Meta-ethics

What is meta-ethics? Meta-ethics is the study of ethical language. The word meta means above and beyond, which is why we use the word metaphysics to describe things that are beyond the natural world such as God, angels and the soul. In meta-ethics, scholars are interested in working out what we mean when we say that something is right or wrong, good or bad. The naturalistic fallacy One of the most important debates in meta-ethics revolves around something called the naturalistic fallacy. This term was coined by G.E. Moore in his book Principia Ethica, written in 1903. The naturalistic fallacy is an argument from ethical non-naturalism. What Moore argued, is that a mistake that many ethicists have made is to describe or define good in terms of things that exist (natural properties) that we already understand. For example, in utilitarianism, goodness is associated with pleasure and in Natural Law, goodness is associated with things that do not go against nature. Moore argued that this is wrong. Goodness, Moore argued is simple and indefinable like yellow. If you were to try to define yellow to a blind person, you would be unable. Moore argued the same thing about good: it is a mistake to define good in terms of something else, such as pleasure as you have failed to define good, you have simply given an example of it. In the same way, if you try to define yellow by referring to the sun or sand on a beach or a rubber duck, you havent defined yellow, youve simply described an object that possesses the quality yellow. For Moore, good is not a natural property i.e. it cannot be experienced, whereas pleasure, pain, joy, misery all are, because we can experience them through our senses. To say that something pleasurable is good, or that something painful is bad is a mistake for Moore. This poses a huge problem for ethics. Many people would argue that drug addiction is bad or wrong because it causes pain, or that homosexuality is wrong because it goes against nature. Moore would argue that the link is not direct and that we need more information to argue why drug addiction or homosexuality are wrong/bad. The naturalistic fallacy is linked to a claim made by David Hume which is called the is-ought gap. The is-ought gap claims that one cannot move from a factual statement about the world such as John was killed to an ought statement (a moral shove, or statement

about how the world should be) such as you ought not to kill. Humes fork states that there are only two types of meaningful statement, those that deal with experience (synthetic statements) or those that deal with definitions (analytic statements). Ought statements dont seem to fit into these categories. This poses us with a problem, as if ought statements cannot be verified then they have no meaning and this means that the whole basis of morality is shaky. If I cannot say to someone you ought not to steal society is in danger of becoming an awful place. The complete separation of is and ought is referred to as Humes guillotine. People who agree with the naturalistic fallacy and the is-ought gap are often referred to as ethical non-naturalists or ethical noncognitivists. These people argue that ethical statements do not convey facts, but simply the opinion of the person who has uttered them. This contrasts with people who argue that ethical statements are factual and relate to actual states of affairs in the world around us i.e. if I state that homosexuality is wrong, the ethical naturalist would argue that this statement corresponds to a fact, either present in nature (e.g. homosexuality does not lead to reproduction, a part of human nature and is therefore bad) or present in revelation from God (do not lie with a man as a man lies with a woman Leviticus). The challenge for ethics is either to show that ethical statements (e.g. killing is wrong) correspond to some kind of reality or objective truth, or that if they dont, they can have some kind of persuasive effect over people as otherwise we are just left with moral nihilism: the belief that there is no morality and we can do as we wish. Intuitionism
Intuitionism is a meta-ethical theory. Meta means above or beyond, and it is rather like meta-ethics views what is happening in normative ethics from above. This means that it is not concerned with telling us how we ought to behave (normative ethical theories such as Natural Moral Law) but is concerned with the meaning of ethical language. In other words, what we mean when we use words like good and duty and what is actually happening when we make practical ethical decisions. D.D. Raphael has defined ethical intuition as follows: The word intuition so used, has nothing to do with the idea of an inexplicable hunch (when, for example, people talk of womens intuition). It simply means understanding. It comes from a Latin word which originally meant looking at something and was then used metaphorically of intellectual seeing, just as the words grasp and apprehend have been transferred from the idea of a physical to that of an intellectual act.

There are three main philosophers involved in Intuitionism: G.E. Moore, H.A. Prichard and W.D. Ross. They all argue slightly different things about moral intuition. Intuitionism largely comes from the question what actions ought I to perform?

G.E. Moore
Moore published a book in 1903 entitled Principia Ethica. Mary Warnock has argued that this book marked a turning point in ethics and was like a sharp and clarifying wind. The two questions which Moore was concerned with were: 1. What kinds of things ought to exist for their own sake? 2. What actions ought I to perform? Moores answer to the first question was that things that should exist for their own sake, are things that are intrinsically good (i.e. things that are good in and of themselves). You might then ask what things are good? Moore argued that it is not possible to define good, saying that good is rather like yellow. It is possible to give examples of things that are yellow, but it would not be possible to define yellow to a person blind from birth. In the same way good is something that we know through our experience of it, but we cannot define or analyse what it is. Moore was criticising philosophers such as J.S. Mill (Utilitarianism) and F.H. Bradley (Naturalism) who he believed were committing something called the Naturalistic Fallacy. Moore accused Mill of saying that desirable things were good things and that you could work out what was good, by looking at what people desire. People desire pleasure and therefore pleasure is good. Importantly, Mill also believed that we could not prove things that are good, just like Moore, but that we can work out what things are good by looking at what things people desire. Nevertheless, Moore believed that you could not use a non-ethical (natural) term to explain an ethical (non-natural) term. In other words, you cannot use desire, which is a natural thing we all experience, to explain what good means. If you do try, you end up with what is called a tautology, or circular argument. For example, if I ask what is good? and you answer happiness is good I am left with the statement the good is happiness because it is good to be happy. I am no closer to understanding what the good is. This is what is known as the Naturalistic Fallacy: that you cannot get an ought from an is. Moore claimed that the good is something that we can have direct knowledge of and that it is a property that things such as giving to charity can have. However, he did not think that goodness is something that exists separately like Platos Form of the Good. Moore explicitly rejected the idea that there exists an objective good.

Moore also believed that ethical judgements could be verified. He was an ethical teleologist and argued that actions could be deemed good, if they aimed to bring about the good. Therefore, it is possible to verify the goodness of an action by how well it aims to the good. This is where our intuition comes in: intuition tells us whether the consequences of our actions are good or not. In terms of his answer to question 2) above, Moore believed that there was only one duty and that was to do what would bring about more good. In this way, he is very close to Utilitarianism. He argued that a duty could be worked out in terms of its consequences and because consequences can never be fully predicted, actions can only ever be probably right. He also argued that our moral sense, or intuition, should present us with a good course of action and that this would depend upon the facts of the situation. In this sense, he is an ethical subjectivist.

Evaluation of Moore
Moores theory was incredibly influential in ethics and his theory of the Naturalistic Fallacy was accepted without question by many philosophers. Mary Warnock has argued that his theory of duty has extreme beauty and economy and fits many of the facts of moral life. His theory gives a clearer understanding of the place of the term good in ethics. Moore accepts that our intuitions may be wrong: i.e. intuition is not infallible. Moores theory is subjective and allows certain duties to be overruled by others if the other actions will bring about more good: e.g. the duty to keep promises may be overruled by the duty to avoid doing harm.

Warnock has argued that Moores criticism of Utilitarianism is for the large part unfounded and that Moore finds himself to have more in common with the Utilitarian position than he would at first have admitted. Moore does not answer the problem of ethical motivation. This means that he does not tell us how we move from a belief that something is good, to actually doing it. Moore was an ethical teleologist, which forces him to only consider the consequences, not the (possibly immoral) actions that lead you there. Moore was an ethical subjectivist. Many disagree with this position claiming that there is an objective goodness and that there are certain intrinsically good and bad actions.

H.A. Prichard
H.A. Prichard followed Moore and was principally concerned with the question why should we do our duty? Prichard argued that there was a gap between things that are good and things that we ought to bring about because once you have decided that something is good, (e.g. giving to

charity) you may then still ask but why should I do it? Prichard believed that duty was just as indefinable as goodness but that duty came after goodness i.e. once you have decided that something is good, you decide that it is your duty to do it afterwards. Prichard believed that there are two types of thinking: general thinking and moral intuition. General thinking absorbs and manipulates knowledge about the world around us, whereas moral intuition presents us with our idea of the good and of our duty when we face moral dilemmas. Prichard argued that our duties are self-evident and that they present themselves to our common sense/moral intuition. He argued that duty cannot be doubted or proved: duties rest on the same kind of knowledge as mathematics i.e. that you know when something is right. This he called genuine knowledge and it cannot be mistaken. This is Prichards moral intuition. Prichard pointed out that the intuition that something was our duty comes not from the action (e.g. we know that killing causes harm, so the action of killing tells us we have a duty to avoid it) but that it comes from our thinking about the action. This means that we get our sense of duty from our feelings about particular actions. In this sense, Prichards moral intuition is subjective, because it depends on our thoughts about the action.

Evaluation of Prichard
Prichards theory gives great insight into our actions and also into the concept of duty in ethics. Prichard supports Moores contention that there are certain terms used in ethics that cannot be defined or analysed. Prichards theory that intuitions about duty are self-evident paints a very positive picture about human nature and the human ability to make ethical decisions. Prichards theory rests on something called personal introspection, which is the proper way of saying that we arrive at our own conclusions about something. This underlines the idea of moral autonomy, that we are not puppets governed by moral laws.

Prichards theory fails to explain how people with less developed intuition can learn how to make better judgements about duty. Prichards theory rests on personal introspection and subjective thought. Many people (such as Kant) would disagree that our moral thinking should rest upon intuition and subjective thought. In order to make the world a more ethical place, we must offer objective criteria (such as the Categorical Imperative) that everyone has a duty to follow. Prichard seems to be saying that in order to arrive at the correct answer, we just need to think about it properly: this is of no benefit to those who have a poorly developed capacity for moral thought. Prichard (along with Moore) does not explain how knowing what our duty is motivates us to do it. This is the key problem with early Intuitionism.

 Prichards theory would be condemned by anybody who takes a deontological approach to ethics: such as Kant. Kant argued that we can know what our duty is by applying the Categorical Imperative. Mary Warnock says of Prichard: With Prichard then, the intuitive clarity of his conclusions turns out to be a fake clarity; and there is a good deal of bluster in the assurance with which he finally states the conclusions themselves.

W.D. Ross.
The theory of W.D. Ross is often known as an ethic of prima facie duties. Ross was trying to produce a theory that was critical of Kant. Kant believed that there are ethical absolutes; Ross observed that principles cannot survive if they are taken to be absolute. What he means by this, is that say you have an absolute duty to keep promises and an absolute duty to do no harm to others, a situation may arise where you have a conflict of duty, such as a promise to tell Nazi soldiers the hiding places of Jews. This promise keeping duty would conflict with your duty to do no harm to others. Ross came up with a series of duties that are self-evident through intuition. These duties are listed on page 69 of Bowie. He argued that some of these duties are self-evidently more important than others, such as the duty to do as much good as possible, which need not be given up. But in the example above concerning promise-keeping and harm, Ross argued that one duty could be seen as less important (and therefore not absolute) than the other i.e. the duty to keep a promise. Ross argues that there is a thing called rightness which exists and like the good in Moore and duty in Prichard, right is indefinable. But Ross effectively argued that there is an objective principle of rightness. Actions can be judged to be right and that it is our moral intuition that tells us whether or not an action is right. Ross makes an attempt to bridge the gap between belief and action, where Moore and Prichard failed. He tries to argue that through seeing frequent cases of lying, we come to observe through its consequences that lying is wrong. We can then make the moral statement lying is wrong, which we can convert into the moral rule we ought not to lie. Ross also argued that we derive our sense of rightness and duty from being in particular situations, for example witnessing someone being beaten. Our experience of that situation and our intuition will tell us what is the right thing to do.

Evaluation of Ross
Peter Vardy points out that Ross makes the helpful distinction between right and good in his theory, which has been important for later understanding of ethics such as Kant.

Ross makes the important contribution that duties can be overridden by more pressing duties, solving the problem posed by absolute duties. Ross also argued that our knowledge of rightness comes from personal introspection and is therefore subjective, like Prichard before him, this underlines moral autonomy.

The main problem with Ross, as pointed out by Jonathan Dancy, is something called externalism. Ross believed that our moral beliefs can only motivate us to act with the help of something external, like desire. But Dancy asks, how can you know that something is wrong and not act? Internalists claim that beliefs are enough to motivate and later Intuitionists such as Nagel have taken this position. The spin-off from this, is that Ross does not solve the problem of motivation. Ross claims that rightness is a fact. He does not explain really how we come to notice this fact.

Conclusion
Generally, Intuitionism has been rejected by most philosophers. Intuitionism does not overcome the hurdle of how our knowledge of moral facts and our belief in them can motivate us to act morally. Also, the mysterious faculty of intuition is never really explained properly and is dismissed by many. However, it is important to recognise that Moores Principia Ethica had a very powerful influence on the ethics that followed and most philosophers engaged in ethics have made strenuous efforts to avoid committing the Naturalistic Fallacy. There are a couple of general criticisms of Intuitionism that are worth a mention here: Intuitionism does not give sufficient reason for moving from believing something is wrong to knowing that something is wrong, except by personal introspection. Vardy argues that this is no more valid than in other areas of knowledge i.e. we have to give reasons for claiming something is true. For example, we might claim that water boils at 100C, but we would claim this without being able to show it. Intuitionism does not give an overriding principle to help us settle disputes, like Utilitarianism (do the greatest good). Its worth finishing with a quote from Alasdair MacIntyre on Intuitionism: That [the Intuitionists] sometimes disagree about what it is we know already only makes them less boring at the cost of making them even less convincing.

Meta-ethics: Emotivism
Emotivism is a meta-ethical theory, because it is concerned with the way in which we use ethical language. It is also a subjective ethical theory, because the two main proponents, Ayer and Stevenson, believed that ethical statements are really only statements of opinion, they are not statements of fact.

Emotivism: A J Ayer
In 1936, when he was just 25 years old, A.J. Ayer published The Foundations of Ethics, Language, Truth and Logic. This book is where Ayer sets out his views on ethics, even though the chapter on ethics is very brief, being only 20 pages long. Ayer attempts to show that there are only two types of meaningful statement, which he bases upon the work of the Vienna Circle and the Logical Positivists. The two types of meaningful statement are those that are analytic and those that are synthetic. Analytic statements are those that are true by definition e.g. blue is a colour. Synthetic statements are those that are true by reference to sense data e.g. its raining outside. This presents a problem for ethical and religious statements (e.g. lying is wrong and God exists and he loves me) as they dont fall into either category. Even the most enthusiastic Intuitionist Mary Warnock writes would never maintain that one literally saw or heard the goodness of an action. It is here worth noting the reaction to the publication of these ideas, again, recorded in Warnock: There is no point in discussing the almost hysterical fury with which the doctrines of Language, Truth and Logic were greeted in some quarters. On the whole, the rage was in inverse proportion to the intelligence of the attack. Logical Positivists were accused, not so much of being mistaken as of being wicked. They were held actually responsible for the greatest evils of the twentieth century. Ayers view of ethical statements is that they are meaningless. This doesnt mean that they are nonsense, but that they do not express anything that can be verified, either analytically or synthetically. Instead, Ayer believed that ethical feelings of approval or disapproval and often known as boo-hurrah ethics. statement such as killing is bad, I Conversely, if I say giving money to saying hurrah for giving to charity. statements express subjective little else. This is why emotivism is Ayer claimed that if I make a am only saying boo to killing. charity is good, I am effectively

If now I say, Stealing money is wrong, I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written Stealing money!! where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer also, like Stevenson after him, claimed that ethical statements are intended to arouse feelings as well as expressing them and that they operate (to varying degrees) as commands. He distinguishes between three different levels of strength of command duty is the strongest, ought is less strong and good is not much of a command at all. This is important as the Intuitionists tended to distinguish between duty, ought and good as well. Finally and as an important difference between Ayer and Stevenson, Ayer did not think that it is possible for two people to contradict each other about ethical statements at all. The reason for this, is that when saying killing is wrong, we are not making a statement that contains facts, we are simply expressing our feelings. If on the other hand, I say its raining outside and it is not, I am making a statement based upon fact and I may be contradicting not only the verifiable facts, but also anyone else who says the sun is shining.

Evaluation of Ayer
Ayers work on ethical statements has a strong pedigree that can be traced back to the work of Hume and Berkeley. Hume felt that moral value is not amongst the things that we sense. Ayers work was very important in clearing the ground and trying to make clear sense of the language we use when we express ourselves in a variety of different ways. Ayer also makes us reflect on the nature of our statements and acts to reign-in those who are excessively metaphysical in their expression.

Peter Vardy has characterised Ayers view of ethical language as an ethical non-theory. He doesnt believe that it constitutes an ethical theory at all and that it just discusses feelings. Ayer does not satisfactorily deal with the link between ethical statements and ethical actions: i.e. motivation. Ayers suggestion that it is not possible to contradict one another on points of ethics seems excessively dismissive. Many people, notably those who adhere to an absolutist or naturalist view of ethics would disagree with this, suggesting that there are certain human actions which are wrong, that we should not perform, e.g. genocide and child abuse and that it is therefore possible to contradict the views of others. Vardy is also concerned that Ayer draws to thick a line between empirical and metaphysical information. He is of the opinion that we do have a real sense of the rightness and wrongness of things and that language (perhaps inadequately) tries to reflect this. Ayer is

wrong to simply claim that ethical statements only express feelings. All moral debate, becomes at the end of the day, just so much hot air and nothing else.

Emotivism: C L Stevenson
C L Stevenson published an article in 1937 entitled The emotive meaning of ethical terms. Stevenson wanted to define what the word good means when used in ethical statements. He decided upon three criteria that must be fulfilled: 1. One must be able to disagree with whether or not the thing is good or not. 2. The thing must have a magnetism, i.e. you must want to do something if you are told that it is good or vice versa. 3. The presence or absence of goodness must not be able to be verified by any scientific method. Stevenson argued that only the emotive understanding of the word good met these three criteria. Stevensons emotive theory is therefore synthetic, as goodness can be either right or wrong; it is an interest theory because it states that the word good arouses our interest through magnetism it also agrees with Ayer that good is not verifiable by scientific method. Stevenson argued that when we call something good we are making a complex statement based on a number ways of thinking. Firstly, when we argue that something is good Stevenson says that we may have reasons to give in defence of our assertion. Stevenson therefore does not rule out empirical justifications. If I say that giving money to charity is good, I may have a number of reasons to give in support of my opinion (it improves the lives of the poor, it contributes to equality of wealth). Secondly, Stevenson says that when we say that something is good we are attempting to persuade others of our opinion. This is the emotive meaning of ethical statements and this is what makes his theory an interest theory. Stevenson is careful to point out however, that this is only part of the meaning of ethical terms. Thirdly, Stevenson says that ethical predicates (good/bad/right/wrong) can only be properly used for avoidable conduct. Because we use words like good in a persuasive way, this suggests that we are trying to convince people to follow our course of actions. For example, if I say giving money to charity is good, I am not only saying this, I am also saying do this as well. You can only use this sense of good for actions that can be chosen, such as giving to charity. A J Ayer argued that we cannot contradict one another when making ethical statements, because we are only expressing feelings, not facts. Stevenson argued that it is through ethical disagreements that we can discover the real use of some ethical terms. As we have seen, Stevenson thought that the word good when used in an ethical statement has a number of uses. He felt that it could be backed up by empirically verifiable reasons and that it had a persuasive or emotive use. However, he felt

that the word good has no factual content itself. On the other hand, ethical terms such as just, generous and cruel are second-order ethical terms and may appeal to facts. If you imagine two people having an argument about the ethics of abortion, they may well be able to produce facts and evidence to support their view that abortion is either cruel or kind. Stevenson felt that even if they can agree what kinds of act are cruel and what kinds of act are kind, they will still try to persuade each other that abortion is either kind or cruel. Stevenson felt that ethical disagreements can be resolved if people first agree on their definition of terms such as cruel and kind (by reference to the consequences; he was a teleologist) and then they can empirically test whether or not an action is cruel/kind. Stevenson felt that it was the persuasive element of ethical statements, which is arrived at subjectively, that causes ethical disagreements.

Evaluation of Stevenson
Stevensons main contribution to ethics, is his view that the word good and other ethical predicates are complex words with a variety of uses. This is an important contrast to Intuitionism and Ayer, who failed to explore this. Stevenson addressed the failure of A J Ayer to consider in detail the way that ethical statements can motivate people. Stevenson produces a good assessment of what motivates us ethically. Stevenson exposed one problem with ethical naturalism, which is that to convert ethical terms into non-ethical terms, removes or undermines the persuasive part of them. James Rachels has argued that Stevensons theory is one of the most advanced and plausible versions of ethical subjectivism.

Stevensons view that ethical terms can only really be used in statements of avoidable conduct has been challenged by Warnock. She argues that there are certain unavoidable human actions that can still be described as disgusting. Vardys criticism that emotivism reduces ethics to opinion also applies to Stevenson. Whilst he refined our understanding of ethical terms, he did not allow for the view that I may feel I know that the killing of 6 million Jews during the Holocaust was and is wrong. He writes human behaviour, given its richness and diversity, arguably needs a moral account that can cope with such depth and diversity.