IDC HERZLIYA

Research Paper: Etsel and Recruitment

Steven Aiello 12/6/2011

This paper discusses the Irgun Tsvai Israel ('Etsel') in pre-Israel Palestine. Specifically, the article focuses on various aspects of recruitment involved, including the target audience, the appeal of the Irgun to potential recruits, and how this was shaped by, and in turn affected the political goals of the organization, in the context1of the British Mandate Zionist movements.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970093

In pre-Israel Palestine, a number of Jewish militant groups were active in a variety of functions. These groups were generally occupied with protecting of the Jewish population in Palestine, as well as the furtherance of the Zionist interest of the creation of a Jewish state. Eventually, many of these groups were enveloped into the national army of the fledgling state of Israel. While it is often taboo to describe them as such in Israeli society even today, by a strict analysis of the facts several groups key to the development of the state of Israel might be identified as involved in terror activities. Studying how these groups were able to recruit participants highlights an interesting connection between a groups inherent political goals and its ability to recruit new members. This article focuses on the Irgun Tsvai Israel (the Etzel) and its aspects of its recruitment. To understand the recruitment appeal and strategy of the Irgun, the organization and its political goals must be understood in context with the time and place in which it was active, as well as the parallel contemporary organizations that also sought to recruit members. This then is undertaken prior to discussing the actual recruitment methods of the Irgun. The Irgun was borne of the Revisionist Zionistic ideology promulgated by Zeev Jabotinsky among others. There were several streams of Zionism present at the time, and the early founders of the Irgun split off from the mainstream groups, the Jewish Agency, the Yishuv leadership, and most notably the Haganah.1 While the groups agreed on many points, they disagreed about tactics and strategy by which to achieve the creation of a Jewish state. The
1

See http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/irgun1.html

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970093

principal differences of opinion between the Irgun founders and the leadership of the more mainstream groups involved how to interact with the British (a strategic issue) and whether violence could be used against civilians (Arab and British; a tactical issue).2 Despite the similarity of opinions, these distinctions of opinion, regarding activism versus passivism, and the use of violence against civilians for the potential political benefits (i.e. the use of terror, although it could be argued that many Haganah leaders disagreed with Irgun policies on the basis of believing it was unproductive, as opposed to on a moral repugnancy per se) shaped the Irguns identity. On the other hand, while relatively small, the Irgun nevertheless remained more closely aligned with the mainstream elements in the Jewish Palestinian community than other off-shoot groups, such as the Lehi (Stern gang). These factors were central to the recruitment of new members to the organization. The Irgun recruited primarily young activists. In this its target recruitment demographic was not much difference than its main competitors in recruitment (the more mainstream Haganah and the more dissident Lehi). Certainly the groups recruited from a very similar pool of Zionist youth. However there is also evidence of what might have led to someone being successfully recruited to the Irgun specifically. As might be expected, one key selling point for the Irgun, was its position advocating challenging the British to achieve autonomy and independence. In this way, the Irgun recruited young men and women (or in many cases children) who were disenfranchised with the passive approach of the Haganah and Yishuv leadership. In the minds of the young recruits, the situation warranted a more pro-active approach. In this vein, the Irgun offered its recruits a chance to fight for their country. While the
2

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac03.htm

Haganah offered the same, to some extent the Irgun message, explicitly or implicitly, discredited the Haganah cause as being less legitimate, even cowardly, relative to the Irgun platform. Thus the Irgun was successful in recruiting by building on the motivation and will to build a Jewish state that was a motivating presence for virtually all of the members of the British Mandate Palestine Jewish community, and the zeal for action of some of the younger members of that community. As one recruit recalls, it was the passivity of the Haganah and the perception that it was not as committed to militant defense and activism that led him to seek an alternative in the Irgun. The passivity of Haganah policy did not, however, appeal to me and training with sticks seemed absurd. I felt it was dangerous to reconcile ourselves to the British presence and was convinced that the only way to implement Zionism was to drive the British out.3 The decision of the Irgun to attack the British, as well as the targeting of both Arab and British civilian sites, was far from controversial. There is no doubt that it may well have cost them recruits, in addition to harming relations with other members of the Yishuv. However it also brought in recruits, in the form of members who were committed to their cause and believed in the need to drive the British out in order to gain independence, regardless of their overall attitude towards the British (some in fact harbored no ill feelings towards the British, though this was most likely the position of a minority).4 From 1944 to 1948, the Irgun was responsible for a number of attacks, most prominently the assassination of Lord Moyne, the Deir Yassin massacre, and the bombing of the King David

The passivity of Haganah policy did not, however, appeal to me and training with sticks seemed absurd. I felt it was dangerous to reconcile ourselves to the British presence and was convinced that the only way to implement Zionism was to drive the British out. http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/history/lapidot/6.htm 4 But then I suddenly remembered that in my youth I had felt exactly the same, when I joined the Irgun at the age of 15. I liked the English (as we called all the British), the English language and English culture, and I was ready to put my life on the line in order to drive the English out of our country. When I said so to the Irguns recruitment committee, while sitting with a bright light shining in my eyes, I was almost rejected. See http://ramallahonline.com/tag/irgun/

hotel.5 These represented the extreme manifestations of their militant activities towards defense of the Jewish community and establishment of a Jewish state. They were also targeted by the Haganah on a number of occasions.6 The Irgun used these high-profile attacks, as well as less infamous ones, to show potential recruits that unlike the Haganah, they were not satisfied with an active defense and instead would take proactive measures (this of course may not have been the only or even the chief motivating factor. However it clearly served this purpose as well). Additionally, as a creation of the Revisionist ideology, Beitar youth groups served as another source of new recruits, as did the Maccabi organization.7 Recruitment was done in a grass-roots method. In addition to youth groups, and those recruited by their friends, papers were posted (at risk of retribution from the British) calling on Irgun supporters to join the movement. The flyers used to gather populist support are illustrative of the recruitment methods of the organization. This is the text from one such bulletin:

TO THE HEBREW NATION IN ZION!

We are in the last stage of the world war. Each and every nation is now conducting its national reckoning. What are its triumphs and what were its losses? What road must it take in order to achieve its goal and fulfil its mission? Who are its friends and who its enemies? Who is the true ally and who the traitor? And who is proceeding towards the decisive battle? Sons of Israel, Hebrew youth! We stand at the final stage of the war, we face an historic decision on our future destiny. The truce proclaimed when war broke out has been violated by the British
5

Sprinzak, Ehud. Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination. 36-40. 6 Ibid. 7 See http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac02.htm

authorities. The rulers of the country have taken into account neither loyalty nor concessions nor sacrifice; they have continued to implement their aim: the liquidation of sovereign Zionism. We must draw the necessary conclusions without wavering. There can no longer be a truce between the Hebrew nation and youth and the British administration of Eretz Israel, which is betraying our brethren to Hitler. Our nation will fight this regime, fight to the end. And this is our demand: Rule over Eretz Israel must immediately be handed over to a provisional Hebrew government. The Hebrew government of Eretz Israel, the sole legal representative of the Jewish people, must, immediately after its establishment, begin the implementation of the following principles: a. establish a national Hebrew army. b. conduct negotiations with all authorized bodies on the organization of the mass evacuation of European Jewry to Eretz Israel. Jews! The establishment of a Hebrew government and the implementation of its plans this is the sole way of rescuing our people, salvaging our existence and our honor. We will follow this path, for there is no other. We will fight! Every Jew in our homeland will fight! Jews! Our fighting youth will not be deterred by victims, blood and suffering. They will not surrender, will not rest until they restore our past glory, until they ensure our people of a homeland, freedom, honor, bread, justice and law. And if you help them, then your own eyes will soon behold the return to Zion and the rebirth of Israel. May God be with us and aid us!8

http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac06.htm

This message reveals several key features. Firstly it invokes the fear of the Jews in Europe, connecting their plight to the struggle for a Jewish state in Palestine. For many youth this represented this was a means of escape from the feeling of helplessness knowing what their relatives in Europe were going through. For others, it was an opportunity to do something for the Jewish people in memory of a loved one or dear friend. In addition, the statements wording makes it clear that the target audience is youth. This is shown not just by the usage of phrases such as Sons of Israel, Hebrew youth, but also in the simplified, hyperbolic and completely unnuanced writing that would be presumptuous or possibly even insulting if targeted at an older demographic. Additionally, the message itself is an absolutist one, declaring that all Jews take up arms against the British, shedding blood until victory is achieved. This part romanticizes the struggle, invoking glory, justice, and the ideas of brethren and unity. Finally the message ends with a reference to God, reminding readers that their mission is divinely supported. In conclusion, the Irgun as an organization was notable for two strategic aspectsfirstly it promoted activism over passivity, seeing a need to drive the British out of Palestine before a Jewish state could be formed. Secondly, it condoned the targeting of non-strictly military targets. This in turn shaped its recruitment audience and methods, as testimony from former activists and a look at the messages used to recruit show. While all of the Zionist groups were built on a strong nationalist, activist ideology, the Irgun was distinct from the mainstream, thereby attracting an even more pro-activism, pro-violence following.

Works Cited Avneri, Uri. "Gandhis Wisdom." RO: Ramallah Online. 25 Sept. 2010. Web. 29 Nov. 2011. <http://ramallahonline.com/tag/irgun/>. Lapidot, Prof. Yehuda. "The Establishment of the Irgun." Jewish Virtual Library - Homepage. Web. 06 Dec. 2011. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/irgun1.html>. Lapidot, Prof. Yehuda. "The Establishment of the Irgun." Jewish Virtual Library - Homepage. Web. 06 Dec. 2011. < http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac02.htm>. Lapidot, Prof. Yehuda. "The Establishment of the Irgun." Jewish Virtual Library - Homepage. Web. 06 Dec. 2011. < http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac06.htm>. Lapidot, Prof. Yehuda. "The Establishment of the Irgun." Jewish Virtual Library - Homepage. Web. 06 Dec. 2011. < http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac03.htm>. Lapidot, Yehuda. "The Irgun Gets A New Recruit." Web. 06 Dec. 2011. <http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/history/lapidot/6.htm>. Sprinzak, Ehud. Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination. New York, NY: Free, 1999. Print.