POLITICAL LAW PART V ARTICLE VI THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 1. Section 1.

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. a. Define legislative power Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power: 1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws 2. principle of separation of powers 3. non-delegability of legislative powers - reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable laws - Separation of Powers Read: a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139 Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution. 2. Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. In view of the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua. The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied

Case Digest: Jose A. Angara vs. The Electoral Commission, et. al. FACTS: In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of Tayabas. The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in office. A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner. The petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the Electoral Commission. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and thesubject matter of the controversy; and 2. Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner. RULING: 1. The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62 Separation of Powers On 17 Nov 1978, Carmen Planas (then a municipal board member of Manila) statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Quezon was published in la vanguardia. The following morning, she received a letter from Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president containing the following: "In the above statement, you appear to make the following charges: (1) That the President of the Philippines has violated the Constitution in that he has taken part in politics, expressing his preference for the

candidates of the Nacionalista Party; (2) That the whole government machinery has been put in action to prevent the election to the National Assembly of the candidates of the people; (3) That the candidates of the NP and of the administration have won the election through frauds and violations of the civil service rules; (4) That the administration does not permit the people to freely elect the candidates of their choice. Planas was then ordered to appear before the CSC for investigation and to prove her allegations against the administration. She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She

said that as an elective official, is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, her statement of November 17th made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions cannot properly be the subject of an administrative investigation had with a view to her suspension or removal, and is only cognizable by our courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of our Penal Code and that her removal due to the same would be an arbitrary act by the CSC. The CSC however took cognizance of the case hence the appeal to the SC. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdictions to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative character. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President. HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178

these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers. In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended. Nevertheless, SC ruled that CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.

employees from social security coverage. Separation of Powers ISSUE: Whether or not the temporary employees are exempt from the compulsory coverage. LSC is engaged in the business of stevedoring, lightering and towing in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod. It owns, maintains and operates towboats, barges and a drydock. In 1959 it carried in its payrolls temporary employees of 1,752 and 2,552 stevedores in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod, respectively, who were hired on rotation and on vessel-by- vessel basis. They were paid daily with the understanding of being laid off at the end of each day. On the average, each stevedore worked for 14 days during the year. On 19 Oct 1960, LSC petitioned to the SSS that the temporary employees be exempt from SSS contributions on the ground that they "work only intermittently and are not in a position to maintain membership in the Social Security System long enough to be fully entitled to the law's sickness, disability, death and retirement benefits . And that the law could not have intended them to be covered without enjoying the benefits of the program. SSS however denied LSC s petition and it ordered LSC to pay back premiums. LSC countered stating that the compulsory coverage of the SSS contributions only covers permanent employees. LSC invoked Sec 9 of the SS Act as amended by RA 1792 which states that an employee must at least have been with the company for six months to be covered by the compulsory coverage. LSC also invoked Sec 8 of the same law which defines employment covered by the SS Act and also provides exemption therefrom. Par. 10 of that section would state that services by temporary employees may be excluded by regulations of the SSC. This is interpreted by LSC as a provision that Congress has delegated to the Social Security Commission the issuance of regulations bearing on the exemption of services performed by temporary HELD: The Social Security Act was amended by RA 2658 on June 18, 1960. The amendment broadened the coverage of the Social Security System, increased its benefits and liberalized the terms and conditions for their enjoyment. Sections 9 and 10 were made to read as follows: "SEC. 9. Compulsory Coverage. Coverage in the System shall be compulsory upon all employees between the ages of sixteen and sixty, inclusive, and their employers: . . ." "SEC. 10. Effective date of coverage. Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first day of his operation, and that of the employee on the date of his employment." Eliminated was the six months' service requirement. Without such requirement, all employees regardless of tenure, such as the employees in question, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS; except of course those classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the SS Act. With such removal, it is the intent of Congress to broaden and include temporary workers to the compulsory coverage. On the other hand, in regards section 8 par 10 being invoked by LSC no such regulation has been cited to buttress the claim for exemption. Perforce, no exemption could be granted as there is no way of telling whether or not the employees in question belong to a group or class designated by regulation of the SSC as exempt.

d.

GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106 Judicial Power Independence Avoidance of Doing Administrative Works under the Executive

Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Court as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge. HELD: Macaraig s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the SC looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the CA or the SC, as the case may be. Needless to say, the SC feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued. e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991 Separation of Powers especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.

Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal. One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDP s leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRET s chairwoman Justice Herrera. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion? HELD: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,

f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 Political Law Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People s Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues among others that the People s Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of people s initiative. ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does it constitute a revision. HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in b. Nature of legislative power

the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good ; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the legislature? d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power. e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.

Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President in case of war or other national emergency, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government. Other exceptions: traditional 3. Delegation to local governments The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to know better the needs of the people therein. a. See Section 5 of Article X b. Read: aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660 Delegation of Powers Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: "With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board, was challenged.

Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes,

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is constitutional. HELD: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term "non-Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term "nonChristian" it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the

prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: ". . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56 Delegation of Powers Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of probation officers in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where there is a probation officer because the local government unit appropriated an amount for his salaries, convicts may avail of probation while in places where no funds were set aside for probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for probation.

a.

Reason for the delegation

4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and Section 32, Article VI The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress of local legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof. f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies. 1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test?

Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569 Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC. HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3: All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof. Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is

stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons. Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Petitioner argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed. Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov t of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President: ... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact. 1. TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)

Delegation of Power Admin Bodies Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and National Federation of Labor Unions (NFLU) are unions representing the agricultural and industrial sectors. They alleged they represent over a million workers all over the country. On the other hand, BP 697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision which states that 3 sectors are to be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor). Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao respectively. These sectors can submit their nomines to the President for approval/appointment through the Minister of Labor. TUPAS however questions the constitutionality of the said BP because it allegedly lacks duly published rules on accreditation, nomination and appointment of industrial labor representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned the acts f Ople, then Minister of Labor, in accrediting certain nominations provided by other industrial labor groups. TUPAS claims that since there is no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the nominations must be handled, the said law has provided undue delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left him with absolute discretion in carrying out the duty of accrediting such nominations. TUPAS did not submit their nomination within the given 20 day period of nominating their representation; they instead proceeded to question the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality of the acts of Ople. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697. HELD: The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite obvious. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion." What is involved then is not a legislative power but the exercise of competence intrinsically executive. What is more the official who could make the recommendation is respondent Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The argument, therefore, that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force. To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines 3. US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1 Delegation of Power Admin Bodies

matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it." The standard "does not even have to be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Such standard is set forth with clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full the limits and scope of the functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said provisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Ho s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate

of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if

necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows: Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit: (a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows: The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows: That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence. The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the GovernorGeneral, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime. By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act

remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in conformity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued. The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. 4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208 matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.

Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject. HELD: The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject

5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (Affecting National interest) 5. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989
Delegation of Power Admin Bodies communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PhilComSat subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power. HELD: Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the

By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." Under Sec 5 of the same law, PhilComSat was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196 was later proclaimed and the same has placed PhilComSat under the jurisdiction of NTC. Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to operate from NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service

manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that

the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In the case at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of merit and reasonable.

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof. Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process. Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasilegislative: that where the function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged. We find merit in petitioner's contention. In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus: Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit: It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or

legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order. At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.

f.

May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative bodies/agencies have the force of law? penal law? In order to be considered as one with the force and effect of a penal law, what conditions must concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) or the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION - a reviewer - Primer by FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, 1987 edition.

6. 7.

PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328 US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327 Delegation of Power Admin Bodies constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. However, the question of undue delegation must be passed upon because of the fact that the prosecution is sustained by the validity of the other law cited which is sections 5 and 8 of Act No 1136. The reference to Act No 355 as amended is not material to the disposition of the case.

Barrias is the captain of a lighter (casco or ship) named Maude operating in the Pasig River. The said Maude is not being powered by steam engine or a similar source of adequate power. The Maude is in fact being navigated manually by use of bamboo poles. This is in clear violation of Circular No. 397 issued by the Insular Collector of Customs. This said circular issued by the Collector is in pursuant to Secs 5 and 8 of Act No. 1136 which empowered the Collector to regulate those engaged in lighterage or any other similar harbor business. On the other hand, Barrias challenged the acts of the Collector with reference to Secs 19 and 311 of Act No. 355 (Phil Customs Administrative Act) as amended by Act 1235 and Act 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Collector. HELD: The SC acknowledged that the issue raised by Barrias indeed poses a serious question and the SC discussed that one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the

8.

VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270 Delegation of Powers Admin Bodies HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of power. Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Equal Protection

Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.

h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII. i. Classify the membership of the legislative department. Differentiate their qualifications, elections/selections and as to the participation of the Commission on Appointments in order to validate their membership. j. Manner of election and selection

1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided for by law. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the election. Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of the House of Representatives.

Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. [2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. For three (3) consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women youth, and such other sectors, as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least one hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. [4] Within 3 years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on standards provided in this section Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election. Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of 3 years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by th law, at noon on the 30 day of June next following their election. No member of the House of Representative shall serve for a period of more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of Sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives. Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987

2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, September 4, 1989 Political Law Appointment of Sectoral Representatives Deles was appointed by the Pres. Aquino as a sect oral representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the CoA filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the CoA. Deles then questioned the objection of the CoA. She said that her appointment does not need the concurrence of the CoA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, does not require confirmation by the CoA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house nor does EO 198 (Providing for the Manner of Nomination and Appointment of Sectoral Representatives to the House of Representatives). The opposite view is taken by the Solicitor General in his Statement of Position (In lieu of Comment), dated July 15, 1988 in this wise: In view of the President s submission of the four sectoral representatives, the petitioner included, to the Commission on Appointments by letter dated April 11, 1988, then confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required. In addition to this, CoA involed sec 23 of the Rules of the Commission which provides that Suspension of Consideration of Nomination or Appointments to be Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President, and unless resubmitted, shall not again be considered by the Commission. ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the Commission on Appointments, namely, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. All other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies. No such exemption from confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution. On the other hand, EO 198 does not deal with the manner of appointment of sectoral representatives. EO 198 confines itself to specifying the sectors to be represented, their number, and the nomination of such sectoral representatives.

b. On gerrymandering

Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection. Equal Protection Gerrymandering HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter s right of suffrage.

** Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. ** Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of representatives thus elected shall serve only the unexpired term. Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337
Vacancy in the Legislature sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term." COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature. HELD: The SC s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XIIC, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: "Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof." There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is

each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.

RA 6645: AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILLING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election. Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in

COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislative districts whose Congressmen resigned or died while in office) without a law passed by Congress appropriating funds for the said purpose. 2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December 28, 1987 Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving such increase. a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress? P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. The President s salary is P300,000.00 per annum, while the VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice is P240,000.00 per annum. The Chairman of the Constitutional Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members, P180,000.00 per annum. b. Read:

1. Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President; P240,000.00 for VP, Senate President; Speaker; Chief Justice; P204,000.00 for Senators, Representatives, Chairmen of CC; P180,000.00 for members of the Constitutional Commissions) 2. PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;
Salaries of the Members of Congress Other Emolument not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is

and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional. HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads: "The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos." When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other emoluments". This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments." "Emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites." It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby

declared unconstitutional by the SC.

3.

LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823

with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligot s term expired on December Salaries of Representatives Retirement 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to

FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing the salaries of

constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance

him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum. ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit. HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or

benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner s colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. a. Privilege from arrest Read: Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22
Privilege from Arrest rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity. ***According to Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution: "The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place." EXEMPTION: They can be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.

Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor." For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative. Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautusta are immune from arrest. HELD: There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the

b. Freedom of Speech and debate Read: 1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
Immunity ISSUE: Whether or not Osmena s immunity has been violated? Then Congressman Osmena Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement upon his parliamentary immunity. He further asked that the respondents should not require him to substantiate his charges against the president with the admonition that if he failed to do so he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Said charges emanated from his one-hour privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia , which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity of Garcia as the then President. HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmena s petition is dismissed.

2)

JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876

Freedom of Speech and Debate statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged. The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.

Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d tat to place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous. ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous. HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place." The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,

Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term

without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Read: 1) ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431 After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) , he is deemed to have resigned his position as Governor of Negros Oriental because as a legislator, he is not allowed to hold any other office in the government.
Singularity of Office/Position Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vicegovernor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament. ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor. HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . . The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

2)

PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153

A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa as appointed member for being a member of the Cabinet is allowed to return to his former position as Governor if he resigns from the Batasan. This is so because he was just an appointed member as distinguished from the Adaza Case. (Note: It appears that an appointed member of the Batasan is placed in a better position than the elected members)
Singularity of Office/Position Punsalan and Mendoza were the vice governor and the governor of Pampanga respectively. Both belong to KBL. On 17 May 1984, Mendoza tendered his resignation as the governor but the same should only be effective at the President s pleasure. On 30 June 1984, Mendoza was appointed as the Minister of Justice by the president. On 14 July 1984, he was concurrently appointed as a member of the Batasan Pambansa. On 16 July 1984, he filed a request to the Minister of Local Government (MLG) to consider him as the governor-on-leave of Pampanga while the President was considering his resignation. The request was subsequently approved by the MLG. Mendoza advised Punsalan to take the governorship temporarily while his resignation is being considered. Punsalan subsequently took his oath of office not as the acting governor but as the governor and thereafter assumed office. About 6 months later however, Mendoza resigned from his Batasan Membership and upon the result of the KBL s caucus, he returned to Pampanga to assume his governorship. Punsalan denounced Mendoza s return claiming that he has already vacated his office by virtue of his resignation which was impliedly approved by the President. Punsalan also pointed out that when Mendoza was a member of the Batasan, he was barred from holding governorship because there is an inhibition against Batasan Members from holding two elective positions; this is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised. Further, Punsalan claimed that Mendoza had forfeited his right and title to the office when he accepted his appointment as Minister of Justice and that of appointive Batasan Member because of the incompatibility of the positions with the Governor s office. ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza can still return to his governorship. HELD: Section 10, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution provides: A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure except that of Prime Minister, Member of the Cabinet or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office which may have been created or emoluments thereof increased while he was a Member of the Batasang Pambansa. Punsalan anchored his contention upon the above provision but he failed to ascertain that the Constitution made a distinction. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into three categories: The elective provincial/city/district representative; the sectoral representatives who are either elected or selected as may be provided by law ; and those chosen from Members of the Cabinet. It is the SC s opinion that the prohibition in question does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet. The prohibitions, undoubtedly, deal with a Member who enters the Batasan primarily as a legislator voted into office by the electorate of his constituency, the elected provincial or city or district representative with a fixed term (6 years) of office i.e an elected governor who, while in office, was elected as a member of the Batasan cannot concurrently hold those two elective positions. Mendoza was elected as the governor but was not elected as a member of the Batasan; he was appointed. Punsalan s contention that Mendoza s resignation was impliedly approved by the

president is not tenable. The president in fact needed more time to consider the validity of the resignation and upon the KBL s recommendation, he

instead chose to approve Mendoza s return to his governorship.

3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Read: 1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39
Appearance in Court On 27 Sept 1979, Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, an assemblyman and a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction . The presiding Judge however overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. Judge said that Courts of First Instance have appellate jurisdiction. Villegas appealed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not CFIs are appellate courts resolving this is essential in determining if Legaspi indeed violated a constitutional provision? HELD: CFI s have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the case at bar, CFI Cebu acted as a court of general original jurisdiction since the case filed by Villegas was not elevated from any lower court. It is then clearly resolved that this CFI in the case at bar is a court without appellate jurisdiction . Legaspi then has violated a constitutional provision and is hereby barred to appear as counsel before the said court of first instance.

2)

PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31

Appearance in Court who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to question the Commissioner s action. ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies? HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyat s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to Acero s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person

What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a member of Congress who is a stockholder of the corporation involved in a case is not allowed to appear under the guise that he is appearing as such, not as counsel for the corporation. Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the 4th Monday of July for its regular season, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until 30 days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members. Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. [2] A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide. [3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty days.

NOTE: In the cases of: 1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN; and
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001 ISSUE:

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam DefensorSantiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days. RULING: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the

information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed: x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis--vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed

against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of twothirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. xxx Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

2.

REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be suspended by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019. This preventive suspension applies to all public officials, including members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will be considered class legislation if Senators and Congressmen who commit the same is exempt from the preventive suspension imposed therein. Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended by the Congress itself. [4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one fifth of the members present, be entered in the journal. Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings. [Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any place than that which the 2 Houses shall be sitting. Read: 1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for reconsideration dated March 14, 1949

Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court. Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution? There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. **Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA. Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?

On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949) Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum. The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the

evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed. Justice Feria: (Concurring) Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required "concurrence of twothirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

2) Disciplinary measures on erring members

Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

Immunity legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmena s petition is dismissed.

Then Congressman Osmena Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement upon his parliamentary immunity. He further asked that the respondents should not require him to substantiate his charges against the president with the admonition that if he failed to do so he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Said charges emanated from his one-hour privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia , which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity of Garcia as the then President.

Case Digest: Osmea, Jr. vs. Pendatun, et. al. G.R. No. L-17144 28 October 1960 Ponente: Bengzon, J. FACTS: Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A Message to Garcia wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President. Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmea was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives. Osmea argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmena s immunity has been violated? HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the

immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned. ISSUE: Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution. RULING:

Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other place. Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that they shall not be questioned in any other place in Congress

3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal 4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the other? Read: U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729 The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper journalists and reporters as to what the proceedings all about.

b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1

Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof." **Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof." The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress. HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects

CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347 The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that it is urea formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde which appears in the journal which was really approved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.
Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign

Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: "The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: xxx xxx xxx "XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users." The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" He further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on

the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. "Urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde" The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131

Journals vs Enrolled Bill
'No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.' Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: "Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. - No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher." Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:

integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected .

by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy

e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714 (NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters required to be entered in the journals, like yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present. ) 5) Differentiate a "regular" from a "special" session.
Astorga v. Villegas April 30, 1974 Original action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory prohibitory injunction. Denied. Facts: House Bill No. 9266 which was filed in the House of Representatives passed on 3rd reading without amendments. It was sent to the Senate for concurrence and it was referred to the appropriate Senate Committee, which recommended approval with a minor amendment recommended by Senator Roxas. (instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter s incapacity to act as Mayor). When the bill was discussed on the Senate Floor, substantial amendments to Section 1 was introduced by Senator Tolentino, which amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that the House Bill had been passed by the Senate by the Senate with amendments. Attached was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas, and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. House of Representatives signified their approval. The printed copies were then certified and attested to by the Secretaries of Senate and House of representatives and the Senate President. The bill with the Roxas amendments were signed by the president of the Philippines and it was subsequently named RA 4065. It was later made public by Senator Tolentino that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate and approved on the Senate Floor. Senate President admitted the mistake in a letter to the President. As a result, the president sent a message to the presiding officer of both houses that he was officially withdrawing his signature from HB 9266. Mayor of Manila issued circulars ordering the disregard of the provisions of RA 4605. He also issued an order recalling 5 members of the city police who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under the authority of RA 4065. Vice Mayor Astorga filed this petition with the court. Respondents contend that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. Issues: 1. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill s due enactment. 2. WON RA 4065 can be considered as valid in the absence of the attestation required Held: 1. No. Senate President declared that his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. This declaration should be accorded greater respect than the attestation that it invalidated. Certification that was made by the presiding officer is merely a mode of authentication. The essential thing is the approval of congress and not the signature of the presiding officers. Function of attestation is not approval because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both houses. Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to the president. Rationale of the enrolled bill theory the signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the president of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. (Field vs. Clark) Enrolled bill theory based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments which requires the judicial department to accept as having passed Congress, all bills authenticate in the manner stated. 2. No. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but he argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting that it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all but would not affect the validity of the statute. The argument of the petitioner would limit the court s inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine within the bill had been duly enacted? In such case, the entry in the journal should be consulted. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the president and signed by him. Bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of 9 members, 3 of whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral tribunal shall be its Chairman. See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last par. Sec. 4, Art. VII Read: 1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988

HRETs Jurisdiction over Electoral Protests

Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the HRET and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatins opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code," was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of

candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRETs jurisdiction. HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

2)
Inhibition in the SET

FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, October 27, 1988
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) ---- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature ---- is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight. HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

3)

ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC & RAZUL AND SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
candidate who was later disqualified. Sanchez was then running as the 25th in ranking among the candidates (Sanchez vs COMELEC). He filed an urgent petition to re-count or re-appreciate those votes in favor of him. Meanwhile, Rasul and Enrile, ranked 23rd and 24th respectively intervened and filed before the COMELEC requesting the latter to proclaim them as the duly elected senators elect completing the 24 senators-elect. They moved to dismiss Sanchez petition. Rasuls lead over Enrile is just about 1,910 and there were just 3

Electoral Tribunals Jurisdiction-Pre-proclamation Controversy

After the first senatorial elections under the 1987 Constitution, Sanchez, a candidate therein, filed before the COMELEC to conduct a recount of the votes. Allegedly, votes intended for him, which were merely written as Sanchez, were considered as stray votes because of the sameness of his last name to that of Gil Sanchez another

municipalities left to be counted (31,000 votes). Enriles lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes. COMELEC then denied Sanchez petition. Subsequently, COMELEC declared Rasul as the 23rd senator-elect but there was still a mathematical possibility that Enrile can overtake Rasul. Enrile opposed Rasuls proclamation as the 23rd senator-elect and he averred that COMELEC should complete the canvassing first before declaring who placed 23rd and 24th respectively (Enrile vs COMELEC and Razul). COMELEC justified Rasuls proclamation on the ground that since the remaining 3 municipalities is in Muslim Mindanao, and that Rasul is a Muslim, there is a logical presumption that majority of the votes therefrom would be for Rasul. While this was foregoing, COMELEC, by a vote of 5 to 2 reversed its earlier decision in denying Sanchez petition and it granted Sanchez request for recount and re-appreciation. Enrile then filed a petition against COMELEC and Sanchez (Enrile vs COMELEC and Sanchez). Enrile alleged that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in granting Sanchez' petition for recount and abused its discretion in refusing to proclaim him (Enrile) on the ground that Sanchez' petition for recount is not a pre-proclamation controversy which involves issues affecting extrinsic validity, and not intrinsic validity, of the said election returns and that Rasul's lead over him was only 1,916 votes while his lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes, with only 31,000 votes remaining to be canvassed in 3 towns, could not offset his lead over Sanchez. ISSUE: Whether Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered a summary preproclamation controversy falling within the Comelec's exclusive jurisdiction (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code) or properly pertains to the realm of election protest falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the [Senate's] members." (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Constitution). HELD: Sanchez petition must fail. There is no clear showing that the said stray votes constitute "omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes" (incomplete election

returns). The election returns are in fact complete as the total number of votes that were counted and appreciated as votes in his favor by the boards of inspectors. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez' petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the COMELEC or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity. 'Canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature, and a strong prima facie case backed up by a specific offer of evidence and indication of its nature and importance has to be made out to warrant the reception of evidence aliunde and the presentation of witnesses and the delays necessarily entailed thereby. Otherwise, the paralyzation of canvassing and proclamation proceedings leading to a vacuum in so important and sensitive an office as that of Senator of the Republic could easily be brought about ---- this time involving the eight place and next time involving perhaps all the eight places, when it is considered that the position of senator is voted for, nationwide by all the voters of the 66 provinces and 57 cities comprising the Philippines.'

4)

BONDOC VS. HRET, supra

when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.

Separation of Powers

Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal. One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion? HELD: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially

Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the Senate President, as ex-oficio chairman, 12 senators and 12 members of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the

political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority of all the members. Read: 1. RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989 If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is substantial so as to dramatically decrease the membership of one party while reducing the other, the number of representatives of the different parties in the Commission on Appointments may also be changed in proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the Senators was only temporary so as not to result in the change of membership in the Commission on Appointments)
Tribunal and its Composition The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court.

2. GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992 Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in addition to the Senate President as the head thereof, every two (2) Senators are entitled to one (1) representative in the Commission. Parties, however, are not allowed to round off their members, I.e., 7 Senators are entitled to 3 representatives in the Commission on Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5. Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires that there must be 24 members of the Commission. If the different parties do not coalesce, then the possibility that the total number of Senators in the CA is less than 12 is indeed a reality. (Example: Lakas---13 Senators; LDP---11 Senators. In this case, Lakas is entitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP would have 5 members (11/2= 5.5)
HRET s Composition Rounding Off ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party s representation in the CoA.

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDPLABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKASNUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Ta ada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDPLABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter s

representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation

of one political party

either the LAKAS

NUCD or the NPC. A party

seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a

3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision) To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Read: 1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29

A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-atArms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of

the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation. HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.

Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation; question hour SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006 CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Question Hour EO 464 In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president s approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative

inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464 s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in

aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

BELOW is a reproduction of EO 464: E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. (a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including: Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998). Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002). (b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President. SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. **The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.** *** On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.***

The Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for,inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005 ; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World ; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled Clear and Present Danger ; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called Gloriagate Scandal ; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines. Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his] utmost personal attention while some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters. On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter[1] dated September 27, 2005 respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited in order to afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. Senate President Drilon, however, wrote[2] Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators are unable to accede to [his request] as it was sent belatedly and [a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week. Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. (a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including: 1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); 2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998). 3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); 4. 5. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002). (b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order: 1. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;

2.

3.

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

4.

5.

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished. Considering that no member of the executive department would want to appear in the above Senate investigations in aid of legislation by virtue of Proc. No. 464, the petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the same unconstitutional because the President abused her powers in issuing Executive Order No. 464. I S S U E S:

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and 3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. H E L D: Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Court s power of judicial review are present is in order. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[3] Invoking this Court s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin[4] andValmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,[5] respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.[6] The Supreme Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,[7] this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. I The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied) The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,[8] a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate s power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held: Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.[9] . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.[10] The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[11] the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.[12] In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour is therefore CONSTITUTIONAL. It is different insofar as Sections 2 and 3 are concerned. Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section(i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are covered by the executive privilege. The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2 Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege , it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege. While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds: There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which,like internaldeliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of informationcannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.[13](Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. 2 E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on matters of public concern. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecumissued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is

presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.[14] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature s power of inquiry. 3 The implementation of Proc. 464 before it was published in the Official Gazette as illegal. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. This is clear from the doctrine laid down in the case of TANADA VS. TUVERA. WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, are declared VOID. Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991 This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations. Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee s inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 1Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one s self. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone. As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made. A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo Baby Lopa of having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies. As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a takeover on his (Lopa s) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious. The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile s) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are baseless and malicious. Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act , a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held : The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to punish those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied) Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution. Investigation in aid of legislation; Executive Privilege ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc)
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be answered falls under executive privilege. HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. 1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test,petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo s cabinet. And 3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of theunavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Inquiry in aid of legislation

Executive Privilege

Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximatelyP16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the PRC. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege . In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SRBC cited Neri for contempt.

THE FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290

(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People s Republic of China. In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senat At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other dates. In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government. On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege . In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,[15][6] (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,[16][7] and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.[17][8] Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads: With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007. Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006). Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege on the following questions, to wit: a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe? Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People s Republic of China. In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. The Letter reads: Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon). The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007. On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus: It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered all the questions that were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive privilege, and which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what remained were only the three questions, where the Executive Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be dispensed with. In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) nonappearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner s request that he be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing.

On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorariassailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007. Respondent Committees found petitioner s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued theOrder dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states: ORDER For failure to appear and testify in the Committee s hearing on Tuesday, September 18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear and give his testimony. The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and make a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement. On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.[18][9] He insisted that he has not shown any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest. He emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter through the issuance of declaration of contempt and arrest. In view of respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contemptOrder. On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent Committees from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their comment. Petitioner contends that respondent Committees show cause Letter and contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are candid discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions. According to him, these discussions dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country s diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid down inSenate v. Ermita[19][10] and United States v. Reynolds.[20][11] Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made to him in official confidence under Section 7[21][12] of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 24[22][13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner s testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2)there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioner s arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands. I S S U E S: 1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the principle of executive privilege ? 1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of the President in the exercise of her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information, which might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People s Republic of China? 1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that the said conversations dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])? 1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of the Constitution: Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest) Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust) Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed) and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers? 2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege? 3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena? H E L D:

At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit: First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order? There is merit in the petition. At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita[23][18] becomes imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.[24][19] Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different. This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Court s pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita[25][20] is clear: When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. I The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded. The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.[26][21] Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.[27][22] This directs us to the consideration of the question is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464? AThere is a Recognized Claim of Executive Privilege Despite the Revocation of E.O. 464 At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom of Information Act[28][23] and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,[29][24] the Philippines has retained its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermita s Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,[30][25] and Chavez v. PEA.[31][26] There was never a mention of E.O. 464. While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita, have comprehensively discussed the concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to clearly define the communications covered by executive privilege. The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential communications privilege.[33][28] In United States v. [34][29] Nixon, the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in preserving the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President s performance of his official duties. It thus considered presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Apparently, the presumption is founded on the President s generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. The latter includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
[35][30] [32][27]

Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President s unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, thepresidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials [36][31] as well as pre-deliberative ones As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege. Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re: Sealed Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has operational proximity to direct presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power, such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.[37][32] Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v. PCGG[38][38], this Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. InChavez v. PEA,[39][39] there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed. As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,[40][40]appointing,[41][41] pardoning,[42][42] and diplomatic[43][43] powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. 2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate [44][44] investigating authority. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People s Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.[45][45] Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. The third element deserves a lengthy discussion. United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutelyprotected by the Constitution. The U.S. Court held: [N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,[46][46] where it was held that presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch. [47][47] Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted. Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see [48][48] no dispute on this. It is settled inUnited States v. Nixon that demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the President s generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the present case s distinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon,

there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to limit the scope of its decision. It stressed that it is not concerned here with the balance between the President s generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for information. Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on theprocedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets. Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the [49][50] We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear right of the people to information on matters of public concern. before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[50][51] Article 229[51][52] of the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k)[52][53] of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e)[53][54] of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential[54][55] and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind. More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people s right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people s right to information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecumissued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases. BThe Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked We now proceed to the issue whether the claim is properly invoked by the President.Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. [55][56]A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality.[56][57] The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient. With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive. [57][58] The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. [58][59] At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and coequal department. II

Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautista s letter, stating that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his conversations with President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an expression of his willingness to testify again, provided he be furnished in advance copies of the questions. Without responding to his request for advance list of questions, respondent Committees issued theOrder dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, informing respondent Committees that he had filed the present petition forcertiorari. Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order in view of five (5) reasons: First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and thequestions relative to and in furtherance thereof. Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner s repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list of questions. Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation. [59][61] Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that: The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members. Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. We quote the OSG s explanation: The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention. A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly, respondent Committees actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioner s motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present petition before this Court and (b)ignored petitioner s repeated request for an advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[60][63] Respondent Committees should have exercised the same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of government. In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have been avoided if powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of separation of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the government. In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Court s mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law. The respondents-Committees were therefore stopped from calling the petitioner and ask the three(3) questions mentioned above in connection with his conversations with the President being covered by the executive privilege rule. Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Right to Privacy; Public disclosure of government transactions; right to information on matters of public concern; right against self-incrimination;

CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers On February 20, 2006, Sen MD Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Sen Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt. HELD: It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Article III, Section 7 The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

The Facts: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[61][4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by theCommittee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[62][6] On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[63][7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted. Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order[64][13] directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees members. On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained. Hence, this petition. I S S U E: Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified. Ranged against it is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[65][15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[66][16] In those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate.

In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, thus: Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it. Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.[67][18] Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 [68][19] Constitutions. Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its committee. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.[69][20] It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court s high regard to such power is rendered more evident inSenate v. Ermita,[70][21] where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.[71][22] It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are [72][23] PCGG belongs to this class. within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis. Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.[73][24] Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,[74][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined: The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x. x x x x x x It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court. Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[75][26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions. 2) NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS. SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE CITY, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 421

inquiry in Aid of Legislation LGUs

In 1985, the SP of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing are the heads of NORECO II Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the LGC grants the SP. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt. HELD: There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.

Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It is also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49). Furthermore, the respondents assert that an inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines and its effect on the power consumption cost on the part of Dumaguete residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and its committees. 1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Amault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in the same way that courts wield an inherent power to enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice. (Commissioner v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly 35 Phil. 944 950 [1916], and other cases). The exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned for the first time in the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950]) where this Court held that the legislative body indeed possessed the contempt power. But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.) The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the real of its respective authority, it must have intended each department s authority to be full and complete, independently of the other s authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . . (Arnault v. Balagtas, L-6749, July 30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370 [1955]). The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra, broke ground in what was then an unexplored area of jurisprudence, and succeeded in supplying the raison d etre of this power of Congress even in the absence of express constitutional grant. Whether or not the reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the respondent committee of a city council is the threshold issue in the present controversy. 3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national

legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law. 4. To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of nonmembers for contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local autonomy. Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in all government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in the legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation. There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Sections 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the Rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the HR at least 3 days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may not cover matter matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. Section 23 [1] The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in a joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. [2] In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by a resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. a. Note the limitations and restrictions for the delegation. b. Note also that it could be withdrawn by mere resolution. c. What is referred to by the phrase next adjournment? d. Read: 1) ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369 the first emergency powers cases
1st Emergency Power Cases

Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of CA No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all E0s passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased. HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

2) RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 Phil. 603 the second emergency powers cases.
2nd Emergency Powers Cases

Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate EO. 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were pursuant to CA 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed HB 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid. HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

3) Republic Act No. 6826, Dec.20, 1989 which grants emergency powers to President Aquino.

Republic Act No. 6826

December 20, 1989

AN ACT TO DECLARE, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, A NATIONAL POLICY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS, TO EXERCISE POWERS NECESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT THE DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. State of National Emergency. - On December 1, 1989, a rebellion committed by certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines aided and abetted by civilians gave rise to an emergency of national proportions. The emergency continues even with the cessation of military hostilities. More than 2,000 persons who participated in the failed coup, including the masterminds and plotters, are said to be still at large. There is a clear threat to national security posed by the rebels who have just "returned to their barracks," and the fence-sitters among the military. Bombings in Metropolitan Manila continue causing loss of lives, maiming of limbs and destruction of property. On December 6, 1989, Proclamation No. 503 was issued by the President declaring a state of national emergency. Meanwhile, secessionist elements in Mindanao, seeking to establish a common cause with rebels and their sympathizers, or taking advantage of the instability occasioned by the coup, are reported to have taken overt acts to dismember the country. Communist rebels have taken advantage of the situation by attacking Government personnel and installations. The economy has suffered and continues to suffer a serious setback, severely disrupting the momentum of our economic recovery. A state of national emergency is hereby declared. Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The mutiny and rebellion by certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines launched to seize state power, destabilize the duly constituted Government and supplant it with a military government by means of force and violence and other illegal means, has caused loss of lives and destruction of property and has set back the economic program of the Government. Due to and by reason thereof, and in order to optimize the efforts of the President to carry out the difficult task of economic reconstruction, it is imperative to grant her emergency powers subject to such limitations as hereinafter provided. Section 3. Authorized Powers. - Pursuant to Article VI, Section 23 (2) of the Constitution, and to implement the declared national policy, the President is hereby authorized to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out any or all of the following powers: (1) To protect the people from hoarding, profiteering, injurious speculations, manipulation of prices, product deceptions, and cartels, monopolies or other combinations in restraint of trade, or other pernicious practices affecting the supply, distribution and movement of food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies, office and school supplies, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements, machinery

equipment and spare parts required in agriculture, industry and other essential services, and other articles of prime necessity, whether imported or locally produced or manufactured; (2) Towards the above ends, (a) to purchase any of the articles or commodities hereinabove mentioned, for storage, sale, or distribution for the relief of hunger and want of the population, and/or to stabilize the prices of such foodstuffs, articles and other commodities; (b) to fix the maximum selling prices thereof; (c) to regulate the fees charged by establishments in connection with the production, processing, milling, storage and distribution of such articles or commodities; (d) to seize and confiscate hoarded foodstuffs and commodities: Provided, That goods which are determined to have been seized wrongfully shall be subject to the subsequent determination and payment of just compensation; and (e) to call upon and deputize recognized nongovernment and people's organizations and volunteers as well as local government units to assist the Government to carry out these powers through the monitoring or implementation of orders, rules and regulations, as the case may be; (3) To temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest that violates the herein declared national policy: Provided, however, That to the extent feasible, management shall be retained, under the direction and supervision of the President or her duly designated representative who shall render a full accounting to the President of the operations of the utility or business taken over: Provided, further, That whenever the President shall determine that the further use or operation by the Government of any such public service or enterprise is no longer necessary under existing conditions, the same shall be restored to the person entitled to the possession thereof; (4) To liberalize the importation and/or grant incentives for the manufacture, assembly, reconditioning, or importation of needed vehicles or vessels, including the necessary parts thereof, for public transportation to relieve the transportation crises; (5) To ensure the availability of credit to the productive sectors of the economy especially in the countryside through measures such as, but not limited to, lowering the effective lending rates of interest and reserve requirements of lending institutions; (6) To stagger the working hours of, and adopt a flexible working schedule for, employees and workers in government, and whenever it becomes necessary, in the private sector; (7) To conserve and regulate the distribution and use of power, fuels and energy and ensure adequate supply of the same; (8) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5, Section 25, Article VI of the Constitution, to decrease expenditures of the Executive Department of the National Government and government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries through the suspension of services, activities or operations which are of no immediate necessity, and for this purpose the President shall order that all departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the government create a reserve fund equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective appropriations, except those pertaining to personnel services, construction and repair of school buildings and hospitals: Provided, however, That in all cases, the security of tenure of civil service employees shall be respected; (9) To issue lawful orders for the recovery and accounting of all firearms, explosives and military equipage, including, but not limited to, those belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police and licensed firearms which have fallen into the possession of unauthorized persons or entities, or are being used by their holders for unlawful purposes, and pursuant thereto, adopt such measures as are reasonably necessary to take custody of such firearms, explosives and equipage and/or otherwise accomplish the purposes herein stated: Provided, That this authority can be exercised only upon specific orders of the President or her duly authorized representative; (10) To ensure that military uniforms, equipment and supplies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police are possessed and used only by authorized officers and members thereof pursuant to law; and (11) To undertake such other measures as may be reasonable and necessary to enable the President to carry out the declared national policy subject to the Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees. Section 4. Reports to Congress. - The President, within ten (10) days from the issuance of any of the executive acts, orders, rules and regulations promulgated and issued by her under the powers herein granted shall report to Congress the issuance thereof and the justification therefor: Provided, That within the first ten (10) days of every month, the President shall likewise submit a monthly report to Congress of all acts performed pursuant to this Act during the preceding month. Section 5. Penalties. - Any violation of the rules or regulations issued pursuant hereto, shall be punishable with imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if the offender is a corporation, association, partnership or any other juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the president, directors, managers, managing partners, as the case may be, who participated in the commission of the offense or who shall have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent the commission of the same. If the offender is an alien, he shall, in addition to the penalties herein prescribed, be deported without further proceedings; Provided, further, That if the offender is a public official or employee, he shall, in addition to the penalties prescribed herein, suffer perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification from office, as the case may be. Section 6. Construction or Interpretation. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted as a restriction of the Bill of Rights or of the Constitution. Section 7. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to any other person or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 8. Promulgation, Effect and Enforcement of Rules and Regulations. - The rules and regulations promulgated by the President pursuant to this Act, which shall have the force and effect of law, shall be numbered consecutively and shall take effect two (2) days after their publication in case of rules and regulations that are denominated "urgent," and five (5) days in case of those without such denomination. The publication shall be effected in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation. Rules and regulations with a penal clause shall be duly published in Filipino and English in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. Said rules and regulations shall cease to be in force and effect upon the expiry date provided in Section 9 hereof without prejudice to benefits and rights that may have vested, and culpabilities and liabilities that may have been incurred and established after due notice and hearing. Section 9. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation and shall be in full force and effect until the next sine die adjournment in June 1990 of the regular session of Congress: Provided, however, That adjournment for a recess shall not affect the duration of this Act: and Provided, further, That the powers granted under this Act may be withdrawn sooner by means of a concurrent resolution of Congress or ended by Presidential Proclamation. Approved: December 20, 1989

Sections 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. NOTE: In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court held that the E-VAT Law is constitutional even if the same was the VERSION which came from the Senate, not from the House of Representatives. This is so because the Senate is allowed to propose amendments to bills which must exclusively originate from the House of Representatives. Section 25 [1] The Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the President for the operation of the government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. [2] No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. [3] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. [4] A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the national treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein. [5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the house of Representatives, the Chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the constitutional commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. [6] Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for the purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. [7] If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. Read: DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208
Transfer of Funds

Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of NA/BP sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 77. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Sec 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment." Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional. HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from 1 dep t to another here.

Section 26. [1] Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. [2] No bill shall be passed unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members 3 days before its passage, except when the President certifies as to its necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of the bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. Read: 1)

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208

The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject. HELD: The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.

2)

DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569

y Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983) F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted

Political Law

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title

De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS . De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: RA 938 was enacted in 1953. Section thereof reads The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: . . . . Then in 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely the power to regulate, but likewise prohibit . . . . The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. If considered as amended, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by De La Cruz that to construe RA. 938 as

allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs is in violation of the constitutional provision that a bill shall contain only one subject matter and shall be expressed in the title thereof. The title clearly expresses that the purpose of which is to regulate. The amendment including prohibition is therefore violative of the constitution for it runs counter against the title of the said RA. As noted, the title was not modified to accommodate the amendment.

Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS . Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

3)

INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710

One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill

ILC is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956, RA 1435 was passed. Sec 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964 ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to have a tax refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The CoIR ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ICL appealed the issue to the Court of Tax Apepal and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the ILC's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the CTA. The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way. The title of RA 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund." The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund. ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ICL. HELD: The SC ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed it.

4)

LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

Political Law Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject

Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of

Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato. ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill? HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

The case questions the law entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur , but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill ? Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation. Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill. This constitutional requirement breathes the spirit of command. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives where the bill, being of local application, originated. Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court. With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur 8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur, read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

5)

ALALAYAN VS. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172

Title Must Express One Subject

Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested in NAPOCOR that "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses." Also it could renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy,". This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. Alalayan and PPDC are contractors with NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by NAPOCOR. They aver that the provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional. HELD: No bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in [its] title . . ." This provision is similar to those found in many American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider. To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment. "Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators." ** RA. 3043, approved June 17, 1961, entitled "An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty-One." "SEC. 3 The National Power Corporation is hereby authorized to represent and transact for the benefit and in behalf of the public consumers, and it shall in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder require as a condition that the franchise holder, if it receives at least fifty percent of its electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation, shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses. The National Power Corporation shall renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy, in order to give effect to the provisions hereof. In the event that the net profit as verified by the Public Service Commission should exceed the said twelve percent, the Public Service Commission shall order such excess to be returned pro rata to the customers either in cash or as credit for future electric bills."

6)

CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418

Political Law One Title, One Subject Rule Tenancy Act Cordero is the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of indigent tenant Salazar who filed a case against landlord Sta. Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of RA 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the Dept of Labor. Judge Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency of the appeal RA 2263 AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES was passed. This law, particularly Sec 19 & 20 thereof, amended the previous law and now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also the basis of creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by virtue of the amendment being the done the issue has now become moot and academic. Cabatuando countered that the provision is not embraced in the title. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether or not to allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants. HELD: The SC ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To declare sections 19 & 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the trial attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. In other words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the intention of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of Justice.

7)

TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 333

Political Law

One Title One Subject Rule

Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims that section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates the one title one rule of Sec 26, Art 6 of the Constitution. Section 5 (b) provides: b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. The inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 not because it violated the one title one subject rule but rather because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. The SC emphasized that the provision of Sec 5 (b) of RA 8180 does not violate the one title one subject rule. The SC, as a policy, has adopted a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule. The SC also emphasized that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The SC held that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.

Section 27. [1] Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such consideration , 2/3 of all the members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections , to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by 2/3 of all the members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each house shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within 30 days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he signed it. [2] The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. Read: a.

BENGZON VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 62 Phil. 912

Political law

Bill

Veto

Veto a Bill

Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen Pangasinan. Upon reaching 65 years of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance to law. He later sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act 4051 An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes. Sec 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon but that provision has been vetoed by the governor general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond the power of the gov-gen hence he sought to file a petition to have the Sec of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law. ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity Law. HELD: The governor general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his power; for this is also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided: The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.

b.

BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA, 11 SCRA 486

Political Law

Veto Power

Condition Attached to an Item

Bolinao Electronics is co-owner an co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Valencia, then Sec of Communications, for operating even after

their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damage to his department. ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages. HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. This ruling, that the executive s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

c.

NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990

Political Law

Veto Power

Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory s veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill. HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his itemveto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President s veto power.

Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY '89] hereinafter), which was vetoed by the President, reads: SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and /or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act. We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto: The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriation. A careful review of the legislative action on the budget as submitted shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as recommended by the President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An unwanted consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services and infrastructure projects. I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the Executive Branch of the Government. The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY 89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY 90), is unconstitutional and without effect. The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto provisions of an Appropriations Bill? Petitioners contend that Section 55 FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are provisions and not items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the item veto power of the President. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution reading, in full, as follows: Sec. 27.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the Executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other words, also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as petitioners urge? The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared that an item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President s veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]). The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill. But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, we are of the opinion that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein. The challenged provisions fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) although labelled as provisions, are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President s veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158). Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor s constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing items of expenditure essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location ot a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor it circumvent the Governor s veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor s constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as items for purposes of the Governor s item veto power over general appropriation bills. Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry with it the power to strike them out, citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In other words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto power. There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct items of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the

appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320). That was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever. The Power of augmentation and The Validity of the Veto The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Said provision reads: Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. (Emphasis ours). If, indeed, the Legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the Executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[l], supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is nothing to override (citing Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld. b. BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992

Political Law

Veto Power of the President

On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that: There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to another. The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides: Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary s appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on fiscal autonomy. III Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797. The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been enacted by practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices on retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied with the statutory prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)

Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]). As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Through the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits. P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the lump sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should include the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices, supra). The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly favored is, again, a misimpression. Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens of thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men retire at a much younger age some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the equal protection clause should first be directed to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the retirement provision is not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of retired Justices whose retirement pensions are founded on constitutional reasons. The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given the power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70 except through impeachment. All courts and court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court s supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative or quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution). Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this Court and the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on retirement benefits of Justices. One last point. The Office of the Solicitor General argues that: . . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds, raised from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already leading private lives and have ceased performing public service. Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law . . . (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16) The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of an office whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the law. Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who represent the government before the two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these retirees, should show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their years. All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as engaging in robbery is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument is unfounded.

If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then quality of research in that institution has severely deteriorated. In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v. Topeka but Citizen s Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, waterpower, and other public works to aid private railroads improve their services. The law was declared void on the ground that the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests. The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that ancient period. Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used for slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only private persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What was robbery in 1874 is now called social justice. There is nothing about retirement benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old textbook or encyclopedia which could not even spell loan correctly. Good lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant citations. The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary requesting adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday living expenses not to mention the high cost of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991); Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it. For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated. 2) What is a pocket veto?

As a general rule, no. Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law. This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force. When is it allowed? The exception is provided in paragraph (2), Section 27 of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

3) What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?

There are three ways for a bill to become a law. They are: 1. 2. 3. When the President signs it When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him.

3.

PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506

Political Law

Veto Power

Part of the Legislative Process

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994. This case also involves the power of Congress as far as the pork barrel fund is concerned. Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In another case, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the President s veto is valid. HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. Veto on special provisions The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate ; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a logrolling legislation. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC s), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP . The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU s Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU s including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the wellestablished principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

What is the so-called executive impoundment ? It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by the President, he however refuses for whatever reason, to spend funds made possible by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three (3) principal sources of authority of the President. [1] authority to impound given to him by Congress, either expressly or impliedly; [2] the executive power drawn from his power as Commander-in-chief; and [3] the Faithful execution clause of the Constitution. Note that in this case the SC held that the Countryside Development Fund (CDF) of Congressmen and Senators is CONSTITUTIONAL because the same is set aside for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by said Senators and Congressmen.

Section 28. [1] The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. [2] The Congress, may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government. [3] Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

[4] No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed directly or indirectly for the benefit, use, or support of any sect, denomination, or system of religion except when such preacher, priest is assigned to the AFP, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Read: 1.

Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219 Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional. HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."

1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789

Political Law

Uniformity in Taxation

In 1960, Ordinance 110 was passed in Butuan. It was later amended by Ordinance 122. This Ordinance imposes a tax on any person, association, etc., of P0.10 per case of 24 bottles of Pepsi- Cola. Pepsi operates within the Butuan and it paid under protest the amount of P4.926.63 from August 16 to December 31, 1960 and the amount of P9,250.40 from January 1 to July 30, 1961. Pepsi filed a complaint for the recovery of the total amount of P14,177.03 paid under protest and those that it may later on pay until the termination of this case on the ground that Ordinance No. 110 as amended of the City of Butuan is illegal, that the tax imposed is excessive and that it is unconstitutional. Pepsi averred it is unconstitutional because it partakes of the nature of an import tax and it is highly unjust and discriminatory. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid. HELD: The tax prescribed in sec 3 of Ordinance No. 110, as originally approved, was imposed upon dealers engaged in selling soft drinks or carbonated drinks. Thus, it would seem that the intent was then to levy a tax upon the sale of said merchandise. As amended by Ord No. 122, the tax is, however, imposed only upon any agent and/or consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or corporation engaged in selling . . . soft drinks or carbonated drinks. As a consequence, merchants engaged in the sale of soft drinks or carbonated drinks, are not subject to the tax, unless they are agents and/or consignees of another dealer, who, in the very nature of things, must be one engaged in business outside the City. Besides, the tax would not be applicable to such agent and/or consignee, if less than 1,000 cases of soft drinks are consigned or shipped to him every month. When we consider, also, that the tax shall be based and computed from the cargo manifest or bill of lading . . . showing the number of cases not sold but received by the taxpayer, the intention to limit the application of the ordinance to soft drinks and carbonated drinks brought into the City from outside thereof becomes apparent. Viewed from this angle, the tax partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is beyond defendant s authority to impose by express provision of law. It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity or equality under all circumstances, or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation. The classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be reasonable and this requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions, but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class. These conditions are not fully met by the ordinance in question. Indeed, if its purpose were merely to levy a burden upon the sale of soft drinks or carbonated beverages, there is no reason why sales thereof by dealers other than agents or consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan should be exempt from the tax.

3)

PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104

Political Law

Exemption From Taxes

The Church

The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that there is no question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes. The proper remedy of the petitioner is appeal and not this special civil action. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes. HELD: The Constitution provides that charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries and required that for the exemption of lands, buildings, and improvements, they should not only be exclusively but also actually and directly used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. In this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses. Further, there is no merit in Abra s contention that the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court.

4)

APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 Phil. 547

Political Law

Exemption From Taxation

Assessment

In 1937, an ordinance (Ord. 137) was passed in the City of Baguio. The said ordinance sought to assess properties of property owners within the defined city limits. Apostolic Prefect of Mt. Province (APMP), on the other hand, is a religious corporation duly established under Philippine laws. Pursuant to the ordinance, it contributed a total amount of P1,019.37. It filed the said contribution in protest. APMP later averred that it should be exempt from the said special contribution since as a religious institution, it has a constitutionally guaranteed right not to be taxed including its properties. ISSUE: Whether or not APMP is exempt from taxes. HELD: The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution. Based on Justice Cooley s words: While the word tax in its broad meaning, includes both general taxes and special assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment, and an assessment is a tax, yet there is a recognized distinction between them in that assessment is confined to local impositions upon property for the payment of the cost of public improvements in its immediate vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed. The differences between a special assessment and a tax are that (1) a special assessment can be levied only on land; (2) a special assessment cannot (at least in most states) be made a personal liability of the person assessed; (3) a special assessment is based wholly on benefits; and (4) a special assessment is exceptional both as to time and locality. The imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in a prescribed area, is a tax and not an assessment, although the purpose is to make a local improvement on a street or highway. A charge imposed only on property owners benefited is a special assessment rather than a tax notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax. In the case at bar, the Prefect cannot claim exemption because the assessment is not taxation per se but rather a system for the benefits of the inhabitants of the city.

4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331

Political Law

Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed

In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig. ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid. HELD: The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

4)

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201

Political Law

Appropriation

Religious Sect

The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration of it, Ruiz, Director of Posts initiated the production of stamps which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation. Aglipay then appealed for the

prohibition of the sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the selling of stamps commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13, Art 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any church or denomination among others. ISSUE: Is the sale of the stamps in support of a particular sect hence unconstitutional? HELD: The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. It merely said that the director of posts may use such fund in a manner as often as may be deemed advantageous to the government . Act 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government . The fact that the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his discretion.

5)

MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

Political Law

Appropriation

Dr. Perez was named Outstanding Health Worker in 1980. Being an awardee, he is entitled to have a salary increase pursuant to Letter Of Iinstruction 562. The Ministry of Health submitted to the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City to have the funds be appropriated for the Perez salary. The SP however denied the request claiming that the said LOI only applies to employees or officials of the national government and Perez is a local government employee hence not covered. Upon appeal, the Office of the Budget and Management determined that Perez is a national government employee hence he is entitled to such increase. However, Alba the City Health Officer refused to recognize Perez right to such increase because he averred that the constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such appropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the payment of the merit salary increase because such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus. ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is entitled to such increment per LOI. HELD: Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. Also their positions are partially funded by the national government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the national funds and the other one-half from local funds. Others are wholly paid by either the local or the national government. There is no basis in Alba s allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Perez has been proven to be a national government official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health Ministry wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus.

Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health Worker for 1980 by the Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an awardee, Dr. Perez was granted by the Ministry of Health a two-step salary increase in accordance with the merit increase program as enunciated in Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 562. Thereafter, the Ministry of Health requested the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, which is paying Dr. Perez salary in full to appropriate the amount corresponding to the merit increase in its current budget. For lack of legal basis, the Bureau of Local Government opposed the proposed merit increase because the provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only to officials/employees in the national government, and consequently, awardee Dr. Perez was not entitled thereto, since he is an employee of the local government as provided for in the charter of San Pablo City. This prompted Dr. Perez to request the Ministry of Health to make the corresponding allocation to issue a notice of salary adjustment effective January 1, 1981. The Minister of Justice, upon a query made by the Ministry of Health, in his Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, dated November 20, 1981, acknowledged that the merit increase program applies only to the officials/employees of the national government but declared Dr. Perez as one such official or employee and concluded that the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase to him. Relying on such opinion, the Ministry of Health issued to respondent Dr. Perez on December 1, 1981 a notice of salary adjustment which release of the amount was denied by the Office of the Budget and Management which insisted that the awardee is an employee of the local or city government who is not covered by the merit increase program. Dr. Perez made his appeal therefrom to the Ministry of Health who forwarded it, recommending favorable action thereon to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The latter referred the appeal to the Minister of the Budget who affirmed his earlier decision of disallowing the merit increase and reiterating the same reasons. A petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Budget and Management to pay the merit increase was filed by Dr. Perez before the lower court which granted the aforementioned favorable decision, subject matter of the present petition for review on certiorari before Us by petitioners arguing that: 1. The position of private respondent as the City Health Officer of San Pablo City is embraced in Sec. 7 of Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 1136 which states among other things that the salary plan provided for in Sec. 8 of the same decree shall cover the City Officer, among other officials, whose salary shall be paid out of city funds and therefore a local government employee whose position does not appear in the list of national government employees defined under another law (P.D. 985). 2. The constitution provides that no money shag be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such appropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the payment of the merit salary increase because such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus.

3. The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an employee of the national government would have far reaching effects such that all other city health officers and local officials similarly situated would also be so entitled to an personal benefits given to national employee. Dr. Perez s exemplary accomplishment which merited for him the grant to a two-step increase must yield to the overriding economic consideration of availability of funds which the government must set aside for the purpose. We do not agree with the arguments set down by petitioners. Private respondent invites Our attention to the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA #5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940) more specifically, Art. IV thereof, which provides that the position of a City Health Officer is not included among the heads of the regular departments of the city but included among the national officials performing municipal functions under the direct control of the Health Minister and not the city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the same charter. Such principle is reiterated in the Decentralization Act of 1967 which shows that the appointing authority is the Health Minister and not the local officials. Petitioner Minister of the Budget admitted thru the testimony of its representative, Alice S. Torres, chief of the Compensation and Position Classification and a specialist thereon that the City Health Officer is under the administrative and technical supervision of the Ministry of Health (p. 69, tsn, June 16, 1983, p. 72, Rollo). Be it noted that, Section 7 of PD 1136 relied upon by petitioners provides that the basic salary of the City Health Officer is paid from city funds. However, the last paragraph of the same Sec. 7, excludes the city health officer from the classification of local government official as can be gathered from the phrase except those occupied by (a) officials whose compensation is fixed in the constitution, Presidential Decrees and other laws and (b) officials and employees who are under the direct supervision and control of the National Government or its agencies and who are paid wholly or partially from national funds. Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. Also their positions are partially funded by the national government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the national funds and the other one-half from local funds. We cannot likewise ignore the opinions of the Ministry of Justice cited by private respondent to wit: 1) Opinion No. 26, Series of 1976 which categorically rules that Officials and employees of provincial and city health offices render service as officials and employees of the Bureau of Health (Ministry of Health) and they are for that reason not local but national officials under the direct supervision and control of the Ministry of Health; 2) Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, which is specific and definitive that the private respondent is a national government employee and the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase awarded to him. In this 1981 opinion, it was explained in detail how the said funds corresponding to his merit increase could be legally disbursed contrary to the unfounded speculations expressed by the petitioners. Lastly, there is no basis in petitioner s allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Respondent Dr. Perez has been proven to be a national government official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health Ministry wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be compelled by mandamus. 20. Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
Political Law Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court

Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid. HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

Regalado, J. Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides: In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for Certiorari within 10 days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or

denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Issue: Is Section 27 of RA 6770 constitutional?

Held: Section 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional since it increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent as provided under Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. As explained in FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. VS. CA, 237 SCRA 519, the aforesaid constitutional provision was intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enactment of Read: MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. Appeal of cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman covered by Section 27 of RA 6770 shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

Sections 32. The Congress, shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefore signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.

Read again RA 6735 & SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC & PIRMA

Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: I. General Provisions Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."

Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. (d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters. (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people. (f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. (h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon. (i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be. Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission. (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter. (c) The petition shall state the following: c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; c.2. the proposition; c.3. the reason or reasons therefor; c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. (e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. (f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay. Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. II. SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. National Initiative and Referendum

The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national

law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect. (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite. (c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission. Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and (b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature. The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee. Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. III. Local Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution. (b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. (c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition. (d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures. (f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted. (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition. (h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections. Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated. Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact. (c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided. Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months. Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved. Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum. Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure. IV. SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. apply to all initiatives and referenda. Section 20. Rules and Regulations. of this Act. Final Provisions

The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall

The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes

Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 22. Separability Clause. effective. Section 23. Effectivity. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and

This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: August 4, 1989