabinePirone,ChinasPacificPushSpursU.S. SpendingonAntiSubWarfare,BusinessWeek,November25,2011. Quoted by Stephen Coates, US Pacific commander warns of tactical errors, The China Post, November10,2011.AdmiralSmithalsonotedthatheexpecteddiplomacytoprevailintheeventofa brushupandcompromisetoprevail.
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few if any indications that this issue is being addressed by ASEANcentric multilateral organizations. RegionalforcemodernizationcombinedwithtensionsintheSouthChinaSeahasraised thesalienceofmaritimesecurityissues.ASEANfacesthetwinprospectsthat(1)major power tensions will continue to be transmitted into Southeast Asia and (2) ASEANs centrality in the regions security architecture may be undermined by a major power takingunilateralactiontodealwithsecuritychallengesinthemaritimedomain. ASEAN has the means to position itself between the global powers to mitigate the spilloveroftheirrivalryinitsmaritimedomain.InMay2006,ASEANDefenceMinisters metforthefirsttimeandbegantheprocessofinstitutionalizingdefencecooperationon a regional basis. This enabled a new structure to emerge that now forms part of the ASEAN PoliticalSecurity Council under the ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN Defence MinistersMeeting(ADMM)becamethecapstoneoverwhatwereinformalmeetingsof thearmy,airforce,navyandmilitaryintelligencechiefs. At present practical guidance to ASEAN Defence Ministers and their subordinates to address maritime security issues as a priority appears to be lacking. In particular, the prospect for practicalcooperation among ASEAN navies does not appear good. At the 4th ADMM in May 2010, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol their maritime boundaries. Little has been done to implement this agreement. At the most recent ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting (ANCM5) in Vietnam in July 2011 there was disagreementoveranumberofissuesincludingtheformalnameofthemeeting,how often it should meet, the conduct of joint patrols and a proposal for an ASEAN communicationsprotocolwhennavyshipspassedeachotheratsea.19 ASEANhasalsoinitiatedothermechanismstodealwithmaritimesecurity.Itestablished theInterSessionalMeeting(ISM)onMaritimeSecurityundertheauspicesoftheASEAN Regional Forum. The ISM on Maritime Securitys Work Plan on Maritime Security was approvedatthe44thASEANMinisterialMeetinginJuly2011.20Itfocusesoninformation sharing, capacity building, and training rather than practical activities such as South ChinaSeaCBMs. In2010,ASEANestablishedtheASEANMaritimeForum(AMF)underthetermsofthe

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Forgeneralreportssee:JoycePangco,VietnamasksAseannaviestouniteamidChinaforays,Manila Standard Today, November 24, 2011 and Viet Nam News Service, ASEAN navy chiefs advance co operation,MaritimeSecurity.Asia,July28,2011.

ASEANRegionalForum,DraftOutlineofaWorkPlanonMaritimeSecurity:ATemplateforDiscussion, 2ndARFISMonMaritimeSecurity,Auckland,March2931,2010;CoChairsSummaryoftheThirdARF InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security, Tokyo, Japan, 1415 February 2011; and 44th AM/PMC/18th ARF, Indonesia 2011, Chairs Statement, 18th ASEAN Regional Forum, 23 July 2011, Bali, Indonesia,Point41.

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ASEAN Political Security Community (APCS) Blueprint.21 The AMF is focused on a comprehensive approach to maritime issues and has so far not dealt with either maritimesecurityorSouthChinaSeaissuesindetail.22ThesecondmeetingoftheAMF washeldinThailandinAugust2011andproposedexpandingitsmembershiptoinclude dialoguepartnersinaseparatemeeting(AMFPlus). More significantly, in October 2010 ASEAN inaugurated the ASEAN Defence Ministers MeetingPlus(ADMMPlus).ThismeetingapprovedthecreationoftheASEANDefence Senior Officials Meeting Plus (ADSOM Plus) and five expert working groups.23 The ADMM Plus agreed tomeeteverythreeyearswith the second meeting scheduled for Bruneiin2013.Ayearafteritsestablishment,thetermsofreferencefortheADMMPlus ExpertsWorkingGrouponMaritimeSecuritywasapproved.Thisgroupwillnowreport its deliberations to the ADSOM Plus. In order to be effective, the ADMM Plus process mustbespeededupwithatleastannualmeetings. Finally, in mid2011 ASEAN member states and China agreed on Guidelines to Implement the DOC nine years after the DOC was adopted. The ASEANChina Joint Working Group to Implement the DOC, originally formed in 2004, is scheduled to recommence its work in January 2012 at a meeting to be hosted by China.24 In November 2011, ASEAN Senior Officials began discussions on what activities and projectstoincludeinaseparateCodeofConduct.Onceagreementisreached,thedraft COCwillbepresentedtoChinatodeterminewhat,when,whereandhowtheproject wouldbecarriedout.25 Insummary,theriseofChinahasraisedtheimportanceofthemaritimesecurityforall states in East Asia. Southeast Asia sits at the critical juncture of SLOCs that cross the IndianOceantotheWesternPacific.ThesecurityoftheseSLOCscouldbeundermined great power rivalry that is transmitted into Southeast Asia as well as ongoing force modernizationprograms.Accordingtoonethinktank,regionalSLOCsaresettobecome morecrowded,contestedandvulnerabletoarmedstrife.26
21

HanoiPlanofActiontoImplementtheASEANRegionalForumVisionStatement,May20,2010,Point 3. Chairs Statement of the 19th ASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011, Points 1417 (Maritime Cooperation).

22

HumanitarianAssistanceandDisasterRelief;MaritimeSecurity;Peacekeeping;CounterTerrorism;and MilitaryMedicine. Antonio Siegfrid O. Alegado, ASEAN, China to set ground rules on sea issues in January, Business World,November29,2011.
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Antara,ASEANreadytodiscusscontinuationofdocwithChina,November14,2011.

RoryMedcalfandRaoulHeinrichs,CrisisandConfidence:MajorPowersandMaritimeSecurityinIndo PacificAsia(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June2011),3andSamBateman,Solvingthe

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ASEANhasestablishedanumberofmechanismstodealwithmaritimesecurityissues. Atpresenttheseoverlapandareuncoordinated.WhatismissingisASEANleadershipin giving direction to these multiple bodies and establishing a structure so that policy recommendations can be transmitted to ministerial and head of state level. ASEAN leaders should position themselves between the global powers as the brokers of consensus on what form a streamlined regional architecture should take and what policy priorities should be adoptedto ensure maritime security inEastAsia. The most recentexpandedEastAsiaSummitdiscussedmaritimesecurityissuesthusestablishinga precedentforretainingmaritimesecurityasanagendaitem.

5.Conclusion
ASEANcanbestpositionitselfbetweenglobalpowersbyfirstgettingitsownhousein order with respect to maritime disputes among its members. This would enhance ASEANs unity and cohesion and better enable ASEAN to promote Southeast Asian autonomyandASEANscentralityintheregionssecurityarchitecture. ASEANs dogged focus on promoting confidencebuilding measures with China in the South China Sea under the DOC, while an important security goal, is fundamentally a misplacedpriority.ThisapproachdividesASEANintotwocategories,claimantsandnon claimants, and prevents ASEAN itself from adopting a common policy. This approach alsoallowsChinatoplayondifferencesamongASEANmembersanddragoutnotonly discussions on DOC confidencebuilding measures but also discussions on a more bindingCodeofConduct.ACOCfortheSouthChinaSeaistoorestrictiveasitdoesnot coverSoutheastAsiaslargermaritimedomain. ThemainpriorityforASEANshouldbetoadoptaCodeofConductforSoutheastAsias Maritime Domain. This proposal is based on two premises. First, the security of the maritimedomaininSoutheastAsiaisindivisibleforallASEANmembers,whethercoastal orlandlockedstates.Second,internationallaw,includingtheUnitedNationsConvention on Law of the Sea, applies equally throughout Southeast Asias maritime domain and notjusttheSouthChina.Itisapplicabletoallstates. Southeast Asia is beset by a number maritime boundary disputes among ASEAN members: Vietnam and the Philippines, CambodiaThailand (Gulf of Thailand), and Indonesiaanditsneighbours,aswellasbetweenMyanmarandBangladesh. Regionalmaritimedisputesinvolvebothclaimstosovereigntyoverislandsandfeatures andsovereignrightsoverresourcesintheseaandcontinentalshelf.Thepurposeofa Code of Conduct for Southeast Asias Maritime Domain is to provide a framework for state behaviour pending the settlement of disputes over sovereignty and sovereign rights. An agreement to a code of conduct should be without prejudice to claims to sovereigntyandsovereignrights.
WickedProblemsofMaritimeSecurity:AreRegionalForumsuptotheTask?,ContemporarySoutheast Asia,33(1),2011,1517.

 Whoshouldbeincludedinaregionalcodeofconduct?Whatareashoulditcover?

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The regional maritime code of conduct should include all ten ASEAN members of the Association(andfuturemembers)27andcoverSoutheastAsiasmaritimedomainnot just the South China Sea in a manner analogous to the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality(1971),TreatyofAmityandCooperation(1976)andSoutheastAsiaNuclear WeaponsFreeZoneTreaty(1995). Coverage of the entire Southeast Asian maritime domain would make all of ASEANs membersstakeholdersinthecodeofconduct,includingCambodiaandMyanmar.28This would overcome the present division of ASEAN states into claimant and nonclaimant states with respect to the South China Sea. The adoption of a Code of Conduct for SoutheastAsiasMaritimeDomainwouldreinforceASEANscorporateandlegalidentity andenhanceitsabilitytodealwithexternalpowers. Allsignatoriestothecodeofconductshouldrenouncethethreatofanduseofforceto: settletheirdisputesoversovereigntyandsovereignrights, disruptgoodorderatseaincludingsafetyofnavigationandoverflight.

AllASEANstatesshouldbringtheirmaritimeclaimsintolinewithinternationallaw,with particularattentiontoeliminatingexcessivebaselinesandclearlydistinguishingislands from rocks for purposes of maritime delimitation. The expertise of an independent paneloftechnicalandlegalexpertscouldbecalledtoassistindeterminingbaselines andtheclassificationofislandsandrocks. Allsignatoriesshouldcommitthemselvestoaresolutionofmaritimedisputeswithina mutuallyagreedtimeframethroughnegotiationsorothermutuallyagreedmethods.If, attheexpirationoftheagreedtimeframenoresolutionofmaritimedisputesisreached thestatesinvolvedshouldagreetoasettlementbasedonarbitrationbyanappropriate internationalcourtortribunal(InternationalTribunalonLawoftheSeaorInternational CourtofJustice)orotheragreedprocedure. AllpartiestotheSoutheastAsiaMaritimeCodeofConductshouldcommitthemselves todemilitarisingthefeatures(islandsandrocks)thattheyphysicallyoccupy,including theprohibitionofdeployingspecifiedtypesofweaponsystemssuchaslandbasedanti shipmissiles. Forpurposesofsecurity,includingprotectionagainstpiracyandarmedcriminals,police orcoastguardpersonnelmaybestationedonoccupiedfeatures.
SuchasTimorLeste. Cambodia and Myanmar were the only two members of ASEAN to remain silent when maritime security/SouthChinaSeaissueswereraisedattheNovember2011EastAsiaSummitLeadersRetreat.

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Amaritimecodeofconductshouldalsocontainprovisionsforallpartiestocooperate in: marine scientific research, marine pollution, fisheries management, search and rescue,antipiracyandotheragreedareas. Aregionalcodeofconductshouldsetupabodytooverseeitsimplementationandto handlecomplaintsanddisputesthatmayarise.Suchabodyshouldbeincludedunder theASEANPoliticalSecurityCommunityCouncil. ThesecurityenvironmentisSoutheastAsiaisoverlayedbythreecompetingpatternsof security cooperation: U.S.led alliances and security networks; Chinas exclusivist East Asia security framework; and ASEANcentric security cooperation.29 ASEAN can best positionitselfbetweenglobalpowersbyreachingconsensusonhowtostreamlinethe existing regional security architecture and by exerting leadership to enhance regional unity and cohesion by addressing maritime disputes among its members as a major priority. Once ASEAN states have agreed to a Code of Conduct on Southeast Asias MaritimeDomaintheyshouldcallontheirdialoguepartnersandotherstakeholdersto agreetoabidebyitsprovisions.

Afourthpatternofsecuritycooperationamongmiddlepowers,exemplifiedbytheFivePowerDefence Arrangements,isnotdiscussedinthispaper.See:CarlyleA.Thayer,SoutheastAsia:PatternsofSecurity Cooperation(Canberra:AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute,2010),1330.

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