2009 NIPP Public Review Draft

Public Review Draft
6 2009 National Infrastructure

7 Protection Plan
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11 September 18, 2008

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Public Review Draft 1

Public Review Draft
1 Preface
2 Risk in the 21st century results from a complex mix of manmade and naturally occurring
3 threats and hazards, including terrorist attacks, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, power
4 outages, hazardous materials spills, and industrial accidents. Within this context, our
5 critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) are inherently vulnerable both within and
6 across sectors, due to the nature of their physical, geographical, and virtual
7 interconnections.
8 Within the CIKR protection mission area, national priorities must include preventing
9 catastrophic loss of life and managing cascading, disruptive impacts to the U.S. and global
10 economies across multiple threat scenarios. Achieving this goal requires a strategy
11 appropriately balancing resiliency—a traditional American strength in adverse times—with
12 focused, risk-informed prevention, protection, and preparedness activities so that we can
13 manage and reduce the most serious risks we face.
14 These concepts represent the pillars of our National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
15 and its 18 supporting Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs). They are carried out in practice by an
16 integrated network of Federal departments, State and local government agencies, private
17 sector entities, and a growing number of regional consortia—all operating together with a
18 largely voluntary CIKR protection framework. This multi-dimensional public-private sector
19 partnership is the key to success in this inherently complex mission area. Integrating
20 multi-jurisdictional and multi-sector authorities, capacities, and resources in a unified
21 approach that is also tailored to specific sector and regional risk landscapes and operating
22 environments is the path to successfully enhancing our Nation’s CIKR protection.
23 The NIPP meets the requirements that the President set forth in Homeland Security
24 Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
25 Protection, and provides the overarching approach for integrating the Nation’s many CIKR
26 protection initiatives into a single national effort. It sets forth a comprehensive risk
27 management framework and clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the Department
28 of Homeland Security; Federal Sector-Specific Agencies; and other Federal, State, local,
29 tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector partners.
30 The 2009 NIPP captures the evolution and maturation of the processes and programs first
31 outlined in 2006. The current document was developed collaboratively with CIKR partners
32 at all levels of government and the private sector. Participation in the implementation of
33 the NIPP provides the government and the private sector the opportunity to use collective
34 expertise and experience to more clearly define CIKR protection issues and practical
35 solutions and to ensure that existing CIKR protection planning efforts, including business
36 continuity and resiliency planning, are recognized.
37 I ask for your continued commitment and cooperation in the implementation of both the
38 NIPP and the supporting SSPs so that we continue to enhance the protection of the
39 Nation’s CIKR.

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1 Table of Contents
2 Preface .........................................................................................................................................2
3 Executive Summary....................................................................................................................5
4 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 5
5 2 Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities ................................................................................................ 6
6 3 The CIKR Protection Program Strategy: Managing Risk ...................................................................... 8
7 4 Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection..................................................................................... 8
8 5 CIKR Protection: An Integral Part of the Homeland Security Mission ................................................. 10
9 6 Ensuring an Effective, Efficient Program Over the Long Term............................................................ 11
10 7 Providing Resources for the CIKR Protection Program ...................................................................... 11
11 1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................13
12 1.1 Purpose............................................................................................................................................. 14
13 1.2 Scope................................................................................................................................................ 15
14 1.3 Applicability ....................................................................................................................................... 15
15 1.4 Threats to the Nation’s CIKR ............................................................................................................ 18
16 1.5 All-Hazards and CIKR Protection ..................................................................................................... 20
17 1.6 Planning Assumptions ...................................................................................................................... 21
18 1.7 Special Considerations ..................................................................................................................... 22
19 1.8 Achieving the Goal of the NIPP ........................................................................................................ 24
20 2. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities ............................................................................27
21 2. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities ............................................................................28
22 2.1 Authorities ......................................................................................................................................... 28
23 2.2 Roles and Responsibilities................................................................................................................ 29
24 3. The Strategy: Managing Risk...............................................................................................43
25 3.1 Set Goals and Objectives ................................................................................................................. 44
26 3.2 Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks .......................................................................................... 46
27 3.3 Assess Risks .................................................................................................................................... 52
28 3.4 Prioritize ............................................................................................................................................ 64
29 3.5 Implement Protective Programs and Resiliency Strategies ............................................................. 66
30 3.6 Measure Effectiveness ..................................................................................................................... 73
31 3.7 Using Metrics and Performance Measurement for Continuous Improvement ................................. 76
32 4. Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection.................................................................77
33 4.1 Leadership and Coordination Mechanisms ...................................................................................... 77
34 4.2 Information Sharing: A Network Approach ....................................................................................... 87
35 4.3 Protection of Sensitive CIKR Information ....................................................................................... 101
36 4.4 Privacy and Constitutional Freedoms............................................................................................. 106
37 5. CIKR Protection as Part of the Homeland Security Mission...........................................107
38 5.1 A Coordinated National Approach to the Homeland Security Mission ........................................... 107
39 5.2 The CIKR Protection Component of the Homeland Security Mission ............................................ 113
40 5.3 Relationship of the NIPP and SSPs to Other CIKR Plans and Programs...................................... 114
41 5.4 CIKR Protection and Incident Management ................................................................................... 117
42 6. Ensuring an Effective, Efficient Program Over the Long Term ......................................119
43 6.1 Building National Awareness .......................................................................................................... 119
44 6.2 Conducting Research and Development and Using Technology................................................... 129
45 6.3 Building, Protecting, and Maintaining Databases, Simulations, and Other Tools .......................... 135
46 6.4 Continuously Improving the NIPP and the SSPs............................................................................139
47 7. Providing Resources for the CIKR Protection Program..................................................141
48 7.1 The Risk-informed Resource Allocation Process ........................................................................... 141
49 7.2 Federal Resource Allocation Process for DHS, the SSAs, and Other Federal Agencies .............. 145
50 7.3 Federal Resources for State and Local Government Preparedness ............................................. 148
51 7.4 Other Federal Grant Programs That Contribute to CIKR Protection .............................................. 149
52 7.5 Setting an Agenda in Collaboration with CIKR Protection Partners ............................................... 150
53 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................................153

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1 Glossary of Key Terms...........................................................................................................157

2 Appendix 1: Special Considerations.....................................................................................162
3 Appendix 1A: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity ..........................................................................162
4 1A.1 Introduction................................................................................................................................... 162
5 1A.2 Cybersecurity Responsibilities ..................................................................................................... 164
6 1A.3 Managing Cyber Risk ................................................................................................................... 167
7 1A.4 Ensuring Long-Term Cybersecurity ............................................................................................. 175
8 Appendix 1B: International CIKR Protection........................................................................181
9 1B.1 Introduction and Purpose of This Appendix ................................................................................. 181
10 1B.2 Responsibilities for International Cooperation on CIKR Protection ............................................. 182
11 1B.3 Managing the International Dimension of CIKR Risk................................................................... 183
12 1B.4 Organizing International CIKR Protection Cooperation ............................................................... 188
13 1B.5 Integration With Other Plans ........................................................................................................ 191
14 1B.6 Ensuring International Cooperation Over the Long Term ............................................................ 192
15 Appendix 2: Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities.........................................................193
16 Appendix 2A: Summary of Relevant Statutes, Strategies, and Directives ........................193
17 2A.1 Statutes ........................................................................................................................................ 193
18 2A.2 National Strategies ....................................................................................................................... 199
19 2A.3 Homeland Security Presidential Directives .................................................................................. 200
20 2A.4 Other Authorities .......................................................................................................................... 205
21 Appendix 2B: NIPP Implementation Initiatives and Actions...............................................207
22 Appendix 3: The Protection Program ...................................................................................208
23 Appendix 3A: Risk Assessment Essential Features and Core Elements..........................208
24 Appendix 3B: Existing Protective Programs and Other In-Place Measures .....................210
25 3B.1 Protective Programs and Initiatives.............................................................................................. 210
26 3B.2 Guidelines, Reports, and Planning............................................................................................... 213
27 3B.3 Information-Sharing Programs That Support CIKR Protection .................................................... 213
28 Appendix 3C: Infrastructure Data Warehouse .....................................................................216
29 3C.1 Why Do We Need a National CIKR Inventory?............................................................................216
30 3C.2 How Does the Inventory Support the NIPP?................................................................................216
31 3C.3 What Is the Current Content of the Inventory? ............................................................................217
32 3C.4 How Will the Current Inventory Remain Accurate? .....................................................................217
33 3C.5 How Will the Infrastructure Data Warehouse Be Maintained?..................................................... 217
34 3C.6 What Are the CIKR Partner Roles and Responsibilities? ............................................................ 218
35 3C.7 What Are the Plans for IDW Expansion? .....................................................................................218
36 Appendix 3D: Effectiveness...................................................................................................220
37 Appendix 4: Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection: Existing Coordination
38 Mechanisms ............................................................................................................................222
39 Appendix 5: Integrating CIKR Protection as Part of the Homeland Security Mission......224
40 Appendix 5A: State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Considerations ..............224
41 5A.1 CIKR Roles and Responsibilities ................................................................................................. 224
42 5A.2 Building Partnerships and Information Sharing............................................................................ 225
43 5A.3 Implementing the Risk Management Framework ........................................................................ 226
44 5A.4 CIKR Data Use and Protection .................................................................................................... 226
45 5A.5 Leveraging Ongoing Emergency Preparedness Activities for CIKR Protection........................... 227
46 5A.6 Integrating Federal CIKR Protection Activities ............................................................................. 227
47 Appendix 5B: Recommended Homeland Security Practices for Use by the Private Sector
48 ..................................................................................................................................................229
49 Appendix 6: DHS S&T Plans, Programs and Research & Development............................232
50 6.1 DHS S&T Organization and Investment Process ........................................................................... 232
51 6.2 Requirements ................................................................................................................................. 234
52 6.3 Progress.......................................................................................................................................... 235
53 6.4 Five Year Strategy/Technology Roadmap...................................................................................... 237

Public Review Draft
1 Executive Summary
2 Protecting the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) of the United States is
3 essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of
4 life. Attacks on CIKR could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and
5 business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical
6 location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological
7 hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property
8 destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and
9 confidence. Attacks using components of the Nation’s CIKR as weapons of mass destruction
10 could have even more devastating physical and psychological consequences.
11 1 Introduction
12 The overarching goal of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is to:
13 Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CIKR to
14 prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy,
15 incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid
16 recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.
17 The NIPP provides the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future CIKR
18 protection efforts and resiliency strategies into a single national program to achieve this
19 goal. The NIPP framework will enable the prioritization of protection initiatives and
20 investments across sectors to ensure that government and private sector resources are
21 applied where they offer the most benefit for mitigating risk by lessening vulnerabilities,
22 deterring threats, and minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks and other
23 manmade and natural disasters. The NIPP risk management framework recognizes and
24 builds on existing protective programs and initiatives.
25 Protection includes actions to mitigate the overall risk to CIKR assets, systems, networks,
26 functions, or their interconnecting links resulting from exposure, injury, destruction,
27 incapacitation, or exploitation. In the context of the NIPP, this includes actions to deter the
28 threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize consequences associated with a terrorist attack
29 or other incident (see figure S-1). Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as
30 hardening facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance
31 into initial facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security
32 systems, promoting workforce surety programs, implementing cybersecurity measures,
33 training and exercises, and business continuity planning, among various others.
34 Achieving the NIPP goal requires
35 actions to address a series of objectives
36 that include:
37 Understanding and sharing
38 information about terrorist threats
39 and other hazards;
40 Building partnerships to share
41 information and implement CIKR
42 protection programs;

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1 Implementing a long-term risk management program; and

2 Maximizing efficient use of resources for CIKR protection.
3 These objectives require a collaborative partnership among a diverse set of partners,
4 including the Federal Government; State, territorial, local, and tribal governments;
5 regional coalitions; the private sector; international entities; and nongovernmental
6 organizations. The NIPP provides the framework that defines the processes and
7 mechanisms that these CIKR partners will use to develop and implement the national
8 program to protect CIKR across all sectors over the long term.
9 2 Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities

10 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for Department of Homeland
11 Security (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the Nation’s CIKR. The act assigns DHS
12 the responsibility to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing CIKR and for
13 recommending “measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure
14 of the United States in coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government and in
15 cooperation with State and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector,
16 and other entities.”
17 The national approach for CIKR protection is provided through the unifying framework
18 established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). This directive
19 establishes the U.S. policy for “enhancing protection of the Nation’s CIKR” and mandates a
20 national plan to actuate that policy. In HSPD-7, the President designates the Secretary of
21 Homeland Security as the “principal Federal official to lead CIKR protection efforts among
22 Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector”
23 and assigns responsibility for CIKR sectors to specific Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) (see
24 table S-1). It also provides the criteria for establishing or recognizing additional sectors. In
25 accordance with HSPD-7, the NIPP delineates roles and responsibilities for partners in
26 carrying out CIKR protection activities while respecting and integrating the authorities,
27 jurisdictions, and prerogatives of these partners.
28 Primary roles for CIKR partners include:
29 Department of Homeland Security: Manage the Nation’s overall CIKR protection framework
30 and oversee NIPP development and implementation.
31 Sector-Specific Agencies: Implement the NIPP framework and guidance as tailored to the
32 specific characteristics and risk landscapes of each of the CIKR sectors.
33 Other Federal Departments, Agencies, and Offices: Implement specific CIKR protection roles
34 designated in HSPD-7 or other relevant statutes, executive orders, and policy directives.
35 State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Develop and implement a CIKR protection program as
36 a component of their overarching homeland security programs.
37 Regional Partners: Use partnerships that cross jurisdictional and sector boundaries to
38 address CIKR protection within a defined geographical area.
39 Boards, Commissions, Authorities, Councils, and Other Entities: Perform regulatory, advisory,
40 policy, or business oversight functions related to various aspects of CIKR operations and
41 protection within and across sectors and jurisdictions.

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1 Private Sector Owners and Operators: Undertake CIKR protection, restoration, coordination,
2 and cooperation activities, and provide advice, recommendations, and subject matter
3 expertise to the Federal Government;
4 Homeland Security Advisory Councils: Provide advice, recommendations, and expertise to
5 the government regarding protection policy and activities.
6 Academia and Research Centers: Provide CIKR protection subject matter expertise,
7 independent analysis, research and development (R&D), and educational programs.
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9 Table S-1: Sector-Specific Agencies and Assigned CIKR Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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1The Department of Agriculture is responsible for agriculture and food (meat, poultry, and egg products).
2 The Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration is responsible for food other than meat, poultry, and egg products.
3 Nothing in this plan impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense (DOD), including the chain of
command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command
and control procedures.
4 The Energy Sector includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power, except for nuclear power facilities.
5The U.S. Coast Guard is the SSA for the maritime transportation mode.
6As stated in HSPD-7, the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security will collaborate on all matters relating to transportation
security and transportation infrastructure protection.

7The Department of Education is the SSA for the Education Facilities Subsector of the Government Facilities Sector

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1 3 The CIKR Protection Program Strategy: Managing Risk

2 The cornerstone of the NIPP is its risk management framework (see figure S-2) that
3 establishes the processes for combining consequence, vulnerability, and threat information
4 to produce a sufficient, systematic, and rational assessment of national or sector risk. The
5 risk management framework is structured to promote continuous improvement to enhance
6 CIKR protection by focusing activities on efforts to: set goals and objectives; identify assets,
7 systems, and networks; assess risk based on consequences, vulnerabilities and threats;
8 establish priorities based on risk assessments and, increasingly, on return-on-investment
9 for mitigating risk; implement protective programs and resiliency strategies; and measure
10 effectiveness. The results of these processes drive CIKR risk-reduction and risk-
11 management activities. The framework applies to the strategic threat environment that
12 shapes program planning, as well as to specific threats or incident situations. DHS, the
13 SSAs, and other CIKR partners share responsibilities for implementing the risk
14 management framework.
15 DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, measures the effectiveness of CIKR
16 protection efforts to provide constant feedback. This allows continuous refinement of the
17 national CIKR protection program in a dynamic process to efficiently achieve NIPP goals
18 and objectives.
19 The risk management framework is tailored and applied on an asset, system, or network
20 basis, depending on the fundamental characteristics of the individual CIKR sectors. Sectors
21 that are primarily dependent on fixed assets and physical facilities may use a bottom-up,
22 asset-by-asset approach, while sectors (such as Communications, Information Technology,
23 and Agriculture and Food) with very open and adaptive systems may use a top-down
24 business or mission continuity approach or systems-based risk assessments. Each sector
25 chooses the approach that produces the most actionable results for the sector and works
26 with DHS to ensure that the relevant risk analysis procedures are compatible with the
27 criteria established in the NIPP and can contribute to sound comparisons across sectors.
28 Figure S-2: NIPP Risk Management Framework
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30 4 Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection

31 The enormity and complexity of the Nation’s CIKR, the distributed nature of those entities
32 with the responsibility, authority, and resources to contribute to managing its risk, and the
33 uncertain nature of the terrorist threat and other manmade and natural disasters make the
34 effective implementation of protection efforts a great challenge. To be effective, the NIPP

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1 must be implemented using organizational structures and partnerships committed to

2 developing, sharing, and protecting the information needed to achieve the NIPP goal and
3 supporting objectives.
4 The NIPP defines the organizational structures that provide the framework for
5 coordination of CIKR protection efforts at all levels of government, as well as within and
6 across sectors. Sector-specific planning and coordination are addressed through private
7 sector and government coordinating councils that are established for each sector. Sector
8 Coordinating Councils (SCCs) are comprised of private sector representatives. Government
9 Coordinating Councils (GCCs) are comprised of representatives of the SSAs; other Federal
10 departments and agencies; and State, local, and tribal governments. These councils create a
11 structure through which representative groups from all levels of government and the
12 private sector can collaborate or share existing consensus approaches to CIKR protection
13 and work together to advance capabilities.
14 DHS also works with cross-sector entities established to promote coordination,
15 communications, and best practices sharing across CIKR sectors, jurisdictions, or
16 specifically defined geographical areas. Cross-sector issues are challenging to identify and
17 assess comparatively. Interdependency analysis is often so complex that modeling and
18 simulation capabilities must be brought to bear. Cross-sector issues and interdependencies
19 are addressed among the SCCs through the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security
20 (PCIS). The PCIS membership is comprised of one or more members and their alternates
21 from each of the SCCs. Cross-sector issues and interdependencies between the GCCs will be
22 addressed through the Government Cross-Sector Council, which is comprised of the NIPP
23 Federal Senior Leadership Council (FSLC), and the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
24 Government Cross-Sector Council (SLTTGCC). Additionally, the Regional Consortium
25 Coordinating Council provides a forum for those with regionally-based interests in CIKR
26 protection.
27 Efficient information-sharing and information-protection processes based on mutually
28 beneficial, trusted relationships help to ensure implementation of effective, coordinated,
29 and integrated CIKR protective programs and activities. Information sharing enables both
30 government and private sector partners to assess events accurately, formulate risk
31 assessments, and determine appropriate courses of action. The NIPP uses a network
32 approach to information sharing that represents a fundamental change in how CIKR part-
33 ners share and protect the information needed to analyze risk and make risk-informed
34 decisions. A network approach enables secure, multidirectional information sharing
35 between and across government and industry. The network approach provides mechanisms,
36 using information protection protocols as required, to support the development and sharing
37 of strategic and specific threat assessments, threat warnings, incident reports, all-hazards
38 consequence assessments, and best practices. This information-sharing approach allows
39 CIKR partners to assess risks, identify and prioritize risk management opportunities,
40 allocate resources, conduct risk management activities, and make continuous
41 improvements to the Nation’s CIKR protection posture.
42 NIPP implementation relies on critical infrastructure information provided by the private
43 sector. Much of this is sensitive business or security information that could cause serious
44 damage to private firms, the economy, public safety, or security through unauthorized
45 disclosure or access. The Federal Government has a statutory responsibility to safeguard
46 CIKR protection-related information. DHS and other Federal agencies use a number of

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1 programs and procedures, such as the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)
2 Program, to ensure that security-related information is properly safeguarded. Other
3 relevant programs and procedures include Sensitive Security Information for
4 transportation activities, Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information, contractual
5 provisions, classified national provisions, Classified National Security Information, Law
6 Enforcement Sensitive Information, Federal Security Information Guidelines, Federal
7 Security Classification Guidelines, and other requirements established by law.
8 The CIKR protection activities defined in the NIPP are guided by legal requirements such
9 as those described in the Privacy Act of 1974, and are designed to achieve a balance
10 between an appropriate level of security and protection of civil rights and liberties.
11 5 CIKR Protection: An Integral Part of the Homeland Security

12 Mission
13 The Homeland Security Act; other statutes and executive orders; the National Strategies
14 for Homeland Security, for the Physical Protection of CIKR, and for Securing Cyberspace;
15 and a series of Homeland Security Presidential directives—most importantly HSPD-7—
16 collectively provide the authority for the component elements outlined in the NIPP. These
17 documents work together to provide a coordinated national approach to homeland security
18 that is based on a common framework for CIKR protection, preparedness, and incident
19 management.
20 The NIPP defines the CIKR protection component of the homeland security mission.
21 Implementing CIKR protection requires partnerships, coordination, and collaboration
22 among all levels of government and the private sector. To enable this, the NIPP provides
23 guidance on the structure and content of each sector’s CIKR plan, as well as the CIKR
24 protection-related aspects of State and local homeland security plans. This provides a
25 baseline framework that informs the tailored development, implementation, and updating
26 of Sector-Specific Plans; State and local homeland security strategies; and partner CIKR
27 protection programs and resiliency strategies.
28 To be effective, the NIPP must complement other plans designed to help prevent, prepare
29 for, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and
30 other emergencies. Homeland security plans and strategies at the Federal, State, local, and
31 tribal levels of government address CIKR protection within their respective jurisdictions.
32 Similarly, private sector owners and operators have responded to the post-9/11
33 environment by instituting a range of CIKR protection-related plans and programs,
34 including business continuity and resilience measures. Implementation of the NIPP will be
35 fully coordinated between CIKR partners to ensure that it does not result in the creation of
36 duplicative or costly risk management requirements that offer little enhancement of CIKR
37 protection.
38 The NIPP and the National Response Framework (NRF) together provide a comprehensive,
39 integrated approach to the homeland security mission. The NIPP establishes the overall
40 risk-informed approach that defines the Nation’s CIKR steady-state protection posture,
41 while the NRF provides the approach for domestic incident management. Increases in
42 CIKR protective measures in the context of specific threats or that correspond to the threat
43 conditions established in the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) provide an

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1 important bridge between NIPP steady-state protection and incident management

2 activities using the NRF.
3 The NRF is implemented to guide overall coordination of domestic incident management
4 activities. NIPP partnerships and processes provide the foundation for the CIKR dimension
5 of the NRF, facilitating NRF threat and incident management across a spectrum of
6 activities including incident prevention, response, restoration, and recovery.
7 6 Ensuring an Effective, Efficient Program Over the Long Term

8 To ensure an effective, efficient CIKR protection program over the long term, the NIPP
9 relies on the following mechanisms:
10 Building national awareness to support the CIKR protection program, related protection
11 investments, and protection activities by ensuring a focused understanding of the all-
12 hazards threat environment and of what is being done to protect and enable the timely
13 restoration of the Nation’s CIKR in light of such threats;
14 Enabling education, training, and exercise programs to ensure that skilled and knowledgeable
15 professionals and experienced organizations are able to undertake NIPP-related
16 responsibilities in the future;
17 Conducting R&D and using technology to improve CIKR protection-related capabilities or to
18 lower the costs of existing capabilities so that CIKR partners can afford to do more with
19 limited budgets;
20 Developing, safeguarding, and maintaining data systems and simulations to enable continuously
21 refined risk assessment within and across sectors and to ensure preparedness for
22 domestic incident management; and
23 Continuously improving the NIPP and associated plans and programs through ongoing
24 management and revision, as required.
25 7 Providing Resources for the CIKR Protection Program

26 Chapter 7 describes an integrated, risk-informed approach used to establish priorities,
27 determine requirements, and fund the national CIKR protection program; focus Federal
28 grant assistance to State, local, and tribal entities; and complement relevant private sector
29 activities. This integrated resource approach coordinates CIKR protection programs and
30 activities conducted by DHS, the SSAs, and other Federal entities, and focuses Federal
31 grant funds to support national CIKR protection efforts conducted at the State, local, and
32 tribal levels. At the Federal level, DHS provides recommendations regarding CIKR
33 protection priorities and requirements to the Executive Office of the President through the
34 National CIKR Protection Annual Report. This report is based on information about
35 priorities, requirements, and related program funding information that is submitted to
36 DHS by the SSA of each sector, and assessed in the context of the National Risk Profile and
37 national priorities. The process for allocating Federal resources through grants to State,
38 local, and tribal governments uses a similar approach. DHS aggregates information
39 regarding State, local, and tribal CIKR protection priorities, requirements, and funding.
40 DHS uses this data to inform the establishment of national priorities for CIKR protection
41 and to help ensure that funding is made available for protective programs that have the
42 greatest potential for mitigating risk. This resource approach also includes mechanisms to

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1 involve private sector partners in the planning process, and supports collaboration among
2 CIKR partners to establish priorities, define requirements, share information, and
3 maximize the use of finite resources.

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1 1. Introduction
2 Protecting and ensuring the continuity of the critical infrastructure and key resources
3 (CIKR) of the United States is essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety,
4 economic vitality, and way of life. CIKR includes assets, systems, and networks, whether
5 physical or virtual, so vital that their failure or destruction would have a debilitating
6 impact on security, continuity of government, continuity of operations, public health and
7 safety, public confidence, or any combination of these effects. Terrorist attacks as well as
8 manmade or natural disasters could significantly disrupt the functioning of government
9 and business alike, and produce cascading effects far beyond the affected CIKR and
10 physical location of the incident. Direct and indirect impacts could result in large-scale
11 human casualties, property destruction, and economic disruption, and also significantly
12 damage national morale and public confidence. Terrorist attacks using components of the
13 Nation’s CIKR as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 8 could have even more devastating
14 physical, psychological, and economic consequences.
15 The protection of the Nation’s CIKR is essential
16 for making America safer, more secure, and
17 more resilient in the context of terrorist attacks
18 and other natural and manmade hazards.
19 Protection includes actions to mitigate the
20 overall risk to physical, cyber, and human
21 CIKR assets, systems, networks, functions, or
22 their interconnecting links resulting from
23 exposure, injury, destruction, incapacitation, or
24 exploitation. In the context of the National
25 Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), this
26 includes actions to deter the threat, mitigate
27 vulnerabilities, or minimize consequences
28 associated with a terrorist attack or manmade
29 or natural disaster (see figure 1-1). Protection
30 can include a wide range of activities such as
31 improving business protocols, hardening
32 facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into initial
33 facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems,
34 leveraging “self-healing” technologies, promoting workforce surety programs, implementing
35 cybersecurity measures, training and exercises, and business continuity planning, among
36 various others. The NIPP (June 2006; revised ___ 2009) and its complementary Sector-
37 Specific Plans (SSPs) (May 2007; to be reissued in 2010) provide a consistent, unifying
38 structure for integrating both existing and future CIKR protection efforts. The NIPP also
39 provides the core processes and mechanisms that enable all levels of government and
40 private sector partners to work together to implement CIKR protection in an effective and
41 efficient manner.
8(1) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces, (iv) missile having an explosive
or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, or (v) mine or (vi) similar device; (2) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious
bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (3) any weapon involving a disease organism; or
(4) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life (18 U.S.C. 2332a).

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1 The NIPP was developed through extensive coordination with partners at all levels of
2 government and the private sector. NIPP processes are designed to be adapted and tailored
3 to individual sector and partner requirements, including State, local, or regional issues.
4 Participation in the implementation of the NIPP provides the government and the private
5 sector the opportunity to use collective expertise and experience to more clearly define
6 CIKR protection issues and practical solutions, and to ensure that existing CIKR protection
7 approaches and efforts, including business continuity and resiliency planning, are
8 recognized.
9 Since the NIPP and the SSPs were first released, the processes and programs outlined in
10 those documents have continued to evolve and mature. This update to the NIPP reflects
11 many of those advances, including:
12 The release of the SSPs, which followed the release of the NIPP
13 Establishment of Critical Manufacturing as the 18th CIKR sector and designation of
14 Education as a subsector of Government Facilities
15 Expansion of the sector partnership model to include the geographically focused
16 Regional Consortium Coordinating Council
17 Integration with State and local fusion centers
18 Evolution of the National Asset Database to the Infrastructure Information Collection
19 System and the Infrastructure Data Warehouse
20 Developments in the programs, approaches, and tools used to implement the NIPP risk
21 management framework
22 Updates on risk methodologies, information sharing mechanisms, and other DHS-led
23 programs
24 Inclusion of robust measurement and reporting processes
25 Description of additional Homeland Security Presidential Directives, National
26 Strategies, and legislation
27 Release of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, regulating a segment of
28 those industries that involve the production, use, and storage of high-risk chemicals
29 Discussion of expanded education, training, outreach, and exercise programs
30 Evolution from the National Response Plan to the National Response Framework
31 Inclusion of further information on research and development and modeling, simulation,
32 and analysis efforts
33 Additionally, the revised NIPP integrates the concepts of resiliency and protection and
34 broadens the focus of NIPP-related programs and activities to the all-hazards environment.
35 1.1 Purpose
36 The NIPP provides the framework for the unprecedented cooperation that is needed to
37 develop, implement, and maintain a coordinated national effort that brings together
38 government at all levels, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and
39 international partners. The NIPP depends on supporting SSPs for full implementation of
40 this framework within and across each CIKR sector. SSPs are developed by the Federal
41 Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) designated in HSPD-7 in close collaboration with sector
42 partners.

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1 Together, the NIPP and SSPs provide the mechanisms for identifying critical assets,
2 systems, and networks and their associated functions; understanding threats to CIKR;
3 assessing vulnerabilities and consequences; prioritizing protection initiatives and
4 investments based on costs and benefits so that they are applied where they offer the
5 greatest mitigation of risk; and enhancing information-sharing mechanisms and protective
6 measures within and across CIKR sectors. The NIPP and SSPs will evolve in accordance
7 with changes to the Nation’s CIKR and the risk environment, as well as evolving strategies
8 and technologies for protecting against and responding to threats and incidents.
9 Implementation of the NIPP and the SSPs occurs at all levels by all parties from Federal
10 agencies to State, regional, and local organizations, to individual CIKR owners and
11 operators.
12 1.2 Scope
13 The NIPP considers a full range of physical, cyber, and human security factors within and
14 across all of the Nation’s CIKR sectors. In accordance with the policy direction established
15 in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the National Strategy for the
16 Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, and the National Strategy to
17 Secure Cyberspace, the NIPP includes an augmented focus on the protection of CIKR from
18 the unique and potentially catastrophic impacts of terrorist attacks. At the same time, the
19 NIPP builds on and is structured to be consistent with and supportive of the Nation’s all-
20 hazards approach to homeland security preparedness and domestic incident management.
21 Many of the benefits of enhanced CIKR protection are most sustainable when protective
22 programs and resiliency strategies are designed to address all hazards.
23 The NIPP addresses ongoing and future activities within each of the CIKR sectors
24 identified in HSPD-7 and across the sectors regionally, nationally, and within individual
25 States or communities. It defines processes and mechanisms used to prioritize protection of
26 U.S. CIKR (including territories and territorial seas) and to address the interconnected
27 global networks upon which the Nation’s CIKR depend. The processes outlined in the NIPP
28 and the SSPs recognize that protective measures do not end at a facility’s fence line or at a
29 national border, and are often a component of a larger business continuity approach. Also
30 considered are the implications of cross-border infrastructures, international
31 vulnerabilities, and cross-sector dependencies and interdependencies.
32 1.3 Applicability
33 While the NIPP covers the full range of CIKR sectors as defined in HSPD-7 it is applicable
34 to the various public and private sector CIKR partners in different ways. The framework
35 generally is applicable to all partners with CIKR protection responsibilities and includes
36 explicit roles and responsibilities for the Federal Government, including CIKR under the
37 control of independent regulatory agencies, and the legislative, executive, or judicial
38 branches. Federal departments and agencies with specific responsibilities for CIKR
39 protection are required to take actions consistent with HSPD-7. The NIPP also provides an
40 organizational structure, guidelines, and recommended activities for other partners to help
41 ensure consistent implementation of the national framework and the most effective use of

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1 resources. State, 9 local, 10 and tribal government partners are required to establish CIKR
2 protection programs consistent with the National Preparedness Guidelines and as a
3 condition of eligibility for certain Federal grant programs.
4 Private sector owners and operators are encouraged to participate in the NIPP partnership
5 model and to initiate measures to augment existing plans for risk management, resiliency,
6 business continuity, and incident management and emergency response in line with the
7 NIPP framework.
8 1.3.1 Goal
9 The overarching goal of the NIPP is to:
10 Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CIKR to
11 prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy,
12 incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid
13 recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.
14 Achieving this goal requires meeting a series of objectives that include: understanding and
15 sharing information about terrorist threats and other hazards, building partnerships,
16 implementing a long-term risk management program, and maximizing the efficient use of
17 resources. Measuring progress toward achieving the NIPP goal requires that CIKR
18 partners strive toward:
19 Coordinated, CIKR risk management plans and programs in place addressing known
20 and potential threats and hazards;
21 Structures and processes that are flexible and adaptable both to incorporate operational
22 lessons learned and best practices and also to quickly adapt to a changing threat or
23 incident environment;
24 Processes in place to identify and address dependencies and interdependencies to allow
25 for more timely and effective implementation of short-term protective actions and more
26 rapid response and recovery; and
27 Access to robust information-sharing networks that include relevant intelligence and
28 threat analysis and real-time incident reporting.
9 Consistent with the definition of “State” in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, all references to States within the NIPP are applicable to Territories and include
by reference any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States (Homeland Security Act).
10A county, municipality, city, town, township, local public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of
whether the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under State law), regional or interstate government entity, or agency or
instrumentality of a local government; an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or, in Alaska, a Native village or Alaska Regional Native Corporation; and a
rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity (Homeland Security Act).

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1 1.3.2 The Value Proposition

2 The public-private partnership called for in the NIPP provides the foundation for effective
3 CIKR protection. Prevention, response, mitigation, and recovery efforts are most efficient
4 and effective when there is full participation of government and industry partners; the
5 mission suffers (e.g., full benefits are not realized) without the full participation of all
6 partners.
7 The success of the partnership depends on articulating the mutual benefits to government
8 and private sector partners. Industry capabilities that add value to the government include:
9 Visibility into CIKR assets, networks, facilities, functions, and other capabilities
10 through its ownership and management of a vast majority of CIKR in most sectors;
11 Ability to take actions to respond to and recover from incidents;
12 Ability to innovate and to provide products, services, and technologies to quickly focus
13 on mission needs; and
14 Robust mechanisms useful for sharing and protecting sensitive information regarding
15 threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures, and best practices.
16 While articulating the value proposition to the government typically is clear, it is often
17 more difficult to articulate the direct benefits of participation for the private sector. In
18 assessing the value proposition for the private sector, there is a clear national security and
19 homeland security interest in ensuring the collective protection of the Nation’s CIKR. More
20 specific benefits that have been realized during the first few years of the partnership
21 include:
22 Participation in a risk analysis and management framework that helps focus both
23 corporate and government resource allocation;
24 Greater information sharing regarding specific threats enabled by issuing security
25 clearances to private sector partners;
26 Leveraged application of preparedness guidelines and self-assessment tools within and
27 across sectors so that risks can be managed more effectively and efficiently from the
28 corporate down to the individual facility level;
29 Targeted allocation of limited resources to the highest risk issues;
30 Coordination across multiple agencies for those assets and facilities which are
31 considered to be of greatest risk;
32 Joint research and development and modeling, simulation, and analysis programs;
33 Participation in national level and cross-sector training and exercise programs;
34 Cross-sector interdependency analyses;
35 Established informal networks among private sector partners and between the private
36 sector and various Federal agencies that can by used for all-hazards planning and
37 response; and
38 Identification of potential improvements in regulations.
39 Government can encourage industry to go beyond efforts already justified by their corporate
40 business needs to assist in broad-scale CIKR protection through activities such as:
41 Providing owners and operators timely, analytical, accurate, and useful information on
42 threats to CIKR;

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1 Ensuring industry is engaged as early as possible in the development of initiatives and

2 policies related to NIPP implementation and, as needed, revision of the NIPP Base
3 Plan;
4 Ensuring industry is engaged as early as possible in the revision of the SSPs,
5 contingency planning, and other CIKR protection initiatives;
6 Articulating to corporate leaders, through the use of public platforms and private
7 communications, both the business and national security benefits of investing in
8 security measures that exceed their business case;
9 Creating an environment that encourages and supports incentives for companies to
10 voluntarily adopt widely accepted, sound security practices;
11 Working with industry to develop and clearly prioritize key missions and enable their
12 protection and/or restoration;
13 Providing support for research needed to enhance future CIKR protection efforts;
14 Developing the resources to engage in cross-sector interdependency studies, through
15 exercises, symposiums, training sessions, and computer modeling, that result in guided
16 decision support for business continuity planning; and
17 Enabling time-sensitive information sharing and restoration and recovery support to
18 priority CIKR facilities and services during incidents in accordance with the provisions
19 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
20 The above examples illustrate some of the ways in which the government can partner with
21 the private sector to add value to industry’s ability to assess its own risk and refine its
22 business continuity and security plans, as well as contribute to the security and sustained
23 economic vitality of the Nation. The NIPP outlines the high-level value in the overall
24 public-private partnership for CIKR protection. The SSPs outline specific activities and
25 initiatives that articulate the corresponding value to those sector-specific CIKR
26 partnerships and protection activities.
27 1.4 Threats to the Nation’s CIKR

28 Presidential guidance and national strategies issued in the aftermath of the September 11th
29 attacks focused initial CIKR protection efforts on addressing the emerging terrorist threat
30 environment. The emergence of the terrorist threat as a reality in the 21st century pres-
31 ented new challenges and required new approaches focused on intelligence-driven analyses,
32 information sharing, and unprecedented partnerships between the government and the
33 private sector at all levels. As a result of decades of experience responding to natural
34 disasters, industrial accidents, and the deliberate acts of malicious individuals, the Nation’s
35 CIKR owners and operators already apply methods for preventing, mitigating, and
36 responding to these incidents as a matter of business continuity. However, government and
37 business continuity, incident, and emergency response plans and preparedness efforts must
38 continue to adapt to a changing threat and hazard environment, and continually address
39 vulnerabilities and gaps in CIKR protection, whether from natural hazards, terrorism,
40 major industrial accidents, or other emergencies.
41 1.4.1 The Vulnerability of the U.S. Infrastructure to 21st Century Threats
42 America is an open, technologically sophisticated, highly interconnected, and complex
43 Nation with a wide array of infrastructure that spans important aspects of the U.S.
44 government, economy, and society. The majority of the CIKR-related assets, systems, and

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1 networks are owned and operated by the private sector. However, in sectors such as Water
2 and Government Facilities, the majority of owners and operators are government or quasi-
3 governmental entities. The great diversity and redundancy of the Nation’s CIKR provide for
4 significant physical and economic resilience in the face of terrorist attacks, natural
5 disasters, or other emergencies, and contribute to the unprecedented strength of the
6 Nation’s economy. However, this vast and diverse aggregation of highly interconnected
7 assets, systems, and networks may also present an attractive array of targets to domestic
8 and international terrorists and magnify greatly the potential for cascading failure in the
9 wake of catastrophic natural or manmade disasters. Improvements in protection and
10 resilience focusing on elements of CIKR deemed nationally critical (through
11 implementation of the NIPP risk management framework) can make it more difficult for
12 terrorists to launch very destructive attacks, as well as lessen the impacts of any attack or
13 other disaster that does occur.
14 1.4.2 The Nature of Possible Terrorist Attacks
15 The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks during the last
16 two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations.
17 Extremist organizations have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible,
18 learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived
19 vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths. Analysis of terrorist goals and motivations
20 points to domestic and international CIKR as potentially prime targets for terrorist attacks.
21 As security measures around more predictable targets increase, terrorists are likely to shift
22 their focus to less protected targets. Enhancing countermeasures to address any one
23 terrorist tactic or target may increase the likelihood that terrorists will shift to another,
24 which underscores the necessity for a balanced, comparative approach that focuses on
25 managing risk commensurately across all sectors and scenarios of concern.
26 Terrorist organizations have shown an understanding of the potential consequences of
27 carefully planned attacks on economic, transportation, and symbolic targets both within the
28 United States and abroad. Future terrorist attacks against CIKR located inside the United
29 States and those located abroad could seriously threaten national security, result in mass
30 casualties, weaken the economy, and damage public morale and confidence.
31 The NIPP considers a broad range of terrorist objectives, intentions, and capabilities to
32 assess the threat to various components of the Nation’s CIKR. Based on that assessment,
33 terrorists may contemplate attacks against the Nation’s CIKR to achieve three general
34 types of effects:
35 Direct Infrastructure Effects: Disruption or arrest of critical functions through direct
36 attacks on an asset, system, or network.
37 Indirect Infrastructure Effects: Cascading disruption and financial consequences for the
38 government, society, and economy through public and private sector reactions to an
39 attack. An operation could reflect an appreciation of interdependencies between
40 different elements of CIKR, as well as the psychological importance of demonstrating
41 the ability to strike effectively inside the United States.
42 Exploitation of Infrastructure: Exploitation of elements of a particular infrastructure to
43 disrupt or destroy another target or produce cascading consequences. Attacks using
44 CIKR elements as a weapon to strike other targets, allowing terrorist organizations to

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1 magnify their capabilities far beyond what could be achieved using their own limited
2 resources.
3 The NIPP outlines the ways in which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its
4 partners use threat analysis to inform comprehensive risk assessments and risk-mitigation
5 activities. The risk management framework discussed in chapter 3 strikes a balance
6 between ways to mitigate specific and general threats. It ensures that the range of
7 plausible attack scenarios considered is broad enough to avoid a “failure of imagination,”
8 yet contains sufficient detail to enable quantitative and qualitative risk assessment and
9 definable actions and programs to enhance resiliency, reduce vulnerabilities, deter threats,
10 and mitigate potential consequences.
11 1.5 All-Hazards and CIKR Protection

12 In addition to addressing CIKR protection related to terrorist threats, the NIPP also
13 describes activities relevant to CIKR protection and preparedness in an all-hazards context.
14 The direct impacts, disruptions, and cascading effects of natural disasters (e.g., Hurricanes
15 Katrina and Rita, the Northridge earthquake, etc.) and manmade incidents (e.g., the Three
16 Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant accident or the Exxon Valdez oil spill) are well
17 documented and underscore the vulnerabilities and interdependencies of the Nation’s
18 CIKR.
19 Many owners and operators, government emergency managers, and first-responders have
20 developed strategies, plans, policies, and procedures to prepare for, mitigate, respond to,
21 and recover from a variety of natural and manmade incidents. The NIPP framework
22 recognizes these efforts and, additionally, provides an augmented focus on the protection of
23 America’s CIKR against international and domestic terrorist attacks. In fact, the day-to-day
24 public-private coordination structures, information-sharing network, and risk management
25 framework used to implement NIPP steady-state CIKR protection efforts continue to
26 function and provide the CIKR protection dimension for incident management activities
27 under the National Response Framework (NRF). The NIPP, and the public and private
28 sector partnership that it represents, works in conjunction with other plans and initiatives
29 to provide a strong foundation for preparedness in an all-hazards context.
30 NIPP elements include:
31 A comprehensive approach that integrates authorities, capabilities, and resources on a
32 national, regional, and local scale;
33 A framework for sufficient and accurate assessment of the Nation’s CIKR that not only
34 helps inform the prioritization of protection activities, but also enables response and
35 recovery efforts;
36 Structures, processes, and protocols to support the NRF for integrated response and
37 recovery activities;
38 An organization and coordinating structure to enable effective partnership between and
39 among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, regional and international entities,
40 as well as the private sector;
41 An integrated approach to reducing the vulnerability of the physical, cyber, and human
42 elements of the Nation’s CIKR in which individual preparedness measures complement
43 one another; and

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1 The development and use of sophisticated analytical and modeling tools to help inform
2 effective risk-mitigation programs in an all-hazards context.
3 1.6 Planning Assumptions

4 The NIPP is based on the following planning assumptions that relate to the sector-specific
5 and cross-sector nature of the CIKR protection mission, the adaptive nature of the terrorist
6 threat, and the most effective approaches to all-hazards CIKR protection.
7 1.6.1 Sector-Specific Nature of CIKR Protection
8 Approaches to CIKR protection and risk management vary based on sector business
9 characteristics, risk landscape, protection authorities, requirements, and maturity;
10 Assets, systems, and networks vary in criticality within and across CIKR sectors;
11 Successful CIKR protection requires robust baseline information on assets, systems, and
12 networks, and the functions they enable, within and across CIKR sectors, regions, and
13 specific localities;
14 Owners and operators conduct risk management planning and invest in security from a
15 business perspective and may look for various types of incentives to elicit maximum
16 participation in CIKR protection;
17 In the majority of sectors, private firms own the vast majority of CIKR;
18 Some regulatory agencies may already impose protective measure requirements on
19 private sector owners and operators. Coordination between the private sector, DHS, and
20 the SSAs and their Government Coordinating Council partners is required to address
21 measures for threats beyond the regulatory baseline; and
22 Strong relationships among partners are essential to meet the overarching goal and
23 supporting objectives set forth in the NIPP.
24 1.6.2 Cross-Sector Dependencies and Interdependencies
25 Relevant sector dependencies and interdependencies must be considered when developing
26 risk management approaches and implementing the SSPs.
27 In some cases, a failure in a portion of one sector may significantly impact another
28 sector’s ability to perform necessary and critical functions—making that second sector
29 dependent on the first. For instance, many CIKR sectors rely on the service grids of the
30 Energy, Information Technology, Communications, and Transportation sectors. Failures
31 in these sectors can prevent others from functioning properly.
32 In other cases, two sectors have very interdependent relationships. The Chemical sector
33 needs water for many of its processes and operations; the Water sector needs chemicals
34 for treating drinking and waste water.
35 1.6.3 Adaptive Nature of the Terrorist Threat
36 CIKR protection activities take place in a highly dynamic threat environment. The
37 general threat environment changes as the capabilities and the intentions of terrorists
38 evolve;
39 It is not practical or feasible to protect all assets, systems, and networks against every
40 possible terrorist attack vector. A risk-informed approach enhanced by intelligence and
41 information analysis and reporting provides the basis for an effective risk management
42 strategy and efficient resource allocation;

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1 CIKR protection planning at the national and sector levels must address the full range
2 of plausible threats and hazards, not just those most frequently reported or considered
3 to be the most likely to occur; and
4 A proactive approach is required to enhance decision-making processes, provide advance
5 warning to potentially targeted or vulnerable CIKR, and assist owners and operators in
6 taking protective steps to enhance CIKR protection in an all-hazards context.
7 1.6.4 All-Hazards Nature of CIKR Protection
8 Natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, wildfires, pandemics,
9 earthquakes, and unintentional manmade disasters such as oil spills or radiological
10 accidents, also pose threats to the Nation’s CIKR; and
11 Efforts to enhance the protection of CIKR from international and domestic terrorist
12 attacks should support all-hazards preparedness and response whenever possible and
13 vice versa.
14 1.7 Special Considerations

15 CIKR protection planning involves special consideration for protection of sensitive
16 infrastructure information, the unique cyber and human elements of infrastructure, and
17 complex international relationships.
Assets, systems, and networks include one or more of the following elements:
Physical—tangible property;
Cyber—electronic information and communications systems, and the information contained
therein; and
Human—critical knowledge of functions or people uniquely susceptible to attack.

18
19 1.7.1 Protection of Sensitive Information
Protection of sensitive information involves:

Protection from unauthorized access and public disclosure;
Security to guard against damage, theft, modification, or exploitation (e.g., firewalls, physical
security); and
Detection to identify malicious activity affecting and electronic information or
communications system.
20
21 Partnership with the private sector requires the establishment of mutually beneficial,
22 trusted relationships supported by a network approach to providing access to
23 information and a business continuity approach to minimizing or managing risk;
24 Great care must be taken by the government to ensure that sensitive infrastructure
25 information is protected and used appropriately to enhance the protection of the
26 Nation’s CIKR;

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1 Information on specific industry assets and vulnerabilities is particularly sensitive

2 because public release may lead to breaches in security, competitive advantage, and/or
3 adverse impacts on an industry’s position in the marketplace; and
4 DHS does not have broad regulatory authority over CIKR and cannot compel private
5 sector entities to submit infrastructure or operational information. Rather, DHS works
6 in partnership with industry and the SSAs and GCCs to identify the necessary
7 information and promote the trusted exchange of such data.
8 1.7.2 The Cyber Dimension
Cyber infrastructure includes electronic information and communications systems, and the
information contained in those systems. Computer systems, control systems such as Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and networks such as the Internet are all part of
cyber infrastructure.
Information and communications systems are composed of hardware and software the process,
store, and communicate. Processing includes the creation, access, modification, and destruction of
information. Storage includes paper, magnetic, electronic, and all other media types. Communications
include sharing and distribution of information.
Information Technology (IT) critical functions are sets of processes that produce, provide, and
maintain products and services. IT critical functions encompass the full set of processes (e.g., research
and development, manufacturing, distribution, upgrades, and maintenance) involved in transforming
supply inputs into IT products and services.
9
10 The U.S. economy and national security depend highly upon the global cyber
11 infrastructure. Cyber infrastructure enables all sectors’ functions and services, resulting
12 in a highly interconnected and interdependent global network of CIKR;
13 A spectrum of malicious actors could conduct attacks against the cyber infrastructure
14 using cyber attack tools. Because of the interconnected nature of the cyber infra-
15 structure, these attacks could spread quickly and have a debilitating impact;
16 The use of innovative technology and interconnected networks in operations improves
17 productivity and efficiency, but also increases the Nation’s risk to cyber threats if
18 cybersecurity is not addressed and integrated appropriately;
19 The interconnected and interdependent nature of the Nation’s CIKR makes it
20 problematic to address the protection of physical and cyber assets independently;
21 Cybersecurity includes preventing damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of
22 electronic information and communications systems and the information contained
23 therein to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Cybersecurity also includes
24 restoring electronic information and communications systems in the event of a terrorist
25 attack or natural disaster; and
26 The NIPP addresses reducing cyber risk and enhancing cybersecurity in two ways: (1)
27 as a cross-sector cyber element that involves DHS, SSAs and GCCs, and private sector
28 owners and operators; and (2) as a major component of the Information Technology
29 sector’s responsibility in partnership with the Communications sector.
30 1.7.3 The Human Element
31 The NIPP recognizes that each CIKR asset, system, and network is made up of physical
32 and cyber components, and human elements;

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1 The human element requires:

2 ¾ Identifying and preventing the insider threat resulting from infiltration or
3 individual employees determined to do harm;
4 ¾ Identifying, protecting, and supporting (e.g., through cross-training) employees and
5 other persons with critical knowledge or functions;
6 ¾ Screening worksite personnel; and
7 ¾ Identifying and mitigating tactics used by terrorist agents to exploit disaffected
8 insiders;
9 Assessing human element vulnerabilities is more subjective than assessing the physical
10 or cyber vulnerabilities of corresponding assets, systems, and networks; and
11 Diverse protective programs and actions to address threats posed by employees,
12 contractors, and other personnel able to access critical facilities need to be put into place
13 across all sectors.
14 1.7.4 International CIKR Protection
15 The NIPP addresses international CIKR protection, including interdependencies and
16 vulnerabilities based on threats that originate outside the country or transit through it;
17 The Federal Government and the private sector work with foreign governments and
18 international/multinational organizations to enhance the confidentiality, integrity, and
19 availability of cyber infrastructure and products;
20 Protection of assets, systems, and networks that operate across or near the borders with
21 Canada and Mexico, or rely on other international aspects to enable critical
22 functionality, requires coordination with, and planning and/or sharing resources among,
23 neighboring governments at all levels, as well as private sector CIKR owners and
24 operators;
25 The Federal Government and private sector corporations have a significant number of
26 facilities located outside the United States that may be considered CIKR;
27 Special consideration is required when CIKR is extensively integrated into an
28 international or global market (e.g., financial services, agriculture, energy,
29 transportation, telecommunications, or information technology) or when a sector relies
30 on inputs that are not within the control of U.S. entities;
31 Special consideration is required when government facilities and functions are directly
32 affected by foreign-owned and -operated commercial facilities; and
33 The Federal government, working in close coordination and cooperation with the private
34 sector, launched the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative in 2007 to identify assets
35 and systems located outside the United States that if disrupted or destroyed, would
36 critically impact the public health and safety, economic, or national security of the
37 United States. The resulting National Critical Foreign Dependencies List now serves as
38 a strategic compendium capable of guiding engagement with foreign countries in the
39 field of critical infrastructure protection.
40 1.8 Achieving the Goal of the NIPP

41 Achieving the NIPP goal of building a safer, more secure, and more resilient America
42 requires actions that address the following principal objectives:

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1 Understanding and sharing information about terrorist threats and other hazards;
2 Building partnerships to share information and implement CIKR protection programs;
3 Implementing a long-term risk management program that includes:
4 ¾ Hardening, distributing, diversifying, and otherwise ensuring the resiliency of CIKR
5 against known threats and hazards, as well as other potential contingencies;
6 ¾ Processes to interdict human threats to prevent potential attacks;
7 ¾ Planning for rapid response to CIKR disruptions to limit the impacts on public
8 health and safety, the economy, and government functions; and
9 ¾ Planning for rapid CIKR restoration and recovery for those events that are not
10 preventable; and
11 Maximizing efficient use of resources for CIKR protection.
12 This section provides a summary of the actions needed to address these objectives. More
13 detailed discussions of these actions are included in the chapters that follow.
14 1.8.1 Understanding and Sharing Information
15 One of the essential elements needed to achieve the Nation’s CIKR protection goals is to
16 ensure the availability and flow of accurate, timely, and relevant information and/or intel-
17 ligence about terrorist threats and other hazards, information analysis, and incident
18 reporting. This includes actions to:
19 Establish effective information-sharing processes and protocols among C partners;
20 Provide intelligence and information to SSAs and other CIKR sector partners as
21 permitted by law;
22 Analyze, warehouse, and share risk assessment data in a secure manner consistent with
23 relevant legal requirements and information protection responsibilities;
24 Provide protocols for real-time threat and incident reporting, alert, and warning; and
25 Provide protocols for the protection of sensitive information.
26 Chapter 3 details the risk and threat analysis processes and products aimed at better
27 understanding and characterizing terrorist threats. Chapter 4 describes the NIPP network
28 approach to information sharing and the process for protecting sensitive CIKR-related
29 information.
30 1.8.2 Building Partnerships
31 Building partnerships represents the foundation of the national CIKR protection effort.
32 These partnerships provide a framework to:
33 Exchange ideas, approaches, and best practices;
34 Facilitate security planning and resource allocation;
35 Establish effective coordinating structures among partners;
36 Enhance coordination with the international community; and
37 Build public awareness.
38 Chapters 2 and 4 detail partner roles and responsibilities related to CIKR protection, as
39 well as specific mechanisms for governance, coordination, and information sharing
40 necessary to enable effective partnerships.

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1 1.8.3 Implementing a Long-Term CIKR Risk Management Program

2 The long-term risk management program detailed in the NIPP includes processes to:
3 Establish a risk management framework to guide CIKR protection programs and
4 activities;
5 Identify and regularly update the status of CIKR protection programs within and across
6 sectors;
7 Conduct and update risk assessments at the asset, system, network, sector, cross-sector,
8 regional, national, and international levels;
9 Develop and deploy new technologies to enable more effective and efficient CIKR
10 protection; and
11 Provide a system for continuous measurement and improvement of CIKR protection,
12 including:
13 ¾ Establishing performance metrics to assess the effectiveness of protective programs
14 and resiliency strategies;
15 ¾ Developing a methodology to gauge the effectiveness of activities that sustain the
16 CIKR protection mission; and
17 ¾ Updating the NIPP and SSPs as required.
18 The NIPP also specifies the processes, key initiatives, and milestones necessary to
19 implement an effective long-term CIKR risk management program. Chapter 3 provides
20 details regarding the NIPP risk management framework and the measurement and
21 analysis process that support its continuous improvement loop; chapter 6 addresses issues
22 important for sustaining and improving CIKR protection over the long term.
23 1.8.4 Maximizing Efficient Use of Resources for CIKR Protection
24 Maximizing the efficient use of resources for CIKR protection includes a coordinated and
25 integrated annual process for program implementation that:
26 Supports prioritization of programs and activities within and across sectors;
27 Informs the annual Federal process regarding planning, programming, and budgeting
28 for national-level CIKR protection;
29 Helps to align the resources of the Federal budget to the CIKR protection mission and
30 goals, and enables tracking and accountability for expending public funds;
31 Accounts for State, local, and tribal government and private sector considerations
32 related to planning, programming, and budgeting;
33 Draws on expertise across organizational and national boundaries;
34 Shares expertise and speeds implementation of best practices;
35 Recognizes the need to build a business case based on the NIPP value proposition for
36 further private sector CIKR protection investments; and
37 Identifies potential incentives for security-related activities where they do not naturally
38 exist in the marketplace.
39 Chapter 5 explains how a coordinated national approach to the CIKR protection mission
40 enables the efficient use of resources. Efficient use of resources requires a deliberate
41 process to continuously improve the technology, databases, data systems, and other
42 approaches used to protect CIKR and manage risk. These processes are detailed in chapter
43 6. Chapter 7 describes the annual processes required to establish investment mechanisms

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1 for CIKR protection that reflect appropriate coordination with SSAs and other partners
2 regarding resource prioritization and allocation. Also discussed are processes to utilize
3 grants and other funding authorities to maximize and focus the use of resources to support
4 program priorities.
More information about NIPP is available on the Internet at:

www.dhs.gov/nipp or by contacting DHS at: nipp@dhs.gov

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1 2. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities

2 Improving the protection and resilience of the Nation’s CIKR in an all-hazards environment
3 requires a comprehensive, unifying organization; clearly defined roles and responsibilities;
4 and close cooperation across all levels of government and the private sector. Protection
5 authorities, requirements, resources, capacities, and risk landscapes vary widely across
6 governmental jurisdictions, sectors, and individual industries and enterprises. This reality
7 presents a complex set of challenges in terms of NIPP compliance and performance
8 measurement. Hence, successful implementation of the NIPP and supporting SSPs depends
9 on an effective partnership framework that fosters integrated, collaborative engagement
10 and interaction; establishes a clear division of responsibilities among diverse Federal,
11 State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector partners; and efficiently allocates
12 the Nation’s protection resources based on risk and need.
13 This chapter includes a brief overview of the relevant authorities and outlines the principal
14 roles and responsibilities of DHS; SSAs and GCCs; other Federal departments and
15 agencies; State, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions; private sector owners and
16 operators; and other partners who share responsibility in protecting the Nation’s CIKR
17 under the NIPP. A comprehensive and unequivocal understanding of these roles and
18 responsibilities provides the foundation for an effective and sustainable national CIKR
19 protection effort.
20 2.1 Authorities
21 The roles and responsibilities described in this chapter are derived from a series of
22 authorities, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, other CIKR protection-related
23 legislation, executive orders, Homeland Security Presidential directives, and Presidential
24 strategies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security established the national CIKR
25 vision with a charge to “forge an unprecedented level of cooperation throughout all levels of
26 government, with private industry and institutions, and with the American people to
27 protect our critical infrastructures and key assets from terrorist attack.” 11 HSPD-7, Critical
28 Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, provided the direction to
29 implement this vision. More detailed information on these and other CIKR protection-
30 related authorities is included in chapter 5 and appendix 2A.
31 The Homeland Security Act provides the primary authority for the overall homeland
32 security mission and outlines DHS responsibilities in the protection of the Nation’s CIKR.
33 It established the DHS mission, including “reducing the Nation’s vulnerability to terrorist
34 attacks,” major disasters, and other emergencies, and charged the department with the
35 responsibility for evaluating vulnerabilities and ensuring that steps are implemented to
36 protect the high-risk elements of America’s CIKR, including food and water systems,
37 agriculture, health systems and emergency services, information technology,
38 telecommunications, banking and finance, energy (electrical, nuclear, gas and oil, and
39 dams), transportation (air, highways, rail, ports, and waterways), the chemical and defense
11The National Strategy for Homeland Security uses the term “key assets,” defined as individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems, but
could create local disaster or profoundly damage the Nation’s morale or confidence. The Homeland Security Act and HSPD-7 use the term “key resources,”
defined more generally to capture publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy or government. “Key resources” is
the current terminology.

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1 industries, postal and shipping entities, and national monuments and icons. Title II, section
2 201, of the act assigned primary responsibility to DHS to develop a comprehensive national
3 plan for securing CIKR and for recommending “the measures necessary to protect the key
4 resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other
5 agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with State and local government
6 agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.”
7 A number of other statutes provide authorities both for cross-sector and sector-specific
8 CIKR protection efforts. Some examples of other CIKR protection-related legislation
9 include: The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
10 2002, which was intended to improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare
11 for, and respond to acts of bioterrorism and other public health emergencies; the Maritime
12 Transportation Security Act; the Energy Policy and Conservation Act; the Critical
13 Infrastructure Information Act; the Federal Information Security Management Act;
14 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007; and various others.
15 Many different HSPDs are also relevant to CIKR protection, including:
16 HSPD-3, Homeland Security Advisory System;
17 HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents: addresses the national approach to
18 domestic incident management;
19 HSPD-8, National Preparedness;
20 HSPD-9, Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food;
21 HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century;
22 HSPD-19, Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States: and
23 HSPD-20, National Continuity Policy.
24 These separate authorities and directives are tied together as part of the national approach
25 for CIKR protection through the unifying framework established in HSPD-7. HSPD-7,
26 issued in December 2003, established the U.S. policy for “enhancing protection of the
27 Nation’s CIKR.” HSPD-7 establishes a framework for public and private sector partners to
28 identify, prioritize, and protect the Nation’s CIKR from terrorist attacks, with an emphasis
29 on protecting against catastrophic health effects and mass casualties. The directive sets
30 forth the roles and responsibilities for DHS; SSAs; other Federal departments and agencies;
31 State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; regional partners; the private sector; and
32 other CIKR partners. The following sections address roles and responsibilities under this
33 integrated approach.
34 2.2 Roles and Responsibilities

35 Given the fact that terrorist attacks and certain natural or manmade disasters can have
36 national-level impact, it is incumbent upon the Federal Government to provide overarching
37 leadership and coordination in the CIKR protection mission area.
38 2.2.1 Department of Homeland Security
39 Under HSPD-7, DHS is responsible for leading, integrating, and coordinating the overall
40 national effort to enhance CIKR protection, including collaborative development of the
41 NIPP and supporting SSPs; developing and implementing comprehensive, multi-tiered risk
42 management programs and methodologies; developing cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional

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1 protection guidance, guidelines, and protocols; and recommending risk management and
2 performance criteria and metrics within and across sectors. Per HSPD-7, DHS is also a
3 focal point for the security of cyberspace. HSPD-7 establishes a central source for
4 coordinating uniform security practices and harmonizing security programs across and
5 within government agencies. In the directive, the President designates the Secretary of
6 Homeland Security as the “principal Federal official to lead, integrate, and coordinate
7 implementation of efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local
8 governments, and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources.”
9 The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for addressing the complexities of the
10 Nation’s Federal system of government and its multifaceted and interdependent economy,
11 as well as for establishing structures to enhance the close cooperation between the private
12 sector and government at all levels to initiate and sustain an effective CIKR protection
13 program.
14 In addition to these overarching leadership and cross-sector responsibilities, DHS serves as
15 the SSA for 11 of the CIKR sectors identified in HSPD-7 or subsequently established using
16 the criteria set out in HSPD-7: Information Technology; Communications; Transportation;
17 Chemical; Emergency Services; Nuclear Reactors, Material, and Waste; Postal and
18 Shipping; Dams; Critical Manufacturing Government Facilities; and Commercial Facilities.
19 Specific SSA responsibilities are discussed in section 2.2.2. DHS, in the person of the
20 Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection or his/her designee, serves as the co-chair
21 of each of the GCCs with the respective SSA for that sector.
22 Additional DHS CIKR protection roles and responsibilities include:
23 Identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating Federal action in support of the protection of
24 nationally critical assets, systems, and networks, with a particular focus on CIKR that
25 could be exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to
26 those produced by a WMD;
27 Coordinating, facilitating, and supporting the overall process for building partnerships
28 and leveraging sector-specific security expertise, relationships, and resources across
29 CIKR sectors, including oversight and support of the sector partnership model described
30 in chapter 4 through several internal Office of Infrastructure Protection branches and
31 offices; cooperation with Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and regional partners;
32 and collaborating with the Department of State to reach out to foreign countries and
33 international organizations to strengthen the protection of U.S. CIKR;
34 Support the formation and development of regional partnerships, including promoting
35 new partnerships, enabling information sharing, and sponsoring clearances.
36 Establishing and maintaining a comprehensive, multi-tiered, dynamic information-
37 sharing network designed to provide timely and actionable threat information, assess-
38 ments, and warnings to public and private sector partners. This responsibility includes
39 protecting sensitive information voluntarily provided by the private sector and
40 facilitating the development of sector-specific and cross-sector information-sharing and
41 analysis systems, mechanisms, and processes;
42 Coordinating national efforts for the security of cyber infrastructure, including
43 precursors and indicators of an attack, and understanding those threats in terms of
44 CIKR vulnerabilities;
45 Coordinating, facilitating, and supporting comprehensive risk assessment programs for
46 high-risk CIKR, identifying protection priorities across sectors and jurisdictions, and

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1 integrating CIKR protective programs with the all-hazards approach to domestic

2 incident management described in HSPD-5;
3 Facilitating the sharing of CIKR protection best practices and processes, and risk
4 assessment methodologies and tools across sectors and jurisdictions;
5 Sponsoring CIKR protection-related research and development (R&D), demonstration
6 projects, and pilot programs;
7 Seeding development and transfer of advanced technologies while leveraging private
8 sector expertise and competencies, including participation in the development of
9 voluntary consensus standards or best practices as appropriate;
10 Promoting national-level CIKR protection education, training, and awareness in
11 cooperation with State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector partners;
12 Identifying and implementing plans and processes for step-ups in protective measures
13 that align to all-hazards warnings, specific threat vectors as appropriate, and each level
14 of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS);
15 Providing real-time (24/7) threat and incident reporting;
16 Conducting modeling and simulations to analyze sector, cross-sector, and regional
17 dependencies and interdependencies, to include cyber, and sharing the results with
18 CIKR partners, as appropriate;
19 Informing the annual Federal budget process based on CIKR risk and need in
20 coordination with SSAs, GCCs, and other partners;
21 Monitoring performance measures for the national CIKR protection program and NIPP
22 implementation process to enable continuous improvement, and providing annual CIKR
23 protection reports to the Executive Office of the President that include current status,
24 priorities, progress, and gaps in program authorities or resources, and recommended
25 corrective actions;
26 Integrating national efforts for the protection and recovery of critical information
27 systems and cyber components of physical CIKR, including analysis, warning,
28 information-sharing, vulnerability reduction, and mitigation activities and programs;
29 Evaluating preparedness for CIKR protection across sectors and jurisdictions as a
30 component of the National Exercise Program;
31 Documenting lessons learned from exercises, actual incidents, and pre-disaster
32 mitigation efforts, and applying those lessons, where applicable, to CIKR protection
33 efforts;
34 Working with the Department of State, SSAs, and other partners to ensure that U.S.
35 CIKR protection efforts are fully coordinated with international partners; and
36 Evaluating the need for and coordinating the protection of additional CIKR categories
37 over time, as appropriate.
38 2.2.2 Sector-Specific Agencies
39 Recognizing that each CIKR sector possesses its own unique characteristics, operating
40 models, and risk landscape, HSPD-7 designates Federal Government SSAs for each of the
41 CIKR sectors (see table 2-1). SSAs are responsible for working with DHS and their
42 respective GCCs to implement the NIPP sector partnership model and risk management
43 framework; develop protective programs, resiliency strategies, and related requirements;
44 and provide sector-level CIKR protection guidance in line with the overarching guidance
45 established by DHS pursuant to HSPD-7. Working in collaboration with partners, they are

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1 responsible for developing or revising and then submitting SSPs and sector-level
2 performance feedback to DHS to enable national cross-sector CIKR protection program gap
3 assessments.
4 In accordance with HSPD-7, SSAs are also responsible for collaborating with private sector
5 partners and encouraging the development of appropriate information-sharing and analysis
6 mechanisms within the sector. This includes supporting sector coordinating mechanisms to
7 facilitate sharing of information on physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents,
8 recommended protective measures, and security-related best practices. This also includes
9 encouraging voluntary security-related information sharing, where possible, among private
10 entities within the sector, as well as among public and private entities.
11 Table 2-1: Sector-Specific Agencies and Assigned CIKR Sectors 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
12
12 The Department of Agriculture is responsible for agriculture and food (meat, poultry, and egg products).
13 The Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration is responsible for food other than meat, poultry, and egg products.
14 Nothing in this plan impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense (DOD), including the chain of
command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command
and control procedures.
15 The Energy Sector includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power, except for nuclear power facilities.
16 The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the SSA for the maritime transportation mode.
17As stated in HSPD-7, the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security will collaborate on all matters relating to transportation
security and transportation infrastructure protection.

18The Department of Education is the SSA for the Education Facilities Subsector of the Government Facilities Sector

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1 SSAs perform the activities above, as appropriate and consistent with existing authorities
2 (including regulatory authorities in some instances), in close cooperation with other sector
3 partners, including their GCCs. HSPD-7 requires SSAs to provide an annual report to the
4 Secretary of Homeland Security on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate CIKR
5 protection in their respective sectors. Consistent with this requirement, DHS provides
6 reporting guidance and templates that include requests for specific information, such as
7 sector CIKR protection priorities, requirements, and resources. SSAs also are responsible
8 for outlining these sector-specific CIKR protection requirements and related budget
9 projections as a component of their annual budget submissions to the Office of Management
10 and Budget (OMB).
11 Additional SSA responsibilities include:
12 Identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of sector-level CIKR with a
13 particular focus on CIKR that could be exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or
14 mass casualties comparable to those produced by a WMD;
15 Managing the overall process for building partnerships and leveraging CIKR security
16 expertise, relationships, and resources within the sector, including sector-level oversight
17 and support of the sector partnership model described in chapter 4;
18 Coordinating, facilitating, and supporting comprehensive risk assessment/management
19 programs for high-risk CIKR, identifying protection priorities, and incorporating CIKR
20 protection activities as a key component of the all-hazards approach to domestic
21 incident management within the sector;
22 Facilitating the sharing of real-time incident notification, as well as CIKR protection
23 best practices and processes, and risk assessment methodologies and tools within the
24 sector;
25 Promoting sector-level CIKR protection education, training, and awareness in
26 coordination with State, local, tribal, territorial, regional, and private sector partners;
27 Informing the annual Federal budget process based on CIKR risk and protection needs
28 in coordination with partners and allocating resources for CIKR protection accordingly;
29 Monitoring performance measures for sector-level CIKR protection and NIPP
30 implementation activities to enable continuous improvement, and reporting progress
31 and gaps to DHS;
32 Contributing to the annual National Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and
33 Development (NCIP R&D) Plan;
34 Identifying/recommending appropriate strategies to encourage private sector
35 participation;
36 Supporting DHS-initiated data calls to populate the Infrastructure Data Warehouse
37 (IDW), enable national-level risk assessment, and inform national-level resource
38 allocation;
39 Supporting protocols for the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)
40 Program;
41 Working with DHS to develop, evaluate, validate, or modify sector-specific risk
42 assessment tools;
43 Supporting sector-level dependency, interdependency, consequence, and other analysis
44 as required;

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1 Coordinating sector-level participation in the National Exercise Program, Homeland

2 Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), and other sector-level activities;
3 Assisting sector partners in their efforts to:
4 ¾ Organize and conduct protection and continuity-of-operations planning, and elevate
5 awareness and understanding of threats and vulnerabilities to their assets, systems,
6 and networks; and
7 ¾ Identify and promote effective sector-specific CIKR protection practices and
8 methodologies;
11 of the HSAS;
12 Understanding and mitigating sector-specific cyber risk by developing or encouraging
13 appropriate protective measures, information-sharing mechanisms, and emergency
14 recovery plans for cyber assets, systems, and networks within the sector and
15 interdependent sectors; and
16 Supporting DHS and Department of State efforts to integrate U.S. CIKR protection
17 programs into the international and global markets, and address relevant dependency,
18 interdependency, and cross-border issues.
19 2.2.3 Other Federal Departments, Agencies, and Offices
20 All Federal departments and agencies function as CIKR partners in coordination with DHS
21 and the SSAs. In accordance with HSPD-7, they are required to cooperate with DHS in
22 implementing CIKR protection efforts, consistent with the Homeland Security Act and
23 other applicable legal authorities. In this capacity, they support implementation of the
24 NIPP and SSPs, as appropriate, and are responsible for identification, prioritization,
25 assessment, remediation, and enhancing the protection of CIKR under their control. HSPD-
26 7 also requires that all departments and agencies work with the sectors relevant to their
27 responsibilities to reduce the consequences of catastrophic failures not caused by acts of
28 terrorism.
29 Federal departments and agencies that are not designated as SSAs, but have unique
30 responsibilities, functions, or expertise in a particular CIKR sector (such as GCC members)
31 will:
32 Assist in assessing risk, prioritizing CIKR, and enabling protective actions and
33 programs within that sector;
34 Support the national goal of enhancing CIKR protection through their roles as the
35 regulatory agencies for owners and operators represented within specific sectors when
36 so designated by statute; and
37 Collaborate with all relevant partners to share security-related information within the
38 sector, as appropriate.
39 Depending on their regulatory roles and their relationships with the SSAs, these agencies
40 may play a supporting role in developing and implementing SSPs and related protective
41 activities within the sector.
42 Under HSPD-7, a number of Federal departments and agencies and components of the
43 Executive Office of the President have special functions related to CIKR protection. The fol-
44 lowing section addresses Federal departments, agencies, and commissions specifically

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1 identified in HSPD-7. Many other Federal entities have sector-specific or cross-sector

2 authorities and responsibilities that are more appropriately addressed in the SSPs.
3 The Department of State, in coordination with DHS and the Departments of Justice
4 (DOJ), Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, works with foreign governments and interna-
5 tional organizations to strengthen U.S. CIKR protection efforts.
6 The Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), acts to
7 reduce terrorist threats, and investigates and prosecutes actual or attempted attacks
8 on, sabotage of, or disruptions of CIKR in collaboration with DHS.
9 The Department of Commerce works with DHS, the private sector, and research,
10 academic, and government organizations to improve technology for cyber systems and
11 promote other critical infrastructure efforts, including using its authority under the
12 Defense Production Act to ensure the timely availability of industrial products,
13 materials, and services to meet homeland security requirements, and to address
14 economic security issues.
15 The Department of Transportation (DOT) collaborates with DHS on all matters related
16 to transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection, and is addi-
17 tionally responsible for operating the National Airspace System. DOT and DHS
18 collaborate on regulating the transportation of hazardous materials by all modes
19 (including pipelines).
20 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) works with DHS and the Department of
21 Energy (DOE), as appropriate, to ensure the protection of commercial nuclear reactors
22 for generating electric power and non-power nuclear reactors used for research, testing,
23 and training; nuclear materials in medical, industrial, and academic settings and
24 facilities that fabricate nuclear fuel; and the transportation, storage, and disposal of
25 nuclear materials and waste. In addition, the NRC collaborates with DHS on any
26 changes in the protective measures for this sector and the approval of any new reactors.
27 The Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and other appropriate Federal
28 departments, such as the Department of the Interior and DOT, are collaborating with
29 DHS on the development and implementation of a geospatial program to map, image,
30 analyze, and sort CIKR data using commercial satellite and airborne systems, as well as
31 associated agency capabilities. DHS works with these Federal departments and
32 agencies to identify and help protect those positioning, navigation, and timing services,
33 such as global positioning systems (GPS), that are critical enablers for CIKR sectors
34 such as Banking and Finance and Communications. DHS and the intelligence
35 community also collaborate with other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection
36 Agency, that manage data addressed by geographic information systems.
37 The Homeland Security Council ensures the coordination of interagency policy related
38 to physical and cyber CIKR protection based on advice from the Critical Infrastructure
39 Protection Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). This PCC is chaired by a Federal
40 officer or employee designated by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.
41 The Office of Science and Technology Policy coordinates with DHS to further
42 interagency R&D related to CIKR protection.
43 The Office of Management and Budget oversees the implementation of government-wide
44 policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for Federal Government computer
45 security programs.

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1 2.2.4 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments

2 State, local, tribal, and territorial governments are responsible for implementing the
3 homeland security mission, protecting public safety and welfare, and ensuring the provision
4 of essential services to communities and industries within their jurisdictions. They also
5 play a very important and direct role in enabling the protection of the Nation’s CIKR,
6 including CIKR under their control, as well as CIKR owned and operated by other NIPP
7 partners within their jurisdictions. The efforts of these public entities are critical to the
8 effective implementation of the NIPP, SSPs, and various jurisdictionally focused protection
9 and resiliency plans. They are equally critical in terms of enabling time-sensitive, post-
10 event CIKR response, restoration, and recovery activities.
11 CIKR partners at all levels of government have developed homeland security strategies
12 that align with and support the priorities established in the National Preparedness
13 Guidelines. With the inclusion of NIPP implementation as one of these national priorities,
14 CIKR protection programs form an essential component of State, local, tribal, and
15 territorial homeland security strategies, particularly with regard to establishing funding
16 priorities and informing security investment decisions. To permit effective NIPP
17 implementation and performance measurement at each jurisdictional level, these protection
18 programs should reference all core elements of the NIPP framework, including key cross-
19 jurisdictional security and information-sharing linkages, as well as specific CIKR protective
20 programs focused on risk management. These programs play a primary role in the
21 identification and protection of CIKR locally and also support DHS and SSA efforts to
22 identify, ensure connectivity with, and enable the protection of CIKR of national-level
23 criticality within the jurisdiction.
24 2.2.4.1 State and Territorial Governments
25 State (and territorial, where applicable) governments are responsible for establishing
26 partnerships, facilitating coordinated information sharing, and enabling planning and
27 preparedness for CIKR protection within their jurisdictions. They serve as crucial
28 coordination hubs, bringing together prevention, protection, response, and recovery
29 authorities; capacities; and resources among local jurisdictions, across sectors, and between
30 regional entities. States and territories also act as conduits for requests for Federal
31 assistance when the threat or incident situation exceeds the capabilities of public and
32 private sector partners at lower jurisdictional levels. States receive CIKR information from
33 the Federal Government to support the national and State CIKR protection and resiliency
34 programs.
35 State and territorial governments are responsible for developing and implementing State or
36 territory-wide CIKR protection programs that reflect the full range of NIPP-related
37 activities. State/territorial programs should address all relevant aspects of CIKR protection,
38 leverage support from homeland security assistance programs that apply across the
39 homeland security mission area, and reflect priority activities in their strategies to ensure
40 that resources are effectively allocated. Effective statewide and regional CIKR protection
41 efforts should be integrated into the overarching homeland security program framework at
42 the State or territory level to ensure that prevention, protection, response, and recovery
43 efforts are synchronized and mutually supportive. CIKR protection at the State/territory
44 level must cut across all sectors present within the State/territory and support national,
45 State, and local priorities. The program also should explicitly address unique geographical

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1 issues, including trans-border concerns, as well as interdependencies among sectors and

2 jurisdictions within those geographical boundaries.
3 Specific CIKR protection-related activities at the State and territorial level include:
4 Acting as a focal point for and promoting the coordination of protective and emergency
5 response activities, preparedness programs, and resource support among local
6 jurisdictions and regional partners;
7 Developing a consistent approach to CIKR identification, risk determination, mitigation
8 planning, and prioritized security investment, and exercising preparedness among all
9 relevant stakeholders within their jurisdictions;
10 Identifying, implementing, and monitoring a risk management plan and taking
11 corrective actions as appropriate;
12 Participating in significant national, regional, and local awareness programs to
13 encourage appropriate management and security of cyber systems;
14 Acting as conduits for requests for Federal assistance when the threat or current
15 situation exceeds the capabilities of State and local jurisdictions and private entities
16 resident within them;
17 Facilitating the exchange of security information, including threat assessments and
18 other analyses, attack indications and warnings, and advisories, within and across
19 jurisdictions and sectors therein;
20 Participating in the NIPP sector partnership model, including Government
21 Coordinating Councils (GCCs) including the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial GCC;
22 Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs); and other CIKR governance efforts and SSP
23 planning efforts relevant to the given jurisdiction to include the State or jurisdiction’s
24 customized version of a sector partnership model, such as combined GCCs/SCCs, which
25 demand less support;
26 Ensuring that funding priorities are addressed and that resources are allocated
27 efficiently and effectively to achieve the CIKR protection mission in accordance with
28 relevant plans and strategies;
29 Sharing information on CIKR deemed critical from national, State, regional, local,
30 tribal, and/or territorial perspectives to enable prioritized protection and restoration of
31 critical public services, facilities, utilities, and processes within the jurisdiction;
32 Addressing unique geographical issues, including trans-border concerns, dependencies,
33 and interdependencies among the sectors within the jurisdiction;
34 ▪ Identifying and implementing plans and processes for increases in protective measures that align to
35 all-hazards warnings, specific threat vectors as appropriate, and each level of the Homeland Security
36 Alert System (HSAS);
37 Documenting lessons learned from pre-disaster mitigation efforts, exercises, and actual
38 incidents, and applying that learning, where applicable, to the CIKR protection context;
39 Providing response and protection where there are gaps and local entities lack resources
40 to address these gaps;
41 Identifying and communicating requirements for CIKR-related R&D to DHS; and
42 Providing information, as part of the grants process and/or homeland security strategy
43 updates, regarding State priorities, requirements, and CIKR-related funding
44 projections.

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1 2.2.4.2 Regional Organizations

2 Regional partnerships include a variety of public-private sector initiatives that cross
3 jurisdictional and/or sector boundaries and focus on homeland security preparedness,
4 protection, response, and recovery within or serving the population of a defined
5 geographical area. Specific regional initiatives range in scope from organizations that
6 include multiple jurisdictions and industry partners within a single State to groups that
7 involve jurisdictions and enterprises in more than one State and across international
8 borders. In many cases, State governments also collaborate through the adoption of
9 interstate compacts to formalize regionally based partnerships regarding CIKR protection.
10 Partners leading or participating in regional initiatives are encouraged to capitalize on the
11 larger area- and sector-specific expertise and relationships to:
12 Promote collaboration among partners in implementing NIPP-related CIKR risk
13 assessment and protection activities;
14 Facilitate education and awareness of CIKR protection efforts occurring within their
15 geographical areas;
16 Coordinate regional exercise and training programs, including a focus on CIKR
17 protection collaboration across jurisdictional and sector boundaries;
18 Support threat-initiated as well as ongoing operations-based activities to enhance
19 protection and preparedness, as well as to support mitigation, response, and recovery;
20 Work with State, local, tribal, territorial, and international governments and the
21 private sector, as appropriate, to evaluate regional and cross-sector CIKR
22 interdependencies, including cyber considerations;
23 Conduct appropriate regional planning efforts and undertake appropriate partnership
24 agreements to enable regional CIKR protection activities and enhanced response to
25 emergencies;
26 Facilitate information sharing and data collection between and among regional
27 initiative members and external partners;
28 Share information on progress and CIKR protection requirements with DHS, the SSAs,
29 the States, and other CIKR partners, as appropriate; and
30 Participate in the NIPP sector partnership model, as appropriate.
31 2.2.4.3 Local Governments
32 Local governments represent the front lines for homeland security and, more specifically,
33 for CIKR protection and implementation of the NIPP partnership model. They provide
34 critical public services and functions in conjunction with private sector owners and
35 operators. In some sectors, local government entities own and operate CIKR such as water,
36 stormwater, and electric utilities. Most disruptions or malevolent acts that impact CIKR
37 begin and end as local situations. Local authorities typically shoulder the weight of initial
38 prevention, response, and recovery operations until coordinated support from other sources
39 becomes available, regardless of who owns or operates the affected asset, system, or
40 network. As a result, local governments are critical partners under the NIPP framework.
41 They drive emergency preparedness, as well as local participation in NIPP and SSP
42 implementation across a variety of jurisdictional partners, including government agencies,
43 owners and operators, and private citizens in the communities they serve.
44 CIKR protection focus at the local level should include, but is not limited to:

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1 Acting as a focal point for and promoting the coordination of protective and emergency
2 response activities, preparedness programs, and resource support among local agencies,
3 businesses, and citizens;
4 Developing a consistent approach at the local level to CIKR identification, risk
5 determination, mitigation planning, and prioritized security investment, and exercising
6 preparedness among all relevant partners within the jurisdiction;
7 Identifying, implementing, and monitoring a risk management plan, and taking
8 corrective actions as appropriate;
10 encourage appropriate management and security of cyber systems;
11 Facilitating the exchange of security information, including threat assessments, attack
12 indications and warnings, and advisories, among partners within the jurisdiction;
13 Participating in the NIPP sector partnership model, including GCCs, SCCs, SLTTGCC,
14 and other CIKR governance efforts and SSP planning efforts relevant to the given
15 jurisdiction;
16 Ensuring that funding priorities are addressed and that resources are allocated
17 efficiently and effectively to achieve the CIKR protection mission in accordance with
18 relevant plans and strategies;
19 Sharing information with partners, as appropriate, on CIKR deemed critical from the
20 local perspective to enable prioritized protection and restoration of critical public
21 services, facilities, utilities, and processes within the jurisdiction;
22 Addressing unique geographical issues, including trans-border concerns, dependencies,
23 and interdependencies among agencies and enterprises within the jurisdiction;
26 of the HSAS;
27 Documenting lessons learned from pre-disaster mitigation efforts, exercises, and actual
28 incidents, and applying that learning, where applicable, to the CIKR protection context;
29 and
30 Conducting CIKR protection public awareness activities.
31 2.2.4.4 Tribal Governments
32 Tribal government roles and responsibilities regarding CIKR protection generally mirror
33 those of State and local governments as detailed above. Tribal governments are accountable
34 for the public health, welfare, and safety of tribal members, as well as the protection of
35 CIKR and continuity of essential services under their jurisdiction. Under the NIPP
36 partnership model, tribal governments must ensure close coordination with Federal, State,
37 local, and international counterparts to achieve synergy in the implementation of the NIPP
38 and SSP frameworks within their jurisdictions. This is particularly important in the
39 context of information sharing, risk analysis and management, awareness, preparedness
40 planning, protective program investments and initiatives, and resource allocation.
41 2.2.4.5 Boards, Commissions, Authorities, Councils, and Other Entities
42 An array of boards, commissions, authorities, councils, and other entities at the State, local,
43 tribal, and regional levels perform regulatory, advisory, policy, or business oversight
44 functions related to various aspects of CIKR operations and protection within and across
45 sectors and jurisdictions. Some of these entities are established through State- or local-level

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1 executive or legislative mandates with elected, appointed, or voluntary membership. These

2 groups include, but are not limited to: transportation authorities, public utility commis-
3 sions, water and sewer boards, park commissions, housing authorities, public health
4 agencies, and many others. These entities may serve as SSAs within a State and contribute
5 expertise, assist with regulatory authorities, or help to facilitate investment decisions
6 related to CIKR protection efforts within a given jurisdiction or geographical region.
7 2.2.5 Private Sector Owners and Operators
8 Owners and operators generally develop and implement the protective programs and
9 resiliency strategies for the CIKR under their control. Private sector owners and operators
10 take action to support risk management planning and investments in security as a
11 necessary component of prudent business planning and operations. In today’s risk
12 environment, these activities generally include reassessing and adjusting continuity-of-
13 business and emergency management plans, building increased resiliency and redundancy
14 into business processes and systems, protecting facilities against physical and cyber attacks
15 and natural disasters, guarding against the insider threat, and increasing coordination
16 with external organizations to avoid or minimize the impacts on surrounding communities
17 or other industry partners.
18 For many private sector enterprises, the level of investment in security reflects risk versus
19 consequence tradeoffs that are based on two factors: (1) what is known about the risk
20 environment, and (2) what is economically justifiable and sustainable in a competitive
21 marketplace or in an environment of limited resources. In the context of the first factor, the
22 Federal Government is uniquely postured to help inform critical security investment
23 decisions and operational planning. For example, owners and operators generally look to
24 the government as a source of security-related best practices and for attack or natural
25 hazard indications, warnings, and threat assessments. In relationship to the second factor,
26 owners and operators also generally rely on government entities to address risks outside of
27 their property or in situations in which the current threat exceeds an enterprise’s capability
28 to protect itself or requires an unreasonable level of additional investment to mitigate risk.
29 In this situation, public and private sector partners at all levels must collaborate to address
30 the protection of national-level CIKR, provide timely warnings, and promote an
31 environment in which CIKR owners and operators can better carry out their specific
32 protection responsibilities. Additionally, CIKR owners and operators may be required to
33 invest in security as a result of Federal, State, and/or local regulations.
34 The CIKR protection responsibilities of specific owners or operators vary widely within and
35 across sectors. Some sectors have regulatory or statutory frameworks that govern private
36 sector security operations within the sector; however, most are guided by voluntary security
37 regimes or adherence to industry-promoted best practices. Within this diverse protective
38 landscape, private sector entities can better secure the CIKR under their control by:
39 Performing comprehensive risk assessments tailored to their specific sector, enterprise,
40 or facility risk landscape;
41 Developing an awareness of critical dependencies and interdependencies at the sector,
42 enterprise, and facility levels;
43 Implementing protective actions and programs to reduce identified vulnerabilities
44 appropriate to the level of risk presented;

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1 Establishing cybersecurity programs and associated awareness training within the

2 organization;
3 Adhering to recognized industry best business practices and standards, including those
4 with a cybersecurity nexus (see appendix 5B);
5 Developing and coordinating CIKR protective and emergency response actions, plans,
6 and programs with appropriate Federal, State, and local government authorities;
7 Participating in the NIPP sector partnership model (including SCCs and information-
8 sharing mechanisms), as appropriate;
9 Assisting and supporting Federal, State, local, and tribal government CIKR data
10 collection and protection efforts, as appropriate;
11 Participating in Federal, State, local, and tribal government emergency management
12 programs and coordinating structures;
13 Establishing resilient, robust, and/or redundant operational systems or capabilities
14 associated with critical functions where appropriate;
15 Promoting CIKR protection education, training, and awareness programs;
16 Adopting and implementing effective workforce security assurance programs to mitigate
17 potential insider threats;
18 Providing technical expertise to SSAs and DHS when appropriate;
19 Participating in regular CIKR protection-focused exercise programs with other public
20 and private sector partners;
21 Identifying and communicating requirements to DHS and/or SSAs or States for CIKR
22 protection-related R&D;
23 Sharing security-related best practices and entering into operational mutual-aid
24 agreements with other industry partners; and
25 Working to identify and help remove barriers to public-private partnerships.
26 2.2.6 Advisory Councils
27 Advisory councils provide advice, recommendations, and expertise to the government (e.g.,
28 DHS, SSAs, and State or local agencies) regarding CIKR protection policy and activities.
29 These entities also help enhance public-private partnerships and information sharing. They
30 often provide an additional mechanism to engage with a pre-existing group of private sector
31 leaders to obtain feedback on CIKR protection policy and programs, and to make
32 suggestions to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of specific government programs.
33 Examples of CIKR protection-related advisory councils and their associated responsibilities
34 include:
35 Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC): CIPAC is a partnership
36 between government and private sector CIKR owners and operators that facilitates
37 effective coordination of Federal CIKR protection programs. CIPAC engages in a range
38 of CIKR protection activities such as planning, coordination, NIPP implementation, and
39 operational activities, including incident response, recovery, and reconstitution. DHS
40 published a Federal Register Notice on March 24, 2006, announcing the establishment
41 of CIPAC as a Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 19 -exempt body pursuant to
42 section 871 of the Homeland Security Act (see chapter 4).
19FACA authorized the establishment of a system governing the creation and operation of advisory committees in the executive branch of the Federal
Government and for other purposes. The act, when it applies, generally requires advisory committees to meet in open session and make publicly available

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1 Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC): The HSAC provides advice and
2 recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security on relevant issues. The Council
3 members, appointed by the DHS Secretary, include experts from State and local
4 governments, public safety, security and first-responder communities, academia, and
5 the private sector.
6 ¾ Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee (PVTSAC): The Secretary of Homeland
7 Security established the PVTSAC as a subcommittee of the HSAC to provide the
8 HSAC with expert advice from leaders in the private sector.
9 National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC): The NIAC provides the President,
10 through the Secretary of Homeland Security, with advice on the security of physical and
11 cyber systems across all CIKR sectors. The Council is comprised of up to 30 members
12 appointed by the President. Members are selected from the private sector, academia,
13 and State and local governments. The Council was established (and amended) under
14 Executive Orders 13231, 13286, and 13385.
15 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC): The NSTAC
16 provides industry-based advice and expertise to the President on issues and problems
17 related to implementing National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP)
18 communications policy. The NSTAC is comprised of up to 30 industry chief executives
19 representing the major communications and network service providers and information
20 technology, finance, and aerospace companies. It was created under Executive Order
21 12382.
22 2.2.7 Academia and Research Centers
23 The academic and research center communities play an important role in enabling
24 national-level CIKR protection and implementation of the NIPP, including:
25 Establishing Centers of Excellence (i.e., university-based partnerships or federally
26 funded R&D centers) to provide independent analysis of CIKR protection issues;
27 Supporting the research, development, testing, evaluation, and deployment of CIKR
28 protection technologies;
29 Analyzing, developing, and sharing best practices related to CIKR protection efforts;
30 Researching and providing innovative thinking and perspective on threats and the
31 behavioral aspects of terrorism;
32 Preparing or disseminating guidelines, courses, and descriptions of best practices for
33 physical security and cybersecurity;
34 Developing and providing suitable security risk analysis and risk management courses
35 for CIKR protection professionals;
36 Establishing undergraduate and graduate curricula and degree programs; and
37 Conducting research to identify new technologies and analytical methods that can be
38 applied by partners to support NIPP efforts.
associated written materials. It also requires a 15-day notice before any meeting may be closed to public attendance, a requirement which could prevent a
meeting on short notice to discuss sensitive information in an appropriate setting.

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1 3. The Strategy: Managing Risk

2 The cornerstone of the NIPP is its risk management framework. Risk is the potential for an
3 unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its
4 likelihood and the associated consequences. This considers threat as the likelihood an event
5 will happen and vulnerability as the likelihood that the event is successful in causing harm
6 via disruption, destruction, or exploitation. This approach allows us to see potential losses
7 in the context of the likelihood that they will occur, making risk an important means of
8 prioritizing mitigation efforts for partners ranging from facility owners and operators to
9 Federal agencies. The NIPP risk management framework (see Figure 3-1) integrates and
10 coordinates strategy, capability, and governance to enable risk-informed decision making
11 related to the nation’s CIKR. This framework is applicable to threats ranging from natural
12 disasters and manmade safety hazards, as well as terrorism, although different information
13 and methodologies may be used to understand each.
14 This chapter addresses the use of the NIPP risk management framework as part of the
15 overall effort to ensure the steady-state protection and resiliency of our Nation’s CIKR.
16 DHS, the SSAs, and their public and private sector partners share responsibility for
17 implementation of the NIPP risk management framework. SSAs are responsible for leading
18 sector-specific risk management programs and for ensuring that the tailored, sector-specific
19 application of the risk management framework is addressed in their respective SSPs. DHS
20 supports these efforts by providing guidance and analytical support to SSAs and other
21 partners. DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, is responsible for using the best
22 available information to conduct cross-sector risk analysis and risk management activities.
23 This includes the assessment of dependencies, interdependencies, and cascading effects;
24 identification of common vulnerabilities; development and sharing of common threat
25 scenarios; assessment and comparison of risk across sectors; identification and
26 prioritization of risk management opportunities across sectors; development and sharing of
27 cross-sector measures to reduce or manage risk; and identification of specific cross-sector
28 R&D needs.
29 Figure 3-1: NIPP Risk Management Framework
30
31
32
33 The NIPP risk management framework is tailored to and applied on an asset, system,
34 network, or functional basis, depending on the fundamental characteristics of the
35 individual CIKR sectors. For those sectors primarily dependent on fixed assets and physical
36 facilities, a bottom-up, asset-by-asset approach may be most appropriate. For sectors such
37 as Communications, Information Technology, and Food and Agriculture, with accessible

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1 and distributed systems, a top-down, business or mission continuity approach or risk
2 assessments that focus on networks and systems may be more effective. Each sector must
3 pursue the approach that produces the most actionable results for the sector and maximizes
4 their ability to contribute to cross-sector comparative risk analyses conducted by DHS.
5 The NIPP risk management framework includes the following activities:
6 Set goals and objectives: Define specific outcomes, conditions, end points, or
7 performance targets that collectively constitute an effective risk management posture.
8 By defining a desirable end state for each cycle of risk management, the CIKR partners
9 can understand and agree upon the protective posture that they are striving for with
10 their risk management activities.
11 Identify assets, systems, and networks: Develop an inventory of the assets, systems,
12 and networks, including those located outside the U.S,, that comprise the Nation’s CIKR
13 and the critical functionality therein; collect information pertinent to risk management
14 that takes into account the fundamental characteristics of each sector.
15 Assess risks: Evaluate the risk considering the potential direct and indirect
16 consequences of a terrorist attack or other hazards (including, as capabilities mature,
17 seasonal changes in consequences and dependencies and interdependencies associated
18 with each identified asset, system, or network), known vulnerabilities to various
19 potential attack methods or other significant hazards, and general or specific threat
20 information.
21 Prioritize: Aggregate and compare risk assessment results to develop an appropriate
22 view of asset, system, and/or network risks and associated mission continuity, where
23 applicable; establish priorities based on risk; and determine protection, resilience, or
24 business continuity initiatives that provide the greatest return on investment for the
25 mitigation of risk.
26 Implement protective programs and resiliency strategies: Select appropriate
27 actions or programs to reduce or manage the risk identified; secure the resources needed
28 to address priorities.
29 Measure effectiveness: Use metrics and other evaluation procedures at the national,
30 regional, State, local, and sector levels to measure progress and assess the effectiveness
31 of the national CIKR protection program in improving protection, managing risk, and
32 increasing resiliency in the most cost-effective way.
33 This process features a continuous feedback loop, which allows the Federal Government
34 and its CIKR partners to track progress and implement actions to improve national CIKR
35 protection and resiliency over time. The physical, cyber, and human elements of CIKR
36 should be considered during each step of the risk management framework. The sector
37 partnership model discussed in chapter 4 provides the structure for coordination and
38 management of risk management activities that are tailored to different sectors and
39 jurisdictions of government.
40 3.1 Set Goals and Objectives

41 Achieving robust, protected, and resilient infrastructure requires national, State, local, and
42 sector-specific CIKR protection goals and objectives that collectively represent the desired

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1 risk management posture. These goals and objectives should consider the physical, cyber,
2 and human elements of CIKR protection. Goals and objectives may vary across and within
3 sectors and jurisdictions of government, depending on the internal structure and
4 composition of a specific industry, resource, or other aspect of CIKR.
5 Nationally, the overall goal of CIKR-related risk management is an enhanced state of
6 protection and resilience achieved through the implementation of focused risk-reduction
7 strategies within and across sectors and levels of government. The risk management
8 framework supports this goal by:
9 Enabling the development of the National, sector, regional, and State risk profiles that
10 serve as the foundation for the National CIKR Protection Annual Report described in
11 Chapter 7. These risk profiles outline the highest risks facing different sectors and
12 geographical regions, and identify cross-sector or regional issues of concern appropriate
13 for Federal CIKR protection focus, as well as opportunities for sector-, State-, and
14 regionally based initiatives.
15 Figure 3-2: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Set Security Goals
16
17 Enabling DHS, SSAs, and other partners to determine the best courses of action to
18 reduce potential consequences, threats, or vulnerabilities. Some available options
19 include encouraging voluntary implementation of focused risk management strategies
20 (e.g., through public-private partnerships), pursuing economic incentive-related policies
21 and programs, and undertaking regulatory action if appropriate; and
22 Allowing the identification of risk management and resource allocation options at
23 various jurisdictional levels, as well as those under the authority of CIKR owners and
24 operators.
25 From a sector or jurisdictional perspective, CIKR protection goals or their related sup-
26 porting objectives:
27 Define the risk management posture that CIKR partners seek to attain within the
28 planning horizon;
29 Express this posture in terms of the outcomes and objective metrics and the time
30 required to attain it through focused program implementation;
31 Consider distinct assets, systems, networks, functions, operational processes, business
32 environments, and risk management approaches; and

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1 Vary according to the business characteristics and security landscape of the affected
2 sector, jurisdiction, or locality.
3 Taken collectively, these goals guide all levels of government and the private sector in
4 tailoring risk management programs and activities to address CIKR protection and
5 resilience needs.
Sample Goal – Communications Sector

Build networks and systems that provide secure and resilient communications for the Nation
and that can be rapidly restored after a natural or manmade disaster.
6 3.2 Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks

7 To meet its responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act and HSPD-7, DHS
8 continuously engages partner agencies and other infrastructure partners to build, manage,
9 and refine a comprehensive inventory of the assets, systems, and networks that comprise
10 the Nation’s CIKR. This inventory provides a common baseline of knowledge that can
11 inform CIKR partners at various levels of government and the private sector regarding
12 infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies as well as enable national, regional,
13 and sector-based risk assessment, prioritization, and management.
14 Given the Nation’s vast and varied infrastructure, developing an inventory of critical
15 assets, systems, and networks is a process that requires an examination specific to the
16 types of CIKR and the sector to which they belong.
17 Figure 3-3: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks
18
19 Screening is the initial process to identify the assets, systems, networks, and functions of
20 concern. It is an important step at every level of risk-informed decision making, as it helps
21 define a subset of scenarios (both CIKR elements and the events that may produce risk) to
22 focus further analysis and risk management. Concerns that are critical to one decision
23 maker may be less so to other partners, so screening by different parties for different
24 purposes will yield alternate results. Specific programs to identify and prioritize nationally
25 and regionally significant CIKR allow DHS’ focus for risk management to be shared with
26 other partners
27 3.2.1 National Infrastructure Inventory
28 DHS maintains a national database of the assets, systems, and networks that make up the
29 Nation’s CIKR. The Nation’s infrastructure includes assets, systems, and networks that are

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1 nationally significant and those that may not be significant on a national level but are,
2 nonetheless, important to State, regional, or local CIKR protection, incident management,
3 and response and recovery efforts. The principal national database of CIKR systems and
4 assets is the Infrastructure Data Warehouse (IDW). The IDW comprises a federated data
5 architecture that provides a single virtual view of one or more infrastructure data sources.
6 DHS uses this database to provide all relevant Federal, State, local, and private-sector CIKR
7 partners with access to the most current and complete view of the Nation’s infrastructure
8 information allowed under applicable Federal, State, or local regulation.
9 The goal for the IDW is to also provide access to relevant assessments for natural disasters,
10 industrial accidents, and other incidents and maintain basic information about the
11 relationships, dependencies, and interdependencies among various assets, systems, and
12 networks, including foreign CIKR upon which the U.S. may rely. The inventory will also
13 include a cyber data framework to characterize each sector’s unique and significant cyber
14 assets, systems, or networks.
15 This information is needed not only to help manage steady-state CIKR protection and
16 resiliency approaches, but also to inform and support the response to a wide array of
17 incidents and emergencies. Risk may change based on many factors including damage
18 resulting from a natural disaster; seasonal or cyclic dependencies; and changes in
19 technology, the economy, or the terrorist threat. The inventory supports domestic incident
20 management by helping to prioritize and focus preparedness planning; inform decision-
21 making; establish strategies for response; and identify priorities for restoration,
22 remediation, and reconstruction.
23 Currently, this inventory and associated attributes are maintained through the
24 Infrastructure Information Collection System (IICS), a federated IDW, accessible in a
25 geospatial context using the tools provided by the Integrated Common Analytical Viewer
26 (iCAV). SSAs and DHS work together and in concert with State, local, territorial, and tribal
27 governments, and private sector partners to ensure that the inventory data structure is
28 accurate, current, and secure. DHS provides guidelines concerning information needed to
29 develop and maintain the inventory. Within this inventory, the set of nationally and
30 regionally significant infrastructure is maintained and constantly improved.
31 Owners, operators, and managers of infrastructure databases, together with other CIKR
32 partners, generally have the best knowledge of their assets, systems, networks, and related
33 data. These subject matter experts work with DHS, Federal departments and agencies,
34 State and local government entities, and the private sector to determine the specific
35 information needed in addition to core requirements to reflect their sectors and
36 jurisdictions in national-level risk analysis. Judgments about information provided to DHS
37 are informed by a screening process that considers the consequences that would result if an
38 asset, system, or network were lost, exploited, damaged, or disrupted.
39 For those sectors whose risk is dominated by fixed assets and systems with relatively
40 constant functions, a bottom-up, asset-based approach often is most appropriate for
41 collecting and organizing inventory information. A bottom-up approach normally includes
42 an aggregate assessment of expected losses for relevant scenarios at the individual facility
43 level. This must consider both on-site and off-site consequences to the facility’s function and

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1 the surrounding population and environment that could result from natural disasters,
2 accidents, or terrorist attacks.
3 For sectors with open adaptive systems, virtual- or information-based core processes, or a
4 principal focus on sustaining a level of service, a top-down system- or network- based
5 approach may be more appropriate. A top-down approach normally includes an assessment
6 of key missions and the identification of the high-level processes, capabilities, and functions
7 on which those missions depend. It considers dependencies on other sectors to evaluate
8 resiliency, redundancy, and recoverability.
Tier1/Tier 2 Program
The Tier 1 and Tier 2 Program identifies nationally significant, high consequence assets and
systems in order to enhance decision-making related to CIKR protection. Assets and systems
identified through the program include those that, if destroyed or disrupted, could cause some
combination of significant casualties, major economic losses, or widespread and long-term
disruptions to national well-being and governance capacity.
The overwhelming majority of the assets and systems identified through this effort will be
classified as Tier 2. Only a small sub-set of assets, which would cause major national or regional
impacts similar to those experienced during Hurricane Katrina and 9/11, will meet the Tier 1
consequence threshold established by DHS senior leadership. The process of identifying these
nationally significant assets and systems is conducted on an annual basis and relies heavily upon
the insights and knowledge of public and private sector security partners.
The Tier 1 and 2 assets and systems resulting from this annual process provide a common basis
on which DHS and its security partners can implement important CIKR protection programs and
initiatives, such as various grant programs, buffer zone protection efforts, facility assessments
and training, and other activities. Specifically, the list of Tier 1 and Tier 2 assets and systems is
used to support eligibility determinations for Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), State
Homeland Security and Buffer Zone Protection Grant Programs. Through the Tier 1 and Tier 2
prioritization process, the NIPP community can ensure that those assets and systems capable of
creating nationally significant consequences are the primary focus of the Nation’s ongoing risk
management efforts..
9
10 Information to be included in the IDW will come from a variety of sources, such as:
11 Sector inventories: SSAs and GCCs maintain close working relationships with
12 owners and operators, SCCs, and other sources that maintain inventories necessary for
13 the sector’s business or mission. SSAs provide relevant information to DHS and update
14 it on a periodic basis to ensure that sector assets and critical functions are adequately
15 represented, and that sector and cross-sector dependencies and interdependencies can
16 be identified and analyzed;
17 Voluntary submittals from CIKR partners: Owners and operators; State, local,
18 territorial, and tribal governments; and Federal departments and agencies voluntarily
19 submit information and previously completed inventories and analyses for DHS to
20 consider;

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1 Results of studies: Various government or commercially owned databases developed
2 as the result of studies undertaken by trade associations, advocacy groups, and regula-
3 tory agencies may contain relevant information;
4 Annual data calls: DHS, in cooperation with SSAs and other CIKR partners, conducts
5 an annual data call to States, territories, and Federal partners. This data call process
6 allows States, territories, and Federal partners to propose assets meeting specified
7 criteria; and
8 Ongoing reviews of particular locations where risk is believed to be higher:
9 DHS- and SSA-initiated site assessments to provide information on vulnerability; help
10 to identify assets, systems, and networks and their dependencies, interdependencies,
11 and critical functionality; and provide information that will help quantify their value in
12 risk analyses.
13 DHS, in coordination with SSAs, State and local governments, private sector owners and
14 operators, and other partners, works to build from and correct existing inventories at the
15 State and local levels to avoid duplication of past efforts.
16 3.2.2 Protecting and Accessing Inventory Information
17 The Federal Government recognizes the sensitive, business, or proprietary nature of much
18 of the information accessed through the IDW. DHS is responsible for protecting this
19 information from unauthorized disclosure or use. Information in the IDW is protected from
20 unauthorized disclosure or misuse to the maximum extent allowed under applicable
21 Federal, State, or local regulation, including PCII and security classification rules (see
22 section 4.3). Additionally, DHS ensures that all data and licensing restrictions are enforced.
23 DHS is implementing resilient and redundant security measures that apply to the IDW and
24 provide system integrity and security, software security, and data protection.
25 Access to the IDW is both controlled using relevant security clearances and classification
26 guidelines, and with extensive regard to maximizing the ability of partners to share
27 appropriate information.
28 3.2.3 SSA Role in Inventory Development and Maintenance
29 SSAs have a leading role in several phases of CIKR inventory development and
30 maintenance, including nominating assets and systems and adjudication of Tier 2 assets
31 and systems proposed by States/territories in response to the annual data call.
32 The specific methods by which SSAs collect sector-specific asset, system, and network data
33 are described in the individual SSPs. The SSPs include descriptions of mechanisms for
34 making data collection efforts more manageable, such as:
35 Prioritizing the approach for data outreach to different partners;
36 Identifying assets, systems, networks, or functions of potential national-, regional-, or
37 sector-level importance; and
38 Identifying, reviewing, and leveraging existing sector infrastructure data sources.
39 SSAs enable sector-specific asset, system, and network awareness, data collection, and
40 information sharing primarily by understanding existing sector-based data sources and by
41 facilitating information-sharing agreements with data owners. For example, DHS, in its

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1 capacity as the SSA, works closely with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the
2 Dams Sector to facilitate data discovery within the National Inventory of Dams (NID).
3 Although owned and maintained by USACE, shared access to the NID provides
4 infrastructure protection partners in Federal, State, and local governments and the private
5 sector with a comprehensive understanding of the national dams landscape, as well as an
6 understanding of how risk in the Dams Sector impacts the national risk profile.
7 More detail on SSA roles and responsibilities in facilitating sector awareness and
8 understanding related to the national CIKR library is included in appendix 3C.
9 3.2.4 State and Local Government Role in Inventory Development and
10 Maintenance
11 State and local government agencies play an important role in understanding the national
12 infrastructure landscape by enabling the identification of assets, systems, and networks at
13 the State and local levels. State and local first responders, emergency managers, public
14 health officials, and others involved in homeland security missions frequently interact with
15 infrastructure owners and operators in their jurisdictions to plan for and respond to all
16 manner of natural and man-made hazards. These relationships form the core of the
17 public/private partnership model and translate into first-hand knowledge of the
18 infrastructure landscape at the State and local level, as well as an understanding of those
19 infrastructure assets, systems, and networks that are considered critical from a State and
20 local perspective.
21 DHS provides a number of tools and resources to help State and local officials leverage their
22 knowledge to create infrastructure inventories that contribute to the federated IDW. This
23 includes the Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System (C/ACAMS) that
24 help State and local officials leverage their knowledge to create infrastructure inventories,
25 implement practical CIKR protection programs, and facilitate information-sharing within
26 and across State and local boundaries, as well as with DHS and other Federal partners. By
Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System
C/ACAMS is a Web-enabled information services portal that helps State and local governments
build CIKR protection programs in their local jurisdictions. Specifically, C/ACAMS provides a set
of tools and resources that help law enforcement, public safety, and emergency response
personnel to:
Collect and use CIKR asset data,
Assess CIKR asset vulnerabilities,
Develop all-hazards incident response and recovery plans, and
Build public/private partnerships.
The Constellation portion of C/ACAMS is an information gathering and analysis tool that allows
users to search a range of free and subscription reporting sources to find relevant information
tailored to their jurisdiction's needs. ACAMS is a secure, online database and database
management platform that allows for the collection and management of CIKR asset data; the
cataloguing, screening and sorting of this data; the production of tailored infrastructure reports;
and the development of a variety of pre- and post-incident response plans useful to strategic and
operational planners and tactical commanders. Email ACAMS-info@hq.dhs.gov for additional
information.

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1 sharing first-hand knowledge and understanding through tools such as C/ACAMS, State
2 and local partners contribute directly to the national CIKR protection mission.
3 Additional information on State roles and responsibilities in this area is contained in
4 appendix 3C.
5 3.2.5 Identifying Cyber Infrastructure
6 The NIPP addresses the protection of the cyber elements of CIKR in an integrated manner
7 rather than as a separate consideration. As a component of the sector-specific risk assess-
8 ment process, cyber infrastructure (assets, systems, and networks) should be identified
9 individually or included as a cyber element of a larger asset, system, or network’s
10 description if they are associated with one. The identification process should include
11 information on international cyber infrastructure with cross-border implications,
12 interdependencies, or cross-sector ramifications. The following list provides examples of
13 cyber assets, systems, or networks that exist in most, if not all, sectors:
14 Business Systems: Cyber systems used to manage or support common business
15 processes and operations. Examples of business systems include Enterprise Resource
16 Planning, e-commerce, e-mail, and R&D systems.
17 Control Systems: Cyber systems used within many infrastructure and industries to
18 monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. Control systems
19 typically collect measurement and operational data from the field, process and display
20 the information, and relay control commands to local or remote equipment or human-
21 machine interfaces (operators). Examples of control systems include SCADA, Process
22 Control Systems, and Distributed Control Systems.
23 Access Control Systems: Cyber systems allowing only authorized personnel and
24 visitors physical access to defined areas of a facility. Access control systems provide
25 monitoring and control of personnel passing throughout a facility by various means,
26 including electronic card readers, biometrics, and radio frequency identification.
27 Warning and Alert Systems: Cyber systems are used for alert and notification
28 purposes in many security missions, including homeland security. These systems pass
29 critical information that triggers protection and response actions for organizations and
30 individual citizens. Examples include local phone-based hazard alerting systems used
31 by some local governments and the Emergency Alert System established by the Federal
32 Communications Commission (FCC), and its National Oceanic and Atmospheric
33 Administration Weather Radio, which is an all-hazards alerting system provided by the
34 Department of Commerce.
35 The Internet has been identified as a key resource comprised of domestic and international
36 assets within both the Information Technology and Communications sectors, and is used by
37 all sectors to varying degrees. While the availability of the service is the responsibility of
38 both the Information Technology and Communications sectors, the need for access to and
39 reliance on the Internet is common to all sectors.
40 DHS supports SSAs and other CIKR partners by developing tools and methodologies to
41 assist in identifying cyber assets, systems, and networks, including those that involve
42 multiple sectors. As needed, DHS works with sector representatives to help identify cyber
43 infrastructure within the NIPP risk management framework. For example, DHS

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1 collaborates with the Department of Education in addressing cyber protection and
2 resiliency for schools.
3 Additionally, DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, provides cross-sector cyber
4 methodologies that, when applied, enable sectors to identify cyber assets, systems, and
5 networks that may have nationally significant consequences if destroyed, incapacitated, or
6 exploited. These methodologies also characterize the reliance of a sector’s business and
7 operational functionality on cyber assets, systems, and networks. Also, if an appropriate
8 cyber asset identification methodology is already being used within the sector, DHS will
9 work with the sector to ensure alignment of that methodology with the NIPP risk
10 management framework.
11 3.2.6 Identifying Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services
12 Space-based and terrestrial positioning, navigation, and timing services are a component of
13 multiple CIKR sectors. These services underpin almost every aspect of transportation
14 across all its various modes. Additionally, the Banking and Finance, Communications,
15 Energy, and Water sectors rely on GPS as their primary timing source. The systems that
16 support or enable critical functions in the CIKR sectors should be identified, either as part
17 of, or independent of the infrastructure, as appropriate. Examples of CIKR functions that
18 depend on positioning, navigation, and timing services include: aviation (navigation, air
19 traffic control, surface guidance); maritime (harbor, inland waterway vessel movement);
20 surface transportation (rail, hazmat tracking); communications networks (global fiber and
21 wireless networks); and power grids.
22 3.3 Assess Risks

23 Common definitions, scenarios, assumptions, metrics and processes are needed to ensure
24 CIKR risk assessments contribute to a shared understanding among CIKR partners. The
25 approach outlined by the NIPP risk management framework results in a sound, scenario-
26 based consequence estimate, along with an assessment of the vulnerabilities to that
27 scenario and the likelihood that this threat scenario would occur.
28 Figure 3-4: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Assess Risks
29
30
31 The NIPP framework calls for CIKR partners to assess risk from any scenario as a function
32 of consequence, vulnerability, and threat, as defined below.

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1 R = f (C,V,T)
2 Consequence: The result of a terrorist attack or other hazard that reflects the level,
3 duration, and nature of the loss resulting from the incident. For the purposes of the
4 NIPP, consequences are divided into four main categories: public health and safety (i.e.,
5 loss of life and illness); economic (direct and indirect), psychological and
6 governance/mission impacts.
7 Vulnerability: Weakness, condition, or quality of being open to exploitation or exposed
8 to natural or man-made threats, harm or attack. When vulnerability is assessed for risk
9 estimates, it is an estimate of the likelihood that a threat or hazard, if initiated, would
10 adversely impact an asset, system, or network.
11 Threat: An entity, action, or occurrence, whether natural or man-made, that has or
12 indicates the potential to pose violence or danger to life, information, operations, and/or
13 property. When threat is assessed to contribute to risk estimates, it is an estimate of the
14 likelihood that the hazardous action or occurrence will happen. In the case of natural
15 hazards, the threat likelihood is estimated based on an analysis of past incidents of that
16 hazard type at a given location. In the case of terrorist attacks, the threat likelihood is
17 estimated based on the intent and capability of the adversary.
DHS uses geospatial tools to visualize consequence, vulnerabilities and threats to CIKR. The
iCAV system is a Web-based geospatial analytical and situational awareness system consisting of
imagery, government-owned and licensed data, and dynamic, mission-specific information
integrating threats, weather, and situation awareness information. Imagery fused with data
layers and information feeds provides users with a rapid, common situational awareness of
threats, events (natural or man-made), CIKR, population centers that are impacted to support
coordinated preparedness, response and recovery activities. iCAV unites partners at Federal,
State, local, tribal, territorial and other non-government partners through an integrated
geographic Common Operating Picture (COP) for information-sharing, analysis, visualization,
and dissemination
18
19 Risk assessments for CIKR protection consider all three components of risk and are
20 conducted on assets, systems, or networks, depending on the characteristics of the
21 infrastructure being examined. Once the three components of risk have been assessed for
22 one or more given assets, systems, or networks, they must be integrated with a defensible
23 model to produce a site, sector, region, national, or international risk estimate.
One program that provides a key synthesizing assessment for the Federal NIPP community is the
Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA). This is an annual collaborative
process conducted in coordination with interested members of the CIKR protection community to
assess and analyze the risks to the Nation’s infrastructure from terrorism as well as natural and
manmade hazards. The information derived through the SHIRA process feeds a number of
analytic products, including the National Risk Profile, the foundation of the congressionally
mandated National CIKR Protection Annual Report, as well as individual Sector Risk Profiles. As
this process matures, the general approach for producing a shared risk assessment with a common
risk model for CIKR will begin to produce multiple, tailored Homeland Infrastructure Risk
Assessments (HIRAs), with SHIRA focusing on a strategic, cross-sector perspective, supported by
a set of regional, State, and local HIRAs.

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1 DHS conducts risk analyses for each of the 18 CIKR sectors, working in close collaboration
2 with SSAs, State and local authorities, and private sector owners and operators. This
3 includes execution of the SHIRA data call that provides input to risk analysis programs and
4 projects and considers data collected more broadly through other IP program activities as
5 well.
6 DHS has identified a number of core risk assessment characteristics and data requirements
7 to produce results that will support consistent cross-sector risk comparisons; these are
8 termed Essential Features. These features provide a guide for improving existing
9 methodologies or modifying them so the investment and expertise they represent can be
10 used to support national-level, comparative risk assessment, investments, and incident
11 response planning, and resource prioritization. The Essential Features are summarized in
12 Appendix 3A in checklist form and discussed below.
20
13 3.3.1 NIPP Risk Assessment Essential Features
14 Risk assessments are conducted by many CIKR partners to meet their own decision needs,
15 and not all of these assessments will require the Essential Features specified here.
16 Whenever possible, however, DHS seeks to use information from partners’ assessments to
17 contribute to an understanding of risks across sectors and throughout the Nation, to
18 increase clear understanding among affected CIKR partners. Recognizing that many risk
19 assessment methodologies are under development and others evolve in a dynamic
20 environment, these Essential Features provide a guide to future adaptations and are
21 designed to assure utility to national cross-sector risk comparisons:
22 Documented: The methodology and the assessment must clearly document what
23 information is used and how it is synthesized to generate a risk estimate. Any
24 assumptions, weighting factors and subjective judgments need to be clear to the user of
25 the methodology, its audience, and others who are expected to use the results. A
26 description should be provided of the decisions the risk assessment is designed to
27 support and the timeframe (e.g., current, next year, next five years) considered in the
28 assessment.
29 Objective: The methodology must produce comparable, repeatable results, even
30 though assessments of different CIKR will be performed by different analysts or teams
31 of analysts. It must minimize the number and impact of subjective judgments, leaving
32 policy and value judgments to be applied by decision makers.
33 Defensible: The risk methodology must logically integrate its components, making
34 appropriate use of the professional disciplines relevant to the analysis, as well as be free
35 from significant errors or omissions. The uncertainty associated with consequence
36 estimates and confidence in the vulnerability and threat estimates should be
37 communicated.
20 The phrase “Baseline Criteria”, used in the 2006 edition of the NIPP has been adjusted to reflect our partners’ path toward maturity. Baseline Criteria is most
often understood as a minimal standard. In implementing the NIPP it was discovered that, since the need to assess and compare risks across infrastructure
sectors in a voluntary collaboration was a substantially new requirement, very few existing approaches fulfill the need. The phrase “Essential Features” and the
strong correlation with the cross-sector comparison purposes of the NIPP is meant to clarify that these are necessary design characteristics to support the goals
of the NIPP. They should be pursued. Not having already incorporated these features, however, does not constitute a failure to exercise reasonable risk
management for owners and operators.

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1 Complete 21: The methodology must assess consequence, vulnerability and threat for
2 every defined scenario and include the specific Core Elements for each. Core Elements
3 are featured throughout this chapter and include steps or considerations that should be
4 addressed when analyzing consequences, vulnerabilities, or threat.
5 3.3.2 Risk Scenario Identification
6 All risk is assessed with respect to a specific scenario or set of scenarios. Simply put, the
7 risk scenario answers the question “the risk of what?” A risk scenario has three parts –
8 what the risk is to, what the risk is from, and the relevant conditions, such as “during peak
9 occupancy” or “during maximum load when alternate components are in maintenance”. All
10 consequence, vulnerability, and threat estimates are specific to the risk scenario. Risks can
11 be assessed for assets, networks, systems, and defined combinations of these. In the case of
12 risks from terrorism, the subject of the risk assessment is commonly called the target.
13 The risk scenario also identifies the potential source of harm. For terrorism, the risk
14 scenario must include the means of attack and delivery, such as a 4000 pound TNT-
15 equivalent vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). In the case of natural
16 hazards, the risk scenario must include the type and magnitude of the hazard (e.g., a
17 Category 5 Hurricane or an earthquake of 6.5 on the Richter scale).
18 Last, the scenario must identify the conditions that are relevant to calculating consequence,
19 vulnerability, and threat. DHS uses reasonable worst-case conditions to assess terrorism
20 risks because intelligent adversaries can choose circumstances where targets are
21 vulnerable and consequences are maximized. The concept of worst case (that combination of
22 conditions that would make the most harmful results the ones that occur) is moderated by
23 reason. Scenarios should not compound in complexity to include numerous unlikely
24 conditions, unless the focus of the contingency and other planning is on extremely rare
25 events. Neither should scenarios be based simply on average conditions. Each type of target
26 will have different characteristics needed to accurately describe reasonable worst-case
27 conditions, such as a stadium’s maximum capacity, the storage volume of a particularly
28 hazardous material at a chemical facility, or the height and duration of a high water level
29 at a dam.
30 3.3.3 Consequence Assessment
31 The consequences that are considered for the national-level comparative risk assessment
32 are based on the criteria set forth in HSPD-7. These criteria can be divided into four main
33 categories:
34 Public Health and Safety Impact: Effect on human life and physical well-being (e.g.,
35 fatalities, injuries/illness);
36 Economic Impact: Direct and indirect economic losses (e.g., cost to rebuild asset, cost
37 to respond to and recover from attack, downstream costs resulting from disruption of
38 product or service, long-term costs due to environmental damage);
21 The completeness of a risk analytic methodology is dependent on the access and authority of the organization conducting the assessment. When an
organization lacks the information to assess particular points, the lack of this information should be noted as part of the assessment, so that other organizations
which have the information may contribute to closing the gap.

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1 Psychological Impact: Effect on public morale and confidence in national economic
2 and political institutions; this encompasses those changes in perceptions emerging after
3 a significant incident that affect the public’s sense of safety and well-being and can
4 manifest in aberrant behavior; and
5 Impact on Government: Effect on the government’s ability to maintain order, deliver
6 minimum essential public services, ensure public health and safety, and carry out
7 national security-related missions.
8 Under the general rubric of “impact on government” are several discrete, federally
9 mandated missions that may be disrupted. Although many of these missions are directly
10 fulfilled by government agencies, some are fulfilled by the private sector and government
11 actions can serve to either foster a healthy environment for them, or inadvertently disrupt
12 them. These include the responsibility to ensure national security, perform other Federal
13 missions; ensure public health; maintain order; enable the provision of essential public
14 services; and ensure an orderly economy.
15 There are indirect and cascading impacts of disruptions that are difficult to understand,
16 and may be more difficult to value. Some may already be accounted for in estimates of
17 economic losses, while others may require further metrics development to enable them to be
18 considered in a more comprehensive risk assessment. Ongoing work with NIPP partners
19 will pursue solutions to these challenges, aiming to improve our ability to compare and
20 prioritize mission-disruption losses in addition to the other types of consequences of
21 concern.
22 A full consequence assessment takes into consideration all four consequence criteria;
23 however, estimating potential indirect impacts requires the use of numerous assumptions
24 and other complex variables. An assessment of all categories of consequence may be beyond
25 the capabilities available (or precision needed) for a given risk assessment. At a minimum,
26 assessments should focus on the two most fundamental impacts—the human consequences
27 and the most relevant direct economic consequences.
28 3.3.3.1 Consequence Assessment Methodologies that Enable National Risk Analysis
29 DHS works with CIKR partners to develop or improve consequence assessment
30 methodologies that can be applied to a variety of asset, system, or network types and
31 produce comparable quantitative consequence estimates. Consequence analysis should
32 ideally address both direct and indirect effects. Many assets, systems, and networks depend
33 on connections to other CIKR to function. For example, nearly all sectors share
34 relationships with elements of the Energy, Information Technology, Communications,
35 Banking and Finance, and Transportation sectors. In many cases, the failure of an asset or
36 system in one sector will impact the ability of inter-related assets or systems in the same or
37 another sector to perform necessary functions. Furthermore, cyber interdependencies
38 present unique challenges for all sectors because of the borderless nature of cyberspace.
39 Interdependencies are dual in nature (e.g., the Energy Sector relies on computer-based
40 control systems to manage the electric power grid, while those same control systems require
41 electric power to operate). As a result, complete consequence analysis addresses both CIKR
42 dependencies and interdependencies for the purposes of NIPP risk assessment.

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1 Various Federal and State entities, including national laboratories, are developing
2 sophisticated models and simulations to identify dependencies and interdependencies
3 within and across sectors. The Federal Government established the National Infrastructure
4 Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) to support these efforts (see Section 6.4.2). The
5 NISAC is chartered to develop advanced modeling, simulation, and analysis capabilities for
6 the Nation’s CIKR. These tools and analyses address dependencies and interdependencies,
7 both physical and cyber, in an all-hazards context. These sophisticated models enhance the
8 Nation’s understanding of CIKR dependencies and interdependencies to better inform
9 decision-makers, especially for cross-sector priorities in the areas of policy analysis,
10 investment, prevention and mitigation planning, education, training, and crisis response.
11 The level of detail and specificity achieved by using the most sophisticated models and
12 simulations may not be practical or necessary for all assets, systems, or networks. In these
13 circumstances, a simplified dependency and interdependency analysis based on expert
14 judgment may provide sufficient insight to make informed risk management decisions in a
15 timely manner.
16 3.3.3.2 Consequence Uncertainty
17 There is an element of uncertainty in consequence estimates. Even when a scenario with
18 reasonable worst-case conditions is clearly stated and consistently applied, there is often a
19 range of outcomes that could occur. For some incidents, the consequence range is small and
20 a single estimate may provide sufficient information to support decisions. If the range of
21 outcomes is large, the scenario may require more specificity about conditions to obtain
22 appropriate estimates of outcomes. However, if the scenario is broken down to a reasonable
23 level of granularity and there is still a significant uncertainty, the single estimate should be
24 accompanied by the uncertainty range to support more informed decisionmaking. The best
25 way to communicate uncertainty will depend on the factors that make the outcome
26 uncertain as well as the amount and type of information that is available.
Core Elements – Consequence Assessment

Document the scenarios assessed, tools used, and any key assumptions made
Estimate fatalities, injuries, and illnesses (where applicable and feasible)
Assess psychological impacts and mission disruption where feasible
Estimate the economic loss in dollars, stating which costs are included and what duration was
considered
If monetizing human health consequences, document the value(s) used and assumptions made
Consider and document any protective or consequence mitigation measures that have their
effect after the incident has occurred such as the rerouting of systems or HAZMAT or fire and
rescue response
27
28 3.3.4 Vulnerability Assessment
29 Vulnerabilities are the characteristics of asset, system, or network design, location, CIKR
30 protection posture, process, or operation that render it susceptible to destruction,
31 incapacitation, or exploitation by mechanical failures, natural hazards, terrorist attacks, or
32 other malicious acts. Vulnerabilities may be associated with physical (e.g., broken fence),
33 cyber (e.g., lack of a firewall), or human (e.g., untrained guard force) factors.

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1
2 A vulnerability assessment can be a stand-alone process or be part of a full risk assessment.
3 The vulnerability assessment involves the evaluation of specific threats to the asset,
4 system, or network under review to identify areas of weakness that could result in
5 consequences of concern.
6 3.3.4.1 Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies that Enable National Risk Analysis
7 Many different vulnerability assessment approaches are used in the different CIKR sectors
8 and by various government authorities. The primary vulnerability assessment
9 methodologies used in each sector are described in the respective SSPs. The SSPs also
10 provide specific detail regarding how the assessments can be carried out (e.g., by whom and
11 how often). The results of vulnerability assessments need to be comparable in order to
12 contribute to national-level, cross-
California Water System Comprehensive Review
13 sector risk analysis. As with risk
14 assessments, vulnerability Federal, State, and local stakeholders collaborated
15 assessments should have the same successfully to complete the first systems-based
16 Essential Features (i.e., be Comprehensive Review (CR). A systems-based CR is a
17 documented, objective, defensible, cooperative government–led analysis of CIKR facilities.
18 and complete) if the results are to The California Water System CR required extensive
coordination, planning, research, data collection, and
19 be compared at a national, cross-
outreach to State and local partners to identify critical
20 sector level. In addition, assets and system interdependencies. DHS, in
21 vulnerability-specific Core conjunction with Federal and California State partners
22 Elements are provided at the end worked with facility owners and operators to identify
23 of this section, below. critical water system assets. This system consists of 161
assets spanning 33 counties. The review determined that
24 3.3.4.2 SSA and DHS Analysis 40 of the 161 assets were critical assets. DHS completed
25 Responsibilities 32 on site vulnerability assessments and six Emergency
26 SSAs and their sector partners are Services Capabilities Assessments. DHS met with site
27 responsible for collecting and owners and operators, California State and local law
28 documenting the vulnerability enforcement and emergency management entities to
29 assessment approaches used analyze and track the gaps, potential enhancements, and
30 within their sectors. Owners or the protective measures that were identified and
31 operators typically perform the evaluate vulnerability mitigation and grant funding
effectiveness.
32 vulnerability assessments,
33 sometimes with facilitation by government authorities. SSAs are also responsible for
34 compiling, where possible, vulnerability assessment results for use in sector and national
35 risk analysis efforts. In addition, SSAs are responsible for identifying and working with
36 DHS to validate the results of assessments for assets, systems, and networks that are of the
37 greatest concern from the SSA’s perspective. SSAs should involve owners and operators in
38 this effort whenever possible. Vulnerability assessment information may be submitted by
39 owner/operators for validation as PCII under the PCII Program (see Section 4.3, Protection
40 of Sensitive CIKR Information). The PCII Program Manager may designate some
41 information as "categorically included" PCII (See Section 4.3.1 below “Protected Critical
42 Infrastructure Information Program”). This designation provides the SSA with the option to
43 receive the categorically included CII directly from the submitter. This arrangement is

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1 based on pre-approval from the PCII Program Office and is approved on a case-by-case
2 basis.
3 DHS is responsible for ensuring that appropriate vulnerability assessments are performed
4 for nationally critical CIKR. DHS works with CIKR owners and operators, the SSAs, and
5 sometimes State and local authorities, to either perform the assessment or to verify the
6 sufficiency and applicability of previously performed assessments to support risk
7 management decisions.
8 DHS also conducts or supports vulnerability assessments that address the specific needs of
9 the NIPP’s approach to CIKR protection and risk management. Such assessments may:
10 More fully investigate dependencies and interdependencies;
11 Serve as a basis for developing common vulnerability reports that can help identify
12 strategic needs for protective programs or R&D across sectors or subsectors;
13 Fill gaps when sectors or owners or operators have not yet completed assessments, even
14 though decision-making requires such studies immediately; and
15 Test and validate new methodologies or streamlined approaches for assessing
16 vulnerability.
17 In some sectors and subsectors, vulnerability assessments have never been performed or
18 may have been performed for only a small number of high-profile or high-value assets,
19 systems, or networks. To help assist in closing this gap, DHS works with SSAs, owners and
20 operators, and other CIKR partners to provide the following:
21 Vulnerability assessment tools that may be
NCSD has developed the Cyber Security
22 used as part of self-assessment processes;
Vulnerability Assessment (CSVA), a
23 Informative reports for industrial sectors, flexible and scalable approach that
24 classes of activities, and high-consequence analyzes an entity’s cyber security
25 or at-risk special event sites; posture and describes gaps and targeted
26 Generally accepted risk assessment considerations that can reduce overall
cyber risks. It assesses the policies,
27 principles for major classes of activities and
plans, and procedures in place to reduce
28 high-consequence or at-risk special event cyber vulnerability in 10 categories (e.g.,
29 sites; access control, configuration
30 Assistance in the development and sharing management, physical security of cyber
31 of industry-based standards and tools; assets, etc.) and leverages various
recognized standards, guidance, and
32 Recommendations regarding the frequency
methodologies (e.g., International
33 of assessments, particularly in light of Organization for Standardization 27001,
34 emergent threats; Information Systems Audit and Control
35 Site assistance visits and vulnerability Association Control Objects for
36 assessments of specific CIKR as requested Information and related Technology, and
37 by owners and operators, when resources the National Institute of Standards and
38 allow; and Technology Special Publication 800
series).
39 Cyber vulnerability assessment best
40 practices. (DHS works to leverage established methodologies that have traditionally
41 focused on physical vulnerabilities by enhancing them to better address cyber
42 elements).

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1 Some vulnerability assessments will include both vulnerability analysis and consequence
2 analysis for specified scenarios.
Core Elements – Vulnerability Assessment

Identify vulnerabilities associated with physical, cyber, or human factors (openness to both
insider and outsider threats), critical dependencies, and physical proximity to hazards. Collect
sufficient information to form an estimate for each attack scenario
Account for the protective measures in place and how they reduce the vulnerability for each
attack type
In evaluating security vulnerabilities, estimate the relative strength of collective protective
measures
In evaluating security vulnerabilities, develop estimates of the likelihood of adversaries’
success for each attack scenario
3
4 3.3.5 Threat Assessment
5 The remaining factor to be considered in the NIPP risk assessment process is the
6 assessment of threat. A threat is a natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or
7 action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the
8 environment, and/or property. In evaluating threats as part of a risk assessment, the factor
9 of importance is the likelihood that this threat will materialize. The severity of the threat,
10 in the context of terrorism risk assessment, is estimated based on an analysis of intent and
11 capability of a defined adversary, such as a terrorist group.
12 Assessment of the current terrorist threat to the United States is derived from extensive
13 study and understanding of terrorists and terrorist organizations, and frequently is
14 dependent on analysis of classified information. DHS provides its partners with Federal
15 Government-coordinated unclassified assessments of potential terrorist threats and
16 appropriate access to classified assessments where necessary and authorized. These threat
17 assessments are derived from analyses of adversary intent and capability, and describe
18 what is known about terrorist interest in particular CIKR sectors, as well as specific attack
19 methods. Since international terrorists, in particular, have continually demonstrated
20 flexibility and unpredictability, DHS and its partners in the Intelligence Community also
21 analyze known terrorist goals and developing capabilities to provide CIKR owners and
22 operators with a broad view of the potential threat and postulated terrorist attack methods.
23 3.3.5.1 Key Aspects of the Terrorist Threat to CIKR
24 Analysis of terrorist goals and motivations reveals that domestic and international CIKR
25 are potentially prime targets for terrorist attack; given the deeply rooted nature of these
26 goals and motivations, CIKR likely will remain highly attractive targets for terrorists.
27 Threat assessments must address the various elements of CIKR – physical, cyber, and
28 human – depending on the attack type and target. Physical attacks, including the
29 exploitation of physical elements of CIKR, represent the attack method most frequently
30 used overtly by terrorists.
31 There are increasing indicators that potential adversaries intend to conduct cyber attacks
32 and are actively acquiring cyber attack capabilities. Cyber attacks may not only target the
33 Internet, but rather they may use it as a means of attack or for other purposes that support

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1 terrorist activities. Additionally, the increasing ease with which powerful cyber attack tools
2 can be obtained and used puts the capability of conducting cyber attacks within reach of
3 most groups or individuals who wish to do harm to the United States. However, credible
4 information on specific adversaries is often not available. As such, DHS collaborates with
5 the law enforcement and intelligence communities and the private sector to more accurately
6 portray the possible ways in which the cyber threat may affect CIKR, including the
7 exploitation of the Internet as a weapon.
8 Another important aspect in this element of risk is the long-standing threat posed by
9 insiders, or persons who have access to sensitive information and facilities. Insider threats
10 can result from intentional actions, such as infiltration of the organization by terrorists, or
11 unintentional actions, such as employees who are exploited or unknowingly manipulated to
12 provide access to, or information about, CIKR. Insiders can intentionally compromise the
13 security of CIKR through espionage, sabotage, or other harmful acts motivated by the
14 rewards offered to them by a terrorist or other party. Others may provide unwitting
15 assistance to an adversary through lack of awareness of the need for or methods to protect
16 assets or employees (e.g., by leaving security badges and uniforms in open areas). CIKR
17 owners and operators, as well as authorities with protection responsibilities, can screen and
18 monitor employees in sensitive positions. These efforts often benefit from the support of
19 Federal regulations and programs that relate to security clearances and employment-
20 related screening.
21
Core Elements – Threat Assessment
For adversary-specific threat assessments:
Account for the access to the target and the opportunity to attack it
Identify attack methods that may be employed
Consider the level of capability that an adversary demonstrates for an attack method
Consider the degree of the adversaries’ intent to attack the target
Estimate threat as the likelihood that the adversary would attempt a given attack method at the
target
For natural disasters and accidental hazards:
Use best-available analytic tools and historical data to estimate the likelihood of these events
affecting CIKR
22
23
24 3.3.6 Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center
25 The DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) conducts
26 integrated threat and risk analyses for CIKR sectors. HITRAC is a joint fusion center that
27 spans both the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)—a member of the Intelligence
28 Community—and IP. As called for in section 201 of the Homeland Security Act, HITRAC
29 brings together intelligence and infrastructure specialists to ensure a sufficient
30 understanding of the risks to the Nation’s CIKR from foreign and domestic threats.
31 HITRAC works in partnership with the U.S. Intelligence Community and national law
32 enforcement to integrate and analyze intelligence and law enforcement information in

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1 threat and risk analysis products. HITRAC also works in partnership with the SSAs and
2 owners and operators to ensure that their expertise on infrastructure operations is
3 integrated into HITRAC’s analysis.
4 HITRAC develops analytical products by combining threat assessments based on all source
5 information and intelligence analysis with vulnerability and consequence assessments. This
6 process provides an understanding of the threat, CIKR vulnerabilities, and potential
7 consequences of attacks. When identified, the analyses also include potential options for
8 managing the risk. This combination of intelligence and practical CIKR knowledge allows
9 DHS to provide products that contain strategically relevant and actionable information. It
10 also allows DHS to identify intelligence collection requirements in conjunction with CIKR
11 partners so that the intelligence community can provide the type of information necessary
12 to support the CIKR risk management and protection missions. HITRAC coordinates
13 closely with partners outside the Federal Government through the SCCs, GCCs, ISACs,
14 and State and Local Fusion Centers to ensure that its products are relevant to partner
15 needs and accessible.
16 3.3.6.1 Threat and Incident Information
17 DHS leverages 24/7 intelligence and operations monitoring and reporting from multiple
18 sources to provide analysis based on the most current information available on threats,
19 incidents, and infrastructure status. The real-time analysis of information provided by DHS
20 is of unique value to CIKR partners and helps them determine if changes are needed in
21 steady-state CIKR risk management measures.
22 DHS uses a variety of tools and systems to capture incident and threat warnings within the
23 24/7 intelligence and operation centers. iCAV ingests and visualizes these incident reports
24 and threat warnings allowing analysts to deliver a geospatial context to numerous
25 information systems. It facilitates fusing information from suspicious activity sources, and
26 provides situational awareness tracking for disasters such as hurricanes and other real-
27 time events. This fusion provides DHS, States, and local jurisdictions and the private sector
28 with a rapid, common understanding of the relationships between these events to support
29 coordinated event risk mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities.
30 Specialized products that directly support the NIPP and SSPs include incident reports and
31 threat warnings, which are made available to appropriate partners.
32 Incident Reports: DHS monitors information on incidents to provide reports that CIKR
33 owners and operators and other decision makers can use when considering how evolving
34 incidents might affect their CIKR protection posture. This reporting provides a responsive
35 and credible source to verify or expand on information that CIKR partners may receive
36 initially through news media, the Internet, or other sources. DHS works with multiple
37 government and private sector operations and watch centers to combine situation reports
38 from law enforcement, intelligence, and private sector sources with infrastructure status
39 and operational expertise to rapidly produce reports from a trusted source. These help
40 inform the decisions of owners and operators regarding changes in risk-mitigation
41 measures that are needed to respond to incidents in progress, such as rail or subway
42 bombings overseas that may call for precautionary actions domestically.

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1 Strategic Threat Assessments: HITRAC works with the Intelligence Community and
2 with DHS’ partners to collect information on adversaries that pose a threat to CIKR, their
3 capabilities, and intent to attack. HITRAC provides a high-level assessment of terrorist
4 groups and other adversaries to the SSAs in order to inform their SSPs and prioritization
5 efforts.
6 Threat Warnings: DHS fuses all-source information to provide analysis of emergent
7 threats on a timely basis. Many of the indicators that are reported by intelligence or law
8 enforcement are not associated with an incident in progress, but are the product of careful
9 intelligence collection. Such indicators also may be of significance only when interpreted in
10 the context of infrastructure operational or status information. DHS monitors the flows of
11 intelligence, law enforcement, and private sector security information on a 24/7 basis in
12 light of the business, operational, and status expertise provided by its owner and operator
13 partners to produce relevant threat warnings for CIKR protection. This analysis clarifies
14 the implications of intelligence reporting about targeted locations or sectors, potential
15 attack methods and timing, or the specific nature of an emerging threat.
16 3.3.6.2 Risk Analysis
17 HITRAC uses risk analysis and other TRIPwire Community Gateway
18 approaches to aid CIKR partners in The TRIPwire Community Gateway (TWCG) is a
19 identifying, assessing, and prioritizing new TRIPwire web portal designed specifically for
20 risk management approaches. HITRAC the Nation’s CIKR owners, operators, and private
21 also develops specialized products for security personnel. TWCG provides expert threat
22 strategic planning that directly support analyses, reports, and relevant planning
23 the NIPP and SSPs. In addition to documents to help key private sector partners
24 these specific products, HITRAC anticipate, identify, and prevent IED incidents.
25 produces strategic assessments and TWCG shares IED related information tailored to
each of the 18 sectors of CIKR. Sector partners
26 trend analyses that help define the
benefit from increased communication, improved
27 evolving risk to the Nation’s CIKR. awareness of emerging threats, and access to
28 Requirements-Based resources and guidance on specific IED
preventive and protective measures for their
29 Infrastructure Risk Analysis:
facilities and requirements.
30 National, cross-sector, sector-
31 specific, regional, state, and site-specific risk analyses and assessments aid decision-
32 makers with planning and prioritizing risk-reduction measures within and across the
33 CIKR sectors. These analyses and assessments leverage a number of analytic
34 approaches, including the SHIRA process, which are tailored to the particular decision
35 support needs of its partners.
36 CIKR Prioritization: HITRAC works with CIKR partners to identify and prioritize
37 the assets, systems, and networks most critical to the Nation through the Tier 1/Tier 2
38 Program for critical assets, systems, networks, nodes, and functions within the United
39 States, and the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) for those same CIKR
40 outside of the United States. The prioritized lists of CIKR are used to guide the
41 Nation’s protective and incident management responses, such as the various homeland
42 security grant programs.
43 Infrastructure Risk Analysis Partnership Program (IRAPP): IRAPP assists
44 partners interested in pursuing their own CIKR risk analysis, whether in the Federal,

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1 State, local, or private sector CIKR protection communities. IRAPP involves customized
2 support to interested partners, and the sharing of best practices across the CIKR
3 protection community.
4 CFIUS Support: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
5 is an inter-agency committee of the United States Government that reviews the
6 national security implications of foreign investments of U.S. companies or operations.
7 HITRAC provides support to CFIUS by developing written threat and risk assessments
8 of foreign direct investment in the United States and evaluating the potential risks
9 posed by foreign acquisition of U.S. infrastructure. HITRAC also supports DHS efforts
10 to manage those risks through the interagency CFIUS process.
11 Critical Infrastructure Red Team (CIRT): The CIRT program focuses its analysis
12 on high-risk sectors/sub-sectors and high-risk attack methods from the perspective of
13 our nation’s adversaries by conducting open source analysis, developing operational
14 plans, and exercising these scenarios through tabletop exercises and developing lessons
15 learned from those activities. These efforts identify gaps in current strategies and risk
16 reduction programs for the Nation’s CIKR, and support the development of
17 recommendations for closing or managing the identified gaps.
18 Risk Analysis Development: The Risk Analysis Development Program works to
19 improve the capabilities available to CIKR risk analysts and risk managers both in
20 DHS and among the rest of the NIPP stakeholders. The program conducts research and
21 development to establish and extend a common risk model for CIKR allowing sound
22 cross-sector comparisons supporting the full range of risk management decisions, and
23 new approaches that contribute to common understanding of risk and good risk
24 management.
25 3.4 Prioritize
26 Prioritizing risk management efforts on the most significant CIKR helps focus planning,
27 increase coordination, and support effective resource allocation and incident management,
28 response, and restoration decisions.
29 Figure 3-5: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Prioritize
30
31 The NIPP risk management framework is applicable to risk assessments on an asset,
32 system, network, function, sector, State, regional, or national basis. Comparing the risk
33 faced by different entities helps identify where risk mitigation is needed, and to
34 subsequently determine and help justify the most cost-effective risk management options.
35 This identifies which CIKR should be given priority for risk management activities and
36 which alternative options represent the best investment based on their risk-reduction

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1 return on investment. The prioritization process also develops information that can be used
2 during incident response to help inform decision makers regarding issues associated with
3 CIKR restoration.
4 3.4.1 The Prioritization Process
5 The prioritization process involves aggregating, combining, and analyzing risk assessment
6 results to determine which assets, systems, networks, sectors, or combinations of these face
7 the highest risk so that risk management priorities can be established. It also provides the
8 basis for understanding the risk-mitigation benefits that, along with costs, are used to
9 support planning and the informed allocation of resources.
10 This process involves two related activities: The first determines which sectors, regions, or
11 other aggregation of CIKR assets, systems, or networks have the highest risk from relevant
12 incidents or events. Of those with similar risk levels, the CIKR with the highest expected
13 losses are accorded the highest priority in risk management program development. The
14 second activity determines which actions are expected to provide the greatest mitigation of
15 risk for any given investment. The risk management initiatives that result in the greatest
16 risk mitigation for the investment proposed are accorded the highest priority in program
17 design, resource allocation, budgeting, and implementation. This approach ensures that
18 programs make the greatest contribution possible to overall CIKR risk mitigation given the
19 available resources.
20 Assessments become more complex at different aggregations, such as when comparisons are
21 necessary across sectors, across different geographic areas, or against different types of
22 events. Using a common approach with consistent assumptions and metrics increases the
23 defensibility of such comparisons. Without this, such assessments are much more
24 challenging. Less informed assessments rely heavily on the subjective interpretation of
25 estimates derived from whatever data can be collected, as well as successful resolution of
26 differences in assumptions.
27 3.4.2 Tailoring Prioritization Approaches to Sector and Decisionmakers’ Needs
28 CIKR partners rely on different approaches to prioritize risk management activities
29 according to their authorities, specific sector needs, risk landscapes, security approaches,
30 and business environment. For example, owners and operators, federal agencies, and State
31 and local authorities all have different options available to them to help reduce risk. Asset-
32 focused priorities may be appropriate for CIKR whose risk is predominately associated with
33 facilities, the local environment, and physical attacks, especially those that can be exploited
34 and used as weapons. Function-focused priorities may more effectively ensure continuity of
35 operations in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster in sectors where CIKR
36 resilience may be more important than CIKR hardening. Programs to reduce CIKR risk
37 give priority to investments that protect physical assets or ensure resilience in virtual
38 systems depending on which option best enables cost-effective CIKR risk management.
39 To ensure a consistent approach to risk analysis for CIKR protection, partners establish
40 priorities using on risk analysis that are consistent with the parameters of risk assessment
41 methodologies set out in appendix 3A. For quick-response decisions, lacking sound risk
42 assessments for reference, some priorities will be informed by top-down assessments using
43 surrogate data or data at high levels of CIKR aggregation (e.g., population density as a
44 surrogate for casualties). As both the NIPP partnership and the knowledgebase of risk
45 assessments grow, decisions can be increasingly informed by both top-down and bottom-up

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1 analyses using detailed data and assessments on specific individual facilities, with a
2 prioritization on how much is reduced for the investment.
3 3.4.3 The Uses of Prioritization
4 A primary use of prioritization is to inform resource allocation decisions, such as where risk
5 management programs should be instituted; the appropriate level of investment in these
6 programs; and which measures offer the greatest return on investment. The result of the
7 prioritization process is information on CIKR risk management requirements and provides
8 the rationale and justification for implementing specific programs or actions. Although for
9 some specific purposes, a master inventory of facilities or sites in priority order may be
10 useful, the results of the prioritization process are primarily used in other ways, such as
11 general guidance on improving security, or the decisions underpinning department budget
12 requests. Given the vast number of CIKR partners that have varied roles and
13 responsibilities in helping to manage risks, it is critical that each authority work to
14 increase the consistency, comparability and utility of their efforts to helping defend the best
15 risk management decisions as worth the investments being considered.
16 At the national level, DHS is responsible for overall national risk-informed CIKR
17 prioritization in close collaboration with the SSAs, States, and other CIKR partners. SSA
18 responsibilities include managing the government interaction with the sector and helping
19 to cultivate an environment of trusted information sharing and collaboration to identify,
20 prioritize, and manage risk. They must also extend their sector focus to include maximizing
21 the ability for cross-sector comparisons of risk to be made that considers the best knowledge
22 available within each sector, and in metrics that allow such comparisons to support
23 evaluations of the risk-reduction return on various investments. At the State level, DHS is
24 working to develop a collaborative relationship with state and local authorities through the
25 Infrastructure Risk Analysis Partnership Program. This effort to work with state
26 authorities to foster the capability to develop, evaluate and support the implementation of
27 CIKR risk management decisions in a state/local environment will be piloted with a limited
28 group of CIKR partners, and then rolled out more broadly as the roles, responsibilities and
29 approaches are tested and refined at this level.
Infrastructure Risk Analysis Partnership Program (IRAPP)

IRAPP is an effort that helps DHS learn about State-level decision requirements and risk
analysis capabilities, to better tailor the transition and transfer of tools and approaches to State
and local partners. By using a common risk model, the burden for information sharing begins to
shift from repeated and duplicative asset and system assessments to responsible sharing of risk
knowledge that is built off of these assessments, allowing the owner/operator to focus more on
their primary responsibilities and reducing costs all around.
30 3.5 Implement Protective Programs and Resiliency Strategies

31 The risk assessment and prioritization process at the sector and jurisdictional levels will
32 help identify requirements for near-term and future protective programs and resiliency
33 strategies. Some of the identified shortfalls or opportunities for improvement will be filled
34 by owner/operators, either voluntarily or based on various forms of incentives. Other
35 shortfalls will be addressed through the protective programs each sector develops under the
36 SSP, in State CIKR protection plans, or through cross-sector or national initiatives
37 undertaken by DHS.

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1 Figure 3-6: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Implement Protective Programs
2
3 The Nation’s CIKR is widely distributed in both a physical and logical sense. Effective
4 CIKR protection requires both distributed implementation of protective programs by
5 partners, and focused national leadership to ensure implementation of a comprehensive,
6 coordinated, and cost-effective approach that helps to reduce or manage the risks to the
7 Nation’s most critical assets, systems, and networks. At the implementation level,
8 protective programs and resiliency strategies consist of diverse actions undertaken by
9 various CIKR partners. From the leadership perspective, programs are structured to
10 address coordination and cost-effectiveness.
11 The following sections describe the nature and characteristics of best practice protective
12 programs and resiliency strategies, as well as some existing programs that could be applied
13 to specific assets, systems, and networks.
14 3.5.1 Risk Management Actions
15 Risk management actions involve measures designed to prevent, deter, and mitigate the
16 threat; reduce vulnerability to an attack or other disaster; minimize consequences; and
17 enable timely, efficient response and restoration in a post-event situation, whether a
18 terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other incident. The NIPP risk management framework
19 focuses attention on those activities that bring the greatest return on investment, not
20 simply the vulnerability reduction. Protective programs and resiliency strategies vary
21 across a wide spectrum of activities, designed to:
22 Deter: Cause the potential attacker to perceive that the risk of failure is greater than
23 that which they find acceptable. Examples include improved awareness and security
24 (e.g., restricted access, vehicle checkpoints) and enhanced police and/or security officer
25 presence;
26 Devalue: Reduce the attacker’s incentive by reducing the target’s value. Examples
27 include developing redundancies and maintaining backup systems or key personnel to
28 improve overall resilience;
29 Detect: Identify potential attacks and validate and/or communicate the information, as
30 appropriate. General detection activities include intelligence gathering, analysis of
31 surveillance activities, and trend analysis of law enforcement reporting. For specific
32 assets, examples include intrusion-detection systems, network monitoring systems,
33 operation alarms, surveillance, detection and reporting, and employee security
34 awareness programs; and
35 Defend: Protect assets by preventing or delaying the actual attack, or reducing an
36 attack’s effect on an asset, system, or network. Examples include perimeter hardening

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1 by enhancing buffer zones, fencing, structural integrity, and cyber defense tools such as
2 antivirus software.
3 Risk management actions also may include means of mitigating the consequences of an
4 attack or incident. These actions are focused on the following aspects of preparedness:
5 Mitigate: Lessen the potential impacts of an attack, natural disaster, or accident by
6 introducing system redundancy and resiliency, reducing asset dependency, or isolating
7 downstream assets;
8 Respond: Activities designed to enable rapid reaction and emergency response to an
9 incident, such as conducting exercises and having adequate crisis response plans, train-
10 ing, and equipment; and
11 Recover: Allow businesses and government organizations to resume operations quickly
12 and efficiently, such as using comprehensive mission and business continuity and
13 resiliency-based plans that have been developed through prior planning.
14 Generally, it is considered more cost-effective to build security into assets, systems, and
15 networks than to retrofit them with security measures after initial development.
16 Accordingly, CIKR partners should consider how risk management, robustness, resiliency,
17 and appropriate physical and cybersecurity enhancements could be incorporated into the
18 design and construction of new CIKR.
19 In situations where robustness and resiliency are keys to CIKR protection, providing
20 protection at the system level rather than at the individual asset level may be more
21 effective and efficient (e.g., if there are many similar facilities, it may be easier to allow
22 other facilities to provide the infrastructure service rather than to protect each facility).
23 3.5.2 Characteristics of Effective Protective Programs and Resiliency Strategies
24 Characteristics of effective CIKR protective programs and resiliency strategies include, but
25 are not limited to, the following:
26 Comprehensive: Effective programs must address the physical, cyber, and human
27 elements of CIKR, as appropriate, and consider long-term, short-term, and sustainable
28 activities. SSPs describe programs and initiatives to protect CIKR within the sector
29 (e.g., operational changes, physical protection, equipment hardening, cyber protection,
30 system resiliency, backup communications, training, response plans, and security
31 system upgrades).
32 Coordinated: Because of the highly distributed and complex nature of the various
33 CIKR sectors, the responsibility for protecting CIKR must be coordinated:
34 ¾ CIKR owners and operators (public or private sector) are responsible for protecting
35 property, information, and people through measures that manage risk to help
36 ensure more resilient operations and more effective loss prevention. These measures
37 include increased awareness of terrorist threats and implementation of operational
38 responses to reduce vulnerability (e.g., changing daily routines, keeping computer
39 software and virus-checking applications up to date, and applying fixes for known
40 software defects).
41 ¾ State, local, and tribal authorities are responsible for providing or augmenting
42 protective actions for assets, systems, and networks that are critical to the public
43 within their jurisdiction and authority. They develop protective programs,
44 supplement Federal guidance and expertise, implement relevant Federal programs

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1 such as the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP), and provide specific law
2 enforcement capability as needed. When appropriate, they have access to Federal
3 resources to meet jurisdictional protection priorities.
4 ¾ Federal agencies are responsible for enabling or augmenting protection for CIKR
5 that is nationally critical or coordinating the efforts of CIKR partners and the use of
6 resources from different funding sources. DHS, SSAs, and other Federal
7 departments and agencies carry out these responsibilities while respecting the
8 authorities of State, local, and tribal governments, and the prerogatives of the
9 private sector.
10 ¾ SSAs, in conjunction with sector partners, provide information on the most effective
11 long-term protective strategies, develop protective programs, and coordinate the
12 implementation of programs for their sectors. For some sectors, this includes the
13 development and sharing of best practices and related criteria, guidance documents,
14 and tools.
15 ¾ DHS, in collaboration with SSAs and other public and private sector partners,
16 serves as the national focal point for the development, implementation, and
17 coordination risk management approaches and tools and of protective programs and
18 resiliency strategies (including cybersecurity efforts) for those assets that are
19 deemed nationally critical.
20 Cost-Effective: Effective CIKR programs and strategies seek to use resources
21 efficiently by focusing on actions that offer the greatest mitigation of risk for any given
22 expenditure. The following is a discussion of factors that should be considered when
23 assessing the cost-effectiveness and public benefits derived through implementation of
24 CIKR protection initiatives:
25 ¾ Operating with full information and lowering coordination costs: The NIPP describes
26 the mechanisms that enable the use of information regarding threats and
27 corresponding protective actions. It includes information sharing; provision of a
28 dedicated communications network; and the use of established, interoperable
29 industry and trade association communications mechanisms. The NIPP also helps to
30 lower the cost of coordination through such mechanisms as partnership
31 arrangements and, where appropriate, the use of a regulatory or incentives-based
32 framework to encourage or drive action.
33 ¾ Addressing the present-future tradeoff in long lead-time investments: The NIPP
34 provides the processes and coordinating structures that allow State, local, and tribal
35 governments and private sector partners to effectively use long lead-time approaches
36 to CIKR protection.
37 ¾ Providing for NIPP-related roles and responsibilities: Appropriate roles for CIKR
38 protection reflect basic responsibilities and shared risks and burdens. CIKR owners
39 and operators are responsible for protecting property, information, and people
40 through measures that manage risk and help ensure more resilient operations and
41 more effective loss prevention. State, local, and tribal authorities are responsible for
42 providing or augmenting protective actions for assets, systems, and networks that
43 are critical to the public within their jurisdiction and authority. Federal agencies are
44 responsible for coordinating and enabling protection for CIKR that is nationally
45 critical. They coordinate with regulatory agencies to help ensure that CIKR
46 protection issues are fully understood and considered in their deliberations. As
47 discussed in chapter 7, they may make Federal resources available for selected

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1 State, local, or tribal CIKR protection efforts through grant programs in certain
2 circumstances.
3 ¾ Matching the underlying economic incentives of each CIKR partner to the extent
4 possible: The NIPP supports market-based economic incentives wherever possible by
5 relying on CIKR partners to undertake those efforts that are in their own interest
6 and complementing those efforts with additional resources where necessary and
7 appropriate. This coordinated approach builds on efforts that have proven to be
8 effective and that are consistent with best business practices, such as owners and
9 operators selecting the measures that are best suited to their particular risk profile
10 and needs.
11 ¾ Addressing the public-interest aspects associated with CIKR protection: Risk
12 management actions for CIKR that provide benefits to the public at large go beyond
13 the actions that benefit owners and operators, or even those that benefit the public
14 residing in a particular State, region, or locality. Such additional actions reflect
15 different levels of the public interest—some CIKR are critical to the national
16 economy and to national well-being; some CIKR are critical to a State, region, or
17 locality; some CIKR are critical only to the individual owner/operator or direct
18 customer base. Actions to protect the public’s interest that require investment
19 beyond the level that those directly responsible for protection are willing and able to
20 provide must be of sufficient priority to warrant the use of the limited resources that
21 can be provided from public funding or may require regulatory action or appropriate
22 incentives to encourage the private sector to undertake them.
23 Risk-Informed: Protective programs and resiliency strategies focus on mitigating risk.
24 Associated actions should be designed to allow measurement, evaluation, and feedback
25 based on risk mitigation. This allows owners, operators, and SSAs to reevaluate risk
26 after the program has been implemented. These programs and strategies use different
27 mechanisms for addressing each element of risk and combine their effects to achieve
28 overall risk mitigation. These mechanisms include:
29 ¾ Consequences: Protective programs and resiliency strategies may limit or manage
30 consequences by reducing the possible loss resulting from a terrorist attack or other
31 disaster through redundant system design, backup systems, and alternative sources
32 for raw materials or information.
33 ¾ Vulnerability: Protective programs may reduce vulnerability by decreasing the
34 susceptibility to destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation by correcting flaws or
35 strengthening weaknesses in assets, systems, and networks.
36 ¾ Threat: Protective programs and resiliency strategies indirectly reduce threat by
37 making assets, systems, or networks less attractive targets to terrorists by lessening
38 vulnerability and lowering consequences. As a result, terrorists may be less likely to
39 achieve their objectives and, therefore, less likely to focus on the CIKR in question.
40 3.5.3 Risk Management Activities, Initiatives, and Reports
41 DHS, in collaboration with SSAs and other sector partners, undertakes a number of
42 protective programs, resiliency strategies, initiatives, activities, and reports that support
43 CIKR protection. Many of these are available to or provide resources for CIKR partners.
44 These activities span a wide range of efforts that include, but are not limited to, the
45 following:

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1 Buffer Zone Protection Program: A Federal

2 grant program designed to provide East Coast Nuclear Power Plant
3 resources to State and local law In October 2007, with PSA support, State
4 enforcement to enhance the protection of a Police and LLE collaborated to develop and
5 given critical facility. enhance a combined response capability for
6 Assistance Visits: Facility security the protection of a nuclear facility site. The
7 assessments jointly conducted by a BZP process required the close coordination
8 federally led team and facility owners and and work of the team of professionals,
which included a DHS assault planner, law
9 operators that are designed to facilitate
enforcement, the PSA, and the security
10 vulnerability identification and mitigation staff of the nuclear power plant, all
11 discussions with individual owners and working toward developing a
12 operators. comprehensive buffer zone protection plan
13 Training Programs: Training programs are specific to that facility and locality. In
14 designed to provide CIKR partners a addition to the development and activation
15 source from which they can obtain of specific plan response procedures, a
significant improvement to the security of
16 specialized training to enhance CIKR
the site was addressed by the acquisition of
17 protection. Subject matter, course length,
much needed equipment including,
18 and location of training can be tailored to interoperable communications equipment
19 partner needs. for both State and LLE, bomb squad
20 Control Systems Security: DHS coordinates support and incident scene support
21 efforts among Federal, State, local, and equipment.
22 tribal governments, as well as control
23 system owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system security within and
24 across all CIKR sectors.
25 Multi-Jurisdiction Improvised Explosive Devices Security Plans: DHS assists high-risk
26 urban environments with developing thorough IED Security plans that efficiently
27 integrate assets and capabilities from multiple jurisdictions and emergency service
28 disciplines. The plan that results from this process can help determine what actions are
29 necessary to enhance IED prevention and protection capabilities of the multi-
DHS/IP Vulnerability Assessment Project
The DHS/IP Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Project serves as the focal point for strategic
planning, coordination and information sharing in conducting vulnerability assessments of the
Nation’s Tier 1 and Tier 2 CIKR. Through the development and deployment of a scalable
assessment methodology, the VA Project supports the implementation of the NIPP through
identifying vulnerabilities, supporting collaborative security planning, and recommending
protective measures strategies. IP VA Project initiatives include the Buffer Zone Protection
Program (BZPP), Site Assistance Visits (SAVs), Comprehensive Reviews (CRs), and the
Computer-Based Assessment Tool (C-BAT). The VA Project provides vulnerability assessment
methodologies that enhance DHS’ and CIKR stakeholders’ ability to prevent, protect, and respond
to terrorist attacks and all-hazards incidents. The VA Project: brings together Federal, State,
local and territorial and tribal governments, local law enforcement, emergency responders, and
CIKR owner and operators to conduct assessments to identify critical assets, vulnerabilities,
consequences, and protective measures and resiliency strategies. The VA Project also provides
analysis of CIKR facilities to include potential terrorist actions for an attack, consequences of
such an attack, and integrated preparedness and response capabilities of the Federal, State, local,
tribal and territorial and private sector partners. The results are used to enhance the overall
CIKR protection posture of the facilities, surrounding communities, and the geographic region
using short-term enhancements and long-term risk-informed investments in training, processes,
procedures, equipment, and resources.

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1 jurisdictional area; which ultimately culminates in the development of a NRF and

2 NIMS compliant multi-jurisdiction plan.
3 A detailed discussion of DHS-supported programs is provided in appendix 3B.
4 SSAs and other Federal departments and agencies also oversee protective programs,
5 initiatives, and activities that support CIKR protection. Many of these are also available or
6 provide resources for CIKR partners. Examples include:
7 The Department of Veterans Affairs created a methodology also used by the
8 Smithsonian Institution and adapted by Federal Emergency Management Agency
9 (FEMA) Manual 452, Risk Management: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential
10 Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, to assess the risk to and mitigation for hundreds of
11 buildings and museums.
12 DOT manages a Pipeline Safety grant program that supports efforts to develop and
13 maintain State natural gas, liquefied natural gas, and hazardous liquid pipeline safety
14 programs.
15 HHS is conducting pilot tests that include a tribal hospital, a local substance abuse
16 treatment center, and an owner/operator administrative office in preparation for a
17 vulnerability assessment of more than 4,000 health care-related facilities.
18 Other risk management activities include developing and providing informational reports,
19 such as the DHS Characteristics of Common Vulnerabilities Reports and the Indicators of
20 Terrorist Activity Reports, which are available to all State and territorial homeland
21 security offices. In addition to threat and vulnerability information, informational reports
22 also include best practices for protection measures. One report in particular, FEMA’s Risk
23 Management Series, addresses the protection of buildings and is applicable across sectors.
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) Program
PSAs were directed to form partnerships with the owners and operators of the Nation’s
identified high-priority CIKR, known as Tier 1 and Tier 2 CIKR and conduct site visits
(Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection) for all of these assets during the period of political
transition in 2008 - 2009. PSAs coordinate site visits with owners and operators, HSAs, Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Local Law Enforcement (LLE) and other CIKR partners, as
necessary. During the visit, PSAs document information on the facility’s current CIKR protection
posture and overall security awareness. The primary goals fro ECIP site visits are to:
Inform facility owners and operators of the importance of their facilities as an identified
high-priority CIKR and the need to be vigilant in light of the ever-present threat of
terrorism;
Identify protective measures currently in place at Tier 1/Tier 2 facilities, provide comparison
across like assets of CIKR protection posture, and track the implementation of new
protective measures;
Enhance existing relationships between Tier 1/Tier 2 facility owners and operators, DHS,
and Federal, State, and LLE personnel in order to:
¾ Provide increased situational awareness regarding potential threats
¾ Maintain an in-depth knowledge of the current CIKR protection posture at each facility
¾ Provide a constant Federal resource to facility owners and operators

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1 3.6 Measure Effectiveness

2 Measuring effectiveness drives continuous improvement of CIKR risk-mitigation programs
3 at the sector level and overall program performance at the national level. The NIPP uses a
4 metrics-based system to provide feedback on efforts to attain the goal and supporting
5 objectives articulated in chapter 1. The metrics also provide a basis for establishing
6 accountability, documenting actual performance, facilitating diagnoses, promoting effective
7 management, and reassessing goals and objectives. Metrics offer an assessment to affirm
8 that specific objectives are being met or to articulate gaps in the national effort or
9 supporting sector efforts. They enable identification of corrective actions and provide
10 decision-makers with a feedback mechanism to help them make appropriate adjustments.
11 They can also provide qualitative insights to help make informed decisions.
12 3.6.1 NIPP Metrics and Measures
13 3.6.1.1 Measuring Performance
14 The NIPP risk management framework uses three types of indicators to measure program
15 performance:
16 Descriptive Measures are used to understand sector resources and activities; they do not
17 reflect CIKR protection performance. Examples include the number of facilities in a
18 jurisdiction; the population resident or working within typical incident effects
19 footprints; and the number, nature, and location of suppliers in an infrastructure
20 service provider’s supply chain.
21 Process (or Output) Measures are used to measure whether specific activities were
22 performed as planned, tracking the progression of a task, or reporting on the output of a
23 process such as inventorying assets. Process measures show progress toward performing
24 the activities necessary to achieve CIKR protection goals. They also help build a
25 comprehensive picture of CIKR protection status and activities. Examples include the
26 number of protective programs implemented in a specific fiscal year and the level of
27 investment for each, the number of detection systems installed at facilities in a given
28 sector, the proportion of a facility’s workforce that has completed training, and the level
29 of response to a data call for asset information.
30 Outcome Measures track progress toward a strategic goal by beneficial results rather
31 than level of activity. As the NIPP is implemented, process measures will be deempha-
32 sized in favor of outcome measures. Examples include the reduction of risk measured by
33 comparing one year of comparative analysis for a specific sector to another, and the
34 overall risk mitigation achieved nationally by a particular CIKR protection initiative.
35 These indicators span a wide range with respect to ease of collection and relationship to the
36 actual performance of CIKR protection efforts. Measuring performance of the NIPP risk
37 management framework relies on a mix of these indicators, the composition of which will
38 change over time as the framework matures and as CIKR partners learn which measures
39 are the most useful in actual practice.

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1 Figure 3-7: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Measure Effectiveness
2
3 3.6.1.2 Metrics
4 Quantitative indicators are used for different groups of metrics to support national
5 assessments. The CIKR Protection Reporting and Analysis Program is following an arc of
6 increasing maturity along several dimensions. The program is consistent with the risk
7 framework set forth in the NIPP and comprises six components that together provide DHS
8 with an overall picture of CIKR protection performance. The components are:
9 NIPP Core Metrics are measures of progress in NIPP Risk Management Framework
10 implementation that are common across the 18 CIKR Sectors. They provide a basis for
11 establishing accountability, documenting performance, identifying issues, promoting
12 effective management, and reassessing goals and objectives.
13 SSA Programmatic Metrics are measures of effectiveness of SSA activities, programs,
14 and initiatives that are identified in the individual Sector SSPs and SARs.
15 National Coordinator Programmatic Metrics are measures of effectiveness of the
16 programs, products, and tools developed by DHS IP to support NIPP- and SSP-related
17 activities
18 Partnership Metrics are used to gauge the effectiveness of the sector partnership in
19 contributing to enhanced risk management and CIKR protection. The partnership metrics
20 provide a point of reference for individual CIKR sectors to reflect their distinctive
21 characteristics and requirements.
22 CIKR Information Sharing Environment Metrics measure the effectiveness of the
23 processes that enable the sharing of CIKR information among security partners.
24 Sector-Specific Metrics are measures of the status of CIKR protection efforts unique to
25 individual Sectors or sub-Sectors as viewed by the owners and operators.
26 Collectively, these six types of metrics provide a holistic picture of the health and
27 effectiveness (see appendix 3D) of the national CIKR protection effort and help drive future
28 investments and resource decisions.
29 3.6.2 Gathering Performance Information
30 DHS works with the SSAs and sector partners to gather the information necessary to
31 measure the level of performance associated with each set of metrics. Given the inherent
32 differences in CIKR sectors, a one-size-fits-all approach to gathering this information is not
33 appropriate. DHS also works with SSAs and sector partners to determine the appropriate

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1 measurement approach to be included in the sector’s SSP and to help ensure that partners
2 engaged with multiple sectors or in cross-sector matters are not subject to unnecessary
3 redundancy or conflicting guidance in information collection. Information collected as part
4 of this effort is protected as discussed in detail in chapter 4.
5 SSAs identify and, as appropriate, share or facilitate the sharing of best practices based on
6 the effective use of metrics to improve program performance.
7 3.6.3 Assessing Performance and Reporting on Progress
8 HSPD-7 requires each SSA to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security with an annual
9 report on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of CIKR in their
10 respective sectors. The report from each SSA will be sent to DHS annually. The reports are
11 due no later than June 1 of each year.
12 The Sector CIKR Annual Protection Reports provide the following information:
13 Provide a common vehicle across all CIKR sectors for communicating CIKR protection
14 performance and progress to partners and government entities;
15 Establish a baseline of existing sector-specific CIKR protection priorities, programs, and
16 initiatives against which future improvements will be assessed;
17 Identify sector priorities and out-year requirements with a focus on projected shortfalls
18 in resources for sector-specific CIKR protection and for protection of CIKR within the
19 sector that is deemed to be critical at the national level;
20 Determine and explain how sector efforts support the national effort;
21 Provide an overall progress report for the CIKR sector and measure that progress
22 against the CIKR protection goals and objectives for that sector as described in the SSP;
23 Provide feedback to DHS, the CIKR sectors, and other government entities to provide
24 the basis for the continuous improvement of the CIKR protection program; and
25 Help identify best practices from successful programs and share these within and
26 among sectors.
27 SSAs work in close collaboration with sector partners, the respective SCCs and the GCCs,
28 and other organizations in developing this report. DHS works with SSAs to assess progress
29 made toward goals in each sector based on these reports.
30 Similar reports are now prepared for the SLTTGCC and the Regional Consortium
31 Coordinating Council (RCCC) and included as appendixes to the National Annual Report.
32 Additional appendixes to the National Annual Report address the year’s accomplishments
33 for DHS IP, the Office of Cybersecurity & Communications, the Tier 1 and 2 Program, and
34 the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC).
35 DHS compiles all of these reports into a national cross-sector report that describes annual
36 progress toward CIKR protection goals on a national basis and makes recommendations to
37 the Executive Office of the President for prioritized resource allocation across the Federal
38 Government to meet national CIKR protection requirements. A more detailed discussion of
39 the national resource allocation process for CIKR protection is included in chapter 7.
40 In addition to these annual reports, SSAs regularly update their measurements of CIKR
41 status and protection levels to support DHS status tracking and comprehensive inventory
42 update. By maintaining a regularly updated knowledge base, DHS is able to quickly

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1 compile real-time CIKR status and protection posture to respond to changing circumstances
2 as indicated by tactical intelligence assessments of terrorist threats or natural disaster
3 damage assessments. This helps inform resource allocation decisions during incident
4 response and other critical operations supporting the homeland security mission.
5 3.7 Using Metrics and Performance Measurement for Continuous

6 Improvement
7 By using NIPP metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of efforts in achieving goals, CIKR
8 partners adjust and adapt the Nation’s CIKR protection approach to account for progress
9 achieved, as well as for changes in the threat and other relevant environments. At the
10 national level, NIPP metrics are used to focus attention on areas of CIKR protection that
11 warrant additional resources or other changes. If an evaluation of the effectiveness of
12 efforts to achieving goals using NIPP metrics reveals that there is insufficient progress
13 (e.g., information-sharing mechanisms have not been established and risk assessments
14 have not been conducted, or one or more sectors have a significant portion of their assets
15 rated as high risk), DHS and its CIKR partners will undertake actions to focus efforts on
16 addressing those particular areas of concern.
17 Information gathered in support of the risk management framework process helps
18 determine adjustments to specific CIKR protection activities. For instance, as protective
19 programs are implemented, the consequences and vulnerabilities associated with the asset,
20 system, or network change. Accordingly, the national risk profile is reviewed routinely to
21 help inform current and prospective allocation of resources in light of recently implemented
22 protective actions or other factors, such as increased understanding of potential system-
23 wide cascading consequences, new threat intelligence, etc.
24 In addition to quantitative measures, the NIPP provides mechanisms for qualitative
25 feedback that can be applied to augment and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
26 public and private sector CIKR protective programs. DHS works with CIKR partners to
27 identify and share lessons learned and best practices for all aspects of the risk management
28 process. DHS also works with SSAs to share relevant input from sector partners and other
29 sources that can be used as part of the national effort to continuously improve CIKR
30 protection.
31 Figure 3-8: NIPP Risk Management Framework: Feedback Loop for Continuous Improvement of
32 CIKR Protection
33
34

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1 4. Organizing and Partnering for CIKR

2 Protection
3 The enormity and complexity of the Nation’s CIKR, the distributed character of our
4 national protective architecture, and the uncertain nature of the terrorist threat and
5 manmade or natural disasters make the effective implementation of protection efforts a
6 great challenge. To be effective, the NIPP must be implemented using organizational
7 structures and partnerships committed to sharing and protecting the information needed to
8 achieve the NIPP goal and supporting objectives described in chapter 1. DHS, in close
9 collaboration with the SSAs, is responsible for overall coordination of the NIPP partnership
10 organization and information-sharing network.
11 4.1 Leadership and Coordination Mechanisms

12 The coordination mechanisms described below establish linkages among CIKR protection
13 efforts at the Federal, State, regional, local, tribal, territorial, and international levels, as
14 well as between public and private sector partners. In addition to direct coordination, the
15 structures described below provide a national framework that fosters relationships and
16 facilitates coordination within and across CIKR sectors:
17 National-Level Coordination: The DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP)
18 facilitates overall development of the NIPP and SSPs, provides overarching guidance,
19 and monitors the full range of associated coordination activities and performance
20 metrics. Chapter 2 details specific roles for DHS—many of these roles are carried out by
21 IP.
22 Sector Partnership Coordination: The Private Sector Cross-Sector Council (i.e., the
23 Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS)), the Government Cross-Sector
24 Council (made up of two subcouncils: the NIPP Federal Senior Leadership Council
25 (FSLC) and the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council
26 (SLTTGCC)), and individual SCCs and GCCs create a structure through which
27 representative groups from Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the
28 private sector can collaborate and develop consensus approaches to CIKR protection.
29 Regional Coordination: Regional partnerships, groupings, and governance bodies
30 enable CIKR protection coordination within and across geographical areas and sectors.
31 Such bodies are composed of representatives from industry and State, local, and tribal
32 entities located in whole or in part within the planning area for an aggregation of high-
33 risk targets, urban areas, or cross-sector groupings. They facilitate enhanced
34 coordination between jurisdictions within a State where CIKR cross multiple
35 jurisdictions, and help sectors coordinate with multiple States that rely on a common
36 set of CIKR. They also are organized to address common approaches to a wide variety of
37 natural or manmade hazards. The Regional Consortium Coordinating Council was
38 established in 2008 to help enhance the engagement of regionally-based partners and to
39 leverage the CIKR protection activities and resiliency strategies that they lead.
40 International Coordination: The United States-Canada-Mexico Security and Prosperity
41 Partnership; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Senior Civil Emergency
42 Planning Committee; certain government councils, such as the Committee on Foreign
43 Investment in the United States (CFIUS); and consensus-based nongovernmental or

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1 public-private organizations, such as the global Forum of Incident Response and

2 Security Teams (FIRST), enable a range of CIKR protection coordination activities
3 associated with established international agreements.
4 4.1.1 National-Level Coordination
5 DHS, in collaboration with the SSAs and the GCCs, oversees the coordination and
6 integration of national-level CIKR protection activities through DHS/IP. In support of CIKR
7 partner coordination, DHS:
8 Leads, integrates, and coordinates the execution of the NIPP, in part by acting as a
9 central clearinghouse for the information-sharing and coordination activities of the
10 individual sector governance structures;
11 Facilitates the development and ongoing support of governance and coordination
12 structures or models;
13 Facilitates NIPP revisions and updates using a comprehensive national review process;
14 Ensures that effective policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies regarding
15 partner coordination are developed and disseminated to enable SSAs and other partners
16 to carry out NIPP responsibilities;
17 Facilitates the sharing of CIKR protection-related best practices and lessons learned;
18 Facilitates participation in preparedness activities, planning, readiness exercises, and
19 public awareness efforts; and
20 Ensures cross-sector coordination of SSPs to avoid duplicative requirements and
21 reporting, and conflicting guidance.
22 4.1.2 Sector Partnership Coordination
23 The goal of NIPP-related organizational structures, partnerships, and information-sharing
24 networks is to establish the context, framework, and support for activities required to
25 implement and sustain the national CIKR protection effort. DHS, in collaboration with
26 SSAs and sector partners, will issue coordinated guidance on the framework for CIKR
27 public-private partnerships, as well as metrics to measure their effectiveness.
28 The NIPP relies on the sector partnership model, illustrated in figure 4-1, as the primary
29 organizational structure for coordinating CIKR efforts and activities. The sector part-
30 nership model encourages formation of SCCs and GCCs as described below. DHS also
31 provides guidance, tools, and support to enable these groups to work together to carry out
32 their respective roles and responsibilities. SCCs and corresponding GCCs work in tandem
33 to create a coordinated national framework for CIKR protection within and across sectors.
34 4.1.2.1 Private Sector Cross-Sector Council
35 Cross-sector issues and interdependencies between the SCCs will be addressed through a
36 Private Sector Cross-Sector Council (i.e., the PCIS):
37 Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security: The PCIS membership is comprised of
38 one or more members and their alternates from each of the SCCs. The partnership
39 coordinates cross-sector initiatives to support CIKR protection by identifying legislative
40 issues that affect such initiatives and by raising awareness of issues in CIKR protection.
41 The primary activities of the PCIS include:
42 ¾ Providing senior-level, cross-sector strategic coordination through partnership with
43 DHS and the SSAs;

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1 ¾ Ientifying and disseminating CIKR protection best practices across the sectors;
2 ¾ Participating in coordinated planning efforts related to the development,
3 implementation, and revision of the NIPP and SSPs; and
4 ¾ Coordinating with DHS to support efforts to plan and execute the Nation’s CIKR
5 protection mission.
6 4.1.2.2 Government Cross-Sector Council
7 Cross-sector issues and interdependencies between the GCCs will be addressed through the
8 Government Cross-Sector Council, which is comprised of two subcouncils: the NIPP FSLC
9 and the SLTTGCC:
10 NIPP Federal Senior Leadership Council: The objective of the NIPP FSLC is to drive
11 enhanced communications and coordination between and among Federal departments
12 and agencies with a role in implementing the NIPP and HSPD-7. The Council’s primary
13 activities include:
14 ¾ Forging consensus on CIKR risk management strategies;
15 ¾ Evaluating and promoting implementation of risk management-based CIKR
16 protection programs;
17 ¾ Advancing CIKR protection collaboration within and across sectors;
18 ¾ Advancing CIKR protection collaboration with the international community; and
19 ¾ Evaluating and reporting on the progress of Federal CIKR protection activities.
20 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council: The SLTTGCC
21 serves as a forum to ensure that State, local, and tribal homeland security advisors or
22 their designated representatives are fully integrated as active participants in national
23 CIKR protection efforts and to provide an organizational structure to coordinate across
24 jurisdictions on State- and local-level CIKR protection guidance, strategies, and
25 programs. The SLTTGCC will provide the State, local, tribal, or territorial perspective
26 or feedback on a wide variety of CIKR issues. The primary functions of the SLTTGCC
27 include the following:
28 ¾ Providing senior-level, cross-jurisdictional strategic communications and
29 coordination through partnership with DHS, the SSAs, and private sector owners
30 and operators;
31 ¾ Participating in planning efforts related to the development, implementation,
32 update, and revision of the NIPP and SSPs;
33 ¾ Coordinating strategic issues and issue management resolution among State, local,
34 tribal, and territorial partners;
35 ¾ Coordinating with DHS to support efforts to plan, implement, and execute the
36 Nation’s CIKR protection mission; and
37 ¾ Providing DHS with information on State-, local-, tribal-, and territorial-level CIKR
38 protection initiatives; activities; and best practices.
39

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1 Figure 4-1: Sector Partnership Model
2
3 The cross-sector bodies described in sections 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.2 will convene in joint session
4 and/or working groups, as appropriate, to address cross-cutting CIKR protection issues. The
5 NIPP-related functions of the cross-sector bodies include activities to:
6 Provide or facilitate coordination, communications, and strategic-level information
7 sharing across sectors and between and among DHS, the SSAs, the GCCs and other
8 supporting Federal departments and agencies, and other public and private sector
9 partners;
10 Identify issues shared by multiple sectors that would benefit from common
11 investigations and/or solutions;
12 Identify and promote best practices from individual sectors that have applicability to
13 other sectors;
14 Contribute to cross-sector planning and prioritization efforts, as appropriate; and
15 Provide input to the government on R&D efforts that would benefit multiple sectors.
16 4.1.2.3 Sector Coordinating Councils
17 The sector partnership model encourages CIKR owners and operators to create or identify
18 an SCC as the principal entity for coordinating with the government on a wide range of
19 CIKR protection activities and issues. SCCs should be self-organized, self-run, and self-
20 governed, with a spokesperson designated by the sector membership. Specific membership
21 will vary from sector to sector, reflecting the unique composition of each sector; however,
22 membership should be representative of a broad base of owners, operators, associations,
23 and other entities—both large and small—within a sector.
24 The SCCs enable owners and operators to interact on a wide range of sector-specific
25 strategies, policies, activities, and issues. SCCs serve as principal sector policy coordination
26 and planning entities. Sectors also rely on ISACs, or other information-sharing

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1 mechanisms, which provide operational and tactical capabilities for information sharing
2 and, in some cases, support for incident response activities. (A more detailed discussion of
3 ISAC roles and responsibilities is included in section 4.2.7.)
4 The primary functions of an SCC include the following:
5 Represent a primary point of entry for government into the sector for addressing the
6 entire range of CIKR protection activities and issues for that sector;
7 Serve as a strategic communications and coordination mechanism between CIKR
8 owners, operators, and suppliers, and with the government during response and
9 recovery as determined by the sector;
10 Identify, implement, and support the information-sharing capabilities and mechanisms
11 that are most appropriate for the sector. ISACs may perform this role if so designated
12 by the SCC;
13 Facilitate inclusive organization and coordination of the sector’s policy development
14 regarding CIKR protection planning and preparedness, exercises and training, public
15 awareness, and associated plan implementation activities and requirements;
16 Advise on integration of Federal, State, regional, and local planning with private sector
17 initiatives; and
18 Provide input to the government on sector R&D efforts and requirements.
19 SCCs are encouraged to participate in voluntary consensus standards development efforts
20 to ensure that sector perspectives are included in standards that affect CIKR protection. 22
21 4.1.2.4 Government Coordinating Councils
22 A GCC is formed as the government counterpart for each SCC to enable interagency and
23 cross-jurisdictional coordination. The GCC is comprised of representatives across various
24 levels of government (Federal, State, local, or tribal) as appropriate to the security
25 landscape of each individual sector. Each GCC is co-chaired by a representative from the
26 designated SSA with responsibility for ensuring appropriate representation on the GCC
27 and providing cross-sector coordination with State, local, and tribal governments. Each
28 GCC is co-chaired by the DHS Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection or his/her
29 designee.
30 The GCC coordinates strategies, activities, policy, and communications across government
31 entities within each sector. The primary functions of a GCC include the following:
32 Provide interagency strategic communications and coordination at the sector level
33 through partnership with DHS, the SSA, and other supporting Federal departments
34 and agencies;
35 Participate in planning efforts related to the development, implementation, update, and
36 revision of the NIPP and SSPs;
37 Coordinate strategic communications, and issue management and resolution among
38 government entities within the sector; and
22Voluntary consensus standards are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic and international. These organizations
plan, develop, establish, or coordinate standards through an agreed-upon procedure that relies on consensus, though not necessarily on unanimity. Federal law
encourages Federal participation in these bodies to increase the likelihood that standards meet both public and private sector needs. Examples of other
standards that are distinct from voluntary consensus standards include non-consensus standards, industry standards, company standards, or de facto standards
developed in the private sector but not in the full consensus process, government-unique standards developed by government for its own uses, and standards
mandated by law.

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1 Coordinate with and support the efforts of the SCC to plan, implement, and execute the
2 Nation’s CIKR protection mission.
3 4.1.2.5 Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
4 The CIPAC directly supports the sector partnership model by providing a legal framework
5 for members of the SCCs and GCCs to engage in joint CIKR protection-related activities.
6 The CIPAC serves as a forum for government and private sector partners to engage in a
7 broad spectrum of activities, such as:
8 Planning, coordination, implementation, and operational issues;
9 Implementation of security programs;
10 Operational activities related to CIKR protection, including incident response, recovery,
11 and reconstitution; and
12 Development and support of national plans, including the NIPP and the SSPs.
13 The CIPAC membership consists of private sector CIKR owners and operators, or their
14 representative trade or equivalent associations, from the respective sector’s recognized
15 SCC; and representatives of Federal, State, local, and tribal government entities (including
16 their representative trade or equivalent associations) that comprise the corresponding GCC
17 for each sector. DHS published a Federal Register Notice on March 24, 2006, announcing
18 the establishment of CIPAC as a FACA-exempt body, pursuant to section 871 of the
19 Homeland Security Act.
20 4.1.3 Regional Coordination and the Partnership Model
21 Regional partnerships, organizations, and governance bodies enable CIKR protection
22 coordination among CIKR partners within and across certain geographical areas, as well as
23 planning and program implementation aimed at a common hazard or threat environment.
24 These groupings include public-private partnerships that cross jurisdictional, sector, and
25 international boundaries and take into account dependencies and interdependencies. They
26 are typically self-organizing and self-governing.
27 Regional organizations, whether interstate or intrastate, vary widely in terms of mission,
28 composition, and functionality. Regardless of the variations, these organizations provide
29 structures at the strategic and/or operational levels that help to address cross-sector CIKR
30 planning and protection program implementation. They may also provide enhanced
31 coordination between jurisdictions within a State where CIKR cross multiple jurisdictions
32 and help sectors coordinate with multiple States that rely on a common set of CIKR. In
33 many instances, State homeland security advisors serve as focal points for regional
34 initiatives and provide linkages between the regional organizations and the sector partner-
35 ship model. Based on the nature or focus of the regional initiative, these organizations may
36 link into the sector partnership model, as appropriate, through individual SCCs or GCCs or
37 cross-sector councils. Additionally, DHS assisted in the formation of a national-level RCCC
38 to address issues that cross sectors and/or jurisdictions of government within a defined
39 geographic area.
40 4.1.4 International CIKR Protection Cooperation
41 Many CIKR assets, systems, and networks, both physical and cyber, are interconnected
42 with a global infrastructure that has evolved to support modern economies. Each of the
43 CIKR sectors is linked in varying degrees to global energy, transportation,
44 telecommunications, cyber, and other infrastructure. This global system creates benefits

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1 and efficiencies, but also brings interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and challenges in the
2 context of CIKR protection. The Nation’s safety, security, prosperity, and way of life depend
3 on these “systems of systems,” which must be protected both at home and abroad.
4 The NIPP strategy for international CIKR protection coordination and cooperation is
5 focused on:
6 Instituting effective cooperation with international CIKR partners, as well as high-
7 priority cross-border protective programs. Specific protective actions are developed
8 through the sector planning process and specified in SSPs;
9 Implementing current agreements that affect CIKR protection; and
10 Addressing cross-sector and global issues such as cybersecurity and foreign investment.
11 International CIKR protection activities require coordination with the Department of State
12 and must be designed and implemented to benefit the United States and its international
13 partners.
14 4.1.4.1 Cooperation with International Partners
15 DHS, in coordination with the Department of State, works with international partners and
16 other entities involved in the international aspects of CIKR protection to exchange
17 experiences, share information, and develop a cooperative environment to materially
18 improve U.S. CIKR protection. DHS, the Department of State, and the SSAs work with
19 foreign governments to identify international interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and risk-
20 mitigation strategies, and through international organizations, such as the Group of Eight
21 (G8), NATO, the European Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the
22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to enhance CIKR
23 protection.
24 While SSAs and owners and operators are responsible for developing CIKR protection
25 programs to address risks that arise from or include international sources or
26 considerations, DHS manages specific programs to enhance the cooperation and
27 coordination needed to address the unique challenges and opportunities posed by the
28 international aspects of CIKR protection:
29 Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI): In response to the NIPP requirement
30 for the Federal Government to create a comprehensive inventory of infrastructure
31 located outside the United States that if disrupted or destroyed, would lead to loss of life
32 in the United States, or critically affect the Nation’s economic, industrial, or defensive
33 capabilities, DHS, working with the Department of State, developed the CFDI, a process
34 designed to ensure the resulting classified National Critical Foreign Dependencies List
35 is inclusive, representative, and leveraged in a coordinated and responsible manner.
36 The Initiative involves three phases:
37 ¾ Phase I – Identification: DHS working with Federal infrastructure protection
38 community partners developed the first ever National Critical Foreign Dependencies
39 List in FY2008, reflecting the critical foreign dependencies of the initial 17 CIKR
40 sectors, as well as critical foreign dependencies of interest to the Nation as a whole.
41 The identification process is conducted on a yearly basis, and includes input from
42 public and private sector infrastructure protection community partners.
43 ¾ Phase II – Prioritization: DHS, working with infrastructure protection community
44 partners, and in particular DOS, prioritized the National Critical Foreign

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1 Dependencies List based upon factors such as overall criticality of the element to the
2 United States, risk to the element, and foreign partner willingness and capability to
3 engage in risk management activities. The prioritization process is conducted on a
4 yearly basis.
5 ¾ Phase III – Engagement: Phase III involves leveraging the prioritized National
6 Critical Foreign Dependencies List to guide current and future U.S. bilateral and
7 multilateral incident and risk management activities with foreign partners. DHS
8 and DOS established mechanisms to ensure coordinated engagement domestic
9 coordination and collaboration by public sector entities.
10 International Outreach Program: DHS, in cooperation with the Department of State
11 and other Federal agencies, carries out international outreach activities to engage
12 foreign governments and international/multinational organizations to promote a global
13 culture of physical and cybersecurity. These outreach activities enable international
14 cooperation and engage constituencies that often do not traditionally address CIKR
15 protection. This outreach encourages the development and adoption of best practices,
16 training, and other programs designed to improve the protection of U.S. CIKR overseas,
17 as well as the reliability of international CIKR on which this country depends. Other
18 Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector entities also engage in international
19 outreach that may be related to CIKR risk mitigation in situations where they work
20 directly with their foreign counterparts.
21 The National Exercise Program: DHS provides overarching coordination for the
22 National Exercise Program to ensure the Nation’s readiness to respond in an all-
23 hazards environment and to practice and evaluate the steady-state protection plans and
24 programs put in place by the NIPP. This exercise program engages international
25 partners to address cooperation and cross-border issues, including those related to
26 CIKR protection. DHS and other CIKR partners also participate in exercises sponsored
27 by international partners.
28 National Cyber Exercises: DHS and its partners conduct exercises to identify, test, and
29 improve coordination of the cyber incident response community, including Federal,
30 State, regional, local, tribal, and international government elements, as well as private
31 sector corporations and coordinating councils.
32 Where applicable, DHS encourages the use of PCII protections to safeguard private sector
33 CIKR information when sharing it with international partners. The PCII Program will
34 solicit the submitter’s express permission before sharing the submitter’s proprietary CIKR
35 information with international partners.
36 4.1.4.2 Implementing Current Agreements
37 Existing agreements with international partners include bilateral and multilateral
38 partnerships that have been entered into with the assistance of the Department of State.
39 The key partners involved in existing agreements include:
40 Canada and Mexico: CIKR interconnectivity between the United States and its
41 immediate neighbors makes the borders virtually transparent. Electricity, natural gas,
42 oil, roads, rail, food, water, minerals, and finished products cross our borders with
43 Canada and Mexico as a routine component of commerce and infrastructure operations.
44 The importance of this trade, and the infrastructures that support it, was highlighted
45 after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, nearly closed both borders. The United
46 States entered into the 2001 Smart Border Declaration with Canada and the 2002

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1 Border Partnership Declaration with Mexico, in part, to address bilateral CIKR issues.
2 In addition, the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP)
3 established a common approach to security to protect North America from external
4 threats, prevent and respond to threats, and further streamline the secure and efficient
5 movement of legitimate, low-risk traffic across the shared borders.
6 United Kingdom: DHS has formed a Joint Contact Group (JCG) with the United
7 Kingdom that brings officials into regular, formal contact to discuss and resolve a range
8 of bilateral homeland security issues.
9 Group of Eight: The G8 underscored its determination to combat all forms of terrorism
10 and to strengthen international cooperation when heads of government attending the
11 July 2005 meeting in Scotland issued a Statement on Counter-Terrorism, citing three
12 areas of focus related to CIKR protection:
13 ¾ To improve the sharing of information on the movement of terrorists across
14 international borders;
15 ¾ To assess and address the threat to the transportation infrastructure; and
16 ¾ To promote best practices for rail and metro security.
17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO addresses CIKR protection issues through
18 the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the senior policy and advisory body to
19 the North Atlantic Council on civil emergency planning and disaster relief matters. The
20 committee is responsible for policy direction and coordination of planning boards and
21 committees in the NATO environment. It has developed considerable expertise that
22 applies to CIKR protection and has planning boards and committees covering ocean
23 shipping, inland surface transport, civil aviation, food and agriculture, industrial
24 preparedness, civil communications planning, civil protection, and civil-military medical
25 issues.
26 4.1.4.3 Approach to International Cybersecurity
27 The United States proactively integrates its intelligence capabilities to protect the country
28 from cyber attack; its diplomatic outreach, advocacy, and operational capabilities to build
29 awareness, preparedness, capacity, and partnerships in the global community; and its law
30 enforcement capabilities to combat cyber crime wherever it originates. The private sector,
31 international industry associations, and companies with global interests and operations
32 also are engaged to address cybersecurity internationally. For example, the U.S.-based
33 Information Technology Association of America participates in international cybersecurity
34 conferences and forums, such as the India-based National Association for Software and
35 Service Companies Joint Conference. These efforts require interaction between policy and
36 operations functions to coordinate national and international activity that is mutually
37 supportive across the globe:
38 International Cybersecurity Outreach: DHS, in cooperation with the Department of
39 State, other Federal departments and agencies and the private sector, engages in mul-
40 tilateral and bilateral discussions to further international computer security awareness
41 and policy development, as well as incident response team information-sharing and
42 capacity-building objectives. DHS engages in bilateral discussions on cybersecurity
43 issues with various international partners, such as India, Italy, Japan, and Norway.
44 DHS also works with international partners in multilateral and regional forums to
45 address cybersecurity and critical information infrastructure protection. For example,
46 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Telecommunications Working Group recently

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1 engaged in a capacity-building program to help member countries develop computer

2 emergency response teams. The OAS has approved a framework proposal by its Cyber
3 Security Working Group to create an OAS regional computer incident response contact
4 network for information sharing and capacity building. Multilateral collaboration to
5 build a global culture of security includes participation in the OECD, G8, and the
6 United Nations. Many of these countries and organizations have developed mechanisms
7 for engaging the private sector in dialogue and program efforts.
8 Collaboration on Cyber Crime: The U.S. outreach strategy for comprehensive cyber laws
9 and procedures draws on the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime, as well as:
10 (1) G8 High-Tech Crime Working Group’s principles for fighting cyber crime and
11 protecting critical information infrastructure, (2) OECD guidelines on information and
12 network security, and (3) United Nations General Assembly resolutions based on the G8
13 and OECD efforts. The goal of this outreach strategy is to encourage foreign
14 governments and regional organizations to join the United States in efforts to protect
15 internationally interconnected systems.
16 Collaborative Efforts for Cyber Watch Warning and Incident Response: The United
17 States works with key allies on cybersecurity policy and operational cooperation.
18 Leveraging pre-existing relationships among Computer Security Incident Response
19 Teams (CSIRTs), DHS has established a preliminary framework for cooperation on
20 cybersecurity policy, watch and warning, and incident response with Australia, Canada,
21 New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The framework also incorporates efforts on
22 strategic issues as agreed upon by these allies. DHS is also participating in the
23 establishment of an International Watch and Warning Network (IWWN) among
24 cybersecurity policy, computer emergency response, and law enforcement participants
25 from 15 countries. The IWWN will provide a mechanism for the participating countries
26 to share information to build global cyber situational awareness and coordinate incident
27 response.
28 Partnerships to Address Cyber Aspects of CIKR Protection: The Federal Government
29 leverages existing agreements such as the SPP and the JCG with the United Kingdom
30 to address the Information Technology sector and cross-cutting cybersecurity as part of
31 CIKR protection. The trilateral SPP builds on existing bilateral agreements between the
32 United States and Canada and the United States and Mexico by providing a forum to
33 address issues on a dual bi-national basis. In the context of the JCG, DHS established
34 an action plan to address cybersecurity, watch, warning, and incident response, and
35 other strategic initiatives.
36 4.1.4.4 Foreign Investment in CIKR
37 CIKR protection may be affected by foreign investment and ownership of sector assets. This
38 issue is monitored at the Federal level by the CFIUS. The committee provides a forum for
39 assessing the impacts of proposed foreign investments on CIKR protection, government
40 monitoring activities aimed at ensuring compliance with agreements that result from
41 CFIUS rulings, and supporting executive branch reviews of telecommunications
42 applications to the FCC from foreign entities to assess if they pose any national security
43 threat to CIKR (see appendix 1B.4.4).

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1 4.2 Information Sharing: A Network Approach

2 The effective implementation of the NIPP is predicated on active participation by
3 government and private sector partners in robust multi-directional information sharing.
4 When owners and operators are provided with a comprehensive picture of threats or
5 hazards to CIKR and participate in ongoing multi-directional information flow, their ability
6 to assess risks, make prudent security investments, and take protective actions is
7 substantially enhanced. Similarly, when the government is equipped with an
8 understanding of private sector information needs, it can adjust its information collection,
9 analysis, synthesis, and dissemination activities accordingly.
10 The NIPP information-sharing approach constitutes a shift from a strictly hierarchical to a
11 networked model, allowing distribution and access to information both vertically and
12 horizontally, as well as the ability to enable decentralized decisionmaking and actions. The
13 objectives of the network approach are to:
14 Enable secure multi-directional information sharing between and across government
15 and industry that focuses, streamlines, and reduces redundant reporting to the greatest
16 extent possible;
17 Implement a common set of communications, coordination, and information-sharing
18 capabilities for all CIKR partners;
19 Provide CIKR partners with a robust communications framework tailored to their
20 specific information-sharing requirements, risk landscape, and protective architecture;
21 Provide CIKR partners with a comprehensive common operating picture that includes
22 timely and accurate information about natural hazards, general and specific terrorist
23 threats, incidents and events, impact assessments, and best practices;
24 Provide CIKR partners with timely incident reporting and verification of related facts
25 that owners and operators can use with confidence when considering how evolving
26 incidents might affect their risk posture;
27 Provide a means for State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to be
28 integrated, as appropriate, into the intelligence cycle, to include providing inputs to the
29 intelligence requirements development process;
30 Enable the flow of information required for CIKR partners to assess risks, conduct risk
31 management activities, invest in security measures, and allocate resources; and
32 Protect the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information.
33 An important tool that DHS uses to facilitate networked-based information sharing is iCAV
34 and the underlying Geospatial Information Infrastructure (GII). Both iCAV and the GII
35 provide mechanisms for industry, Federal, State, local, and other partners to exchange
36 static and real-time information supporting situational and strategic awareness using
37 standards-based information exchange mechanisms. While iCAV permits viewing this
38 information in a dynamic map, the GII and IDW provide additional capabilities allowing
39 that data to be shared, stored and archived in federally compliant standard formats. iCAV
40 also provides the ability to integrate or link a variety of systems and numerous users,
41 ranging from local first responders to interested agencies within the Federal government.
42 Through iCAV, DHS connects previously stove-piped systems, providing consistent,
43 mission-specific COPs across organizational boundaries, fostering horizontal and vertical
44 CIKR information sharing with mission partners.

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1 The information-sharing process is designed to communicate both actionable information on

2 threats and incidents and information pertaining to overall CIKR status (e.g., plausible
3 threats, vulnerabilities, potential consequences, incident situation, and recovery progress)
4 so that owners and operators, States, localities, tribal governments, and other partners can
5 assess risks, make appropriate security investments, and take effective and efficient
6 protective actions.
7 4.2.1 Information Sharing Between NIPP Partners
8 The primary objective of the NIPP network approach to information sharing is to enhance
9 situational awareness and maximize the ability of government and private sector partners
10 at all levels to assess risks and execute risk-mitigation programs and activities.
11 Implementation of the Nation’s CIKR protection mission depends on the ability of the
12 government to receive and provide timely, actionable information on emerging threats to
13 CIKR owners and operators and security professionals so that they can take the necessary
14 steps to mitigate risk.
15 Ongoing and future initiatives generally fall within one of three overarching categories:
16 Planning: All partners have a stake in setting the individual information requirements
17 that best suit the needs of each CIKR sector. DHS, in conjunction with SSAs and other
18 State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners, will collaboratively develop
19 and disseminate an Annual CIKR Protection Information Requirements Report that
20 summarizes the sectors’ input and makes recommendations for collecting information
21 requirements. The Information Requirements Report will be disseminated to the sectors
22 through the SCCs and included in the National CIKR Protection Annual Report. In
23 addition to this process, DHS will coordinate with the Intelligence Community to
24 support information collection that reflects the emerging requirements provided by
25 SSAs and State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners.
26 Information Collection: Private sector participation in information collection is
27 voluntary and includes providing subject matter expertise and operational, vulner-
28 ability, and consequence data. Private sector partners also report suspicious activity
29 that could signal pre-operational terrorist activity to the DHS National Operations
30 Center (NOC) through the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC).
31 Information shared by the private sector, including that which is protected by PCII or
32 other approaches, is integrated with government-collected information to produce
33 comprehensive threat assessments and threat warning products. DHS assessments,
34 such as SAVs and BZPs, which may include information protected as PCII, are shared
35 across the sectors through electronic dissemination, posting to Homeland Security
36 Information Network (HSIN) portals, and direct outreach by DHS/IP and
37 DHS/HITRAC. These efforts provide the private sector with timely, actionable
38 information to enhance situational awareness and enable security planning activities.
39 Analysis and Decisionmaking: DHS/HITRAC is responsible for integrating CIKR
40 specific vulnerability and consequence data with threat information to produce
41 actionable risk assessments used to inform CIKR risk-mitigation activities at all levels.
42 DHS/HITRAC analysts work closely with CIKR sector subject matter experts to ensure
43 that these products address the individual requirements of each sector and help actuate
44 corresponding security activities.

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1 4.2.2 Information-Sharing Life Cycle

2 Planning, information collection, analyses, and decisionmaking are key elements of the
3 CIKR information life cycle. Protection of sensitive information and dissemination of
4 actionable information are central tenets that are maintained throughout each stage of the
5 life cycle.
6 4.2.2.1 Information Requirement
7 The information-sharing process begins with defining the information collection
8 requirements to be adopted by field entities, analytic entities, and all other partners that
9 collect and disseminate intelligence and other security-related information.
10 4.2.2.2 Balancing the Sharing and Protection of Information
11 Effective information sharing relies on the balance between making information available,
12 and the ability to protect information that may be sensitive, proprietary, or that the
13 disclosure of which might compromise ongoing law enforcement, intelligence, or military
14 operations or methods.
15 Distribution of information is based on using appropriate protocols for information
16 protection. Whether the sharing is top-down (by partners working with national-level infor-
17 mation such as system-wide aggregate data or the results of emergent threat analysis from
18 the Intelligence Community) or bottom-up (by field officers or facility operators sharing
19 detailed and location-specific information), the network approach places shared
20 responsibility on all CIKR partners to maintain appropriate and protected information-
21 sharing practices.
22 4.2.2.3 Top-Down and Bottom-Up Sharing
23 During incident situations, DHS monitors risk management activities and CIKR status at
24 the functional/operations level, the local law enforcement level, and at the cross-sector
25 level. Information sharing may also incorporate information that comes from pre- and post-
26 event natural disaster warnings and reports.
27 Top-Down Sharing: Under this approach, information regarding a potential terrorist threat
28 originates at the national level through domestic and/or overseas collection and fused
29 analysis, and subsequently is routed to State and local governments, CIKR owners and
30 operators, and other Federal agencies for immediate attention and/or action. This type of
31 information is generally assessed against DHS analysis reports and integrated with CIKR-
32 related information and data from a variety of government and private sector sources. The
33 result of this integration is the development of timely information products, often produced
34 within hours that are available for appropriate dissemination to CIKR partners, based on
35 previously specified reporting processes and data formats.
36 Bottom-Up Sharing: State, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations
37 report a variety of security- and incident-related information from the field using estab-
38 lished communications and reporting channels. This bottom-up information is assessed by
39 DHS and its partners in the intelligence and law enforcement communities in the context of
40 threat, vulnerability, consequence, and other information to illustrate a comprehensive risk
41 landscape.
42 Threat information that is received from local law enforcement or private sector suspicious
43 activity reporting is routed to DHS through the NICC and the NOC. The information is
44 then routed to intelligence and operations personnel, as appropriate, to support further

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1 analysis or action as required. In the context of evolving threat or incident situations,

2 further national-level analyses may result in the development and dissemination of a
3 variety of HITRAC products as discussed in chapter 3. Further information-sharing and
4 incident management activities are based on the specific analysis and needs of these
5 operations personnel.
6 DHS also monitors operational information such as changes in local risk management
7 measures, pre- and post-incident disaster or emergency response information, and local law
8 enforcement activities. Monitoring local incidents contributes to a comprehensive picture
9 that supports incident-related damage assessment, restoration prioritization, and other
10 national- or regional-level planning or resource allocation efforts. Written products and
11 reports that result from the ongoing monitoring are shared with relevant CIKR partners
12 according to appropriate information protection protocols.
13 4.2.2.4 Decisions and Actions
14 Information sharing, whether top-down or bottom-up, is a means to an end. The objective of
15 the information-sharing life cycle is to provide timely and relevant information that
16 partners can use to make decisions and take necessary actions to manage CIKR risk.
17
18 4.2.3 The Information-Sharing Approach
19 Figure 4.2 illustrates the broad concept of the NIPP multidirectional networked
20 information-sharing approach. This information-sharing network consists of components
21 that are connected by a national communications platform, the Homeland Security
22 Information Network (HSIN). HSIN is a counterterrorism communications system

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1 developed by State and local authorities and connecting all 50 States, 5 territories,
2 Washington, DC, and 50 major urban areas. HSIN is one of the key DHS technology tools
3 for strengthening the protection and ensuring reliable performance of the nation's critical
4 infrastructure through communication, coordination, and information sharing. It is an
5 Internet-based platform that enables secure, encrypted sensitive but unclassified (SBU)
6 and for official use only (FOUO) communication between DHS and vetted members within
7 and across CIKR sectors so that partners can obtain, analyze, and share information. The
8 diagram illustrates how the HSIN is used for two-way and multi-directional information
9 sharing between DHS; the Federal Intelligence Community; Federal departments and
10 agencies; State, local, and tribal jurisdictions; and the private sector. The connectivity of
11 the network also allows these partners to share information and coordinate among them-
12 selves (e.g., State-to-State coordination). CIKR partners are grouped into nodes in the
13 information-sharing network approach.
14 4.2.3.1 Information Sharing Environment
15 As specified in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Federal
16 Government is working with State and local partners and the private sector to create the
17 information-sharing environment (ISE) for terrorism information, in which access to such
18 information is matched to the roles, responsibilities, and missions of all organizations
19 engaged in countering terrorism and is timely and relevant to their needs. CIKR ISE has
20 been adopted as the private sector component, with the Assistant Secretary for
21 Infrastructure Protection as the designated Federal government lead. It is important to
22 note that most of the information shared day-to-day with the CIKR ISE consists of
23 information necessary for coordination and management of risks resulting from natural
24 hazards and accidents. Consequently, for information sharing to be efficient and
25 sustainable for the CIKR owners and operators, the same environment should be used to
26 share terrorism information.
27 CIKR information sharing breaks new ground. It also creates business risks for the owners
28 and operators. Significant questions are raised, such as: What information is required for a
29 productive two-way exchange? How is information most efficiently delivered and to whom
30 to elicit effective action? How is information–both proprietary and government–
31 appropriately protected? How will the sectors effect appropriate action in coordination with
32 all levels of government? How can business risks be mitigated when an exchange takes
33 place?
34 Of particular criticality is the coordination of CIKR information sharing at the national
35 level with that at the local level, where most decisions are made and actions taken to
36 support the CIKR protection mission. The integration of the CIKR ISE into the national
37 ISE as its private sector component, in recognition of its comprehensiveness and
38 engagement with all levels of government, strengthens the foundation for effective
39 coordination.
40 The CIKR ISE supports three levels of decision making and action: 1) strategic planning
41 and investment; 2) situational awareness and preparedness; and 3) operational planning
42 and response. It provides for policy, governance, planning, and coordination of information
43 sharing, as well as forums for developing effective, tailored forms and identifying the types
44 of information necessary for partners to make appropriate decisions and take necessary
45 actions for effective risk management.

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1 The CIKR ISE also encompasses a number of mechanisms that facilitate the flow of
2 information, mitigate obstacles to voluntary information sharing by CIKR owners and
3 operators, and provide feedback and continuous improvement for structures and processes.
4 The CIKR ISE accommodates a broad range of sector cultures, operations, and risk
5 management approaches and recognizes the unique policy and legal challenges for full two-
6 way sharing of information between the CIKR owners and operators and various levels of
7 government.
8 4.2.3.2 Information Sharing With HSIN
9 When fully deployed, the HSIN will constitute a robust and significant information-sharing
10 system that supports NIPP-related steady-state CIKR protection and NRF-related incident
11 management activities, as well as serving the information-sharing processes that form the
12 bridge between these two homeland security missions. The linkage between the nodes
13 results in a dynamic view of the strategic risk and evolving incident landscape. HSIN
14 functions as one of a number of mechanisms that enable DHS, SSAs, and other partners to
15 share information. Other supporting technologies and more traditional methods of
16 communications will continue to support CIKR protection, as appropriate, and will be fully
17 integrated into the network approach.
18 DHS and the SSAs work with other partners to measure the efficacy of the network and to
19 identify areas in which new mechanisms or supporting technologies are required. The
20 HSIN and the key nodes of the NIPP information-sharing approach are detailed in the
21 subsequent sections. By offering a user-friendly, efficient conduit for information sharing,
22 HSIN enhances the combined effectiveness in an all-hazards environment. HSIN network
23 architecture design is informed by experience gained by DOD and other Federal agencies in
24 developing networks to support similar missions. It supports a secure common operating
25 picture for all command or watch centers, including those of supporting emergency manage-
26 ment and public health activities.
27 HSIN will be one part of the ISE, and when fully developed, users of HSIN will be able to
28 access ISE terrorism information based on their roles, responsibilities, and missions. The
29 HSIN is composed of multiple, non-hierarchal communities of interest (COIs) that offer
30 CIKR partners the means to share information based on secure access. COIs provide virtual
31 areas where groups of participants with common concerns, such as law enforcement,
32 counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, emergency management, intelligence,
33 international, and other topics, can share information. This structure allows government
34 and industry partners to engage in collaborative exchanges, based on specific sector-
35 generated information requirements, mission emphasis, or interest level. Within the
36 Homeland Security Information Network for Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS) COI, each sector
37 establishes rules for participation, including vetting and verification processes that are
38 appropriate for the sector CIKR landscape and requirements for information protection. For
39 example, in some sectors, applicants are vetted through the SCC or ISAC; others may
40 require participants to be documented members of a specific profession, such as law
41 enforcement.
42 4.2.3.3 Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network
43 Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CWIN) is a relatively new
44 mechanism that facilitates the flow of information, mitigates obstacles to voluntary
45 information sharing by CIKR owners and operators, and provides feedback and continuous
46 improvement for structures and processes. CWIN is the critical, survivable network

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1 connecting DHS with vital sector partners that are essential to restoring the Nation's core
2 infrastructure. Those sectors/subsectors are communications, IT, and electricity as well as
3 their Federal and State official counterparts. In the circumstance where all or a major part
4 of telecommunications and Internet connectivity are lost or disrupted, CWIN is designed to
5 provide a survivable “out of band” communications and information-sharing capability to
6 coordinate and support infrastructure restoration. Once the core capabilities of
7 telecommunications, the Internet, and electricity are restored, normal communication
8 channels can be utilized and other critical infrastructures can begin the process of
9 restoration.
10 4.2.4 The Federal Intelligence Node
11 The Federal Intelligence Node, comprised of national Intelligence Community agencies,
12 SSA intelligence offices, and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/OI&A),
13 identifies and establishes the credibility of general and specific threats. This node also
14 includes national, regional, and field-level information-sharing and intelligence fusion
15 center entities that contribute to information sharing in the context of the CIKR protection
16 mission.
17 At the national level, these centers include, but are not limited to, the DHS/HITRAC, the
18 FBI-led National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), the National Counterterrorism
19 Center (NCTC), and the National Maritime Intelligence Center.
20 DHS/HITRAC analyzes and
Project Seahawk is a taskforce comprised of 40
21 integrates threat information and
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies that
22 works closely with components of the enhances intermodal transportation and port security by
23 Federal Infrastructure Node to sharing jurisdictional responsibility for the Port of
24 generate and disseminate threat Charleston and its metropolitan area. Other examples of
25 warning products to CIKR partners, information-sharing and intelligence fusion center
26 both internal and external to the entities include:
27 network, as appropriate.
DHS/USCG operates a Maritime Intelligence Fusion
28 The NJTTF mission is to enhance Center (MIFC)—Pacific (Alameda, CA) and an
29 communications, coordination, and MIFC—Atlantic (Dam Neck, VA). These centers
30 cooperation among Federal, State, serve as resources for intelligence support for the
31 local, and tribal agencies DHS/USCG, as well as for local and international
32 representing the intelligence, law maritime, intelligence, and law enforcement
33 enforcement, defense, diplomatic, partners;
34 public safety, and homeland security DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement
35 communities by providing a point of operates the Human Smuggling and Trafficking
36 fusion for terrorism intelligence and Center, an inter-agency joint intelligence fusion
center focused specifically on human smuggling and
37 by supporting Joint Terrorism Task
human trafficking. Other DHS entities, the
38 Forces (JTTFs) throughout the Department of State, DOJ, and other members of the
39 United States. Intelligence Community participate in the Center;
40 The NCTC serves as the primary and
41 Federal organization for analyzing The Defense Intelligence Agency operates analytic
42 and integrating all intelligence fusion centers in the various overseas areas of
43 possessed or acquired by the U.S. operation (i.e., EUCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM,
44 Government pertaining to terrorism SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM). These fusion cells
45 and counterterrorism, except purely support production coordination and
46 domestic counterterrorism targeting/operational activities, as well as ongoing
area operations or special programs.

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1 information. The NCTC may, consistent with applicable law, receive, retain, and
2 disseminate information from any Federal, State, or local government or other source
3 necessary to fulfill its responsibilities.
4 The National Maritime Intelligence Center serves as the central point of connectivity to
5 fuse, analyze, and disseminate information and intelligence for shared situational
6 awareness across classification boundaries.
7 At the regional and field levels, Federal information-sharing and intelligence fusion centers
8 include entities such as the local JTTFs, the DHS/DOJ-sponsored Project Seahawk, and
9 FBI Field Intelligence Groups that provide the centralized intelligence/information-sharing
10 component in every FBI field office.
11 4.2.5 The Federal Infrastructure Node
12 The Federal Infrastructure Node, comprised of DHS, SSAs, GCCs, and other Federal
13 departments and agencies, gathers and receives threat, incident, and other operational
14 information from a variety of sources (including a wide range of watch/operations centers).
15 This information enables assessment of the status of CIKR and facilitates the development
16 and dissemination of appropriate real-time threat and warning products and corresponding
17 protective measures recommendations to CIKR partners (see chapter 3). Participants in the
18 Federal node collaborate with CIKR owners and operators to gain input during the
19 development of threat and warning products and corresponding protective measures
20 recommendations.
21 4.2.6 State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, and Regional Node
22 This node provides links between DHS, the SSAs, and partners at the State, local, regional,
23 tribal, and territorial levels. Several established communications channels provide
24 protocols for passing information from the local to the State to the Federal level and
25 disseminating information from the Federal Government to other partners. The NIPP
26 network approach augments these established communications channels by facilitating
27 two-way and multi-directional information sharing. Members of this node provide incident
28 response, first-responder information, and reports of suspicious activity to the FBI and
29 DHS for purposes of awareness and analysis. Homeland security advisors receive and
30 further disseminate coordinated DHS/FBI threat and warning products, as appropriate.
31 Numerous States and urban area jurisdictions also have established fusion centers or
32 terrorism early warning centers to facilitate a collaborative process between law
33 enforcement, public safety, other first-responders, and private entities to collect, integrate,
34 evaluate, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence and other information that relates
35 to CIKR protection.
Information exchange between fusion centers
36 4.2.6.1 Fusion Centers and local partners
37 Another key mechanism for information Site-specific risk information
38 exchange at the local level is SLFCs. SLFCs Interdependency information
39 are developing or integrating operational Suspicious activity reports
40 capabilities that focus on securing CIKR
Communications capability information
41 and advancing Federal, State, local, and
42 private sector CIKR protection efforts. The Adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures
43 operational capability will include the Best practices
44 development of analytical products, such as Standard operating procedures for incident
45 risk and trend analysis, and the response
Emergency contact/alert information

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1 dissemination of those products to appropriate CIKR partners. SLFCs will provide a

2 comprehensive understanding of the threat, local CIKR vulnerabilities, the potential
3 consequences of attacks, and the effects of risk-mitigation actions on not only the risk, but
4 also on ongoing CIKR operations within the footprint or jurisdiction of the fusion center.
5 CIKR protection capabilities in an SLFC will assist State, regional, and local partners in
6 the mitigation and response to terrorist threats as well as man-made or natural hazards.
7 When fully equipped with CIKR protection capabilities, SLFCs will assist with both
8 information sharing and broad-based data collection. The collection process for CIKR
9 information should draw on various mechanisms and sources, such as existing SLFC
10 records or databases, open-source searches, site-assistance visits, technical systems,
11 Federal and State resources, subject matter experts, utilization of associations (including
12 SCCs), and information shared by owners and operators.
13 4.2.6.2 Protective Security Advisors
14 The mission of the Protective Security Advisor (PSA) is to represent DHS and IP in local
15 communities throughout the US. PSAs work with State HSAs, serving as liaisons between
16 DHS, the private sector, and Federal, State, territorial, local, and tribal entities; acting as
17 DHS’ on-site critical infrastructure and vulnerability assessment specialists. As a result of
18 their locations throughout the United States, PSAs are often the first Department
19 personnel to respond to incidents. Consequently, PSAs are uniquely able to provide early
20 situational awareness to DHS and IP leadership during an incident or contingency
21 operations. During natural disasters and contingencies, PSAs deploy to state and local
22 Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) and State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs) to
23 provide situational awareness and facilitate information exchange to and from the field.
24 During incidents, upon designation by the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection,
25 PSAs perform duties as Infrastructure Liaisons (ILs) at Joint Field Offices (JFOs) in
26 support of the Principal Federal Officials (PFOs) and Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs)
27 under the National Response Framework. PSAs also provide support to officials responsible
28 for special events planning and exercises. The PSA Duty Desk serves as the 24/7 conduit
29 between the PSAs, DHS headquarters, and other CIKR stakeholders to facilitate 24/7
30 coordination and collaboration between the PSAs, their State, local, and private sector
31 counterparts, and DHS during steady state and incident operations.
32 Additionally, PSAs provide support to officials responsible for special events planning and
33 exercises, and provide real-time information on facility significance and protective
34 measures to facility owners and operators, as well as State and local representatives. PSAs
35 assist and facilitate IP efforts to identify, assess, monitor, and minimize risk to CIKR at the
36 state, regional, and local level. As the liaison between the field and DHS, PSAs coordinate
37 requests for DHS assistance including training and vulnerability assessments (VAs): Site
38 Assistance Visits (SAVs), Buffer Zone Plans (BZPs), Comprehensive Reviews (CRs);
39 Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities, Potential Indicators for Terrorist Attack, and
40 Protective Measures Reports; Risk Mitigation Courses: Surveillance Detection and Soft
41 Target Awareness, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Awareness and Counter Terrorism
42 Awareness; CIKR verification; and technical assistance visits. PSAs assist owners and
43 operators with the development of plans to address the vulnerabilities identified during
44 VAs.

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1 4.2.7 Private Sector Node

2 The Private Sector Node includes CIKR owners and operators, SCCs, ISACs, and trade
3 associations that provide incident information, as well as reports of suspicious activity that
4 may indicate actual or potential criminal intent or terrorist activity. DHS, in return,
5 provides all-hazards warning products, recommended protective measures, and alert
6 notification to a variety of industry coordination and information-sharing mechanisms, as
7 well as directly to affected CIKR owners and operators.
8 The NIPP network approach connects and augments existing information-sharing
9 mechanisms, where appropriate, to reach the widest possible population of CIKR owners
10 and operators and other partners. Owners and operators need accurate and timely incident
11 and threat-related information in order to effectively manage risk; enable post-event
12 restoration and recovery; and make decisions regarding protective strategies, partnerships,
13 mitigation plans, security measures, and investments for addressing risk.
14 ISACs provide an example of an effective private sector information-sharing and analysis
15 mechanism. Originally recommended by Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in
16 1998, ISACs are sector-specific entities that advance physical and cyber CIKR protection
17 efforts by establishing and maintaining frameworks for operational interaction between
18 and among members and external partners. ISACs typically serve as the tactical and
19 operational arms for sector information-sharing efforts.
20 ISAC functions include, but are not limited to, supporting sector-specific
21 information/intelligence requirements for incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities; providing
22 secure capability for members to exchange and share information on cyber, physical, or
23 other threats; establishing and maintaining operational-level dialogue with appropriate
24 governmental agencies; identifying and disseminating knowledge and best practices; and
25 promoting education and awareness.
26 The sector partnership model recognizes that not all CIKR sectors have established ISACs.
27 Each sector has the ability to implement a tailored information-sharing solution that may
28 include ISACs; voluntary standards development organizations; or other mechanisms, such
29 as trade associations, security organizations, and industry-wide or corporate operations
30 centers, working in concert to expand the flow of knowledge exchange to all infrastructure
31 owners and operators. Most ISACs are members of the ISAC Council, which provides the
32 mechanism for the inter-sector sharing of operational information. Sectors that do not have
33 ISACs per se use other mechanisms that participate in the HSIN and other CIKR
34 protection information-sharing arrangements. For the purposes of the NIPP, these
35 operationally oriented groups are also referred to collectively as ISACs.
36 ISACs vary greatly in composition (i.e., membership), scope (e.g., focus and coverage within
37 a sector), and capabilities (e.g., 24/7 staffing and analytical capacity), as do the sectors they
38 serve. As the sectors define and implement their unique information-sharing mechanisms
39 for CIKR protection, the ISACs will remain an important information-sharing mechanism
40 for many sectors under the NIPP partnership model.
41 4.2.8 DHS Operations Node
42 The DHS Operations Node maintains close working relationships with other government
43 and private sector partners to enable and coordinate an integrated operational picture,
44 provide operational and situational awareness, and facilitate CIKR information sharing

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1 within and across sectors. DHS and other Federal watch/operations centers provide the
2 24/7 capability required to enable the real-time alerts and warnings, incident reporting,
3 situational awareness, and assessments needed to support CIKR protection.
4 The principal purpose of a watch/operations center is to collect and share information.
5 Therefore, the value and effectiveness of such centers is largely dependent upon a timely,
6 accurate, and extensive population of information sources. The NIPP information-sharing
7 network approach virtually integrates numerous primary watch/operations centers at
8 various levels to enhance information exchange, providing a far-reaching network of
9 awareness and coordination.
10 4.2.8.1 National Operations Center 23
11 The NOC, formerly known as the Homeland Security Operations Center, serves as the
12 Nation’s hub for domestic incident management operational coordination and situational
13 awareness. The NOC is a standing 24/7 interagency organization fusing law enforcement,
14 national intelligence, emergency response, and private sector reporting. The NOC
15 facilitates homeland security information-sharing and operational coordination among
16 Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector partners, as well as select members of the
17 international community. As such, it is at the center of the NIPP information-sharing
18 network.
19 The NOC information-sharing and coordination functions include:
20 Information Collection and Analysis: The NOC maintains national-level situational
21 awareness and provides a centralized, real-time flow of information. An NOC common
22 operating picture is generated using data collected from across the country to provide a
23 broad view of the Nation’s current overall risk and preparedness status. Using the
24 common operating picture, NOC personnel, in coordination with the FBI and other
25 agencies, as appropriate, perform initial assessments to gauge the terrorism nexus and
26 track actions taking place across the country in response to a threat, natural disaster, or
27 accident. The information compiled by the NOC is distributed to partners, as
28 appropriate, and is accessible to affected CIKR partners through the HSIN.
29 Situational Awareness and Incident Response Coordination: The NOC provides the all-
30 hazards information needed to help make decisions and define courses of action.
31 Threat Warning Products: DHS jointly reviews threat information with the FBI,
32 Intelligence Community, and other Federal departments and agencies on a continuous
33 basis. When a threat is determined to be credible and actionable, DHS is responsible for
34 coordinating with these Federal partners in the development and dissemination of
35 threat warning products. This coordination ensures, to the greatest extent possible, the
36 accuracy and timeliness of the information, as well as concurrence by Federal partners.
37
38 DHS disseminates threat warning products to Federal, State, local, and tribal governments,
39 as well as to private sector organizations and international partners as COI members
40 through the HSIN, established e-mail distribution lists, and other methods, as required:
23The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, issued by the Homeland Security Council, February 2006, recommended the establishment of
the NOC as a single entity to unify situational awareness and response, recovery, and mitigation functions. The NOC replaces the DHS Homeland Security
Operations Center.

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1 Threat Advisories: Contain actionable threat information and provide recommended

2 protective actions based on the nature of the threat. They also may communicate a
3 national, regional, or sector-specific change in the level of the HSAS.
4 Homeland Security Assessments: Communicate threat information that does not meet
5 the timeliness, specificity, or criticality criteria of an advisory, but is pertinent to the
6 security of U.S. CIKR.
7 The NOC is comprised of four sub-elements: the NOC Headquarters Element (NOC-HQE),
8 the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the intelligence and analysis element,
9 and the NICC.
10 NOC Headquarters Element: The NOC-HQE is a multi-agency center that provides
11 overall Federal prevention, protection, and preparedness coordination. The NOC-HQE
12 integrates representatives from DHS and other Federal departments and agencies to
13 support steady-state threat-monitoring requirements and situational awareness, as well
14 as operational incident management planning and coordination. The organizational
15 structure of the NOC-HQE is designed to integrate a full spectrum of interagency
16 subject matter expertise, operational planning capability, and reach-back capability to
17 meet the demands of a wide range of potential incident scenarios.
18 National Response Coordination Center: The NRCC is a multi-agency center housed
19 within FEMA that provides overall coordination of Federal response, recovery, and
20 mitigation activities, and emergency management program implementation.
21 Intelligence and Analysis Element: The intelligence and analysis element is responsible
22 for interagency intelligence collection requirements, analysis, production, and product
23 dissemination for DHS, to include homeland security threat warnings, advisory
24 bulletins, and other information pertinent to national incident management (see section
25 4.2.4).
26 National Infrastructure Coordinating Center: The NICC is a 24/7 watch/operations
27 center that maintains ongoing operational and situational awareness of the Nation’s
28 CIKR sectors. As a CIKR-focused element of the NOC, the NICC provides a centralized
29 mechanism and process for information sharing and coordination between the
30 government, SCCs, GCCs, and other industry partners. The NICC receives situational,
31 operational, and incident information from the CIKR sectors, in accordance with
32 information-sharing protocols established in the NRF. The NICC also disseminates
33 products originated by HITRAC that contain all-hazards warning, threat, and CIKR
34 protection information:
35 ¾ Alerts and Warnings: The NICC disseminates threat-related and other all-hazards
36 information products to an extensive customer base of private sector partners.
37 ¾ Suspicious Activity and Potential Threat Reporting: The NICC receives and
38 processes reports from the private sector on suspicious activities or potential threats
39 to the Nation’s CIKR. The NICC documents the information provided, compiles
40 additional details surrounding the suspicious activity or potential threat, and
41 forwards the report to DHS sector specialists, the NOC, HITRAC, and the FBI.
42 ¾ Incidents and Events: When an incident or event occurs, the NICC coordinates with
43 DHS sector specialists, industry partners, and other established information-sharing
44 mechanisms to communicate pertinent information. As needed, the NICC generates
45 reports detailing the incident, as well as the sector impacts (or potential impacts),
46 and disseminates them to the NOC.

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1 ¾ National Response Planning and Execution: The NICC supports the NRF by
2 facilitating information sharing among SCCs, GCCs, ISACs, and other partners
3 during CIKR mitigation, response, and recovery activities.
4 4.2.8.2 National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications
5 Pursuant to Executive Order 12472, the National Communications System (NCS) assists
6 the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Office of Science and
7 Technology Policy (OSTP) and OMB in the coordination and provision of NS/EP
8 communications for the Federal Government under all circumstances, including crisis or
9 emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstitution. As called for in the Executive order, the
10 NCS has established the NCC, which is a joint industry-government entity. Under the
11 Executive order, the NCC assists the NCS in the initiation, coordination, restoration, and
12 reconstitution of national security or emergency preparedness communications services or
13 facilities under all conditions of crisis or emergency. The NCC regularly monitors the status
14 of communications systems. It collects situational and operational information on a regular
15 basis, as well as during a crisis, and provides information to the NCS. The NCS, in turn,
16 shares information with the White House and other DHS components.
17 4.2.8.3 United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
18 The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is a 24/7 single point
19 of contact for cyberspace analysis, warning, information sharing, and incident response and
20 recovery for CIKR partners. It is a partnership between DHS and the public and private
21 sectors designed to enable protection of cyber infrastructure and to coordinate the
22 prevention of and response to cyber attacks across the Nation.
23 US-CERT coordinates with CIKR partners to disseminate reasoned and actionable
24 cybersecurity information through a Web site, accessible through the HSIN, and through
25 mailing lists. Among the products it provides are:
26 Cybersecurity Bulletins: Weekly bulletins written for systems administrators and other
27 technical users that summarize published information concerning new security issues
28 and vulnerabilities.
29 Technical Cybersecurity Alerts: Written for system administrators and experienced
30 users, technical alerts provide timely information on current security issues,
31 vulnerabilities, and exploits.
32 Cybersecurity Alerts: Written in a language for home, corporate, and new users, these
33 alerts are published in conjunction with technical alerts when there are security issues
34 that affect the general public.
35 Cybersecurity Tips: Tips provide information and advice on a variety of common
36 security topics. They are published biweekly and are primarily intended for home,
37 corporate, and new users.
38 National Web Cast Initiative: DHS, through US-CERT and the Multi-State Information
39 Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), has initiated a joint partnership to develop a
40 series of national Web casts that will examine critical and timely cybersecurity issues.
41 The purpose of the initiative is to strengthen the Nation’s cyber readiness and
42 resilience.
43 US-CERT also provides a method for citizens, businesses, and other important institutions
44 to communicate and coordinate directly with the Federal Government on matters of

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1 cybersecurity. The private sector can use the protections afforded by the Critical
2 Infrastructure Information Act to electronically submit proprietary data to US-CERT.
3 4.2.10 Other Information-Sharing Nodes
4 DHS, other Federal agencies, and the law enforcement community provide additional
5 services and programs that share information supporting CIKR protection with a broad
6 range of partners. These include, but are not limited to, the following:
7 Sharing National Security Information: DHS sponsors security clearances for
8 designated private sector owners and operators to promote the sharing of classified
9 information using currently available methods and systems.
10 FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO): LEO can be accessed by any approved employee of
11 a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, or approved member of an authorized
12 law enforcement special interest group. LEO provides a communications mechanism to
13 link all levels of law enforcement throughout the United States.
14 RISSNET™ is a secure nationwide law enforcement and information-sharing network
15 that operates as part of the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program.
16 RISS is composed of six regional centers that share intelligence and coordinate efforts
17 targeted against criminal networks, terrorism, cyber crime, and other unlawful activi-
18 ties that cross jurisdictional lines. RISSNET features include online access to a RISS
19 electronic bulletin board, databases, RISS center Web pages, secure e-mail, a RISS
20 search engine, and other center resources. The RISS program is federally funded and
21 administered by the DOJ/Bureau of Justice Assistance.
22 FBI InfraGard: InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI, other government entities,
23 and the private sector. The InfraGard National Membership Alliance is an association
24 of businesses, academic institutions, State and local law enforcement agencies, and
25 other participants that enables the sharing of knowledge, expertise, information, and
26 intelligence related to the protection of U.S. CIKR from physical and cyber threats.
27 Interagency Cybersecurity Efforts: The intelligence and law enforcement communities
28 have various information-sharing mechanisms in place. Examples include:
29 – U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces: U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic
30 Crimes Task Forces (ECTFs) prevent, detect, and investigate electronic crimes, cyber-
31 based attacks, and intrusions against CIKR and electronic payment systems, and
32 provide interagency information sharing on related issues.
33 – Cybercop Portal: The DHS-sponsored Cybercop portal is a secure Internet-based
34 information-sharing mechanism that connects more than 5,300 members of the law
35 enforcement community, bank investigators, and the network security specialists
36 involved in electronic crimes investigations.
37 CEO COM LINKSM: The Critical Emergency Operations Communications Link (CEO
38 COM LINK) is a telephone communications system that will enable the Nation’s top
39 chief executive officers (CEOs) to enhance the protection of employees, communities,
40 and the Nation’s CIKR by communicating with government officials and each other
41 about specific threats or during national crises. The calls, which are restricted to
42 authorized participants, allow top government officials to brief CEOs on developments
43 and threats, and allow CEOs to ask questions or share information with government
44 leaders and with each other.

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1 4.3 Protection of Sensitive CIKR Information

2 NIPP implementation will rely greatly on critical infrastructure information provided by
3 the private sector. Much of this is sensitive business or security information that could
4 cause serious damage to companies, the economy, and public safety or security through
5 unauthorized disclosure or access to this information.
6 The Federal Government has a statutory responsibility to safeguard information collected
7 from or about CIKR activities. Section 201(d)(12)(a) of the Homeland Security Act requires
8 DHS to “ensure that any material received pursuant to this Act is protected from
9 unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for the performance of official duties.”
10 DHS and other Federal agencies use a number of programs and procedures, such as the
11 PCII Program, to ensure that CIKR information is properly safeguarded. In addition to the
12 PCII Program, other programs and procedures used to protect sensitive information include
13 Sensitive Security Information for transportation activities, Unclassified Controlled
14 Nuclear Information (UCNI), contractual provisions, classified national provisions,
15 Classified National Security Information, Law Enforcement Sensitive Information, Federal
16 Security Information Guidelines, Federal Security Classification Guidelines, and other
17 requirements established by law.
18 4.3.1 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program
19 The PCII Program was established pursuant to the Critical Infrastructure Information
20 (CII) Act of 2002. The Program institutes a means for sharing private sector CIKR
21 information voluntarily with the government while providing assurances that the infor-
22 mation will be exempt from public disclosure and will be properly safeguarded.
23 The PCII Program, which operates under the authority of the CII Act and the
24 implementing regulation (6 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 29 (the Final Rule)),
25 defines both the requirements for submitting CII and those that government entities must
26 meet for accessing and safeguarding PCII. DHS remains committed to making PCII an
27 effective tool for robust information sharing between critical infrastructure owners and
28 operators and the government. For more information, contact the PCII Program Office at
29 pcii-info@dhs.gov. Additional PCII Program information may also be found at
30 www.dhs.gov/pcii.
31 4.3.1.1 PCII Program Office
32 The PCII Program Office is responsible for managing PCII Program requirements,
33 developing protocols for handling PCII, raising awareness of the need for protected informa-
34 tion sharing between government and the private sector, and ensuring that programs
35 receiving voluntary CII submissions that have been validated as PCII use approved
36 procedures to continuously safeguard submitted information. The Program Office
37 collaborates with governmental organizations and the private sector to develop
38 information-sharing partnerships that promote greater homeland security.
39 4.3.1.2 Critical Infrastructure Information Protection
40 The following processes and procedures apply to all CII submissions:
41 Individuals or collaborative groups may submit information for protection to either the
42 PCII Program Office or a Federal PCII Program Manager Designee;

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1 The PCII Program Office validates the information as PCII if it qualifies for protection
2 under the CII Act;
3 All PCII is stored in a secure data management system and CIKR partners follow PCII
4 Program safeguarding, handling, dissemination and storage requirements established
5 in the Final Rule and promulgated by the PCII Program Office;
6 Secure methods are used for disseminating PCII, which may only be accessed by
7 authorized PCII users who have taken the PCII Program training (see Section 6.2 for
8 PCII training offerings), have homeland security duties as well as a need-to-know for
9 the specific PCII;
10 Authorized users must comply with safeguarding requirements defined by the PCII
11 Program Office; and
12 Any suspected disclosure of PCII will be promptly investigated.
13 The Final Rule invested the PCII Program Manager with the authority and flexibility to
14 designate certain types of CII as presumptively valid PCII to accelerate the validation
15 process and to facilitate submissions directly to SSAs. This is known as a “categorical
16 inclusion.” Specifically, categorical inclusions allow:
17 The PCII Program Manager to establish categories of information for which PCII status
18 will automatically apply;
19 Indirect submissions to DHS through DHS field representatives and other SSAs;
20 The PCII Program Office to designate DHS field representatives and SSAs other than
21 DHS to receive CII indirectly on behalf of DHS, but only the PCII Program Manager is
22 authorized to make the decision to validate a submission as PCII.
23 The Final Rule enables submitters to submit their CII directly to a PCII Program Manager
24 Designee within a given SSA. Interested submitters should contact the PCII Program Office
25 at pcii-info@dhs.gov to determine whether an SSA has an appropriate PCII categorical
26 inclusion program established. If the SSA does not have one, the PCII Program Office will
27 work with the submitter and the SSA to establish a program and facilitate the application
28 of PCII protections to the submitter’s CIKR information.
29 4.3.1.3 Uses of PCII
30 PCII may be shared with accredited government entities, including authorized Federal,
31 State, or local government employees or contractors supporting Federal agencies, only for
32 the purposes of securing CIKR and protected systems. PCII will be used for analysis,
33 prevention, response, recovery, or reconstitution of CIKR threatened by terrorism or other
34 hazards.
35 Accredited government entities may generate advisories, alerts, and warnings relevant to
36 the private sector based on the PCII. Communications available to the public, however, will
37 not contain any actual PCII. PCII can be combined with other information, including
38 classified information to support CIKR protection activities, but must be marked
39 accordingly.
40 The CII Act specifically authorizes disclosure of PCII without the permission of the
41 submitter to:
42 Further an investigation or prosecute a criminal act;

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1 Either House of Congress, or to the extent they address matters within their
2 jurisdiction, or any related committee, subcommittee, or joint committee;
3 The Comptroller General or any authorized representative of the Comptroller General,
4 while performing the duties of the General Accounting Office.
5 4.3.1.4 PCII Protections and Authorized Users
6 The PCII Program has established policies and procedures to ensure that PCII is properly
7 accessed, used, and safeguarded throughout its life cycle. These safeguards ensure that
8 submitted information is:
9 Used appropriately for homeland security purposes;
10 Accessed only by authorized and properly trained government employees and
11 contractors with homeland security duties who have a need to know and for non-Federal
12 government employees who have signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement;
13 Protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and similar
14 State and local disclosure laws, and from use in civil litigation and regulatory actions;
15 and
16 Protected and handled in a secure manner.
17 The law and rule prescribe criminal penalties for intentional unauthorized access,
18 distribution, and misuse of PCII including the following provisions:
19 Federal employees may be subject to disciplinary action, including criminal and civil
20 penalties and loss of employment;
21 Contract employees may face termination, and the contractor may have its contract
22 terminated; and
23 The CII Act sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of PCII apply only to Federal
24 personnel. In order to become accredited, State and local participating entities must
25 demonstrate that they can apply appropriate State and local penalties for improperly
26 handling sensitive information such as PCII.
27 PCII is actively used by numerous DHS information collection and assessment tools,
28 including the Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System (C/ACAMS),
29 Buffer Zone Plans (BZPs), and Site Assistance Visits (SAVs). PCII also partners with many
30 Federal agencies, notably the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
31 Department of Defense (DoD). In addition, the PCII Program actively partners with all
32 States and territories interested in becoming accredited.
33 4.3.2 Other Information Protection Protocols
34 Information protection protocols may impose requirements for access or other standard
35 processes for safeguarding information. Information need not be validated as PCII to
36 receive security protection and disclosure restrictions. Several categories of information
37 related to CIKR are considered to be sensitive but unclassified and require protection.
38 Examples include sector-specific information, such as sensitive transportation or nuclear
39 information, or information determined to be classified information based on the analysis of
40 unclassified information. The major categories that apply to CIKR are discussed below.

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1 4.3.2.1 Sensitive Security Information

2 The Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Aviation Transportation Security Act, and
3 the Homeland Security Act establish protection for Sensitive Security Information (SSI).
4 TSA and the USCG may designate information as SSI when disclosure would:
5 Be detrimental to security;
6 Reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information; or
7 Constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
8 Parties accessing SSI must demonstrate a need to know. Holders of SSI must protect such
9 information from unauthorized disclosure and must destroy the information when it is no
10 longer needed. SSI protection pertains to government officials as well as to transportation
11 sector owners and operators.
12 4.3.2.2 Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
13 DOD and DOE may designate certain information as UCNI. Such information relates to the
14 production, processing, or use of nuclear material; nuclear facility design information; and
15 security plans and measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials. This
16 designation is used when disclosure could affect public health and safety or national
17 security by enabling illegal production or diversion of nuclear materials or weapons. Access
18 to UCNI is restricted to those who have a need to know. Procedures are specified for
19 marking and safeguarding UCNI.
20 4.3.2.3 Freedom of Information Act Exemptions and Exclusions
21 FOIA was enacted in 1966 and amended and modified by congressional legislation,
22 including the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 and the Privacy Act of 1974.
23 The act established a statutory right of public access to executive branch information in the
24 Federal Government and generally provides that any person has a right, enforceable in
25 court, to obtain access to Federal agency records. Certain records may be protected from
26 public disclosure under the act if they fall into one of three special law enforcement
27 exclusions that protect information, such as informants’ names. They may also be protected
28 from public disclosure under the act if they are in one of nine exemption categories that
29 protect such information as classified national security data, trade secrets, or financial
30 information obtained by the government from individuals, personnel and medical files, and
31 CIKR information.
32 4.3.2.4 Classified Information
33 Under amended Executive Order 12958and amended Executive Order 12829, the
34 Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives is responsible to the
35 President for overseeing the security classification programs in both government and
36 industry that safeguard National Security Information (NSI), including information related
37 to defense against transnational terrorism.
38 Classified information is a special category of sensitive information that is accorded special
39 protections and access controls. Specific characteristics distinguish it from other sensitive
40 information. These include:
41 Information that can only be designated as classified by a duly empowered authority;
42 Information that must be owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the
43 Federal Government;

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1 Unauthorized disclosure of the information that reasonably could be expected to result

2 in identifiable damage to U.S. national security; and
3 Only information related to the following that may be classified as:
4 ¾ Military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
5 ¾ Foreign government information;
6 ¾ Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods,
7 or cryptology;
8 ¾ Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential
9 sources;
10 ¾ Scientific, technological, or economic matters related to national security, which
11 includes defense against transnational terrorism;
12 ¾ Federal Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
13 ¾ Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructure, projects,
14 plans, or protection services related to national security, which includes defense
15 against transnational terrorism; or
16 ¾ Weapons of mass destruction.
17 Many forms of information related to CIKR protection have these characteristics. This
18 information may be determined to be classified information and protected accordingly.
19 4.3.2.5 Physical and Cybersecurity Measures
20 DHS uses strict information security protocols for the access, use, and storage of sensitive
21 information, including that related to CIKR. These protocols include both physical security
22 measures and cybersecurity measures. Physical security protocols for DHS facilities require
23 access control and risk-mitigation measures. Information security protocols include access
24 controls, login restrictions, session tracking, and data labeling. Appendix 3C provides a
25 discussion of these protections as applied to the IDW.
26 4.3.2.6 Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information
27 On April 9, 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Chemical
28 Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). Congress authorized these interim final
29 regulations (IFR) under Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security
30 Appropriations Act of 2007, directing the Department to identify, assess, and ensure
31 effective security at high risk chemical facilities. In Section 550, Congress also
32 acknowledged DHS’s need to both protect and share chemical facility security information.
33 Consequently, DHS included provisions in the IFR to create and explain Chemical-
34 terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI), a new category of protected information to
35 protect extremely sensitive information that facilities develop for purposes of complying
36 with the CFATS that could be exploited by terrorists. At the same time, CVI allows sharing
37 relevant information with state and local government officials who have a “need to know”
38 CVI to carry out chemical facility security activities. Before being authorized to access CVI,
39 individuals will have to complete training to ensure that the individuals understand and
40 comply with the various safeguarding and handling requirements for CVI.
41 More information on CFATS and CVI, including the CVI Procedures Manual, can be found
42 at: www.dhs.gov/chemicalsecurity.

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1 4.4 Privacy and Constitutional Freedoms

2 Mechanisms detailed in the NIPP are designed to provide a balance between achieving a
3 high level of security and protecting the civil rights and liberties that form an integral part
4 of America’s national character. Achieving this balance requires acceptance of some level of
5 risk. In providing for effective protective programs, the processes outlined in the NIPP
6 respect privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom from unlawful
7 discrimination, and other liberties that define the American way of life.
8 Compliance with the Privacy Act and governmental privacy regulations and procedures is a
9 key factor that is considered when collecting, maintaining, using, and disseminating
10 personal information. The following DHS offices support the NIPP processes:
11 DHS Privacy Office: Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, DHS has designated a
12 privacy officer to ensure that it appropriately balances the mission with civil liberty and
13 privacy concerns. The officer consults regularly with privacy advocates, industry
14 experts, and the public at large to ensure broad input and consideration of privacy
15 issues so that DHS achieves solutions that protect privacy while enhancing security.
16 DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act,
17 DHS has established an Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to review and assess
18 allegations of abuse of civil rights or civil liberties, racial or ethnic profiling, and to
19 provide advice to DHS components.

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1 5. CIKR Protection as Part of the

2 Homeland Security Mission
3 This chapter describes the linkages between the NIPP, the SSPs, and other CIKR
4 protection strategies, plans, and initiatives that are most relevant to the overarching
5 national homeland security and CIKR protection missions. It also describes how the unified
6 national CIKR protection effort integrates elements of the homeland security mission
7 including preparedness and activities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover
8 from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. Sector-specific linkages to
9 these other national frameworks are addressed in the SSPs.
10 5.1 A Coordinated National Approach to the Homeland Security

11 Mission
12 The NIPP provides the structure needed to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize activities
13 derived from various relevant statutes, national strategies and Presidential directives into
14 the unified national approach to implementing the CIKR protection mission. The relevant
15 authorities include those that address the overarching homeland security and CIKR
16 protection missions, as well as those that address a wide range of sector-specific CIKR
17 protection-related functions, programs, and responsibilities. This section describes how
18 overarching homeland security legislation, strategies, HSPDs, and related initiatives work
19 together (see figure 5-1). Information regarding sector-specific CIKR-related authorities is
20 addressed in the respective SSPs.
21 5.1.1 Legislation
22 The Homeland Security Act (figure 5-1, column 1) provides the primary authority for the
23 overall homeland security mission and establishes the basis for the NIPP, the SSPs, and
24 related CIKR protection efforts and activities. A number of other statutes (as described in
25 chapter 2 and appendix 2A) provide authorities for cross-sector and sector-specific CIKR
26 protection activities. Individual SSPs address relevant sector-specific authorities.
27 5.1.2 Strategies
28 The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy for the Physical
29 Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, and the National Strategy to Secure
30 Cyberspace together provide the vision and strategic direction for the CIKR protection
31 elements of the homeland security mission (see figure 5-1, columns 1 and 2). A number of
32 other Presidential strategies, such as the National Intelligence Strategy, provide direction
33 and guidance related to CIKR protection on a national or sector-specific basis (see appendix
34 2A).
35 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (figure 5-1, column 1) provides the primary authority
36 for the overall homeland security mission and establishes the basis for the NIPP, the SSPs,
37 and related CIKR protection efforts and activities. Public Law 110-53, Implementing
38 Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, further refines and enumerates
39 those authorities specified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and formally assigns key
40 infrastructure protection responsibilities to DHS, including the creation of a database of all
41 national infrastructures to support cross-sector risk assessment and management.

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1 5.1.2.1 The National Strategy for Homeland Security

2 The President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) established protection of
3 America’s CIKR as a core homeland security mission and as a key element of the
4 comprehensive approach to homeland security and domestic incident management. This
5 strategy articulated the vision for a unified “American Infrastructure Protection effort” to
6 “ensure we address vulnerabilities that involve more than one infrastructure sector or
7 require action by more than one agency,” and to “assess threats and vulnerabilities
8 comprehensively across all infrastructure sectors to ensure we reduce the overall risk to the
9 country, instead of inadvertently shifting risk from one potential set of targets to another.”
10 This strategy called for the development of “interconnected and complementary homeland
11 security systems that are reinforcing rather than duplicative, and that ensure essential
12 requirements are met … [and] provide a framework to align the resources of the Federal
13 budget directly to the task of securing the homeland.”
14 The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security builds on the first National Strategy for
15 Homeland Security and complements both the National Security Strategy issued in March
16 2006 and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in September 2006. It
17 reflects the increased understanding of threats confronting the United States, incorporates
18 lessons learned from exercises and real-world catastrophes, and addresses ways to ensure
19 long-term success by strengthening the homeland security foundation that has been built.
20 Figure 5-1: National Framework for Homeland Security
21

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1 5.1.2.2 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key
2 Assets
3 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key
4 Assets identifies national policy, goals, objectives, and principles needed to “secure the
5 infrastructures and assets vital to national security, governance, public health and safety,
6 economy, and public confidence.” The strategy identifies specific initiatives to drive near-
7 term national protection priorities and inform the resource allocation process; identifies key
8 initiatives needed to secure each of the CIKR sectors; and addresses specific cross-sector
9 security priorities. Additionally, it establishes a foundation for building and fostering the
10 cooperative environment in which government, industry, and private citizens can carry out
11 their respective protection responsibilities more effectively and efficiently.
12 5.1.2.3 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
13 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace sets forth objectives and specific actions
14 needed to prevent cyber attacks against America’s CIKR; identifies and appropriately
15 responds to those responsible for cyber attacks; reduces nationally identified
16 vulnerabilities; and minimizes damage and recovery time from cyber attacks. This strategy
17 articulates five national priorities, including the establishment of a security response
18 system, a threat and vulnerability reduction program, awareness and training programs,
19 efforts to secure government cyberspace, and international cooperation.
20 Priority in this strategy is focused on improving the national response to cyber incidents;
21 reducing threats from and vulnerabilities to cyber attacks; preventing cyber attacks that
22 could affect national security assets; and improving the international management of and
23 response to such attacks.
24 5.1.2.4 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
25 This act requires the implementation of some of the recommendations made by the 9/11
26 Commission, to include requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to: 1) establish
27 department-wide procedures to receive and analyze intelligence from State, local, and tribal
28 governments and the private sector; and 2) establish a system that screens 100 percent of
29 maritime and passenger cargo. The Act also established grants to support high-risk urban
30 areas and State, local, and tribal governments in preventing, preparing for, protecting
31 against, and responding to acts of terrorism; and to assist States in carrying out initiatives
32 to improve international emergency communications.
33 5.1.3 Homeland Security Presidential Directives and National Initiatives
34 Homeland Security Presidential directives set national policies and executive mandates for
35 specific programs and activities (see figure 5-1, column 3). The first was issued on October
36 29, 2001, shortly after the attacks on September 11, 2001, establishing the Homeland
37 Security Council. It was followed by a series of directives regarding the full spectrum of
38 actions required to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s
39 vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the
40 damage and recover from incidents that do occur.” A number of these are relevant to CIKR
41 protection. HSPD-3, Homeland Security Advisory System, provides the requirement for the
42 dissemination of information regarding terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local
43 authorities, and the American people. HSPD-5 addresses the national approach to domestic
44 incident management; HSPD-7 focuses on the CIKR protection mission; and HSPD-8

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1 focuses on ensuring the optimal level of preparedness to protect, prevent, respond to, and
2 recover from terrorist attacks and the full range of natural and manmade hazards.
3 This section addresses the Homeland Security Presidential directives that are most
4 relevant to the overarching CIKR protection component of the homeland security mission
5 (e.g., HSPDs 3, 5, 7, and 8). Other Presidential directives, such as HSPD-9, Defense of the
6 United States Agriculture and Food, and HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century, are
7 relevant to CIKR protection in specific sectors and are addressed in further detail in the
8 appropriate SSPs.
9 5.1.3.1 HSPD-3, Homeland Security Advisory System
10 HSPD-3 (March 2002) established the policy for the creation of the HSAS to provide
11 warnings to Federal, State, and local authorities, and the American people in the form of a
12 set of graduated Threat Conditions that escalate as the risk of the threat increases. At each
13 threat level, Federal departments and agencies are required to implement a corresponding
14 set of protective measures to further reduce vulnerability or increase response capabilities
15 during a period of heightened alert. The threat conditions also serve as guideposts for the
16 implementation of tailored protective measures by State, local, tribal, and private sector
17 partners.
18 5.1.3.2 HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents
19 HSPD-5 (February 2003) required DHS to lead a coordinated national effort with other
20 Federal departments and agencies; State, local, and tribal governments; and the private
21 sector to develop and implement a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the
22 NRF (see figure 5-1, column 4).
23 The NIMS (March 2004) provides a nationwide template enabling Federal, State, local, and
24 tribal governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work
25 together effectively and efficiently to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
26 incidents regardless of cause, size, and complexity. The NIMS provides a uniform doctrine
27 for command and management, including Incident Command, Multiagency Coordination,
28 and Joint Information Systems; resource, communications, and information management;
29 and application of supporting technologies.
30 The NRP (December 2004) was superseded by the National Response Framework (January
31 of 2008) Both the NRP and the NRF were built on the NIMS template to establish a single,
32 comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents (including threats)
33 that require DHS coordination and effective response and engaged partnership by an
34 appropriate combination of Federal, State, local, and tribal governments; the private sector;
35 and nongovernmental organizations. The NRF includes a CIKR Support Annex that
36 provides the policies and protocols for integrating the CIKR protection mission as an
37 essential element of domestic incident management, and establishes the Infrastructure
38 Liaison function to serve as a focal point for CIKR coordination at the field level.
39 5.1.3.3 HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
40 HSPD-7 (December 2003) established the U.S. policy for “enhancing protection of the
41 Nation’s CIKR.” It mandated development of the NIPP as the primary vehicle for imple-
42 menting the CIKR protection policy. HSPD-7 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security
43 to lead development of the plan, including, but not limited to, the following four key
44 elements:

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1 A strategy to identify and coordinate the protection of CIKR;

2 A summary of activities to be undertaken to prioritize, reduce the vulnerability of, and
3 coordinate protection of CIKR;
4 A summary of initiatives for sharing information and for providing threat and warning
5 data to State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector; and
6 Coordination and integration, as appropriate, with other Federal emergency
7 management and preparedness activities, including the NRP and guidance provided in
8 the National Preparedness Guidelines.
9 HSPD-7 also directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to maintain an organization to
10 serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace. The NIPP is supported by a series of
11 SSPs, developed by the SSAs in coordination with their public and private sector partners,
12 which detail the approach to CIKR protection goals, initiatives, processes, and
13 requirements for each sector.
14 5.1.3.4 HSPD-8, National Preparedness
15 HSPD-8 (December 2003) mandates development of a national preparedness goal, which
16 was finalized in the National Preparedness Guidelines (see figure 5-1, column 4), aimed at
17 helping entities at all levels of government build and maintain the capabilities to prevent,
18 protect against, respond to, and recover from major events “to minimize the impact on lives,
19 property, and the economy.”
20 To do this, the National Preparedness Guidelines provide readiness targets, priorities,
21 standards for assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the Nation’s overall
22 level of preparedness across four mission areas: prevention, protection, response, and
23 recovery. There are four critical elements of the National Preparedness Guidelines:
24 The National Preparedness Vision, which provides a concise statement of the core
25 preparedness goal for the Nation.
26 The National Planning Scenarios, which depict a diverse set of high-consequence
27 threat scenarios of both potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Collectively,
28 the 15 scenarios are designed to focus contingency planning for homeland security
29 preparedness work at all levels of government and with the private sector. The
30 scenarios form the basis for coordinated Federal planning, training, exercises, and grant
31 investments needed to prepare for emergencies of all types.
32 The Universal Task List (UTL), which is a menu of some 1,600 unique tasks that can
33 facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the major
34 events that are represented by the National Planning Scenarios. It presents a common
35 vocabulary and identifies key tasks that support development of essential capabilities
36 among organizations at all levels. No entity is expected to perform every task.
37 The Target Capabilities List (TCL), which defines 37 specific capabilities that
38 communities, the private sector, and all levels of government should collectively possess
39 in order to respond effectively to disasters.
40 The National Preparedness Guidelines uses capabilities-based planning processes and
41 enables Federal, State, local, and tribal entities to prioritize needs, update strategies,
42 allocate resources, and deliver programs. The guidelines reference standard planning tools
43 that are applicable to implementation of the NIPP, including the UTL and the TCL. Like
44 the NIPP, the UTL and TCL are living documents that will be enhanced and refined over
45 time.

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1 Annex 1 to HSPD-8 established a standard and comprehensive approach to National

2 Planning intended to enhance the preparedness of the Nation. The Annex articulated the
3 U.S. Government policy “to integrate and effective policy and operational objectives to
4 prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards, and comprises: (a) a
5 standardized Federal planning process; (b) national planning doctrine; (c) strategic
6 guidance, strategic plans, concepts of operations, and operations plans and as appropriate,
7 tactical plans; and (e) a system for integrating plans among all levels of government.”
8 5.1.3.5 HSPD-19, Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States
9 In February 2007, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19
10 (HSPD-19), ‘Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the US’ requiring the Attorney
11 General to develop a report to the President, including a national strategy and
12 recommendations, on how more effectively to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and
13 respond to explosive attacks, including the coordination of Federal Government efforts
14 with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, first responders, and private sector
15 organizations. HSPD-19 required that the “Attorney General, in coordination with the
16 Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security and the heads of other Sector-Specific
17 Agencies (as defined in HSPD-7) and agencies that conduct explosive attack detection,
18 prevention, protection, or response activities…develop an implementation plan.” HSPD-19
19 required that the plan implement its policy and any approved recommendations in the
20 report and “include measures to (a) coordinate the efforts of Federal, State, local, territorial,
21 and tribal government entities to develop related capabilities, (b) allocate Federal grant
22 funds effectively, (c) coordinate training and exercise activities, and (d) incorporate, and
23 strengthen as appropriate, existing plans and procedures to communicate accurate,
24 coordinated, and timely information regarding a potential or actual explosive attack to the
25 public, the media, and the private sector.”
26 The HSPD-19 Report presents a holistic approach to improve the Nation’s ability to deter,
27 prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to the threat of terrorist explosive and IED
28 attacks to the homeland. The Report provides 35 recommendations to enhance and align
29 our current counter-IED capabilities and concludes that in order to improve our national
30 CIKR protection posture, there must be a systematic approach in which all deterrence,
31 prevention, detection, protection, and response efforts are unified. The strategy and
32 recommendations provide a way forward that streamlines and enhances current activities,
33 reducing conflict, confusion, and duplication of effort among interagency partners. The
34 Implementation Plan builds upon the policies, strategy, and guidance set forth by the
35 President in HSPD-19 and outlined by the Attorney General and interagency partners in
36 the HSPD-19 Report to the President.
37 The Secretary of Homeland Security designated IP to lead the Department’s HSPD-19
38 efforts and represent DHS in the DOJ-led implementation of HSPD-19. IP efforts to
39 enhance and coordinate the Nation’s ability to detect, deter, prevent, and respond to IED
40 attacks against critical infrastructure, key resources, and soft targets include: coordinating
41 national and intergovernmental IED security efforts; conducting requirements, capabilities,
42 and gap analyses; and promoting information-sharing and IED security awareness.
43 HSPD-19 also assigns DHS specific roles and responsibilities for information sharing and
44 counter-IED research, development, testing, and evaluation. HSPD-19 states that the
45 Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Director of
46 National Intelligence, and the Secretaries of State and Defense, will establish and maintain

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1 secure information-sharing systems to provide law enforcement agencies and other first
2 responders with access to detailed information that enhances the preparedness of
3 Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal government personnel to deter, prevent, detect,
4 protect against, and respond to explosive attacks in the US. The information-sharing
5 systems will include lessons learned and best practices regarding the use of explosives
6 as a terrorist weapon and related insurgent war fighting tactics employed both domestically
7 and internationally.
8 Additionally, HSPD-19 states that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination
9 with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of
10 Science and Technology Policy, is responsible for coordinating Federal Government
11 research, development, testing, and evaluation activities related to the detection and
12 prevention of, protection against, and response to explosive attacks and the development
13 of explosives render-safe tools and technologies.
HSPD-19 Implementation efforts seek to coordinate and enhance the Nation’s capabilities to
deter, prevent, detect protect against, and respond to a terrorist attack using explosives or IEDs.
14 5.2 The CIKR Protection Component of the Homeland Security

15 Mission
16 The result of this interrelated set of national authorities, strategies, and initiatives is a
17 common, holistic approach to achieving the homeland security mission that includes an
18 emphasis on preparedness across the board, and on the protection of America’s CIKR as a
19 steady-state component of routine, day-to-day business operations for government and
20 private sector partners.
21 The NIPP and NRF are complementary plans that span a spectrum of prevention,
22 protection, response, and recovery activities to enable this coordinated approach on a day-
23 to-day basis, as well as during periods of heightened threat. The NIPP and its associated
24 SSPs establish the Nation’s steady-state level of protection by helping to focus resources
25 where investment yields the greatest return in terms of national risk management. The
26 NRF addresses prevention, protection, response, and recovery in the context of domestic
27 threat and incident management. The National Preparedness Guidelines support
28 implementation of both the NIPP and the NRF by establishing national priorities and
29 guidance for building the requisite capabilities to support both plans at all levels of
30 government.
31 Each of the guiding elements includes specific requirements for DHS and other Federal
32 departments and agencies to build engaged partnerships and work in cooperation and
33 collaboration with State, local, tribal, and private sector partners. This cooperation and
34 collaboration between government and private sector owners and operators is specifically
35 applicable to the CIKR protection efforts outlined in the NIPP.
36 The NIPP risk management framework, sector partnership model, and information-sharing
37 mechanisms are structured to support coordination and cooperation with private sector
38 owners and operators while recognizing the differences between and within sectors,
39 acknowledging the need to protect sensitive information, establishing processes for
40 information sharing, and providing for smooth transitions from steady-state operations to
41 incident response.

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1 5.3 Relationship of the NIPP and SSPs to Other CIKR Plans and
2 Programs
3 The NIPP and SSPs outline the overarching elements of the CIKR protection effort that
4 generally are applicable within and across all sectors. The SSPs are an integral component
5 of the NIPP and exist as independent documents to address the unique perspective, risk
6 landscape, and methodologies associated with each sector. Homeland security plans and
7 strategies at the State, local, and tribal levels of government address CIKR protection
8 within their respective jurisdictions, as well as mechanisms for coordination with various
9 regional efforts and other external entities. The NIPP also is designed to work with the
10 range of CIKR protection-related plans and programs instituted by the private sector, both
11 through voluntary actions and as a result of various regulatory requirements. These plans
12 and programs include business continuity and resilience measures. NIPP processes are
13 designed to enhance coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among CIKR partners
14 within and across sectors to synchronize related efforts and avoid duplicative or
15 unnecessarily costly security requirements.
16 5.3.1 Sector-Specific Plans
17 Based on guidance from DHS, SSPs were developed jointly by SSAs in close collaboration
18 with SCCs, GCCs, and others, including State, local, and tribal homeland partners with key
19 interests or expertise appropriate to the sector. The SSPs provide the means by which the
20 NIPP is implemented across all sectors, as well as a national framework for each sector
21 that guides the development, implementation, and updating of State and local homeland
22 security strategies and CIKR protection programs. The SSPs for the original 17 sectors
23 were all submitted to DHS by December 31, 2006 and were officially released on May 21,
24 2007 after review and comment by the Homeland Security Council’s Critical Infrastructure
25 Protection Policy Coordinating Committee.
26 Those SSPs that are available for general release may be downloaded from:
27 http://www.dhs.gov/nipp (click on Sector-Specific Plans). If an SSP is not posted there, it is
28 marked as For Official Use Only (FOUO). For copies of the FOUO SSPs, please contact the
29 responsible SSA, or the NIPP Program Management Office (NIPP@dhs.gov).
30 SSPs are tailored to address the unique characteristics and risk landscapes of each sector
31 while also providing consistency for protective programs, public and private protection
32 investments, and resources. SSPs serve to:
33 Define sector partners, authorities, regulatory bases, roles and responsibilities, and
34 interdependencies;
35 Establish or institutionalize already existing procedures for sector interaction,
36 information sharing, coordination, and partnership;
37 Establish the goals and objectives, developed collaboratively between sector partners,
38 required to achieve the desired protective posture for the sector;
39 Identify international considerations;
40 Identify areas for government action above and beyond an owner/operator or sector risk
41 model; and

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1 Identify the sector-specific approach or methodology that SSAs, in coordination with

2 DHS and other sector partners, uses to conduct the following activities consistent with
3 the NIPP framework:
4 ¾ Identify priority CIKR and functions within the sector, including cyber
5 considerations;
6 ¾ Assess sector risks, including potential consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats;
7 ¾ Assess and prioritize assets, systems, networks, and functions of national-level
8 significance within the sector;
9 ¾ Develop risk-mitigation programs based on detailed knowledge of sector operations
10 and risk landscape;
11 ¾ Provide protocols to transition between steady-state CIKR protection and incident
12 response in an all-hazards environment;
13 ¾ Use metrics to measure and communicate program effectiveness and risk
14 management within the sector;
15 ¾ Address R&D requirements and activities relevant to the sector; and
16 ¾ Identify the process used to promote governance and information sharing within the
17 sector.
18 The structure for the SSPs is shown in figure 5-2; it facilitates cross-sector comparisons and
19 coordination by DHS and other SSAs.
20
21
22 5.3.2 State, Regional, Local, Tribal, and Territorial CIKR Protection Programs
23 The National Preparedness Guidelines defines the development and implementation of a
24 CIKR protection program as a key component of State, regional, local, and tribal homeland
25 security programs. Creating and managing a CIKR protection program for a given
26 jurisdiction entails building an organizational structure and mechanisms for coordination

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1 between government and private sector entities that can be used to implement the NIPP
2 risk management framework. This includes taking actions within the jurisdiction to set
3 security goals; identifying assets, systems, and networks; assessing risks; prioritizing CIKR
4 across sectors and jurisdictional levels; implementing protective programs; measuring the
5 effectiveness of risk management efforts; and sharing information between relevant public
6 and private sector partners. These elements form the basis of focused CIKR protection
7 programs and guide the implementation of the relevant CIKR protection-related goals and
8 objectives outlined in State, local, and tribal homeland security strategies. To assist in the
9 development of such CIKR protection programs, DHS issued A Guide to Critical
10 Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection at the State, Regional, Local, Tribal, and
11 Territorial Levels (2008).
12 In a regional context, the NIPP risk management framework and information-sharing
13 processes can be applied through the development of a regional partnership model or the
14 use of existing regional coordinating structures. Effective regional approaches to CIKR
15 protection involve coordinated information sharing, planning, and sharing of costs and risk.
16 Regional approaches also include exercises to bring public and private sector partners
17 together around a shared understanding of the challenges to regional resilience; analytical
18 tools to inform decisionmakers on risk and risk management with the associated benefits
19 and costs; and forums to enable decisionmakers to formulate protective measures and
20 identify funding requirements and resources within and across sectors and jurisdictions.
21 State, regional, local, tribal, and territorial CIKR protection efforts enhance
22 implementation of the NIPP and the SSPs by providing unique geographical focus and
23 cross-sector coordination potential. To ensure that these efforts are consistent with other
24 CIKR protection planning activities, the basic elements to be incorporated in these efforts
25 are provided in appendix 5A. The recommended elements described in this appendix
26 recognize the variations in governance models across the States; recognize that not all
27 sectors are represented in each State or geographical region; and are flexible enough to
28 reflect varying authorities, resources, and issues within each State or region.
29 5.3.3 Other Plans or Programs Related to CIKR Protection
30 Federal partners should review and revise, as necessary, other plans that address elements
31 of CIKR protection to ensure that they support the NIPP in a manner that avoids
32 unnecessary layers of CIKR protection guidance. Examples of government plans or
33 programs that may contain relevant prevention, protection, and response activities that
34 relate to or affect CIKR protection include plans that address: State, local, and tribal
35 hazard mitigation; continuity of operations (COOP); continuity of government (COG);
36 environmental, health, and safety operations; and integrated contingency operations.
37 Review and revision of State, local, and tribal strategies and plans should be completed in
38 accordance with overall homeland security and grant program guidance.
39 Private sector owners and operators develop and maintain plans for business risk
40 management that include steady-state security and facility protection, as well as business
41 continuity and emergency management plans. Many of these plans include heightened
42 security requirements for CIKR protection that address the terrorist threat environment.
43 Coordination with these planning efforts is relevant to effective implementation of the
44 NIPP. Private sector partners are encouraged to consider the NIPP when revising these
45 plans, and to work with government partners to integrate their efforts with Federal, State,
46 local, and tribal CIKR protection efforts as appropriate.

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1 5.4 CIKR Protection and Incident Management

2 Together, the NIPP and the NRF provide a comprehensive, integrated approach to
3 addressing key elements of the Nation’s homeland security mission to prevent terrorist
4 attacks, reduce vulnerabilities, and respond to incidents in an all-hazards context. The
5 NIPP establishes the overall risk-informed approach that defines the Nation’s CIKR
6 steady-state protection posture, while the NRF and NIMS provide the overarching
7 framework, mechanisms, and protocols required for effective and efficient domestic incident
8 management. The NIPP risk management framework, information-sharing network, and
9 sector partnership model provide vital functions that, in turn, inform and enable incident
10 management decisions and activities.
11 5.4.1 The National Response Framework
12 The NRF provides an all-hazards approach that incorporates best practices from a wide
13 variety of disciplines, including fire, rescue, emergency management, law enforcement,
14 public works, and emergency medical services. The operational and resource coordinating
15 structures described in the NRF are designed to support decisionmaking during the
16 response to a specific threat or incident and serve to unify and enhance the incident
17 management capabilities and resources of individual agencies and organizations acting
18 under their own authority. The NRF applies to a wide array of natural disasters, terrorist
19 threats and incidents, and other emergencies.
20 The NRF Base Plan and annexes provide protocols for coordination among various Federal
21 departments and agencies; State, local, and tribal governments; and private sector
22 partners, both for pre-incident prevention and preparedness, and post-incident response,
23 recovery, and mitigation. The NRF specifies incident management roles and responsibili-
24 ties, including emergency support functions designed to expedite the flow of resources and
25 program support to the incident area. SSAs and other Federal departments and agencies
26 have roles within the NRF structure that are distinct from, yet complementary to, their
27 responsibilities under the NIPP. Ongoing implementation of the NIPP risk management
28 framework, partnerships, and information-sharing networks sets the stage for CIKR
29 security and restoration activities within the NRF by providing mechanisms to quickly
30 assess the impacts of the incident on both local and national CIKR, assist in establishing
31 priorities for CIKR restoration, and augment incident-related information sharing.
32 5.4.2 Transitioning From NIPP Steady-State to Incident Management
33 A variety of alert and warning systems that exist for natural hazards, technological or
34 industrial accidents, and terrorist incidents provide the bridge between routine steady-state
35 operations using the NIPP risk management framework and incident management
36 activities using the NRF concept of operations for actions related to both pre-incident
37 prevention and post-incident response and recovery. These all-hazards alert and warning
38 mechanisms include programs such as National Weather Services hurricane and tornado
39 warnings, and alert and warning systems established around nuclear power plants and
40 chemical stockpiles, among various others. In the context of terrorist incidents, the HSAS
41 provides a progressive and systematic approach that is used to match protective measures
42 to the Nation’s overall threat environment. This link between the current threat
43 environment and the corresponding protective actions related to specific threat vectors or
44 scenarios and to each HSAS threat level provides the indicators used to transition from the

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1 steady-state processes detailed in the NIPP to the incident management processes

2 described in the NRF.
3 DHS and CIKR partners develop and implement stepped-up, protective actions to match
4 the increased terrorist threat conditions specified by the HSAS, and to address various
5 other all-hazards alerts and warning requirements. As warnings or threat levels increase,
6 NRF coordinating structures are activated to enable incident management. DHS and CIKR
7 partners carry out their NRF responsibilities and also use the NIPP risk management
8 framework to provide the CIKR protection dimension. The NRF CIKR Support Annex
9 describes the concept of operations and details the activities needed to support public-
10 private sector incident operations and requirements, as well as to provide situational
11 awareness, analysis, and prioritized recommendations to inform incident management
12 decisions. When an incident occurs, regardless of the cause, the NRF is implemented for
13 overall coordination of domestic incident management activities. The CIKR Support Annex
14 includes a process for considering requests for assistance from CIKR owners and operators.
15 Implementation of the CIKR Support Annex and the NIPP risk management framework
16 facilitates those actions directly related to the current threat status, as well as incident
17 prevention, response, restoration, and recovery.
18 The process for integrating CIKR protection with incident management and transitioning
19 from NIPP steady-state processes to NRF incident management coordination includes the
20 following actions by DHS, SSAs, and other CIKR partners:
21 Increasing protection levels to correlate with the specific threat vectors or threat level
22 communicated through the HSAS or other relevant all-hazards alert and warning
23 systems, or in accordance with sector-specific warnings using the NIPP information-
24 sharing networks;
25 Using the NIPP information-sharing networks and risk management framework to
26 review and establish national priorities for CIKR protection; facilitating communica-
27 tions between CIKR partners; and informing the NRF processes regarding priorities for
28 response, recovery, and restoration of CIKR within the incident area, as well as on a
29 national scale;
30 Fulfilling roles and responsibilities as defined in the NRF for incident management
31 activities; and
32 Working with sector-level information-sharing entities and owners and operators on
33 information-sharing issues during the active response mode.
34

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1 6. Ensuring an Effective, Efficient

2 Program Over the Long Term
3
4 This chapter addresses the efforts needed to ensure an effective, efficient CIKR protection
5 program over the long term. It focuses particularly on the long-lead-time elements of CIKR
6 protection that require sustained plans and investments over time, such as generating
7 skilled human capital, developing high-tech systems, and building public awareness.
8 Key activities needed to enhance CIKR protection over the long term include:
13 Enabling education, training, and exercise programs to ensure that skilled and
14 knowledgeable professionals and experienced organizations are able to undertake NIPP-
15 related responsibilities in the future;
16 Conducting R&D and using technology to improve protective capabilities or to lower the
17 costs of existing capabilities so that CIKR partners can afford to do more with limited
18 budgets;
19 Developing, protecting, and maintaining data systems and simulations to enable
20 continuously refined risk assessment within and across sectors and to ensure
21 preparedness for domestic incident management; and
24 6.1 Building National Awareness

25 DHS, in conjunction with the SSAs and other CIKR partners, is responsible for
26 implementing a comprehensive national awareness program that focuses on public and
27 private sector understanding of the CIKR all-hazards risk environment and motivates
28 actions that support the sustainability of CIKR protection, security investments, and risk
29 management initiatives. Objectives of the CIKR national awareness program are to:
30 Incorporate CIKR protection and restoration considerations into business planning and
31 operations, including employee and senior manager education and training programs,
32 across all levels of government and the private sector;
33 Support public and private sector decisionmaking; enable relevant and effective
34 strategic planning for CIKR protection and restoration; and inform resource allocation
35 processes;
36 Foster understanding of:
37 ¾ CIKR dependencies and interdependencies, and the value of cross-sector CIKR
38 protection and restoration planning down to the community level;
39 ¾ Evolving threats to CIKR as assessed by the intelligence community and in the
40 context of the HSAS; and

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1 ¾Efforts to address the threat environment and enhance CIKR protection and rapid
2 restoration.
3 DHS and other Federal agencies also engage in comprehensive national cyberspace security
4 awareness campaigns to remove impediments to sharing vulnerability information among
5 CIKR partners. This campaign includes audience-specific awareness materials, expansion
6 of the Stay Safe Online campaign, and development of awards programs for those making
7 significant contributions to the effort.
8 A Continuum of Capability Development
9 This document establishes a framework to enable awareness, education, training, and
10 exercise programs that allow people and organizations to develop and maintain core
11 competencies and expertise required for effective implementation of the CIKR protection
12 mission. Building the requisite individual and organizational capabilities requires
13 attracting, training, and maintaining sufficient numbers of professionals who have the
14 particular expertise unique or essential to CIKR protection. This, in turn, requires
15 individual education and training to develop and maintain the requisite levels of
16 competency through technical, academic, and professional development programs. It also
17 requires organizational training and exercises to validate process and enhance efficiency
18 and effectiveness of CIKR programs.
19 As illustrated below, outreach and awareness create the foundation upon which a
20 comprehensive CIKR education and training program can be built. Exercises provide an
21 objective assessment of an entity’s or individual’s capabilities thus identifying areas for
22 improvement and highlighting training gaps and needs.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32 The objectives of NIPP-related training and education programs are to:
33 • Provide an integrated, coordinated approach to NIPP and CIKR-related education
34 and training that energizes and involves all partners
35 • Develop and implement grassroots education and training programs that
36 communicate effectively with key audiences
37 • Maximize coordination, deepen relationships, and broaden participation and
38 practices required for implementing the NIPP and the SSPs
39 The framework for education, training, and exercises is discussed below.

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1 6.1.1 Education and Training

2 CIKR threat mitigation/protection has a broad variety of target audiences. Emphasis, for
3 the purpose of education and training, is placed on these target audiences as collections of
4 individuals rather than organizations or entities, since it is the engagement and
5 decisionmaking of those individuals, operating in their own areas of expertise and
6 responsibility that will determine the success of the public-private CIKR partnership.
7 It is crucial to understand these audiences and the similarities and differences between
8 them in order to ensure the effective and efficient delivery of CIKR education and training.
9 Following is a description of the primary CIKR training target audiences:
10 State, local, tribal, and territorial government officials; SLTTGCC members, State
11 elected officials, Homeland Security Directors/Advisors, emergency managers, program
12 managers, and specialists;
13 DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) personnel, senior executives, program
14 managers/analysts, Protective Security Advisors, training managers, and specialists;
15 SSA and other Federal agency personnel; senior executives, program managers, and
16 specialists;
17 Regional consortium members;
18 Owner/operator executives, security managers, program managers, and specialists; and
19 Others including international partners executives, security managers, program
20 managers, and specialists.
21 6.1.2 Core Competencies for Implementing CIKR Protection
22 The U.S. Office of Personnel Management defines a competency as "a measurable pattern of
23 knowledge, skills, abilities, behaviors, and other characteristics that an individual needs to
24 perform work roles or occupational functions successfully." A competency model is a
25 collection of competencies that together define the elements required for performance. The
26 CIKR competency model provides the information needed to:
27 Define education and training requirements;
28 Organize existing education and training efforts;
29 Identify education and training gaps;
30 Set forth a business case for education and training investments; and,
31 Establish performance metrics.
32 Each competency area is defined in the table that follows the graphic.
33
34
35
36
37
38

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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Area Includes Knowledge and Skills To . . .
Risk Analysis • Perform accurate, thorough, and complete risk-informed analyses (threat,
vulnerability, and consequence).
• Design, develop, and conduct analyses that are current, timely, and accurate.
• Support executive and managerial decision making related to CIKR programs.
Protective Measures/ • Establish CIKR program goals and objectives based on risk analysis.
Mitigation Strategies • Plan, develop, and implement CIKR-related projects, measures, and activities. Take
advantage of existing emerging and anticipated methods and technologies in order
to develop effective strategies, projects, and activities.
• Implement continuous feedback mechanisms.
Partnership Building/ • Understand the roles and responsibilities of all partners.
Networking • Establish mechanisms for interacting with partners and exchanging information
and resources (including best practices).
Information • Use systems, tools, and protocols to collect, analyze, organize, report, and evaluate
Collection & information.
Reporting • Communicate and share information with sector partners at each tier of
(Information Sharing) governance including: sector-specific, across sectors, and within the private
sector.
Program • Establish sector-specific or jurisdictional CIKR goals and plans.
Management • Identify and prioritize CIKR projects, strategies, and activities for a sector or
jurisdiction.
• Manage a CIKR program on schedule, within budget, and in compliance with
performance standards.
• Design and implement continuous feedback mechanisms at the program level.
• Develop and implement CIKR training plans.

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Area Includes Knowledge and Skills To . . .
Metrics & Program • Define and establish CIKR metrics based on goals and objectives.
Evaluation • Establish data collection and measurement plans, systems, and tools.
• Collect and analyze data.
• Report findings and conclusions.
Technical & Tactical • Note: This area includes the specialized (sector-specific) expertise required to
Expertise (Sector- plan, implement, and evaluate technical and tactical activities, measures, and
Specific) programs.
1
2 The Training Delivery levels identified in the graphic above represent a cumulative
3 structure that begins with basic awareness and progresses to expert knowledge and skills
4 required to perform specific CIKR related tasks and functions. Training and education
5 programs typically fall into these levels:
6 Awareness Materials: Motivate or inform course participants about CIKR-related
7 concepts, principles, policies, or procedures.
8 College Courses: Present advanced CIKR knowledge, research, and theories to promote
9 professional development.
10 Skill Development Sessions: Focus on improving the performance of specific CIKR
11 functions and tasks both during training and in the workplace.
12 Exercises: Reinforce and test CIKR skill acquisition, processes, and procedures.
13 Job Aids: Include tools or resources (such as guides, checklists, templates, and decision
14 aids) that allows an individual to quickly access the CIKR information he or she needs
15 to perform a task.
16 6.1.3 Individual Education and Training
17 Building and sustaining capabilities to implement the NIPP involves a complex approach to
18 the education and training effort that leverages existing accredited academic programs,
19 professional certification standards, and technical training programs. This requires an
20 effort with a national scope that includes, but is not limited to, the following components:
21 Training to provide individuals with the skills needed to perform their roles and
22 responsibilities under the NIPP and SSPs;
23 Academic and research programs that result in formal degrees from accredited
24 institutions; and
25 Professional continuing education, which incorporates the latest advances in CIKR risk-
26 mitigation approaches and, where appropriate, certification based on government,
27 industry, and professional organization standards.
28 To enable each of these components, the specific areas of emphasis are discussed in the
29 subsections that follow.
30 6.2.3.1 CIKR Protection Training
31 DHS, SSAs, and other CIKR partners offer a wide array of training programs designed to
32 enhance core competencies and build capabilities needed to support NIPP and SSP
33 implementation among the various target audiences. The level and content of training
34 programs vary based on sector requirements. Some sectors rely on the use of established
35 training programs while others develop courses to meet specific tactical or technical

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1 objectives. DHS offers NIPP awareness level training through the DHS/FEMA Emergency
2 Management Institute (EMI). The Independent Study Course (IS860) is available online or
3 for classroom delivery. This course provides a foundation of basic principles of the NIPP
4 including the risk management and partnership frameworks, information-sharing, and
5 roles and responsibilities.
6 DHS, SSAs and other CIKR partners offer courses that enhance CIKR protection. One of
7 the ongoing objectives of NIPP and SSP-related training is to identify and align training
8 that enhances the core competencies and provides the appropriate level of training and
9 development opportunities for each of the identified training audiences.
10 NIPP and SSP-related training and education programs, to date, focus on enhancing risk
11 management, information collection, and the tactical and technical competencies required
12 to detect, deter, defend, and mitigate against terrorist activities and other incidents. DHS
13 and other Federal agencies support and provide training resources to local law enforcement
14 and others, with a special focus on urban areas with significant clusters of CIKR, localities
15 where high-profile special events are typically scheduled, or other potentially high-risk
16 geographical areas or jurisdictions. Federally provided technical training covers a range of
17 topics such as buffer zone protection, bombing prevention, workforce terrorism awareness,
18 surveillance detection, high-risk target awareness, and WMD incident training.
19 DHS supports cybersecurity training, education, and awareness programs by educating
20 vendors and manufacturers on the value of pre-configuring security options in products so
21 that they are secure on initial installation; educating users on secure installation and use of
22 cyber products; increasing user awareness and ease of use of the security features in
23 products; and, where feasible, promotion of industry guides. These training efforts also
24 encourage programs that leverage the existing Cyber Corps Scholarship for Service
25 program, as well as various graduate and post-doctoral programs; link Federal
26 cybersecurity and computer forensics training programs; and establish cybersecurity
27 programs for departments and agencies, including awareness, audits, and standards as
28 required.
29 DHS solicits recommendations from national professional organizations and from Federal,
30 State, local, tribal, and private sector partners for additional discipline-specific technical
31 training courses related to CIKR protection, and supports course development as
32 appropriate.
33 6.2.3.2 Academic Programs
34 DHS works with a wide range of academic institutions to incorporate CIKR protection into
35 professional education programs with majors or concentrations in CIKR protection. DHS
36 collaborates with universities to incorporate homeland security-related curriculum,
37 sponsors a post-graduate level program at the Naval Postgraduate School in homeland
38 defense and security, and collaborates with other higher education programs. These
39 programs offer opportunities to incorporate concentrations in various aspects of CIKR
40 protection as part of the multi-disciplinary degree programs.
41 DHS is promoting the development of a long-term higher education program which will
42 include academic degrees and adult education. The program is being developed through a
43 collaborative effort involving the DHS/IP, the DHS/S&T Universities and Centers for
44 Excellence Programs, DHS/TSA, and others. The initial program is being developed in
45 conjunction with the National Transportation Security Center for Excellence (NTSCOE)

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1 that brings together a number of academic institutions with a mandate to build education
2 and training programs relevant to the CIKR protection mission. This initiative provides the
3 framework for the identification, development, and delivery of critical infrastructure
4 courses for the transportation industry. The initiative will lead to the implementation of
5 adult education and academic degree programs as part of a multidisciplinary core
6 curriculum applicable across all critical infrastructure sectors.
7 DHS will examine existing cybersecurity programs within the research and academic
8 communities to determine their applicability as models for CIKR protection education and
9 broad-based research. These programs include:
10 Co-sponsorship of the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Information
11 Assurance Education (CAEIAE) program with the National Security Agency; and
12 Collaboration with the National Science Foundation to co-sponsor the Cyber Corps
13 Scholarship for Service program. The Scholarship for Service program provides grant
14 money to selected CAEIAE and other universities with programs of a similar caliber to
15 fund the final 2 years of student bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral study in information
16 assurance in exchange for an equal amount of time spent working for the Federal
17 Government.
18 DHS will ensure that the NCIP R&D Plan appropriately considers the human capital needs
19 for protection-related R&D by incorporating analysis of the research community’s future
20 needs for advanced degrees in protection-related disciplines into the plan development
21 process.
22 6.2.3.3 Continuing Education and Professional Competency
23 DHS encourages the use of established professional standards where practicable and, when
24 appropriate, works with CIKR partners to facilitate the development of continuing
25 education, professional competency programs, and professional standards for areas
26 requiring unique and critical CIKR protection expertise. For example DHS is fostering the
27 development of CIKR adult and continuing education programs and leading the
28 development of private sector Preparedness Standards that are relevant to the CIKR
29 protection mission.
30 The adult education initiative focuses on enhancing the skills and ability of the CIKR
31 professionals and employees at all levels, to provide:
32 General awareness and baseline understanding of critical infrastructure, preparedness,
33 and protective measures.
34 Specialized CIKR training for individuals directly engaged in jobs or activities related to
35 CIKR protection (security, business continuity, emergency management, IT,
36 engineering, and others).
37 6.1.4 Organizational Training and Exercises
38 Building and maintaining organizational and sector expertise requires comprehensive
39 exercises to test the interaction between the NIPP and the NRF in the context of terrorist
40 incidents, natural disasters, and other emergencies. Exercises are conducted by private
41 sector owners and operators, and across all levels of government. They may be organized by
42 these entities, on a sector-specific basis, or through the National Exercise Program (NEP).

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1 DHS IP serves as the conduit for all eighteen CIKR sectors’ participation in NEP-sponsored
2 activities and events. As such, the IP exercise program strictly adheres to the tenets of the
3 NEP. Exercise planning and participation is coordinated within IP through its Exercise
4 Working Group (EWG), which consists of representation from all IP projects and the
5 private sector. The EWG allows IP and private sector partners to translate goals and
6 priorities into specific objectives, coordinate exercise activities, and track improvement plan
7 actions against current capabilities, training and exercises. This group is also responsible
8 for maintaining the IP Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan. This document is assessed
9 and revised, as needed, on an annual basis at the IP Training and Exercise Planning
10 Workshop.
11 National Exercise Program
12 DHS provides overarching coordination for the National Exercise Program (NEP) to ensure
13 the Nation’s readiness to respond in an all-hazards environment and to test the steady-
14 state protection plans and programs put in place by the NIPP and their transition to the
15 incident management framework established in the NRF.
16 NEP program components include:
17 National Level Exercise- an annual national security and/or homeland security
18 exercise centered on White House directed, U.S. Government-wide strategy and policy
19 Principal Level Exercise (PLE)- a quarterly cabinet level exercise focused on current
20 U.S. Government-wide strategic issues
21 Five-year schedule of NLE/PLE and significant NEP Tiered exercises with a strategic
22 U.S. Government-wide focus
23 National Exercise Schedule (NEXS)- a schedule of all Federal, State, and local
24 exercises
25 Corrective Action Program (CAP) - administered by DHS in support of the HSC and
26 NSC, involves a system and process for identifying, assigning, and tracking remediation
27 of issues.
28 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) - DHS policy
29 and guidance for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating exercises. Provides a
30 threat and performance-based exercise process that includes a mix and range of exercise
31 activities through a series of four reference manuals to help States and local
32 jurisdictions establish exercise programs and design, develop, conduct, and evaluate
33 exercises.
34 The NEP categorizes exercise activities into four tiers. These tiers reflect the relative
35 priority for interagency participation, with Tier I as the highest and Tier IV the lowest.
36 USG exercises are assigned to tiers based on a consensus interagency judgment of how
37 closely they align to USG-wide strategic and policy priorities.
38 Tier I Exercises (Required). Tier I exercises are centered on White House directed,
39 U.S. Government-wide strategy and policy-related issues and are executed with the
40 participation of all appropriate Cabinet level Secretaries or their Deputies and all
41 necessary operations centers. NLEs and Cabinet Level Exercises (CLEs) constitute Tier
42 I and there are five NEP Tier I exercises annually. Examples include the Top Officials
43 and Eagle Horizon (COOP) exercises.

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1 Tier II Exercises (Required). Tier II

2 Exercises are focused on strategy and
3 policy issues supported by all Tier I
1 NLE
4 appropriate departments and agencies
4 PLEs
5 either through the National Simulation
6 Cell (Center) or as determined by each
7 department or agency's leadership. Tier 3 Tier II
8 II exercises are endorsed through the Interagency
9 NEP process as meriting priority for Exercises
10 interagency participation. Tier II
11 exercises take precedence over Tier III
12 exercises in the event of resource Regional or Other Tier III
13 conflicts. The PTEE PCC shall Federal Exercises
14 recommend no more than three Tier II
15 exercises for interagency participation
16 annually. An example of a Tier II Tier IV
17 exercise is the Ardent Sentry, an Non-Federal
18 annual terrorism exercise focused on Exercises
19 defense support to civil authorities that
20 is jointly sponsored by the North
21 American Aerospace Defense Command
22 (NORAD) and the U.S. Northern
23 Command (NORTHCOM). Ardent Sentry has been integrated with the DHS National
24 Homeland Security Exercise Program and is held concurrently with the TOPOFF
25 exercises
26 Tier III Exercises (Permitted). Tier III Exercises are other Federal exercises focused
27 on operational, tactical, or organization-specific objectives and not requiring broad
28 interagency headquarters-level involvement to achieve their stated exercise or training
29 objectives.
30 Tier IV Exercises. Tier IV Exercises are exercises in which State, territorial, local,
31 and/or tribal governments, and/or private sector entities, are the primary training
32 audience or subject of evaluation.
33 DHS chairs the NEP Executive Steering Committee (ESC). The NEP ESC coordinates
34 Department/Agency, as well as Regional/State/local exercise requirements/objectives and
35 build a recommended NEP NLE Five-Year Exercise Schedule. The NEP ESC also
36 prioritizes recommended lessons learned and corrective action plans. The core members
37 include DOD, DOE, HHS, DOJ, DOS, DOT, ODNI, and FBI. There are up to three rotating
38 members serving one-year terms. HSC, NSC, and OMB representatives serve in a non-
39 voting oversight capacity. The recommended NEP NLE 5-Year exercise schedule and
40 Corrective Action Plan are submitted to the Deputies for approval through the Disaster
41 Readiness Group (DRG) Exercise and Evaluation Sub-Group Policy Coordination
42 Committee (EESC) to frame those decisions.
43 Capabilities-Based Planning
44 The NEP emphasizes training and exercising of specific capabilities rather than specific
45 threats. HSEEP is designed to support capabilities-based planning through a cyclical
46 process of planning, training, exercising, and improvement planning, which emphasizes
47 development of priority capabilities. This is different from threat-based planning, where the

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1 focus is on responding to a specific incident. As

2 planning and training increase in complexity,
3 jurisdictions increase their capability to perform
4 critical tasks. Benefits are achieved through a
5 building-block approach that exposes program
6 participants to gradually increasing levels of
7 complexity, building on lessons learned from
8 previous exercises. As shown in the figure below,
9 HSEEP activities begin with informational
10 seminars and workshops and progress through a
11 series of interactive activities, from tabletop to
12 full-scale exercises.
13 H
14 S
15 EEP Activities Progression
16 Training and exercise events focus on improving individual and collective ability to
17 perform; however exercises also focus heavily on evaluating capability, or an element of
18 capability such as a plan or policy. The NEP includes exercises, not training events, with
19 the exception of transition training for senior officials. Necessary training takes place prior
20 to the NEP exercise.
21 Training and Exercise Outreach and Coordination
22 DHS, SSAs, SCC, GCC, and the private sector work together to ensure that exercises
23 include adequate testing of steady-state CIKR protection measures and plans, including
24 information sharing; application of the NIPP risk management framework; and the ability
25 for a protected core of life-critical CIKR services, such as power, food and water, and
26 emergency transportation, to withstand attacks or natural disasters and continue to
27 function at an appropriate level. DHS also ensures that the NIMS Integration Center,
28 which serves as the repository and clearinghouse for reports and lessons learned from
29 actual incidents, training, and exercises, regularly compiles and disseminates information
30 on CIKR protection best practices.
31 In an effort to better familiarize its regional, State, local, territorial, tribal and private
32 sector partners with the NIPP, IP hosts an annual series of Tier III, NIPP-related
33 workshops and tabletop exercises. Goals for this series include increasing understanding of
34 the NIPP; increasing understanding of the IP organization, as well as non-IP SSAs;
35 increasing understanding of IP critical points of entry for public and private partners;
36 increasing understanding of regional, state, local, territorial and tribal organizations’ CIKR
37 protection activities; increasing understanding of private sector CIKR protection activities;
38 and identifying gaps and redundancies in these CIKR protection activities.
39 6.1.5 CIKR Partner Role and Approach
40 Given the scope and nature of the education, training, and exercise needs related to CIKR
41 protection, the approach adopted must, to the greatest extent possible, leverage existing
42 education, training, and exercise programs.
43 DHS works through the NIPP partnership structure to provide awareness-level training to
44 introduce public and private sector partners to the NIPP contents and requirements, and
45 other core curriculum that provides a cross-sector basis for CIKR program management,

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1 sector awareness, metrics, and other content relevant for all sectors and jurisdictions. DHS
2 encourages and, where appropriate, facilitates specialized NIPP-related occupational and
3 professional training and education, and development of professional and personnel
4 security guidelines. It also will encourage academic and research programs, and coordinate
5 the design of exercises that test and validate the interaction between the NIPP framework
6 and the NRF.
7 The SSAs and other Federal agencies are responsible for reviewing, updating and, as
8 appropriate, developing new CIKR protection-related training and education programs that
9 align with the NIPP and the compentency model. Other CIKR partners are encouraged to
10 review existing and/or develop new training to align with the competency model and
11 support implementation of the NIPP, the SSPs, and/or identified CIKR protection needs
12 within their jurisdiction. All CIKR partners should work with DHS and the SSAs to
13 identify and fill gaps in current training, education, and exercise programs for those
14 specialized disciplines that are unique to CIKR protection.
15 6.2 Conducting Research and Development and Using

16 Technology
17 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7): Critical Infrastructure
18 Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, released on December 17, 2003, establishes
19 the United States policy for “enhancing protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and
20 key resources” and mandates plans to: systematically “harness the Nation’s research and
21 development capabilities”; provide the long-term technology advances needed for more
22 effective and cost-efficient protection of critical infrastructure and key resources; and
23 provide the sustained science, engineering, and technology base needed to prevent or
24 minimize the impact of future attacks on our physical and cyber infrastructure systems.
25 Protection of the Nation’s physical and cyber infrastructure and the people who operate and
26 use these vital systems is an extremely challenging portion of the overall homeland security
27 effort. The frameworks of CIKR assets and systems continually grow more complex and
28 more interdependent. Therefore, plans must cut across a broad range of sectors, Federal
29 and non-Federal government entities, and critical industries.
30 Federal agencies work collaboratory to design and execute R&D programs to help develop
31 knowledge and technology that can be used to more effectively mitigate the risk to CIKR.
32 Congress has provided for liability protections under the Support Anti-Terrorism by
33 Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act) that serve to encourage
34 technology use by CIKR partners.
35 In the near term, risk-informed priorities are designed to address the challenges posed by
36 the limited resources available to meet all CIKR protection needs by allocating protection
37 resources where they can best mitigate risk, and lead to resilient infrastructure which
38 support national continuity of the services provided by this infrastructure. As security is
39 the primary role of all agencies with continuity as a critical duty, the additional
40 consideration of resilience and sustainability is a natural addition to R&D decisions already
41 being pursued. In the long term, R&D holds the key to more effective and cost-efficient
42 CIKR protection through advances in technology. R&D programs work to improve all
43 aspects of CIKR protection—from detection of threats, through protection and performance
44 measures, to inherently secure advanced infrastructure designs.

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1 Because owners and operators play a major role in CIKR protection, research programs
2 that support the NIPP must find effective ways to consider the perspectives of sector
3 professional associations, sector councils, and other sources that understand owner and
4 operator technology needs.
5 Key activities needed to enhance CIKR protection over the long term include:
10 Enabling education, training, and exercise programs to ensure that skilled and
11 knowledgeable professionals and experienced organizations are able to undertake NIPP-
12 related responsibilities in the future;
13 Conducting R&D and using technology to improve protective capabilities or to lower the
14 costs of existing capabilities so that CIKR partners can afford to do more with limited
15 budgets;
16 Developing, protecting, and maintaining data systems and simulations to enable
17 continuously refined risk assessment within and across sectors and to ensure
18 preparedness for domestic incident management; and
21 Unique R&D needs associated with CIKR protection include:
22 Conducting development, or re-design, of technology-based equipment to significantly
23 lower the costs of existing capabilities rather than improving technical performance, so
24 that CIKR partners with limited budgets can afford state-of-the-art solutions;
25 Researching issues, such as resiliency and protection in building design, that affect all
26 CIKR and can result in solutions that can provide benefits across sectors if imple-
27 mented; and
28 Focusing research on the implementation and operational aspects of technology used for
29 CIKR protection to provide resources that can help inform technology investment
30 decisions, such as technical evaluation of security equipment or technology clearing
31 house information.
32 6.2.1 The SAFETY Act
33 Ingenuity and invention are the lifeblood of robust research and development. But potential
34 liabilities could stifle the entrepreneurial spirit for developing disruptive and enabling
35 technologies and products. As part of the Homeland Security Act, Public Law 107-296,
36 Congress enacted the SAFETY Act, which creates liability protections for sellers of
37 qualified anti-terrorism technologies. The SAFETY Act provides incentives for the develop-
38 ment and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by limiting liability through a system
39 of risk and litigation management. The purpose of the SAFETY Act is to ensure that the
40 threat of liability does not deter potential sellers of anti-terrorism technologies from
41 developing, deploying, and commercializing technologies that could save lives. The SAFETY
42 Act gives liability protection to both sellers of qualified anti-terrorism technology and their
43 customers, and applies to all types of enterprises that develop, sell, or use anti-terrorism
44 technologies.

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1 The SAFETY Act applies to a broad range of technologies, including products, services, and
2 software, or combinations thereof, as well as technology firms and providers of security
3 services. The SAFETY Act protects those businesses and their customers and contractors
4 by providing a series of liability protections if their products or services are found to be
5 effective by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Additionally, if the Secretary certifies the
6 technology under the SAFETY Act (i.e., that the technology actually performs as it is
7 intended to do and conforms to certain seller specifications), the seller is afforded a
8 complete defense in litigation related to the performance of the technology in preventing,
9 detecting, or deterring terrorist acts or deployment to recover from one. Those technologies
10 that have been “certified” are placed on an Approved Product List for Homeland Security
11 that is published at www.safetyact.gov.
12 A clear benefit of the SAFETY Act is that a cause of action may be brought only against the
13 seller of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology and may not be brought against the
14 buyer(s), their contractors, or downstream users of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism
15 Technology, or against the seller’s suppliers or contractors. This stipulation includes CIKR
16 owners and operators.
17 CIKR facility owners and operators are encouraged to examine the SAFETY Act closely
18 because: (1) CIKR owners (if purchasers of qualified technologies) will enjoy the liability
19 protections that flow from using qualified SAFETY Act technologies, and (2) CIKR owners
20 will also have a level of assurance that the qualified products/services they are utilizing
21 have been vetted by DHS. Lower liability insurance burdens for those using qualified
22 technologies are another potential outcome.
23 In these ways, the SAFETY Act is a valuable tool that can enhance the ability of owners
24 and operators to protect our Nation’s CIKR.
25 6.2.2 National Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Plan
26 As directed by HSPD-7, the Secretary of Homeland Security works with the Director of the
27 OSTP, Executive Office of the President, to develop the National Critical Infrastructure
28 Protection (NCIP) R&D Plan as a vehicle to support implementation of CIKR risk
29 management and supporting protective activities and programs.
30 The NCIP R&D Plan provides the focus and coordination mechanisms required to achieve
31 the vision provided in the President’s Physical and Cyber CIKR Protection Strategies. That
32 vision calls for a “systematic national effort to fully harness the Nation’s research and
33 development capabilities.” The R&D planning process is designed to address common issues
34 faced by the various sector partners and ensure a coordinated R&D program that yields the
35 greatest value across a broad range of interests and requirements. The plan addresses both
36 physical and cyber CIKR protection. The planning process also provides for the revision of
37 research goals and priorities over the long term to respond to changes in the threat,
38 technology, environment, business continuity, and other factors.
39 DHS and OSTP coordinate with Federal and private sector partners, including academic
40 and national laboratory representatives, during the R&D planning cycle. The interagency
41 process used to develop and coordinate this plan is managed through the Infrastructure
42 Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), which is co-chaired
43 by DHS and OSTP. The SSAs are responsible for providing input into the plan after
44 coordination with sector representatives and experts through such bodies as the SCCs and
45 GCCs.

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1 The NCIP R&D Plan articulates strategic R&D goals and identifies the R&D areas in which
2 advances in CIKR protection must be made. The goals and cross-sector R&D areas
3 contained in the NCIP R&D Plan are discussed in the following subsections. A final
4 subsection describes coordination of SSP R&D planning with the NCIP R&D Plan.
5 6.2.2.1 CIKR Protection R&D Strategic Goals
6 The NCIP R&D planning process identifies three long-term, strategic R&D goals for CIKR
7 protection:
8 A common operating picture architecture;
9 A next-generation Internet architecture with designed-in security; and
10 Resilient, self-diagnosing, self-healing systems.
11 The strategic goals are used to guide Federal R&D investment decisions and also to provide
12 a coordinated approach to the overall Federal research program. The S&T Directorate and
13 OSTP will work with the OMB to use the R&D Plan as a decision making tool for evalu-
14 ation of budget submissions across Federal agencies. These goals also help guide programs
15 of research performers who receive Federal grants and contracts.
16 6.2.2.2 CIKR Protection R&D Areas
17 R&D development projects for CIKR protection programs fall into nine R&D areas or
18 themes that cut across all CIKR sectors:
19 Detection and sensor systems;
20 Protection and prevention systems;
21 Entry and access portals;
22 Insider threats;
23 Analysis and decision support systems;
24 Response, recovery, and reconstitution tools;
25 New and emerging threats and vulnerabilities;
26 Advanced infrastructure architectures and systems design; and
27 Human and social issues.
28 Organizing research in these areas enables the development of effective solutions that may
29 be applied across sectors and disciplines. These themes also provide an organizing frame-
30 work for SSA use during the development of R&D requirements for their respective sectors,
31 which will be reflected in the SSPs. These requirements specify the capabilities each sector
32 needs to satisfy CIKR protection needs. By incorporating these requirements into the NCIP
33 R&D Plan, OMB is better able to ensure that agency R&D budget requests are aligned with
34 the National R&D Plan for CIKR Protection. Requirements are refreshed each year through
35 the Sector Annual Reporting process.
36 6.2.2.3 Coordination of NCIP R&D Plan with SSP and Sector Annual Report R&D Planning
37 Each SSP includes a section on sector-specific CIKR protection R&D that explains how the
38 sector will strengthen the linkage between sector-specific and national R&D planning
39 efforts, technology requirements, current R&D initiatives, gaps, and candidate R&D
40 initiatives. New candidate R&D initiatives are developed during the Sector Annual Report
41 writing process. The SSP explains the process for:

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1 Sector Technology Requirements: Identifying and providing a summary of sector

2 technology requirements, and communicating them to IP and the DHS S&T
3 Directorate/OSTP for inclusion in the NCIP R&D Plan on an annual basis;
4 Current R&D Initiatives: Annually soliciting a listing of current Federal R&D initiatives
5 from the DHS S&T Directorate/OSTP that have the potential to meet sector CIKR
6 protection challenges, and providing a description of how this listing will be analyzed to
7 indicate which initiatives have the greatest potential for a positive impact;
8 Gaps: Conducting an analysis of the gaps between the sector’s technology needs and
9 current R&D initiatives from the DHS S&T Directorate/OSTP; and
10 Candidate R&D Initiatives: Determining which candidate R&D initiatives are most
11 relevant for the sector and how these will be summarized and reported to all
12 appropriate stakeholders.
13 Each SSA coordinates the development of the sector R&D planning component of their SSP
14 and SAR so that these documents reflect the SSA’s sector-level R&D investment priorities.
15 Coordination between IP, DHS/S&T and the sectors through the SSAs, GCCs, and SCCs
16 ensures that the R&D information in the SSP and SAR is comprehensive.
17 6.2.3 Other R&D That Supports CIKR Protection
18 Other R&D efforts that may support CIKR protection are conducted by the SSAs and other
19 Federal agencies. These programs address the research requirements set forth in the
20 President’s Physical and Cyber Security CIKR Protection Strategies, which call for:
21 Ensuring the compatibility of communications systems with interoperability standards;
22 Exploring methods to authenticate and verify personal identity;
23 Coordinating the development of CIKR protection consensus standards; and
24 Improving technical surveillance, monitoring, and detection capabilities.
25 For example, the Technical Support Working Group is the U.S. national forum that
26 identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and international R&D requirements for
27 combating terrorism. The Technical Support Working Group rapidly develops technologies
28 and equipment to meet the high-priority needs of the combating terrorism community,
29 including efforts that can contribute to CIKR protection, and addresses joint international
30 operational requirements through cooperative R&D with major allies.
31 Other examples of R&D that may support CIKR protection include the SAFECOM program
32 conducted by the DHS S&T Directorate Office of Interoperability. This program serves as
33 the Federal umbrella to promote and coordinate initiatives between State, local, and tribal
34 entities to develop interoperable wireless communications. SAFECOM’s primary role is to
35 work with Federal agencies and public safety personnel to define requirements and to
36 create standards, models, and solutions to help meet those requirements.
37 DHS also conducts cooperative R&D programs with other Federal agencies related to
38 authentication and verification of personal identity for the CIKR protection workforce, and
39 works with the American National Standards Institute and the National Institute of
40 Standards and Technology (NIST) through the Homeland Security Standards Panel to help
41 coordinate the development of consensus standards that support CIKR protection.

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1 6.2.4 DHS Science and Technology Strategic Framework

2 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the DHS Science and Technology (S&T)
3 Directorate the responsibility to advise the DHS Secretary on S&T requirements, priorities
4 and programs that support the Department’s vision and mission. The Directorate also has
5 the responsibility to develop and integrate technology with the strategies, policies,
6 procedures to protect the nation’s CIKR.
7 Successful transition of the technologies contained within the Division will substantially
8 improve DHS components’ performance and support the Secretary’s goals of:
9 Protecting the Nation from dangerous people;
10 Protecting the Nation from dangerous goods;
11 Protecting Critical Infrastructure;
12 Building a nimble and responsive emergency response system; and
13 Strengthening and unifying DHS operations and management.
14 The S&T Directorate functions as the nation’s homeland security research, development,
15 test and evaluation manager for science and technology. Six critical objectives inform and
16 shape S&T’s plans, programs, and activities:
17 Develop and deploy state-of-the-art, high-performance, affordable systems to prevent,
18 detect and mitigate the consequences of Chemical, Biological and enhanced Explosive
19 (CBE) attacks and disasters that require a federal response
20 Develop equipment, protocols and training for response to and recovery from CBE
21 attacks and disasters
22 Enhance the technical capabilities of the Department’s operational elements and other
23 Federal, state, and local and tribal agencies to fulfill their homeland security-related
24 roles, missions and tasks
25 Develop methods and capabilities to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities,
26 anticipate emerging threats and prevent technological surprise
27 Develop technical standards and establish certified laboratories to evaluate homeland
28 security and first-response technologies, and evaluate technologies for SAFETY Act
29 protections
30 Support U.S. leadership in science and technology through basic research focused on
31 filling phenomenology gaps that impede development of effective homeland security
32 technologies and systems
33 The organization of S&T results in an improved process to identify, validate and procure
34 new technologies, given its responsibility to develop and integrate technology with the
35 strategies, policies, procedures to protect the nation’s CIKR. The division’s RDT&E
36 program achieves S&T strategic goals in six fundamental disciples: (1) Explosives; (2)
37 Chemical and Biological; (3) Command, Control and Interoperability; (4) Borders and
38 Maritime Security; (5) Human Factors; and (6) Infrastructure and Geophysical, which are
39 also S&T’s six Divisions (see Appendix 6 for a more detailed discussion of the S&T
40 organization as it relates to CIKR technology development).
41 6.2.5 Transitioning Requirements into Reality
42 The Directorate focuses on enabling its customers—the DHS components—and their
43 customers, including Border Patrol agents, Coast Guardsmen, airport baggage screeners,

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1 Federal Air Marshals, and state, local, and Federal emergency responders, as well as the
2 many others teamed and committed to the vital mission of securing the Nation. To reach
3 its goals, the S&T Directorate created a customer-focused, output-oriented, full-service
4 science and technology management organization.
5 S&T established Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to coordinate the planning and execution
6 of R&D programs together with the eventual hand-off to maintainers and users of project
7 results. The IPTs are critical nodes in the process to determine operational requirements,
8 assess current capabilities to meet operational needs, analyze gaps in capabilities and
9 articulate programs and projects to fill in the gaps an expand competencies.
10 IPTs constitute the Transition portfolio of DHS S&T, targeting deployable capabilities in
11 the near term. IPTs generally include the research and technology perspective, the
12 customer and end user perspective, and an acquisition perspective. The customer and end
13 users monitor and guide the capability being developed; the research and technology
14 representatives inform the discussions with scientific and engineering advances and
15 emerging technologies; and the acquisition staff help transition the results into practice by
16 the maintainers and end-users of the capability.
17 6.3 Building, Protecting, and Maintaining Databases, Simulations,

18 and Other Tools
19 Many data systems, databases, models, simulations, decision support systems, and similar
20 information tools currently exist or are under development to enable the execution of
21 national risk management for CIKR.
22 To keep pace with the constantly evolving threat, technology, and business environments,
23 these tools must be updated and, in some cases, new tools must be developed. Sensitive
24 information associated with these tools must be appropriately protected. Priority efforts in
25 this area will be focused on updating and improving key databases, developing and
26 maintaining simulation and modeling capabilities, and coordinating with CIKR partners on
27 databases and modeling.
28 6.3.1 National CIKR Protection Data Systems
29 HSPD-7 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement plans and programs that
30 identify, catalog, prioritize, and protect CIKR in cooperation with all levels of government
31 and private sector entities. Data systems currently provide the capability to catalog,
32 prioritize, and protect CIKR through such functions as:
33 Maintaining an inventory of asset information and estimating the potential
34 consequences of an attack or incident (e.g., the IDW);
35 Storing information related to terrorist attacks or incidents (e.g., the National Threat
36 and Incident Database);
37 Analyzing dependencies and interdependencies (e.g., the NISAC);
38 Managing the implementation of various protective programs (e.g., the BZPP Request
39 Database); and
40 Providing the continuous maintenance and updating required to enable data in these
41 systems to reflect changes in actual circumstances, using tools such as iCAV.

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1 Properly maintaining systems with current and useful data involves long-term support,
2 coordination, and resource commitments by DHS, the SSAs, the States, private sector
3 entities, and other partners. Important aspects of the support, coordination, and resource
4 commitments required over the long term to sustain the NIPP include:
5 Need for Information Protection: Data accuracy and currency for CIKR protection is
6 dependent upon the ability of the various partners to keep their databases and data
7 systems current. Over the long term, the level of cooperation and commitment needed
8 for this must be sustained by a trusted working relationship. This requires that
9 information regarded as sensitive by providers be protected from unauthorized access,
10 use, or disclosure. Data content, accuracy, and currency must also be protected from
11 tampering or other corruption.
12 Durable Information: The complexity, scope, and magnitude of the U.S. CIKR require
13 reliance on multiple data sources that are acquired over long periods of time. As a
14 result, information pertaining to the characteristics and quality of the data must be
15 provided along with the actual data from each source. This requires the use of a
16 common and standardized format, data scheme, and categorization system (i.e.,
17 taxonomy) that is viable over the long term. DHS and the SSAs are responsible for
18 working together to establish and utilize the appropriate data collection format. The
19 DHS taxonomy is the foundation for multiple DHS programs that focus on CIKR
20 information, such as the IDW and the National Threat Incident Database. This
21 taxonomy provides the foundation for a national-level information scheme.
22 Recurring Nature of Information Needs: The process of information identification and
23 additional data collection represents a recurring need. Data requirements and
24 availability are continually reassessed based on the current threat environment,
25 analyses to identify gaps, or other factors. Focused data calls to specific sectors or
26 locales, in coordination with the SSAs and the States, as appropriate, may be required
27 to fill identified information gaps. This imposes a continuing need for resources to build
28 and update the system over the long term.
29 6.3.2 Simulation and Modeling
30 A number of CIKR partners make use of models and simulations to comprehensively
31 examine potential consequences from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and manmade
32 accidents that impact CIKR, including the effects of sector and cross-sector dependencies
33 and interdependencies. Continuous maintenance and updating are required for these tools
34 to produce reliable projections. Over the long term, new tools are needed to address
35 fundamental changes due to factors such as technology, threats, or the business
36 environment.
37 DHS /IP is the lead for modeling and simulation capabilities regarding CIKR protection. In
38 this capacity, the DHS will:
39 Coordinate with the DHS S&T Directorate on requirements for the development,
40 maintenance, and application of research-related modeling capabilities for CIKR
41 protection;
42 Specify requirements for the development, maintenance, and application of operations-
43 related modeling capabilities for CIKR protection in coordination with the DHS S&T
44 Directorate and the SSAs, as appropriate;

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1 Coordinate with the SSAs that have relevant modeling capabilities to develop
2 appropriate mechanisms for the development, maintenance, and use of such for CIKR
3 protection as directed by HSPD-7;
4 Familiarize the SSAs and other CIKR partners with the availability of relevant
5 modeling and simulation capabilities through training and exercises;
6 Work with end-users to design operations-related tools that provide maximum utility
7 and clarity for CIKR protection activities in both emergencies and routine operations;
8 Work with end-users to design appropriate information protection plans for sensitive
9 information used and produced by CIKR protection modeling tools;
10 Provide guidance on the vetting of modeling tools to include the use of private sector
11 operational, technical, and business expertise where appropriate; and
12 Review existing private sector modeling initiatives and opportunities for joint ventures
13 to ensure that DHS and its CIKR partners make maximum use of applicable private
14 sector modeling capabilities.
15 The principal modeling, simulation and analysis capability within the DHS IP is the
16 National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC). NISAC analysts and
17 operational resources are located at the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories, and
18 the program operates under the direction of a small DC-based program office within IP’s
19 Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division (IASD). Mandated by Congress to be a
20 “source of National Expertise to address critical infrastructure protection” research and
21 analysis, NISAC prepares and shares analyses of CIKR including their interdependencies,
22 vulnerabilities, consequences of loss, and other complexities. Over a span of several years,
23 NISAC has developed tailored analytical tools, a core of unique expertise, and procedures
24 designed to effectively address the strategic-level analytical needs of CIKR decision makers.
25 While the 2001 PATRIOT (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
26 Terrorism) Act established the requirement for NISAC, the Homeland Security
27 Appropriations Act of 2007 specifies its current mission. NISAC is required to provide
28 “modeling, simulation, and analysis of the assets and systems comprising CIKR in order to
29 enhance preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation activities.” The
30 Center is also directed to share information with Federal agencies and departments that
31 have CIKR responsibilities. Information sharing is accomplished through outreach
32 meetings with sectors, analysts, and consumers. NISAC pre-incident studies (e.g, hurricane
33 scenario studies) are posted and available for download on HSIN. Selected products are
34 reproduced for widespread dissemination in hard copy. Products requested from the NISAC
35 program office are usually distributed by email or on electronic media.
36 NISAC’s objectives cover two main areas of focus:
37 Provide operational support to DHS and other Federal Government entities on an
38 as-needed basis in the form of analysis, simulation, and scenario development; and
39 Develop long-term capabilities by maintaining expertise in the application of analysis
40 tools and the development of improved processes and tools in support of longer-term
41 DHS projects.
42 NISAC accomplishes its mission through three types of products:
43 Pre-planned long-term analyses;
44 Pre-planned short-term analyses; and

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1 Unplanned priority analytical projects that are based on higher-level tasking or that are
2 related to current threats to critical infrastructure (e.g., hurricanes).
3 NISAC utilizes CIKR information and data from a variety of government CIKR sector and
4 private sector sources, including other participants in CIKR protection projects and
5 programs. NISAC uses some data that are considered proprietary to a single industry—or
6 even to a specific firm; the data must therefore be protected from unrestricted
7 dissemination in order to maintain the trust of the information providers. NISAC products
8 principally serve government decision makers, who can derive valuable insight into
9 incident consequences at a higher level than the supporting data could provide. In selected
10 cases, NISAC products are made available to the private sector in order to facilitate access
11 to key NISAC recommendations of concern to a wider community of CIKR stakeholders.
12 Although NISAC is the principal resource within the Office of Infrastructure Protection for
13 modeling, simulation, and analysis, it is not the sole source available to CIKR stakeholders
14 in need of these capabilities. NISAC strives to establish joint ventures with other
15 stakeholders and to share critical authoritative data in order to improve overall analytical
16 quality and insure consistency with other providers of CIKR analysis.
17 6.3.3 Coordination on Databases and Modeling
18 Integrating existing databases into DHS databases, such as the IDW, not only reduces
19 duplication of effort, but also ensures that available data are consistent, current, and
20 accurate, and provide users with a consolidated picture across all CIKR sectors. However,
21 this approach is effective only if the source information is protected and maintained prop-
22 erly. Maintaining a current and useful database involves the support, coordination, and
23 commitment of the SSAs, private sector entities, and other partners. Because the most
24 current and accurate CIKR-related data are best known by owners and operators, the
25 effectiveness of the effort depends on all CIKR partners keeping their databases and data
26 systems current.
27 As the responsible agent for the identification of assets and existing databases for their
28 sectors, the SSAs:
29 Outline in their SSPs the sector plans and processes for the database, data system, and
30 modeling and simulation development and updates;
31 Work with sector partners to facilitate the collection and protection of accurate
32 information for database, data system, and modeling and simulation use;
33 Specify the timelines and milestones for the initial population of CIKR databases; and
34 Specify a regular schedule for maintenance and updating of the databases.
35 DHS works with the SSAs and other CIKR partners to:
36 Identify databases and other data services that will be integrated with CIKR protection
37 databases and data systems;
38 Facilitate the actual integration of supporting databases or importation of data into
39 CIKR protection databases and data systems, using a common and standardized format,
40 data scheme, and categorization system or taxonomy specified by DHS in coordination
41 with the SSAs; and
42 Define the schedule for integrating data and databases into such systems as the IDW.

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1 6.4 Continuously Improving the NIPP and the SSPs

2 The NIPP uses the SCCs, GCCs, and the Government and Private Sector Cross-Sector
3 Councils as the primary forums for coordination of policy, planning, training, and other
4 requirements needed to ensure efficient implementation and ongoing management and
5 maintenance of the NIPP and the SSPs.
6 6.4.1 Management and Coordination
7 DHS/IP is the Federal executive agent for NIPP management and maintenance.
8 The NIPP is a multi-year plan describing mechanisms for sustaining the Nation’s steady-
9 state CIKR protection posture. The NIPP and its component SSPs include a process for
10 annual review; periodic interim updates as required; and regularly scheduled partial
11 reviews and re-issuance every three years, or more frequently, if directed by the Secretary
12 of Homeland Security.
13 DHS/IP oversees the review and maintenance process for the NIPP; the SSAs, in
14 coordination with the GCCs and SCCs, establishes and operates the mechanism(s)
15 necessary to coordinate this review for their respective SSPs. The NIPP and SSP revision
16 processes includes developing or updating any documents necessary to carry out NIPP
17 activities. The NIPP is reviewed at least annually to:
18 Ensure that the NIPP framework is capable of measuring accomplishments in support
19 of CIKR protection goals and objectives and supporting the overall national approach to
20 the homeland security mission;
21 Ensure that the plan adequately reflects the organization of DHS, the SSAs, and the
22 Federal budget process;
23 Ensure that the NIPP is consistent with those Federal plans and activities that it
24 directly supports;
25 Adjust practices and procedures called for in the NIPP based on changes in the national
26 risk management environment;
27 Incorporate lessons learned and best practices from day-to-day operations, exercises,
28 and actual incidents and alerts; and
29 Reflect progress in the Nation’s CIKR protection, as well as changes to national
30 priorities and guidance, critical tasks, sector organization, or national capabilities.
31 As changes are warranted, periodic updates to the NIPP will be issued. Types of
32 developments that merit a periodic update include new laws, executive orders, Presidential
33 directives, or regulations, and procedural changes to NIPP activities based on real-world
34 incidents or exercise experiences.
35 6.4.2 Maintenance and Updating
36 The following paragraphs establish the procedures for posting interim changes and periodic
37 updating of the NIPP:
38 Types of Changes: Changes include additions of new or supplementary material and
39 deletions. No proposed change should contradict or override authorities or other plans
40 contained in statute, executive order, or regulation.
41 Coordination and Approval: While DHS is the Federal executive agent for NIPP
42 management and maintenance, any Federal department or agency with assigned

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1 responsibilities under the NIPP may propose a change to the plan. DHS is responsible
2 for coordinating the review and approval of all proposed modifications to the NIPP with
3 SSAs and other CIKR partners, as appropriate. Policy changes will be coordinated and
4 approved thorough the Homeland Security Council policy process.
5 Notice of Change: DHS will issue an official Notice of Change for each interim revision
6 to the NIPP. After publication, the modifications will be considered part of the NIPP for
7 operational purposes pending a formal revision and re-issuance of the entire document.
8 Interim changes can be further modified or updated using this process. (Periodic
9 updates resulting from the annual review process do not require the formal Notice of
10 Change.)
11 Distribution: DHS will distribute Notices of Change to SCCs, GCCs, and other CIKR
12 partners. Notices of Change to other organizations will be provided upon request.
13 Re-Issuance: DHS will coordinate full reviews and updating of the NIPP every 3 years,
14 or more frequently, if the Secretary deems necessary. The review and updating will
15 consider lessons learned and best practices identified during implementation in each
16 sector and will incorporate the periodic changes and any new information technologies.
17 DHS will distribute revised NIPP documents for interagency review and concurrence
18 through the Homeland Security Council process.
19 The SSAs, in coordination with their GCCs and SCCs, establish and operate the
20 mechanism(s) necessary to coordinate SSP maintenance and update in accordance with the
21 process established for the NIPP.
22
23
24

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1 7. Providing Resources for the CIKR

2 Protection Program
3 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, government and private sector
4 expenditures to improve CIKR protection and resilience have increased across sectors and
5 jurisdictional levels. With finite resources available to support protection of the Nation’s
6 CIKR, the NIPP serves as the unifying framework to ensure that CIKR investments are
7 coordinated and address the highest priorities, based on risk, to achieve the homeland
8 security mission and ensure continuity of the essential infrastructure and services that
9 support the American government, economy, and way of life.
10 This chapter describes an integrated, risk-informed approach to fund the national CIKR
11 protection program and focus Federal grant assistance to State, local, tribal, and territorial
12 entities, and complement relevant private sector activities. This integrated resource
13 approach coordinates CIKR protection programs and activities conducted by DHS, the
14 SSAs, and other Federal entities through the Federal appropriations process, and focuses
15 Federal grant funds to support national CIKR protection efforts conducted at the State,
16 local, tribal, and territorial levels. This resource approach also includes mechanisms to
17 involve private sector partners in the planning process and supports collaboration among
18 CIKR partners to establish priorities, define requirements, share information, and
19 maximize the use of finite resources. Implementation of this coordinated approach will help
20 ensure that limited resources are applied efficiently and effectively to address the Nation’s
21 most critical CIKR protection needs.
22 7.1 The Risk-informed Resource Allocation Process

23 Funding in support of CIKR protection programs at all levels is guided by a straightforward
24 principle: Resources must be directed to areas of greatest priority to enable effective
25 management of risk. By definition, all CIKR assets, systems, and networks are important
26 to the Nation. However, considering the risk factors of threat, vulnerability, and
27 consequences, some assets, systems, networks, or functions are deemed to be more critical
28 to the Nation, as a whole, than others. This chapter provides a process to ensure that the
29 Nation’s CIKR protection resource requirements are correctly identified and appropriately
30 prioritized to meet the Nation’s most critical protection needs. Using a risk-informed
31 approach, DHS collaborates with CIKR partners to identify those assets, systems,
32 networks, and functions that are most critical from a national perspective, and lead,
33 integrate, and coordinate a cohesive effort to help ensure their protection. Through the
34 NIPP framework, DHS works with the SSAs, States, and other government and private
35 sector partners to gain an understanding of how CIKR protection is being conducted across
36 the country, what priorities and requirements drive these efforts, and how such efforts are
37 funded. This assessment helps DHS to identify duplicative efforts and gaps in CIKR
38 protection across sectors and jurisdictions. DHS then uses the information gained to rec-
39 ommend funding targeted at the appropriate CIKR protective programs or activities that
40 help ensure that government resources are allocated to the areas of greatest priority.
41 7.1.1 Sector-Specific Agency Reporting to DHS
42 Given their unique capabilities and individual risk landscapes, CIKR sectors each face
43 different protection challenges. For instance, some sectors have distinct, easily identifiable

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1 assets that can be logically prioritized. Some have thousands of identical assets, not all of
2 which are equally critical. Others are made up of systems or networks, as opposed to
3 distinct assets, for which the identification of specific protective measures may prove to be
4 impossibly complex. Furthermore, interdependencies among sectors can cause duplicative
5 protection efforts or lead to gaps in funding for CIKR protection. To ensure that resources
6 are allocated according to national priorities and are based on national risk and need, DHS
7 must be able to accurately assess priorities, requirements, and efforts across these diverse
8 sectors.
9 As DHS conducts this assessment, the SSAs, supported by their respective SCCs and GCCs,
10 provide information regarding their sectors’ individual CIKR protection efforts. The SCCs
11 participate in the process to ensure that private sector input is reflected in SSA reporting of
12 sector priorities and requirements. The first step for an SSA in the risk-informed resource
13 allocation process is to coordinate with sector partners, including SCCs and GCCs as
14 appropriate, to accurately determine sector priorities, program requirements, and funding
15 needs for CIKR protection. HSPD-7 requires each SSA to provide an annual report to the
16 Secretary of Homeland Security on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate CIKR
17 protection in their respective sectors. Consistent with this requirement, DHS provides the
18 SSAs with reporting guidance and templates that include requests for specific information,
19 such as CIKR protection priorities, requirements, and resources. The following elements
20 are included in the Sector CIKR Protection Annual Report to help inform prioritization
21 resource allocation recommendations:
22 Priorities and annual goals for CIKR protection and associated gaps;
23 Sector-specific requirements for CIKR protection activities and programs based on risk
24 and need; and
25 Projected CIKR-related resource requirements for the sector, with an emphasis on
26 anticipated gaps or shortfalls in funding for sector-level CIKR protection and/or for
27 protection efforts related to national-level CIKR that exist within the sector.
28 7.1.2 State Government Reporting to DHS
29 Like sectors, State governments face diverse CIKR protection challenges and have different
30 priorities, requirements, and available resources. Furthermore, State CIKR protection
31 efforts are closely intertwined with those of other government and private sector partners.
32 In particular, States work closely with local and tribal governments to address CIKR
33 protection challenges at those levels. To accurately assess the national CIKR protection
34 effort and identify protection needs that warrant attention at a national level, DHS must
35 aggregate information across State jurisdictions as it does across sectors.
36 DHS requires that each State develop a homeland security strategy that establishes goals
37 and objectives for its homeland security program that include CIKR protection as a core
38 element. State administrative agencies develop a Program and Capability Enhancement
39 Plan that prioritizes statewide resource needs to support this program. The State adminis-
40 trative agency works with DHS to identify:
41 Priorities and annual goals for CIKR protection;
42 State-specific requirements for CIKR protection activities and programs, based on risk
43 and need;

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1 Mechanisms for coordinated planning and information sharing with government and
2 private sector partners;
3 Unfunded CIKR protection initiatives or requirements that should be considered for
4 funding using Federal grants (described in further detail below); and
5 Other funding sources utilized to implement the NIPP and address identified priorities
6 and annual goals.
7 For consideration in the deliberations related to CIKR protection resources as part of the
8 Federal budget cycle, information on statewide CIKR resources needs must be reported to
9 DHS by the date specified in the appropriate annual DHS/GPD planning guidance.
10 DHS/GPD includes information such as model reports or report templates with the
11 planning guidance to support the States’ reporting efforts.
12 7.1.3 State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council
13 (SLTTGCC) Reporting to DHS
14 In 2007, DHS formed the SLTTGCC in order to better support the State, local, tribal, and
15 territorial partners. It provides a forum to ensure that SLTT governments are fully
16 integrated into the CIKR protection process and can actively coordinate across their
17 jurisdictions and with the Federal government on CIKR protection guidance, strategies,
18 and programs. Furthermore, the Council is the second subcouncil of the Government Cross-
19 Sector Council, as prescribed in the NIPP, which provides the forum to address cross-sector
20 issues and interdependencies among the Government Coordinating Councils.
21 The SLTTGCC comprises representatives from a broad and diverse group of SLTT
22 governments. The intent of the Council is to provide SLTT input and suggestions for
23 implementation of the NIPP, including sector protection programs and initiatives. These
24 types of engagements foster broad public sector partner involvement in actively developing
25 sector priorities and requirements. Through the SLTTGCC Annual Report, the Council
26 provides annual updates on protection programs and initiatives that are being conducted or
27 planned by the Council, DHS, other Federal partners, or private sector partners. The
28 Council leverages its broad experiential base and apolitical perspective to:
29 Inform implementation and planning efforts related to the NIPP, State-specific, and
30 regional-focused plans;
31 Coordinate strategic communication and achieve resolution among SLTT partners;
32 Facilitate the building and implementation of information-sharing channels to
33 promulgate CIKR plans, programs, and processes; and
34 Develop policy recommendations.
35 7.1.4 Regional Consortium Coordinating Council (RCCC) Reporting to DHS
36 Cross-sector and multijurisdictional CIKR protection challenges provide an opportunity to
37 manage interdependent risks at the regional level Individually, regional consortiums’
38 activities can enhance the physical security, cybersecurity, emergency preparedness, and
39 overall public/private continuity and resiliency of one or more States, urban areas, or
40 municipalities.
41 Because of the multitude of public and private sector partners involved, specific regional
42 initiatives have a broad-reaching scope. In some cases, initiatives can even cross national
43 borders and become international efforts. To better support these initiatives and further
44 implement the National Infrastructure Implementation Plan, DHS supported the formation

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1 of the RCCC in July 2008. The RCCC provides a unique mechanism to integrate NIPP
2 implementation on a regional scale and details its efforts in the RCCC CIKR Protection
3 Annual Report.
4 The mission of the RCCC is to strengthen regional consortiums that enhance protection,
5 response, recovery, and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources
6 by working to:
7 Develop a policy framework for regional infrastructure protection, prevention,
8 deterrence, response, recovery, and longer-term restoration;
9 Provide the foundation for regional cross-sector collaboration;
10 Foster the development of risk-informed protection and mitigation measures to enable
11 measurable progress towards robust security and disaster resilience; and
12 Enhance the education and awareness of critical infrastructure interdependencies.
13 7.1.5 Aggregating Submissions to DHS
14 DHS uses the information collected from the Sector CIKR Protection Annual Reports, the
15 SLTTGCC Annual Report, the RCCC Annual Report, and State reports to DHS/GPD to
16 assess CIKR protection status and requirements across the country. As national priorities
17 and requirements are established, DHS will develop funding recommendations for
18 programs and initiatives designed to reduce national-level risk in the CIKR protection
19 mission area. In cases where gaps or duplicative efforts exist, DHS will work with the SSAs
20 and the States to identify strategies or additional funding sources to help ensure that
21 national CIKR protection priorities are efficiently and effectively addressed.
22 Following the collection and aggregation of sector- and State-level reports, DHS
23 summarizes this information in the National CIKR Protection Annual Report. This report
24 provides a summary of national CIKR protection priorities and requirements and makes
25 recommendations for prioritized resource allocation across the Federal Government to meet
26 national-level CIKR protection needs. The National CIKR Protection Annual Report is
27 submitted along with the DHS budget submission to the Executive Office of the President
28 on or before September 1 as part of the annual Federal budget process (see figure 7-1).

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1 Figure 7-1: National CIKR Protection Annual Report Process
2
3
4 7.2 Federal Resource Allocation Process for DHS, the SSAs, and
5 Other Federal Agencies
6 The Federal resource allocation process described in this section is designed to ensure that
7 the collective efforts of DHS, the SSAs, and other Federal departments and agencies
8 support the NIPP and national priorities. It is also designed to be consistent with the DHS
9 responsibility to coordinate overall national CIKR protection and to identify national-level
10 gaps, overlaps, or shortfalls. Driven in large part by existing and well-understood Federal
11 budget process milestones, this approach is integrated with the established Federal budget
12 process and reporting requirements. The resource allocation process for CIKR protection
13 outlined in this chapter recognizes the existing budget authorities and responsibilities of all
14 Federal departments and agencies with CIKR protection-related programs and activities.
15 The NIPP process aims to create synergy between current and future efforts to ensure a
16 unified and effective national CIKR protection effort. The specific roles of DHS and the
17 SSAs are described in further detail below.
18 7.2.1 Department of Homeland Security
19 DHS is responsible for overall coordination of the Nation’s CIKR protection efforts. To carry
20 out this responsibility, DHS must identify and prioritize nationally critical assets, systems,
21 and networks; help ensure that appropriate protective initiatives are implemented; and
22 help address any gaps or shortfalls in the protection of nationally critical CIKR. DHS works
23 closely with the Executive Office of the President to aggregate CIKR protection-related
24 activities and related resource requests from the SSAs and other Federal departments and
25 agencies as a way to make informed tradeoffs in prioritizing Federal investments.
26 DHS works with the Executive Office of the President offices to establish a national CIKR
27 protection strategic approach and priorities, and with the SSAs, supported by their

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1 respective SCCs and GCCs, to develop sector-specific CIKR protection-related

2 requirements. Driven largely by the identification and prioritization of critical assets, sys-
3 tems, networks, and functions across sectors and States, the establishment of national
4 protection priorities helps inform resource allocation decisions later in the process. SSAs
5 communicate information about their existing CIKR protection-related programs and
6 outstanding requirements to DHS through their Sector CIKR Protection Annual Reports.
7 DHS uses the sector annual reports to inform the National CIKR Protection Annual Report.
8 The National CIKR Protection Annual Report analyzes information about sector priorities,
9 requirements, and programs in the context of the National Risk Profile, a high-level
10 summary of the aggregate risk and protective status of all sectors. The National Risk
11 Profile drives the development of national priorities, which, in turn, are used to assess
12 existing CIKR programs and to identify existing gaps or shortfalls in national CIKR protec-
13 tion efforts. This analysis provides the Executive Office of the President with information
14 that supports both strategic and investment decisions related to CIKR protection.
15

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1 Figure 7-3: DHS and SSA Roles and Responsibilities in Federal Resource Allocation
2
3
4 7.2.2 Sector-Specific Agencies
5 Earlier chapters of the NIPP articulate how DHS and the SSAs work with the respective
6 CIKR sectors to determine risk and set priorities. Based on guidance from DHS, each SSA
7 develops and maintains an SSP that supports the NIPP goal and supporting objectives.
8 Additionally, the SSAs, in partnership with the SCCs and GCCs, determine sector-specific
9 priorities and requirements for CIKR protection. The SSAs submit these priorities and
10 requirements to DHS in their sector annual reports, along with identification of resource
11 needs, to allow for a more comprehensive National CIKR Protection Annual Report. SSAs
12 work within their respective department or agency budget process to determine the CIKR
13 protection-related aspects of their department’s budget submission. SSA annual reports are
14 submitted to DHS on or before June 1 of each year. Resource information contained in the
15 SSA annual reports is based on appropriated funding, as well as the President’s most
16 recent budget.
17 Additionally, the subset of CIKR protection funding requirements directed toward R&D and
18 S&T investments are highlighted by the SSAs, SCCs, and GCCs in the sector annual
19 reports to inform the NCIP R&D Plan and its technology roadmap, while ensuring efficient
20 coordination with the DHS R&D/S&T community and supporting the Federal research and
21 technology base. These R&D and S&T plans and requirements are based on the R&D

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1 planning section of each sector’s SSP. The identified R&D requirements are prioritized
2 based on the potential increase in CIKR protection capabilities for a given investment.
3 7.2.3 Summary of Roles and Responsibilities
4 Figure 7-2 outlines the roles and responsibilities of DHS and the SSAs throughout this
5 process, as well as the annual timelines associated with major activities.
6 The final determination of funding priorities, based on the collaborative efforts of DHS, the
7 SSAs and other Federal departments and agencies, and the Executive Office of the
8 President, guides CIKR protection programs and the allocation of resources in support of
9 the NIPP. These priorities support Federal Government (DHS and SSA) CIKR protection
10 activities, as well as guide and support homeland security and CIKR protection activities
11 across and within State, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions.
12 7.3 Federal Resources for State and Local Government

13 Preparedness
14 Federal grants from DHS and Federal agencies, and other programs, such as training and
15 technical assistance, offer key support to State and local jurisdictions for CIKR protection
16 programs. These grants and other programs provide resources to meet CIKR needs that are
17 managed by State and local entities.
18 DHS/GPD is responsible for coordinating Federal homeland security grant programs to help
19 State, local, and tribal governments enhance their ability to prevent, protect against,
20 respond to, and recover from terrorist acts or threats and other hazards. DHS/GPD offers
21 State, local, and tribal partners access to funding through several grant programs that can
22 be leveraged to support CIKR protection requirements based on risk and need.
23 For the purposes of the NIPP, Federal grants available through DHS/GPD can be grouped
24 into two broad categories: (1) overarching homeland security programs that provide funding
25 for a broad set of activities in support of homeland security mission areas and the national
26 priorities outlined in the National Preparedness Guidelines, and (2) targeted infrastructure
27 protection programs for specific CIKR-related protection initiatives and programs within
28 identified jurisdictions. States should leverage the range of available resources, including
29 those from Federal, State, local, and tribal sources, as appropriate, in support of the
30 protection activities needed to reduce vulnerabilities and close identified capability gaps
31 related to CIKR within their jurisdictions.
32 Overarching Homeland Security Programs: The Overarching Homeland Security Grant
33 Program supports activities that are conducted in accordance with the National
34 Preparedness Guidelines. These funds support overall State and local homeland security
35 efforts, and can be leveraged to support State, regional, local, and/or tribal CIKR protection.
36 These funds are intended to complement and be allocated in coordination with national
37 CIKR protection efforts.
38 The primary overarching homeland security grant programs include:
39 State Homeland Security Program: The SHSP supports the implementation of the State
40 Homeland Security Strategy to address identified planning, equipment, training, and
41 exercise needs for acts of terrorism. In addition, SHSP supports the implementation of

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1 the National Preparedness Guideline, the NIMS, the NRF, and the NIPP to support the
2 prevention of, protection against, response to, and recovery from acts of terrorism.
3 Urban Areas Security Initiative: UASI funds address the unique planning, equipment,
4 training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas, and assist them
5 in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, respond
6 to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
7 Targeted Infrastructure Protection Programs: Targeted infrastructure protection programs
8 include grants for specific activities that focus on the protection of CIKR, such as ports,
9 mass transit, rail transportation, etc. These funds support CIKR protection capabilities
10 based on risk and need in coordination with DHS, SSAs, and Federal agencies. Though
11 recent appropriations have been divided among specific sectors, DHS seeks to combine
12 these grants into a program that supports a more integrated risk-informed approach across
13 CIKR sectors.
14 DHS/IP and DHS/GPD work with States to focus targeted infrastructure protection grant
15 programs, such as the BZPP and transportation security grants, to support national-level
16 CIKR protection priorities and to reinforce activities funded through Federal department
17 and agency budgets and other homeland security grant programs. As appropriate, SSAs
18 serve as subject matter experts reviewing and providing recommendations for specific
19 target grant programs. Grantees should apply resources available under the overarching
20 homeland security grant programs, such as SHSP and UASI to address their regionally or
21 locally critical priority CIKR protection initiatives. A further prioritized combination of
22 grant funding across various programs may be necessary to enable the protection of certain
23 assets, systems, networks, and functions deemed to be nationally critical.
24 Available DHS/GPD grant funding is awarded to the Governor-appointed State
25 administrative agency, which serves in each State as the lead for program implementation.
26 Through the State administrative agencies, States will identify and prioritize their
27 homeland security needs, including CIKR protection, and leverage assistance from these
28 funding streams to accomplish the priorities identified in their State Homeland Security
29 Strategies, and Program and Capability Enhancement Plans. These planning processes
30 undertaken at the State level are built on the common framework articulated in the
31 National Preparedness Guideline; the National Priorities, including implementation of the
32 NIPP; and capabilities enhancements based on the TCL.
33 DHS provides State, local, and tribal authorities with additional guidance on how to
34 identify, assess, and prioritize CIKR protection needs and programs in support of the
35 National Preparedness Guidelines as they apply for homeland security grants. Additional
36 information on DHS grant programs, guidelines, allocations, and eligibility is available at:
37 http://www.fema.gov/grants.
38 7.4 Other Federal Grant Programs That Contribute to CIKR

39 Protection
40 Other Federal departments and agencies provide grant programs that can contribute to
41 CIKR protection. These are usually sector- or threat-specific programs; many are related to
42 technology development initiatives. Examples of these grant programs include:

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1 Department of Energy: DOE manages grant programs for the development of

2 technologies for assurance of the U.S. energy infrastructure. These programs address
3 the development and demonstration of technologies and methodologies to protect
4 physical energy infrastructure assets. Technologies and methodologies of relevance are
5 those that accomplish security and reliability functions such as hardening of assets;
6 surveillance; non-invasive inspection of sealed containers; remote detection; and
7 characterization of damage, entry control, perimeter monitoring, detection of explosives,
8 and improved electricity reliability.
9 Department of the Interior: The Bureau of Indian Affairs manages a grant program for
10 the Safety of Dams on Indian Lands with the objective of improving the structural
11 integrity of dams on Indian lands. Financial awards are specific to a given site; awards
12 are restricted to Indian tribes or tribal organizations.
13 Department of Justice: The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Office of Justice
14 Programs, manages a grant program for Domestic Anti-Terrorism Technology
15 Development. The objective of the program is to support the development of
16 counterterrorism technologies, assist in the development of standards for those
17 technologies, and work with State and local jurisdictions to identify particular areas of
18 vulnerability to terrorist acts and to be better prepared to respond if such acts occur.
19 The NIJ is authorized to make grants to, or enter into contracts or cooperative
20 agreements with, State and local governments, private nonprofit organizations, public
21 nonprofit organizations, for profit organizations, institutions of higher education, and
22 qualified individuals. Applicants from the Territories of the United States and federally
23 recognized Indian tribal governments are also eligible to participate in this program.
24 Department of Transportation: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
25 Administration Pipeline Safety grant program supports efforts to develop and maintain
26 State natural gas, liquefied natural gas, and hazardous liquid pipeline safety programs.
27 Grant recipients are typically State government agencies.
28 Department of Transportation: The Federal Transit Administration is a grants-in-aid
29 agency that has several major assistance programs for eligible activities. Funds are
30 provided through legislative formulas or discretionary authority. Funding from these
31 programs is provided on an 80/20 Federal/local funding match basis, unless otherwise
32 specified. These assistance programs can contribute to CIKR protection efforts through
33 funding for metropolitan and State planning and research grants; urban, non-urban,
34 and rural transit assistance programs; bus and railway modernization efforts; major
35 capital investments; and special flexible-funding programs.
36 These programs are available to a wide range of grant recipients, including CIKR owners
37 and operators and State, local, and tribal governments.
38 7.5 Setting an Agenda in Collaboration with CIKR Protection

39 Partners
40 Resource allocation decisions for CIKR protection at all levels of government should align
41 as integral components of the unified national approach established in the NIPP. In
42 accordance with the responsibilities established in HSPD-7, DHS works with the SSAs and
43 other government and private sector partners to set the national agenda that specifies this
44 strategic approach to CIKR protection, articulates associated requirements, supports
45 collaboration among partners, and recognizes the contributions of private sector partners to

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1 the overall effort. While Federal Government funding of programs and initiatives that sup-
2 port CIKR protection makes a significant contribution to the security of the Nation, a fully
3 successful effort requires DHS; the SSAs; and State, local, and tribal governments to work
4 closely with the private sector to promote the most effective use of Federal and non-Federal
5 resources.
6 The NIPP uses the risk management framework to support coordination between CIKR
7 partners outside the Federal Government. Each step of the risk management framework
8 presents opportunities for collaboration between and among all CIKR partners.
9 Coordination between State and local agencies and the sectors themselves ensures that
10 cross-sector needs and priorities are more accurately identified and understood.
11 Government coordination with private sector owners and operators at all levels is required
12 throughout the process to ensure a unified national CIKR protection effort; provide
13 accurate, secure identification of CIKR assets and systems; provide and protect risk-related
14 information; ensure implementation of appropriate protective measures; measure program
15 effectiveness; and make required improvements.
16 These opportunities for collaboration allow private sector owners and operators to benefit
17 from CIKR protection investments in a number of ways. First, investments in CIKR
18 protection will enable risk mitigation in a broader, all-hazards context, including common
19 threats posed by malicious individuals or acts of nature, in addition to those posed by
20 terrorist organizations. Second, business continuity planning can facilitate recovery of
21 commercial activity after an incident. Finally, investing in CIKR protection within the
22 NIPP framework will help private sector owners and operators enhance protective
23 measures, and will support decisionmaking with more comprehensive risk-informed
24 information. DHS explores new opportunities to encourage such collaboration through
25 incentives (such as the SAFETY Act), which creates liability protection for sellers of
26 qualified anti-terrorism technologies), regulatory changes, and by providing more useful
27 information on risk assessment and management. While States typically are the eligible
28 applicants for DHS grant programs, certain private sector entities can apply directly for
29 grant funds through programs such as the Port Security Grant Program and the Intercity
30 Bus Security Grant Program.
31
32 More information about the NIPP is
33 available on the Internet at:
34 www.dhs.gov/nipp or by contacting DHS at:
35 nipp@dhs.gov
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

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Example: Leveraging Resources to Support Homeland Security and CIKR Protection

Activities of a Mass Transit System
The following example provides an illustration of how the various funding sources described in this
chapter can work together in a practical situation to address the CIKR protection needs of a local
system that, through implementation of the NIPP risk management framework and SSP processes,
is deemed to be critical to the Nation. This example focuses on a mass transit system in a
community that participates in the UASI program.
In this situation, the following resources may be applied to support the safety and security of the
mass transit system:
Owner/Operator Responsibilities
The local mass transit authority, as the owner and operator of the system, funds system-specific
protection and security measures, including resiliency and business continuity planning activities,
for the system on a day-to-day basis.
State, Local, and Tribal Government Responsibilities
State, local, and tribal governments support the day-to-day protection of the public; enforce
security, protective, and preventive measures around the system’s facilities; and provide response
and/or recovery capabilities should an incident occur.
Federal Support and Grant Funding
Assistance from the Federal Government through a variety of resources, including grants (both
targeted infrastructure protection grant programs and overarching homeland security grant
programs), training, technical assistance, and exercises, further support and enhance ongoing
homeland security and CIKR protection activities. In this example, DHS, as the SSA for the
Transportation sector; TSA; DOT; and the USCG may contribute to the protection efforts through
either appropriated program funds or grants. Based on eligibility, a range of grants may support
the overall protection of this system, including:
If the mass transit system is eligible for targeted infrastructure protection program funding,
such as the Transit Security Grant Program, this funding source may be leveraged to support
security enhancements for the mass transit system.
If the mass transit system is eligible under the BZPP, this funding source may also be leveraged
to improve security around the system or enhance preparedness capabilities within the
surrounding community.
Homeland Security grant program funding from programs such as the SHSP, UASI, and Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program may be leveraged to enhance prevention,
protection, response, and recovery capabilities in and around the mass transit system if the
system is deemed critical by the State and/or local authorities within their homeland security
strategies and priorities, and in accordance with allowable cost guidance.
The Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program may be leveraged to support preparedness
capabilities of the local fire department that are necessary to protect the system within the city.
Federal Transit Administration grant programs to support metropolitan and State planning
may be leveraged to provide planning for upgrades to the system, which include more resilient
CIKR design, and the major capital investments and special flexible-funding grant programs
may be leveraged to help build these improvements.
All of these resources, used in support of the region’s mass transit system, are coordinated with
State and urban area homeland security strategies, as well as the applicable Regional Transit
Security Strategy. Additionally, other services, training, exercises, and/or technical assistance (for
example, the DHS/GPD Mass Transit Technical Assistance Program, which includes a facilitated
1 risk assessment) may be leveraged from a variety of Federal partners.

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1 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

2 BZPP Buffer Zone Protection Program
3 C/ACAMS Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System
4 CAEIAE Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education
5 CEO Chief Executive Officer
6 CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
7 CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
8 CFR Code of Federal Regulations
9 CII Critical Infrastructure Information
10 CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
11 CIPAC Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
12 COG Continuity of Government
13 COI Community of Interest
14 COOP Continuity of Operations
15 COP Common Operating Picture
16 CSIA IWG Cyber Security and Information Assurance Interagency Working Group
17 CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Teams
18 CWIN Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network
19 DHS Department of Homeland Security
20 DOD Department of Defense
21 DOE Department of Energy
22 DOJ Department of Justice
23 DOT Department of Transportation
24 ECTF Electronic Crimes Task Force
25 E.O. Executive Order
26 EOP Executive Office of the President
27 FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act
28 FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
29 FCC Federal Communications Commission
30 FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
31 FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
32 FOIA Freedom of Information Act
33 FOUO For Official Use Only
34 FSLC Federal Senior Leadership Council
35 GCC Government Coordinating Council

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1 GFIRST Government Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams

2 GPD FEMA/Grant Programs Directorate (Division of DHS Preparedness Directorate)
3 GPS Global Positioning System
4 GSA General Services Administration
5 HHS Department of Health and Human Services
6 HITRAC Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center
7 HMGP Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
8 HSAC Homeland Security Advisory Council
9 HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System
10 HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
11 HSIN Homeland Security Information Network
12 HSIN-CS Homeland Security Information Network for Critical Sectors
13 HSIP Homeland Security Infrastructure Program
14 HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center
15 HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive
16 iCAV Integrated Common Analytical Viewer
17 IDW Infrastructure Data Warehouse
18 IED Improvised Explosive Device
19 IICD Infrastructure Information Collection Division
20 IICP Infrastructure Information Collection Program
21 IICS Infrastructure Information Collection System
22 IICV Infrastructure Information Collection and Visualization
23 IDM Infrastructure Data Management
24 IP Office of Infrastructure Protection (Division of DHS National Protection and Programs
25 Directorate)
26 ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
27 ISE Information-Sharing Environment
28 IWWN International Watch and Warning Network
29 IV Infrastructure Visualization
30 JCG Joint Contact Group
31 JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
32 LEO Law Enforcement Online
33 MIFC Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center
34 MS-ISAC Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center
35 NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
36 NCC National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications

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1 NCIP R&D National Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and Development

2 NCRCG National Cyber Response Coordination Group
3 NCS National Communications System
4 NCSA National Cyber Security Alliance
5 NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
6 NHC National Hurricane Center
7 NIAC National Infrastructure Advisory Council
8 NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
9 NICC National Infrastructure Coordinating Center
10 NIJ National Institute of Justice
11 NIMS National Incident Management System
12 NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan
13 NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
14 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
15 NJTTF National Joint Terrorism Task Force
16 NOC National Operations Center
17 NOC-HQE National Operations Center – Headquarters Element
18 NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
19 NRCC National Response Coordination Center
20 NRF National Response Framework
21 NSA National Security Agency
22 NS/EP National Security and Emergency Preparedness
23 NSTAC National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
24 NSTC National Science and Technology Council
25 OAS Organization of American States
26 OCA Original Classification Authority
27 OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
28 OI&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis (Division of DHS Preparedness Directorate
29 OMB Office of Management and Budget
30 OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy
31 PCC Policy Coordinating Committee
32 PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
33 PCIS Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security
34 PDD Presidential Decision Directive
35 PSA Protective Security Advisor

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1 PVTSAC Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee

2 RCCC Regional Consortium Coordinating Council
3 R&D Research and Development
4 RISS Regional Information Sharing Systems
5 SAV Site Assistance Visit
6 SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
7 SCC Sector Coordinating Council
8 SHSP State Homeland Security Program
9 SLTTGCC State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council
10 SPP Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
11 SSA Sector-Specific Agency
12 SSI Sensitive Security Information
13 SSP Sector-Specific Plan
14 S&T Science and Technology Directorate of DHS
15 SVA Security Vulnerability Assessment
16 TCL Target Capabilities List
17 TSA Transportation Security Administration
18 UASI Urban Areas Security Initiative
19 UCNI Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
20 U.S. United States
21 U.S.C. United States Code
22 US-CERT United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
23 USCG United States Coast Guard
24 UTL Universal Task List
25 VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
26 VISAT Voluntary Identification Self-Assessment Tool
27 WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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1 Glossary of Key Terms

2 Many of the definitions in this Glossary are derived from language enacted in Federal laws
3 and/or included in national plans, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, USA
4 PATRIOT Act of 2001, the National Incident Management System, and the National
5 Response Plan.
6 All-Hazards. An approach for prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery
7 that addresses a full range of threats and hazards, including domestic terrorist attacks,
8 natural and manmade disasters, accidental disruptions, and other emergencies.
9 Asset. Contracts, facilities, property, electronic and non-electronic records and documents,
10 unobligated or unexpended balances of appropriations, and other funds or resources (other
11 than personnel).
12 Business Continuity. The ability of an organization to continue to function before, during, and
13 after a disaster.
14 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). Section 550 of the DHS Appropriations
15 Act of 2007 grants the Department of Homeland Security the authority to regulate chemical
16 facilities that “present high levels of security risk.” The CFATS establish a risk-informed
17 approach to screening and securing chemical facilities determined by DHS to be “high risk.”
18 CIRK Partner. Those Federal, State, regional, territorial, local, or tribal government entities,
19 private sector owners and operators and representative organizations, academic and
20 professional entities, and certain not-for-profit and private volunteer organizations that
21 share in the responsibility for protecting the Nation’s CIKR.
22 Consequence. The result of a terrorist attack or other hazard that reflects the level, duration,
23 and nature of the loss resulting from the incident. For the purposes of the NIPP,
24 consequences are divided into four main categories: public health and safety, economic,
25 psychological, and governance impacts.
26 Control Systems. Computer-based systems used within many infrastructure and industries
27 to monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. These systems typically
28 collect measurement and operational data from the field, process and display the
29 information, and relay control commands to local or remote equipment or human-machine
30 interfaces (operators). Examples of types of control systems include SCADA systems,
31 Process Control Systems, and Digital Control Systems.
32 Critical Infrastructure. Assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to
33 the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such assets, systems, or networks
34 would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, public health or
35 safety, or any combination of those matters.
36 Critical Infrastructure Information (CII). Information that is not customarily in the public
37 domain and is related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems. CII
38 consists of records and information concerning any of the following:
39 Actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of, or
40 incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected systems by either physical or
41 computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including the misuse of or
42 unauthorized access to all types of communications and data transmission systems) that

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1 violates Federal, State, or local law, harms interstate commerce of the United States, or
2 threatens public health or safety.
3 The ability of any critical infrastructure or protected system to resist such interference,
4 compromise, or incapacitation, including any planned or past assessment, projection, or
5 estimate of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or a protected system, including
6 security testing, risk evaluation thereto, risk management planning, or risk audit.
7 Any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical infrastructure or
8 protected systems, including repair, recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity,
9 to the extent it is related to such interference, compromise, or incapacitation.
10 Cybersecurity. The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of, and, if
11 needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems and the
12 information contained therein to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Includes
13 protection and restoration, when needed, of information networks and wireline, wireless,
14 satellite, public safety answering points, and 911 communications systems and control
15 systems.
16 Dependency. The one-directional reliance of an asset, system, network, or collection thereof,
17 within or across sectors, on input, interaction, or other requirement from other sources in
18 order to function properly.
19 Function. In the context of the NIPP, function is defined as the service, process, capability,
20 or operation performed by specific infrastructure assets, systems, or networks.
21 Government Coordinating Council. The government counterpart to the SCC for each sector
22 established to enable interagency coordination. The GCC is comprised of representatives
23 across various levels of government (Federal, State, territorial, local, and tribal) as
24 appropriate to the security and operational landscape of each individual sector.
25 Hazard. Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an
26 unwanted outcome.
27 HSPD-19. This directive establishes a national policy, and calls for the development of a
28 national strategy and implementation plan, on the prevention and detection of, protection
29 against, and response to terrorist use of explosives in the US.
30 Incident. An occurrence or event, natural or human-caused, that requires an emergency
31 response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters,
32 emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous
33 materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes,
34 tropical storms, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other
35 occurrences requiring an emergency response.
36 Infrastructure. The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising
37 identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution
38 capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and
39 economic security of the United States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels,
40 and society as a whole. Consistent with the definition in the Homeland Security Act,
41 infrastructure includes physical, cyber, and/or human elements.
42 Interdependency. The multi- or bi-directional reliance of an asset, system, network, or
43 collection thereof, within or across sectors, on input, interaction, or other requirement from
44 other sources in order to function properly.

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1 Key Resources. As defined in the Homeland Security Act, “key resources” are publicly or
2 privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and
3 government.
4 Mitigation. Activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to
5 lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident. Mitigation measures
6 may be implemented prior to, during, or after an incident. Mitigation measures are often
7 developed in accordance with lessons learned from prior incidents. Mitigation involves
8 ongoing actions to reduce exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards.
9 Measures may include zoning and building codes, floodplain buyouts, and analysis of
10 hazard-related data to determine where it is safe to build or locate temporary facilities.
11 Mitigation can include efforts to educate governments, businesses, and the public on
12 measures they can take to reduce loss and injury.
13 Network. In the context of the NIPP, a group of assets or systems that share information or
14 interact with each other in order to provide infrastructure services within or across sectors.
15 Normalize. In the context of the NIPP, the process of transforming risk-related data into
16 comparable units.
17 Owners/Operators. Those entities responsible for day-to-day operation and investment in a
18 particular asset or system.
19 Preparedness. The range of deliberate critical tasks and activities necessary to build,
20 sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
21 recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at
22 all levels of government and between government and private sector and nongovernmental
23 organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required activities
24 and resources to mitigate risk.
25 Prevention. Actions taken to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from
26 occurring. Prevention involves actions taken to protect lives and property. Involves
27 applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such
28 countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance
29 and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the
30 threat; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; public health and agricultural surveillance
31 and testing processes; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at
32 deterring, preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending
33 potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice.
34 Prioritization. In the context of the NIPP, prioritization is the process of using risk
35 assessment results to identify where risk-reduction or mitigation efforts are most needed
36 and subsequently determine which protective actions should be instituted in order to have
37 the greatest effect.
38 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII). PCII refers to all critical infrastructure
39 information, including categorical inclusion PCII, that has undergone the validation process
40 and that the PCII Program Office has determined qualifies for protection under the CII Act.
41 All information submitted to the PCII Program Office or Designee with an express
42 statement is presumed to be PCII until the PCII Program Office determines otherwise.
43

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1 Protection. Actions to mitigate the overall risk to CIKR assets, systems, networks, or their
2 interconnecting links resulting from exposure, injury, destruction, incapacitation, or
3 exploitation. In the context of the NIPP, protection includes actions to deter the threat,
4 mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize consequences associated with a terrorist attack or
5 other incident. Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as hardening
6 facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into initial
7 facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems,
8 promoting workforce surety, and implementing cybersecurity measures, among various
9 others.
10 Protective Security Advisor (PSA) Program. DHS CIKR protection and vulnerability
11 assessment specialists are assigned as liaisons between DHS and the protective community
12 at the State, local, and private sector levels in geographical areas representing major
13 concentrations of CIKR across the United States. PSAs are responsible for sharing risk
14 information and providing technical assistance to local law enforcement and owners and
15 operators of CIKR within their respective areas of responsibility.
16 Recovery. The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration
17 plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and
18 services through individual, private sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance
19 programs that identify needs and define resources; provide housing and promote
20 restoration; address long-term care and treatment of affected persons; implement
21 additional measures for community restoration; incorporate mitigation measures and
22 techniques, as feasible; evaluate the incident to identify lessons learned; and develop
23 initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.
24 Resiliency. In the context of the NIPP, resiliency is the capability of an asset, system, or
25 network to maintain its function during or to recover from a terrorist attack or other
26 incident.
27 Response. Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident, including
28 immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs.
29 Response also includes the execution of emergency operations plans and incident mitigation
30 activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other
31 unfavorable outcomes. As indicated by the situation, response activities include applying
32 intelligence and other information to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident;
33 increased security operations; continuing investigations into the nature and source of the
34 threat; ongoing surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine;
35 and specific law enforcement operations aimed at preempting, interdicting, or disrupting
36 illegal activity, and apprehending actual perpetrators and bringing them to justice.
37 Risk. A measure of potential harm that encompasses threat, vulnerability, and consequence.
38 In the context of the NIPP, risk is the expected magnitude of loss due to a terrorist attack,
39 natural disaster, or other incident, along with the likelihood of such an event occurring and
40 causing that loss.
41 Risk Management Framework. A planning methodology that outlines the process for setting
42 security goals; identifying assets, systems, networks, and functions; assessing risks; pri-
43 oritizing and implementing protective programs; measuring performance; and taking
44 corrective action. Public and private sector entities often include risk management
45 frameworks in their business continuity plans.

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1 Sector. A logical collection of assets, systems, or networks that provide a common function to
2 the economy, government, or society. The NIPP addresses 18 CIKR sectors, as identified by
3 the criteria set forth in HSPD-7.
4 Sector Coordinating Council. The private sector counterpart to the GCCs, these councils are
5 self-organized, self-run, and self-governed organizations that are representative of a
6 spectrum of key stakeholders within a sector. SCCs serve as the government’s principal
7 point of entry into each sector for developing and coordinating a wide range of CIKR
8 protection activities and issues.
9 Sector Partnership Model. The framework used to promote and facilitate sector and cross-
10 sector planning, coordination, collaboration, and information sharing for CIKR protection
11 involving all levels of government and private sector entities.
12 Sector-Specific Agency. Federal departments and agencies identified in HSPD-7 as
13 responsible for CIKR protection activities in specified CIKR sectors.
14 Sector-Specific Plan. Augmenting plans that complement and extend the NIPP Base Plan and
15 detail the application of the NIPP framework specific to each CIKR sector. SSPs are
16 developed by the SSAs in close collaboration with other sector partners.
17 Steady-State. In the context of the NIPP, steady-state is the posture for routine, normal, day-
18 to-day operations as contrasted with temporary periods of heightened alert or real-time
19 response to threats or incidents.
20 System. In the context of the NIPP, a system is a collection of assets, resources, or elements
21 that performs a process that provides infrastructure services to the Nation.
22 Terrorism. Any activity that: (1) involves an act that is (a) dangerous to human life or
23 potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources, and (b) a violation of the
24 criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States;
25 and (2) appears to be intended to (a) intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (b) influence
26 the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (c) affect the conduct of a
27 government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.
28 Threat. The intention and capability of an adversary to undertake actions that would be
29 detrimental to CIKR.
30 Value Proposition. A statement that outlines the national and homeland security interest in
31 protecting the Nation’s CIKR and articulates benefits gained by all CIKR partners through
32 the risk management framework and public-private partnership described in the NIPP.
33 Vulnerability. A weakness in the design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system, or
34 network that can be exploited by an adversary, or disrupted by a natural hazard or
35 technological failure.
36 Weapons of Mass Destruction. (1) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (i) bomb, (ii)
37 grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces, (iv) missile having
38 an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, or (v) mine or (vi) similar
39 device; (2) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
40 through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their
41 precursors; (3) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is designed
42 to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life (18 U.S.C. 2332a).

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1 Appendix 1: Special Considerations

2 Appendix 1A: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity
3 This appendix provides additional details on the processes, procedures, and mechanisms
4 needed to achieve NIPP goals and supporting objectives regarding cybersecurity. It specifies
5 cybersecurity roles and responsibilities, coordination processes, initiatives to mitigate risk,
6 and milestones and metrics to measure progress.
7 This appendix provides information concerning the users of cyber infrastructure, including
8 the various CIKR sectors and their associated partners. Matters concerning producers and
9 providers of cyber infrastructure (i.e., the Information Technology and Communications
10 sectors) are addressed in the SSPs. This appendix is organized to align with the
11 corresponding chapters of the NIPP to provide the reader with the context for the
12 additional information as follows:
13 1A.1 Introduction
14 1A.2 Responsibilities
15 1A.3 Managing Cyber Risk
16 1A.4 Ensuring Long-Term Cybersecurity
17 1A.1 Introduction
18 The U.S. economy and national security are highly dependent upon cyber infrastructure.
19 Cyber infrastructure enables the Nation’s essential services, resulting in a highly
20 interconnected and interdependent network of CIKR. This network provides services
21 supporting business processes and financial markets, and also assists in the control of
22 many critical processes, including the electric power grid and chemical processing plants,
23 among various others.
24 A spectrum of malicious actors can and do conduct attacks against critical cyber
25 infrastructure on an ongoing basis. Of primary concern is the risk of organized cyber
26 attacks capable of causing debilitating disruption to the Nation’s CIKR, economy, or
27 national security. Furthermore, while terrorist groups have not yet initiated a major attack
28 against the Internet, there is potential of their using it as a means of attack or for other
29 purposes that support terrorist activities.
30 DHS and the SSAs are committed to working collaboratively with other public, private,
31 academic, and international entities to enhance cybersecurity awareness and preparedness
32 efforts, and ensure that the cyber elements of CIKR are:
33 Robust enough to withstand attacks without incurring catastrophic damage;
34 Responsive enough to recover from attacks in a timely manner; and
35 Resilient enough to sustain nationally critical operations.
36 1A.1.1 Value Proposition for Cybersecurity
37 The value proposition for cybersecurity aligns with that for CIKR protection in general, as
38 discussed in chapter 1 of the NIPP Base Plan, but with a concentrated focus on cyber
39 infrastructure. Many CIKR functions and services are enabled through cyber systems and

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1 services; if cybersecurity is not appropriately addressed, the risk to CIKR is increased. The
2 responsibility for cybersecurity spans all CIKR partners, including public and private sector
3 entities. The NIPP provides a coordinated and collaborative approach to help public and
4 private sector partners understand and manage cyber risk.
5 The NIPP promotes cybersecurity by facilitating participation and partnership in CIKR
6 protection initiatives, leveraging cyber-specific expertise and experience, and improving
7 information exchange and awareness of cybersecurity concerns. It also provides a
8 framework for public and private sector partner efforts to recognize and address
9 similarities and differences between approaches to cyber risk management for business
10 continuity and national security. This framework enables CIKR partners to work
11 collaboratively to make informed cyber risk management decisions, define national cyber
12 priorities, and address cybersecurity as part of an overall national CIKR protection
13 strategy.
14 1A.1.2 Definitions
15 The following definitions explain key terms and concepts related to the cyber dimension of
16 CIKR protection:
17 Cyber infrastructure: Includes electronic information and communications systems and
18 services and the information contained therein. Information and communications
19 systems and services are composed of all hardware and software that process, store, and
20 communicate information, or any combination of all of these elements. Processing
21 includes the creation, access, modification, and destruction of information. Storage
22 includes paper, magnetic, electronic, and all other media types. Communications
23 includes sharing and distribution of information. For example, computer systems;
24 control systems (e.g., SCADA); networks, such as the Internet; and cyber services (e.g.,
25 managed security services) are part of cyber infrastructure:
26 ¾ Producers and providers of cyber infrastructure represent the information
27 technology industrial base, and comprise the Information Technology sector. The
28 producers and providers of cyber infrastructure play a key role in developing secure
29 and reliable products and services.
30 ¾ Consumers of cyber infrastructure must maintain its security as new vulnerabilities
31 are identified and the threat environment evolves. Individuals, whether private
32 citizens or employees with cyber systems administration responsibility, play a
33 significant role in managing the security of computer systems to ensure that they
34 are not used to enable attacks against CIKR.
35 Information Technology (IT) critical functions are sets of processes that produce,
36 provide, and maintain products and services. IT critical functions encompass the full set
37 of processes (e.g., research and development, manufacturing, distribution, upgrades,
38 and maintenance) involved in transforming supply inputs into IT products and services.
39 Cybersecurity: The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if
40 needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems and
41 services (and the information contained therein) to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and
42 availability.
43 Cross-Sector Cybersecurity: Collaborative efforts between DHS, the SSAs, and other
44 CIKR partners to improve the cybersecurity of the CIKR sectors by facilitating cyber
45 risk-mitigation activities.

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1 1A.1.3 Cyber-Specific Authorities

2 Various Federal strategies, directives, policies, and regulations provide the basis for
3 Federal actions and activities associated with implementing the cyber-specific aspects of
4 the NIPP. The three primary authorities associated with cybersecurity are the National
5 Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, HSPD-7, and the Homeland Security Act. These documents
6 are described in further detail in appendix 2A of the NIPP.
7 1A.2 Cybersecurity Responsibilities

8 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, HSPD-7, and the Homeland Security Act
9 identify the responsibilities of the various CIKR partners with a role in securing
10 cyberspace. These roles and responsibilities are described in more detail below.
11 1A.2.1 Department of Homeland Security
12 In accordance with HSPD-7, DHS is a principal focal point for the security of cyberspace.
13 DHS has specific responsibilities regarding the coordination of the efforts of CIKR partners
14 to prevent damage to, unauthorized use and exploitation of, and enable the restoration of
15 cyber infrastructure to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. These
16 responsibilities include:
17 Developing a comprehensive national plan for securing U.S. CIKR;
18 Providing crisis management in response to incidents involving cyber infrastructure;
19 Providing technical assistance to other government entities and the private sector with
20 respect to emergency recovery plans for incidents involving cyber infrastructure;
21 Coordinating with other Federal agencies to provide specific warning information and
22 advice on appropriate protective measures and countermeasures to State, local, and
23 tribal governments; the private sector; academia; and the public;
24 Conducting and funding cybersecurity R&D, in partnership with other agencies, which
25 will lead to new scientific understanding and technologies in support of homeland
26 security; and
27 Assisting SSAs in understanding and mitigating cyber risk and in developing effective
28 and appropriate protective measures.
29 Within the risk management framework described in the NIPP, DHS is also responsible for
30 the following activities:
31 Providing cyber-specific expertise and assistance in addressing the cyber elements of
32 CIKR;
33 Promoting a comprehensive national awareness program to empower businesses, the
34 workforce, and individuals to secure their own segments of cyberspace;
35 Working with CIKR partners to reduce cyber vulnerabilities and minimize the severity
36 of cyber attacks;
37 Coordinating the development and conduct of national cyber threat assessments;
38 Providing input on cyber-related issues for the National Intelligence Estimate of cyber
39 threats to the United States;
40 Facilitating cross-sector cyber analysis to understand and mitigate cyber risk;

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1 Providing guidance, review, and functional advice on the development of effective cyber-
2 protective measures; and
3 Coordinating cybersecurity programs and contingency plans, including recovery of
4 Internet functions.
5 1A.2.2 Sector-Specific Agencies
6 Recognizing that each CIKR sector possesses its own unique characteristics and operating
7 models, SSAs provide the subject matter and industry expertise through relationships with
8 the private sector to enable protection of the assets, systems, networks, and functions they
9 provide within each of the sectors. SSAs must understand and mitigate cyber risk by:
10 Identifying subject matter expertise regarding the cyber aspects of their sector;
11 Increasing awareness of how the business and operational aspects of the sector rely on
12 cyber systems and processes;
13 Determining whether approaches for CIKR inventory, risk assessment, and protective
14 measures currently address cyber assets, systems, and networks; require enhancement;
15 or require the use of alternative approaches;
16 Reviewing and modifying existing and future sector efforts to ensure that cyber
17 concerns are fully integrated into sector security strategies and protective activities;
18 Establishing mutual assistance programs for cybersecurity emergencies; and
19 Exchanging cyber-specific information with sector partners, including the international
20 community, as appropriate, to improve the Nation’s overall cybersecurity posture.
21 1A.2.3 Other Federal Departments and Agencies
22 All Federal departments and agencies must manage the security of their cyber
23 infrastructure while maintaining awareness of vulnerabilities and consequences to ensure
24 that the cyber infrastructure is not used to enable attacks against the Nation’s CIKR. A
25 number of Federal agencies have specific additional responsibilities outlined in the
26 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace:
27 The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission: Working with the sectors
28 to address barriers to mutual assistance programs for cybersecurity emergencies.
29 The Department of Justice and Other Federal Agencies:
30 ¾ Developing and implementing efforts to reduce or mitigate cyber threats by
31 acquiring more robust data on victims of cyber crime and intrusions;
32 ¾ Leading the national effort to investigate and prosecute those who conduct or
33 attempt to conduct cyber attacks;
34 ¾ Exploring means to provide sufficient investigative and forensic resources and
35 training to facilitate expeditious investigation and resolution of CIKR incidents; and
36 ¾ Identifying ways to improve cyber information sharing and investigative
37 coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement communities;
38 other agencies; and the private sector.
39 The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Intelligence Community: Ensuring a strong
40 counterintelligence posture to deter intelligence collection against the Federal
41 Government, as well as commercial and educational organizations.

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1 The Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and Law Enforcement Agencies:
2 Improving the Nation’s ability to quickly attribute the source of threats or attacks to
3 enable timely and effective response.
4 1A.2.4 State, Local, and Tribal Governments
5 State, local, and tribal governments are encouraged to implement the following cyber
6 recommendations:
7 Managing the security of their cyber infrastructure while maintaining awareness of
8 threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to ensure that it is not used to enable attacks
9 against CIKR, and ensuring that government offices manage their computer systems
10 accordingly;
12 encourage local governments and citizens to manage their cyber infrastructure
13 appropriately; and
14 Establishing cybersecurity programs, including policies, plans, procedures, recognized
15 business practices, awareness, and audits.
16 1A.2.5 Private Sector
17 The private sector is encouraged to implement the following recommendations as indicated
18 in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace:
20 vulnerabilities and consequences to ensure that it is not used to enable attacks against
21 the Nation’s CIKR;
22 Participating in sector-wide programs to share information on cybersecurity;
23 Evaluating the security of networks that affect the security of the Nation’s CIKR,
24 including:
25 ¾ Conducting audits to ensure effectiveness and the use of best practices;
26 ¾ Developing continuity plans that consider the full spectrum of necessary resources,
27 including off-site staff and equipment; and
28 ¾ Participating in industry-wide information sharing and best practices dissemination;
29 Reviewing and exercising continuity plans for cyber infrastructure and examining
30 alternatives (e.g., diversity in service providers, implementation of recognized
31 cybersecurity practices) as a way of improving resiliency and mitigating risk;
32 Identifying near-term R&D priorities that include programs for highly secure and
33 trustworthy hardware, software, and protocols; and
34 Promoting more secure out-of-the-box installation and implementation of software
35 industry products, including increasing user awareness of the security features of
36 products; ease of use for security functions; and, where feasible, promotion of industry
37 guidelines and best practices that support such efforts.
38 1A.2.6 Academia
39 Colleges and universities are encouraged to implement several recommendations as
40 indicated in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace:

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2 vulnerabilities and consequences to ensure that it is not used to enable attacks against
3 the Nation’s CIKR;
4 Establishing appropriate information-sharing mechanisms to deal with cyber attacks
5 and vulnerabilities;
6 Establishing an on-call point of contact for Internet service providers and law
7 enforcement officials in the event that the institution’s cyber assets, systems, or
8 networks are discovered to be launching cyber attacks; and
9 Establishing model guidelines empowering Chief Information Officers to manage
10 cybersecurity, develop and exchange best practices for cybersecurity, and promote model
11 user awareness programs.
12 1A.3 Managing Cyber Risk

13 Under the NIPP, risk management follows a logical process that is comprised of the
14 following fundamental activities: (1) setting security goals; (2) identifying cyber assets,
15 systems, networks, and functions; (3) assessing risk, which is based on consequences,
16 threats, and vulnerability; (4) prioritizing efforts that maximize risk mitigation; (5)
17 implementing protective programs; and (6) measuring effectiveness and improving
18 programs. Each of these activities is discussed as they pertain to the cyber dimension of
19 CIKR protection in the subsections that follow.
20 1A.3.1 Set Security Goals
21 The goals and objectives set forth in the NIPP provide the overarching direction for CIKR
22 protection. The following cybersecurity objectives support the NIPP:
23 Objective 1: Expand DHS cybersecurity leadership team, personnel, capabilities, and
24 services to public and private sector partners
25 Expanding DHS’ cybersecurity leadership and capabilities will improve the Nation’s ability
26 to prevent, protect against, detect, respond to, and reconstitute rapidly after a cyber
27 incident by enhancing information exchange and analysis, improving situational
28 awareness, and promoting collaboration and coordination among public, private, and
29 international communities.
30 Section 1.A.3.5 of this appendix describes DHS focus areas, initiatives, and programs for
31 cybersecurity that aim to improve the preparedness and resiliency of Federal networks and
32 information systems, and information sharing initiatives that foster improved collaboration
33 and coordination across public and private sectors.
34 Objective 2: Enhance federal cyber situational awareness, intrusion detection, and
35 response capabilities
36 Building and maintaining trusted relationships and enabling information exchange and
37 collaboration with public, private, academic, and international partners will raise
38 cybersecurity awareness. Raising national cybersecurity awareness, in turn, empowers
39 businesses, the workforce, and individuals to secure their own segments of cyberspace.
40 Furthermore, improving and coordinating cyber intelligence and threat detection and
41 deterrence capabilities will help identify and reduce cyber threats.

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1 Section 1A.4.1 of this appendix describes outreach and awareness initiatives to empower
2 CIKR partners at all levels of government and the private sector to secure cyberspace.
3 Additionally, Section 1A.3.5 of this appendix describes various cybersecurity initiatives and
4 programs, as well as exercise programs that promote effective collaborative response to
5 cyber attack while Section 1A.4 of this appendix describes information sharing and inter-
6 national efforts to improve collaboration and coordination.
7 Objective 3: Ensure that cybersecurity is integrated into federal, state, private sector and
8 international risk assessment, preparedness, and response efforts
9 Working with the public and private sectors to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the
10 severity of cyber attacks will help improve the security of CIKR by reducing risks to cyber
11 infrastructure, such as control systems. Section 1A.3.5 of this appendix describes protective
12 programs to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks.
13 Objective: Develop and promote the adoption of cybersecurity standards and best practices
14 by all levels of government, the private sector, the general public, and the international
15 community.
16 The adoption of cybersecurity standards and best practices strengthens the security of
17 individual systems and the security posture of interconnected infrastructures. Similarly,
18 training and education on standards and best practices are important components of
19 establishing a knowledge base focused on the security of cyberspace. To foster adequate
20 training and education to support the Nation’s cybersecurity needs, a cadre of cybersecurity
21 professionals must be developed and maintained through appropriate training and
22 education programs.
23 Section 1.A.3.5 of this appendix discusses cybersecurity standards and best practices while
24 Section 1A.4.3 of this appendix describes training and education programs designed to help
25 develop cybersecurity professionals.
26 1A.3.2 Identify Cyber Assets, Systems, Networks, and Functions
27 Cyber assets, systems, networks, and functions are examined as a key aspect of risk
28 analysis. The process for identifying cyber assets, systems, networks, and functions should
29 be repeatable, scalable, and distributable, and enable cyber interdependency analysis at
30 both the sector and national levels to facilitate risk prioritization and mitigation.
31 Cyber assets, systems, and networks represent a variety of hardware and software
32 components that perform a particular function. Examples of assets, systems, networks, and
33 functions include networking equipment, database software, security systems, operating
34 systems, local area networks, modeling and simulation, and electronic communications. The
35 following are examples of cyber systems that exist in most, if not all, sectors and should be
36 identified individually or included as a cyber element of a physical asset’s description if the
37 operation of that asset depends on them:
38 Business Systems: Cyber systems used to manage or support common business
39 processes and operations. Examples of business systems include Enterprise Resource
40 Planning, e-commerce, e-mail, and R&D systems.
41 Control Systems: Cyber systems used within many infrastructure and industries to
42 monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. Control systems
43 typically collect measurement and operational data from the field, process and display

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1 the information, and relay control commands to local or remote equipment or human-
2 machine interfaces (operators). Examples of control systems include SCADA, Process
3 Control Systems, and Distributed Control Systems.
4 Access Control Systems: Cyber systems allowing only authorized personnel and visitors
5 physical access to defined areas of a facility. Access control systems provide monitoring
6 and control of personnel passing throughout a facility by various means, including
7 electronic card readers, biometrics, and radio frequency identification.
8 The Internet is a key resource comprised of domestic and international assets within both
9 the Information Technology and Communications sectors. It is used by all sectors to
10 varying degrees. Availability of Internet service is the responsibility of both the Information
11 Technology and Communications sectors; however, the need for access to and reliance on
12 the Internet are common to all sectors.
13 DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, provides a cross-sector cyber asset
14 identification methodology that, when applied, enables a sector to identify cyber assets,
15 systems, networks, and functions that may have nationally significant consequences if
16 destroyed, incapacitated, or exploited. This methodology also characterizes the reliance of a
17 sector’s business and operational functionality on cyber assets, systems, and networks.
18 Additional documentation on this methodology will be available in the near future. If an
19 appropriate cyber asset identification methodology is already being used within the sector,
20 DHS will work with the sector to ensure alignment of that methodology with the NIPP risk
21 management framework described in chapter 3.
22 1A.3.3 Assess Risks
23 Risk assessment for cyber assets, systems, and networks is an integral part of the risk
24 management framework described in the NIPP. This framework combines consequences,
25 threats, and vulnerabilities to produce systematic, comprehensive, and defensible risk
26 assessments. DHS and the SSAs assess risk for cyber assets, systems, and networks
27 associated with other CIKR at the national and sector levels.
28 DHS and the SSAs will incorporate the results of these risk assessments into their overall
29 risk management processes to prioritize where the Nation’s limited resources for CIKR
30 protection activities should be applied.
31 Consequence Analysis: The first step in the risk assessment process involves determining
32 the consequences of destruction; incapacitation; or exploitation of an asset, system,
33 network, or the functions they provide.
34 To assess whether a given asset may be nationally consequential, physical, cyber, and
35 human asset dependencies and interdependencies need to be assessed. Cyber
36 interdependence presents a unique challenge for all sectors because of the borderless
37 nature of cyberspace. Interdependencies are dual in nature (e.g., the Energy sector relies on
38 computer-based control systems to manage the electric power grid, while those same control
39 systems require electric power to operate).
40 Modeling and simulations through the NISAC will help quantify national and international
41 dependency and interdependency, as well as their resulting consequences. However, this
42 effort is highly complex and may not be appropriate for all assessments. When such
43 advanced capability is not available or required, dependency and interdependency analyses
44 may be carried out in a more subjective manner, with the participation of subject matter

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1 experts who have operational knowledge of the sectors involved, as well as the cross-sector
2 interactions that are likely.
3 The consequences of cyber asset, system, or network destruction, incapacitation, or
4 exploitation should be measured and described using a consistent system of measurements
5 to ensure that the results can be compared across sectors. The NIPP provides essential
6 features and core elements of assessment methodologies to ensure such consistency. DHS
7 also makes consequence analysis tools and processes available for sectors to use at their
8 discretion. The NIPP essential features and DHS tools and processes require that cyber
9 assets, systems, and networks be properly accounted for in the analysis process for the
10 results to accurately reflect the consequences of cyber loss.
11 Vulnerability Assessment: The second step of
12 the risk assessment process is analysis of NCSD has developed the Cyber Security
13 vulnerability—determining which elements of Vulnerability Assessment (CSVA), a
14 infrastructure are most susceptible to attack flexible and scalable approach that
15 and how attacks against these elements would analyzes an entity’s cybersecurity
posture and describes gaps and targeted
16 most likely be carried out.
considerations that can reduce overall
17 DHS works to identify cross-sector best cyber risks. It assesses the policies,
18 practices to ensure that existing methodologies plans, and procedures in place to reduce
cyber vulnerability in 10 categories (e.g.,
19 used by SSAs and other CIKR partners address
access control, configuration
20 cyber vulnerabilities. DHS has taken a broad, management, physical security of cyber
21 inclusive approach by reviewing various assets, etc.) and leverages various
22 existing, publicly available methods across recognized standards, guidance, and
23 government, industry, and academia to methodologies (e.g., International
24 assemble a hybrid of the best practices. For Organization for Standardization 27001,
25 example, DHS not only examines vulnerability Information Systems Audit and Control
26 standards from the International Organization Association Control Objects for
27 for Standardization and NIST, but also studies Information and related Technology, and
28 vulnerability assessment methods used in the the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Special Publication 800
29 law enforcement and intelligence communities
series).
30 and the private sector. DHS works to leverage
31 established methodologies that have
32 traditionally focused on physical vulnerabilities by enhancing them to better address cyber
33 elements.
34 There are cyber vulnerabilities that all sectors should consider when conducting their
35 assessments, such as system interconnections. System interconnections (also known as
36 trusted connections) are defined as the direct connection of two or more cyber systems
37 owned by separate organizations. Business or government offices may interconnect for a
38 variety of reasons, depending on the relationship between the interconnected entities.
39 These interconnections may increase the security risk by exposing one system to
40 vulnerabilities associated with another location.
41 Threat Analysis: The third step of the risk assessment process is the analysis of threat,
42 which provides the likelihood that a target will be attacked. There are increasing indicators
43 that potential adversaries intend to conduct cyber attacks and are actively acquiring cyber
44 attack capabilities. Cyber attacks may not only target the Internet, but rather they may use
45 it as a means of attack or for other purposes that support terrorist activities. Additionally,

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1 the increasing ease with which powerful cyber attack tools can be obtained and used puts
2 the capability of conducting cyber attacks within reach of most groups or individuals who
3 wish to do harm to the United States. However, credible information on specific adversaries
4 is often not available. As such, DHS collaborates with the law enforcement and intelligence
5 communities and the private sector to more accurately portray the possible ways in which
6 the cyber threat may affect CIKR, including the exploitation of the Internet as a weapon.
7 As called for in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, DHS provides input on cyber-
8 related issues for the National Intelligence Estimate of Cyber Threats to the U.S.
9 Information Infrastructure. DHS will update its assessment on an annual basis to inform
10 the general threat scenarios used in risk assessments and provide input to the National
11 Intelligence Estimate as required.
12 The HITRAC conducts integrated threat analysis for CIKR within DHS. HITRAC brings
13 together intelligence and infrastructure specialists to ensure a complete and sophisticated
14 understanding of the risks to U.S. CIKR, including cyber infrastructure. To do this,
15 HITRAC works in partnership with the U.S. Intelligence Community and national law
16 enforcement to integrate and analyze intelligence and law enforcement information on the
17 threat. It also works in partnership with the SSAs and owners and operators to ensure that
18 their expertise on infrastructure operations is integrated into threat analysis. HITRAC
19 combines intelligence, which includes all-source information, threat assessments, and trend
20 analysis, with expert operational and practical knowledge, and an understanding of U.S.
21 CIKR to provide products for CIKR risk assessment that include actionable conclusions
22 regarding terrorist threats and risks. Additional information on HITRAC products can be
23 found in section 3.3.4 of the NIPP Base Plan.
24 1A.3.4 Prioritize
25 NIPP risk assessments provide comparable estimates of the risk faced by each CIKR
26 element and sector. This process allows key elements and sectors to be prioritized according
27 to risk, and protective programs, including those focused on improving cybersecurity, to be
28 designed that can help mitigate the highest priority risks. Those programs that offer the
29 greatest risk mitigation for the dollars spent are afforded the highest priority. Although
30 cyber-specific protective programs are frequently perceived to be costly, the costs of these
31 programs may be significantly lower than the cascading costs associated with a successful
32 cyber attack.
33 Cyber assets, systems, and networks and the functions they provide are prioritized using an
34 overall risk-informed approach. By integrating cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and
35 consequences into risk analysis and by measuring risk in comparable terms for all elements
36 and sectors, cyber assets, systems, networks, and functions are included in the
37 prioritization process in a manner that ensures that they are appropriately considered
38 along with other aspects of CIKR.
39 1A.3.5 Implement Protective Programs
40 Since each sector has a unique reliance on cyber infrastructure, DHS will assist the SSAs in
41 developing a range of effective and appropriate cyber-protective measures.
42 In addition to individual sector-level protective measures, DHS has partnered with other
43 public and private sector entities to develop and implement specific programs to help

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1 improve the security of the cyber infrastructure across sectors, as well as to support
2 national cyber risk-mitigation activities, including:
3 Government Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST): Following the
4 model of the global FIRST organization, the Federal interagency community established
5 the GFIRST to facilitate interagency information sharing and cooperation across
6 Federal agencies for readiness and response efforts. GFIRST is a group of technical and
7 tactical security response team practitioners responsible for securing government
8 information technology systems. The members work together to understand and handle
9 computer security incidents and to encourage proactive and preventive security
10 practices.
11 Cross Sector Cybersecurity Working Group (CSCSWG): The CSCSWG serves as a forum
12 to bring government and the private sector together to collaboratively address risk
13 across the CIKR sectors. This cross-sector perspective facilitates the sharing of
14 perspectives and knowledge about various cybersecurity concerns, such as common
15 vulnerabilities and protective measures, and leverages functional cyber expertise in a
16 comprehensive forum.
17 The National Cyber Response Coordination Group: The NCRCG member agencies use
18 their established relationships with the private sector and State, local, and tribal
19 governments to facilitate cyber incident management, develop courses of action, and
20 devise appropriate response and recovery strategies. NCRCG facilitates coordination of
21 the Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from cyber
22 incidents and physical attacks that have significant cyber consequences. Outlined in the
23 NRF Cyber Annex, the NCRCG serves as the Federal Government’s principal
24 interagency mechanism for operational information sharing and coordination of Federal
25 Government response and recovery efforts during a cyber crisis.
26 Programs for Federal Systems Cybersecurity: The Federal Government is continually
27 increasing capabilities to address cyber risk associated with critical networks and
28 information systems. Current measures to prevent future attacks and intrusion
29 attempts include:
30 ¾ Increasing personnel support to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
31 (US-CERT), DHS’ 24x7 watch and warning center for the Federal Government’s
32 Internet infrastructure.
33 ¾ Expanding the EINSTEIN Program to all Federal departments and agencies,
34 providing government officials with an early warning system to gain better
35 situational awareness, earlier identification of malicious activity, and a more
36 comprehensive network defense. The EINSTEIN Program helps identify unusual
37 network traffic patterns and trends which signal unauthorized network traffic so
38 security personnel are able to quickly identify and respond to potential threats.
39 ¾ Consolidating the number of external connections including Internet points of
40 presence for the Federal Government Internet infrastructure, as part of the Office of
41 Management and Budget’s (OMB) “Trusted Internet Connections Initiative,” will
42 more efficiently manage and implement security measures to help bring more
43 comprehensive protection across the federal “.gov” domains.
44 ¾ Creating a National Cybersecurity Center to further our progress in addressing
45 cyber threats and increasing cybersecurity efforts. This Center will bring together
46 federal cybersecurity organizations, by virtually connecting and in some cases,

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1 physically collocating personnel and resources to gain a clearer understanding of the

2 overall cyber security picture of Federal networks.
3 ¾ Expanding the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), to include
4 representation from the U.S. Secret Service and several other federal agencies. This
5 existing cyber investigation coordination organization overseen by the Federal
6 Bureau of Investigation will serve as a multi-agency national focal point for
7 coordinating, integrating, and sharing pertinent information related to cyber threat
8 investigations.
9 ¾ Working towards a stronger supply chain defense to reduce the potential for
10 adversaries to manipulate IT and communications products before they are imported
11 into the U.S. To address this challenge, the Federal Government is exploring
12 protections into our federal acquisition process and developing a multi-faceted
13 strategy to reduce risk at the most appropriate stage of the IT and communications
14 product lifecycle.
15 In addition to the programs listed above, DHS operates the Cyber Exercise Program in
16 coordination with the National Exercise Program. Through this program, DHS and CIKR
17 partners conduct exercises to improve coordination among members of the cyber incident
18 response community. The program includes participation from Federal, State, local, tribal,
19 and international government elements, as well as private sector corporations, coordinating
20 councils, and academic institutions. The main objectives of national cyber exercises are to
21 practice coordinated response to cyber attack scenarios; provide an environment for
22 evaluation of interagency and cross-sector processes, procedures, and tools for
23 communications and response to cyber incidents; and foster improved information sharing
24 among government agencies and between government and private industry.
25 DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR partners, has also established several vulnerability-
26 reduction programs under the NIPP risk management framework, including:
27 Critical Infrastructure Protection Cybersecurity (CIP CS) Program: The CIP CS Program
28 strengthens preparedness by partnering with the public and private sectors to improve
29 the security of the IT Sector and cybersecurity across the Nation’s critical
30 infrastructures by facilitating risk management activities that reduce cyber
31 vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks. The program includes
32 responsibilities for development and implementation of the IT SSP; for cross-sector
33 cyber support to SSAs as they maintain and implement their SSPs and reduce cyber
34 risk to their sectors; and support to the NIPP Program Management Office for
35 development of the NIPP’s cyber component, SSP development guidance and technical
36 assistance sessions, and the National CIKR Annual Report. The CIP CS Program also
37 facilitates activities and partnerships to improve the resiliency of the Internet.
38 Software Assurance Program: Public and private sector partners work together to
39 develop best practices and new technologies to promote integrity, security, and
40 reliability in software development. DHS leads the Software Assurance Program, a
41 comprehensive effort that addresses people, processes, technology, and acquisition
42 throughout the software life cycle. Focused on shifting away from the current security
43 paradigm of patch management, these efforts will encourage the production of higher
44 quality, more secure software. These efforts to promote a broader ability to routinely
45 develop and deploy trustworthy software products through public-private partnerships
46 are a significant element of securing cyberspace and the Nation’s critical infrastructure.

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1 DHS also partners with NIST in the National Information Assurance Partnership
2 (NIAP), a Federal Government initiative originated to meet the security testing needs of
3 both information technology consumers and producers. NIAP is operated by NSA to
4 address security testing, evaluation, and validation programs.
5 Control Systems Cybersecurity Program: The DHS Control Systems Cybersecurity
6 Program coordinates efforts among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as
7 well as control system owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system
8 security within and across all critical infrastructure sectors. The Control Systems
9 Cybersecurity Program coordinates activities to reduce the likelihood of success and
10 severity of impact of a cyber attack against critical infrastructure control systems
11 through risk-mitigation activities. These activities include assessing and managing
12 control system vulnerabilities, assisting the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center
13 with control system incident management, and providing control system situational
14 awareness through outreach and training initiatives.
15 The Standards and Best
Control systems, which are critical components of our Nation’s
16 Practices Program: As critical infrastructure, monitor and control sensitive processes and
17 part of its efforts to functions upon which our Nation depends (e.g., electricity
18 develop practical generation, transmission, and distribution; natural gas production
19 guidance and review and distribution; transportation systems monitoring and control;
20 tools, and promote R&D water supply and treatment; and chemical processing.
21 investment in
Control systems historically were designed with proprietary
22 cybersecurity, DHS and
solutions for specific uses in isolation, but are now frequently
23 NIST co-sponsor the being implemented with remote access and open connectivity,
24 National Vulnerability utilizing common operations systems and, thus, are potentially
25 Database. This database vulnerable to various cyber attacks. Cybersecurity practices
26 provides centralized and commonly implemented in business systems are often difficult to
27 comprehensive implement in operational control systems environments. As a
28 vulnerability mitigation result, cyber threats to control systems could potentially have
29 resources for all types of devastating impacts on national security, economic security,
30 users, including the public health and safety, as well as the environment.
31 general public, system
32 administrators, and vendors to assist with incident prevention and management
33 (including links to patches) to mitigate consequences and vulnerabilities.
34 1A.3.6 Measure Effectiveness and Improve Programs
35 The NIPP uses a metrics-based approach as a means to document performance, facilitate
36 diagnoses, promote effective management, and reassess goals. Within the NIPP metrics
37 framework, DHS works with CIKR partners to help ensure that the NIPP core measures
38 include the review, consideration, and integration of common cybersecurity policies, plans,
39 procedures, and sound business practices, as appropriate. Additionally, DHS works with
40 CIKR sectors to develop cybersecurity sector-specific metrics where applicable. Separate
41 sector-specific measures for cybersecurity may not be necessary in all cases; however, the
42 sector-specific measures should strive to consider all sector assets, including cyber assets,
43 systems, and networks when measuring performance against goals.
44 The overall purpose of measuring effectiveness using metrics is to improve cyber CIKR
45 protection by mitigating risk. This means that using metrics as descriptors is not sufficient
46 and that measured effectiveness must be compared to goals and improvements to enable
47 the addressing of priority gaps.

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1 1A.4 Ensuring Long-Term Cybersecurity

2 The effort to ensure a coherent cyber CIKR protection program over the long term has four
3 components that are described in greater detail below:
4 Information Sharing and Awareness: Ensures implementation of effective, coordinated,
5 and integrated protection of cyber assets, systems, and networks, and the functions they
6 provide, and enables cybersecurity partners to make informed decisions with regard to
7 short- and long-term cybersecurity postures, risk mitigation, and operational continuity.
8 International Cooperation: Promotes a global culture of cybersecurity and improves
9 overall cyber incident preparedness and response posture.
10 Training and Education: Ensures that skilled and knowledgeable cybersecurity
11 professionals are available to undertake NIPP programs in the future.
12 Research and Development: Improves cybersecurity protective capabilities or
13 dramatically lowers the costs of existing capabilities so that State, local, tribal, and
14 private sector partners can afford to do more with their limited budgets.
15 1A.4.1 Information Sharing and Awareness
16 Information sharing and awareness involves sharing programs with agency partners and
17 other CIKR partners, and special sharing arrangements for emergency situations. Each of
18 these is discussed below:
19 Interagency Coordination: Interagency cooperation and information sharing are essential to
20 improving national cyber counterintelligence and law enforcement capabilities. The
21 intelligence and law enforcement communities have both official and informal mechanisms
22 in place for information sharing that DHS supports:
23 FBI’s Cyber Task Forces involve more than 50 law enforcement agency cyber task forces
24 and more than 80 additional cyber working groups throughout the country,
25 collaborating with Federal, State, and local partners to maximize investigative
26 resources to ensure a timely and effective response to cybersecurity threats of both a
27 criminal and national security nature.
28 Cybercop Portal is a secure Internet-based information-sharing mechanism for more
29 than 5,300 law enforcement members involved in the field of electronic crimes
30 investigations. The law enforcement community, including investigators from private
31 industry (e.g., banks and the network security community), is tied together and
32 supported by this secure, Internet-based collaboration portal.
33 FBI’s InfraGard program is a public-private partnership coordinated out of the 56 FBI
34 field offices nationwide. The program brings together law enforcement, academia, and
35 private sector entities on a monthly basis to provide a forum for information sharing
36 and networking.
37 FBI’s Inter-Agency Coordination Cell is a multi-agency group focused on sharing law
38 enforcement information on cyber-related investigations.
39 U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces provide interagency coordination on
40 cyber-based attacks and intrusions.
41 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers: Underscoring effective cybersecurity efforts is
42 the importance of information sharing between and among industry and government. To
43 this end, the Information Technology and Communications ISACs work closely together

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1 and with DHS and the SSAs to maximize resources, coordinate preparedness and response
2 efforts, and maintain situational awareness to enable risk mitigation regarding cyber
3 infrastructure.
4 Cybersecurity Awareness for CIKR Partners: DHS plays an important leadership role in
5 coordinating a public-private partnership to promote and raise cybersecurity awareness
6 among the general public by:
7 Partnering with other Federal and private sector organizations to sponsor the National
8 Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), including creating a public-private organization, Stay
9 Safe Online, to educate home users, small businesses, and K-12 and higher education
10 audiences on cybersecurity best practices.
11 Engaging with the MS-ISAC to help enhance the Nation’s cybersecurity readiness and
12 response at the State and local levels, and launching a national cybersecurity awareness
13 effort in partnership with the MS-ISAC. The MS-ISAC is an information-sharing
14 organization, with representatives of State and local governments, that analyzes,
15 sanitizes, and disseminates information pertaining to cyber events and vulnerabilities
16 to its constituents and private industry.
17 Collaborating with the NCSA, the MS-ISAC, and the public and private sector to
18 establish October as National Cyber Security Awareness Month and participating in
19 activities to continuously raise cybersecurity awareness nationwide.
20 Cyberspace Emergency Readiness: DHS established the US-CERT, which is a 24/7 single
21 point of contact for cyberspace analysis and warning, information sharing, and incident
22 response and recovery for a broad range of users, including government, enterprises, small
23 businesses, and home users. US-CERT is a partnership between DHS and the public and
24 private sectors designed to help secure the Nation’s Internet infrastructure and to
25 coordinate defenses against and responses to cyber attacks across the Nation. US-CERT is
26 responsible for:
27 Analyzing and reducing cyber threats and vulnerabilities;
28 Disseminating cyber threat warning information; and
29 Coordinating cyber incident response activities.
30 To support the information-sharing requirements of the network approach, US-CERT
31 provides the following information on their Web site, accessible through the HSIN, and
32 through mailing lists:
33 Cybersecurity Alerts: Written in a language for home, corporate, and new users, these
34 alerts are published in conjunction with technical alerts in the context of security issues
35 that affect the general public.
36 Cybersecurity Bulletins: Bulletins summarize information that has been published
37 regarding emergent security issues and vulnerabilities. They are published weekly and
38 are written primarily for systems administrators and other technical users.
39 Cybersecurity Tips: Tips provide information and advice on a variety of common
40 cybersecurity topics. They are published biweekly and are written primarily for home,
41 corporate, and new users.
42 National Web Cast Initiative: In an effort to increase cybersecurity awareness and
43 education among the States, DHS, through US-CERT, and the MS-ISAC have launched
44 a joint partnership to develop a series of national Web casts that will examine critical

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1 and timely cybersecurity issues. The purpose of the initiative is to strengthen the
2 Nation’s cyber readiness and resilience.
3 Technical Cybersecurity Alerts: Written for systems administrators and experienced
4 users, technical alerts provide timely information on current cybersecurity issues,
5 vulnerabilities, and exploits.
6 US-CERT also provides a method for citizens, businesses, and other institutions to
7 communicate and coordinate directly with the Federal Government on matters of
8 cybersecurity. The private sector can use the protections afforded by the Protected Critical
9 Infrastructure Information Act to electronically submit proprietary data to US-CERT.
10 1A.4.2 International Coordination on Cybersecurity
11 The Federal Government proactively uses its intelligence capabilities to protect the country
12 from cyber attack, its diplomatic outreach and operational capabilities to build partnerships
13 in the global community, and its law enforcement capabilities to combat cyber crime
14 wherever it originates. The private sector, international industry associations, and
15 companies with global interests and operations are also engaged in addressing
16 cybersecurity internationally. For example, the U.S.-based Information Technology
17 Association of America participates in international cybersecurity conferences and forums,
18 such as the India-based National Association for Software and Service Companies Joint
19 Conference. These efforts involve interaction with both the policy and operational
20 communities to coordinate national and international activities that are mutually
21 supportive across the globe:
22 International Cybersecurity Outreach: DHS, in conjunction with the Department of
23 State and other Federal agencies, engages in multilateral and bilateral discussions to
24 further international security awareness and policy development, as well as incident
25 response team information-sharing and capacity-building objectives. The United States
26 engages in bilateral discussions on important cybersecurity issues with close allies and
27 others with whom the United States shares networked interdependencies, to include,
28 but not limited to: Australia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan,
29 the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom, etc. The United States also provides
30 leadership in multilateral and regional forums addressing cybersecurity and CIKR
31 protection to encourage all nations to take systematic steps to secure their networked
32 systems. For example, U.S. initiatives include: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
33 Telecommunications Working Group capacity-building program to help member
34 countries develop CSIRTs, and the OAS framework proposal to create a regional
35 computer incident response points-of-contact network for information sharing and to
36 help member countries develop CSIRTs. Other U.S. efforts to build a culture of
37 cybersecurity include participation in OECD, G8, and United Nations activities. The
38 U.S. private sector is actively involved in this international outreach in partnership
39 with the Federal Government.
40 Collaboration on Cyber Crime: The U.S. outreach strategy for comprehensive cyber laws
41 and procedures draws on the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime, as well as:
42 (1) the G8 High-Tech Crime Working Group’s principles for fighting cyber crime and
43 protecting critical information infrastructure, (2) the OECD guidelines on information
44 and network security, and (3) the United Nations General Assembly resolutions based
45 on the G8 and OECD efforts. The goal of this outreach strategy is to encourage

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1 individual nations and regional groupings of nations to join DHS in efforts to protect
2 internationally interconnected national systems.
3 Collaborative Efforts for Cyber Watch, Warning, and Incident Response: The Federal
4 Government is working strategically with key allies on cybersecurity policy and
5 operational cooperation. For example, DHS is leveraging pre-existing relationships
6 among CSIRTs. DHS also has established a preliminary framework for cooperation on
7 cybersecurity policy, watch, warning, and incident response with key allies. The
8 framework also incorporates efforts related to key strategic issues as agreed upon by
9 these allies. An IWWN is being established among cybersecurity policy, computer
10 emergency response, and law enforcement participants representing 15 countries. The
11 IWWN will provide a mechanism for the participating countries to share information to
12 build global cyber situational awareness and coordinate incident response.
13 Partnerships to Address Cyber Aspects of Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS and
14 the SSAs are leveraging existing agreements, such as the SPP and the JCG with the
15 United Kingdom, to address the Information Technology sector and cross-cutting cyber
16 components of CIKR protection. The trilateral SPP builds on existing bilateral
17 agreements between the United States and Canada and the United States and Mexico
18 by allowing issues to be addressed on a dual bi-national basis. In the context of the JCG,
19 DHS established a 10-point action plan to address cybersecurity, watch, warning, and
20 incident response and other strategic initiatives.
21 1A.4.3 Training and Education
22 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace highlights the importance of cyberspace
23 security training and education. Education and training are strategic initiatives in which
24 DHS and other Federal agencies are actively engaged to affect a greater awareness and
25 participation in efforts to promote cybersecurity for the future.
26 The Federal Government has undertaken several initiatives in partnership with the
27 research and academic communities to better educate and train future cybersecurity
28 practitioners:
29 DHS developed the IT Security Essential Body of Knowledge (EBK): A Competency and
30 Functional Framework for IT Security Workforce Development. The EBK is provides a
31 national baseline representing the essential knowledge and skills that IT security
32 practitioners should have to perform specific roles and responsibilities.
33 DHS co-sponsors the National CAEIAE program with NSA. Together, DHS and NSA
34 are working to expand the program nationally.
35 DHS collaborates with the National Science Foundation to co-sponsor and expand the
36 Cyber Corps Scholarship for Service program. The Scholarship for Service program
37 provides grant money to selected CAEIAE and other universities with programs of a
38 similar caliber to fund the final 2 years of bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral study in
39 information assurance in exchange for an equal amount of time spent working for the
40 Federal Government.
41 In fiscal year 2004, the joint DHS/Treasury Computer Investigative Specialist program
42 trained 48 Federal criminal investigators in basic computer forensics. Agents from ICE,
43 the Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Secret Service attended the basic 6½-week
44 course. This training was funded through the Treasury Executive Office of Asset
45 Forfeiture.

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1 DHS is collaborating with DOD to finalize a comprehensive information technology job

2 skills standard to guide development of a national certification program for security
3 professionals within the Federal Government and private industry.
4 Through DHS, DOJ, DOD, and the Department of State, the Federal Government
5 provides cyber-related training to foreign cyber incident responders (incident response
6 management, creation of CSIRTs) and law enforcement personnel and jurists (laws,
7 computer forensics, case handling).
8 1A.4.4 Research and Development
9 The Cyber Security Research and Development Act of 2002 authorized a multi-year effort to
10 create more secure cyber technologies, expand cybersecurity R&D, and improve the
11 cybersecurity workforce.
12 To further address cyber R&D needs, the White House’s OSTP established a CSIA IWG
13 under the NSTC. The CSIA IWG was jointly chartered by NSTC’s Subcommittee on
14 Networking and Information Technology R&D and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure.
15 This interagency working group includes participation from 20 organizations representing
16 11 departments and agencies, as well as from several offices in the White House.
17 The purpose of the working group is to coordinate Federal programs for cybersecurity and
18 information assurance R&D. It also is responsible for developing the Federal Plan for Cyber
19 Security and Information Assurance R&D, which includes near-term, mid-term, and long-
20 term cybersecurity research efforts in response to the National Strategy to Secure
21 Cyberspace and HSPD-7. The document includes descriptions of approximately 50
22 cybersecurity R&D topics, such as Automated Attack Detection, Warning, and Response;
23 Forensics, Traceback, and Attribution; Security Technology and Policy Management
24 Methods; Policy Specification Languages; and Integrated, Enterprise-Wide Security
25 Monitoring and Management. The document also identifies the top cybersecurity and
26 information assurance research topics across the Federal Government. Finally, the
27 document includes key findings and recommendations. DHS actively co-chairs the CSIA
28 IWG with OSTP and continues to identify critical cyber R&D requirements for
29 incorporation into Federal R&D planning efforts.
30 1A.4.5 Exploring Private Sector Incentives
31 Awareness and understanding of the need for cybersecurity present a challenge for both
32 government and industry. Although cybersecurity requires significant investments in time
33 and resources, an effective cybersecurity program may reduce the likelihood of a successful
34 cyber attack or the impact if a cyber attack occurs. Network disruptions resulting from
35 cyber attacks can lead to loss of money, time, products, reputation, sensitive information, or
36 even potential loss of life through cascading effects on critical systems and infrastructure.
37 From an economic perspective, cyber attacks have resulted in billions of dollars of business
38 losses and damages in the aggregate.
39 The private sector makes risk management decisions, including those for cybersecurity,
40 based on return on investment and ensuring business continuity. Market-based incentives
41 for cybersecurity investments include protection of intellectual capital, security-influenced
42 procurement, market differentiation, and public confidence. Sometimes, however, cyber
43 assets, systems, networks, or functions may be deemed nationally critical and necessitate
44 additional risk management beyond that which the private sector implements as part of
45 their corporate responsibility. To address this difference, DHS is collaborating with the

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1 public and private sectors through various programs and outreach efforts (e.g., US-CERT,
2 the Control Systems Cybersecurity Program, and the Software Assurance Program) to
3 promote awareness of cybersecurity risks, and create incentives for increased investment in
4 cybersecurity.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

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1 Appendix 1B: International CIKR

2 Protection
3 1B.1 Introduction and Purpose of This Appendix
4 This appendix provides guidance for addressing the international aspects of CIKR
5 protection in support of the NIPP.
6 1B.1.1 Scope
7 The NIPP provides the mechanisms, processes, key initiatives, and milestones necessary to
8 enable DHS, the Department of State (DOS), the SSAs, and other partners to address
9 international implications and requirements related to CIKR protection. The NIPP and
10 associated SSPs recognize protective measures do not stop at a facility’s fence line or a
11 national border. Because disruptions in the global infrastructure can ripple and cascade
12 around the world, the NIPP and the SSPs also consider cross-border CIKR, international
13 vulnerabilities, and global dependencies and interdependencies.
14 1B.1.2 Vision
15 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets
16 identifies “fostering international cooperation” as one of the eight guiding principles of its
17 vision for the future. The strategy underscores the need for a coordinated, comprehensive,
18 and aggressive global action as a key aspect of the NIPP approach to CIKR protection.
19 Furthermore, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace sets forth strategic objectives for
20 national security and international cyberspace security cooperation that deal directly with
21 the international aspects of CIKR protection, including preventing cyber attacks against
22 America’s critical infrastructure, reducing vulnerabilities, and minimizing damage and
23 recovery time from cyber attacks and incidents that do occur.
24 1B.1.3 Implementing the Vision With a Strategy for Effective Cooperation
25 The NIPP CIKR international coordination and protection strategy outlined in this
26 appendix is focused on establishing effective cooperation with international partners,
27 rather than on discussing specific protective measures. Specific protective measures are
28 tailored to each sector’s particular circumstance and are developed in the SSPs. This
29 appendix also focuses on implementing existing agreements that affect CIKR protection
30 and addressing cross-sector and global issues such as cybersecurity.
31 DOS, DHS, and the SSAs periodically review the international CIKR protection strategy
32 and redraft it, as needed, to ensure it complements and supports specific objectives detailed
33 in the NIPP.
34 On an ongoing basis, DHS, DOS, and other concerned Federal departments and agencies
35 ensure the international CIKR coordination and protection strategy found in the NIPP is
36 incorporated into their strategies for cooperating with other countries and
37 international/multinational organizations. This effort focuses on promoting a global culture
38 of physical and cybersecurity, managing CIKR-related risk as far as possible outside the
39 physical borders of the United States; accelerating international cooperation to develop
40 intellectual infrastructure based on shared assumptions and compatible conceptual tools;

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1 and connecting constituencies not traditionally engaged in security. The broad structure of
2 this approach is outlined in this appendix; it is based on the following high-level
3 considerations.
4 1B.2 Responsibilities for International Cooperation on CIKR

5 Protection
6 In accordance with HSPD-7, DOS, in conjunction with DHS, DOJ, DOD, the Departments
7 of Commerce and Treasury, the NRC, and other appropriate departments and agencies, is
8 responsible for working with foreign countries and international/multinational
9 organizations to strengthen the protection of U.S. CIKR. This section provides further
10 details regarding the responsibilities related to the international dimension of CIKR
11 protection.
12 1B.2.1 Department of Homeland Security
13 Under the CIKR risk management framework described in this plan, DHS, in collaboration
14 with other CIKR partners, is responsible for the following actions, all of which have an
15 international dimension:
16 Building partnerships;
17 Implementing a comprehensive, integrated risk management program; and
18 Implementing protective programs.
19 DHS, in conjunction with DOS and in cooperation with other Federal departments/agencies
20 with foreign affairs components, share with international entities appropriate information
21 and perform outreach functions to enhance information sharing and management of
22 international agreements regarding CIKR protection.
23 Some of the more complex challenges presented by the international aspects of CIKR
24 protection involve analyzing the complex dependencies, interdependencies, and
25 vulnerabilities that require the application of sophisticated and innovative modeling
26 techniques. DHS is responsible for pursuing research and analysis in this area. It will call
27 on a range of outside sources for this work, including those with expertise in the
28 international community and the NISAC.
29 1B.2.2 Department of State
30 The Secretary of State has direct responsibility for policies and activities related to the
31 protection of U.S. citizens and U.S. facilities abroad. The Secretary of State, in conjunction
32 with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is responsible for coordinating with foreign
33 countries and international organizations to strengthen the protection of U.S. CIKR. DOS
34 supports DHS and other Federal department/agency efforts by providing knowledge about
35 and access to foreign governments. DOS leverages bilateral and multilateral relationships
36 around the world to ensure that the Federal Government can act effectively to identify and
37 protect U.S. CIKR.
38 DOS, DHS, and other Federal departments/agencies are engaged in a wide range of
39 activities throughout the world to prevent, disrupt, and deter threats and acts of terrorism
40 directed against the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. The objectives of these efforts are
41 to develop and work with global partners to ensure mutual security and to raise awareness
42 of the terrorist threat.

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1 1B.2.3 Other Federal Departments and Agencies

2 SSAs exchange information, as appropriate, including cyber-specific information, with
3 CIKR partners in other countries, per guidelines established by DHS and DOS and other
4 Federal departments/agencies to improve the Nation’s overall CIKR protection posture.
5 DOC, Treasury, DOJ, DOD, DOE, DOT, and other Federal departments/agencies share
6 responsibility, per HSPD-7, for working through DOS to reach out to foreign countries and
7 international organizations to strengthen the protection of U.S. CIKR.
8 1B.2.4 State, Local, and Tribal Governments
9 State, territorial, local, and tribal governments ensure ongoing cooperation with relevant
10 regional, State, local, and private sector CIKR protection efforts.
11 1B.2.5 Private Sector
12 DHS is working with the private sector, SSAs, private voluntary and nongovernmental
13 organizations, and information-sharing mechanisms and organizations to protect cross-
14 border infrastructure and understand international and global vulnerabilities. DHS relies
15 on the private sector for data, expertise, and knowledge of their international operations to
16 identify relevant international assets, systems, and networks, and assess risks and global
17 vulnerabilities, including shared threats and interdependencies.
18 1B.2.6 Academia
19 The academic community provides data, insight, and research into the significance of
20 international interdependencies, modeling, and analysis.
21 1B.3 Managing the International Dimension of CIKR Risk

22 The NIPP addresses international CIKR protection, including interdependencies and the
23 vulnerability to threats that originate outside the country. The NIPP brings a new focus to
24 international security cooperation and provides a risk-informed strategic framework for
25 measuring the effectiveness of international CIKR protection activities. The NIPP also
26 provides tools to assess international vulnerabilities and interdependencies that
27 complement long-standing cooperative agreements with Canada, Mexico, the United
28 Kingdom, NATO, and others, and provides a framework for effective collaborative engage-
29 ment with additional international partners.
30 SSPs are required to include international considerations as an integral part of each
31 sector’s planning process rather than instituting a separate layer of planning. Some
32 international aspects of CIKR protection require additional overarching or cross-sector
33 emphasis. These include:
34 U.S. interaction with foreign governments and international organizations to enhance
35 the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of cyber-based infrastructure that often
36 has an international or even global dimension;
37 Protection of physical assets located on, near, or extending across the borders with
38 Canada and Mexico that require cooperation with and/or planning and resource
39 allocation among neighboring countries, States bordering on these countries, and
40 affected local and tribal governments and the private sector;

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1 Sectors with CIKR that are extensively integrated into an international or global
2 market (e.g., Banking and Finance or other information-based sector, Energy, or
3 Transportation) or when the proper functioning of a sector relies on inputs that are not
4 within the control of U.S. entities; and
5 U.S. Government and corporate facilities located overseas may be regarded as CIKR
6 based on implementation of the NIPP framework. Protection for the Government
7 Facilities sector involves careful interagency collaboration, as well as cooperation with
8 foreign CIKR partners.
9 The following subsections discuss issues associated with the international aspects of CIKR
10 protection in the context of the steps of the NIPP risk management process. (See NIPP
11 Chapter 3, The Protection Program Strategy: Managing Risk.)
12 1B.3.1 Setting Security Goals
13 The overarching goal of the NIPP—to enhance the protection of U.S. CIKR—applies to the
14 international “system of systems” that underpins U.S. CIKR. The NIPP and the SSPs
15 provide guidance and risk management approaches to address the international aspects of
16 CIKR protection efforts on both a national and a sector-specific level. In addition, a
17 separate set of goals and priorities guide cross-sector and global efforts to improve
18 protection for CIKR with international linkages. These goals fall into three categories:
19 Identifying and addressing cross-sector and global issues;
20 Implementing existing and developing new agreements that affect CIKR; and
21 Improving the effectiveness of international cooperation.
22 DHS, in conjunction with DOS and other CIKR partners, defines the requirement for a
23 comprehensive international CIKR protection strategy. The integration of international
24 CIKR protection considerations and measures into each SSPs is important for pursuing and
25 achieving these goals in ways that complement each other and are achievable with the
26 resources available.
27 Important considerations in achieving these goals are discussed in this section; actions
28 required to achieve these goals are addressed in the section on key implementation actions.
29 1B.3.2 Identifying CIKR Affected by International Linkages or Located
30 Internationally
31 Once international security goals are set, the next step in the risk management process is
32 to develop and maintain a comprehensive inventory of the Nation’s CIKR outside U.S.
33 borders and of foreign CIKR that may lead to loss of life in the United States, or critically
34 affect the Nation’s economic, industrial, or defensive capabilities. The process for
35 identifying nationally critical CIKR involves working with U.S. industry, SSAs, academia,
36 and international partners to gather and protect information on the foreign infrastructure
37 and resources on which U.S. CIKR rely or which significantly impact U.S. interests as
38 noted above.
39 Dependency, Interdependency and International CIKR Protection Cooperation: The NIPP
40 risk management framework details a structured approach for use in determining
41 dependencies and interdependencies, including physical, cyber, and international
42 considerations. This approach is designed to address CIKR protection needs and
43 vulnerabilities in three areas:

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1 Direct international linkages to U.S. physical and cyber CIKR:

2 ¾ Foreign cross-border assets linked to U.S. CIKR (e.g., roads, bridges, rail lines,
3 pipelines, gas lines, telecommunications lines and undersea cables and facilities, and
4 power lines physically connecting U.S. CIKR to Canada and Mexico);
5 ¾ Foreign infrastructure whose disruption or destruction could directly harm the U.S.
6 homeland (e.g., a Canadian dam that could flood U.S. territory, a Mexican chemical
7 plant that could affect U.S. territory, or foreign ports where security failures could
8 directly affect U.S. security); and
9 ¾ U.S. CIKR that may be located overseas (e.g., non-military government facilities or
10 overseas components of U.S. CIKR;
11 Indirect international linkages to physical and cyber U.S. CIKR:
12 ¾ The potential cascading and escalating effects of disruption or destruction of foreign
13 assets, systems, and networks; critical foreign technology; goods; resources; transit
14 routes; and chokepoints; and
15 ¾ Foreign ownership, control, or involvement in U.S. CIKR and related issues;
16 Global aspects of physical and cyber U.S. CIKR:
17 ¾ Assets, systems, and networks either located around the world or with global
18 mobility that require the efforts of multiple foreign countries to secure.
19 Dependency and interdependency analysis is primarily based on information from each
20 sector and is formulated by the judgments of CIKR owners and operators regarding their
21 supply chains and sources of services from other infrastructure sectors (e.g., Energy and
22 Water). As the capability for sophisticated network analysis grows, these inputs are
23 complemented by assessments that examine less apparent network-based dependencies and
24 interdependencies. The NISAC supports this effort by analyzing and quantifying national
25 and international dependency and interdependency for complex systems and networks that
26 affect specific sectors.
27 1B.3.3 Assessing Risks
28 The risk assessment for CIKR affected by international linkages is an integral part of the
29 risk management framework described in the NIPP. The risk management framework
30 combines consequences, threats, and vulnerabilities to produce systematic and
31 comprehensive risk assessments that can be clearly explained in the following three-step
32 process:
33 Determine the consequences of destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation of CIKR. This
34 is done to assess potential national significance, as well as physical, cyber, and human
35 dependencies and interdependencies that may result from international linkages.
36 Analyze vulnerability, including determining which elements of CIKR are most
37 susceptible to attack or other disruption, and whether attacks against these elements
38 could be a consequence of any international linkages.
39 Conduct a threat analysis to identify the likelihood a target will be attacked. CIKR with
40 international linkages may present greater opportunities for attack and thus increase
41 the likelihood they may be the subject of attacks.
42 Issues important to the other countries may be different from those for the United States.
43 Risk analysis needs to be conducted in coordination with other countries to draw on their
44 analysis, as well as our own.

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1 1B.3.4 Prioritizing
2 Assessing CIKR on a level playing field that adjudicates risk based on a common
3 framework ensures resources are applied where they offer the most benefit for reducing
4 risk; deterring threats; and minimizing the consequences of attacks, natural disasters, and
5 other emergencies. The same prioritization used for domestic CIKR protection is observed
6 to evaluate the risk arising from international linkages and CIKR located in foreign
7 countries. The priority for investment in protecting CIKR could be raised if international
8 linkages/location increase the risk.
9 1B.3.5 Implementing Programs
10 The primary responsibility for developing protective measures that address risks arising
11 from international factors belongs to the SSAs. In addition to sector protective measures,
12 DHS has specific programs to help enhance the cooperation and coordination needed to
13 address the unique challenges posed by the international aspects of CIKR protection:
14 International Outreach Program: DHS works in conjunction with DOS and with other
15 departments/agencies that have foreign affairs coordination responsibilities to conduct
16 international outreach with foreign countries and international organizations to
17 encourage the promotion and adoption of organizational and policymaking structures,
18 information-sharing mechanisms, industry partnerships, best practices, training, and
19 other programs as needed to improve the protection of overseas assets and the
20 reliability of foreign infrastructure on which the United States depends.
21 The National Cyber Response Coordination Group: The NCRCG facilitates coordination
22 of the Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from cyber
23 incidents and physical attacks that have significant cyber consequences (collectively
24 known as cyber incidents). It serves as the Federal Government’s principal interagency
25 mechanism for operational information sharing and coordination of Federal
26 Government response and recovery efforts during a cyber incident. The NCRCG
27 considers and consults with international partners on a regular basis for routine
28 situational awareness and during incidents. NCRCG member agencies integrate their
29 capabilities to facilitate assessment of the domestic and international scope and severity
30 of a cyber incident.
31 The National Exercise Program: DHS provides overarching coordination for the
32 National Exercise Program to ensure the Nation’s readiness to respond in an all-
33 hazards environment and to test the steady-state protection plans and programs put in
34 place by the NIPP. The exercise program, as appropriate, engages international
35 partners to address cooperation and cross-border issues, including those related to
36 CIKR protection. DHS and other CIKR partners also participate in exercises sponsored
37 by international partners, including cross-border, multi-sector tabletops.
38 National Cyber Exercises: DHS conducts exercises to identify, test, and improve
39 coordination of the cyber incident response community, including Federal, State,
40 territorial, local, tribal, and international government elements, as well as private
41 sector corporations and coordinating councils.
42 Because of the complex nature of the international dimension of CIKR, a substantial
43 emphasis is placed on best practices that can be used to improve cooperation and
44 coordination. To this end, DHS leads efforts to:

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1 Collaborate to establish best practices and successful protection measures, related to

2 telecommunications, air transportation systems, container shipping, cybersecurity, and
3 other global systems as appropriate;
4 Encourage the development and adoption of, and adherence to, standards of the
5 International Organization for Standards and similar organizations to help reduce
6 insurance premiums and level CIKR protection costs for businesses; and
7 Work with international partners to determine the appropriate threshold for
8 engagement with countries on cyber issues.
9 1B.3.6 Measuring Effectiveness and Making Improvements
10 The NIPP specifies three types of quantitative indicators to measure program effectiveness:
11 Descriptive Metrics are necessary to understand sector resources and activities; they
12 do not reflect CIKR protection performance;
13 Process Metrics measure whether specific activities were performed as planned; these
14 track the progression of a task or report on the completion of an enabling process (e.g.,
15 forming a bilateral partnership); and
16 Outcome Metrics track progress toward a strategic goal by measuring beneficial
17 results rather than level of activity.
18 The NIPP also distinguishes between two groups of metrics: core metrics that enable
19 comparison and analysis between and among different sectors and sector-specific metrics
20 that are useful within a sector.
21 Because protective measures are designed, implemented, and evaluated through sector-
22 specific mechanisms guided by the SSPs, they deal with the protection challenges that
23 impact a particular facility, network, or sector rather than international issues that may
24 affect protection measures. Conversely, most initiatives that address the international
25 issues affecting CIKR protection are enablers rather than protective measures themselves.
26 As a result, the metrics used to measure the effectiveness of international CIKR protection
27 initiatives are primarily process metrics in the core group of CIKR protection metrics.
28 These measure progress on tasks that enable CIKR protection in situations that have
29 international ramifications.
30 These metrics are used to manage the comprehensive international CIKR protection
31 strategy, which enables SSP protection initiatives, and to track progress toward the
32 strategy’s three goals:
33 Improving the effectiveness of international cooperation;
34 Implementing existing and developing new agreements that affect CIKR; and
35 Addressing cross-sector and global CIKR protection issues.
36 DHS, in cooperation with other Federal departments/agencies, develops the metrics to track
37 progress on international CIKR protection enablers. Examples of such metrics include:
38 The international issues being faced by each sector that affect multiple sectors, and
39 which issues are the most important;
40 The countries that should be involved in protection partnerships for each sector;
41 The number and type of bilateral and multinational agreements affecting CIKR
42 protection;

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1 The nature, level of implementation, and effectiveness of bilateral and multinational

2 agreements;
3 The sectors affected by each international partnership;
4 The number and type of outcomes enabled by an international initiative; and
5 Where possible, the specific CIKR protection enhancements that directly result from a
6 particular international initiative.
7 Once the core metrics have been developed and approved, DHS, the SSAs, and other CIKR
8 partners collaborate to establish a data-gathering and reporting process. This outlines, but
9 is not limited to, responsibilities; data collection, reporting procedures, and timeframes;
10 metrics calculation; and the schedule for computing and updating the metrics on a regular
11 basis.
12 1B.4 Organizing International CIKR Protection Cooperation

13 DHS, in conjunction with DOS and other Federal departments/agencies, works with
14 individual foreign governments, and regional and international organizations in
15 partnership to enhance the protection of the Nation’s CIKR and to deny the exploitation of
16 CIKR assets. Potential partnerships depend on:
17 Physical proximity to the United States or U.S. CIKR;
18 Useful experience and information to be gained from other countries;
19 Existing relationships, alliances, agreements, and high-level commitments;
20 Critical supply chains and vulnerable nodes; and
21 Interdependencies and networked technologies, and the need for a global “culture of
22 security” to protect CIKR.
23 As international CIKR protection partnerships mature, cooperative efforts strengthen in
24 two dimensions:
25 Development of new partnerships with countries possessing useful experience and
26 information regarding CIKR protective efforts, as well as terrorism prevention,
27 preparedness, response, and recovery; and
28 Development of new international relationships and institutions to protect global
29 infrastructure and address international interdependencies, networked technologies,
30 and the need for a global culture of physical and cybersecurity.
31 The coordination mechanisms supporting the NIPP create linkages between CIKR
32 protection efforts at the national, sector, State, regional, local, tribal, and international
33 levels. The entities and bodies that are involved with this coordination are diverse and
34 depend on the specifics of the issues they address, as well as other considerations as
35 discussed in the following subsections.
36 1B.4.1 Domestic Aspects of International CIKR Protection Cooperation
37 Interagency Coordination—DOS and DHS Leadership: DHS works with DOS, international
38 partners, and with U.S. entities involved with the international aspects of CIKR protection
39 to exchange experiences, share information, and develop a cooperative atmosphere to
40 materially improve U.S. CIKR protection, information sharing, cybersecurity, and global
41 telecommunications standards. DHS, DOS, other Federal departments/agencies and SSAs
42 work with specific countries to identify international interdependencies and vulnerabilities.

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1 SSAs consider such international factors as cross-border infrastructure, international

2 vulnerabilities, and global interdependencies in their SSPs.
3 Interagency Coordination—Review of Existing Mechanisms to Support the NIPP: The
4 International Affairs offices in Federal Government departments/agencies maintain
5 existing relationships with foreign counterpart ministries and agencies, and are the
6 primary partners with DOS in coordinating with foreign governments on international
7 CIKR matters.
8 DHS also works with SSAs to ensure that SSPs reflect international factors (e.g., cross-
9 border infrastructure, international interdependencies, and global vulnerabilities).
10 1B.4.2 Foreign Aspects of International CIKR Protection
11 International cooperation on cybersecurity and other CIKR protection issues (e.g., energy
12 supplies) of a global nature is necessary because of the cross-border or borderless nature of
13 these infrastructures. These efforts require interaction on both the policy and the
14 operational levels and involve a broad range of entities from both the government and the
15 private sector. Interaction on the international aspects of CIKR protection takes place
16 bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally:
17 Bilateral: DHS, in conjunction and consultation with DOS, participates in bilateral
18 discussions and programs with countries of interest where issues are best addressed on
19 a country-to-country basis.
20 Regional: DHS and DOS partner to provide leadership in regional groups (e.g., the OAS
21 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), to raise awareness and develop cooperative
22 programs. The United States engages with Canada and Mexico, as regional neighbors,
23 on CIKR protection to enhance collaboration efforts. Current activities include the
24 North American Security and Prosperity Partnership ( SPP); the U.S.-Canada Critical
25 Infrastructure Protection Framework for Cooperation (Smart Border Action Plan); and
26 the U.S.-Mexico Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework for Cooperation (Border
27 Partnership Action Plan).
28 Multilateral: Multilateral collaboration on this aspect of CIKR involves initiatives on
29 the part of the G8 and the United Nations. For the cybersecurity aspects of global CIKR
30 protection, DHS has established a preliminary framework for cooperation on
31 cybersecurity policy, watch and warning, and incident response for CIKR with key allies
32 such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. DHS is coordinating
33 and participating in the establishment of an IWWN among cybersecurity policy,
34 computer emergency response, and law enforcement participants of 15 countries. The
35 IWWN provides a mechanism for the participating countries to share information to
36 build cyber situational awareness and coordinate incident response.
37 1B.4.3 Working With Specific Countries and International Organizations
38 DHS, SSAs, and other partners work with other countries to promote CIKR protection best
39 practices and they pursue infrastructure security through international/multilateral
40 organizations such as the G8, NATO, European Union, OAS, OSCE, OECD, and Asia-
41 Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The approach to working with some specific
42 countries and organizations is founded on formal agreements that address cooperation on
43 CIKR protection.

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1 Canada and Mexico: The CIKR relationships between the United States and its
2 immediate neighbors are closely interconnected and cover a wide range of sectors.
3 Electricity, natural gas, oil, telecommunications, roads, rail, food, water, minerals, and
4 finished products cross the borders on a regular basis as part of normal commerce. The
5 importance of this trade, and the infrastructure that supports it, was highlighted after
6 the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, nearly closed both borders. The United
7 States entered into the 2001 Smart Border Accord with Canada and the 2002 Border
8 Partnership Plan with Mexico, in part, to address bilateral CIKR issues. In addition, the
9 2005 SPP established a trilateral approach to common security issues. The SPP
10 complements, rather than replaces, existing agreements.
11 United Kingdom: The United Kingdom is a close ally with much experience in fighting
12 terrorism and protecting its CIKR. The United Kingdom developed substantial expertise
13 in law enforcement and intelligence systems, and in the protection of commercial
14 facilities based on its experience in countering terrorism. Like the United States, most
15 of the critical infrastructure in the United Kingdom is privately owned. The government
16 of the United Kingdom developed an effective, sophisticated system of managing public-
17 private partnerships. DHS formed a JCG with the United Kingdom that brings officials
18 into regular, formal contact to discuss and resolve a range of bilateral homeland
19 security issues.
20 G8:Since September 11, the infrastructure in several G8 countries has been exploited
21 and used to inflict casualties and fear. As a result, G8 partners underscored their
22 determination to combat all forms of terrorism and to strengthen international
23 cooperation. Counterterrorism work is the focus of a number of initiatives launched at
24 G8 summits. For example, at their meeting in Gleneagles in Scotland, in July 2005, the
25 G8 heads of government issued a Statement on Counterterrorism. In it, they pledged to
26 “commit ourselves to new joint efforts. We will work to improve the sharing of
27 information on the movement of terrorists across international borders, to assess and
28 address the threat to the transportation infrastructure, and to promote best practices
29 for rail and metro security.” DHS works closely with the G8 to address the common
30 threats to CIKR and cyberspace.
31 European Union: The European Union is pursuing CIKR as a matter of policy, noting
32 that an effective strategy should focus on both preparedness and on consequence
33 management. DHS engages the European Union early in this process to share its
34 experience, and to further cooperate on characteristics and common vulnerabilities of
35 critical infrastructure and cyberspace, risk analysis techniques, and strategies to
36 mitigate risk and minimize consequences.
37 North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO addresses CIKR issues through the Senior
38 Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the senior policy and advisory body to the North
39 Atlantic Council on civil emergency planning and disaster relief matters. The committee
40 is responsible for policy direction and coordination of Planning Boards and Committees
41 in the NATO environment. It developed considerable expertise that applies to CIKR
42 protection and implemented planning boards and committees covering ocean shipping,
43 inland surface transport, civil aviation, food and agriculture, industrial preparedness,
44 civil communications planning, civil protection, and civil-military medical issues. DHS
45 provides a delegation to the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee at NATO,
46 participates in NATO’s telecommunications working group, and engages with NATO in
47 preparedness exercises.

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1 1B.4.4 Foreign Investment in U.S. CIKR

2 CIKR protection may be affected by foreign investment and ownership of sector assets. At
3 the Federal level, this issue is monitored by the CFIUS. The committee is chaired by the
4 Secretary of the Treasury, with membership including the Secretaries of State, Defense,
5 Commerce, and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Directors of the OMB and
6 the OSTP; the U.S. Trade Representative; the Chairman of the Council of Economic
7 Advisers; the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; and the Assistant to the
8 President for National Security Affairs.
9 DHS has important responsibilities regarding various government commissions that
10 support the NIPP. These include:
11 As a member of the CFIUS, DHS examines the impact of proposed foreign investments
12 on CIKR protection. The committee coordinates the development and negotiation of
13 security agreements with foreign entities that may be necessary to manage the risk to
14 CIKR that a foreign investment may pose. DHS leads government monitoring activities
15 aimed at ensuring compliance with these agreements.
16 DHS acts as a partner with DOJ and other executive branch departments/agencies in
17 supporting executive branch reviews of applications to the FCC from foreign entities
18 pursuant to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934 to assess if they pose any
19 threat to CIKR protection.
20 1B.4.5 Information Sharing
21 Effective international cooperation of CIKR protection requires a system for information
22 sharing that includes processes and protocols for updates among all partners, mechanisms
23 for systematic sharing of best practices, and frequent opportunities for partners to meet to
24 discuss and address international CIKR issues.
25 The NOC serves as the Nation’s hub for information sharing and situational awareness for
26 domestic incident management and is responsible for increasing coordination (through the
27 NICC) among those members of the international community who are involved because of
28 the role they play in enabling the protection of U.S. CIKR.
29 The HSIN supports ongoing information-sharing efforts by offering COIs for selected
30 international partners requiring close coordination with the NOC.
31 DHS also provides mechanisms (the US-CERT portal), to improve information sharing and
32 coordination among government communities and selected international partners for
33 cybersecurity. In addition, the Cybercop portal is a secure Internet-based information-
34 sharing mechanism for law enforcement members involved in the field of electronic crimes
35 investigation. This secure, Internet-based collaborative tool links and supports the law
36 enforcement and investigative community worldwide, serving participants from more than
37 40 countries.
38 1B.5 Integration With Other Plans

39 The NIPP brings a new focus to international security cooperation and provides a risk-
40 informed strategic framework for measuring the effectiveness of international activities.
41 The NIPP processes serve as management tools to assess international vulnerabilities and
42 interdependencies. The NIPP process complements long-standing cooperative agreements

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1 with Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, NATO, and others, and provides the framework
2 for collaborative engagement with additional international partners.
3 SSPs include descriptions of sector relationships and partner roles and responsibilities that
4 address international/multinational organizations and foreign governments. SSPs also
5 provide a comprehensive view of CIKR, including cross-sector dependencies and
6 interdependencies; international links; and cyber systems needed for the sector to function.
7 1B.6 Ensuring International Cooperation Over the Long Term

8 The effort to ensure a sustainable approach to addressing the international aspects of CIKR
9 protection over the long term requires special consideration in the following areas:
10 Awareness: Awareness of international aspects of CIKR protection issues helps ensure
11 implementation of effective, coordinated, and integrated CIKR protection measures and
12 enables CIKR partners to make informed decisions. Often these issues are not apparent
13 to those who can take the most effective action because of the complexity of the
14 international systems affecting CIKR protection. Awareness programs designed to
15 identify such issues and provide the common framework that allows these issues to be
16 effectively addressed by CIKR partners are required for continued support for protection
17 programs over the long term.
18 Training and Education: NIPP training topics for the managers and staff responsible
19 for CIKR that require emphasis include international considerations for CIKR
20 protection because of the complex considerations that often accompany international
21 linkages and initiatives. Because training and education programs can result in a
22 higher quality workforce for international partners, they provide benefits over entire
23 careers rather than on a one-time basis as direct aid to international partners often
24 does. In addition, DHS ensures the organizational and sector expertise needed to
25 implement the international aspects of the NIPP program over the long term is
26 developed and maintained through exercises that include adequate testing of
27 international CIKR protection measures and plans.
28 Research and Development: Cooperative and coordinated research efforts are one of the
29 most effective ways to improve protective capabilities or to dramatically lower the costs
30 of existing capabilities so that international CIKR partners can afford to do more with
31 their limited budgets. Techniques and designs developed through research can cost very
32 little to share with international CIKR partners and, although the lead times needed for
33 maturation of technology from the laboratory to the field can be decades, such
34 improvements can have wider applicability or much greater effectiveness than available
35 through current methods.
36 Plan Update: NIPP and SSP updates must reflect the current international situation
37 and must be coordinated, as required, with international agreements affecting CIKR
38 protection.

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1 Appendix 2: Authorities, Roles, and

2 Responsibilities
3 Appendix 2A: Summary of Relevant
4 Statutes, Strategies, and Directives
5 This summary provides additional information on a variety of statutes, strategies, and
6 directives referenced in chapters 2 and 5, as applicable to CIKR protection. This list is not
7 inclusive of all authorities related to CIKR protection; rather, it includes the authorities
8 most relevant to national-level, cross-sector CIKR protection. Please note that there are
9 many other authorities that are related to specific sectors that are not discussed in this
10 appendix; these are left for further elaboration in the SSPs.
11 2A.1 Statutes
12 Homeland Security Act of 2002 24
13 This act establishes a Cabinet-level department headed by a Secretary of Homeland
14 Security with the mandate and legal authority to protect the American people from the
15 continuing threat of terrorism. In the act, Congress assigns DHS the primary missions to:
16 Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
17 Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism at home;
18 Minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that occur; and
19 Ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by
20 efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.
21 This statutory authority defines the protection of CIKR as one of the primary missions of
22 the department. Among other actions, the act specifically requires DHS:
23 To carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the CIKR of the
24 United States, including the performance of risk assessments to determine the risks
25 posed by particular types of terrorist attacks;
26 To develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical
27 infrastructure of the United States, including power production, generation, and
28 distribution systems; information technology and telecommunications systems
29 (including satellites); electronic financial and property record storage and transmission
30 systems; emergency preparedness communications systems; and the physical and
31 technological assets that support such systems; and
32 To recommend measures necessary to protect the CIKR of the United States in
33 coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with
34 State and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other
35 entities.
24 Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2135. It is coded at 6 U.S.C.

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1 Those requirements, combined with the President’s direction in HSPD-7, mandate the
2 unified approach to CIKR protection taken in the NIPP.
3 Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 25
4 Enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act, this act creates a framework that enables
5 members of the private sector and others to voluntarily submit sensitive information
6 regarding the Nation’s CIKR to DHS with the assurance that the information, if it satisfies
7 certain requirements, will be protected from public disclosure.
8 The PCII Program, created under the authority of the act, is central to the information-
9 sharing and protection strategy of the NIPP. By protecting sensitive information submitted
10 through the program, the private sector is assured that the information will remain secure
11 and only be used to further CIKR protection efforts. 26
12 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
13 This act requires the implementation of some of the recommendations made by the 9/11
14 Commission, to include requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to: 1) establish
15 department-wide procedures to receive and analyze intelligence from State, local, and tribal
16 governments and the private sector; and 2) establish a system that screens 100 percent of
17 maritime and passenger cargo.
18 This Act establishes the International Border Community Interoperable Communications
19 Demonstration Project, to help identify and implement solutions to cross-border
20 communications and cooperation, and the Interagency Threat Assessment and
21 Coordination Group (ITACG), to improve interagency communications. The establishment
22 of ITACG Advisory Councils allows Federal agencies to set policies to improve
23 communication within the information-sharing environment and supports establishment of
24 an ITACG Detail that gives State, local, and tribal homeland security officials, law
25 enforcement officers, and intelligence analysts the opportunity to work in the National
26 Counterterrorism Center.
27 The Act also established grants to support high-risk urban areas and State, local, and tribal
28 governments in preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding to acts of
29 terrorism; and to assist States in carrying out initiatives to improve international
30 emergency communications.
31 National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 2007)
32 The updated strategy serves to guide, organize, and unify our Nation's homeland security
33 efforts. It is a national strategy – not a Federal strategy – that articulates the approach to
34 secure the homeland over the next several years. It builds on the first National Strategy for
35 Homeland Security, issued in July 2002, and complements both the National Security
36 Strategy issued in March 2006 and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued
37 in September 2006. It reflects the increased understanding of threats confronting the
38 United States, incorporates lessons learned from exercises and real-world catastrophes, and
39 addresses ways to ensure long-term success by strengthening the homeland security
40 foundation that has been built.
25 The CII Act is presented as subtitle B of title II of the Homeland Security Act (sections 211-215) and is codified at 6 U.S.C. 131 et seq.
26 Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 8079 (Feb. 20, 2004), are codified at 6 CFR Part 29.

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1 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) 27
2 The Stafford Act provides comprehensive authority for response to emergencies and major
3 disasters—natural disasters, accidents, and intentionally perpetrated events. It provides
4 specific authority for the Federal Government to provide assistance to State and local
5 entities for disaster preparedness and mitigation, and major disaster and emergency
6 assistance. Major disaster and emergency assistance includes such resources and services
7 as:
8 The provision of Federal resources, in general;
9 Medicine, food, and other consumables;
10 Work and services to save lives and restore property, including:
11 ¾ Debris removal;
12 ¾ Search and rescue; emergency medical care; emergency mass care; emergency
13 shelter; and provision of food, water, medicine, and other essential needs, including
14 movement of supplies or persons;
15 ¾ Clearance of roads and construction of temporary bridges;
16 ¾ Provision of temporary facilities for schools and other essential community services;
17 ¾ Demolition of unsafe structures that endanger the public;
18 ¾ Warning of further risks and hazards;
19 ¾ Dissemination of public information and assistance regarding health and safety
20 measures;
21 ¾ Provision of technical advice to State and local governments on disaster
22 management and control; and
23 ¾ Reduction of immediate threats to life, property, and public health and safety;
24 Hazard mitigation;
25 Repair, replacement, and restoration of certain damaged facilities; and
26 Emergency communications, emergency transportation, and fire management
27 assistance.
28 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
29 This act amends the Stafford Act by repealing the previous mitigation planning provisions
30 (section 409) and replacing them with a new set of requirements (section 322). This new
31 section emphasizes the need for State, Tribal, and local entities to closely coordinate
32 mitigation planning and implementation efforts.
33 Section 322 continues the requirement for a State mitigation plan as a condition of disaster
34 assistance, adding incentives for increased coordination and integration of mitigation
35 activities at the State level through the establishment of requirements for two different
36 levels of State plans—standard and enhanced. States that demonstrate an increased
37 commitment to comprehensive mitigation planning and implementation through the
38 development of an approved Enhanced State Plan can increase the amount of funding
39 available through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). Section 322 also
40 established a new requirement for local mitigation plans and authorized up to 7 percent of
27 Public Law 93-288, as amended, codified at 42 U.S.C. 68.

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1 HMGP funds available to a State to be used for development of State, local, and tribal
2 mitigation plans.
3 Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 (also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley
4 Act) 28
5 The act applies to entities required to file periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange
6 Commission under the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
7 It contains significant changes to the responsibilities of directors and officers, as well as the
8 reporting and corporate governance obligations of affected companies. Among other things,
9 the act requires certification by the company’s CEO and chief financial officer that
10 accompanies each periodic report filed that the report fully complies with the requirements
11 of the securities laws and that the information in the report fairly presents, in all material
12 respects, the financial condition and results of the operations of the company. It also
13 requires certifications regarding internal controls and material misstatements or omissions,
14 and the disclosure on a “rapid and current basis” of information regarding material changes
15 in the financial condition or operations of a public company. The act contains a number of
16 additional provisions dealing with insider accountability and disclosure obligations, and
17 auditor independence. It also provides severe criminal and civil penalties for violations of
18 the act’s provisions.
19 The Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Defense Production Reauthorization Act of 2003
20 This act provides the primary authority to ensure the timely availability of resources for
21 national defense and civil emergency preparedness and response. Among other powers, this
22 act authorizes the President to demand that companies accept and give priority to
23 government contracts that the President “deems necessary or appropriate to promote the
24 national defense,” and allocate materials, services, and facilities, as necessary, to promote
25 the national defense in a major national emergency. This act also authorizes loan
26 guarantees, direct loans, direct purchases, and purchase guarantees for those goods
27 necessary for national defense. It also allows the President to void international mergers
28 that would adversely affect national security. This act defines “national defense” to include
29 critical infrastructure protection and restoration, as well as activities authorized by the
30 emergency preparedness sections of the Stafford Act. Consequently, the authorities
31 stemming from the Defense Production Act are available for activities and measures
32 undertaken in preparation for, during, or following a natural disaster or accidental or
33 malicious event. Under the act and related Presidential orders, the Secretary of Homeland
34 Security has the authority to place and, upon application, authorize State and local
35 governments to place priority-rated contracts in support of Federal, State, and local emer-
36 gency preparedness activities. The Defense Production Act has a national security nexus
37 with the NIPP. National emergencies related to CIKR may arise that require the President
38 to use his authority under the Defense Production Act.
39 The Freedom of Information Act 29
40 This act generally provides that any person has a right, enforceable in court, to obtain
41 access to Federal agency records, except to the extent that such records are protected from
42 public disclosure by nine listed exemptions or under three law enforcement exclusions.
28Public Law 107-204, July 30, 2002.

29Codified as 5 U.S.C. 552.

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1 Persons who make requests are not required to identify themselves or explain the purpose
2 of the request. The underlying principle of FOIA is that the workings of government are for
3 and by the people and that the benefits of government information should be made broadly
4 available. All Federal Government agencies must adhere to the provisions of FOIA with
5 certain exceptions for work in progress, enforcement confidential information, classified
6 documents, and national security information. FOIA was amended by the Electronic
7 Freedom of Information Act Amendment of 1996.
8 Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 30
9 Under section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, NIST
10 develops standards, guidelines, and associated methods and techniques for Federal
11 computer systems. Federal Information Processing Standards are developed by NIST only
12 when there are no existing voluntary standards to address the Federal requirements for the
13 interoperability of different systems, the portability of data and software, and computer
14 security.
15 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 31
16 Among other things, this act (title V) provides limited privacy protections on the disclosure
17 by a financial institution of nonpublic personal information. The act also codifies
18 protections against the practice of obtaining personal information through false pretenses.
19 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 32
20 This act improves the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to
21 bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. Key provisions of the act, 42 U.S.C. 247d
22 and 300hh among others, address: (1) development of a national preparedness plan by HHS
23 that is designed to provide effective assistance to State and local governments in the event
24 of bioterrorism or other public health emergencies; (2) operation of the National Disaster
25 Medical System to mobilize and address public health emergencies; (3) grant programs for
26 the education and training of public health professionals and the improvement of State,
27 local, and hospital preparedness for and response to bioterrorism and other public health
28 emergencies; (4) streamlining and clarification of communicable disease quarantine
29 provisions; (5) enhancement of controls on dangerous biological agents and toxins; and (6)
30 protection of the safety and security of food and drug supplies.
31 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
32 Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) 33
33 This act outlines the domestic policy related to deterring and punishing terrorists, and the
34 U.S. policy for CIKR protection. It also provides for the establishment of a national
35 competence for CIKR protection. The act establishes the NISAC and outlines the Federal
36 Government’s commitment to understanding and protecting the interdependencies among
37 critical infrastructure.
38 The Privacy Act of 1974 34
39 This act provides strict limits on the maintenance and disclosure by any Federal agency of
40 information on individuals that is maintained, including “education, financial transactions,
30Public Law 104-106.

31Public Law 106-102 (1999), codified at 15 U.S.C. 94.
33Public Law 107-56, October 26, 2001.
34Codified at 5 U.S.C. 552a.

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1 medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains [the] name, or the
2 identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such
3 as a finger or voice print or a photograph.” Although there are specific categories for
4 permissible maintenance of records and limited exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure
5 for legitimate law enforcement and other specified purposes, the act requires strict
6 recordkeeping on any disclosure. The act also specifically provides for access by individuals
7 to their own records and for requesting corrections thereto.
8 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 35
9 This act requires that Federal agencies develop a comprehensive information technology
10 security program to ensure the effectiveness of information security controls over
11 information resources that support Federal operations and assets. This legislation is
12 relevant to the part of the NIPP that governs the protection of Federal assets and the
13 implementation of cyber-protective measures under the Government Facilities SSP.
14 Cyber Security Research and Development Act of 2002 36
15 This act allocates funding to NIST and the National Science Foundation for the purpose of
16 facilitating increased R&D for computer network security and supporting research
17 fellowships and training. The act establishes a means of enhancing basic R&D related to
18 improving the cybersecurity of CIKR.
19 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 37
20 This act directs initial and continuing assessments of maritime facilities and vessels that
21 may be involved in a transportation security incident. It requires DHS to prepare a
22 National Maritime Transportation Security Plan for deterring and responding to a
23 transportation security incident and to prepare incident response plans for facilities and
24 vessels that will ensure effective coordination with Federal, State, and local authorities. It
25 also requires, among other actions, the establishment of transportation security and
26 crewmember identification cards and processes; maritime safety and security teams; port
27 security grants; and enhancements to maritime intelligence and matters dealing with
28 foreign ports and international cooperation.
29 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 38
30 This act provides sweeping changes to the U.S. Intelligence Community structure and
31 processes, and creates new systems specially designed to combat terrorism. Among other
32 actions, the act:
33 Establishes a Director of National Intelligence with specific budget, oversight, and
34 programmatic authority over the Intelligence Community;
35 Establishes the National Intelligence Council and redefines “national intelligence”;
36 Requires the establishment of a secure ISE and an information-sharing council;
37 Establishes a National Counterterrorism Center, a National Counter Proliferation
38 Center, National Intelligence Centers, and a Joint Intelligence Community Council;
39 Establishes, within the Executive Office of the President, a Privacy and Civil Liberties
40 Oversight Board;
35Public Law 107-347, December 17, 2002.

36Public Law 107-305, November 27, 2002.
37Public Law 107-295, codified at 46 U.S.C. 701.

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1 Requires the Director of the FBI to continue efforts to improve the intelligence
2 capabilities of the FBI and to develop and maintain, within the FBI, a national
3 intelligence workforce;
4 Directs improvements in security clearances and clearance processes;
5 Requires DHS to develop and implement a National Strategy for Transportation
6 Security and transportation modal security plans; enhance identification and
7 credentialing of transportation workers and law enforcement officers; conduct R&D into
8 mass identification technology, including biometrics; enhance passenger screening and
9 terrorist watch lists; improve measures for detecting weapons and explosives; improve
10 security related to the air transportation of cargo; and implement other aviation
11 security measures;
12 Directs enhancements to maritime security;
13 Directs enhancements in border security and immigration matters;
14 Enhances law enforcement authority and capabilities, and expands certain diplomatic,
15 foreign aid, and military authorities and capabilities for combating terrorism;
16 Requires expanded machine-readable visas with biometric data; implementation of a
17 biometric entry and exit system, and a registered traveler program; and implementation
18 of biometric or other secure passports;
19 Requires standards for birth certificates and driver’s licenses or personal identification
20 cards issued by States for use by Federal agencies for identification purposes, and
21 enhanced regulations for social security cards;
22 Requires DHS to improve preparedness nationally, especially measures to enhance
23 interoperable communications, and to report on vulnerability and risk assessments of
24 the Nation’s CIKR; and
25 Directs measures to improve assistance to and coordination with State, local, and
26 private sector entities.
27 2A.2 National Strategies

28 The National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002)
29 This strategy establishes the Nation’s strategic homeland security objectives and outlines
30 the six critical mission areas necessary to achieve those objectives. The strategy also
31 provides a framework to align the resources of the Federal budget directly to the task of
32 securing the homeland. The strategy specifies eight major initiatives to protect the Nation’s
33 CIKR, one of which specifically calls for the development of the NIPP.
34 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
35 (February 2003)
36 This strategy identifies the policy, goals, objectives, and principles for actions needed to
37 “secure the infrastructures and assets vital to national security, governance, public health
38 and safety, economy, and public confidence.” The strategy provides a unifying
39 organizational structure for CIKR protection and identifies specific initiatives related to the
40 NIPP to drive near-term national protection priorities and inform the resource allocation
41 process.

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1 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003)

2 This strategy sets forth objectives and specific actions to prevent cyber attacks against
3 America’s CIKR, reduce nationally identified vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, and minimize
4 damage and recovery time from cyber attacks. The strategy provides the vision for
5 cybersecurity and serves as the foundation for the cybersecurity component of CIKR.
6 The National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005)
7 This strategy provides the framework to integrate and synchronize the existing
8 department-level strategies and ensure their effective and efficient implementation, and
9 aligns all Federal Government maritime security programs and initiatives into a
10 comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, State, local, and
11 private sector entities.
12 The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002)
13 This strategy provides policy guidance on combating WMD through three pillars:
14 Counter proliferation to combat WMD use;
15 Strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation; and
16 Consequence management to respond to WMD use.
17 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003)
18 This strategy provides a comprehensive overview of the terrorist threat and sets specific
19 goals and objectives to combat this threat, including measures to:
20 Defeat terrorists and their organizations;
21 Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists;
22 Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and
23 Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.
24 The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America
25 The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America outlines the
26 fundamental values, priorities, and orientation of the Intelligence Community. As directed
27 by the Director of National Intelligence, the strategy outlines the specific mission objectives
28 that relate to efforts to predict, penetrate, and pre-empt threats to national security. To
29 accomplish this, the efforts of the different enterprises of the Intelligence Community are
30 integrated through policy, doctrine, and technology, and by ensuring that intelligence
31 efforts are appropriately coordinated with the Nation’s homeland security mission.
32 2A.3 Homeland Security Presidential Directives

33 HSPD-1: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council (October 2001)
34 HSPD-1 establishes the Homeland Security Council and a committee structure for
35 developing, coordinating, and vetting homeland security policy among executive
36 departments and agencies. The directive provides a mandate for the Homeland Security
37 Council to ensure the coordination of all homeland security-related activities among
38 executive departments and agencies and promotes the effective development and
39 implementation of all homeland security policies. The Homeland Security Council is
40 responsible for arbitrating and coordinating any policy issues that may arise among the
41 different departments and agencies under the NIPP.

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1 HSPD-2: Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies (October 2001)

2 HSPD-2 establishes policies and programs to enhance the Federal Government’s
3 capabilities for preventing aliens who engage in or support terrorist activities from entering
4 the country, and for detaining, prosecuting, or deporting any such aliens who are in the
5 United States.
6 HSPD-2 also directs the Attorney General to create the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task
7 Force to ensure that, to the maximum extent permitted by law, Federal agencies coordinate
8 programs to accomplish the following: (1) deny entry into the United States of aliens
9 associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity; and (2)
10 locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the United States.
11 HSPD-3: Homeland Security Advisory System (March 2002)
12 HSPD-3 mandates the creation of an alert system for disseminating information regarding
13 the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities, and the public. It also
14 includes the requirement for a corresponding set of protective measures for Federal, State,
15 and local governments to be implemented, depending on the threat condition. Such a
16 system provides warnings in the form of a set of graduated threat conditions that are
17 elevated as the risk of the threat increases. For each threat condition, Federal departments
18 and agencies are required to implement a corresponding set of protective measures.
19 HSPD-4: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002)
20 This directive outlines a strategy that includes three principal pillars: (1) Counter-
21 Proliferation to Combat WMD Use, (2) Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD
22 Proliferation, and (3) Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use. It also outlines
23 four cross-cutting functions to be pursued on a priority basis: (1) intelligence collection and
24 analysis on WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies; (2) R&D to improve our
25 ability to address evolving threats; (3) bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and (4)
26 targeted strategies against hostile nations and terrorists.
27 HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents (February 2003)
28 HSPD-5 establishes a national approach to domestic incident management that ensures
29 effective coordination among all levels of government, and between the government and the
30 private sector. Central to this approach is the National Incident Management System
31 (NIMS), an organizational framework for all levels of government, and the National
32 Response Framework (NRF), an operational framework for national incident response.
33 In this directive, the President designates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the
34 principal Federal official for domestic incident management and empowers the Secretary to
35 coordinate Federal resources used for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery
36 related to terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. The directive assigns
37 specific responsibilities to the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State,
38 and the Assistants to the President for Homeland Security and National Security Affairs,
39 and directs the heads of all Federal departments and agencies to provide their “full and
40 prompt cooperation, resources, and support,” as appropriate and consistent with their own
41 responsibilities for protecting national security, to the Secretary of Homeland Security,
42 Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State in the exercise of leadership
43 responsibilities and missions assigned in HSPD-5.

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1 HSPD-6: Integration and Use of Screening Information (September 2003)

2 HSPD-6 consolidates the Federal Government’s approach to terrorist screening by
3 establishing a Terrorist Screening Center. Federal departments and agencies are directed
4 to provide terrorist information to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which is then
5 required to provide all relevant information and intelligence to the Terrorist Screening
6 Center. In order to protect against terrorism, this directive established the national policy
7 to: (1) develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current information about
8 individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct
9 constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism (Terrorist Information);
10 and (2) use that information, as appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law, to
11 support (a) Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, foreign government, and private sector
12 screening processes; and (b) diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement,
13 immigration, visa, and protective processes.
14 HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (December 2003)
15 HSPD-7 establishes a framework for Federal departments and agencies to identify,
16 prioritize, and protect CIKR from terrorist attacks, with an emphasis on protecting against
17 catastrophic health effects and mass casualties. HSPD-7 mandates the creation and
18 implementation of the NIPP and sets forth roles and responsibilities for DHS; SSAs; other
19 Federal departments and agencies; and State, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and
20 other CIKR partners.
21 HSPD-8: National Preparedness (December 2003)
22 HSPD-8 establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent,
23 protect, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major
24 disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness
25 goal; establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to
26 State and local governments; and outlining actions to strengthen the preparedness
27 capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities. This directive mandates the development of
28 the goal to guide emergency preparedness training, planning, equipment, and exercises,
29 and to ensure that all entities involved adhere to the same standards. The directive calls for
30 an inventory of Federal response capabilities and refines the process by which preparedness
31 grants are administered, disbursed, and utilized at the State and local levels.
32 HSPD-9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food (January 2004)
33 HSPD-9 establishes an integrated national policy for improving intelligence operations,
34 emergency response capabilities, information-sharing mechanisms, mitigation strategies,
35 and sector vulnerability assessments to defend the agriculture and food system against
36 terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
37 HSPD-10: Biodefense for the 21st Century (April 2004)
38 HSPD-10 outlines the essential pillars of our national biodefense program as threat
39 awareness, prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and response and
40 recovery. This directive describes these various disciplines in detail and sets forth objectives
41 for further progress under the national biodefense program, highlighting key roles for
42 Federal departments and agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for
43 coordinating domestic Federal operations to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
44 biological weapons attacks.

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1 HSPD-11: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures (August 2004)

2 HSPD-11 requires the creation of a strategy and implementation plan for a coordinated and
3 comprehensive approach to terrorist screening to improve and expand procedures to screen
4 people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and objects that pose a threat.
5 HSPD-12: Policy for a Common Identification for Federal Employees and Contractors (August
6 2004)
7 HSPD-12 establishes a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms
8 of identification issued by the Federal Government to its employees and contractors to
9 enhance security, increase government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect
10 personal privacy. The resulting mandatory standard was issued by NIST as the Federal
11 Information Processing Standard Publication.
12 HSPD-13: Maritime Security Policy (December 2004)
13 HSPD-13 directs the coordination of U.S. Government maritime security programs and
14 initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving the
15 appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector entities. The directive also establishes
16 a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate interagency maritime
17 security policy efforts.
18 HSPD-14: Domestic Nuclear Detection (April 2005)
19 HSPD-14 establishes the effective integration of nuclear and radiological detection
20 capabilities across Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector for a
21 managed, coordinated response. This directive supports and enhances the effective sharing
22 and use of appropriate information generated by the intelligence community, law
23 enforcement agencies, counterterrorism community, other government agencies, and
24 foreign governments, as well as providing appropriate information to these entities.
25 HSPD-15: War on Terror (March 2006)
26 HSPD-15 is classified but the objective of the directive is to improve government
27 coordination in the global war on terror.
28 HSPD-16: Aviation Security Policy (June 2006)
29 HSPD-16 details a strategic vision for aviation security while recognizing ongoing efforts,
30 and directs the production of a National Strategy for Aviation Security and supporting
31 plans. The supporting plans address the following areas: aviation transportation system
32 security; aviation operational threat response; aviation transportation system recovery; air
33 domain surveillance and intelligence integration; domestic outreach; and international
34 outreach. The Strategy sets forth U.S. Government agency roles and responsibilities,
35 establishes planning and operations coordination requirements, and builds on current
36 strategies, tools, and resources.
37 HSPD-17: Nuclear Materials Information Program (August 2006)
38 The contents of HSPD-17 are classified. The directive addresses an interagency effort
39 managed by the Department of Energy to consolidate information from all sources
40 pertaining to worldwide nuclear materials holdings and their security status into an
41 integrated and continuously updated information management system.

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1 HSPD-18: Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction (January 2007)

2 HSPD-18 builds upon the vision and objectives articulated in the National Strategy
3 to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense for the 21st Century to ensure
4 that the Nation's medical countermeasure research, development, and acquisition efforts
5 target threats for catastrophic impact on public health; yield a rapidly deployable and
6 flexible capability to address existing and evolving threats; are part of an integrated WMD
7 consequence management approach; and include the development of effective, feasible, and
8 pragmatic concepts of operation for responding to and recovering from an attack. The
9 directive designates the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategic, integrated
10 all-CBRN risk assessment that integrates the findings of the intelligence and law
11 enforcement communities with input from the scientific, medical, and public health
12 communities.
13 HSPD-19: Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States (February 2007)
14 HSPD-19 establishes a national policy, and calls for the development of a national strategy
15 and implementation plan, on the prevention and detection of, protection against, and
16 response to terrorist use of explosives in the United States. This directive mandates that
17 the Secretary of Homeland Security coordinate with other Federal agencies to maintain
18 secure information-sharing systems available to law enforcement agencies and other first
19 responders, to include best practices to enhance preparedness across the government. The
20 Secretary of Homeland Security is also responsible, in coordination with other Federal
21 agencies, for Federal Government research, development, testing, and evaluation activities
22 related to explosives attacks and the development of explosive render-safe tools
23 and technologies.
24 HSPD-20: National Continuity Policy (May 2007)
25 HSPD-20 establishes a comprehensive national policy on the continuity of Federal
26 Government structures and operations and designates a single National Continuity
27 Coordinator responsible for leading the development and implementation of Federal
28 continuity policies. This policy establishes "National Essential Functions;" prescribes
29 continuity requirements for all executive departments and agencies; and provides guidance
30 for State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and private sector organizations. This
31 directive aims to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national continuity program that
32 will enhance the credibility of our national security posture and enable a more rapid and
33 effective response to and recovery from a national emergency.
34 HSPD-21: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (October 2007)
35 HSPD-21 establishes a National Strategy for Public Health and Medical Preparedness. The
36 Strategy draws key principles from the National Strategy for Homeland Security (October
37 2007), the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002),
38 and Biodefense for the 21st Century (April 2004) that can be generally applied to public
39 health and medical preparedness. Implementation of this strategy will transform our
40 national approach to protecting the health of the American people against all disasters.
41 HSPD-23: Cyber Security and Monitoring (January 2008)
42 The contents of HSPD-23 are classified. The directive establishes a task force, headed by
43 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to identify the sources of cyber attacks
44 against government computer systems. The Department of Homeland Security will work to

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1 protect the systems and the Department of Defense will devise strategies for counterattacks
2 against intruders.
3 HSPD-24: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security (June
4 2008)
5 HSPD-24 establishes a framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and
6 agencies use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use,
7 analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of
8 individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner, while respecting their information privacy
9 and other legal rights under U.S. law.
10 2A.4 Other Authorities

11 Executive Order 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age (October
12 2001) (amended by E.O. 13286, February 28, 2003)
13 This Executive order provides specific policy direction to ensure protection of information
14 systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and
15 the physical assets that support such systems. It recognizes the important role that
16 networked information systems (critical information infrastructure) play in supporting all
17 aspects of our civil society and economy and the increasing degree to which other critical
18 infrastructure sectors have become dependent upon such systems. It formally establishes as
19 U.S. policy the need to protect against disruption of the operation of these systems and to
20 ensure that any disruptions that do occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, manageable,
21 and cause the least damage possible. The Executive order specifically calls for the
22 implementation of the policy to include “a voluntary public-private partnership, involving
23 corporate and nongovernmental organizations.” The Executive order also reaffirms existing
24 authorities and responsibilities assigned to various executive branch agencies and
25 interagency committees to ensure the security and integrity of Federal information systems
26 generally and of national security information systems in particular.
27 National Infrastructure Advisory Council
28 In addition to the foregoing, Executive Order 13231 (as amended by E.O. 13286 of February
29 28, 2003, and E.O. 13385 of September 29, 2005) also established the NIAC as the
30 President’s principal advisory panel on critical infrastructure protection issues spanning all
31 sectors. The NIAC is composed of not more than 30 members, appointed by the President,
32 who are selected from the private sector, academia, and State and local government,
33 representing senior executive leadership expertise from the critical infrastructure and key
34 resource areas as delineated in HSPD-7.
35 The NIAC provides the President, through the Secretary of Homeland Security, with advice
36 on the security of critical infrastructure, both physical and cyber, supporting important
37 sectors of the economy. It also has the authority to provide advice directly to the heads of
38 other departments that have shared responsibility for critical infrastructure protection,
39 including HHS, DOT, and DOE. The NIAC is charged to improve the cooperation and
40 partnership between the public and private sectors in securing critical infrastructure and
41 advises on policies and strategies that range from risk assessment and management, to
42 information sharing, to protective strategies and clarification on roles and responsibilities
43 between public and private sectors.

Public Review Draft
1 Executive Order 12382, President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory

2 Committee (amended by E.O. 13286, February 28, 2003)
3 This Executive order creates the NSTAC, which provides to the President, through the
4 Secretary of Homeland Security, information and advice from the perspective of the
5 telecommunications industry with respect to the implementation of the National Security
6 Telecommunications Policy.
7 Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness
8 Telecommunications Functions (amended by E.O. 13286, February 28, 2003)
9 Executive Order 12472 assigns NS/EP telecommunications functions, including wartime
10 and non-wartime emergency functions, to the National Security Council, OSTP, Homeland
11 Security Council, OMB, and other Federal agencies. The Executive order seeks to ensure
12 that the Federal Government has telecommunications services that will function under all
13 conditions, including emergency situations. This Executive order establishes the NCS with
14 the mission to assist the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
15 Council, the Director of OSTP, and the Director of the OMB in: (1) the exercise of
16 telecommunications functions and responsibilities set forth in the Executive Order; and (2)
17 the coordination of planning for and provision of NS/EP communications for the Federal
18 Government under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and
19 reconstitution.
20

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1 Appendix 2B: NIPP Implementation

2 Initiatives and Actions
3
4 [Note: NIPP implementation initiatives and actions are now captured in the National and
5 Sector Annual CIKR Protection Reports. The National CIKR Protection Annual Report
6 includes annual reports from the SLTT and RCCC. Since all of these reports are prepared
7 each year, they are more amenable to being kept current. Detailed implementation actions
8 can also be found in each of the Sector-Specific Plans. As a result, this appendix is being
9 removed from the NIPP.]
10
11

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1 Appendix 3: The Protection Program

2 Appendix 3A: Risk Assessment Essential
3 Features and Core Elements
4 The essential features and core elements of a risk assessment identify the characteristics
5 and information needed to produce results that can contribute to cross-sector risk
6 comparisons. This Appendix provides a guide for modifying existing methodologies so the
7 investment and expertise they represent can be used to support national-level comparative
8 risk assessment, investments, incident response planning, and resource prioritization. This
9 Appendix is a checklist summary of information provided in Section 3.3 of the NIPP which
10 can be referenced for further detail on these topics.
11 Many stakeholders conduct risk assessments to meet their own decision needs.
12 Independent risk management may not require the essential features and core elements
13 specified here. Whenever possible, however, DHS seeks to use information from
14 stakeholders’ assessments to contribute to an understanding of risks across sectors and
15 regions throughout the Nation. To do this consistently, the challenge of minimizing
16 disparity of approaches must be addressed. Some of the essential features and core
17 elements apply to the methodologies themselves, while others are addressed in the process
18 of conducting an assessment.
19 Essential Features:
20 Documented: The methodology and the assessment must clearly document what
21 information is used and how it is synthesized to generate a risk estimate. Any
22 assumptions, weighting factors and subjective judgments need to be clear to the user of
23 the methodology, its audience, and others who are expected to use the results. A
24 description should be provided of the decisions the risk assessment is designed to
25 support and the timeframe (e.g., current, next year, next 5 years) considered in the
26 assessment.
27 Objective: The methodology must produce comparable, repeatable results, even
28 though assessments of different CIKR will be performed by different analysts or teams
29 of analysts. It must minimize the number and impact of subjective judgments, leaving
30 policy and value judgments to be applied by decision makers.
31 Defensible: The risk methodology must be technically sound, making appropriate use
32 of the professional disciplines relevant to the analysis, as well as be free from significant
33 errors or omissions. The uncertainty associated with consequence estimates and
34 confidence in the vulnerability and threat estimates must be communicated.
35 Complete: The methodology must assess consequence, vulnerability and threat for
36 every defined scenario and include the specific Core Elements for each.
37 Core Elements:
38 Consequence Assessment
39 Document the scenarios assessed, tools used, and any key assumptions made
40 Estimate fatalities, injuries, and illnesses (where applicable and feasible)
41 Assess psychological impacts and mission disruption where feasible

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1 Estimate the economic loss in dollars, stating which costs are included and what
2 duration was considered
3 If monetizing human health consequences, document the value(s) used and assumptions
4 made
5 Consider and document any protective or consequence mitigation measures that have
6 their effect after the incident has occurred such as the rerouting of systems or HAZMAT
7 or fire and rescue response
8 Vulnerability Assessment
9 Identify vulnerabilities associated with physical, cyber, or human factors (openness to
10 both insider and outsider threats), critical dependencies, and physical proximity to
11 hazards. Collect sufficient information to form an estimate for each attack scenario
12 Account for the protective measures in place and how they reduce the vulnerability for
13 each attack type
14 In evaluating security vulnerabilities, estimate the relative strength of collective
15 protective measures
16 In evaluating security vulnerabilities, develop estimates of the likelihood of adversaries’
17 success for each attack scenario
18 Threat Assessment
19 For adversary-specific threat assessments:
20 ¾ Account for the access to the target and the opportunity to attack it
21 ¾ Identify attack methods that may be employed
22 ¾ Consider the level of capability that an adversary demonstrates for an attack
23 method
24 ¾ Consider the degree of the adversaries’ intent to attack the target
25 ¾ Estimate threat as the likelihood that the adversary would attempt a given attack
26 method at the target
27 For natural disasters and accidental hazards:
28 ¾ Use best-available analytic tools and historical data to estimate the likelihood of
29 these events affecting CIKR
30

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1 Appendix 3B: Existing Protective

2 Programs and Other In-Place Measures
3 This appendix provides examples of the Federal protective programs that currently support
4 NIPP implementation. The examples provided herein generally cut across sectors and have
5 national significance. These Federal programs augment the extensive State, local, tribal,
6 territorial, and private sector protective programs that constitute important efforts already
7 being implemented in support of the NIPP. The SSPs address sector-specific programs that
8 are conducted under the leadership of the SSAs, and include selected protection programs
9 undertaken by other CIKR partners that apply broadly across the sector.
10 3B.1 Protective Programs and Initiatives

11 Site Assistance Visits: SAVs are facility vulnerability assessments jointly conducted by DHS
12 in coordination and collaboration with Federal, State, local stakeholders and CIKR owners
13 and operators. The SAV uses a hybrid methodology of dynamic and static vulnerabilities
14 including elements of asset-based approaches (identifying and discussing critical site assets
15 and current CIKR protection postures) and scenario-based approaches (assault planning
16 and likely attack scenarios to ensure current threats are included). Through SAVs, DHS
17 informs CIKR owners and operators of vulnerabilities and provides recommended
18 protective measures that would increase the ability to detect and prevent terrorist attacks,
19 and provides recommendations for reducing vulnerabilities. An SAV can range from a
20 “quick visit” to a full security vulnerability assessment; three to five days to
21 comprehensively assess physical, cyber, and system interdependencies. An SAV identifies
22 consequence and vulnerability information that supports risk analyses.
23 Buffer Zone Protection Program: The BZPP is a DHS-administered grant program designed
24 to support local law enforcement (LLE) and owners and operators of CIKR increase security
25 in the “buffer zone” – the area outside of a facility that can be used by an adversary to
26 conduct surveillance or launch an attack. The Buffer Zone Plan (BZP) is a strategic
27 document developed by the responsible jurisdictions that: identifies significant assets at the
28 site that may be targeted by terrorists; identifies specific threats and vulnerabilities
29 associated with the site and its significant assets; and develops an appropriate buffer zone
30 extending outward from the facility in which protective measures can be employed to make
31 it more difficult for terrorists to conduct site surveillance or launch attacks.
32 Comprehensive Reviews: The Comprehensive Review (CR) is a cooperative government– led
33 analysis of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) facilities. The CR considers
34 not only potential terrorist methods of attack, the consequences of such an attack, the
35 integrated preparedness and response capabilities of the owner/operator, local law
36 enforcement (LLE), and emergency response organizations; but also preparedness and
37 response for a natural disaster. The results are used to enhance the overall security and
38 preparedness posture of the facilities, their surrounding communities, the geographic
39 region, and ultimately the nation. The CR provides a forum for candid and open dialogue
40 among all levels of the government and private sector. The CR incorporates a variety of
41 assessment and exercise tools. Information obtained from the CR is used not only to
42 enhance the capabilities of CIKR owner/operators and community first responders, but also
43 to provide risk data to inform Federal investment and research and development decisions.

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1 Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities (CV), Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity

2 (PI), and Protective Measures (PM) Reports: These reports identify common vulnerabilities
3 of critical infrastructure, site-specific vulnerabilities, and the types of terrorist activities
4 that likely would be successful in exploiting these vulnerabilities. The VAB has developed
5 Integrated Infrastructure Papers (IIPs) that integrate these reports, which are currently
6 available to over 500 Federal, State, local and private sector partners on a secure website.
7 Computer-Based Assessment Tool (C-BAT): The Computer-Based Assessment Tool (CBAT)
8 is an extension of the technical assistance provided for the DHS’s SAV Program and BZPP,
9 and in support of national and special events. CBAT comprises technology and services
10 that help DHS, owners and operators, local law enforcement, and emergency personnel
11 prepare for, respond to, and manage CIKR and special events. By integrating SAV and
12 BZPP assessment data with geospherical video and geospatial and hypermedia data, CBAT
13 provides planners with a computer-based, cross-platform tool that allows them to present
14 data, make informed decisions quickly, and confidently respond to an incident. The “video
15 walkthrough” of the facility or perimeter provided by CBAT also affords emergency
16 response personnel a first-hand view of what they will encounter. The camera system
17 combines six individual, high-resolution cameras that provide a 360-degree spherical color
18 video of facilities, routes, and specific areas pertaining to a CBAT request.
19 Control Systems Security Initiative: DHS sponsors programs to increase the security of
20 control systems. A control system is an interconnection of components (designed to
21 maintain operation of a process or system) connected or related in such a manner as to
22 command, monitor, direct, or regulate itself or another system. Control systems are
23 embedded throughout the Nation’s CIKR and may be vulnerable to increasing cyber threats
24 that could have a devastating impact on national security, economic security, public health
25 and safety, and the environment. The DHS Control Systems Security Initiative provides
26 coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as control system
27 owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system security within and across all
28 CIKR sectors.
29 Federal Cyber System Security Programs: DHS established the GFIRST to facilitate
30 interagency information sharing and cooperation across Federal agencies responsible for
31 cyber system readiness and response. The members work together to understand and
32 manage computer security incidents and to encourage proactive and preventive security
33 practices. Other examples of Federal agency cybersecurity access control, certification, and
34 policy enforcement tools include:
35 The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for developing and
36 implementing an infrastructure for authentication services, as well as an automated
37 risk assessment tool for government-wide use in certifying and accrediting its
38 eAuthentication gateway. GSA is creating a list of approved solution providers that
39 supply smart cards based on Federal Public Key Infrastructure standards and that
40 include a new electronic authentication policy specification.
41 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency has implemented enterprise-wide
42 vulnerability assessments and virus-detection software, an intrusion-detection system,
43 anti-virus scanning gateways, and a patch management policy.
44 Federal Hazard Mitigation Programs: FEMA administers three programs that provide
45 funds for activities that reduce losses from future disasters or help prevent the occurrence
46 of catastrophes. These hazard mitigation programs include the Flood Mitigation Assistance

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1 Program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, and the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program.
2 These programs enable grant recipients to undertake activities such as the elevation of
3 structures in floodplains, relocation of structures from floodplains, construction of
4 structural enhancements to facilities and buildings in earthquake-prone areas (also known
5 as retrofitting), and modifications to land-use plans to ensure that future construction
6 ameliorates, and does not exacerbate, hazardous conditions.
7 International Outreach Program: DHS works with the Department of State and other CIKR
8 partners to conduct international outreach with foreign countries and international
9 organizations to encourage the promotion and adoption of best practices, training, and
10 other programs, as needed, to improve the protection of overseas assets and the reliability
11 of the foreign infrastructure on which the United States depends.
12 National Cyber Exercises: DHS conducts exercises to identify, test, and improve
13 coordination of the cyber incident response community, including Federal, State, territorial,
14 local, tribal, and international government elements, as well as private sector corporations
15 and coordinating councils.
16 National Cyber Response Coordination Group: This entity facilitates coordination of the
17 Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents
18 and physical attacks that have significant cyber consequences (collectively known as cyber
19 incidents). The NCRCG serves as the Federal Government’s principal interagency
20 mechanism for operational information sharing and coordination of the Federal
21 Government’s response and recovery efforts during a cyber crisis. It uses established
22 relationships with the private sector and State and local governments to help manage a
23 cyber crisis, develop courses of action, and devise appropriate response and recovery
24 strategies.
25 Protective Community Support Program: Specific advisory support is provided to the
26 protective community (e.g., law enforcement, first-responders), including training and
27 exercise support.
28 Protective Security Advisor Program: DHS protection specialists are assigned as liaisons
29 between DHS and the protective community at the State, local, and private sector levels in
30 geographical areas representing major concentrations of CIKR across the United States.
31 The PSAs are responsible for sharing risk information and providing technical assistance to
32 local law enforcement and CIKR owners and operators of CIKR within those areas.
33 Software Assurance: DHS is developing best practices and new technologies to promote
34 integrity, security, and reliability in software development. Focused on shifting away from
35 the current security paradigm of patch management, DHS is leading the Software
36 Assurance Program, a comprehensive strategy that addresses processes, technology, and
37 acquisition throughout the software life cycle to result in secure and reliable software that
38 supports critical mission requirements.
39 Training Programs: DHS training programs are designed to provide CIKR partners with a
40 source from which they can obtain specialized training to enhance CIKR protection. Subject
41 matter, course length, and location of training can be tailored to specific partner needs.

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1 3B.2 Guidelines, Reports, and Planning

2 Cybersecurity Planning: DHS recognizes that each sector will have a unique reliance on
3 cyber systems and will, therefore, assist SSAs in considering a range of effective and
4 appropriate cyber protective measures. The sector-level approaches to cybersecurity will be
5 documented in the respective SSPs.
6 Educational Reports: DHS provides several types of informational reports to support efforts
7 to protect CIKR. They cover subjects such as CIKR common vulnerabilities, potential
8 indicators of terrorist activity, and best practices for protective measures. As they are
9 developed, these reports are distributed to all State and territorial Homeland Security
10 Offices with the guidance that they should be shared with CIKR owners and operators, the
11 law enforcement community, and captains of the ports in their respective jurisdictions.
12 Risk Management Manuals: In response to the September 11, 2001, attacks, FEMA’s role
13 was expanded to include activities to reduce the vulnerability of buildings to terrorist
14 attacks. In support of this, FEMA created the Risk Management Series, a collection of
15 publications directed at providing design guidance to mitigate the consequences of
16 manmade disasters.
17 To date, the series includes the following manuals:
18 FEMA 155, Building Design for Homeland Security
19 FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings
20 FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks
21 FEMA 428, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks
22 FEMA 429, Insurance, Finance, and Regulation Primer for Terrorism Risk Management
23 in Buildings
24 FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components in Architectural
25 Design
26 FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks
27 Against Buildings
28 FEMA 453, Multihazard Shelter (Safe Havens) Design
29 3B.3 Information-Sharing Programs That Support CIKR Protection

30 Federal agencies and the law enforcement community provide information-sharing services
31 and programs that support CIKR protection information sharing. These include:
32 DHS Homeland Security Information Network: HSIN is a national, Web-based
33 communications platform that allows DHS; SSAs; State, local, tribal, and territorial
34 government entities; and other partners to obtain, analyze, and share information based
35 on a common operating picture of strategic risk and the evolving incident landscape.
36 The network is designed to provide a robust, dynamic information-sharing capability
37 that supports both NIPP-related steady-state CIKR protection and NRF-related
38 incident management activities, and to provide the information-sharing processes that
39 form the bridge between these two homeland security missions. HSIN will be one part of
40 the ISE called for by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; as
41 specified in the act, it will provide users with access to terrorism information that is

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1 matched to their roles, responsibilities, and missions in a timely and responsive

2 manner. HSIN is discussed in detail in chapter 4.
3 FBI’s InfraGard: InfraGard is an information-sharing and analysis effort serving the
4 interests and combining the knowledge base of a wide range of members. At its most
5 basic level, InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and the private sector.
6 InfraGard is an association of businesses, academic institutions, State and local law
7 enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and
8 intelligence related to the protection of U.S. CIKR from both physical and cyber threats.
9 InfraGard chapters are geographically linked with FBI Field Office territories. Each
10 InfraGard chapter has an FBI Special Agent Coordinator who works closely with
11 Supervisory Special Agent Program Managers in the Cyber Division at FBI
12 Headquarters.
13 Interagency Cybersecurity Efforts: Interagency cooperation and information sharing are
14 essential to improving national counterintelligence and law enforcement capabilities
15 pertaining to cybersecurity. The intelligence and law enforcement communities have
16 various official and unofficial information-sharing mechanisms in place. Examples
17 include:
18 ¾ U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces: U.S. Secret Service’s ECTFs
19 provide interagency coordination on cyber-based attacks and intrusions. At present,
20 15 ECTFs are in operation, with an expansion planned.
21 ¾ FBI’s Inter-Agency Coordination Cell: The Inter-Agency Coordination Cell is a
22 multi-agency group focused on sharing law enforcement information on cyber-
23 related investigations.
24 ¾ Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section: DOJ, Criminal Division,
25 Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section is responsible for prosecuting
26 nationally significant cases of cyber crime and intellectual property crime. In
27 addition to its direct litigation responsibilities, the division formulates and
28 implements criminal enforcement policy and provides advice and assistance.
29 ¾ Cybercop Portal: The DHS-sponsored Cybercop portal is a secure Internet-based
30 information-sharing mechanism that connects more than 5,300 members of the law
31 enforcement community worldwide (including bank investigators and the network
32 security community) involved in electronic crimes investigations.
33 Law Enforcement Online: The FBI provides LEO as national focal point for electronic
34 communications, education, and information sharing for the law enforcement
35 community. LEO, which can be accessed by any approved employee of a Federal, State,
36 or local law enforcement agency, or approved member of an authorized law enforcement
37 special interest group, is intended to provide a communications mechanism to link all
38 levels of law enforcement throughout the United States.
39 Regional Information Sharing Systems: The RISS Program is a federally funded
40 program administered by DOJ, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice
41 Assistance. RISS serves more than 7,300 member law enforcement agencies in 50
42 States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Australia,
43 Canada, and the United Kingdom. The program is comprised of six regional centers that
44 share intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in
45 many locations across jurisdictional lines. Typical targets of RISS activities are
46 terrorism, drug trafficking, violent crime, cyber crime, gang activity, and organized
47 criminal activities. The majority of the member agencies are at the municipal and

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1 county levels; however, more than 485 State agencies and more than 920 Federal
2 agencies also participate. The Drug Enforcement Administration; FBI; U.S. Attorneys’
3 Offices; Internal Revenue Service; Secret Service; U.S. Immigration and Customs
4 Enforcement; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives are among
5 the Federal agencies participating in the RISS Program.
6 Sharing National Security Information: The ability to share relevant classified
7 information poses a number of challenges, particularly when the majority of industry
8 facilities are neither designed for nor accredited to receive, store, and dispose of these
9 materials. Ultimately, HSIN may be used to more efficiently share appropriate
10 classified national security information with cleared private sector owners and
11 operators during incidents, times of heightened threat, or on an as-needed basis. While
12 supporting technologies and policies are identified to satisfy this requirement, DHS will
13 continue to expand its initiative to sponsor security clearances for designated private
14 sector owners and operators, sharing classified information using currently available
15 methods.
16 Web-Based Services for Citizens: A variety of Web-based information services are
17 available to enhance the general awareness and preparedness of American citizens.
18 These include CitizenCorps.gov, FirstGov.gov, Ready.gov, and USAonwatch.org.
19

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1 Appendix 3C: Infrastructure Data

2 Warehouse
3 3C.1 Why Do We Need a National CIKR Inventory?
4 HSPD-7 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to lead efforts to reduce the Nation’s
5 vulnerability to terrorism and deny the use of infrastructure as a weapon by developing,
6 coordinating, integrating, and implementing plans and programs that identify, catalog,
7 prioritize, and protect CIKR in cooperation with all levels of government and private sector
8 entities. A central Federal data repository for analysis and integration is required to
9 provide DHS with the capability to identify, collect, catalog, and maintain a national
10 inventory of information on assets, systems, networks, and functions that may be critical to
11 the Nation’s well being, economy, and security. This inventory is also essential to help
12 inform decisionmaking and specific response and recovery activities pertaining to natural
13 disasters and other emergencies.
14 To fulfill this need, DHS has developed the federated IDW, a continually evolving and
15 comprehensive catalog of the assets, systems, and networks that comprise the Nation’s
16 CIKR. The IDW enables access to descriptive information regarding CIKR. Although the
17 IDW is not a listing of prioritized assets, it has the capability to help inform risk-mitigation
18 activities across the CIKR sectors and government jurisdictions.
19 3C.2 How Does the Inventory Support the NIPP?

20 The IDW provides a coordinated and consistent framework to access and display the CIKR
21 data submitted by Federal, State, and local agencies; the private sector; and integrated
22 Federal or commercial databases. The federated framework and structure of the IDW have
23 been constructed to readily integrate other CIKR data sources and provide the required
24 data in a usable and effective manner. Two primary components of this framework are the
25 Infrastructure Protection Taxonomy and the infrastructure type data fields:
26 The IP taxonomy groups CIKR by sector and identifies overlaps between and across
27 sectors. It was developed by DHS in coordination with the SSAs to ensure that every
28 CIKR type is represented.
29 The infrastructure type data fields outline the attributes of interest that are integral to
30 assessment and analysis per a specific category of CIKR making the IDW National
31 Information Exchange Model (NIEM)-compliant. The information contained in these
32 data fields feeds the strategic risk assessment process used to prioritize CIKR in the
33 context of terrorist threats or incidents, natural disasters, or other emergencies.
34 The information accessed through the IDW enables the analysis necessary to determine
35 which assets, systems, and networks comprise the Nation’s CIKR, and to inform security
36 planning and preparedness, resource investments, and post-incident response and recovery
37 activities within and across sectors and governmental jurisdictions.

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1 3C.3 What Is the Current Content of the Inventory?

2 DHS gathers data related to the Nation’s CIKR from a variety of sources. The inventory
3 reflects a collection of information garnered from formal data calls, voluntary additions, and
4 the leveraging of various Federal and commercial databases. Information accessed through
5 the IDW has been received from Federal agencies, State and local submissions, voluntary
6 private sector submissions, commercial demographics products, external data sources, and
7 subject matter experts. The information is used to inform CIKR protection efforts,
8 contingency planning, planning for implementation of initiatives such as the BZPP, and to
9 aid decisionmakers during response, recovery, and restoration following terrorist attacks,
10 natural disasters, or other emergencies.
11 3C.4 How Will the Current Inventory Remain Accurate?

12 DHS continues to seek input from multiple infrastructure sources, including existing
13 databases managed by SSAs, commercial providers, State and local governments, and the
14 private sector. Integrating existing databases using a federated framework will provide a
15 dynamic common operating interface of infrastructure and vulnerability information
16 through a cross flow of data between separate databases, or linked access to other
17 databases. Existing databases being considered for integration are shown in table 3C-1.
18 Ownership and control of the data will be determined according to the circumstances of
19 each database. Classification of the data will be based on Original Classification Authority
20 (OCA) guidance and will be protected as required by OCA guidance and direction.
21
22 3C.5 How Will the Infrastructure Data Warehouse Be Maintained?

23 The process of ensuring that the data collected is both current and accurate is continual.
24 Data updates and currency are largely dependent upon the sources of the data and the
25 frequency of the updates that they provide.

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1 Efficiency and reliability are maintained through the implementation by the data steward
2 of various data quality control techniques. Verification and validation efforts by contracted
3 companies or Federal employees will play a key role in ensuring information currency.
4 3C.6 What Are the CIKR Partner Roles and Responsibilities?

5 The CIKR information accessible through the IDW is highly dependent upon the
6 participation and support of the SSAs, the States, and private sector entities:
7
8 SSAs have primary responsibility for providing sector information (through replication
9 of the data or access to the original data source) to DHS for inclusion in the IDW using
10 the format and categorization system employed by the IDW. 39 The processes used for
11 sector CIKR and database identification in coordination with partners should be
12 described in the SSPs.
13 Some State governments have either already developed infrastructure databases or
14 have begun the process to identify and assess CIKR within their jurisdictions. State
15 homeland security advisors should work closely with DHS and the SSAs to ensure that
16 data collection efforts are streamlined, coordinated, and reflect the most accurate data
17 possible.
18 The most current and accurate data are best known by CIKR owners and operators.
19 Thus, as the owners and operators of the majority of the Nation’s CIKR, private sector
20 entities are encouraged to be actively involved in the development of CIKR information.
21 Primarily through the voluntary provision of CIKR information and industry-specific
22 subject matter expertise, the private sector is playing an integral role in the expansion
23 of information accessed through the IDW.
24 3C.7 What Are the Plans for IDW Expansion?

25 The current IDW incorporates a flexible service oriented architecture to facilitate evolution,
26 growth, and continued interconnectivity with additional databases and tools.
27 Advancements will include integration with multiple commercial and Federal CIKR
28 databases, vulnerability assessment tools and libraries, intelligence and threat reporting
29 databases, and geospatial tools.
30 DHS is developing the IDW with a more versatile platform to better support integration of
31 DHS and SSA mission-specific applications and mission-specific databases. The goal of this
32 effort is to create a means to access national CIKR information that more efficiently and
33 effectively supports the implementation of NIPP risk management framework activities,
34 including:
35 Integration of vulnerability, consequence, and asset/system/network attribute data into
36 a single portal interface as the foundation for the NIPP risk assessment process;
37 Access to threat data to support the development of asset, system, and network risk
38 scores;
The DHS/IP Taxonomy is the foundation for multiple DHS programs that focus on CIKR, such as the IDW and the National Threat Incident Database, and
39
should provide the foundation for the lexicon used in the SSPs. This common framework will allow more efficient integration and transfer of information, as well
as a more effective analytical tool for making comparisons.

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1 Assessment and, if appropriate, prioritization of assets, systems, and networks across

2 sectors and jurisdictions based on risk to promote the more effective allocation and use
3 of available resources and to inform planning, threat response, and post-incident
4 restoration actions at all levels of government and the private sector;
5 Sharing of consistent information so that all partners involved in CIKR protection
6 operate from a common frame of reference;
7 Acting as a primary information and integration hub for protective security needs
8 throughout the country in support of DHS- and SSA-led activities;
9 Supporting the efforts of law enforcement agencies during National Security Special
10 Events and other high-priority security events; and
11 Supporting the efforts of primary Federal agencies in responding to and recovering from
12 major natural or manmade disasters.

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1 Appendix 3D: Effectiveness

2 The CIKR measurement and analysis process continues to mature as the basis for
3 establishing accountability, documenting performance, identifying issues, promoting
4 effective management, and reassessing CIKR goals and objectives. In FY 2008, the CIKR
5 protection metrics program efficiently captured descriptive and output measures to monitor
6 the progress of risk-mitigation activities, coordination, and information sharing.
7 Figure 3D-1 displays the evolution of the CIKR protection metrics components for the
8 measurement and analysis process from FY 2006 to FY 2009. To capture the effectiveness
9 of protection programs and risk-mitigation activities, the measurement and analysis
10 process will continue to evolve and collect outcome measures in FY 2009 and beyond.
11 Figure 3D-1: Evolution of CIKR Metrics
12
FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009
13
Metrics Focus
Evolution of
14 Descriptive Outcome
Measures to Output Measures to Measures to
15 Characterize Monitor Progress Assess
Status Effectiveness
16
17 Core Metrics (NIPP Core Metrics (NIPP NIPP Core Metrics NIPP Core Metrics
Evolution of Metrics Components
Risk Management Risk Management

SSA Programmatic SSA Programmatic
18 Framework and
Governance/
Framework and
Governance/
Metrics Metrics
Coordination) Coordination) Sector Partnership Sector Partnership
19 IP Programmatic
Metrics Metrics
Metrics Sector-Specific Sector-Specific
20 Metrics Metrics
National Coordinator National Coordinator
21 Programmatic Programmatic
Metrics Metrics
22 CIKR Information CIKR Information
Sharing Environment Sharing Environment
23 Metrics Metrics
24
25
26 DHS is enhancing its established measurement and analysis capabilities through the
27 collection of data from all CIKR security partners and development of a methodology to
28 gauge effectiveness of activities that sustains the CIKR protection mission.
29 The methodology, metrics, and analysis to date provide a foundation for measuring the
30 efficacy of risk management activities performed under the NIPP and the progress made in
31 reducing the risks to the Nation’s CIKR from terrorist attacks and other hazards. The
32 measurement process supports the continuous improvement loop of the NIPP Risk
33 Management Framework. DHS is further developing the methodology to estimate
34 effectiveness of risk-mitigation activities. This methodology can be applied at different
35 levels of aggregation. In the context of CIKR protection, effectiveness is represented as a
36 function of impact, performance, and quality (see figure 3D-2).
37 Effectiveness (E) can be expressed as a function of its components:

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1 E = f(I, P, Q),
2 Where
3 I = impact;
4 P = performance; and
5 Q = quality.
6
7 Figure 3D-2 Model of Effectiveness
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 Effectiveness (E) can be modeled at varying levels of detail depending on the unit of
22 analysis (e.g., effectiveness of an activity, action, project, or initiative) used. Impact (I)
23 refers to the robustness, value, or inherent worth (significance) of an activity, action,
24 project, or initiative associated with the metrics components if it were to fully achieve its
25 intended results: how important is an activity to the overall goals and objectives of CIKR
26 protection? Performance measures (P) are used to gauge program performance and are
27 based on targets that are quantifiable or have an otherwise measurable characteristic: how
28 well does a program meet its performance measures? Performance measures must be
29 meaningful in the context of the specific program and capture the most important aspects of
30 a program’s mission and priorities. Another essential element needed to achieve program
31 goals and objectives and develop a sustainable CIKR protection program is assessment:
32 how well is the work being performed? The quality indicator (Q) captures the completeness,
33 accuracy, timeliness, and reliability of a product or service being developed to meet
34 specified requirements.

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1 Appendix 4: Organizing and Partnering

2 for CIKR Protection: Existing
3 Coordination Mechanisms
4 The coordination mechanisms established under the NIPP serve as the primary means for
5 coordinating CIKR protection activities nationally. However, many other avenues exist for
6 CIKR partners to engage with each other and government at all levels to ensure that their
7 efforts are fully coordinated in accordance with the principles outlined in the NIPP. The
8 following table summarizes many of these available mechanisms.
Coordination Mechanism Description

Local to Local Inter-Local Cities and towns exchange information and cooperate on any number of
Agreements projects. Inter-local agreements are a mechanism to do cooperatively
anything that can be done as an individual municipality.
Mutual-Aid Established means through which one local government can offer
Agreements assistance and another receive assistance in a time of disaster. These
agreements cover logistics, deployment, liability, reimbursement, and
many other issues. The intent is to provide assistance in the most efficient
manner possible by coordinating the relevant terms and conditions in
advance.
County County commissioners provide leadership, services, and programs to
Commissioner meet the health, safety, and welfare needs of their citizens in an
Interaction integrated, collaborative network.
Local to State Committees, Local-to-State legislative- and regulatory-level interactions occur through
Commissions, and State committees, commissions, and boards dealing with counter-
Boards terrorism, environmental, transportation, community development,
retirement, insurance, and many other issues. Interactions also include
coordination between the office of the Governor, homeland security
advisor, Emergency Management Agency, and National Guard.
Local to Federal Associations National associations of local governments serve as a bridge between
local elected officials and the Federal Government to ensure that the
public safety and homeland security needs of localities are met. These
organizations, such as the National League of Cities, the National
Association of Counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, work to
ensure that Federal resources are appropriately targeted for disaster
planning, mitigation, and recovery.
State to State Intrastate Councils Councils of State Governments are regional councils that, by law, are
of Government political subdivisions of the State with the authority to plan and initiate
needed cooperative projects; however, they do not have the power to
regulate or tax because these authorities are exclusively assigned to
cities and counties. A council’s duties may include comprehensive
planning for regional employment and training needs, criminal justice,
economic development, homeland security, emergency preparedness,
bioterrorism, 911 service, solid waste, aging, transportation, and rural
development, among various others.

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Coordination Mechanism Description

Interstate or States face issues that are not confined to geographical boundaries or
Regional Compacts jurisdictional lines. Interstate compacts are a mechanism that can be
(including those used to address sector interdependencies and coordinate protection of
with cross-border CIKR. Compacts are organized in a number of ways:
entities) • Sector-based compacts focus on specific CIKR resources that are
shared or are interdependent across State boundaries (e.g., the
Western Interstate Energy Compact);
• Preparedness-focused compacts, such as the Interstate Mutual-Aid
Compact, establish a means for participating jurisdictions to provide
voluntary assistance to other States in response to an event that
overwhelms the resources of individual State and local governments;
and
• Regional compacts provide a means for participating jurisdictions to
coordinate activities within a specific geographical area that spans
multiple States. These agreements, such as the Canadian River
Compact, define the specific equities of each State within the particular
region.
For more information on interstate compacts, contact the National Center
for Interstate Compacts: www.csg.org/programs/ncic/default.aspx.
State to Federal Associations Organizations such as the National Governors Association, National
Conference of State Legislatures, and Council of State Governments
represent the interests of States in the Federal policymaking process.
State-level professional associations, such as the Association of State
Drinking Water Administrators and the Association of State Water
Pollution Control Administrators, also provide sector-specific coordination
mechanisms. Additionally, these groups support State leaders by keeping
their members informed of key Federal decisions that impact State
government.
State Liaison Some States have formed specific liaison offices in Washington, DC, to
Offices maintain awareness of Federal developments and ensure that their
individual State perspective is represented in the Federal policymaking
process. These offices report back regularly to their State’s leadership
and legislature regarding Federal issues of interest.
Federal to Memoranda of Agreements between two or more Federal departments and agencies to
Federal Understanding or cooperate on a specific topic or initiative.
Agreement
Private Sector to Public-Private Contractual agreement between a public agency (i.e., Federal, State, or
Government (all Partnerships local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and
levels) assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a
service or facility for the use of the general public.
Advisory Councils, In addition to the SCCs and ISACs, a variety of private sector
Boards, and organizations exist that focus on homeland security and CIKR protection
Commissions activities on a sector and geographical basis. These groups are made up
of members of the public and subject matter experts, and provide advice
and recommendations to governments at all levels.
Associations Myriad private sector associations exist that advocate on behalf of their
members in the policymaking process at the Federal, State, and local
levels. These groups are comprised of individuals or companies with
common interests. Because of their ability to communicate with their
members, private associations provide an effective means for
government to provide information to the public and also learn the
concerns of specific groups of CIKR partners.
1
2

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1 Appendix 5: Integrating CIKR Protection

2 as Part of the Homeland Security Mission
3 Appendix 5A: State, Local, Tribal, and
4 Territorial Government Considerations
5 State, local, tribal, and territorial efforts support the implementation of the NIPP and
6 associated SSPs by providing a jurisdictional focus and enabling cross-sector coordination.
7 The NIPP recognizes that there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to CIKR protection
8 planning at the State and local levels. Creating and managing a CIKR protection program
9 for a given jurisdiction entails building an organizational structure and mechanisms for
10 coordination between government and private sector entities that can be used to implement
11 the NIPP risk management framework. This includes taking actions within the jurisdiction
12 to set security goals; identify assets, systems, and networks; assess risks; prioritize CIKR
13 across sectors; implement protective programs; and measure the effectiveness of risk-
14 mitigation efforts. These elements form the basis of CIKR protection programs and guide
15 the implementation of relevant CIKR protection-related goals and objectives outlined in
16 State, local, tribal, and territorial homeland security strategies.
17 This appendix provides general guidance that can be tailored to unique jurisdictional
18 characteristics, organizational structures, and operating environments at the State, local,
19 and tribal levels. Additional guidance is available in A Guide to Critical Infrastructure and
20 Key Resources Protection at the State, Regional, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Levels (2008).
21 The NIPP is structured to avoid redundancy and ensure coordination between State, local,
22 and Federal CIKR protection efforts. States or localities are encouraged to focus their
23 efforts in ways that leverage Federal resources and address the relevant CIKR sector’s
24 protection requirements in their particular areas or jurisdictions. This appendix outlines a
25 basic framework to guide the development of CIKR protection strategies, plans, and
26 programs in coordination with the NIPP.
27 To align with the NIPP, State and local CIKR protection plans and programs should
28 explicitly address six broad categories regarding their CIKR protection approach:
29 CIKR protection roles and responsibilities;
30 Building partnerships and information sharing;
31 Implementing the NIPP risk management framework;
32 CIKR data use and protection;
33 Leveraging ongoing emergency preparedness activities for CIKR protection; and
34 Integrating Federal CIKR protection activities.
35 5A.1 CIKR Roles and Responsibilities

36 The NIPP outlines a set of broad roles and responsibilities for State, regional, local, and
37 tribal entities (see chapter 2). State, regional, local, and tribal CIKR protection plans (or
38 elements addressing CIKR in State or local homeland security plans or strategies) should

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1 describe how each jurisdiction intends to implement these roles and responsibilities. In
2 particular, jurisdictions should consider and describe in their plans the following:
3 Which offices or organizations in the jurisdiction perform the roles or responsibilities
4 outlined in the NIPP or supporting SSPs;
5 Whether gaps exist between the jurisdiction’s current approach and those roles and
6 responsibilities outlined in the NIPP or in an SSP, and how the gaps will be addressed;
7 Whether any roles and responsibilities should be revised, modified, or consolidated to
8 accommodate the unique operating attributes of the jurisdiction;
9 How the jurisdiction will maintain operational awareness of the performance of the
10 CIKR protection roles assigned to different offices, agencies, or localities; and
11 How the jurisdiction will coordinate its CIKR protection roles and responsibilities with
12 other jurisdictions and the Federal Government.
13 5A.2 Building Partnerships and Information Sharing

14 Effective CIKR protection requires the development of partnerships, collaboration, and
15 information sharing between government and private sector owners and operators. This
16 includes maintaining awareness of CIKR owner and operator concerns, disseminating
17 relevant information to owners and operators, and maintaining processes for rapid response
18 and decisionmaking in the event of a threat or incident involving CIKR within the
19 jurisdiction. To address partnership building, networking, and information sharing, State
20 and local entities should determine whether the appropriate mechanisms for sharing
21 information and networking with CIKR partners are in place. If mechanisms are not
22 established at all of the relevant levels, State and local entities should identify means for
23 better coordinating and sharing information with CIKR partners. Options to be considered
24 and described in State, regional, local, and tribal CIKR protection plans can include, but
25 are not limited to:
26 Ensuring collaboration with other government entities and the private sector using a
27 process based on the partnership model outlined under the NIPP or an abbreviated form
28 of the model addressing just those sectors that are most relevant to the jurisdiction;
29 Instituting specific information-sharing networks, such as an information-sharing
30 portal, for the jurisdiction. These types of networks allow owners and operators, and
31 governmental entities to share best practices, provide a better understanding of sector
32 and cross-sector needs, and inform collective decisionmaking on how best to utilize
33 resources;
34 Developing standing committees and work groups to discuss relevant CIKR protection
35 issues;
36 Developing a regular newsletter or similar communications tool for CIKR owners and
37 operators on relevant CIKR protection issues and coordination within the jurisdiction;
38 and
39 Participating in existing sector-wide and national information-sharing networks,
40 including those offered by trade associations, ISACs, SCCs, and threat warning and
41 alert notification systems.
42 The information-sharing approach for a given jurisdiction will vary based on CIKR
43 ownership, number and type of CIKR sectors represented in the jurisdiction, and the extent

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1 to which existing mechanisms can be leveraged. The options presented above are merely a
2 description of some available mechanisms that jurisdictions may consider as they develop
3 the organization of their programs and document their processes in a CIKR protection plan.
4 5A.3 Implementing the Risk Management Framework

5 The NIPP risk management framework described in chapter 3 provides a useful model for
6 State, regional, local, and tribal jurisdictions to use in addressing CIKR protection within
7 the given jurisdiction. The model provides a risk-informed approach to identify, prioritize,
8 and protect CIKR assets and systems at the State and local level. This process also allows
9 State and local jurisdictions to enhance coordination with DHS and the SSAs in developing
10 and implementing CIKR protection programs. The following should be considered when
11 developing CIKR protection programs:
12 What are the jurisdiction’s goals and objectives for CIKR protection? How do these goals
13 relate to those of the NIPP and the SSPs that are relevant to the jurisdiction?
14 What are the CIKR assets, systems, networks, and functions within the jurisdiction or
15 that impact the jurisdiction? Are there significant interstate or international
16 dependencies or interdependencies? Are any of the assets, systems, or networks within
17 the jurisdiction deemed to be nationally critical by DHS?
18 Are risk assessments for CIKR within the State being conducted or planned by DHS,
19 SSAs, or owners and operators in accordance with the processes outlined in the NIPP?
20 Is there a need for the jurisdiction to conduct additional or supplemental risk
21 assessments? Do the methodologies for conducting risk assessments address the
22 baseline criteria outlined in chapter 3?
23 What are the CIKR protection priorities within the jurisdiction? How do these priorities
24 correlate with the national priorities established by the Federal Government? How do
25 these priorities correlate with the ongoing CIKR protection priorities established for
26 each sector at the national level?
27 What actions or initiatives are being taken within the jurisdiction to address CIKR
28 protection? How do these relate to the national effort?
29 What types of metrics will be used to measure the progress of CIKR protection efforts?
30 5A.4 CIKR Data Use and Protection

31 States and other jurisdictions may employ a variety of means to collect CIKR data or
32 respond to CIKR data requests. State, regional, local, and tribal plans should outline how
33 the jurisdiction has organized itself to address CIKR data use and protection. The following
34 issues should be considered in developing the CIKR protection plan:
35 Will the jurisdiction maintain a comprehensive database of CIKR in the State, region,
36 or locality? How will the jurisdiction collect such information? What tools are available
37 from DHS or the commercial marketplace to support infrastructure information
38 collection and management?
39 How will sensitive data that may be in the possession of State, local, or tribal
40 governments be legally and physically protected from public disclosure, and what
41 safeguards will be used to control and limit distribution to appropriate individuals?

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1 Will data collection mechanisms be compatible and interoperable with the IDW
2 framework to enable data sharing?
3 How will the jurisdiction ensure that it is maintaining current information?
4 Will data requests from the Federal Government for CIKR data be channeled to the
5 owners and operators through the States?
6 Are there local legal authorities and policy directives related to data collection? Are
7 these authorities adequate? If not, how will the jurisdiction address these issues?
8 5A.5 Leveraging Ongoing Emergency Preparedness Activities for

9 CIKR Protection
10 The emergency management capabilities of each State and local jurisdiction are an
11 important component of improving overall CIKR protection. States and localities should
12 look to existing programs and leverage ways in which CIKR protection can be integrated
13 into ongoing activities. Areas to be considered when drafting a CIKR protection plan
14 include:
15 Does the jurisdiction’s exercise program account for CIKR protection? If not, how will
16 the State or locality incorporate CIKR protection exercise scenarios to increase the level
17 of preparedness?
18 How do CIKR protection efforts relate to initiatives outlined in the jurisdiction’s hazard
19 mitigation plan? How do various hazard modeling or ongoing mitigation efforts relate to
20 the CIKR protection initiatives?
21 How will the jurisdiction share best practices, reports, or other output from emergency
22 preparedness activities with CIKR owners and operators?
23 Have CIKR owners and operators been invited to participate in exercise events, and are
24 CIKR owners and operators linked to existing warning or response systems?
25 What existing education and outreach programs can be leveraged to share information
26 with partners regarding CIKR protection?
27 Are there other outreach or emergency management programs that should include a
28 CIKR component?
29 5A.6 Integrating Federal CIKR Protection Activities

30 State-, local-, and tribal-level CIKR protection programs should complement and draw on
31 Federal efforts to the maximum extent possible to utilize risk management methodologies
32 and avoid duplication of efforts.
33 State, local, and tribal efforts should consider the adequacy of DHS and SSA guidance and
34 resources for their particular situation. For example:
35 Are the existing criteria for risk analysis inclusive of levels of consequence that are of
36 concern to the State or locality, or should the jurisdiction’s criteria be expanded to
37 include additional local assets?
38 Are the self-assessment tools developed by DHS and the SSAs sufficient, or do these
39 tools need additional tailoring to reflect local conditions?
40 Are there additional best practices that should be shared among CIKR partners?

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1 Are there additional authorities that need to be documented?

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1 Appendix 5B: Recommended Homeland

2 Security Practices for Use by the Private
3 Sector
4 This appendix provides a summary of practices that may be adopted by private sector
5 owners and operators to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their CIKR protection
6 programs. The recommendations herein are based on best practices in use by various
7 sectors and other groupings. The NIPP encourages private sector owners and operators to
8 adopt and implement those practices that are appropriate and applicable at the specific
9 sector enterprise and individual facility levels:
10 Asset, System, Network, and Function Identification:
11 ¾ Incorporate the NIPP framework for the assets, systems, and networks under their
12 control; and
13 ¾ Voluntarily provide CIKR-related data to DHS to facilitate national CIKR protection
14 program implementation with appropriate information protections.
15 Assessment, Monitoring, and Reduction of Risks/Vulnerabilities:
16 ¾ Conduct appropriate risk and vulnerability assessment activities using tools or
17 methods that are rigorous, well-documented, and based on accepted practices in
18 industry or government;
19 ¾ Implement measures to reduce risk and mitigate deficiencies and vulnerabilities
20 corresponding to the physical, cyber, and human security elements of CIKR
21 protection;
22 ¾ Maintain the tools, capabilities, and protocols necessary to provide an appropriate
23 level of monitoring of networks, systems, or a facility and its immediate
24 surroundings to detect possible insider and external threats;
25 ¾ Develop and implement personnel screening programs to the extent feasible for
26 personnel working in sensitive positions; and
27 ¾ Manage the security of computer and information systems while maintaining
28 awareness of vulnerabilities and consequences to ensure that systems are not used
29 to enable attacks against CIKR.
30 Information Sharing:
31 ¾ Connect with and participate in the appropriate national, State, regional, local, and
32 sector information-sharing mechanisms (e.g., HSIN-CS and the sector information-
33 sharing mechanism);
34 ¾ Develop and maintain close working relationships with local (and, as appropriate,
35 Federal, State, territorial, and tribal) law enforcement and first-responder
36 organizations relevant to the company’s facilities to promote communications, with
37 appropriate protections, and cooperation related to prevention, remediation, and
38 response to a natural disaster or terrorist event;
39 ¾ Provide applicable information on threats, assets, and vulnerabilities to appropriate
40 government authorities, with appropriate information protections;

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1 ¾ Share threat and other appropriate information with other CIKR owners and
2 operators;
3 ¾ Participate in activities or initiatives developed and sponsored by relevant NIPP
4 SCC or entity that provides the sector coordinating function;
5 ¾ Participate in, share information with (with appropriate protections), and support
6 State and local CIKR protection programs, including coordinating and planning with
7 Local Emergency Planning Committees;
8 ¾ Collaborate with other CIKR owners and operators on security issues of mutual
9 concern; and
10 ¾ Use appropriate measures to safeguard information that could pose a threat and
11 maintain open and effective communications regarding security measures and
12 issues, as appropriate, with employees, suppliers, customers, government officials,
13 and others.
14 Planning and Awareness:
15 ¾ Develop and exercise appropriate emergency response, mitigation, and business
16 continuity-of-operations plans;
17 ¾ Participate in Federal, State, local, or company exercises and other activities to
18 enhance individual, organization, and sector preparedness;
19 ¾ Demonstrate continuous commitment to security and resilience across the entire
20 company;
21 ¾ Develop an appropriate security protocol corresponding to each level of the HSAS.
22 These plans and protocols are additive so that as the threat level increases for
23 company facilities, the company can quickly implement its plans to enhance physical
24 or cybersecurity measures in operation at those facilities and modify them as the
25 threat level decreases;
26 ¾ Utilize National Fire Protection Association 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency
27 Management and Business Continuity Programs, endorsed by DHS and Congress,
28 when developing Emergency Response and Business Continuity-of-Operations Plans
29 if the sector has not developed its own standard;
30 ¾ Document the key elements of security programs, actions, and periodic reviews as
31 part of a commitment to sustain a consistent, reliable, and comprehensive program
32 over time;
33 ¾ Enhance security awareness and capabilities through periodic training, drills, and
34 guidance that involve all employees annually to some extent and, when appropriate,
35 involve others such as emergency response agencies or neighboring facilities;
36 ¾ Perform periodic assessments or audits to measure the effectiveness of planned
37 physical and cybersecurity measures. These audits and verifications should be
38 reported directly to the CEO or his/her designee for review and action;
39 ¾ Promote emergency response training, such as the Community Emergency Response
40 Team training offered by the U.S. Citizen Corps, 40 for employees;
40The U.S. Citizen Corps is a national organization that brings citizen groups together and focuses the efforts of individuals through education, training, and
volunteer service to help make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to address the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disasters of
all kinds. It works through a national network of State, local, and tribal Citizen Corps Councils that include leaders from law enforcement, fire, emergency
medical, emergency management, volunteer organizations, local elected officials, the private sector, and other community stakeholders. More information is
available on the internet at www.CitizenCorps.gov.

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1 ¾ Consider including programs for developing highly secure and trustworthy operating
2 systems in near-term acquisition or R&D priorities;
3 ¾ Create a culture of preparedness, reaching every level of the organization’s
4 workforce, which ingrains in each employee the importance of awareness and
5 empowers those with responsibilities as first-line defenders within the organization
6 and community;
7 ¾ As the organization performs R&D or acquires new or upgraded systems, consider
8 only those that are highly secure and trustworthy;
9 ¾ Encourage employee participation in community preparedness efforts, such as
10 Citizen Corps, schools, Red Cross, Second Harvest, etc.;
11 ¾ Work with others locally, including government, nongovernmental organizations,
12 and private sector entities, both within and outside its sector, to identify and resolve
13 gaps that could occur in the context of a terrorist incident, natural disaster, or other
14 emergency;
15 ¾ Work with DHS to improve cooperation regarding personnel screening and
16 information protection; and
17 ¾ Identify supply chain and “neighbor” issues that could cause workforce or production
18 disruptions for the company.

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1 Appendix 6: DHS S&T Plans, Programs

2 and Research & Development
3 This appendix provides additional details on DHS S&T programs and initiatives supporting
4 the NIPP and CIKR. It includes details of how S&T is organized to produce and execute its
5 investment strategy, and how that strategy results in developing technology-based
6 solutions to meet customer and end-user requirements.
7 6.1 DHS S&T Organization and Investment Process

8 The organization of S&T results in an improved process to identify, validate and procure
9 new technologies, given its responsibility to develop and integrate technology with the
10 strategies, policies, procedures to protect the nation’s CIKR. The division’s RDT&E
11 program achieves S&T strategic goals in six fundamental disciples: (1) Explosives; (2)
12 Chemical and Biological; (3) Command, Control and Interoperability; (4) Borders and
13 Maritime Security; (5) Human Factors; and (6) Infrastructure and Geophysical, which are
14 also S&T’s six technical Divisions.
15
16 These technical Divisions are linked to three research and development investment
17 portfolio directors in a “matrix management” structure. These three portfolio directors –
18 Director of Research, Director of Transition, and Director of Innovation/Homeland Security
19 Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) – provide cross-cutting coordination of their
20 respective elements (or thrusts) of the investment strategy within the technical Divisions.
21 Each technical Division is comprised of at least one Section Director of Research who
22 reports to the Director of Research in addition to the Division Director so that a

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1 crosscutting focus on basic and applied research capability is maintained and leveraged,
2 and a Section Director of Transition who reports to the Director of Transition in addition to
3 the Division Director to help the division stay focused on technology transition.
4 The Director of Transition coordinates within the Department to expedite technology
5 transition and transfer to customers. The Director of Innovation/HSARPA sponsors basic
6 and applied homeland security research to promote revolutionary changes in technologies;
7 advance the development, testing and evaluation, and deployment of critical homeland
8 security technologies; and accelerate the prototyping and deployment of technologies that
9 would address homeland security vulnerabilities and works with each of the Division Heads
10 to pursue game-changing, leap-ahead technologies that will significantly lower costs and
11 markedly improve operational capability through technology application.
12 This cross-cutting coordination facilitates unity of effort. The matrix structure also allows
13 the S&T Directorate to provide more comprehensive and integrated technology solutions to
14 its customers by appropriately bringing all of the disciplines together in developing
15 solutions.
16 6.1.1 Investments and Planning
17 Along with the organizational alignment discussed above, the S&T Directorate has also
18 aligned its investment portfolio to create an array of programs that balance project risk,
19 cost, mission impact, and the time it takes to deliver solutions. The S&T Directorate
20 executes projects across the spectrum of technical maturity and transitions them in
21 accordance with our customers needs. Its investment portfolio is balanced across long-term
22 research, product applications, and leap-ahead “game-changing” capabilities while also
23 meeting mandated requirements. This balanced portfolio ensures that the Directorate
24 maintains a self-replenishing pipeline of future capabilities and products to transition to
25 customers.
26 The DHS Transition Program is a formalized, structured process that aligns investments to
27 Agency requirements and is managed by Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).
28 These teams constitute the Transition portfolio of DHS S&T, targeting deployable
29 capabilities in the near term. S&T established these teams to coordinate the planning and
30 execution of R&D programs together with the eventual hand-off to maintainers and users of
31 project results. They are critical nodes in the process to determine operational
32 requirements, assess current capabilities to meet operational needs, analyze gaps in
33 capabilities and articulate programs and projects to fill in the gaps an expand
34 competencies.
35 IPTs generally include the research and technology perspective, the customer and end user
36 perspective, and an acquisition perspective, and are specifically chartered to ensure that
37 technologies are engineered and integrated into systems scheduled for delivery and made
38 available to DHS customers. The customer and end users monitor and guide the capability
39 being developed; the research and technology representatives inform the discussions with
40 scientific and engineering advances and emerging technologies; and the acquisition staff
41 help transition the results into practice by the maintainers and end-users of the capability.
42 The IPT topic areas reflect the capability requirements of homeland security stakeholders.
43 The current IPTs operated by DHS S&T are listed below. Each sponsors projects that are
44 relevant to the infrastructure protection mission. The three bolded IPTs are co-chaired by
45 the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection.

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1
Information Sharing/Management Counter IED
Border Security Cargo Security
Chem/Bio Defense People Screening
Maritime Security Infrastructure Protection
Cyber Security Preparedness & Response: Incident Management
Transportation Security Preparedness & Response: Interoperability
2
3 Each IPT identifies, validates and prioritizes requirements for the S&T Directorate and
4 provides critical input to investments in programs and projects that will ultimately deliver
5 technology solutions that can be developed, matured and delivered to customer acquisition
6 programs for deployment to the field. Investments are competitively selected and focus on
7 DHS’s highest-priority requirements that provide capability to DHS operating components
8 and first responders. A successful transition portfolio requires sustained customer feedback
9 from DHS components to ensure that programs address genuine capability gaps. To gain
10 this insight, S&T established 46 Project IPTs and semi-annually reach out to DHS
11 components to gauge their overall satisfaction with delivered products and capabilities. The
12 results are explicitly tied to outcome-based performance metrics of cost, schedule and
13 technology readiness.
14 6.2 Requirements
15 The Directorate’s top priorities recommended by the S&T capstone IPTs in each of the
16 homeland security functional areas (i.e., Border Security, Cargo Security, CBRNE,
17 Infrastructure Protection, etc.) are consistent with the DHS Strategic roadmap in this
18 document’s NIPP Implementation Initiative and Actions section (Appendix 2 B) to ensure
19 an effective and efficient program over the long term.
20 This requirements map supports several initiatives and actions necessary for NIPP
21 implementation, particularly regarding the initiatives to:
22 Review and revise CIKR-related plans as needed to reinforce linkage between NIPP
23 steady-state CIKR protection and NRP incident management requirements
24 Identify cross-sector vulnerabilities
25 Communicate requirements for CIKR-related R&D to DHS for use in the national R&D
26 planning effort
27 The Office of Infrastructure Protection has developed an R&D Requirements Map showing
28 connections between 2007 Sector Annual Report R&D requirements and ongoing S&T
29 projects in each functional area, which may fully or partially address Sectors needs. The
30 Map shows the Sector priorities in terms of the requirements needed, and how that
31 requirement is being met in S&T by citing the specific projects to meet the requirement.
32 Further, the map crosswalks the projects initiated by each Capstone IPT and the capability
33 gap it addresses. The Map will be regularly updated and undergo a detailed review as the
34 analysis continues.
35 6.2.1 High Priority Technology Needs
36 Each year S&T publishes the high priority technology needs in its functional areas. The
37 following is a representative sample of needs for the nation’s CIKR.

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1 Analytical tools to quantify interdependencies and cascading consequences as

2 disruptions occur across critical infrastructure sectors – In particular, tools for natural
3 and manmade disruptions
4 Effective and affordable blast analysis and protection for critical infrastructure, and an
5 improved understanding of blast-failure mechanisms and protection measures for the
6 most vital CIKR
7 Advanced, automated, and affordable monitoring and surveillance technologies – In
8 particular, decision support systems to prevent disruption, mitigate results, and build in
9 resiliency
10 Rapid mitigation and recovery technologies to quickly reduce the effect of natural and
11 manmade disruptions and cascading effects
12 Critical utility components that are affordable, highly transportable, and provide robust
13 solutions during manmade and natural disruptions
14 6.2.2 Industry Involvement
15 Industry is a valued partner of the S&T Directorate and its continued participation in
16 developing solutions for homeland security applications is vital to our effort to safeguard
17 the nation. Consistent with the Directorate’s new structure, the Innovation/HSARPA
18 portfolio and six technical divisions will proactively seek industry participation to address
19 specific challenges in their respective areas. Additionally, private sector owners and
20 operators, via SCCs, have provided powerful independent validation of the R&D priorities
21 set by the Federal CIKR community. Several Government and Sector Coordinating
22 Councils have established joint R&D working groups to provide course-correcting inputs for
23 future R&D directions.
24 6.3 Progress
25 Critical infrastructure is a widely distributed enterprise across multiple industries,
26 government agencies, and academia, so its R&D program cannot be managed through
27 command and control. Instead, DHS and OSTP are fostering an evolving network of
28 partnerships and coordination groups. These groups have different focuses including
29 sector-specific needs, technology themes of interest to multiple sectors, and committees that
30 coordinate federal agency resources. The National Annual Report, including the National
31 CIP R&D Plan Update, provides the overarching strategy, goals, and plans that allow this
32 distributed R&D enterprise to act in coordinated ways.
33 6.3.1 Partnerships and Collaboration
34 The NIPP Partnership Framework
35 The Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Councils (CIPAC), established by DHS,
36 have been very effective in helping federal infrastructure protection groups work with the
37 private sector and with state, local, territorial, and tribal governments. The CIPAC
38 provides a forum in which the sectors have engaged very actively in a broad spectrum of
39 activities to implement their sector protection plans, including planning, prioritizing, and
40 coordinating R&D agendas.
41 Sector and Cross Sector Coordination
42 The Sector R&D Working Groups, typically Joint SCC and GCC, have developed well
43 founded technical R&D agendas essential for their sector to achieve sector security goals for

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1 2008. These R&D agendas coordinate challenges across the spectrum of sector stakeholders
2 and are used to represent sector R&D interests in cross-sector settings. The executive
3 managers of each sector coordinate activities through the Federal Senior Leadership
4 Council (FSLC). The SCCs have formed a cross-sector group, the Partnership for Critical
5 Infrastructure Security (PCIS), to coordinate cross-sector initiatives that promote public
6 and private infrastructure protection initiatives. One of the objectives of the PCIS is to
7 provide cross-sector input regarding R&D priorities.
8 In 2007, the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) established a group to perform
9 cross-sector R&D analyses and to help sectors coordinate with the CIKR protection R&D
10 community. The R&D Analysis Branch of the Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy
11 Division elicits sector capability gaps in order to establish R&D priorities. This branch is
12 coordinating with each Division of the DHS S&T to relate existing and planned projects to
13 these capability gaps, and to help sectors get involved in DHS-led S&T projects. In 2008,
14 they established an R&D web portal providing a means for sectors to share R&D
15 information and disseminate best practices.
16 Federal Agency Coordination
17 Within a sector, the GCC is the primary mechanism for coordination across government
18 agencies. Government coordination across multiple sectors is accomplished by the NSTC.
19 The NSTC Infrastructure Subcommittee (ISC) of the Committee on Homeland and National
20 Security was established in 2003 by HSPD-7 as the R&D interagency community to
21 examine all forms of protecting the nation’s infrastructure including security. Its primary
22 focus involves R&D that is needed by more than one sector such that economies of scope
23 and scale can be realized.
24 For 2008, the NSTC-ISC recognized the need to address aging infrastructure and new
25 methods of repair or replacement to make future infrastructure more sustainable –
26 economically, environmentally, and safely – and has formed an internal working group to
27 develop the research agenda needed to realizes these objectives. Members of the NSTC-ISC
28 include representatives from almost every federal agency, not just those that are Sector
29 Specific Agencies (SSAs).
30 Coordination Regarding Cybersecurity
31 Because of the ubiquity and importance of information technology across all sectors and
32 agencies, the NSTC created a separate group, the Network and Information Technology
33 R&D Subcommittee (NITRD), which coordinates all R&D related to IT across agencies. In
34 2006, the Cyber Security and Information Assurance Interagency Working Group (CSIA
35 IWG) was established to coordinate cybersecurity as an important subset of IT R&D.
36 Universities
37 Universities and research centers across multiple federal agencies contribute to agency
38 mission accomplishment and CIKR protection in the full spectrum of time from before a
39 disrupting event to after a disrupting event. The DHS Centers of Excellence contribute to
40 the national-level implementation of the NIPP and to CIKR protection; their contributions
41 take different forms, including the following:
42 Provide independent analysis of CIKR protection (full spectrum) issues;
43 Conduct research and provide innovative perspective on threats and the behavioral
44 aspects of terrorism;

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1 Conduct research to identify new technologies and analytical methods that can be
2 applied by CIKR partners to support NIPP efforts;
3 Support research, development, testing, evaluation, and deployment of CIKR protection
4 technologies;
5 Analyze, provide, and share best practices related to CIKR protection efforts; and
6 Develop and provide suitable security risk analysis and risk management courses for
7 CIKR protection professionals.
8 International
9 HS, DoD, DOE, and other federal agencies have undertaken many different outreach efforts
10 to foreign government representatives and organizations that are pursuing similar R&D
11 planning and performance. From the United Kingdom to Scandinavian countries, France,
12 Germany, Japan, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, and others, agreements of
13 cooperation and joint pursuit and knowledge sharing have been created. Other
14 organizations such as the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) also have developed
15 successful R&D collaborations with a number of countries.
16 State & Local
17 State, local, territorial, and tribal governments play an important role in the protection of
18 the nation’s CIKR. These government entities not only have CIKR under their direct
19 control but also have CIKR owned and operated by other partners who are within their
20 jurisdictions. The State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Government Coordination Council
21 (SLTGCC) brings national CIKR protection principles to the local level and is an important
22 source of capability requirements that drive R&D priorities.
23 Industry Organizations
24 In addition to R&D input provided by government organizations, there are major industrial
25 groups that provide input and comment to both influence future R&D by illuminating
26 issues they have surfaced or issues that are likely based on new product development they
27 are doing but cannot discuss openly for competitive reasons. For example, the INFOSEC
28 Research Council has provided valuable input on cybersecurity including publishing a Hard
29 Problems list41 that is an important planning tool used by all R&D contributors. The
30 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) identified critical
31 gaps that require new cyber and telecommunications R&D.
32 6.4 Five Year Strategy/Technology Roadmap

33 The S&T Directorate implements its business approach through its Planning,
34 Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process which encompasses the
35 development of priorities, program plans, resource requirements, and associated
36 performance metrics. The PPBE process builds the framework to link strategy for the out-
37 years to program execution in the present. It ensures the directorate remains mission-
38 focused, customer-oriented, threat and risk-informed to prioritize resource allocation and
39 remain accountable in its pursuit to secure the homeland.
40 The five-year execution plan details the S&T investment portfolio, outlines the
41 Directorate’s activities and plans at the division level, and includes each division’s research
42 thrusts, programs, and key milestones. It supports the Department’s strategic plan and
41 http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/docs/IRC_Hard_Problem_List.pdf

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1 priorities as well as S&T’s priorities. The five-year plan is the roadmap to achieving
2 success; however, the planning process must be flexible and nimble to adjust to a changing
3 homeland security environment. The plan will be updated annually to ensure it continues
4 to address the correct set of priorities, fills our customer’s homeland security capability
5 gaps, and enables a safer homeland.
6

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6 2009 National Infrastructure

11 September 18, 2008

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1 Glossary of Key Terms...........................................................................................................157

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1  Implementing a long-term risk management program; and

9 2 Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities

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security and transportation infrastructure protection.

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1 3 The CIKR Protection Program Strategy: Managing Risk

30 4 Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection

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1 must be implemented using organizational structures and partnerships committed to

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11 5 CIKR Protection: An Integral Part of the Homeland Security

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1 important bridge between NIPP steady-state protection and incident management

7 6 Ensuring an Effective, Efficient Program Over the Long Term

25 7 Providing Resources for the CIKR Protection Program

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1 1.3.2 The Value Proposition

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1  Ensuring industry is engaged as early as possible in the development of initiatives and

27 1.4 Threats to the Nation’s CIKR

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11 1.5 All-Hazards and CIKR Protection

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3 1.6 Planning Assumptions

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14 1.7 Special Considerations

Human—critical knowledge of functions or people uniquely susceptible to attack.

Protection of sensitive information involves:

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1  Information on specific industry assets and vulnerabilities is particularly sensitive

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1  The human element requires:

40 1.8 Achieving the Goal of the NIPP

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1 1.8.3 Implementing a Long-Term CIKR Risk Management Program

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More information about NIPP is available on the Internet at:

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1 2. Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities

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34 2.2 Roles and Responsibilities

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1 integrating CIKR protective programs with the all-hazards approach to domestic

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security and transportation infrastructure protection.

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1 Implementing a long-term risk management program; and

1 Ensuring industry is engaged as early as possible in the development of initiatives and

1 Information on specific industry assets and vulnerabilities is particularly sensitive

1 The human element requires:

1 Coordinating sector-level participation in the National Exercise Program, Homeland

1 Establishing cybersecurity programs and associated awareness training within the

1 Buffer Zone Protection Program: A Federal