Pe Lim vs. CA FACTS: Private respondent, Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student.

She also worked as a receptionist at Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas Blvd., Manila. She met petitioner during her first night on the job. Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They soon lived together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a succession of apartments in Cubao, Quezon City, Tambo, Paranaque and Makati, Metro Manila. Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of the same year. The couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not financially stable. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. The bills for Maribel's three-day confinement at the hospital were paid for by Raymond and he also caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child's birth certificate. After Joanna Rose's birth, the love affair between Maribel and petitioner continued. Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner's feelings toward her started to wane. He subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel tried to support herself by accepting various jobs and with occasional help from relatives, but it was never enough. She asked petitioner for support but, despite promises to do so, it was never given. Maribel then filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for support. After the Trial Court rendered its judgment in favour of Maribel, petitioner now argues before the Court that there is no clear and convincing evidence on record to show that there was actual cohabitation between him and Maribel. Petitioner further infers that Maribel became pregnant only when she went to Japan. In short, he denies that he is the father of Joanna Rose. He further questions the awarded support of P10,000.00 per month, saying that the same is beyond his means, considering that he has a family to support. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is not the father of Joanna Rose. HELD: The petition is without merit. The evidence in the instant case shows that petitioner considered himself to be the father of Joanna Rose as shown by the hand-written letter he wrote to Maribel. From the tenor of the letter and the statements petitioner made therein it is clear that, contrary to his vehement assertion that he and Maribel were just friends, they were actually lovers. It was only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny paternity of Joanna Rose. Until he got married to another woman, he did not object to being identified as Joanna Rose's father as disclosed in the Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals that he even got a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling, as shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan Municipal Office. His belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father of Joanna Rose. This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father." Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Marquino v. IAC FACTS: Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent. ISSUES: Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs. HELD: SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child can not be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquinos dismissed.

David v. CA FACTS: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. The RTC ruled in favor of Daisie. But the CA reversed the trial court s decision. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the custody for the child can be taken away from the mother even if the latter is deemed unfit. HELD: Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him.

DSWD v. Belen FACTS: Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea, which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5830 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992, after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own. However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present administrative complaint against respondent judge charging him with violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 which requires, inter alia, that petitions for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents. It was also alleged by the DSWD that respondent Elma P. Vedaa had asked for an undisclosed amount of money from the adopting parents in order to expedite the adoption case with the DSWD. ISSUE: Whether or not there were violations committed by the respondents. HELD: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) went over the fact that respondent judge definitely rendered the adoption decree in violation of the provisions of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and of Circular No. 12 of this Court. Additionally, while the act of corruption attributed to her was not proved, respondent Vedaa, on her part, likewise failed to comply with the requirement in Circular No. 12 that she should have coordinated with the DSWD in connection with the preparation of the home and case study reports. The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law. By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. However, the Court finds that respondent judge acted in good faith when he stated in his decision that the DSWD submitted the required reports to his court through respondent Vedaa, presumably in the belief that it was standard procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a Regional Trial Court to do so in coordination with the DSWD. There were also findings of the OCA that there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaa sought to obtain any amount from the adopting parents. This is proved by the affidavit of the child's natural mother, Loreta Ibea.

Lam v. Chua FACTS: Jose Lam was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, Adriana Chua was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia [5] Santiago, and another Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock, showing that Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984. The Pasay RTC rendered its decision in favor of Adriana. On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund had even amounted to P500,000.00 not only P250,000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a compromise agreement between Jose and Adriana for the support of John Paul. HELD: there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support.

Golangco v. CA FACTS: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos Golangco against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The couple had two children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings of the case, a hearing for custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation rights of at least one week in a month. Thereafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21, 1994 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition and instead affirmed the order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the order dated July 21, 1994 before this Court. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the appellate court. On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. She sought redress due to an alleged incident on July 5, 1995, in which her estranged husband physically abused their son Justin. Due to the incident, a criminal complaint for slight physical injuries was filed on July 1995 against Rene by his son Justin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati on the basis of Justin s complaint-affidavit. On August 16, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order against him and set the hearing of the motion. After it was decided in favor of Luisa, Rene filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the October 4, 1995 order. ISSUE: Whether or not Rene is denied of due process of law. HELD: The trial court gave both parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence and witnesses. An adequate hearing was conducted and, based on the evidence, the trial court deemed it proper to grant the writ of preliminary injunction. The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involves findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying in the case. This Court, therefore, finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal of the trial court s declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Amadora v. CA FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports). ISSUE: Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable. HELD: The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes. In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident. Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

RP v.Cagandahan FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar. ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court. RULING: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondent s position and his personal judgment of being a male.