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Psychomusicology, 10, 127-139 1991 Psychomusicology

DEFINING A PROTOTYPICAL UTTERANCE


Robert O. Gjerdingen State University of New York at Stony Brook The difficulties in adequately defining a prototypical music utterance are often underestimated. A comparison with the problem of defining a prototypical beginning sentence for a small set of fairy tales shows how a prototypical utterence is reducible neither to a single defining essense nor to a simple list of traits or features. Most likely to be overlooked are the great number of spatio-temporal correlations that accompany the more overt features of words or, for music, tones. Two previous studies of music phrase prototypes wereflaweddue to inadequate control of such correlative features. Effects of serial position in the presentation of exemplars further complicate the study of music prototypes. Two historical case studies demonstrate that, in spite of subjects having quite different initial music experiences, there can be a convergence upon the same prototype when very large numbers of similar exemplars are heard. The phrase prototypes abstracted from actual music, however, may be too complex for succinct verbal description. For such cases, neural-network models suggest new modes of definition.

Music scholars bandy about words like "typical," "characteristic," or "standard" with the open confidence of embezzlers who, knowing that they alone keep the books, cannot imagine being called to account. Take for example the following statements from a widely-read general history of music: Typical illustrations of Haydn's late Classical chromaticism may be heard in the Andante of Symphony No. 104.... The sonata in Eb (Op. 7), published in 1797, is especially characteristic of Beethoven in the theme of the Largo.... [The] external form [of Schubert's piano sonatas] never departs from the standard Classical patterns (Grout, 1973, pp. 490,519,561). The academic tone of these statements may give the impression that objectively defined prototypes provide solid anchors for these allusions to "standard patterns." In truth, this is not the case. The ability to specify those precise correlations of harmonies, inflected tones, rhythms, melodic motives, and contrapuntal lines that constitute the most typical instances of "Haydn's late Classical chromaticism" remains beyond the reach of music theorists. And music historians would be hard pressed to list the specific criteria that distinguish a prototypical theme "characteristic of Beethoven" from one characteristic of Cherubini (one of Beethoven's important contemporaries). Examined closely, the musicological usage of words like "typical," "characteristic," and "standard" reveals a hesitancy to voice the underlying and seemingly more subjective notion "reminds me of." Saying that a sonata "is especially characteristic of Beethoven" sounds more scientific, more learned than saying it "really reminds me of Beethoven." Yet whereas the former phrase is at best a vague reference to other equally hazy generalizations, the latter phrase may Gjerdingen 127

well be solidly grounded in a musicologist's life-long experience with classical music. Paradoxically, psychologists interested in studying the complex spatiotemporal patterns of music sometimes overlook the rich notion of "sounds like" in favor of the simple lists of traits that musicologists pass off as the definientia of music prototypes. The same textbook definition of a phrase type, a melodic style, or a music form that a musicologist readily interprets as merely a token for that deeper understanding gained only after years of careful listening may be easily misread by the psychologist as aji actual specification of a complex music utterance. What functions as the culturally determined, historical artifact of a musicologieal mode of discourse can too easily be taken as a natural distillation of music perception. To illustrate the methodological problems in defining a prototypical utterance, I provide the following set of first sentences from ten common folktales (Grimm & Grimm, 1812/1984). Once Upon a Time... Vor einem groBen Walde lebte ein Holzhacker mit seiner Frau; der hatte nur ein einziges Kind, das war ein Madchen von drei Jahren. [Just outside a great forest there lived a woodcutter with his wife; he had but an only child, a little girl of three (Tale No. 3).] Vor einem groBen Walde wohnte ein armer Holzhacker mit seiner Frau and seinen zwei Kindern; das Bubchen hieB Hansel and das Madchen Gretel. [Just outside a great forest there dwelled a poor woodcutter with his wife and two children; the little boy was called Hansel and the little girl Gretel (Tale No. 15).] Dar W56r maal eens en Fischer un syne Fru, de waanden tosamen in'n PiBputt, dicht an der See, un de Fischer gung alle Dage hen un angeld: un he angeld un angeld. [Once upon a time there was a fisherman and his wife who lived together in a chamber pot by the sea, and every day the fisherman went and fished: and he fished and he fished (Tale No. 19).] Es war einmal ein Muller, der war arm, aber er hatte eine schone Tochter. [Once upon a time there was a miller who was poor, but he had a beautiful daughter (Tale No. 5.5).] Es war ein armer Mann unci eine arme Frau, die hatten nichts als eine kleine Hutte and nghrten sich vom Fischfang, und es ging bei ihnen von Hand zu Mund. [There once was a poor man and a poor woman who had nothing but a little cottage and fed themselves by catching fish, and they were living hand-to-mouth (Tale No. 85).] Es war einmal ein armer Holzhacker, der arbeitete vom Morgen bis in die spate Nacht [Once upon a time there was a poor woodcutter who worked from morning till lajte at night (Tale No. 99).] Es saB einmal ein Mann mit seiner Frau vor der Haustur, und sie hatten ein gebraten Huhn vor sich stehen and wollten das zusammen verzehren. [Once upon a time there sat a man with his wife in front of their house, and they had before them a roast chicken upon which they both wished to feast (Tale No. 145).] Es war einmal ein Mann und eine Frau, die hatten nur ein einziges Kind und lebten in einem abseits gelegenen tale ganz allein. [Once upon a time there was a man and a wife who had but an only child, and they lived all alone in an out-of-the-way valley (Tale No. 166).] Ein armer Holzhauer lebte mit seiner Frau und drei Tochtern in einer kleinen Hutte an-dem Rande eines einsamen Waldes. [A poor woodcutter lived with his wife and 128 Psychomusicology Fall 1991

three daughters in a little cottage at the edge of a lonely forest (Tale No. 169).] Es war einmal ein Einsiedler, der lebte in einem Walde an dem FuBe eines Berges und brachte seine Zeit in Gebet und guten Werken zu, und jeden Abend trug er noch zur Ehre Gottes ein paar Eimer Wasser den Berg hinauf. [Once upon a time there was a hermit who lived in a forest at the foot of a mountain and spent his time in prayer and in doing good works, and each evening, for the glory of God, he would carry two buckets of water up the mountain (Tale No. 206).] Is there a prototypical utterance underlying all these sentences? The answer depends very much on how one evaluates similarity. The openings of Tales No. 3 and 15, for example, are similar in diction but dissimilar in narrative (No. 15 introduces a male child, Hansel). The openings of Tales No. 15 and 169, by contrast, are similar in narrative but dissimilar in diction. Similar motifs are shared by Tales No. 19 and 85 (fishing), Tales No. 3 and 166 (an only child), and Tales No. 15,55,85,99,169, and 206 (poverty). And all these tales, when read by a loving parent to a wide-eyed child, share a special performance practice of careful, emphatic diction. Indeed, as documented by the history of folktale research (Darnton, 1984; Thompson, 1946), the same repertory of utterences will support many different approaches to defining similarity. Traditional folktale collectors, for example, focused on a protagonistwoodcutter, fisherman, miller, hermitand defined a prototype through this central agent: a woodcutter's tale, a fisherman's tale, and so on. The tale of Jack and the Beanstalk is thus known as a "Jack" tale. But what of Tales No. 145 and 166? A "man and wife" tale does not define a prototype recognized by folktale collectors. Nineteenthcentury researchers surmounted this obstacle by defining more abstract prototypes (Fromm, 1951; Bettelheim,1976). They distinguished quest tales from joke tales, tales of the supernatural from tales of cunning. And certain twentieth-century researchers have extended nineteenth-century trends in the new directions of psychoanalysis or political critique. A continental literary theorist, for instance, might define the prototype of the above sentences as the figurative expression of an urban petty bourgeoisie's fascination with amarginalized rural poor. The humble woodcutter (fisherman, miller, hermit) does, after all, live "just outside" ("by the sea," "hand to mouth," "all alone," "out of the way," "at the edge," "at the foot of the mountain"). These approaches, however interesting they may be, all suffer from the defect of attempting to reduce complex phenomena to single essences. The opening sentence of Tale No. 3 is neither essentially about woodcutters nor fundamentally about the marginalized rural poor. The sentence introduces a woodcutter, to be sure. But it goes on to place that woodcutter in a relationship with his wife, to place the two of them in a parental relationship with their three-year-old daughter, to color that parental relationship with the phrase "only child," and to place the whole family unit in a setting near a large forest. Such a tabulation of relationships and constituent motifs plays a large role in the taxonomic approach of the early twentieth-century Finnish school of folktale study (Aarne & Thompson, 1961). Their mammoth compilations of tale prototypes''tale types," in their terminologyare based on analyses of constituent motifs and shared complexs of motifs. For them, a Cinderella tale type is Gjerdingen 129

defined not as any story about a charmaid, or any story about stepmothers, or any story about sibling rivalry, but as a specific list of narrative episodes each with a list of constituent motifs"tale type 510B." A tale type is in many respects analogous to a story schema as defined in the psychological literature (Mandler, 1984). Both assume different levels of analysis subordinate narrative episodes each with its own subordinate motifsand both eschew the single defining essence in favor of complexes of defining features, often hierarchically nested. Yet neither is the last word in defining-'a prototypical utterance. As past generations of philosophers (Kant, 1952; Wittgenstein, 1953) and the present generation of cognitive psychologists (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) have been at pains to point out, a complex mental category, whether termed a tale type, schema, or what have you, is something more than a fixed hierarchy of defining features. Take, for example, the case ofthe three woodcutter's tales (Nos. 3,15, and 169). All three omit an opening "Once upon a time." Is the consistent omission of this stock opening phrase thus an integral part of a "woodcutter" schema or tale type? If this is true, then knowledge of a broader category, that of fairy tales in general, affects the definition of this particular utterance. The point may seem trivial, but it does have significant ramifications. First, it suggests that the exemplars of a prototype may not contain all the features that define the prototype. Second, it demonstrates that a prototype may have defining features that are not overt, in the sense of articulated words or phrases. Third, it indicates that defining features rhay specify a temporal location or other relational attributes. And fourth, it leads to the conclusion that the very notion of levels is an oversimplification. In particular, "Once upon a time" is both subordinate and superordinate to the sentence in which it may appear. Prototypical Muisic Phrases As one defines a prototypical utterance ever more carefully, more richly^ more as a unique network of relationships &nd less as a generic tree structure of neatly nested nodes, the evolving definition becomes less and less amenable to verbal description. A succinct verbal definition can in fact signal the possibility that complex relationships and contextual factors are being overlooked. One case in point is Welker's (1982) study of melodic prototypes. Following the model of Franks and Bransford (1971) for investigating visual prototypes, Welker subjected various one- or twO-measure sections of four-measure melodic phrase prototypes to simple transformations so as to vary the exemplars presented to subjects. The approach, which implies that the prototype can be succinctly defined as a simple tree structure of unitized measures each with its subordinate tones, is problematical On two counts. The first, like the problem of the missing "Once upon a time" in the woodcutter's tale, is the slighting of larger contextual factors. If the prototype melody sounds like real music, that is, if it evokes music memories, initiates learned expectations, and is perceived as a meaningful utterance, then arbitrary alterations to that melody will likely produce music that is not merely different but actually sounds "wrong." Just as replacing "woodcutter" or "fisherman" with "investment banker" pro130 Psychomusicology Fall 1991

duces something that cannot be a tale told by the brothers Grimm, randomly inverting a measure or changing its note values can produce nonmusic rather than music slightly varied. The aesthetic results of the manipulations were bizarre enough to cause Welker (1982) to comment, "It is possible that the prototypes...had a greater degree of musical integrity...than the other melodic patterns" (p. 445). The second pitfall is a slighting of relational features. Take, for example, a three-note melody C D E. By analogy with visual patterns of dots, one might adopt the position that a listing of the three notes adequately defines the three important features of this melody and that randomly changing the third tone from E to C would result in a mere 17% variation in the pitch of one feature. Nothing could be further from the truth. The new melody, C D C , would have a different contour, a different highest tone, a different relationship between the second and third tones, a different relationship between the first and third tones, a sense of return as opposed to a sense of progression, a new melodic direction, a different set of likely continuations, a broader set of keys into which the melody could fit, and a different set of associations with other known melodies. Another problematical case appears in Rosner and Meyer's (1982) important study of two music phrase prototypes. The first, the "changing-tone archetype," is difficult to define without music notation or some other graphic aid because it entails two corresponding coordinations of bass movement, melody, harmony, rhythm, and metrical position. The second, the "gap-fill archetype," has a succinct verbal definition: a melodic leap establishes a registral gap that is subsequently filled in, often by scalar motion. Subjects, however, found the changing-tone archetype far easier to abstract and recognize. In one experiment it appears they went so far as to categorize exemplars of the two archetypes as "changing-tone" and "not changing-tone" rather than as "changingtone" and "gap-fill." The verbally concise, "essentialist" definition of the gapfill archetype proved a poorer indicator of subjects' perceptions than the verbally intractable, "relationally rich" definition of the changing-tone archetype. In the above repertory of folktale fragments, the early placement of two successive references to woodcutters makes "woodcutter" a more salient feature than it would have been had two "fisherman" sentences begun the list. These common effects of serial position and redundancy further complicate the study of music prototypes by suggesting that if no two people have had the same time course of music experiences, then no two people will have abtracted the same set of music prototypes. To counter this bleak prospect of solipsistic individuality one can appeal to the general concept of convergence. That is, will not the prototypes that listeners abstract eventually converge in the direction of increasing similarity as the number of related exemplars experienced by the subjects becomes large? Will not the initial diversity of abstracted prototypesan accident of differing early exemplars-be eventually overcome by the weight of numbers? The time required to play a subject even a handful of music excerpts militates against experiments involving the thousands upon thousands of examplars Gjerdingen 131

needed for the thorough study of prototype convergence. One can, however, point to intriguing anecdotal evidence of such convergence. For instance, Gjerdingen (1988) carried out a large historical survey in search of exemplars of a common eighteenth-century music phrase prototype. Most scholars had assumed that the phrase type in question was ubiquitous over a broad range of music history. This assumption, however, was predicated on an "essentialist" definition of this phrase as a simple harmonic pattern (I-V, V-I). Because Gjerdingen defined the prototype instead as a complex correlation of melodic, contrapuntal, harmonic, and metrical features, the set of phrases meeting that definition showed great historical specificity. In particular, the collected examplars approximate a normal population distribution that peaked sharply in the early 1770's. The exemplars from near the population peak converged on what to a surprising

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Figure 1. Mozart, Symphony inGMajor,HI,mm. 12-16, KV 110(1771) [transposed to F major for comparison with subsequent music examples]. The letters m and M mark the two halves of the phrase. degree was the very description of a subtype of the changing-tone archetype formulated by Meyer over two centuries later (Meyer, 1980). Meyer had originally abstracted his prototype intuitively from a lifetime of music experiences centered on a somewhat later and more complex repertory of music. Yet because thousands of pieces formed the repertory for both Meyer and his eighteenth-century music forebears, there was near convergence on a common prototype. A similar case of convergence on a shared prototype involved another type of common eighteenth-century music phrase. While searching through thousands of eighteenth-century compositions for exemplars of the changing-note prototype, I repeatedly came across other music phrases that "reminded me o f each other. I began to record in my notes the appearances of what I variously called the "vi-V," "ii-I," or "one-step-down" pattern, an example of which is shown in Figure 1. My "one-step-down" mnemonic referred to the fact that the music in the first two measures following the repeat sign (beginning at m in the figure) reoccurs one step lower in the second two measures (beginning at ). While still engaged in this work I chanced upon a reference to the writings of a now obscure eigtheenth-century musician named Joseph Riepel (1755). Riepel, as it turns out, had himself abstracted the same prototype and had given it an 132 Psychomusicology Fall 1991

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Figure 2. The fonte (see text) as presented in Riepel (1755). The letters m and n are added to mark the two halves of the phrase. analogous mnemonic. He called it a "fonte" implying a pattern that goes "down a well" or "down to the source," and he also specified its location as immediately following a repeat sign. In his writings, Riepel does not define afonte prototype. Instead he merely illustrates it with a model examplethe melody shown in Figure 2. Riepel needed to print only the melody because, for his intended eighteenth-century reader, the cue validity of the melody was sufficient to instantiate the schematic default values of the other features (bass, harmony, inner-voice motion, etc.). He could take it for granted that those interested enough in music to read

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Figure 3. Mozart, Minuet in F Major, mm. 8-16, KV 2 (1762) [transposed to C major for comparison]. his book would have already abstracted this prototype from their own music experiences. Evidence supporting this premise comes from the early works of Mozart, who was born the year after Riepel's book appeared. Mozart grew up listening to a repertory of music similar to that from which Riepel had abstracted the fonte prototype, and Mozart appears to have made a similar ab-

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Figure 4. Mozart, Symphony in Bb Major, HI,mm. 50-58, KV 22 (1765) [transposed to C major for comparison].

Figure 5. Mozart, Symphony in D Major, IE, mm. 8-12, KV 48 (1768) [transposed to C major for comparison].

straction at a very early age. By his sixth birthday he had already used a fonte in a small minuet, as shown in Figure 3. ? And as Figure 4 and Figure 5 demonstrate, he continued to produce phrases modeled on the fonte prototype throughout his music adolescence. How should one define the fonte prototype? Like the set of sentences presented earlier, a set of similar music phrases can be defined in several ways. For an eighteenth-century theorist like Jean-Phillipe Rameau (1722), someone 134 Psychomusicology Fall 1991

Figure 6. Haydn, Symphony in Bb Major, mm. 50-58, KV 22 (1765) [transposed to C major for comparison].

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steeped in the figured-bass tradition of improvised keyboard accompaniments, the underlying pattern would have been described as essentially harmonic just a circle of fifths played out by the roots of the four chords. The bass line in a fonte from Haydn's London Symphony (Figure 6), for example, moves down a fifth, up a fourth, and down a fifth as it presents what Rameau called the basse fondamentale. For a late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century analyst like Heinrich Schenker (1935), who interpreted music from the abstract perspective of longrange harmony and voice leading, a fonte would have been viewed as essentially just a digression, a perturbation in, or "prolongation" of, a larger tonal region. A huge fonte written by the fifteen-year-old Mozart (Figure 7) might thus be understood as an interpolation of material between the C major chord at measure 54, with its bass C3 and soprano C6, and the very similar chord in measure 67. The fonte prototype is, of course, all of the above and more. That is, it is defined by a melody, by a bass progression, and by tonal trajectory. Yet equally significant are the correlations between these and other features. Note, for instance, that RiepeFs melodic exemplar divides into two halves, each of which begins with an upward leap followed by a stepwise descent-a small example of Meyer's gap-fill archetype. This is the defining melodic shape of the fonte and correlates with melodic movements to and from specific scale degrees. For example, the first phrase half moves from scale degrees 4,5, or 6 in the local dminor context down to scale degree 1, and then fie second phrase half repeats that same sequence of scale degrees a step lower in the new C-major context. This pairing of the minor and major modes is itself one of the central features of the fonte, correlating in turn not only with the structure of the encompassing diatonic major key but also with a host of more general eighteenth-century cultural ideals of balanced gestures, phrases, forms, and designs. The relational features of affective contrast, metrical pattern, chordal-scalar correlations, melodic shape, voice leading, and general contour all contribute to defining the fonte prototype, as does its typical location immediately following the repeat sign. Yet not every feature will be present in every exemplar, nor is every feature equally important. The fonte shown previously in Figure 4, for example, lacks a preceeding repeat sign because that movement does not repeat its first section (though the conclusion of a formal unit is signaled by the preceding rest). Thefonte shown earlier in Figure 6, by contrast, is nowhere near a repeat sign or a major point of closure. Apparently the formal location of the fonte was not as important as its melodic and harmonic features. Figure 8, for example, shows a thirty-two-year-old Mozart writing a lovely fonte to be placed just prior to the entrance of an important new theme. And the eccentric fonte in Beethoven's late Piano Sonata, Op. 109 (Figure 9), remarkable for its sudden change to a slow tempo in an otherwise fast movement, occurs very near the beginning of its movement. Thus formal location, especially in a late eighteenth- or early nineteenth-century repertory, has a wider range of variation and a lower index of criticality than does basic harmonic progression or melodic design. At the same time, in spite of its variability, the default location of the fonte has never been completely displaced. Even today, 136 Psychomusicology Fall 1991

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Figure 9. Beethoven, Sonata in E Major, Op. 109,1, mm. 9-11,(1820) [transposed to F major for comparison].

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when many people encounter Xhtfonte primarily through the theme music for Leave It to Beaver (Figure 10), it remains comfortably positioned immediately after a repeat sign. The fact that RiepeY sfonte of the 1750's maps quite easily onto music from apopulartelevisionprogramofthelate 1950's shows both the long-term stability of specific correlations of music features and the ability of succeeding generations of musicians and listeners to converge on a prototype abstracted from a large repertory of classical compositions. VasXfonte prototype is neither a single essence nor a simple list of features. Rather, it is a network of relationships that is itself embedded within larger networks tif music and cultural patterns. Are we left then with definitions too complex to talk about? A definition whose multiple features might specify varying degrees of criticality, varying indices of typicality, covariances with other defining features, and dozens upon dozens of diverse spatio-temporal interrelationships scarcely resembles the definitions given in music textbooks or dictionaries. Ttie resemblance is instead to the kind of distributed definitions implicit in neural-network models. The case for using such models in the field of music perception has been argued by Bharucha (1987). And Gjerdingen (1990; in press) has shown that the sellorganized abstraction of complex prototypes of the kind that form constituents of music phrases is possible given exposure to spatio-temporal patterns of music features. While few such studies can claim fidelity to human neurophysiology, they can, at the very least, foster a reconceptuaiization of how patterns might better be defined. Someday, perhaps, we can once againcasually refer to a "typical Mozartean phrase" and actually be able to define what that means. References Aarne, A., & Thompson, S. (1961). The types of the folktale. (2nd rev. ed.). Helsinki: Academia Scienfiarum Fennica. Bettelheirft, B. (1976). The uses of enchantment: The meaning and importance of fairy tales. New York: Knopf. Bharucha, J.J. (1987). Music cognition and perceptual facilitation: A connectionist framework. Music Perception, 5,1 -30. Darton, Robert. (1984). The great cat massacre and other episodes infrench cultural history. New York: Basic Books. Franks, J.J., & Bransford, J.D. (1971). Abstraction of visual patterns. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 90>,65-74. Fromm, E. (1951). The forgotten language: An introduction to the understanding of dreams. New York: Rinehart. Gjerdingen, R..O. (1988). A classic turn ofphrase: Music and the psychology of convention. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Gjerdingen, R.O. (1990). Categorization of musical patterns by self-organizing neuronlike networks. Music Perception, 8,329-370. Gjerdingen, R.O. (in press). Learning syntactically significant temporal patterns of chords: A masking field embedded in an ART 3 architecture. Neural Networks. Grimm, J., & Grimm, W. (1984). Kinder- undHausmarchen. Frankfurt: Insel Verlag. (Original work published in 1812). Grout, D.J. (1973). A history of western music, (rev. ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. Kant, I. (1952). The critique of pure reason. (J.M.D. Meiklejohn, Trans.) Chicago: Encyclopedia Britanica. 13 8 Psy chomusicology Fall 1991

Mandler,J.M. (1984). Stories, scripts, and scenes: Aspects ofschema theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Meyer,L.B.(1980). Exploiting limits: Creation, archetypes, and style change. Daedalus, 109,177-205. Rameau, J-P.(1722). Traite de Vharmonie reduite a sesprincipes naturels. Paris. Riepel,J. (1755). Grundregeln zur tonordnung insgemein. Frankfurt. Rosch, E.,& Mervis,C.B. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7,573-605. Rosner, B.S., & Meyer, L.B. (1982). Melodic processes and the perception of music. In D. Deutsch (Ed.), The Psycholoy of Music (pp. 317-341), New York: Academic Press. Schenker, H. (1935). Neue musikalische theorien und phantasien, Band III: Derfreie Satz. Vienna: Universal. Thompson, S. (1946). The folktale. New York: Dryden Press. Welker, R. (1982). Abstraction of themes from melodic variations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, #,435-447. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhes, eds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Author Notes The author may be contacted at the following address: Robert 0 . Gjerdingen, Department of Music, SUNY, Stony Brook, New York 11794-5474.

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