Why Asia?

Kwang-Soo Lee
Associate Member of the Solidarity for Peace & Human Rights of Asia
Professor of Pusan University of Foreign Studies

1. Poverty
Radiating from Europe, it was not long before imperialism invaded the Asian
continent. During its inception, colonies found their economies crumble to pieces by
overwhelming taxes, unfair trade and labor exploitation. During the last stages of
imperialism, plundering of resources and capital as well as the spread of colonized
economies took its final toll on the colonies' economies. As a consequence to
colonialism, newly independent colonies found poverty as sole legacy to years' long of
subjugation. Many countries in Asia suffered from famine and starvation long after
independence while countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Cambodia
have not yet freed themselves from such precarious existence.
Poverty, in turn, has become the source of rampant social issues in Asia ranging from
the deepening of wealth disparity, labor exploitation, human rights violation,
environmental depredation, urban problems, prostitution, collapse of traditional order to
spread of diseases.

2. Feudalistic Society
As a means to effectively govern colonies, colonial powers were often passive in their
endeavors to transform Asian societies into modern societies while they made utmost
effort to retaining Asia's existing feudal social order. As a result, a patriarchal male-
oriented, blood-oriented and feudal social order was maintained in most Asian
countries. Within such feudalistic order, existing group of elites still held their title of a
privileged few while those in the lower ranks of society still found themselves unable to
rise above from their present condition.
Contrary to Europe, where modern industry had made progressive development, Asia
had not been able to foster a working class and neither a social structure of labor and
capital. Filling that void instead was collectivism centered around groups marked by
feudalistic concepts such as tribe, clan, religion, lineage, region and language. As such,
Asia missed an crucial opportunity to achieve democracy and sound social
development.
 The fact that democracy has not taken full root in any part of Asia has a deep
implication with Asia's deep-seated male-chauvinistic feudal beliefs. India's Indira
Gandhi and Sonia Gandhi, Sri Lanka's Sirimavo Bandaranaike Tunga and Kumar
Tunga, Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto, the Philippines' Corazon Aquino, Indonesia's
Megawati, Burma's AungSan Suu Kyi and Korea's Park Geun-Hye are all examples of
how easy it was for women leaders to take up political positions and how the Asian
society is still far from breaking free of past ghosts, namely blood lineage and family.

3. Nationalism
Unlike Europe, the majority of Asian countries did not intrinsically embrace a unitary
concept of race or people, rendering difficult to create a single order of a nation-state
based on race or people. However, colonial administrators adopted the concept of a
nation-state in order to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in governing its colonies.
Due to the underlying ideology of its creation, however, an incomplete form of
democracy was adopted. Consequently, contrary to Europe, where a nation-state of a
political unity had been developed, Asia saw nation-states being created around the
dominant majority in terms of race or religion and the latter two factors serving as a
mechanism to create state power. This is to say that nations were created before people
were defined and that tribes, clans, religious groups that did not form a majority became
the object of oppression and persecution in the name of the state. As a result, internal
colonialism and genocide were carried out.
In the end, incomplete nationalism begot religious nationalism and spurred the
development of separatist movements. This is the reason as to why the history of
conflict and war shows no sign of ending as could be seen in Kosovo, Ache, West
Papua, India and Miyanmar. Furthermore, the fact that all human rights are being
reserved within the rim of nationalism in many Asian countries can also be understood
in this context.

4. Division
One of the most notable characteristics of colonialism is that it incites division and
conflict within the colonized society. Although the method or form might show slight
difference among the British, the French and the Dutch (and the Japanese), the big
picture still remains the same. Because nation-states in Asia were purely formed by the
necessity of the colonial powers and were not based on race/people, Asian states found
themselves totally helpless in such situation. The instruments employed to provoke
division were the aforementioned religion, tribes and clans. Multi-racial societies such
as Afghanistan, Burma and Indonesia disintegrated too easily while traditionally strong
homogeneous societies such as Malaysia were shaken up using imported Chinese and
Indian citizens.
The biggest outcome of division is endless disputes and consequent social unrest.
Afghanistan has been plagued with a civil year for 24 years while the two Koreas and
India and Pakistan have suffered a gruesome partition. India and Pakistan, in particular,
are still mired in terrorist attacks, massacres and retaliative terror attacks due to conflicts
among communities.

5. Dictatorships
In the 1970s, dictators like Korea's Park Jung-Hee, the Philippines' Marcos, Iran's Palevi
and Indonesia's Suharto all held absolute power and committed human rights violations
in the name of the state. Came 1980s and most dictators were dethroned from power.
However, the empty space was not immediately filled by a sound democracy. This is
attributable to the inability of the people to outgrow from the nationalistic ideas they
have been brainwashed with for decades and the fact that while democracy had been
unable to take root, feudal collectivism that had replaced its place. Iran's islamic
socialism led by Khomeini, Afghanistan's islamic fundamentalism led by the Muzahidin
and the Taleban, Korea's regional hegemony of Kyeongsang Province initiated from
Cheon Du-Hwan and North Korea's Juche (self-proficiency) principle led by Kim Il-
Sung and Kim Jung-Il are all good examples to the above point.
In the case of East Asia and South East Asia, most dictatorships are related to the
problem of "Asian values". Asian values are typically described as embodying the
Confucian ideals of loyalty to family, favoritism, rule of person, authoritarianism, the
belief that community is more important than the individual, ardor for education and
hard work and that such values have fueled Asia's stunning economic growth.
According to this thesis, individualism, rationalism, human rights and the rule of law
are all Western values that "do not fit" Asians. The term of Asian values was first used
by Western scholars and media to explain the fast and extensive economic growth that
East Asian countries experienced in the early 1970s but was taken up and further
developed by Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew and Malaysia's Mahathir. This is a concept
that is without a shred of doubt, undemocratic and runs contrary to the universality of
human rights.
The U.S. has played a major part until Asia was able to stand on its own two feet in
recent times. But their help was not driven by sheer altruism. Indeed, the U.S.
encouraged and interfered in the independence of Asian countries in order to weaken
European colonialist powers such as Britain after the Second World War. Consequently
during the bipolar order, the U.S. locked in endless competition with the USSR and in
the process took the defense of Asia as its god-given mission. Amid such process, the
War of Vietnam was waged and Cambodia's "Killing Fields" massacres were executed
while military-based forces such as Korea's Park Jung-Hee and Cheon Du-Hwan, Irak's
Hussein, Pakistan's Zia-hul-Haq, the Philippines' Marcos, Burma's Newin and
Thailand's Suchinda were supported. Anti-communist ideologies alone drove U.S.
interests while despotism or democracy failed to raise any interest in them. Soon
afterwards, civil uprisings flared up in Kwangju, Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila and
countless civilians were murdered in the process. This is how the shameful history of
civilian massacres began in many countries in Asia. It comes as no surprise that such
incidents are linked to the U.S. and that the tide of anti-americanism is rising in Asia.

6. Anti-Americanism
After the Second World War, European colonialism was directly inherited by the
Americans. In the early 1990s, the bipolar order collapsed, the U.S. became the sole
superpower and its economy entered a recession. It was at this time that the U.S. began
to openly reveal its hegemonic ambitions over Asia. The reason as to why anti-american
movements are so widespread in Asia can be attributed to America's neocolonial
attitude. Anti-american movements in Asia can be categorized into two groups. The
first is the anti-americanism centered around leftist blocs. As the Soviet Union collapsed
and socialist values lost their luster and was replaced by neo-liberalism, the lives of
workers, farmers and the urban poor are becoming increasingly more difficult. Despite
such reality, some parts of the leftist bloc are only concerned with anti-american
activities while turning a blind eye to progressive values such as human rights, welfare
and the right to live. Such attitude illustrates that they are not free from the remnants of
colonialism, namely nationalism and anti-american sentiments. The latter type of anti-
americanism is the anti-american resistance of the Islamic bloc. This type of anti-
americanism can trace its roots to the American support of Israel and its Middle East oil
policies. As it was fully expected, fighting fairly against the U.S. and Israel - two
powers armed with massive economic and military strength - proved to be impossible
and futile. The only resort left was to turn to feudalistic methods, in this case, to resist
through religion.

7. Orientalism
 Colonialism is the other identical twin of orientalism. European imperialists regarded
Asia as fundamentally different from Europe and called it a 'savage' land that was
irrational, unscientific, unreasonable, unindividualistic and inefficient. They even
claimed that they had the responsibility to govern Asia to bring enlightenment. What is
alarming is that Asian countries such as Korea that have successfully embraced
industrialization are now imitating a form of colonialism masked by orientalism. In all
areas that Koreans have expanded, including China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines
and Thailand, human rights violations and labor exploitation are being inflicted. Their
behavior is in no way different from the colonial rule of former imperialists.
Furthermore, the attitude of the Korean society on foreign migrant workers is often
more vicious than the treatment of Europeans and Americans of Asians. Another notable
phenomenon is that Asian countries are striving to find a common identity under the
common denominator of 'Asia'. A good example of this could be found when Korea
made it to the semi-finals in the 2002 World Cup. The Bangladeshis and Thais cheered
and rooted for the Korean team and took its feat as a matter of great honor for Asia. The
Koreans in turn, responded with the phrase 'Pride of ASIA'. However, such sentiments
brings to memory of Japan's goal of building 'The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere' which turned out to be a disguise for Japanese imperialism and are therefore a
very dangerous notion to keep. Another example of dangerous orientalism is that Korea,
India and many Middle East countries are all claiming themselves to be the cradle of
spiritual civilization.
 1Liquidation of the Past in Korea: Some Ground Rules

Prof. Dong Choon Kim (Sungkonghoe University)

1. What is liquidation of the past?

Liquidation of the past is a series of actions designed to uncover the fact on past
government wrongdoings and their consequences; restorethe lost honor of victims; and
make proper reparations for damages sustained by the victims. There is a reason that it
should be the liquidation of the "past", not the "past history". Obviously, the past is
something irreversible, butpast wrongdoings can still have a lingering impact on the
present politics, laws and institutions. If the persons responsible for those wrongdoings
are still in powerful positions, and if the victims are alive, it is required to redress the
wrongs in oneway or another so that we can live in a society with real law and justice.
In traditional societies, decorations and rewards; punishment and redemption; and
writing a new history book were routine procedures in the changes of royal dynasties or
political powers. But in modern societies, public power is often exercised in a
systematic and even secretive manner, as we went through full-scale wars, coups and
revolutions. Public power also tends to rarely admit its wrongdoings. Therefore, fact-
finding activities take precedence over rewards or punishment.

Even in modern societies, the nature and scope of the liquidation can vary depending on
who is controlling the process. It can proceed in the form of retaliation through rulings
by a kangaroo court and "street justice" or "blanket amnesty"as demonstrated in Spain
where past wrongdoings were characterized as completely political mishaps and those
involved went unpunished. With no doubt, however, every attempt to liquidate the past
is a political behavior to a certain extent, which is often influenced by the current
structure of political power. It is also likely to face countless difficulties and even end
in failure, since old power dies hard in any society, exercising strong socio-political
influence and resisting vehemently to what they consider any attempt threatening their
vested rights.

Although liquidation of the past includes setting the history straight, it should be clearly
distinguished from the simple "interpretation of the history". With legal mandate, the
former is an effort to bring the violations of human rights by the previous governments
to light, disclose who committed such violations in what context, confirm the damages,
and provide appropriate compensations. By contrast, the latter or history review is
designed to shed new light on some previously uncovered aspects of what happened and
suggest where we should go now from here, under the premise that we all know the
truth. Currently, the Grand National Party is claiming that independent research
institutes should lead the efforts of liquidating the past. This is nothing but an attempt
to reduce the liquidation of thepast to historical interpretation, on the pretext that a
liquidation process should not be tied together with political interests. By nature, the
liquidation of the past deals with crimes committed by previous governments or public
power. If investigation ofthe alleged violations of law by government institutions or
employees is not allowed; if the access to vital information is denied; if the confession
of those involved in wrongdoings cannot be induced; or if the disclosure of damages by
victims cannot be encouraged, there is virtually nothing can be done by those
independent historians.

The liquidation of the past is divided into individual and institutional liquidation.
Individual liquidation means punishing the wrongdoers or forcing them to step down
from influential positions, whereas institutional liquidation is associated with
transforming the settings that allowed wrongdoings to take place. With its strong
ethical tradition, Korea has a tendency to favor the first form of liquidation. It is irony,
however, that little progress has been made in the fact-finding and the reform of the
relevant laws and institutions in relation to the Gwangju Democratic Movement, the
civil uprising on 18 May 1980, even after former presidents were jailed for their crimes
during presidency. Actually, we may repeat such a practice in the future, unless we
repeal the National Security Law and other laws and institutions that have justified the
wrongdoings of public power and that have even promoted inter-Korean animosity and
national division. Although an emphasis on institutional frameworks may dilute the
accountability of individuals, it will prevent us from turning a blind eye to a reality
where individuals are often weak as a mere cog of the political machine. Indeed, the
unwavering commitment to the transformation of institutions and social environment
will make the liquidation a forward-looking process, promise a future with hope and
vision to the public, and ensure national unity.

2. Why is it important?
A failure to change the conditions that enabled improper exercise of state power,
remove its direct cause, or bring the wrongdoers to justice may lead to the recurring
crimes by public power or emotionally-charged retaliation by victims. Of course, such
retaliation is far from resolving the real issue and can make it even worse. Social
reconciliationand integration will be attained only when people responsible for past
government wrongs are identified and take the consequences.

A course of action ranging from fact-finding, punishment and restoring one's honor to
redemption and compensation helps us to set the direction to move towards as a nation.
It is also considered a state-led public education process. If a political group controls
this process according to their interests, it could be dangerous. The setback of the 1949
Special Committee on Pro-Japanese Collaborators is a good example. When the
Committee's effort to investigate those who collaborated with the colonial government
ended without avail, a widely shared notion was that even traitors would be forgiven if
they were anti-communist and that any behaviors would be acceptable if they were
based on anti-communism.

Leaning toward the right, German society is witnessing the neo Nazi group emerging.
But it will not happen again for Germany to invade its European neighbors, because this
country had a successful closure of the Nazi era through the trials of the major war
criminals. Japan, however, has followed a different path since 1945: the country has
restored its emperor system, punished no war criminals, and denied any wrongdoings
during its colonial rule. It does explain Tokyo's renewed shift to the right of the
political spectrum. Europe is moving towards integration, while East Asia is facing the
challenges of arms race and the rise of nationalism. This striking difference between the
two regions results from what they did to redress their past crimes. As the failure of the
1949 Special Committee defines the political and ideological landscape of Korea's
modern history, the present of Germany and Japan is also affected by their liquidation of
the past represented by their different treatment of war criminals.

If war or state-inflicted violenceis put to an end only when the international community
or a domestic political group embraces a new order without war or conflict, bringing
wrongdoers to justice will make just a starting point. Efforts to redress past government
wrongs are essential to break the vicious cycle of recurrence of such incidents and
retaliation. But more important is a solid commitment to overcoming conflicts within a
country or between countries, which will lead to permanent peace.

A society where the rule of justice is not honored in the exercise of public power will
end up being disintegrated. A person does not turn into a thief only because of poverty.
It is when there is nobody being held accountable for any wrongs and the definition of
justice cannot be established that people will let their instincts govern their behaviors. It
is hard to develop a constructive interpersonal relationship in society where the victims
of politicalviolence can neither publicly discuss what they sustained nor identify who is
responsible for it. Therefore, justice that will be realized through a fact-finding mission
will ward off social disintegration.

As rightly pointed out in the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee of South
Africa, careful investigation of the human rights violations of government agencies or
employees is not condemning the evil or dealing with some psychological issues.
Instead, it should help people know what difference exists in the views of wrongdoers
and victims, and understand the impacts of various factors such as ideological or
political conditions (Cold War, anti-colonialism, and racism), peer pressureparalyzing
ethical judgment, internalization of the prevailing values within a group, and
contribution of languages dehumanizing others.

In the fact-finding activities, the process is as important as the goals. When state-
inflictedviolence and past government wrongdoings as well as damages and sufferings
of victims are disclosed, members of society will be able to share the victims' feelings
and understand what caused such tragic incidents. In this process, other members of
society will also have a time for reflection on their indifference and fear. Unlike other
illnesses, social illness can be healed with truth and justice. Without going though such
a healing process, society may seem working properly on the surface. But it is like a
seemingly healthy person with a mental illness. Social health will collapse when the
laws, norms, and ethical codes underpinning a society do not play their roles.
Forgiveness should be highly valued but it should be justified only after appropriate
fact-finding. You cannot simply forgive anybody without knowing who did what.

3. Definition of "the past"

The scope of the liquidation of the past is, in principle, limited to redressing
governmentwrongdoings that occurred after the establishment of the modern
government on August 15, 1948. The government of the Republic of Korea should be
held accountable for state-inflicted violence, massacres, torture, and suspicious deaths
that have since taken place. But it could become a daunting task because of complex
issues in our modern history. Moreover, we cannot completely ignore what happened
before 1948 inthe liquidation process in consideration of the mission of a state.

First of all, forced labor and pro-Japanese collaborators were products of the political
circumstances where national sovereignty was lost and responsible public power was
inexistent. But from the point of view of an independent nation-state wishing to
overcome the legacy of the Japanese colonial rule, it is a right thing to do to closely
examine what was done in the past and ask for reparations. Unfortunately, however,
these tasks were put on a back burner in Korea, because of national division, military
rules and pro-growth policies.

Investigation of pro-Japanese collaborators is an essential element of redressing the

past, but it remains incomplete, sincemany of those collaborators joined the power elite
after liberation. If it were sixty years ago, they should be punished for their
collaboration with the forces of imperialism and fascism. But today many of those
involved already died, and the damages they caused would be considered affecting the
country and the people as a whole rather than particular individuals. Therefore, we
should first reveal who played an active role in the anti-democratic and anti-human
rights colonial government and then examine the serious consequences of their acts
from the historical perspective.

Civilian victims of various incidents occurring before and after the 1950 Korean War
constitute the next subject we should address in the liquidation effort. In this case, we
should focus on getting to the bottom of killings of civilians and other atrocities done by
soldiers, law enforcement officers, and para-military groups during the time period.
Since fact-finding works have been completed for several incidents, we now need to
consolidate these works. Investigation should be conducted carefully, because we are
dealing with a special wartime situation. What we should do now is to establish what
happened according to the 5 W's and 1 H rule and prepare a mechanism designed to
prevent similar incidents from happening when war or armed conflict breaks out on the
Korean peninsula.

The last subject in the liquidation of the past is very complicated: the redress for the
wrongdoings of the past military governments. Falling under thiscategory are a number
of cases examined by the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths,
apparently government-concocted spy cases, and some cases for which the relevant law
enforcement processes seemed suspicious, even though they went through a legal
procedure. Unlike the previous two categories, this will focus on the activities of
various public security agencies and the roles of their employees. The work for the
1980 Gwangju Democratic Movement has been almost completed, while the cases of
suspicious deaths in association with democratic movement in the 1980's require
additional investigation. The investigation of suspicious deaths should be expanded in
its coverage to include other incidents that are not related to democratic movement.
Violence of military governments is, by nature, directly linked to the present power
structure and governance. Investigation of such cases is destined to face strong
resistance from wrongdoers who are still alive and incumbent officials. Nevertheless,
redressing the past is critical to redefine the role of public security agencies as guardians
ofcitizens and help democracy to take root in Korean society.

In sum, redressing past government wrongs should focus on the damages caused by
anti-human rights and inhuman exercise of public power. Accordingly, any incidents
requiring just history review or judgment should not be subjectto the liquidation
process. The priorities are incidents where one can establish a direct link to the
damages, and circumstantial evidences were uncovered to a certain extent. The time
scope will range from the late 1860's to early 1990's. However, the oppression on Dong
Hak, the home-grown religion in the 19th century, is likely to become a subject of
academic research, while the abuse of public power after military governments can be
examined by the National Human Rights Commission. As a result, the practical scope
is believed to be from 1905, when Korea lost diplomatic authority to Japan, through
1992, which marks the end of military governments. One thing should be noted here is
that we need to seek cooperation of Japan and the United States to gain necessary
information for fact-finding in relation to the incidents during the Japanese colonial rule
and the war years. In addition, public power abuse occurred during the US military rule
raises a difficult question of how to deal with it, because Korea had no sovereignty at
that time. Likewise, civilian massacres by the North Korean or Chinese army during
the Korean War may also become a subject of the liquidation process, but we do not
have the necessary data and the Korean government wasnot directly responsible for
those incidents. Therefore, we should start by studying the size and status of damages
through the data we can obtain in Korea or the testimonies of survivors before
launching the full-fledged investigation in collaboration with relevant countries.

4. Steps and rules for the liquidation of the past

As we often found in the fact-finding for suspicious deaths, a fact-finding cannot

achieve its goal of uncovering what is really behind particular cases when we just
identify the isolated incident and the person(s) responsible for the death, and stop short
of examining and confirming social conditions that had caused the death. In this case,
to what extent a person should be punished for his/her behavior is a controversial issue.

Indeed, the question of punishment remains the subject of a heated debate. Lower-level
officials often took a particular action by order ortacit consent of their superiors, who in
turn had to consider circumstances or political conditions. For this reason, some people
will say they are not guilty even though their behaviors caused deaths and loss of
assets. Nevertheless, people who did notfollow any orders and committed crimes on
their own should be punished. We should also continue to find out who was
masterminding particular cases. Because of the political nature of the liquidation
process, punishment should be minimized even if a case can still be prosecutedas it is
within the applicable statute of limitation. This rule should be applied especially when
it is very unlikely that the wrongdoers will be involved in similar incidents. Actually,
most bills now before the parliament do not require punishment of those involved in
past government wrongdoings. Compared to punishment followed by a pardon, "social
punishment" through a fact-finding process is more desirable. We should not let the
question of punishment trigger conflict among members of political community.

Restoring the honor of victims cannot be postponed. We should make sure that there is
nobody who suffers for the whole lifeand receives unfair treatment because he/she was
branded as a spy or leftist.

Reparation is a touchy subject. Material compensation is the best means to placate

victims when the government had to admit its wrongdoings. But the political power
lacking legitimacy tends to make a compromise with victims using reparations and
compensations in return for their approval of ceasing fact-finding effort. This will make
victims question the equity in the reparation process and have conflict with each other.
Therefore, we should make sure that fact-finding comes before reparation and
compensation, and if reparation at the individual level is necessary before the fact-
finding, the exception needs to be allowed only for those with no income to cover their
medical care or other social security expenses.

History education and commemoration projects are the last set of tasks in the liquidation
of the past.History education is important, because one of the best ways to prevent past
government wrongdoings from happening again is helping members of society
recognize the injustice in our history and raise awareness of history. In commemoration
projects, equity and continuity are essential elements. Projects without theses two
elements can be counterproductive. If we do not want to reduce such projects to just a
ceremonial event, we should keep in mind the followingrules. First, these projects
should be free from any political interest. Second, a communication channel should be
established between organizers of different projects so that they can exchange views and
share the vision and contents of their projects. And third, a centralized coordination
body is necessary. Coordinators of commemoration projects should keep abreast of the
current social agendaand invite experts in the private sector to participate in planning
and operation in order to develop substantive and useful projects.

Some aspects of the liquidation process are also involved with academic interpretation
and assessment. For example, the contents of the bills on pro-Japanese collaborators
and reparation for democratic movement may change in accordance with the result of
on-going history review. Thus, these bills should be fully reflecting the viewsof the
academic circle and based on social consensus. Details of the reparation bill are still not
decided, because consensus has not been reached yet among experts on the definition of
authoritarian rule and democratic movement against it. Likewise, the debate on the
collaborator bill is still under way, because we have just started discussion on how to
define pro-Japanese collaboration and democratization in Korea, topics overshadowed
for a long time by anti-communism and pro-growth mentality. Similarly, theApril 3
Jeju Uprising has not been properly defined as yet, even though the fact-finding
committee completed its job. It is important to maintain a balanced view in this
academic interpretation and assessment, because both too much negative andpositive
views run counter to the spirit of the liquidation process.
Historically, there are two models of liquidation of the past: victors punishing losers in
Nuremberg Trials vs. truth and reconciliation in South Africa. The Presidential Truth
Commission on Suspicious Deaths in Korea is closer to the South African model in its
experience, but it also does not exclude the possibility of punishment. Ifwe successfully
undertake comprehensive liquidation of the past, it will be something unprecedented in
the world. The issues of pro-Japanese collaboration and reparation for pro-democracy
movement require history review and interpretation. But many issues are involved with
incidents happened a long time ago and suspicious cases, so we need to focus on fact-
finding, restoring victims' honor, and setting the history straight rather than legal and
political punishment, where our process is different from that of other countries. In
short, the liquidation of the past in Korea will invest maximum resources in fact-finding
and restoring victims' honor; exclude punishment; and use conservative guidelines for
reparation in order to strengthen national unity and reconciliation.

5. Participants and organization

Participants in the liquidation process will decide the direction of the task. Opposition
parties are opposing a process led by the incumbent government and instead proposing
that independent figures from the private sector should participate in the process. As I
mentioned earlier, if victims lead the liquidation of the past, it is very likely that they
will act out of personal grudge. If wrongdoers themselves or people who share the
same interests with them lead or influence the process, the liquidation itself will fail.
For example, the attempt to punish the person who issued a shooting order at the April
19 Uprising failed; and the fact-finding committee for April 3 Jeju Uprising had to delay
or even suspend its investigation because of members with the military background did
not cooperate.Consequently, there is a danger of nullifying or reducing the effect of the
liquidation process if the two groups with conflicting interests participate in the
process. So opposition parties have a reason to oppose the participation of the
incumbent government.

The dilemma is that liquidation of the past cannot proceed effectively without the help
of the political power. If an independent organization is the major player in the
liquidation process, their decisions will have no legally binding force and the outcome
is limited to the ethical aspect of the liquidation or historical assessment. It may sound
rational to say that the liquidation of the past should be led by independent figures, but
they will find ultimately that there is nothing much they can do.
Then, what should we do now? First, legal framework can be formulated through
bipartisan effort; and an independent committee where the public is well-represented
will coordinate the plans and monitor a series of steps in the liquidation process so that
they can serve the great cause.

The Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths is a good precedent of such a

partnership between the public and private sector. But private sector involvement has
been recently constrainedafter conservative newspapers attacked some members of the
Commission, revealing their past record of spy charges. It is very dangerous to
determine the membership of the Commission by an agreement between political
parties. We should not also allow people who have negative views on the issue of
suspicious deaths to join the Commission. The best candidate will be a person who has
firm commitment to the cause of the Commission and strong conviction not swayed by
either victims or wrongdoers.

Many people have noted the problem of overlapping organizations for the liquidation of
the past. If possible, it will be more desirable to establish a single body to address the
liquidation issue. If it is not possible, then a higher-level committee should be set up
and coordinate the activities of a number of sub-committees. The objective of the
committee will be to prevent wrongdoers from disturbing the liquidation process, to put
a proper limit on the demands of victims, and to ensure forward-looking liquidation of
the past from the perspective of the public. Members and investigators need to be
recruited in a transparent manner, and information on every activity should be made
publicly available. This is an ad-hoc committee working for a certain period of time, so
any unfinished job after the period should be passed on to other organizations. Once the
fact-finding, which is the major role of the committee, is completed, the rest of the work
will be left up to the academic community, and history review and awareness programs
will be launched.

“Separatism” here is used in the sense of a movement for the creation of a fully
independent state.
 Chad; Democratic Republic of Congo (Banyamulenge); Cyprus; France (New
Caledonia); India (Nagaland); Indonesia (Aceh); Indonesia (Kalimantan); Iraq (Kurds,
Shi’a); Italy (South Tyrol); Lebanon (Muslims); Macedonia (Albanians); Mexico
(Chiapas); Moldova (Transdniestr); Myanmar (Chin/Zomis, Kachins, Karens, Karenni,
Mons, Wa); Niger (Tuaregs); Pakistan (East Pakistan/Bangladesh); Philippines (Moros);
Rhodesia; South Africa (during apartheid regime); Spain (Basques); Sri Lanka (Tamils);
Sudan (South); Turkey (Kurds); United Kingdom (Northern Ireland); and Yugoslavia
(Kosovo).

Eritrea, Palestine, West Papua, East Timor and the Western Sahara. The 1998
International Conference of Experts organised in Barcelona by UNESCO Division of
Human Rights Democracy and Peace UNESCO Centre of Catalonia on the
implementation of the right of self-determination as a contribution to conflict prevention
proposed the following understanding of self-determination: “…an ongoing process of
choice for the achievement of human security and fulfillment of human needs with a
broad scope of possible outcomes and expressions suited to different specific situations.
These can include, but are not limited to, guarantees of cultural security, forms of self-
governance and autonomy, economic self-reliance, effective participation at the
international level, land rights and the ability to care for the natural environment,
spiritual freedom and the various forms that ensure the free expression and protection of
collective identity in dignity”. Such an understanding is not however the same as the
right of self-determination from a legal, international perspective, where it is much
more limited in scope, and being traditionally viewed as limited to the entire population
(a people for the purposes of international law) of an existing state or non-self-
governing territory. See for example Rosalyn Higgins, “Postmodern Tribalism and the
Right to Secession, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law, C. Brőlman, R.
Lefeber, M. Zieck (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993.

Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination

Movements, and Democracy, Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Center for
International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Also
available online at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict_2003.asp

It should be pointed out that although it is normally members of an ethnic, religious or

linguistic majority who control the state machinery and can therefore see their own
language, religion or culture reflected or favoured in the operations of the state, there
are in modem times well-known examples of a minority being politically dominant. The
political exclusion of the non-white majority in apartheid South Africa is perhaps the
most well-known. The subsequent preferences of the State for ‘white languages’ and the
white ‘race’ had the effect of excluding or marginalising most non-white South Africans
from a variety of employment opportunities and levels of power within an otherwise
modern state structure. Not entitled to full citizenship, most South Africans were
politically excluded in a state that was overtly non-neutral to an extreme degree. In fact,
what occurred was the almost complete exclusion of the majority of the population from
effective participation and representation in the public life of the State. It should
nevertheless be added that there is nothing in international human rights to prevent a
state from privileging the cultural, religious or linguistic preferences of the State (and its
ethnic, religious or linguistic majority). In other words, human rights do not in
themselves have the effect of automatically prohibiting such preferences, subject to one
major proviso: no cultural, religious or linguistic preferences are permissible in
international law if they amount to a violation of fundamental human rights such as
freedom of religion, nondiscrimination, etc.

Among possible exceptions one can mention the Mohajirs in Pakistan and the
Banyamulenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo, although one could argue that the
presence of the Banyamulenge is actually quite long-standing. In both cases the
minorities involved are very substantial.

Young, Crawford, "Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview", Occasional

Paper No. 8, World Summit for Social Development, UNRISD, 1994.
What constitutes discrimination under international treaties should be explained briefly.
Contrary to popular misconceptions, not all distinctions on the ground of religion,
language, race and other characteristics are prohibited in international human rights
treaties. While there is slightly different wording used in various decisional bodies such
as the European Court of Human Rights or the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, among others, the general approach is largely the same: for example, a
state’s religious, linguistic or racial preferences which have the effect of denying to,
excluding or disadvantaging individuals because of their religion, language or race
would be deemed discriminatory only if it is pursued for an illegitimate purpose, or is in
the circumstances unjustified or disproportionate to the objectives sought. Thus, the
United Nations Human Rights Committee concluded that the exclusive use of English
as the only language permitted under the Namibian Constitution and legislation was
discriminatory in not permitting the use of Afrikaans by local administrative authorities,
and a breach of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in
the absence of any reasonable justification for such an exclusive language preference
(UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 760/1997, Diergaardt v Namibia,
views of 25 July 2000). For a more detailed look as to what constitutes discrimination in
international law, see de Varennes, Fernand, Language, Minorities and Human
Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996, chapter 4.
Indonesia and a number of other states where ethnic conflicts erupted had policies by
which large numbers of individuals were transferred, usually, from more populous part
of the country to less densely inhabited areas. Sometimes presented as steps to assist the
development of less advanced regions, these policies often had disastrous consequences,
as they generally meant that members of the ethnic or religious majority, with
government support, swamped areas to such as extent that local population, usually
indigenous, would lose ownership and use of traditional lands, often without appropriate
compensation in any. Additionally, the economic benefits associated with these
“transmigration” population movements within a state seldom flowed to the minority or
indigenous populations which were gradually marginalised.
Closely linked, though not always to transmigration programmes are state policies
which, in the name of development, nationalises or extinguishes traditional resources
uses or rights of minorities and indigenous populations. In Kalimantan, for example, the
Government of Indonesia effectively extinguished the traditional customary rights of the
indigenous Dayaks and others in order to grant vast land-holdings to corporations
involved in rice, oil palm and rubber plantations. This re-allocation of natural resources
also had a clearly discriminatory impact on the basis of ethnic origins or even race, in
the sense that the beneficiaries of these resource policies were almost always Javanese
or others linked to them, whilst the Dayaks for their part usually lost any legal title or
use of traditional resources and land.

Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova,

Myanmar, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Rhodesia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Turkey, Yugoslavia

Chad, France, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger,
Philippines, Rhodesia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey.
Chad, Congo, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Niger, Rhodesia, South Africa, Sudan,
United Kingdom

Cyprus, Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, Philippines, Spain, Sudan,

Yugoslavia

Eritrea, Indonesia, Israel, Morocco

David Little, "Belief, Ethnicity and Human Rights", 1996, U.S. Institute of Peace

France (New Caledonia), India (Nagaland), Indonesia (Aceh), Italy (South Tyrol),
Mexico (Chiapas), Philippines (Moros), Spain (Basques), Sudan (Southern minorities),
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland).
Eritrea, East Timor, East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
Cyprus, Moldova, Yugoslavia
See generally Christine Bell (2001), Peace Agreements and Human Rights, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.

This has occurred for example at various times in Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Israel, Morocco, Myanmar, Philippines, Rhodesia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, and the
United Kingdom
There is of course always the argument that “it’s the other side which failed first”, as
shown in the recent travails of the Belfast (“Good Friday”) Peace Agreement. For the
purposes of this chapter, I have considered whether there has been a breach of the actual
commitments contained in an agreement, instead of the ‘spirit’ of a text or some other
claimed misbehavior.

Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, United Kingdom

Most peace agreements, at least in the immediate, dramatically lower the level of
intensity in most of the cases observed (especially Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Israel, Morocco, Philippines, Rhodesia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan and the United
Kingdom.

The human rights of minorities are fairly well elaborated in documents such as the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities, the Framework Convention on the Protection of National
Minorities; the Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National
Minorities, the The Hague Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of
National Minorities, and the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of
National Minorities in Public Life. They provide guidance as to the linguistic, religious
and cultural elements in state practices that have to be understood and in some cases
tempered in order to find that necessary balance to prevent ethnic conflicts. See also
generally on the issue of the use of language by state authorities de Varennes, Fernand
(1996), Language, Minorities and Human Rights, Kluwer Law International, The
Hague.

Fernand, could you mention the organizations that ‘authored’ these documents and
provide references to each of the documents?

UN Doc. A/47/277, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and

peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by
the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.

Civil Society, NGOs, and Social Movement

 (Presentation Notes)

Francis Daehoon Lee

November 2005
Gwangju, May-18 Foundation

Civil Society

The idea of civil society often comes as a part of modern liberal thoughts: society of
free and equal individuals and the state protecting this freedom. Civil society is
understood as a space where citizens voluntarily form communities and express their
diverse interests, very often in conflictual ways. In a democratic polity, civil society is
understood as a space fairly independent of the state and the market. In general, actors
in civil society engage with state agencies in different ways – resisting, conceding or
collaborating. The state in its part tries to repress, persuade or mediate civil society
actors. State-civil society relationship depends on the kind of organisation and the kind
of issues a particular organisation raises.

In South Korea, awareness and discussion on civil society began to flourish since the
democratisation that roughly started in 1987. Civic groups began to describe themselves
as non-governmental and non-profit organisations. This reflects the change of the nature
of the state (from authoritarian to liberal, roughly) and the efforts of large number of
popular groups to enlarge spaces of life-world independent of the state intervention.
This change also leads to a changed relationship between the two sides.

Civil society is both a political community in the larger sense of politics, as well as a
space where economic and others conflicts express themselves. In other words,
communities formed in civil society are not homogeneous and are often in conflict,
henceforth creating constant state of ‘hegemonic competition.’ This competition is
basically about what is and how to reach a better justice for larger groups of people.

Therefore, civil society-state relationship cannot be homogeneous in a country either.

Ideally, the more democratic a country is, such relationship, internal conflicts, and ways
of popular participation in larger politics are the more diverse. In the case of South
Korea, certain factors create push effects for civil society dynamism. One of them is
limited liberalisation of the institutional politics meaning the parliament does not
sufficiently represent diverse civil society demands and therefore other ways of
representation is on demand.

However, there are critical issues to think about here. What are the essential freedoms in
the idea of free individuals. Usually it refers to liberal citizenship and market rules
(freedom in the market). An interesting reflection comes from the history of translation
of ‘civil society’ along with that of ‘civilisation’ in East Asia: ‘civil’ in 市民, 公民, 民
間, for example. Other references are also useful:

- Marx: civil society = bourgeois society: a space class struggle

- Gramsci: State-civil society-market, space of hegemonic struggle (competition
for consensus on the political and economic legitimacy)
- Harbermas: State (public authority) – civil society (economics, labour, family –
individual interest) – public sphere (communications beyond individual interest)

NGOs (non-governmental organisations)

There are many names calling civic groups: non-governmental, voluntary, non-profit,
civil society, people’s, grassroots, organisations, etc.: NGOs, VOs, NPOs, CSOs, POs.
The attributes given to such groups also vary: social movement (traditional and new),
voluntary, autonomous, non-partisan or politically neutral, non-profitable, issue-
advocacy, public-good-oriented, service-delivery, revolutionary, etc. The origin of the
name ‘NGO’ comes from a UN usage – keeping central role for governments and
having non-governmental groups as subsidiary participants. Deeper understanding of
civil society dynamics always require an analysis of social movements, probing into
how activists are recruited, how people are mobilised, how groups are connected, what
issues gain public attention, how they contribute to social and political transformation,
etc.

In South Korea, the name “NGOs” become fashionable since late 1980s, coinciding
with the start of political liberalisation and diversification of social movements. Some
critiques say there are tension and difference between NGOs and POs. Many debates
run around some common questions:

- Are NGOs a way of liberal cooptation to the system, different from more
critical, resistant types of social movements?
 - Does democratisation create better ground for NGO activism and diversity?
- Do NGOs always work for ‘public good’? Is there a good distinction between
public good and collective self-interest’?
- Should NGO activities always be legal, non-partisan (neutral), ethical, non-
state? How far can NGOs participate in politics or work with government?
- How can diverse civic groups form solidarity over difference in values and
ideologies, etc (networking, alliance, front, issue coalition)?
- In view of growing global injustice (global market economy, inequality,
conflicts, ecological degradation), how can NGOs work in a way conducive to
global governance or global civil society?

Civil Society and Democratisation, Korea

Since 1945, the history of South Korea has been marred by the misery of the national
division and the war, the terror and suffocation of democracy inflicted by dictatorial rule
of authoritarian and fascist state. On the other hand, it is also a history of people’s strife
to restore human dignity in opposition to state violence and rule of dictators – history of
people’s resistance to all sorts of oppression, exploitation, discrimination and
marginalisation, and struggle for deeper and wider democracy. In the process, major
political crises were created roughly in a ten-year cycle. With the political breakthrough
made in 1987, the country entered a transition period towards democracy. The transition
itself also contained tensions, conflicts and struggles at various levels in the process of
reforming and transforming the old system.

The democracy of South Korea unfolded in dynamic interactions among state, political
society and social movements, but the fundamental force moving it forward was the
movement from below. Democracy, in both its formation and progress, was possible
because there was a strong movement driving it forward. In the sense that democratic
restoration and progress come along with democratic rearrangement of the relationships
among state, political society and civil society, such a rearrangement was possible in
South Korea because there was continuously a strong driving force. A more systematic
understanding of democracy invites one to look at a democratic transition of a country
beyond an individual event of change from an authoritarian or military regime to a
civilian or elected government, and to look at democratisation movement beyond
popular struggles against dictatorship or for institutional democratisation of the state. In
the same token, the history of democratisation in Korea is to be seen as a macro-
historical process that unfolded since the national liberation with repeated upward and
downward dynamics, and where wider range of movements coexisted and interacted
with each other for socio-economic democracy, producer-oriented democracy or
democracy in the life-world.

NGOs, Market, and State

NGOs differ in their view and relationship to capitalist market economy. This is in
relation to questions such as inequality and conflict created in civil society by
capitalism, the role and limits of welfare states, neo-liberal globalisation logic, and ways
of redistribution of wealth. Understanding of capitalism is one of the key factors
distinguishing NGO behaviour. Therefore, different views affect different NGOs in their
actions towards corporations. Most highlighted issues have been wage, working
conditions, participation to management, environment, gender, taxation and corporate
re-structuring. Corporations also make diverse relationship with NGOs –
confrontational, consultative, co-opting, or even supporting through various funding
schemes.

In a democratic society, the state-NGO relationship is complex, differing from that in a

non-democratic society. It can be confrontational, cooperative, or co-opted. In some
countries, state totally dominates over civil society. It is difficult to generalise on what is
the state of maturity in civil society development or NGO development. In general,
most social issues taken up by NGOs have political effect and affect state behaviour.
NGOs and state agency often compete for state identity and legitimacy. In the process,
some NGOs work with political parties, even though ‘NGOs’ usually refer to civic
groups not directly participating in electoral parties. Green parties and environmental
groups is one example. When there is a long tradition of corruption and nepotism in
party politics, NGOs’ close relationship with parties are not legitimised. In a transitional
society, NGO activities are more often politically interpreted as they clash with
formation of a new state identity and legitimacy.

Recently economic globalisation is creating huge challenge to NGO activities across

national borders. Large scale ‘anti-globalisation’ demonstrations and regional and global
forums such the World Social Forum reflect this. The trend cannot be simplified to
‘internationalisation’ of NGO activism or formation of ‘global civil society.’ As ‘civil
society’ and ‘democracy’ have been bound by ‘nation-state’ thinking, the challenge of
neo-liberal globalisation forces NGOs to re-think of their origin – nation-state and
nationalism and devise alternatives to globalised capitalism through trans-border
solidarity links. Formation of regional and global solidarity linkage is an enormous task
for anyone given the diversity of NGOs and all the cultural and technical difficulties.
Peace and justice now come under a new light in this respect – what is justice for
peoples who live apart around the world when globalised capitalism serves only top
minorities so-well connected and backed by use of the most destructive power (the US
military).

Complex Interaction: Example of NGO-GO interaction in Human Rights Regime

- The types of human rights stipulated in international human rights laws

- The common features in the international human rights laws: individual rights,
int’l monitoring and cooperation, domestic effect
- The components of international human rights regimes: norms, institutions,
procedures, actors
- What sustains the int’l HR regimes?: Interdependence of nation-states,
legitimacy of the UN, practical procedures, non-governmental organisations,
power of liberal thoughts – sanction of shame.
- Key norms (declarations, covenants, conventions, treaties; sometimes called
‘instruments’) and institutions (the UN, regional, national)
- Key procedures of the UNCHR:
* 1235 procedure (open discussion) – chair’s statement, report, resolution,
special rapporteur, technical cooperation and advisory services, recommended
sanction to the UN Security Council.
* 1503 procedure (confidential review) – communications, working group
review, report, pass to 1235 procedure.

Some Examples: local and regional NGOs

PSPD – People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

ARENA – Asia Regional Exchange for New Alternatives
GPPAC process – Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflict
Exercise 3: The View of (Some) Experts on Violent Conflicts within States and
What should be done

1. Material Used for Discussions:

• Extracts from various reports on violence in (mainly) Asian States.

2. Objectives:

To identify and critique the basis of violence in states according to a number of

reports/experts. Though the causes are of course many in any situation, the object
here is to point out some of the most prevalent in Asia (and elsewhere) and to single
out the ideology or commonalities involved in many of these conflicts.

Please note also that there is no consensus among experts on many of these issues,
and the extracts here are necessarily selective.

3. Method:

• Each participant will be asked to:

o Comment on one extract and indicate whether the point(s) made appear
consistent with what has been observed during this seminar
o Indicate in relation to his/her own experiences or observations the
strengths/weaknesses of the argument(s) made
o Suggest what should be done to address the causes of violent conflicts in
states
 MATERIAL FOR EXERCISE 3

1. PHILIPPINES: For hundreds of years, the government of Spain and then the

government of the Philippines had by decree or laws sent invaders, abolished the

laws of the Moros, expropriated much of their land, refused to use officially

their language, tried to discourage them in their Islamic practices, forced their

children to go to schools often controlled by Christians, etc.

2. SUDAN: The attempts of the north not only to define the identity [of Sudan] as

Arab and Islamic, but to structure and stratify the life and role of citizens along

those lines [has been an underlying cause of the civil war]”… Some northerners

sincerely feel that Sudan can only be united through religious and cultural

uniformity, and have therefore supported efforts to Islamise the south… Far

from achieving the desired unity, however, the result has been continued civil

war.

3. MYANMAR (BURMA): At first, the “special position” of Buddhism was

“recognised” [in Burma], but in 1961 this equivocal phrasing was repealed by a

State Religion Act that made Buddhism the official religion. The Act required

the Public Service Commission, in recruiting candidates for government

employment, to accord the same weight to a knowledge of Pali, the liturgical

language, as to other subjects, a provision which reflected the careerist

motivation of some proponents. But the main support for the state religion
 movement came from the countryside, a fact which cannot be explained without

reference to the significance of the state religion as a symbol of Burman

hegemony. This is precisely the way it was interpreted by minorities, especially

the Kachins and Chins.

4. Most conflicts find their “causes” in the actions of government: the State and its

institutions are seen as acting against the interests of an ethnic group (by

discriminating, expropriating land, not giving jobs, causing poverty).

5. Rodolpho Stavenhagen, pp. 80-81: Ethnic conflicts generally involve a clash of

interests or a struggle over rights: rights to land, to education, to the use of

language, to political representation, to freedom of religion, to the preservation

of ethnic identity, to autonomy, to self-determination, and so forth.

6. BANGLADESH: When the Pakistani Government declared that “Urdu and only

Urdu” would be the national language, a language that virtually no one knew,

the Bengalis decided that this was the last straw. The primacy given to Urdu

resulted in the creation of the Bangla Language Movement which rapidly

became a Bengali national movement and the real beginning of the move

towards independence. There were riots in Dhaka, and on 21 February 1952, 12

students were killed by the Pakistani army. The Awami League, led by Sheik

Mujibur Rahman, emerged as the national political party in Pakistan, and the

Language Movement became its ideological underpinning. During the 1960s the
 Awami League grew more powerful and instigated numerous protests against

domination by West Pakistan. The catastrophic cyclone of 1970 devastated East

Pakistan, killing some half a million people, and while foreign aid poured in, the

Pakistani government appeared to do little. Support for the Awami League

peaked and in the 1971 national elections it won 167 of the 313 seats, a clear

majority. In East Pakistan it won all the seats except one. Constitutionally the

Awami League should have formed the government of all Pakistan, but the

President postponed the opening of the National Assembly. Riots and hartals

(strikes) broke out in East Pakistan. At Chittagong, a clash between civilians and

soldiers left 55 Bengalis dead. When President Khan secretly returned to Wwest

Pakistan in March 1971 after talks with Sheik Mujib had failed, Sheik Mujib

was arrested and Pakistani troops went on a rampage throughout Eeast Pakistan,

burning down villages, looting shops and homes, and indiscrimiantely

slaughtering civilians. While estimates vary widely, probably close to a million

people died in the conflict. [21 February (Amar Ekushe – Ntional Day of

Mourning) is a public holiday: it commemorates the students who succesfully

opposed the government’s attempts to deny Bangla the status of state language.

On 21 February 1952 several students from the Language Movement were killed

and subsequently awarded martyr status].

7. DR NEELAN TIRUCHELVAM: In the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh,

Bengali immigration with state complicity has transformed the patterns of land

tenure and radically altered the demography of this area. Non-indigenous settlers
now occupy most of the fertile land. A very large-scale hydro electric project has

also had a damaging impact on tribal land security. It resulted in the submerging

of almost 40 per cent of prime agricultural land and the displacing of almost

100,000 tribals, with no compensation for most of the persons affected. It is now

estimated that the non-tribal immigrants constitute almost 40 per cent of the

Chittagong Hill Tracts. The Bangladesh government has been accused of

‘carrying out a programme of systematic extermination of the indigenous

nationalities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts because they are ethnically,

religiously and culturally different from Muslim Bengalis’.5 Although the

government recently appointed a national committee to re-evaluate its policies

towards the Chittagong Hill Tracts, issues relating to political autonomy over

areas traditionally occupied by the tribals, and questions relating to the legal

recognition of tribal land rights are yet to be resolved. Similar issues have arisen

with regard to transmigration programmes of the Indonesian government

whereby hundreds of thousands of Javanese were resettled with World Bank

assistance in less densely populated, ethnically distinct areas such as

Kalimantan, West Papua, and East Timor. Stavenhagen has pointed out that the

impact of these programmes on minorities and indigenous people has been

disastrous. In Sabah and Sarawak, concessions to logging companies and other

logging projects have had an adverse impact on traditional forest dwellers such

as Dayak and ‘Anak Negeri’ communities.

 The NGOs as Global Actor: Myth or Reality?

Prof. Hae-Young Lee (Hanshin University)

I. Introduction

One of the peculiar trends in the nineties in the international political arena is
doubtlessly the NGOs. With the 1989/90 collapse of the so-called real existent socialism
was boastfully proclaimed the New World Order. The World-Capitalism has
successfully proved its viability once again. As a result, the 'Age of Extremes' (E.J.
Hobsbawm) seems to expire now and forever without knowing its successor. After ten
years of anxious hope are many people now conscious that the "Age of Extremes" is
ended irreversibly but the next century also has nothing to do with the "brave new
world". On the contrary the U.S. as a sole empire on the globe is continuing the
"imperial overstretch" (P. Kennedy). Only the "neo-feudal" international system has
substituted its antecedent. One imperial state assisted by the "knight" states such as G7
dominates the most countries. One used to say that after "September 11" everything has
changed utterly. However, the hard core of the age, in my view, has not changed at all.

Amidst fin de siecle pessimism had J. Habermas 1984 diagnosed our times as
follows :

The future is negatively cathected ; we see outlined on the threshold of the twenty-
first century the horrifying panorama of a worldwide threat to universal life
interests: the spiral of the arms race, the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons,
 the structural impoverishment of developing countries, problems of environmental
overload, and the nearly catastrophic operations of high technology are the
catchwords that have penetrated public consciousness by way of the mass media.
... The situation may be objectively obscure. Obscurity is nonetheless also a
function of a society's assessment of its own readiness to take action. What is at
stake is Western culture's confidence in itself.1

On the one hand, the aftermath of "September 11" has reactivated the pessimism of
"new obscurity." On the other hand it may imply no other than a warning signal which
urges us to take measures. The "optimism of will" (A. Gramsci) could be justified above
all by the fact that in the nineties the NGOs have increased their capacities at the
international as well as at the national level so dramatically that the national
governments can hardly hold the countervailing power of NGOs under control. The
international institutions such as WB, IMF, WTO must react to them by any means.
Moreover, they are often considered as a recognized actor of world politics and people
demand them to hold even more accountability and morals than the politicians. In the
national politics many assign them to take the role of the "fifth pillar" next to
legislature, executive, jurisdiction and media. One often says, "taking NGOs seriously."
The NGO-activists' catchphrase may be: "Together, we are superpower."

Despite success stories of NGOs in the nineties, there may be still many
unanswered questions for closer examination. For some critics, "NGOs are the most
overestimated actor of the nineties." 22 However, others forecast the "shift of power"
from states to NGOs.33 There are good reasons for the critical review of previous global
activity of NGOs: as many contradictions and divergences as harmonies and
convergences exist between
- NGOs from the North and South
- "Moderate" and "radical" NGOs
- Lobbying-oriented and movement-oriented NGOs
- Rich and poor NGOs
- Large and small NGOs
- National and international NGOs
1
) J. Habermas (1989), The New Conservatism, MIT Press; Cambridge, pp.50-51.
2
P. Wahl (1998), “NGO Transnationals, McGreenpeace and the Network Guerrilla”,
(www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/issues/wahl.htm)
3
) Jessica Mathews, the head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote that "the steady
concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, is over, at least for
a while." See Economist, December 11-17, 1999.
 - "Occidental" and "oriental" NGOs
etc.

The list could last endlessly. Nevertheless, central in my paper is the next
problem: Could NGOs be a political alternative in the future? In other words, are they
politically capable enough to articulate a vision of global governance that re-regulates
the "disembedded" economy into world-society without world-government? If such
expectation seems to be unrealistic for the moment, then, is NGOs' future confined to
play a role of "checks and balances" in world politics, namely, the "junior-partner" of
senior players like states and international organizations? Is their role simply a moral
counterpart of corporate- or state-led international system in order to bridge the gap
between the people and international organizations? Is herein an alternative project to
the present international order included? This essay wants to contribute to such a
discussion.

II. Globalization and the rise of NGOs in the nineties

Although NGOs have existed for a long time in history (in the early 1800s, the
British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society played an important role in abolishing the
slavery system), they have not established themselves as an independent international
factor until the 1990s. The NGOs in the new age are one of unintended consequences of
neo-liberal globalization.

Most imposing is above all their increase in number. The Yearbook of

International Organizations has counted on the rather conservative basis - that is, groups
with operations in more than one country - the number of international NGOs at more
than 26,000 today, up from 6,000 in 1990. 44 In addition, the U.N. now lists more than
3,000 NGOs. The World Watch Institute suggested that in the U.S. alone there are about
2 million NGOs, 70% of which are less than 30 years old. In Eastern Europe sprang up
between 1988 - 1995 more than 100,000 NGOs. The big international NGOs are
concentrated mostly in three main areas: human rights, development and the
environment. Also remarkable is the membership growth in these areas; for instance, the
Worldwide Fund for Nature now has around 5 million members, up from 570,000 in
1985, which doesn't need to be shy to compare to the population of small countries.
4
) Ibid.
 All this is a historically unprecedented phenomenon. In form, the "NGO
swarm" is amorphous, linked each other "online", organized highly decentralized and
acts "molecularly". The NGOs as a whole are, in short, not an organization in classical
sense, but a "net" itself.

As mentioned, the dramatic proliferation of NGOs was a reaction against the

neo-liberal globalization realized at the outset as an anti-crisis strategy in the advanced
capitalist countries since the 1970s. It is first of all the globalization of the economy.
The Transnational Corporations are one of its most enthusiastic protagonists. The neo-
liberal offensive enforced the reorganization of traditional nation-states as the
'transmission belt' of world market. With the transition of such nation-states into the
neo-liberal "competition-states", as J. Hirsch conceptualized, was every realm of life
threatened to subordinate into the logic of market. The hegemony of "Neo-liberal
International" (P. Anderson) accelerated, for instance, the shifts of the alliance between
the labor and the industry capital, which characterize the "Golden Age" of postwar
capitalism, to that of industry and financial capital against the labor. But the key
problem lies no other than in the fatal unbalance between the globalized economy and
the nationally structured politics. As a consequence, it is inevitable to reactivate the
critical potentials installed in the civil society and to mobilize its resources to block the
neo-liberal offensive from inside as well as from outside.

The list of achievements by the NGOs over the past decade is quiet
encouraging:

- Promoting agreements on controlling greenhouse gases 1992

- "Fifty Years is Enough" campaign 1994
- Campaign to outlaw anti-personal land mines 1997
- Establish an international criminal court
- Numerous concerted actions to improve labor conditions in the South against
individual corporations such as Nike and to control the genetically modified
organisms (GMOs)
etc.

The protest movement against such international institutions as WTO, World

Bank, IMF and the temporarily failed MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment)
belongs to the latest and most spectacular events in the nineties organized by
international NGOs. If the 1992 UN earth summit in Rio was the first turning-point in
the history of modern NGOs, where for the first time NGOs participated in the global
decision-making process not as protester, the anti-MAI campaign could be estimated as
an epoch-making second turning-point. In this campaign the NGOs as "global player"
experimented new methods of movement, which is "possibly turning out to be an
alternative to the transnationalization of large NGOs that is quite problematic from a
democratic point of view"55. From now on, the NGO movement gains another
dimension. The global political terrain changed radically: Seattle (November 1999),
Washington (April 2000) , Prague (September 2000), Quebec(April 2001),
Gothenburg(June 2001), Barcelona (June 2001), Genoa (July 2001), Washington
(September 2001) and now Qatar (November 2001). As C. Fred Bergsten commented
April 1999, "the anti-globalization forces are now in the ascendancy."

Of course, it is not true to say that the failure of MAI-negotiations66 was

exclusively due to the NGO protest. P. Wahl highlights three characteristics of anti-
MAI-campaign. First, this campaign has confronted initially not with the so-called "soft
issues" on the international agenda - like as environmental or development issues - but
with the "hard" economic issues. Secondly, the - limited - success of NGOs was "not
achieved by large, transnational NGOs, but by a lose network of both, i.e., small NGOs
together with some large, transnational NGOs." Lastly, "the campaign did not aim at
improving a project promoted by the government, but classified the agreement as part of
the globalization process and rejected it completely."

Furthermore, the experience of MAI campaign could be very useful as a

strategic framework for the future of NGOs:

"- With the issues of neo-liberalism and globalization, NGOs have picked out a
fundamental social problem as a central campaign issue and have overcome their
traditional single-issue projects.
- Refusing the MAI instead of "improving" it did not harm the image of the
campaign in the media.
- NGOs are politically successful when their issues move and mobilize the public.
- Loose networks turned out to be efficient; centralized and hierarchical structures
5
) See Wahl (1998), op.cit
6
) For the detailed description and critique, see M. Barlow/ T. Clarke (1998), MAI: The Threat to
American Freedom, New York: Stoddart.
 were not necessary, and would have possibly been counterproductive.
- Small and flexible NGOs played an important role." 77

With the anti-MAI campaign begins the trends to change. The "hard" issues
were imported into the international NGO community. The NGOs turn to the "high
politics" and the core international institutions. As results, there took place a process of
differentiation from inside. The anti-globalization movement has become an
indispensable component of international NGOs.

III. The Strategic Framework for NGOs in Relation to Globalization

With the ongoing differentiation in the international NGO community, inherent

differences and disparities among various NGOs are confirmed inevitably. One of
decisive diverging points may be related to the problem of how to deal with the
economic globalization. In another words, - as W. Bello said - "should we seek to
transform or to disable the main institutions of corporate-led globalization?"88: in short,
"Reform or Disempowerment" of international institutions.

Tendency Main Argument Key Institutions

Global Against globalization of social/labor movements;

Justice capital(not people), environment advocacy groups;
Movements for "people-centered radical activist networks; regional
development" and national coalitions; leftwing
think-tanks; academic settings

Third World Join the system Self-selecting third world nation-

Nationalism but on much fairer States
terms
Post-Washington Reform "imperfect Most United Nations agencies;
Consensus markets" & "sustainable governments of France and Japan
development"

Washington Slightly adjust the status U.S. agencies (Treasury, Federal

Consensus quo (transparency, Reserve, USAID); Bretton Woods
7 supervision & regulation Institutions; WTO, centrist
) See Wahl (1998), op. cit.
8
) W. Bello (2001), “Toward a New System of Global EconomicWashington
Governance”,think-tanks; Britishatand
manuscript presented
a seminar organized by Munwha Ilbo, PSPD, Suh Sangdon Committee in Seoul, February
German governments 22.2001
Resurgent Restore U.S. isolationism; Populist & libertarian wings of
Rightwing Punish bank's mistakes Republican party; American Enterprise
Institute, Cato Institute, Manhattan
Institute, Heritage Institute
 <Table1: Five Reactions to the Global Crisis>

Especially, P. Bond has devoted his attention to this problem in recent years. He
categorizes five reactions to the globalization since the international financial crisis
around mid-1997 99(See the Table 1). Amongst the above five tendencies, this essay is of
course interested mainly in - following Bond's terminology - the "Global Justice
Movements", that is, international NGO movements. However, except the so-called
"Co-opted NGOs (CoNGOs)", which receive fund from the neo-liberal agency and seek
usually the "dialogue and compromise", there are also each other conflicting and
competing subcurrents within the NGO camp. With regard to the NGOs' global strategy
can there be logically two main axes: Pro-Globalist or Anti-Globalist. But the empirical
reality must not be so simplistic. There also can be minute sub-categories. For example,
one could be against the globalization of capital, but in favor of the "democratic"
globalization of people or "from below". To which camp, then, does this tendency
belong? While someone criticizes the present form of globalization, can he or she
imagine or accept at the same time alternative ways to globalization? Therefore, all
strategic models of NGOs must take into consideration such a case.

Ideal-typically, three kinds of approaches to the problem appear, for the

moment, according to the main line of argument and attitude to globalization: 1)
"international reformism" 2) "globalization from below" 3) "delinking."

1) "International reformist" approach:

This view is a global version of social partnership or corporatism at the national

level, which has backed up the 'Golden Age of capitalism" in Western society. It refers
basically to the thesis of "democratic deficit" of international institutions and regimes
that can be covered only by the cooperation with international civil society. The
interests of NGOs as "stakeholder" could be accommodated with the business. The
political legitimacy grounded on the support from the NGOs as junior-partner is a
necessary condition for the viability of global capitalism. Therefore, it aims the
capitalism with "human face".

9
) Patrick Bond (2001), “Strategy and Self-Activity in the Global Justice Movements”, FPIF Discussion
Paper #5, August 2001.
 John Clark, a former leading Bank critic at Oxfam, issued an email memo now
as chief NGO liaison officer at the World Bank:

"[H]ow to respond to the demo organizers' request to all NGOs to boycott all
meetings with the Bank and Fund ... For some the compromise was to take part in
meetings with Bank staff off the premises (some said this was because they didn't
want to be seen and identified by demonstrators and be accused of cooption); but
others - notably Jubilee 2000 [U.S.] - were quite open that they intended to ignore
the request."1010

The aim of "international reformist" lies not in the abolition of international

institutions but in their improvement. From this viewpoint, it is not marvelous to find to
some extent the logical homogeneity with the so-called "Post-Washington Consensus"
of which World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz takes the initiative. Aimed at the
correcting capitalist system's "imperfect markets", he tried to introduce a "new
paradigm" into the neo-liberal economy. J. Stiglitz writes: "The policies advanced by
the Washington Consensus are hardly complete and sometimes misguided. ... The focus
on freeing up markets, in the case of financial market liberalization, may actually have
had a perverse effect, contributing to macro-instability through weakening of the
financial sector."1111 This results in an elite fight between IMF and World Bank. The
World Bank shows, in comparison with its sister organization, the IMF, a relatively high
sensitivity to the activity of NGOs, which is well reflected in its document:
"Consultation with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): General Guidelines for the
World Bank Staff.” Some of lines in the document say: “The primary objective of
consultations is to improve the quality of decisions by: capturing the experience of
specialized non-governmental agencies, tapping the knowledge of CSOs that work at
the community level, giving voice to the poor ..., and giving sustainability for proposed
reforms beyond any one government administration."1212 The World Bank's co-optation
strategy may express its changed approach to the integrationist fraction in the
international neo-liberal blocks.

In recent years, the partnership between business and NGOs increased

10
) Cited from Bond (2001). op. cit.
11
) Cited from P. Bond (1999), “Global and National Financial Reforms”, Proceeding at International
Conference on Neo-liberalism, Global Capitalism and Civil Alternatives, October 5, 1999,
Sungkonghoe University, Seoul Korea.
12
) See World Bank's homepage http://wbln0018.worldbank.org.
variously. The Financial Times reported:

"For companies, the desire to work with NGOs stemmed from a recognition that
environmental and social issues can provide business benefits, ranging from
differentiating products to cutting costs. "In the world of business, environmental
performance is increasingly seen as a competitive and strategic issue for
companies," says SustainAbility. In several instances NGOs have been willing to
endorse products. In 1992 Greenpeace helped launch a hydrocarbon called
"Greenfreeze" that could replace an ozone-damaging coolant in refrigerators. Its
efforts resulted in 70,000 orders."1313

The "symbiosis" between business and NGOs follows, as such, the business
logic: an equivalent exchange between profitability of business and fund-raising of
NGOs:

"The problem with partnerships lies not so much in the nature of the relationship as
in objectives. Despite the grand rhetoric, when it comes to negotiating the terms of
the partnerships, there is a tendency to revert to fundamental organizational aims:
reputation enhancement at the local and international level for the business and
access to financial resources for the NGO. Hence, most NGOs give the
responsibility for corporate partnerships to the fund-raising department, rather than
to their advocacy department."1414

But even such a partnership is inaccessible to the NGOs of the South, due mainly to the
"power differentials":

"The idea of partnership between a multi-billion dollar global corporation and a

poor, marginalized local community group in the South is at odds with the
enormous power differentials and divergent interests inherent in such a
relationship. On the other hand, when larger NGOs establish new collaborative
relationships with business, there appears to be greater scope for shared power and
control. Such NGOs increasingly need to work with business in order to realize
their organizational goals in a globalized economy. Their business partners need
credible independent guidance in order to respond appropriately to concerns about
13
) V. Houlder (2001), “Campaigners Learn Lesson of Business Advantage”, Financial Times, July 24,
2001.
14
) Kelly Currah (2000), “How Corporations Absolve Their Sins”, Guardian, August 28, 2000
 the social and environmental impacts of their products and production processes."
1515

As mentioned above, the relationship between two "non-state actors" is recently

interwoven, to a great extent, because not of mutual understandings but rather of mutual
interests. Even though it is for now not proper to judge about it ultimately, one thing is
however not deniable that such an invisible connection could jeopardize all the
achievements of NGO movement. For instance, at the local level, the NGO's
intervention encouraged by many donors of the North, that is also NGOs, was accused
of misleading the outcome:

"By their action and their line of work, NGOs have a strong tendency to take in
charge some tasks or services that are normally of the State' s responsibility. This
attitude often leads peasants to consider the NGOs as being the State or its
legitimate substitute. It also represents a form of justification of the State's
passivity concerning rural development, or even a means of taking away from it its
responsibilities. The extension and generalization of such an attitude can also open
the way for the existence of two parallel States or of a State in the State..."

2) "Globalization from below" approach:

W. Bello, Director of Focus on the Global South, represents one of the typical
positions with regards to the anti-globalization campaign in the NGO community.
According to him, "a classic crisis of legitimacy has struck the multilateral institutions
that serve as key elements of the system of global economic governance: The WTO,
IMF and the World Bank." Therefore, "the focus of our efforts these days is not to try to
reform the multilateral agencies but to deepen the crisis of legitimacy of the whole
system. ... We are talking about disabling not just the WTO, the IMF and the World
Bank but the transnational corporations itself. And we are not talking about a process of
"re-regulation" of the TNCs but of eventually disabling or dismantling them as
fundamental hazards to people, society, the environment, to everything we hold dear."

So, the strategic orientation focused not on the "re-regulation" but on the
disempowerment of TNCs. Bello seeks the alternative to globalization in the "de-

15
David F. Murphy (1998), “Business and NGOs in the Global Partnership Process”,
(http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/unctad16.htm)
globalization":

"We are not talking about withdrawing from the international economy.
We are speaking about reorienting our economies from production for export to
production for the local market;
...
We are talking, essentially, about an approach that consciously subordinates the
logic of the market, the pursuit of cost efficiency to the values of security, equity
and social solidarity. Following Karl Polanyi, we are speaking, about reembedding
the economy in society, rather than having society driven by the economy."1616

Rejecting capitalist globalization radically, Michael Albert also recently

elaborates the alternative strategy to the globalization. The anti-globalization activists
now want to replace the core three institutions of capitalist globalization, such as the
IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, with dramatically new and different structures:

"The WTO trumps governments and populations on behalf of corporate profits.

The full story about these three centrally important global institutions is longer, of
course, but improvements are not hard to conceive. First, why not have, instead of
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade
Organization, an International Asset Agency, a Global Investment Assistance
Agency, and a World Trade Agency. These three new (not merely reformed)
institutions would work to attain equity, solidarity, diversity, self-management, and
ecological balance in international financial exchange, investment and
development, trade, and cultural exchange."1717

M. Albert advocates, furthermore, a "bottom-up" method as the organizational principle

of the new institutions:

"And second, ... anti-globalization activists also advocate a recognition that

international relations should not derive from centralized but rather from bottom-
up institutions. The new overarching structures mentioned above should therefore
gain their credibility and power from an array of arrangements, structures, and ties
enacted at the level of citizens, neighborhoods, states, nations and groups of

16
) See Bello (2001), op. cit.
17
) See Michael Albert (2001), “What Are We For?”, ZNet, September 6, 2001.
 nations, on which they rest. And these more grass-roots structures, alliances, and
bodies defining debate and setting agendas should, like the three earlier described
one, also be transparent, participatory and democratic, and guided by a mandate
that prioritizes equity, solidarity, diversity, self-management, and ecological
sustainability and balance."1818

3) "Delinking" approach:

Yash Tandon, a former chair of CIVIUS: World Alliance for Citizen

Participation, also presents a grassroots-oriented alternative from the perspective of the
South: "What are the alternatives? Stepping outside of the global economy is hardly a
realistic option. However, the South can do at least two things in relation to the process
of globalization. One: it can slow down the process of its further integration into the
global process. And two: it can strengthen its local- community based systems of
production and marketing, and begin to control local resources away from the hands of
multinational corporations."1919 For him, the governments in the South are not capable
any more of defending against the encroachment of their sovereignty accompanied by
globalization. Furthermore, most of the Southern NGOs are funded by the Northern
counterparts and consequently tend to be either "welfarist or single-issue oriented."
Hence, "by and large it is unrealistic to expect the NGOs (excepting a few) to take the
lead to raise broader issues of development and the effects of capital-led
globalization."2020 Instead, rather how the "ordinary people on the ground who are the
direct recipients of the damage that modernization, and now the globalization" will
become a force for change is a crucial issue for the South. "When they rise", "the NGOs
could become good allies for them, just as when the street kids of townships in South
Africa rose up to single-handedly take on the might of the apartheid state the middle
class intellectual cadre of NGOs became a strong support base of them."2121

In the tradition of Dependency Theory, S. Amin continued to radicalize the

strategy of "delinking" - "not autarky, but the subordination of outside relations to the

18
) Ibid.
19
) Yash Tandon (1997), “Globalization and the South: the Logic of Exploitation”, Internationale Politik
und Gesellschaft, 4/1997, p. 397.
20
) Ibid., p. 398.
21
) Ibid.
logic of internal development and not the reverse".2222 Then he reviewed the most
radical reform proposals against the "Bretton Woods institutions", which are very
similar to the M. Albert's ideas sketched above: 1) the transformation of the IMF into a
genuine world central bank; 2) the transformation of the World Bank into a fund that
would collect surpluses and lend them to the Third World; 3) the creation of a genuine
international trade organization, etc. Although these are as such a very fine project for
the reform of world economic and political system, they have the blind spots, too. For
instance, too much "value judgments" are included in the analyses; the transformation
of the IMF or World Bank into new ones ought not to be the objective for the immediate
future in the long transition to world socialism. Consequently, he is afraid that "by
setting the bar too high we are condemning ourselves to failure"; because "the status of
globalization has not always been clearly defined (is it a determining objective force, or
one tendency among others?) certain elements of the reform project ... strike me as
doubtful.2323

For him, capitalist globalization is not in itself a way of resolving the crisis. A
simple "rejection" of globalization could not constitute an adequate solution, for it
become, at last, integrated into this globalization and are made use of it. The "delinking
is not to be found in these illusory and negative rejections but on the contrary by an
active insertion capable of modifying the conditions of globalization."2424 It means no
other than the "substituting the unilateral adjustment of the weak to the strong with a
structural adjustment that is truly bilateral" by means of "another type of globalization".
Most important is the problem for the "national and popular democratic alliance". It is
so impossible to bypass the "stage of popular national construction, of regionalization,
of delinking and the building of a polycentric world".2525

IV. Toward the Global Governance of People

Every political process presupposes normally three dimensions: polity, politics

and policy. The same applies also to the international political arena. It can’t be denied
that in the nineties NGOs act as global player like multinational corporations
successfully as well as unsuccessfully. They contract occasionally the strategic alliances
22
) S. Amin (1997), Capitalism in the Age of Globalization, London & New Jersey: Zed Books, p. 40.
23
) Ibid., p. 43 passim.
24
) Ibid., p. 75.
25
) Ibid., p.78-9.
with each other and form a united front against the "tyranny of market". All these were
obviously political actions or at least "politically-oriented" actions. Like usual political
parties, they put pressure upon the government at the national level and contributed
immensely to the further democratization of society. In the public sphere they were
approved as a quasi-political party and gained a considerable "power of influence",
namely the "indirect" power compared to that of the administration. With regard to the
environmental and social issues, their positions nowadays are respected and adopted on
a case-by-case basis. If one takes all these processes seriously, she/he may conclude that
NGOs become global political actors. However, still one thing lacks in the NGOs
exactly as the TNCs do. That is democratic legitimacy. They were never elected but
only selected by the people on the basis of beliefs that they are morally superior to the
politicians by profession. If so, they have at best the virtual or ad hoc legitimacy, which
would be fulfilled only through their post-factum activity. In essence, people’s
acknowledgement of the NGOs is a kind of social contract that could be broken
anytime. As far as NGOs have never constituted themselves in the "body politic", the
legitimacy problem of NGOs remains unresolved.

Paradoxically the globalization made a favorable condition to create some type

of global polity. The globalized economy leads to the selective globalization of society.
Against this background, NGOs were rapidly internationalized. R. Falk and A. Strauss
proposed in Foreign Affairs a formation of "Global Parliament": "As with the early
European parliament, a relatively weak assembly initially equipped with largely
advisory powers could begin to address concerns about the democratic deficit while
posing only a long-term threat to the realities of state power."2626 According to them,
there are two ways to reach it. First, "civil society, aided by receptive states, could
create the assembly without resorting to a formal treaty process. Under this approach,
the assembly would not be formally sanctioned by states, so governments would
probably contest its legitimacy at the outset. But this opposition could be neutralized to
some extent by widespread grassroots and media endorsement." Second approach
"rel[ies] on a treaty, using what is often called the 'single negotiating text method'. After
consultation with sympathetic parties from civil society, business, and nation-states, an
organizing committee could generate the text of a proposed treaty establishing an
assembly."2727

26
) Richard Falk / Andrew Strauss (2001), “Bridging the Globalization Gap: Toward Global Parliament”,
Foreign Affairs, January-February 2001.
27
) Ibid.
 Of course, it may be a too defeatist to reject this proposal only because it
sounds utopian. But it is also problematic to insist that the possibilities exist without
probing in detail the concrete conditions of it. Unacceptable is moreover that the idea of
"Global Parliament" is de-linked with any abolition or at least radical reform of neo-
liberal institutions.

Although it is true that the formation of a political unit on a global scale is in

the last instance one of the ultimate solution of legitimation problem, it matters,
however, in the first instance if its political contents are well planned and the political
driving forces are sufficiently organized. For instance, the ideological factor plays here
a significant role. To tell the truth, the ideological terrain within the NGO community is
to a great extent confusing and divergent. Especially those at the core of anti-
globalization understand themselves as "anarchist". Following B. Epstein, their
intellectual and philosophical perspectives might be better described as an "anarchist
sensibility than as anarchism per se." In this sense "it is a form of politics that revolves
around the exposure of the truth rather than strategy."2828 The ideological-political
backgrounds of anti-globalization movements vary from Marxism, Trotskyism, to the
Islam. A certain form of movement such as "network guerilla," on which the "anarchist"
mind-set is dominant, could be advantageous to access to the people. Neither the
movement could however vagabondize from here to there perpetually, nor works the
internet always.

The NGOs per se is an expression of a specific phase of history, wherein the

classical labor movement is politically inactive and the "new" social movement
somewhat suffers from tiredness. A. Gramsci proposed once a perspective of
"reabsorption of state into the civil society". This standpoint could be valid at the
national level. However, in the international arena there is no central authority as world-
state. It seems to be also not plausible that in the near future the world-state becomes a
reality. The "governance without government" is seemingly the only feasible alternative
in the world politics for the present. For the global "civil society" - whatsoever it may
be -this constellation might be a chance, for the international NGOs could try to
constitute themselves politically without relatively less backlash of states. In my view,
the future of NGOs depends considerably on whether they will reorganize themselves
anew as political body. Neither NGO-fetishism nor NGO-nihilism helps this project at

28
) Barbara Epstein (2001), “Anarchism and the Anti-Globalization Movement”, Monthly Review,
September 2001.
all. Anyhow, so true is the following: "There is no alternatives."