Discussion Topic: Incorrigible Knowledge and the Mind-Body Problem Guiding Question: Do we have incorrigible knowledge of , or "privileged access"

to, the foundations of knowledge in our experience of 'raw feels'? Or are these concepts ('raw feels', privileged access) simply a symptom of an expendable metaphysical language maintained by social practice? Required Reading Homework: Rene Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations 1-2 Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Chapters 1-2 I. Descartes' Skepticism: Doubt and Indubitable knowledge
1. What is Descartes' method for attaining indubitable Truth? How does this method

eventually lead Descartes' to claim that the mind is better known than the body? A. Descartes' abandonment of 'preconceived notions' (cultural, traditional, social opinions) for clear and distinct postulates as a foundation for Science.
i. ii.

Science vs. science Testing the epistemic shakability of previous beliefs conceived as the foundations of knowledge

2. According to Descartes, how do our senses deceive us; what examples does Descartes provide for this claim? B. Our Thinking and Our Senses: Constancy and Change. "Is it not the very same 'I' who now doubts almost everything, who nevertheless understands something, who affirms that this one thing is true, who denies other things, who desires to know more..." (Meditations on First Philosophy 20) i. ii. Wax example The inner, indubitably knowable world of the mind versus the outer, doubtful world of the senses

II.

Richard Rorty: The Rise of Incorrigible Knowledge and the Dispensability of Metaphysical Language
3. According to Rorty, what is Plato's hylomorphic model of mind-body, and how is

Descartes' 'representative' model a re-articulation of the former?

C. The Greek Conception of Mind and Descartes: Mind-As-Reason to Mind-AsInner-Arena i. ii. The Mirror of Nature and the Inner Eye "Clear and distinct ideas" and "Indubitability"

4. How does Rorty define a "phenomenal property" and how are phenomenal properties attributed to "raw feels"? Moreover, in what ways are the Antipodeans said to lack "raw feels"? D. The 'Inner' and 'Outer' Worlds Revisited: Immediate Phenomenal Knowing. i. The Antipodean's, the Terran philosophers, and their different languages. ii. Saul Kripke: Immediate phenomenological knowing: "Someone can be in the same epistemic situation as he would be if there were heat, even in the absence of heat, simply be feeling the sensation of heat; and even in the presence of heat, he can have the same evidence as he would have in the absence of heat simply be lacking the sensation S. No such possibility exists with pain or other mental phenomena." E. Dissolving Incorrigible Knowledge as a Matter of Social Practice i. ii. The Incorrigibility Paradox Conclusions

Can you imagine yourself adopting an Antipodean language in place of a metaphysical language? Could we completely eliminate our metaphysical language? Would we lose anything important in doing so? Does a metaphysical language reveal some truth that an Antipodean language cant?

The above lesson was constructed around one guiding question, and four other focus questions (that mark the start of each new section). The four focus questions are the same questions that I would have assigned my students to have completed by the beginning of our discussion. During each section, I provide a contextual background to the focus questions and fill-in any details and questions students may have.