The China Factor of India's Non-Alignment

Modern South Asia and the World June 2006
Rhena Forrer 4th Year Licence
THE CHINA FACTOR OF INDIAS NON-ALIGNMENT

A TEST FOR NEHRUS POLICY AT REGIONAL AND COLD WAR LEVEL
Introduction Indias non-alignment is often referred to as being the main principle and cornerstone of its foreign policy, sometimes with a mystical connotation which was given by the Neruhvian idealism. It was Nehru, as the first Premier Minister of independent India, who influenced this specific foreign policy and tailored it to his person. In this policy, Nehru saw for India an alternative to the one offered by the two blocs. He describes his policy of non-alignment in a speech to Lok Sabha on 9 December 1958 as followed: When we say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously we mean nonalignment with military blocs. It is not a negative policy. It is a positive one, a definite one and I hope a dynamic one. But in so far as military blocs today and in the cold war are concerned, we do not align ourselves with either bloc.1 There are authors who stress the aspect that non-alignment is only a desire to play a specific and independent role in world politics2, while others see it as a consequence of Indias domestic policy. The choice of non-alignment based on the affirmation of independence of
1 2
cited by Norman D. PALMER, Indias Foreign Policy. The Political Quarterly, Vol.33, No.4 (Oct./ Dec.1962): p.400 THUAN, Cao-Huy, Role et essence du non-alignement indien , Non-alignement et intervention trangre: lExemple de lInde, in Peuple et Etats du Tiers monde face lordre international., Paris, P.U.F., 1978: p.111
India was for Nehru also a way to pacify the opposed forces within the vast, newly independent country and to assure a certain political stability within India. The internal factors for Indias non-alignment can therefore not be neglected, but as it would enlarge the scope of the analysis of this paper I will not go into further details and focus on the external factors which determined Indias non-alignment under Nehru. The external policy of non-alignment has many facets. To pin it down to a principle, it can be summarized to the policy inspired by Nehru, a policy that refers to a non-involvement in power blocs, a non-entanglement in Cold War alliances. This reflects a policy of independence to guarantee the national interest of the newly independent nation. Indias non-alignment has been influenced by many different factors, such as the need for an independent foreign policy, regional preoccupations about its difficult relations with Pakistan, as well as the search for a role according to its international ambitions. In this analysis I will focus on the factor represented by China. From the Indian point, I will look at the impact this factor had on New Delhis commitment to non-alignment. It goes without saying that the China factor was not only limited to bilateral Sino-Indian interaction, but had an important impact on the international perception of Indias non-alignment. The Third World will play a major role when looking at the China factor of Indias non-alignment, as it reflects the universal phenomenon of the neighbourly relations with all its consequences. Nevertheless the China factor was, among others, also responsible for a change in attitude towards Indias nonalignment of the United States and the Soviet Union. My main argument is that China as a neighbour, partner and enemy has been one of the main reasons for major changes in the application of Indias national policy of non-alignment. First, I will emphasize the important aspects of territorial integrity and the promotion of peaceful relations with regard to their bilateral relation. We will then see, with a view to Indias performance on regional and Cold War level, how the concept of non-alignment had to be readapted with the growing deterioration of the relationship between the two neighbours. Another important consequence of the worsened relations was the differentiation between the two concepts of Afro-Asia as proclaimed in Bandung and non-alignment in the Third World. As a result of the Sino-Indian Border War in 1962, the two concepts could no longer be considered as mutually supportive, but rather as two distinct and exclusive concepts. For a better illustration, I will scrutinize Nehrus period, when India defined its policy and when the quest for an independent foreign policy among ex-colonies was very important in terms of nation building. This paper will explore the contribution of the relationship with China for the definition of Indias non-alignment in the light of Sandhu Bims quotation that 2
the policy of non-alignment is dynamic and adaptive to changing international environment. Thus, after the Sino-Indian warfare of 1962, the premises as well as the objectives of Indias non-alignment changed3. Further questions will frame my argument: To which extent did Indias relation with China influence the basic principle of foreign policy directed with and later against the neighbour state? Why has there never been the realization of a common leadership of the Third World? Was Indias non-alignment in danger to be given up due to the border war with China in 1962? Among several illustrations I will raise the argument that the decision of Indias nonalignment was to a large extent defined and re-defined by its relation with China. I want to illustrate that the China factor was the main reason why Indias non-alignment was especially in danger to be given up in 1962, as a consequence of the Sino-Indian border war. This was a serious test to Indias commitment to non-alignment, which had an important impact on both the regional and the Cold War level.
I. Indias non-alignment in relation to China in the 1950s 1.1 Indias role in the settlement of the Korean War The peaceful settlement of the Korean War was of great significance to India. On the pretext of mediation, India could exert the closest possible collaboration with China with the intention to develop friendly relations and goodwill with Peking4. It is to be understood from this point of view why India abstained to brand China as one of the aggressor in the Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on January 20, 1951. 5 The Indian Government pursued the strategy of strict non-involvement and of neutrality. It took the lead towards mediation between the different parties to the conflict in Korea, even though India realised that China seemed to create a kind of Monroe doctrine on its own 6. In fact, it was at this time that the policy of non-alignment, with its active understanding, came on scene as an attempt to mediate between the opposing parties. At the same time, the solution for world peace was clearly driven by self-interest, as it was seen as a precondition for Indias own development. To Nehru, the policy of non-alignment
3 4
SANDHU, Bim, Unresolved Conflict China and India, New Delhi, Radiant Publisher, 1988: p.52
KYOUNG-SOO, Kim. The Korean War and Indias non-alignment, Korea and World Affairs, No.4, Vol. 7, Winter 1983: p.718 5 GAOR Fifth Session, First Committee Mtg 428, p.528 (UN Doc A/C. 1/SR 428) 6 GAOR Fifth Session, First Committee Mtg 415, p.461 (UN Doc A/C. 1/SR 415)
legitimized his acts as a peacemaker between the conflicts parties in Korea. This was of a fairly difficult nature as in Korea there was a complete absence of any cooperative spirit between the parties which did not allow the coming of an agreement.7 But nevertheless, Nehru contributed actively to the ending of the war by several proposals of immediate ceasefires and a six-point program for the establishment of peace in Indochina.8 After the war in Korea, it was rather clear that it had the purpose of cementing the good relations with China to prevent any further agitations of the huge neighbour. The possibility was stressed, that it was not only the eventual further agitations of China at the regional level, but rather the growing American support towards Pakistan, which pushed India towards a continuing good relation with China.9 Consequently, in April 1954, Premier Nehru and Premier Chou negotiated the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, better known as the Panch Shila-agreement.10 It was in the preamble of the treaty, which accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, that the five principles of coexistence were mentioned. Among them the mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty as well as the guarantee for mutual non-aggression, were aimed to become the cornerstones of the neighbouring relations. Correspondingly, during his visit to China in October 1954, Nehru referred also to the ongoing border question between India and China, while assuring several times that as far as the Indian side was concerned there was no doubt about the demarcation.11 The China factor at this moment seemed to be the biggest success in Indias foreign policy: regarding their common border - at least from Nehrus point of view there seemed to be no longer any disagreement. Sino-Indian relations were at their best, which motivated the neighbours to promote their basic principles in a united conference of the Third World in 1955 in Bandung.
1.2 China-India rapprochement on the idea of an Asian solidarity (from Panch Shila to Bandung)
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Jawaharlal Nehru. Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964. Oxford University Press. London/Delhi Vol.4: p.17 ND Jayaprakash, India and the Bandung Conference of 1955, online edition archives (May-June 2005) http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/1224/1 9 DOMENACH, J.-L./RICHER Phillippe. La Chine. Tome 1 1949-1971. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 1987: p.82 10 Document on Tibet 1950-1957, p.66 cited in HONG Janjun, From Confrontation to normalisation: the last two decades of Sino-Indian relations (a Chinese perspective). IUHEI, Genve, 1996: p.18 Five principals of Panch Shila: 1) mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty 2) mutual non- aggression 3) mutual non-interference in each others internal affairs 4) equality and mutual benefit 5) peaceful coexistence 11 Jawaharlal Nehru. op.cit.: p.82
The Bandung Conference in 195512 resulted in the practical application of the theoretical approach of the Panch Shila principles formulated between India and China the year before. The call for an Afro-Asian solidarity under Indo-Chinese leadership seemed to be an alternative for the newly independent states of Africa and Asia to the option to join either Cold War bloc. A gathering of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia under a joint leadership, the Chinese-Indian condominium, was promoted to be a success in the Third World, while in the occidental press there were already echoes about rising differences on the influence between India and China at Bandung.13 During the Conference, the bilateral principles of peaceful coexistence became integrated in the multilateral creation of the AfroAsian movement. In addition to the attractiveness of the propaganda value attached to the solidarity among the Afro-Asians, important practical decisions were taken. Furthermore, both the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity in respect to colonial borders and the principle of complete self-determination were officially proclaimed. Paradoxically, this mutual respect of territorial integrity will be of crucial importance for the future relations between New Delhi and Beijing. The policy of Panch Shila and the era of the superficial friendship between India and China reached its climax at the Bandung Conference, not only between the two countries, but also between the two leaders Chou and Nehru who both claimed the leadership of a united AfroAsia, already threatened by divergent interests. Still, the Panch Shila principle seemed to keep on dominating the relation between the two neighbours, as showed the statement made by Premier Chou during the conference: By following the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems can be realized. When these principles are insured implementation, there is no reason why international disputes cannot be settled through negotiation.14 India found sufficient evidence of Chinese sincerity about Panch Shila and friendship within Chous statement, which would later be proved as wrong assumptions. The American press, taking a differentiated view regarding the key man at the Bandung parley, declared Nehru to have failed in everything he aimed for at the conference, while
12
The first Asian-African conference at Bandung, Indonesia took place from April 18 to 24, 1955 :23 countries from Asia (Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Iran, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Peoples Republic of China, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey and Yemen) and 6 Countries from Africa (Egypt, Ethiopia,Ghana,Liberia,Libya and Sudan) were present. 13 QUEUILLE, Pierre. Histoire de lAfro-Asiatisme jusqu Bandoung-Naissance du Tiers-Monde, Paris, Payot, 1965: p.298 14 Chou Enlai cited by the New York Times, 20 April, 1955
Chou got the most attention.15 India had to accept that the interests of the former colonial territories were not necessarily identical to hers and that it implied not to accept India as the natural leader of the non-aligned nations. Despite the fact that the respect Nehru gained during the war in Korea among the newly independent nations remained, it was at the Bandung Conference of 1955 that Communist China obviously took the leading role.16 China clearly aimed to dominate Bandung and gathered the more radical group around itself. Nehrus role was clearly limited as not all the present Afro-Asian countries felt obliged to the neutralism he represented and promoted.17 It was argued by Edwardes that the above cited mediatory role which India occupied during the Korean War was one of the main reasons for leading India into isolation. Accepted by the major powers in its role as a mediator, India could no longer represent the revolutionary mood of the newly independent nations present in Bandung.18 A first indicator that the Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai- policy (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was not supposed to be of a long duration was the unsettled border question between the neighbours. As mentioned above, India thought that there was no border disagreement with China, since the border question had never been raised during the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954. It was shortly after the Bandung Conference, when India discovered Chinas secret construction of a road across the Aksai Chin plateau, a region of major strategic importance to both countries in 1958.19 Obviously, the colonial borders between the two countries were perceived differently. Nehrus above mentioned declaration that there was no doubt about the border question suddenly became questionable. Until 1959, it became increasingly clear that the relation of the two neighbours was gradually shifting away from Panch Shila policy to an open territorial dispute in the Himalayan region. Chinas brotherly relation with India increasingly targeted its influence among the Afro-Asian countries, and especially on the regional level among the common neighbour countries. Strategically, Beijing concluded several border arrangements between 1960-1963 with Nepal, Burma, Pakistan and Afghanistan.20
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ALDEN, Roberts. Key men at the Bandung Parley, Special to the New York Times, April 24, 1955/ SANDHU, Bim. Unresolved Conflict: China and India. New Delhi. Radiant Publishers, 1988: p.99 16 EDWARDES, Michael. Illusion and Reality in Indias foreign Policy, International Affairs, Vol.41,No.1 (Jan 1965): p.51 17 LACOUTURE, Jean. Die Asian-Afrika Konferenz in Bandung 1955. Le Monde diplomatique, Nr. 7640, 15.4. 2005: p.3 18 EDWARDES, op.cit: p.51 19 STEELE, Tracy Lee. The Politics of Anglo-American Aid to non-aligned India 1962 Electronic journal of International History http://www.history.ac.uk/ejournal/art7.html: p.1 20 DOMENACH, J.-L./ RICHER Phillippe. La Chine. Tome 1 1949-1971. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 1987: p. 217
1.3 Rising rivalries between the neighbours To Nehrus surprise, Premier Chou shattered all previous remaining beliefs and illusions of the Indian Government in his letter of January 23, 1959. For the first time, Chou declared openly his countrys policy regarding the Sino Indian border. Chou questioned the legality of the Mc Mahon line, the official Sino-Indian border, as it is was a product of British imperialism. He also claimed a large proportion of the NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) area.21 India, on the other hand, believed in the legality of the Mc Mahon line. 22 While Indias official response to Chinese actions was rather comprehensive, it was the Indian public and Parliamentarians who reacted shocked to the Chinese aggression in Tibet the same year.23 The intervention in Tibet in 1959 marked therefore a turning point for the Sino-Indian relations. The suppression of the Tibetan uprising was viewed by India as a violation of Tibetan autonomy and thus a violation of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet. Chinas imperial ambitions in the Himalayan region undermined not only the bilateral agreements between India and China, but also its credibility as a friendly member of the Afro-Asian movement. The Chinese action in Tibet attracted international attention and was widely denounced, while for the neighbouring countries it represented an awakening of the fear of a Chinese threat to their national integrity. As far as India-China relations were concerned, the border incidents were followed by a forward policy, a reciprocal arms race on both sides of the undefined frontier. In fall of the same year, there was a military collision in the region of Ladakh and NEFA areas claimed by China. Whatever small element of faith may have remained in the Sino-Indian friendship was finally erased by an active correspondence between the two governments concerning border incidents and other issues regarding the regional policy between the two states.24 With the degradation of the relationship between India and China, India turned towards non-alignment, as it became obvious that the Afro-Asian idea under the principle of Panch Shila could no longer be the focus of Indias cold war policy. Nonalignment was put in an official framework at the first non-aligned conference in Belgrade from the 1st to the 6th of September 1961, where India was undoubtedly the leader together with Yugoslavia and Egypt, while China clearly aligned to the communist ideology, was not invited to the Conference. At this stage, Indias non-alignment, in Belgrade defined as a principle of equidistance to the two blocs, was no longer orientated on China. It was even an
21
SANDHU, Bim. Unresolved Conflict: China and India. New Delhi. Radiant Publishers, 1988: p.105 Letter of October 21 1962, Jawaharlal Nehru. Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964. Oxford University Press. London/Delhi Vol.5: p.536 as fort the so-called McMahon Line, it is clearly stated in the old treaty (confirmed on July 3,1914 in a tripartite agreement between Britain, Tibet and China) that the High ridge of the watershed of the Himalayas is the international frontier. 23 ibid: p.113 24 PRINGSHEIM, Klaus H., China, India, and their Himalayan Border (1961-1963) Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 10 (Oct. 1963): p.474
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emancipating movement from its Asian neighbour. The China factor in Indias policy of nonalignment led at this stage to Indias steady withdrawal from the Afro-Asian movement of Bandung. The Non-Alignment Movement created in Belgrade became, despite divergent approaches to an eventual institutionalisation of non-alignment, an important platform for common action of the Third World.25 Non-alignment, contrary to the Afro-Asian movement, de-emphasized the issue of colonialism in favour of the importance of peace.26 The events in late 1961 introduced several questions: Did India, as a founding member of both the AfroAsian movement and the Non-Alignment Movement, no longer see any perspective in the former, while believing in the persistent success of the latter? Was it possible for India to maintain the fundamental principle of non-alignment in a situation when there were growing tensions with China? The main components of non-alignment - the importance of peace and the equidistance to the two superpowers were challenged in the open Sino-Indian Border War in 1962, which I will analyze in the second section.
II. The Sino-Indian Border War 2.1 Test for Indias non-alignment The Chinese invasion in Tibet and its Indian equivalent, the invasion in Goa in December 1961, sent the signal that the two nations were willing to use force in order to make accesible any region they perceived as part of their territory. In the run-up to the 1962 Border War, the Sino-Indian relation had already experienced several blows to Panch Shila and the HindiChini-bhai-bhai- policy in the Himalayan region claimed by both sides. However, the war of 1962 was different from the preceding conflicts as it would not only have an impact on bilateral relations, but also introduce the final separation of non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity. The time before the war can be characterized as a dual policy27 . It implies the pretence of the two nations that they were interested in peaceful and amicable settlement of disputes, while continuing to build up military strength on both sides of the frontier. Different authors
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26
BRAILLARD, B. et DJALILI, M.-R., Tiers Monde et Relations Internationales, Masson, Fribourg, 1984 : p.180 PRINGSHEIM. op.cit.: p.475 27 SANDHU, Bim. Unresolved Conflict: China and India. New Delhi. Radiant Publishers, 1988: p.105/ 202
emphasise the importance of the unilateral attempts to increase their bargaining power regarding the disputed area. According to Pringsheim, China at the end of the year 1961 wanted to renew the treaty of Friendship from 1954 with New Delhi, while the Indian government refused.28 Behind the faade of Panch Shila both sides boosted their military presence in the disputed area. Indias in spite of all, Nehru did not believe that the Chinese would really take the risk to attack and he seemed surprised about the Chinese invasion as became clear in his letters shortly after the beginning of the open aggression: We have felt no ill will against the Chinese people. In international matters, we have often helped the Chinese Government. It has been a matter of grief to me that, in spite of our friendly attitude to them, the Chinese Government should have paid us back aggression and calumny. The Chinese newspapers are full of the utmost vituperation against India and the Government of India.29 Chinese invasion started on October 20, 1962 simultaneously in the Eastern and the Western sector in the region Aksai Chin. Within only a few weeks China occupied the territory that it claimed in the Ladakh and NEFA area. Consequently, after an overwhelming success, China declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962. After the announcement of the ceasefire, Beijing did retreat its troops towards 20km from the effective control line between China and India. The reasoning why China ended the conflict as surprisingly as it began can only be guessed about: Was the date of the conflict chosen to get the Soviet support for the military action as it took place in the week of the hottest phase of the Cold War, when the missile crisis in Cuba was on the brink of an atomic war? Or was the conflict deliberately chosen to distract from internal problem the Mao-regime faced in the beginning of the year 1962? The policy of the Great leap was a failure and it seemed to be necessary for the regime to restore an internal legitimization by a quick military success.30 With regard to the relationship with India, the main question we have to ask concerns the essence of the border conflict: Was it only a demonstration of power or was it a concrete Chinese attempt to diminish Indias prestige and its influence not only in the region but also among the nonaligned countries?31 The Nehru government was persuaded and there seems to be a wide consensus that China aimed to launch an attack on non-alignment itself.32 Moreover, even on the regional level it
28
PRINGSHEIM, op.cit.: p.476 Letter of the 21. October, in Jawaharlal Nehru. Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964.Oxford University Press. London/Delhi, 1989,Vol.5: p.538 30 PRINGSHEIM, Klaus H., China, India, and their Himalayan Border (1961-1963) Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 10. (Oct., 1963): p.477 31 DOMENACH, J.-L., RICHER Phillippe. La Chine. Tome 1 1949-1971. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. 1987: p. 217 32 Vice-President of India, Dr. Z. Hussain, in Times of India, March 9, 1963 cited in CRABB Cecil V.
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is very interesting to stress the assumption that Chinas lesson mainly targeted Indias influence among the non-aligned Afro-Asian Countries and its neighbours. The border arrangements China concluded between 1960 and 1963 with its neighbouring countries except with India support such an argumentation.33 Considering that the Chinese drive was mainly directed against Indias non-alignment and to openly challenge Indias legitimacy for leadership of the Afro-Asian, the reaction of the non-aligned countries as well as the Cold War protagonists will be analysed in the following. Brechers analysis regarding the unilateral ceasefire on 21st November reflects how much Indias non-alignment policy depended on Chinas behaviour. According to him, one day before the Chinese declared their ceasefire; Nehru made a special and personal request to the Western world for massive air defence. The nature of the secret note to the President of the United States indicates that Nehru was aware that such a demand could be interpreted as a breach of the principle of non-alignment.34 Although the term military alliance was not stated, it could be understood that Nehru was giving up non-alignment due to the intense security dilemma caused by the Chinese attacks. Was Nehru willing to renounce to certain principles of non-alignment in order to resist the Chinese attack and prevent a disastrous defeat? Would China have risked the Indias moving away from non-alignment? Through this lens, the unilateral ceasefire seemed to be the natural solution for China, since the Soviet Union was moving away from neutrality and the United States were ready to fully support India. It seems a logical move given that it was not in Chinas interest to see India completely dependent on the West. Such a situation would have been especially after the Sino-Soviet rift - contributing to an uneasy situation of encirclement for the Peoples Republic of China. As controversial as it may sound, it is in this period of two days that, due to Chinas action, India nearly completely sacrificed its basic principle of non-alignment, and thanks to the unilateral ceasefire it was possible for India to ensure its continued legitimacy 35 of non-alignment, although in a redefined version which will further be developed. In the following I will try to emphasize, guided by the above cited assumptions, that the border war of 1962 was not only the final blow to the peaceful coexistence between India and China, but also to Indias strict non-alignment. Chinas aim to break Indias status as the
Testing of Non-Alignment, the Western Political Quarterly, Vol.17, No.3 (Sep.1964): p.523 DOMENACH, op.cit: p.217 34 BRECHER, Michael. Non-alignment under Stress: The West and the India-China Border War, Pacific Affairs, Vol.52, No. 4 (Winter 1979/80): p.618 35 BRECHER, Michael, op.cit: p.619
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Leader of the Belgrade non-alignment movement probably was its biggest success. The reaction of the non-aligned countries reflected the important loss of Indias prestige and the loss of credibility of its non-alignment policy. Reaction of the non-aligned countries As India came out of the war completely humiliated and shocked, it was the most turning points in its relationship with its non-aligned friends as it felt betrayed by them because they took a neutral position towards the two parties of the conflict. In the article of 29th October 1962 in the New York Times, A.M. Rosenthal writes about the Indian disillusionment of the non-alignment policy: Still another well of disillusionment for the Indians these last few days has been the silence of her non-aligned friends. Last year in Belgrades conclave of non-aligned powers Mr. Nehru sat honoured and admired among men who had followed the path of non-alignment that he had given the prestige. They insisted that they were not neutral against the evil, but simply not members of Western or Eastern power blocs. Now Indian politicians privately ask each other and ask visitors: where are our friends, where is Egypt and Indonesia, Ghana and Yugoslavia? Mr. Nehru is not expected to drop non-alignment, but his followers do not expect him ever again to persuade his people to have faith in the word of the Communist power.36 Nevertheless, Nehru, completely disappointed regarding this reaction, still stuck to the policy he created by stating that China had to be seen as an exception. In the Hindustan Times of the 6th December of 1962, Nehru claimed that there [were] no non-alignment vis--vis China37 which illustrates that he was not willing to see it as problem of being aligned or non-aligned, but rather as a simple violation by Beijing of the bilateral agreements of their coexistence including the Panch Shila principles. The failure of the Colombo Conference will serve as another evidence for the fact that there was not much left of Indias strict interpretation of non-alignment, which explains also the internal and external voices calling for abandonment of the strategy of non-alignment. Failure of the Colombo conference
36
37
New York Times, 29. Oct.1962 cited in CRABB, Cecil V. Testing of Non-Alignment. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.17, No.3 (Sept.1964): p.539
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The Colombo conference from the 9th to the 12th of December 1962 pointed out the initiative to offer mediation to the two belligerents by the six so-called unaligned powers. 38 Nevertheless the initiative lacked of real engagement and the split-up between the non-aligned countries themselves was the first sign of the new confrontation of the concepts of Afro-Asia and of non-alignment, of Bandung versus Belgrade.39 In Colombo, it seemed that Bandung had won. Even though only six Afro-Asian non-aligned countries were present at the conference they behaved much more Afro-Asian than non-aligned, due to the fact that one of the two belligerents was clearly not non-aligned. The conference often described as nonaligned saw itself far more as a successor of the Afro-Asian meeting than of Belgrade40, especially because the participating countries were rather tending to a Chinese leadership than an Indian hegemony in Afro-Asia. The Economist on December 22, 1962 described the situation as followed: For the neutralist mind, however genuinely distressed by the present threat to fraternal solidarity and to non-alignment policy, has an almost pathological aversion of being bossed.41 The most radical among them did not even make a distinction between aggressor and victim, as they were too afraid of the reaction of the belligerents.42 Once more, it illustrates that Nehru was deeply disappointed and that he felt China only wanted to dominate the Third world: China has been very careful to maintain a fiction of reasonableness, of willingness to negotiate and even of being the victim of aggression. They continue repeating Panchsheel or the five principles of peaceful co-existence, even though they have broken them in every way. This however, indicates that they attach value to the effect they produce on other Asian and African countries.43 When in February 1963 China showed no intention to accept the proposals, the neutral six began to close their ranks. The Sino-Indian crisis had, therefore, the additional effect as it served to harden the lines of division which were already underlying in the Afro-Asian world. While India felt betrayed by her own camp, the reaction from the superpowers was more in her favour, at that moment.
38
The six nations present in Colombo: Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia JANSEN, G.H., Non-alignment and the Afro-Asian States. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Publisher, 1966: p.336 40 ibid, p.338 41 The Economist The Colombo Line, December 22, 1962: p.1210 42 STEBBINS, Richard P. United States in World Affairs -1962. Harper and Row, New York 1963: p.188 43 Jawaharlal, Nehru. Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964. Oxford University Press. London/Delhi Vol.5: p.556
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2.2 Aid from the Cold War Blocs The reaction of the Superpowers towards India, when the principle of non-alignment stood at the brink of collapse,44 corresponded to the climate of dtente after the hottest phase of the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis. The United States, as well as the Soviet Union, supported India with military equipment and other needs. According to Edwardes, India was dependent on the U.S. for a defence against the Chinese attack but as there was no formal obligation for this temporary alignment it always left a door open for the Soviet Union. He describes Indias opportunistic attitude as an attitude of alignment towards the one who is the first to help accompanied with the satisfaction to get everything while they did not have to give up anything.45 Why were the two blocs suddenly sympathetic to Indias non-alignment? What influence had the Sino-Indian conflict on the American and Soviet perception of Indias nonalignment? Despite the de facto alignment to the West, Nehru was eager to defend his non-alignment policy by creating a new dimension to it. What he got was military reliance without military alliance.46 According to Sandhu, New Delhi, having based non-alignment on moral and ideal principles after the war with China, began using the policy as an expression of national interest and as a reliable device to secure maximum military aid, in terms of material and economic support, from both the West and the Soviet Bloc.47 As it will be analyzed below, it was not only due to arms supply, but also economic assistance which India needed and enjoyed.48 Steeles argument sums up the opinion of many authors, that Indias non-alignment was the justification of its right to buy arms from both blocs, a strategy which also allowed maintaining non-alignment.49 It seems that with their behaviour of continued support, both blocs showed clear incentives to support Indias non-alignment, as they came to realize that the Chinese factor was a threat to Indias non-alignment in the first place. At the beginning of the border conflict, the missile crisis was the major concern of the two Superpowers, which hinders them to take a firm stand to one of the belligerent. Neither side was willing to include India in their hemisphere at this particular moment, which meant that,
44
BRECHER, Michael. Non-alignment under Stress: The West and the India-China Border War, Pacific Affairs, Vol.52, No. 4 (Winter 1979/80): p.613 45 EDWARDES, Michael, Illusion and Reality in Indias foreign Policy, International Affairs, Vol.41,No.1 (Jan 1965): p.55 46 C.C. OBrien, Non-Alignment, New Statesman, 8. April 1966 cited in SANDHU Bim, Unresolved Conflict: China and India. New Delhi. Radiant Publishers: p.129 47 SANDHU, Bim. op.cit.: p.158 48 AMIT, Das Gupta, South Asia and Superpower Competition (1954-1972), Asian Affairs, Vol.26. No.4
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(Oct.-Dec. 2004): p.22 (www.cdrb.org/journal/current/amit.pdf) STEELE, Tracy Lee. The Politics of Anglo-American Aid to Nonaligned India, 1962, Electronic Journal of International History: p.8
13
for the first time, both sides saw the advantages of Indias foreign policy. Consequently nonalignment got exploited by the Cold War protagonists, while India saw itself, for the first time, forced to sacrifice the principles of non-alignment, or at least parts of it. According to this argument it is the China factor even on Cold War level that made India consider to abandon its non-alignment. Is such a step also in the interest of the cold war blocs? Ties with the East The mutual sympathy between India and the Soviet Union was widely known and is most perceptible when looking at Indias economic socialism. Nehrus industrial ambitions were aimed to be realized by five-year plans, according to the soviet model. As relations between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated throughout the 1950s, ties between India and the Soviet Union became closer and more cordiale.50 On October 25, 1962, when the Pravda announced the Russian attitude regarding the border conflict, it marked a change in the previous Soviet position of neutrality and brought disillusionment to Indians. The Hindustan Times declared that Russia had at last made it plain that if it had to choose between brotherly China and friendly India, the choice would always go in favour of the brother, whether the brother being right or wrong.51 Despite the obvious tensions within the SinoSoviet alliance, Moscow supported Pekings efforts for the opening of peaceful negotiations on the border dispute with India. The Soviet support was guided to ensure a minimum of communist bloc solidarity when the Cuba crisis was in its most dangerous stage. After the Cuba crisis, the Soviet Union no longer needed Chinese support for a possible confrontation with the United States. Moscow turned towards India and against their common hostile neighbour. Such an interpretation explains to a certain degree the increasing support of the Soviet Union towards India with the intensification of the Sino-Indian border conflict. The rift between the Soviet Union and China was another factor why Nehru had no doubt about keeping non-alignment as a strategy. Consequently, the opportunism of non-alignment became more important than the dogma itself : ctait la conviction que le divorce entre Pkin et Moscou tait devenu irrversible qui devait amener Nehru dfendre le nonalignement contre vents et mares en dpit de la dpendance du pays envers laide militaire des Etats-Unis.52
50
HEMEN, Ray. The Policy of Russia towards the Sino-Indian Conflict. The Political Quarterly, Vol.36, No. 1, Jan 1965: p.94 51 (Text of Pravda statement of Oct.25, 1962 in Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vol. XIV, No.43 (Nov.21, 1962): pp.18-19/ The Hindustan Times, Oct. 27, 1962 p.9) cited in Sandhu, Bim. Unresolved Conflict: China and India. New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1988: p.176 52 BOQUERAT, Gilles. Les Avatars du Non-alignement: Linde et les politiques daide amricaine et sovitique de lindpendance la Confrence de Tachkent (1947-1966) Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1997: p.229
14
The policy of support of the Soviet Union was to prevent India from leaning on the West, as they feared that due to internal pressure the Indian government would modify its policy of non-alignment, whose maintenance had become the major preoccupation of the Soviet policy.53 According to Hemen, Moscow saw in its support to New Delhi, after having lost China, the possibility to spread its influence in Asia and Africa by intense relations to the nonaligned country. Therefore, the importance of Indias non-alignment needed to be maintained; as such a plan would fail if India became too aligned. Similar considerations seemed to be made by the United States, when they assured India of support to face the Chinese aggression. Ally in the West? It seems that while in Pakistan, the United States had found one of its most-allied allies in Asia, the relations with India remained less sincere. According to Ali, the United States, northwithstanding, wished India to become an ally with the aim to build a regional security bloc in South Asia to contain the spread of Communism. 54 Thus the American government regarded with certain scepticism Indias non-alignment, but was still eager to keep connected to the South Asian giant democracy based on long-term considerations. The growing IndoAmerican friendship and cooperation in the late 1950s is an essential factor why China felt more and more encircled and denounced India as a Trojan horse inside the Africa-Asian movement. The period prior to the border crisis, Beijing had carried on an intense propaganda campaign against Nehrus government and Indias non-alignment as posed to disguise growing ties and dependence upon western imperialists.55 The arrival of Kennedy in 1961 intensified the more Indian friendly policy, but this attitude did not change the original American scepticism towards Indias non-alignment. The border conflict can therefore be seen as an opportunity to enlarge the U.S.s interest in South Asia and to shift closer to India; while the intention was to keep Pakistan as the major ally for American interest in the Middle East.56 The U.S. policy, despite the above mentioned scepticism with regard to non-alignment, was not to discriminate between India and Pakistan, which would not be possible in the long run as we will see in the wars to come between the two neighbours. In the heights of the Sino-Indian border war, a renewal of the 1958 Military Assistance Agreement between Washington and New Delhi, as a basis for a strategic alliance, would imply to abandon the non-alignment policy, which would consequently change the Cold War
53 54
HEMEN, Ray, op cit: p.103/104 ALI, Mahmud S., Cold War in the Himalayas, Curzon, Richemond 1999 55 CRABB, Cecil V. Testing of Non-Alignment. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.17, No.3 (Sept.1964): p.524 56 Statement by the President of the United States on November 20, 1962 , Documents on American Foreign Relations, Harper & Row, New York, 1963: p.271/272
15
picture considered to be at its most relaxing point at that moment. Such a scenario was also feared by the United States, as the American ambassador in India, John Galbraith, wrote to Kennedy: If the Chinese should really come down the mountain in force, there will be more political changes here. Much so-called non-alignment went out the window with Menon. In his pro-Soviet manoeuvres and his articulate antiAmericanism he was the counterbalance for five ordinary pro-Western ministers. Popular opinion and our military assistance have worked further []. The problem in face of a really serious attack would be how we react to the prospect of a new, large and extremely expensive ally. I personally hope that the Chinese do not force this choice. The Indians are busy worrying about the end of nonalignment. It is we that should be doing the worrying on this.57 The Kennedy administration seemed to realize that there could be a chance to gain influence among non-aligned countries by cultivating a tolerant attitude and support towards neutralism58. India offered a good opportunity but only as long as the Nehru administration was able to maintain his non-alignment. The Kennedy administration was nevertheless seen to be given a unique chance in the Sino-Indian border conflict and especially to take advantage of a situation in which India seemed to realize that China was the greater threat to its security than Pakistan.59 American officials believed that Nehru was disillusioned with his policy of non-alignment, now that the Chinese destroyed the illusion of the Hindi-Chini-bhaibhaism60. The ultimate goal for the Americans was not necessarily to break down Indias nonalignment, but to change it. Nehru himself also realized that to receive military assistance from the United States introduced an element of confusion into Indias policy of nonalignment and, consequently, that it would require a fresh definition.61 According to Crabb it was the decision of the United States to no longer differentiate between aligned or nonaligned in South Asias defence. The Kennedy administration, consciously or unconsciously, contributed to avoid a complete sacrifice of Indias non-alignment. 62 The conclusion Crabb
57
Letter from the Ambassador to India to President Kennedy, New Delhi, 13 November 1962, in Ali, Mahmud, Cold War in the Himalayas, Curzon, 1999: p.148/149 58 McMAHON, Robert. The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997: p.273 59 STEELE, Tracy Lee. The Politics of Anglo-American Aid to Nonaligned India, 1962, Electronic Journal of International History: p.4 60 ibid: p.5 61 GOPAL, Sarvepalli, Jawaharlal Nehru a Biography, Volume Three 1956-1964, The Trinity Press, London 1984: p.229 62 CRABB, Cecil V., Testing of Non-Alignment, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.17, No.3 (Sept. 1964): p.541
16
makes does support the argument that India could enjoy intensified American support without abandoning non-alignment. Nevertheless, to both superpowers the criteria for arms transfer was still rather political than economic, but as explained above, it was not primarily Indias alignment which was their ultimate aim in 1962. It was therefore very likely that India was, at this moment of the Cold War, not only too big in terms of rearmament and economic aid to digest, but also a major threat to actual Cold War relaxations. The hostility between India and China had the potential to turn into a Cold War issue in the case where either bloc would support one of the belligerents. Thus, based on the choice not to intervene; there was a continued military and economic support from both Cold War blocs, as the New York Times reported in August 1963.63 According to Amit Das Gupta, the United States and the Soviet Union at that stage aimed to contain the Peoples Republic of China with a closed South Asian Front. This was the most important aspect for non-escalation of the border conflict. There seemed to be an agreement for no further direct intervention in the subcontinent. Such reasoning reflects the complex combination of circumstances which allowed India to keep its non-alignment. Also, because the two blocs realized the disadvantages and implications if India gave up its policy it has to be stressed that this is one of the rare occasions when the two Superpowers wanted India to keep its non-alignment. From New Delhis point of view, throughout this whole period of the cold war, New Delhi was eager to defend actively its nation-building achievements by its non-alignment policy which was undermined by the hostility of neighbour states acting alone or together with China. Non-alignment as an overarching principle in the global context became secondary, but was used in a national interest in a situation of a threat to the life of the nation. Due to the Chinese factor, the Indians learned painfully that non-alignment did not require military impotence: to imagine that it did-or to depend upon slogans like the spirit of Bandung to preserve territorial integrity - risked nothing less than national suicide.64 In order to preserve territorial integrity, India eventually renounced to certain principles which implied a considerable shift in its conception of non-alignment after the Sino-Indian war. The question whether India still adhered to non-alignment during this time is affirmatively answered by Norman D. Palmer65, but one has to nuance this answer: India, despite the
63
New York Times, August 3, 1963- Soviet missiles offered to India

ibid: p.539 PALMER, Norman D, Indias Foreign Policy, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct/Dec 1962): p.401
64 65
17
external and especially internal pressure to abandon from its foreign policy principle, was still committed to a policy of non-alignment66, but it was a policy of a clearly different kind. In 1963, India under Nehru behaved less as a spokesman of non-aligned Afro-Asia, which could be seen as the ultimate goal of the Chinese aggression. The isolation of India from what had become the Third World was already visible in the years after Bandung, but with the Indo-Chinese border conflict and the resulting support of the two superpowers for nonalignment, it became irreversible. Despite the argument that India maintained its nonalignment, according to Edwards analysis, among the Afro-Asians even though their solidarity still had a propaganda value was no longer of any appeal and had to give way to self-centred nationalisms.67 Hence the focus of Indias policy shifted away from the aim to promote and represent peaceful international relations. It turned to a policy of a humiliated major power concerned with the promotion of its own national interests by means sponsored by the two sides of the Cold War.
66 67
CRABB, Cecil V. Testing of Non-Alignment, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.17, No.3 (Sept. 1964): p.563 EDWARDES, Michael, Illusion and Reality in Indias foreign Policy, International Affairs, Vol.41. No.1 (Jan 1965): p.54
18
Conclusion At the end of the year 1962, the universalism of the Panch Shila principles, which in Bandung were praised to be the basis for peace among nations, were destroyed by national interests and territorial ambitions. The forerunners of those principles, India and China brought to an end the era of peaceful coexistence by non respect for each others territorial integrity and their failure to establish durable peaceful coexistence by a settlement of the border question. As a consequence not only their bilateral relations, but also the Afro-Asian community was shattered. The failure of the Colombo conference of the non-aligned powers to mediate between the two belligerents was thus the final blow to the solidarity among Afro-Asian countries. The situation had radically changed since Bandung: For countries such as India, it was no longer the two blocs, but China which was seen as a threat to its national independence and territorial integrity.68 According to Brown, one of Nehrus greatest misjudgements was his failure to perceive that China, the Asian brother, could use its nationalism to destabilize and attack peaceful relations.69 Consequently, non-alignment and the intense promotion of peace under Nehru had not protected India. This could explain the slow but steady erosion of the Nehruvian framework of non-alignment. The international role of India was replaced by a smaller one, linked to national and regional interests along with continued dependence on the two superpowers. The Indian case was no exception because in the late 1960, most of the Asian and African countries, on the one hand, sought to strengthen their links with the great powers and, on the other hand, placed renewed emphasis on regional cooperation: Thus in place of the old Afro-Asian brotherhood there has been increasing emphasis on bilateral and regional association, based on practical national interest.70 In this sense, Indias change in perspective of its non-alignment and foreign policy in general was not an exceptional case but indicated as well the waning interest in international Afro-Asian solidarity, which only China was interested to keep alive, now that it could claim to be its only leader. 71 Nevertheless, Chinas efforts to outmanoeuvre the non-aligned and to cement its leadership by a second Afro-Asian conference in Algeria did not meet wide approval.72 The absence of any enthusiasm for a second Bandung reflected the failure of the Afro-Asian solidarity and the belief in its principles.
68 69
PAUKER, op.cit.: p.427 BROWN, Judith M., Nehru, Longman, London and New York, 1999: p.184 70 KIMCHE, David, The Afro-Asian Movement Ideology and Foreign policy of the Third World, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1973: p.267/268 71 PAUKER, Guy J., The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian solidarity, Asian Survey, Vol.5, No.9 (Sept. 1965): p.427
72
MATES, Leo, Non-alignment and the Great Powers. 48 Foreign Affairs (1969-1970): p.530
19
Indias non-alignment passed the most difficult test in the end of 1962, when Nehrus definition and its orientation towards cooperation with China definitely proved to be an illusion. Obviously the honeymoon period of Panch Shila 73 was over and the idea of AfroAsian solidarity was finally buried by an Asian-Asian concurrence over leadership and two diverging interpretations of national strategy regarding each other. We can therefore conclude that the China factor was for Indias non-alignment very decisive, mainly in regard of two major issues related to the Cold War situation. Firstly, it led to an open rift between the Afro-Asian nations and, secondly, the China factor was the element due to which India nearly lost - and at the same time - could maintain its non-alignment. Concerning the tensions within the Afro-Asian movement, the Sino-Indian border war was foremost the source of division with its disastrous effects on the Third World solidarity. The perception of Chinas foreign policy had surely the most striking impact on India but also on the smaller states of Asia. The initial fear of an Indian hegemony was now replaced by the fear of a Chinese domination. The resulting effect in the Third World was an open manifestation of a split of the Afro-Asian nations between a pro-Chinese and a pro-Indian fraction74. According to my argumentation, this rift strengthened the ongoing rapprochement of India to non-alignment and eventually made India completely turn to non-alignment, supported in its choice by the two blocs, as for them Indias non-aligned position was seen as a strategic advantage. With regard to the solidarity the Cold War blocs expressed towards Indias non-alignment, China was cornered in isolation. Nevertheless, China had succeeded by deeply humiliating its neighbour and direct rival regarding the leadership of the Third World. In this sense, the China factor contributes as much to destroy as to keep the major principles of Indias foreign policy. One can say that China had much influence on Indias non-alignment policy. In a direct way by ignoring the commitments made to India regarding frontiers and in an indirect way by pushing a non-aligned nation in the arms of the two superpowers in order to get the protection needed against China.
Bibliography:
73 74
SANDHU, Bim. Unresolved Conflict: China and India. New Delhi. Radiant Publishers, 1988 p.181 ibid: p.180
20
I.
Primary Sources
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GAOR Fifth Session, First Committee Mtg 428, p.528 (UN Doc A/C. 1/SR 428) GAOR Fifth Session, First Committee Mtg 415, p.461 (UN Doc A/C. 1/SR 415)
DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1962, Vol.24, Harper & Row, New York, 1963 Memories JAWAHARLAL Nehrus speeches, Volume three (March 1953-August 1957) New Dehli, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1958, vol.3 JAWAHARLAL Nehru. Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964. Vol.4/5 Oxford University Press. London/Delhi, 1989 BROWN, Judith M. Nehru, Longman, London 1999 GOPAL, Sarvepalli, Jawaharlal Nehru A Biography. Jonathan Cape, London, 1984 Articles GREEN L.C., Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute, The China Quarterly, No.3 (Jul.-Sep.,1960) PALMER Norman D., Indias Foreign Policy, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1962 RAY Hemen, The Policy of Russia towards the Sino-Indian Conflict, The Political Quarterly, Vol.36, No. 1, Jan 1965 NEW YORK TIMES, Alden Robert Key Men at the Bandung parley, Apr 24, 1955 New York Times NEW YORK TIMES, Brady Thomas Gailbraith Strongly defends U.S. Military Mission in India, Feb 21 1963 New York Times NEW YORK TIMES, Brady Thomas India Air defence weighed by the West, Jan 25 1963 New York Times NEW YORK TIMES, A.M. Rosenthal Asians now rallying for Bandung parley, Apr 10, 1955 New York Times NEW YORK TIMES, A.M. Rosenthal India searching for aid in fight, Oct 22, 1962 New York Times NEW YORK TIMES, A.M. Rosenthal Warfare alters India profoundly, Oct 29 1962
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New York Times NEW YORK TIMES, Grimes Paul Colombo: Fear of China is haunting non-aligned powers, Dec 17, 1962 THE HINDU, August 5, 2001 Advocating a pragmatic policy THE ECONOMIST, December 22, 1962 The Colombo Line II. Secondary Sources
Works BOQUERAT Gilles, Les Avatars du Non-Alignement: Linde et les politiques daide amricaine et sovitique de lindpendance la conference de Tachkent (1947-1966) Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1997 BRAILLARD B. et DJALILI M.-R., Tiers Monde et Relations Internationales, Masson, Fribourg, 1984 BRAILLARD Philippe, Mythe et ralit du non-alignement, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1987 COHEN Stephen Philip, India: Emerging Power, Washington, Brookings, 2001 HONG Janjun, From Confrontation to normalisation: the last two decades of Sino-Indian relations (a Chinese perspective), IUHEI, Genve, 1996 JANSEN G.H., Non-alignment and the Afro-Asian States, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Publisher, 1966 KIMCHE David, The Afro-Asian Movement Ideology and Foreign policy of the Third World, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1973 ALI Mahmud S., Cold War in the Himalayas, Curzon, Richemond 1999 MAXWELL Neville, Indias China war, London, Trinity Press, 1970 McMAHON Robert, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997 QUEUILLE Pierre, Histoire de lAfro-Asiatisme jusqu Bandoung Naissance du Tiers -Monde, Paris, Payot, 1965 SANDHU Bim, Unresolved Conflict China and India, New Delhi, Radiant Publisher, 1988 STEBBINS Richard P., United States in World Affairs 1962, Harper & Row, New York, 1963
22
Articles BRECHER, Michael. Non-alignment under Stress: The West and the India-China Border War, Pacific Affairs, Vol.52, No. 4 (Winter 1979/80) CRABB Cecil V., Testing of Non-Alignment, the Western Political Quarterly, Vol.17, No.3 (Sep.1964) 517-542 EDWARDES Michael, Illusion and Reality in Indias Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Vol.41 (Jan. 1965) 48-58 ELKIN Jerrold F., FREDERIKS Brian, Sino-Indian border Talks: the view from New Delhi Asian Survey Vol. 23, No. 10 (October 1983) 1128-1139 HORN Robert C., Afghanistan and the Soviet-Indian Influence Relationship, Asian Survey, Vol.23, No.3 (March 1983) 244-260 KYOUNG-SOO Kim, The Korean War and Indias non-alignment, Korea and World Affairs, No.4, Vol. 7, Winter 1983 pp.709-727 MATES Leo, Non-alignment and the Great Powers. 48 Foreign Affairs (1969-1970) NORBU Dawa, Tibet in Sino-Indian relations: The Centrality of Marginality Asian Survey Vol.37 No. PAUKER Guy J., The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian solidarity, Asian Survey, Vol.5, No.9 (Sept. 1965) 425-432 PRINGSHEIM Klaus H., China, India, and their Himalayan Border (1961-1963) Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 10 (Oct. 1963) Newspapers and Websites AMIT Das Gupta, South Asia and Superpower Competition (1954-1972), Asian Affairs, Vol.26, No.4 (Oct.-Dec. 2004) 5-43 www.cdrb.org/journal/current/amit.pdf LACOUTURE Jean, Die Asian-Afrika Konferenz in Bandung 1955 Le Monde diplomatique, Nr. 7640, 15.4.2005 ND JAYAPRAKASH, India and the Bandung Conference of 1955, Political Affairs Magazine (May-June 2005) www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/1224/1 STEELE Tracy Lee, The Politics of Anglo-American Aid to non-aligned India 1962 Electronic journal of International History www.history.ac.uk/ejournal/art7.html www.chinaembassy.org.in (Picture) www.history.ac.uk www.hindustantimes.com www.hinduonnet.com www.globalsecurityy.org/military/libary
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Modern South Asia and the World June 2006

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