Challenging The Discourse On Fragile States

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Conflict, Security & Development
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Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Eka Ikpe
To cite this Article Ikpe, Eka(2007) 'Challenging the discourse on fragile states', Conflict, Security & Development, 7: 1, 85
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To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14678800601176543 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800601176543
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Conict, Security & Development 7:1 April 2007

Eka Ikpe
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The paper reviews the current discourse on state fragility and examines the denitional basis for this label. It puts forward a model for dening state fragility that is based on the states capacity, which is its capability to protect itself, deliver services and manage economic risks and the states resilience, which has to do with the management of social relations and political risks. This model also takes into account both middleincome and low-income countries. The nature and extent of state fragility here is a
function of the relationship between state capacity and resilience. The relationship between state fragility and development and security outcomes is addressed with reference to the impact of initial conditions. The paper concludes by examining the resulting aid allocation on the basis of the existing state fragility discourse and puts forward an alternative aid allocation structure based on the proposed model for state fragility, and nds signicant differences to the existing arrangement.
If dominant neo-liberal development models of the 1980s and early 1990s posited a false dichotomy between state and the market, the East Asian economic successes, and the post-9/11 priorities have brought the state rmly back on the agenda. At the other end of the spectrum, radical development and ethnographic theorists have posited a postdevelopment discourse, articulated from solidarist, quasi-Third-Worldist perspectives that propose fundamental global governance reforms and concentrate on radical public sector solutions to development problems.
Eka Ikpe is currently Research Associate and Project Coordinator with the Conict Security and Development Group, Kings College, London. She is also a PhD Economics candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Her thesis is provisionally titled Agriculture the means to an Industrialisation end: A study of the Nigerian States engagement with the Rice economy.
ISSN 1467-8802 print/ISSN 1478-1174 online/07/010085-40 q 2007 International Policy Institute DOI: 10.1080/14678800601176543
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Eka Ikpe Ideological considerations aside, the failure of traditional development assistance
assumptions and practices in the fragile states across vast swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and elsewhere, have called for a critical re-evaluation of governance as a development factor. The conuence of intellectual trends has led to a resurgence of the state in the development discourse. The nexus between conict and what is variously described as state fragility, failure, weakness, poor performers and difcult environments
or difcult partners; has highlighted the states vital role in delivering on development and security goals. The human security relevance of state weakness is vast: according to the denitions offered in this paper, the very fragile states constitute 1,372.6 million of the worlds population of which 773.9 million are among the poorest and insecure. Perversely, they receive the lowest per capita aid allocation of any grouping. Yet there has been a dearth of scholarly attention from the perspective of state theory and mainstream war/security studies. This paper will look at the concept of state fragility in four parts: denition; characteristics; development and security. It also reviews aid allocation policies with reference to state fragility.
Dening state fragility

State fragility is a continuum. At one extreme, a state can be so frail that it will fail as soon as it is threatened by a hostile internal or external force. In the literature, the focus is skewed to those that fall in this category since they pose the greatest risks to regional and global stability. However, there are those that are weak but not so frail as to risk imminent collapse but are unwilling or unable to guarantee the welfare of their citizens. From a human security perspective, state fragility matters whether or not it affects international security. The key characteristics of fragile countries (variously described as weak, frail, failing, failed or as difcult partners and poor performers) is their instability and lack of responsiveness to human needs. From this perspective, fragility has to do with the capacity of the state to adapt to changed circumstances, protect citizens, absorb shocks and manage conict without resort to violence. A state is not fragile if it can manage transition processes, and ensure its stability through peaceful management of change. In this paper, we dene state fragility as a combination of capacity and resilience. Capacity is the capability of the state to protect
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itself, deliver services and manage economic risks. Resilience has to do with the management of social relations and political risks. Fragility (whether due to low capacity, low resilience or both) is a source of instability.1 Instability is not a simple causal process, but a dynamic outcome of various pressures including initial conditions, triggering events and fragility. Capacity and resilience are structural characteristics of the state.2 The resulting instability is self-perpetuating if the
structural handicaps are deeply rooted and resistant to remedy or if the state is subjected to brutal and recurrent shocks that prevent recuperation. The interplay between external challenges, structural factors and initial conditions is complex so that accurate prediction of system behaviour is not feasible. In other words, fragility characteristics only measure proneness to instability. They have limited predictive value. Development and security outcomes are only partly explained by structural factors. Human agency and exogenous inuences also intervene.
The state of the debate

The discourse on state fragility has been driven by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the subsequent war on terrorism and Coalition interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, analysis should not be overly focused on these two country contexts given that they are highly distinct models of state fragility and, therefore, exclude the vast majority of fragile states. Thus, the War on Terror led agenda has resulted in a focus on the category of states leaning closest to state failure or countries suspected of harbouring Al Qaeda linked groups, leading to skewed analysis and policy priorities. The UK Department for International Development (DfID) denes fragile states as those countries where the government cannot or will not deliver core services to the majority of its people, including the poor. It is based on the World Banks Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), a set of indicators derived from the states performance record on economic management, structural policies, social inclusion, equity as well as public sector management and institutions. The World Bank has a similar category also based on the CPIA- Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS). These are countries plagued by poor policies, institutions and governance so that they cannot deliver effective poverty reduction especially with regard to economic management, social services delivery and government efcacy.3 Here the
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differences are seen as occurring in terms of having conict or not, as well as varying levels of government capacity. Fragile states are also dened with reference to their particular connection to the developed world mostly in terms of donor engagement, Difcult Partnership Countries (DPC), which are countries that are noted as having weak capacity and weak states as dened by the Overseas Economic Co-operation for Development (OECD).4
Owing to the aid dimension of state fragility, most lists of fragile states are limited to low income countries even though the most severe global security risks may well lie with large, middle income countries. These lists are as shown in Table 1. Many denitions co-exist for state fragility, but they share some features. First, is the focus on low-income countries. The LICUS are explicitly low income and DfIDs fragile states are so because they are concerned with aid performance and allocations. Dollar and Levin also posit that their paper seeks to investigate whether there is a group of forgotten states with low income and weak institutions, which receive signicantly less aid than other recipients.5 There is clearly an overwhelming use of the development lens on the problem of state fragility, which inadvertently limits the usefulness of the concept for global security assessments. Remarkably, the CPIA measurement, upon which three of the denitions are based, fails to isolate the initial conditions as it includes debt in its economic management ratings and inequality in its social inclusion ratings.6 This in essence penalises country policy makers trying to improve the lot of their citizens and handicapped by factors that are beyond their control. In effect, by using a mix of initial conditions, structural characteristics and policy design features it conates the legacy of history (including colonialism, wars, etc.) with policy performance. Thus, the DFID denition posits that some countries will not deliver core services to its people as if they invariably had the nancial and administrative resources to do so. The nal and less clear-cut problem is a subliminal focus on countries that have been weakened by exogenous shocks or internal dissension and are perceived to be vulnerable. The state fragility model being put forward here, aims to overcome these biases. The Failed States Index, which comes closest to the Fragility Index in its broader range, is in contrast to the prevalent narrow scope of what constitutes instability. The list comprises both low and middle-income countries with an understanding of a scale in vulnerability. The indicators used to generate the index are also wide ranging in the consideration of social, economic, political and military factors. What is found to be most signicant is uneven development, which comprises poverty and inequality and criminalisation and delegitimisation of the state. However, these are more outcomes than
Table 1. DfID 46 Afghanistan Angola Azerbaijan Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Dem Rep. Congo, Rep of Cote dIvoire Djibouti Dominica Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia, The Georgia Guinea Guinea Bissau Guyana Haiti Indonesia Kenya Kiribati Lao LICUS Afghanistan Angola Burundi Cambodia Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. of Cote dIvoire Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Gambia, The Georgia Guinea Guinea Bissau Haiti Kosovo Lao Liberia Myanmar Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sao Tome and Principe Sierra Leone DPCs Afghanistan Angola Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep of Guinea Guinea Bissau Haiti Lao Liberia Myanmar Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sao Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Tajikistan Timor Leste Failed states index Afghanistan Angola Azerbaijan Bahrain Bangladesh Belarus Bhutan Bosnia and Herzegovina Burma Burundi Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Colombia Cuba Dominican Republic Congo, Dem. Rep Ecuador Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia, The Guatemala Guinea Haiti
Challenging the discourse on fragile states 89
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Table 1continued
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DfID 46 Liberia Mali Myanmar Nepal Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sao Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Tajikistan Timor Leste Togo Tonga Uzbekistan Vanuatu Yemen Zimbabwe
LICUS Solomon Islands Somalia Sudan Tajikistan Timor Leste Togo Uzbekistan Zimbabwe
DPCs Togo Uruguay Yemen Zimbabwe
Failed states index Honduras Indonesia Iran Iraq Ivory coast Kenya Laos Lebanon Liberia Mozambique Nepal Nigeria North Korea Pakistan Paraguay Peru Philippines Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Syria Tajikistan Tanzania
Table 1continued DfID 46 LICUS DPCs Failed states index Turkey Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Venezuela Vietnam Yemen
Sources: DfID, 2005; Dollar and Levin, 2005; Foreign Policy July/August 2005. Challenging the discourse on fragile states 91
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causal elements of what drives the states status. Additionally, the measure intrinsically comprises initial conditions in the previously mentioned inequality. With the fragility index, capacity and resilience are structural characteristics of the state. None the less, pains have been taken in the Failed States index to target both states that are visibly approaching violent internal conict and those that are at varying levels of vulnerability. There is the acknowledgement that state collapse may be sudden or involve
the steady deterioration of social political and economic institutions. Sixty-ve per cent of the countries on the Failed States Index appear on the Very Fragile States list.7 Of these 70 per cent are either in the critical or in danger categories of the Failed States Index.
The model: a basic explanation

The states ability is seen as being dened by its resilience and capacity, which together determine both the nature and the extent of its fragility. Initial or structural conditions are also considered as these have a strong impact on the development and security outcomes. Social services delivery and economic management measure capacity, and resilience is measured by voice, accountability and political freedom. Initial conditions are measured by the following variables: per capita income; inequality; debt/GDP; infant mortality; malnutrition; primary product dominance and landlockedness. The logic of the state fragility model sees capacity and resilience as antecedents to the security and development, where capacity is needed to achieve development and resilience is needed to mediate conicting interests and achieve security.8 Hence, decits in capacity or resilience threaten the states stability by threatening its security or development. The model is rooted in Hirschmans Exit, Voice and Loyalty trilogy. It views violence as an extreme form of exit and voice (a key characteristic of resilience) as its antidote. The democratic glue facilitates dialogue about resource allocation and allows peaceful resolution of disputes. Grievances (and incentives to resort to the exit option) intensify when state capacity to deliver services in a competent and fair fashion is absent. The discontent may escalate and culminate in violence when the voice option is not activated, e.g. due to lack of resilience or wholesale capture of the state. In this scheme, loyalty is presented as a restraint on exit that activates the voice option and depends on the identication of the citizen with the representatives of the state (e.g. as a by-product of nationalism or ethnic identication). With a breakdown in resilience, a relatively healthy
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level of state capacity may not be sufcient to prevent violence if the citizens can no longer identify with the state and respond to a performance shortfall or an exogenous shortfall by relying on the voice option.9 Another important factor that introduces a different aspect to the logic of resilience is strong and charismatic leadership. Other things being equal, a common language, a distinctive culture and national symbols can strengthen a sense of identity and contribute to loyalty and preserve state stability (at least for some time)
despite performance set backs as in Post Independent Sub-Saharan Africa, Communist China and the former Soviet Union. Capacity and resilience are interlinked. However, they are also subject to different dynamics and tension exists between the two characteristics. Capacity is largely about economics and resilience is largely about politics. The interaction takes place in the society that denes the internal dynamics given cultural and institutional factors. The implied hypothesis of the model is that capacity is strongly linked to development outcomes and resilience is strongly linked to security outcomes. This is conrmed by the high proportion of low capacity states with low development levels at 64 per cent and the even higher proportion of low resilience states with low security levels at 79 per cent. This means that the least fragile states will therefore be strong on both capacity and resilience and exhibit the highest development and security outcomes, whereas the most fragile states will have the worst capacity and resilience levels and consequently the poorest development and security outcomes.
Characteristics of fragile states

In applying the state fragility model to the low-income and middle-income groups of countries as dened by the World Bank, the result has posited three typologies of fragility that will be addressed in this section of the paper. The characteristics of these various categories, in terms of the coincidence of poverty and conict, the number of people and the prevalent regions will be examined.
Fragility typology
This research has resulted in three rankings of fragile states that are as follows: not fragile (NF), very fragile (VF) and somewhat fragile (SF). The not fragile group of states refers to
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states that are strong on both capacity and resilience whereas the very fragile states are weak on both capacity and resilience. The somewhat fragile states are either capacity fragile10 or resilience fragile.11 The added categorisation on this point is useful in better addressing the particularity of the fragility and thus positing more efcient rules of engagement. Of the 11412 middle income and low-income countries being assessed, the very fragile states constitute 44 per cent; the somewhat fragile states constitute another 44
per cent; and the not fragile states constitute only 12 per cent. There is, however, a need to avoid a stied and dogmatic approach in favour of a dynamic and adaptable one, because of the dynamic nature of fragility that is widely accepted.13
What do fragile states look like?

This papers contention is based on the coincidence of particular levels of state capacity and state resilience. What are the implications for human security (conict and poverty) of low state capacity and resilience; low state capacity and high state resilience; high state capacity and low state resilience; high state capacity and high state resilience? The relevance of the state fragility discourse is best identied in its empirical realities, where policy oriented research can then be justied as facilitating a real response to a real problem. The very fragile states constitute 1,372.6 million and 21 per cent of the worlds population of which at 773.9 million, 56 per cent are also among the poorest and insecure. They also receive the lowest per capita aid allocation at US $33. The somewhat fragile states have 3,163.1 million people of which China and India make up 2,344.4 million. The resilience fragile states are most represented among the country group with low security and medium poverty levels at 33 per cent. Alternatively, the capacity fragile states are most represented in both the country groups with high poverty and low security and high poverty and high security. This reinforces the importance of identifying the type of fragility to better ascertain the appropriate responses. No countries on the list have both low poverty levels and high insecurity levels, although 16 per cent of the countries have low insecurity and high poverty levels. This leans to the suggestion of greater susceptibility of conict encouraging poverty than of the alternative at the margins. It is important to note that although this is indicative of an underlying relationship pattern between conict and poverty, it is at this point a mere leaning and can only be better understood with more in-depth research.
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The not fragile states have poverty and security levels that range from medium to high in both instances. However, the richest and most secure states have a high representation of capacity fragile states which rather implies that low resilience levels may be more detrimental than low capacity levels on the boundaries, following the conict to poverty ` dynamic vis-a-vis the poverty to conict dynamic mentioned earlier. The resilience fragile states have a total population of 586.6 million sans China as compared to the capacity
fragile states total of 228.1 million sans India. This poses a great challenge in the face of the earlier intimation of the greater threat posed by the resilience fragile states relative to the capacity fragile states. The most fragile states are most represented by the Sub-Saharan African countries at 56 per cent. The second largest group constitutes the Middle Eastern and North African countries at 13 per cent alongside Asia also at 13 per cent. The next group is of the Eastern European countries, which constitutes 10 per cent and the smallest group is of Central, South America and the West Indies at 8 per cent. The most fragile countries are also overwhelmingly primary goods producers and exporters, and the countries that import and export the most tend to be the mineral resource producers such as Angola and Nigeria. Alternatively, the single biggest trader is a largely manufacturing goods exporter, Swaziland. The smallest traders are the countries that are some of the poorest and most insecure, including Congo Dem Rep., Central African Republic, Burundi and Sudan. See Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for data on the Very Fragile states. The capacity fragile states again are most represented by Sub-Saharan African countries at 60 per cent, followed by Central, South America and the West Indies at 20 per cent and the Asian countries at 20 per cent. With the resilient fragile countries, the largest group are the Eastern European and Newly Independent States of the Soviet Union at 32 per cent. Asian countries follow at 19.5 per cent as do Central, South America and the West Indies at 19.5 per cent. The Sub-Saharan African countries are at 16 per cent and the North African and Middle Eastern States are the smallest group at 13 per cent. This is a particularly varied group and is indicative of the especially prolic nature of non-resilience, insecurity and therefore fragility. Although, the numbers for both country groups are similar there are some poignant contrasts. On average, the imports of goods and services are similar for both somewhat fragile groups. However, the exports of goods and services are more for the resilience fragile states. Furthermore, the primary product exports for the capacity fragile states exceed those for the resilience fragile states, whereas the manufacturing product exports for the latter exceeds that of the former.
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Eka Ikpe An important related factor is that 53 per cent of the resilience fragile group are
middle-income group whereas 45 per cent of the capacity fragile group are middleincome countries, which are interestingly concentrated in Africa and Central/South America and the West Indies. As expected, the resilience fragile countries on average receive less per capita aid that their capacity fragile counterparts at US $48 compared with US $54. Given the possibility of relatively more severe problem of the impact of
weak resilience to fragility and security as was indicated earlier, more analysis of these countries will be especially pertinent for addressing proneness to conict and therefore abating low security outcomes. Please see Tables A2.2 and A2.3 for the data on Capacity and Resilience Fragile states.
Middle-income fragile states and low-income fragile states, different?

The literature on fragile states has overwhelmingly focussed on low-income states. However, in isolating initial conditions and the development and security outcomes, a truer picture as to the extent of state fragility emerges. The majority of fragile states are indeed low-income, but the middle-income states make up 24 per cent of the total. This is a substantial proportion to warrant addressing the vulnerability of middle-income countries in this group. The majority of these very fragile middle-income countries are in Africa and the Middle East at 66 per cent. The especially signicant ndings arise in the somewhat fragile states, where the resilience fragile states overwhelmingly consists of middle-income countries at 90 per cent as compared with the capacity fragile states at 45 per cent. This indicates some difference as to the characteristics of state fragility depending on income levels especially with somewhat fragile states. This is as would be expected, as income levels are mainly because of capacity levels, where middle-income countries would clearly perform better. The low-income countries do remain in the worst conditions, as they tend to have the less favourable initial conditions as well as the poorer outcomes. The majority of the poorest and insecure in this collective group of the most fragile remains the low-income countries. It is certainly not a myth that the majority of the most fragile countries are indeed low income as they have the lowest capacity levels coupled with the lowest resilience levels, putting them at risk of both high poverty and insecurity.
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Looking at Table A2.1, manufacturing exports are higher for the middle-income countries than for the low-income countries at 38 per cent to 28 per cent respectively, within the very fragile states. With the capacity fragile states, low-income countries are again in the minority at 27 per cent to the middle income countries 59 per cent as with the resilience fragile states at 49 per cent. Exports as a proportion of GDP are also higher for the middle-income countries for both the capacity and resilient fragile
states at 39 per cent and 44 per cent compared to the low-income countries 26 per cent and 21 per cent respectively. For the very fragile states, the disparity is lower at 43 per cent for the middle-income countries and 31 per cent for the low-income countries.
Fragility, development and security

Fragility is intended to provide insight to the development and security levels experienced by a country. In other words, causality is seen as stemming from state fragility to the development and security outcomes. It is of course probable that the level of state fragility is reinforced by the outcomes on the ground as low development levels make it more difcult to invest in strengthening capacity levels as a result of nancial limitations, for instance. Likewise, low resilience is further threatened by violent conict where the citizens are unable to exercise voice and therefore decide on exiting in the most extreme mode of violence. In this analysis, the very fragile states have the largest proportion of low development and security countries at 65 per cent and 82 per cent respectively. For the somewhat fragile states, the gures are also dire, at 58 per cent low development and 52 per cent low security respectively. Interestingly, in unpacking the somewhat fragile states the resilience fragile states are more likely to achieve high development than the capacity fragile states at 45 per cent to 38 per cent respectively. Alternatively, capacity fragile states are more likely to achieve high security than the resilience fragile states at 67 per cent and 35 per cent respectively. An additional interesting factor is that capacity levels do not appear to matter as much for development as resilience factors do for security. Any stringent claims in this regard will be best conrmed by more extensive and specialised research into the linkages in a particular relationship between development, security and state fragility, such as is possible in a country case study.
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Why is looking at only fragility insufcient to explain outcomes?

In order to proffer policy recommendations to address less than favourable outcomes it is necessary to identify the key factors that are responsible. Although state fragility is at the core of the factors that will most affect outcomes, there are exogenous14 factors that also heavily affect development and security. One of the most inuential is the state of the international community, especially with the increasingly globalised world. The
international working of the global economy progressively means that international politics can also be an important factor in determining outcomes. It may be argued that the US/UK coalitions engagement with Iraq in 2003/04 has affected security outcomes more so than the level of the states fragility. From this experience with the breakdown of the state, although it began as resilience fragile, some degree of coercion-restrained violence and to some degree loyalty in the customs, rules and social protocols perhaps emanating from a largely Islamic state appear to have held it together. The external intervention may have improved state resilience in the recent elections, but has worsened the security outcome, state capacity and therefore the development outcomes. This is of course an extreme example, but none the less an example of where state fragility may not have been the initial basis for troubled security and development outcomes. Even in this instance, building state capacity has rightly become the focus15 with the understanding that it will impact security outcomes by improving development outcomes.16 Another factor that has been seminally addressed with regard to inuencing states performance in Picciotto et al.17 in spite of being well overdue18 is the role of initial conditions. They inuence development and security outcomes, and they are not subject to state performance.19 From Table 2, is clear that the less favourable the initial conditions the lower the development and security outcomes and the more favourable initial conditions are, the more favourable the development and security outcomes. Sixty-eight per cent of countries with unfavourable initial conditions deliver poor development outcomes and again 68 per cent of them are insecure. Clearly, initial conditions are very relevant for both development and security outcomes. Here one sees the problem with the CPIA measurement in its failure to isolate the initial conditions as it includes debt in its economic management ratings and inequality in its social inclusion ratings.20 Separating out initial conditions enables the focus to be placed where there can be benecial change by identifying where state performance can bring
Challenging the discourse on fragile states Table 2. Initial conditions, security and development High development No. (%) Favourable initial conditions (44) Unfavourable initial conditions (70) Total (114) 26 (59) Low development No. (%) 18 (41) High security No. (%) 17 (39)
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Low security No. (%) 27 (61)
22 (32)
48 (68)
22 (32)
48 (68)
about change and where the problems are subject to more factors than the state performance such as geographical conditions, colonisation, disease epidemics and international markets activity. However, it is notable that the less fragile a state, the better it will be able to manage poor initial conditions.
State fragility and poverty

State fragility exceeds the boundaries it is attributed by the focus on poverty. Collier and Dollar noted the relevance of conict situations to aid allocation with regard to its impact on poverty but conceded difculty in its inclusion in aid allocation assessment due to a poor theoretical base.21 The absence of middle-income states in the state fragility discourse is also because of the overwhelming emphasis on poverty. The issue at hand is that the state is responsible for the welfare of its populace and this comprises both poverty reduction and strengthening security. There is a relationship between poverty and conict, where they reinforce one another and causality is highly complex and can therefore not be generalised. This is evident in the high coincidence of poverty and conict among the most fragile states. However, as has already been noted, less fragile states may have acceptable development levels coexisting with low security outcomes. In these situations, poverty is unlikely to feature substantially, although with the outbreak of conict remains a salient concern. An additional and very pertinent factor is the limited collaboration between development and security discourse on poverty and conict within the same context.22 This state fragility model is not premised upon poverty with conict treated as an appendage, but rather
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emphasises the importance of both in their own right. Poverty alone draws the discussion to looking at measures that mostly address development. As a result, security outcomes are sidelined, even though human welfare, therefore, is threatened.
State fragility and the millennium development goals

Pro-poor development has become the acceptable mandate for many of the poorest countries in the world, a number of which are very fragile states as has already been mentioned. The MDGs are, therefore, most relevant to any attempt to tackle state fragility and improve human security levels. They also constitute the most difcult and necessary environments in which to achieve the goals, as Ko Annan stated that Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other . . . . Accordingly we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development . . . .23 Thus, a vital crisis-MDG nexus has been insufciently examined, in spite of its acknowledgement. Poor outcomes on the MDGs can exacerbate conict situations and conversely, countries at some level of achievement on the MDGs are less susceptible to conict. The path to achieving these MDGs is relevant to whether or not the process will reduce the chances of conict as complex and interlinking factors that can push progress such as governance reform, rule of law and human rights are vital for state resilience. Furthermore, the progress on MDGs that are especially linked to initial conditions such as malnutrition, infant mortality, and debt levels will positively inuence development and security outcomes. The reverse implications of conict on the progress on the MDGs is clearer and sharper, with crises slowing down and often reversing hard won gains.24 One may observe the reinforcing impact of capacity on resilience with regard to state fragility. In this framework, the MDG indicators comprise of both initial conditions and capacity as the former includes malnutrition, infant mortality, and debt levels, whereas the latter deals with literacy rates and health service delivery. Our conclusion has been that countries with low initial conditions tend also to be fragile. Our very fragile list, which implies low capacity levels, has 73 per cent of which have low initial conditions. This shows that the MDGs are closely associated with one another so that improvements in some will likely be coincidental with improvements in others.25 Among our most fragile states, the status of the progress on the millennium goals is similar to the PRDE report on the progress in DfIDs fragile state list in 2000, except in
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the instance of the Malaria Death Rate (Table 3).26 Although the data is largely awed, poverty levels remain the best indicator that MDG 1 is very much threatened by the situation in fragile states. On average approximately 28 per cent of the countries that are fragile states are undernourished, which is reportedly twice as high as in other developing countries.27 Progress on this has been notably slow in all developing countries.28 MDG 2 of primary education enrolment is also not on schedule at 74 per
cent in fragile states. A three-fold improvement is needed as compared to the other developing countries.29 Universal Primary education is also a vital minimum as completion rates are unlikely to be as high as enrolment rates. For MDG 3 the elimination of gender disparity by 2015 seems distant as it is currently only at 0.84. Although improvements have been reported in the difcult environments, simply sustaining this as the status quo will be insufcient for achieving the target.30 MDG 4 and MDG 5 of reducing the child and maternal mortality rates are very much behind the 2015 targets particularly in the fragile states at 116 per 1,000 and 604 per 100,000 births respectively. At the current improvement rates the child mortality target of 26 per 1,000 seems implausible given the high fragile states and difcult environments average. For MDG 6 the Very Fragile states have about 78 per cent of those living with HIV in the developing world. The malarial death rate is even higher than the Difcult Environment estimate as has been previously mentioned. It is very much related to MDG 7 of maintaining environmental sustainability, as it is a vector borne disease. This has not faired better due to poor progress in meeting the necessary challenge for achieving this goal of increasing the number of people with access to safe water.31 They are overwhelmingly concentrated in these fragile states at 33 per cent. As the MDGs are directly targeted at the development outcomes in the primary aim of tackling poverty, the UNDP also address possible means of dealing with negative security outcomes by presenting a forum for political and social dialogue, thus building resilience. This will be addressed later in the section. Additionally, UNDP posits that MDGs will be best served when adapted to local conditions, so that in conict settings it is essential that the right entry point to plugging in to the MDGs be sought. The pursuit of the Goals should always be a means of reducing difculty and not its source. Factors that may help to determine the path of MDGs achievement to adopt include the typology and duration of the crisis as well as the paths to development and governance structures that can determine the best response on the MDGs to ease the situation.
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Eka Ikpe Table 3. MDG progress in difcult environments and very fragile states Very fragile states 468 million 28% 74% 0.84 116 604 26.4 million 6678 33% Difcult environments 343 million 33% 70% 0.84 138 734 17.1 million 90 38%
MDGs Number of people living on less than US $1 a day Proportion of undernourished Primary education enrolment Primary education female:male enrolment Ratio Child mortality rate per 1000 Maternal mortality per 100,000 Number of people living with HIV/AIDS Malaria death rate per 100,000 % of population without access to safe water
Source: PRDE (2004) and Human Development Indicators 2004. The challenges of achieving the MDGs in these countries are in that the weak capacity levels of the states greatly diminish the opportunities for progress. Furthermore, because these difcult environments make up about 14 per cent of the world population32 and our most fragile states list make up about 21 per cent it is evident that immense developments must be pursued for any progress overall. Additionally, a number of factors make engagement especially difcult in these states. These include poor state capacity and hence administration capability as well as poor security levels, which impinge on personal security of the staff. These states also have weak resilience levels that can be indicative of severe legitimacy and governance problems, and that tend to put off meaningful donor engagements with the state in favour of engaging with non-state actors.33 This will often serve to undermine the long-term objective of rebuilding state capacity.34 These challenges have meant that this group of countries has remained largely neglected. However, there is a rising consensus that neglect is not a viable option but rather developing a new means of engagement. This consensus is based upon the mood of contemporary global economic and political arena brought about by eventualities. These include the drive for the MDGs in the ght against poverty; the acknowledgement of the failure of conditionalities; the fear of disease spread and the perceived post 9/11 security threats.35 If the MDGs are to be achieved, it is necessary to address them with reference to the particular outcomes of fragility that are encountered. UNDP has a guide that focuses on how to use the Millennium Declaration in these complex settings; when to use trade offs such as when to raise the MDGs and when it may be best to be less vocal about them as well as other
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means of effective communication.36 This is discussed as follows; the Millennium Declaration provides a useful tool for advocacy as along with the MDGs they address clear-cut targets within specic time frames and present a sense of urgency to addressing the development challenges. Although the provision for security outcomes and state resilience is limited within the MDGs, the Millennium Declaration details a commitment to peace, security and human rights. The Declaration along with the MDGs can directly impact resilience by providing a
means through which the state apparatus may be held to account by its populace. Additionally, resilience may be strengthened by consensus and coalition building as well as the provision of information to the public that can result from an efcient national dialogue about local and national needs and priorities. The focus on the targets and indicators associated with the MDGs also drive capacity building in the concerned sectors at least initially, with regard to budgeting, prioritising policy action and resources, coordination of related activities, monitoring and statistical analysis. The MDGs can also provide a framework within which to position external support in alignment with ongoing domestic progress for the most efcient outcomes.
Aid allocation in fragile states

Until recently, aid allocation to the developing world was being steered by their policy status, whereby countries conceived as having poor policies and capacity levels were receiving less aid.37 Furthermore, where slight concessions are being made to this stance, the additional factor that is considered is the poverty level in the country. As has been discussed so far, state fragility improves on this progress in that, it considers both capacity and resilience levels. As a result, aid allocation based on state fragility takes a holistic approach in aiming to address development and security outcomes, thus tackling poverty and conict. The additional dimension, being proposed here is also cognisant of initial conditions, and so goes even further in addressing the dynamics of factors that the state may not be directly responsible for.
Aid allocation and poverty: a step forward, but not far enough
DfIDs approach to aid in difcult environments is to be guided by improving human development outcomes for poor and vulnerable people; Building pro-poor, government
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led systems.38 This clearly targets human development in focussing on poverty. Collier and Dollars work on poverty efcient aid allocation also focuses on poverty levels as guidance on aid allocation, albeit with a continued focus on policy efciency so that the poorest with the best policies are to be the highest aid recipients.39 As is to be expected, the poorest of the poor countries do not have the best policy efciency levels and hence remain receiving the least aid. Both allocation systems barely consider middle-income countries,
which is also largely a consequence of the poverty alleviation drive. It has been widely established that there is a clear link between poverty and conict although the argument is skewed to the effect of the latter on the former.40 However, it fails to address the issue of human security, so that there is certainly a movement in the discourse about the greater need for human security but practical measures to achieving this are not likewise pursued. When conict is considered if at all, it is in its effect on poverty and therefore implies looking at conict only after it has occurred. With conict and conict susceptibility as an integral part of the consideration for aid allocation, the goal is increasingly of human security as well as human development. State fragility would be a vital component of the process and, thus, serving the status of the state and identifying those at or near the threshold of the risk of state failure.
Aid allocation: the emerging consensus on aid in fragile states

As mentioned earlier, state fragility is a core element of the level of instability that could ensue, thus raising a countrys level of shock proneness. Aid can, therefore, be an external stabilising factor to supporting country capacity and resilience.41 Collier and Dollar also note that although research on aid allocation in vulnerable environments is in its infancy, results have suggested that shocks need to be taken into account.42 A more systematic approach will have to be developed given the hitherto ad hoc system of donor engagement that has been in place in conict societies. Guillaumont and Chauvet report that aid especially raises the growth rate in countries that are most susceptible to shocks, as aid provides a bolster for government revenue, which is likely to be adversely affected.43 Particularly relevant for low capacity levels, this would necessitate a focus on counter cyclical budget support to cover non-deferrable recurrent expenditure.44 This is notably pertinent for the pursuit of the MDGs in support to the vulnerable health and education departments. Indeed, Collier and Dollar
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acknowledge the need for aid allocation to take on an enlarged spectrum of consideration in addressing security outcomes in addition to the previous focus on poverty.45 In Collier and Hoefer, and Collier et al., aid is found to reduce the risk of conict, particularly through economic variables, and therefore, the capacity element of fragility.46 The best identiable mode of addressing aid with respect to resilience is examining its impact on Security Sector Transformation or Reform. The security sector comprises an
array of institutions including the security forces, justice and law enforcement organisations as well as civil management and oversight bodies. Fragile states with serious governance decits may require a fundamental transformation of relations between the civil authorities and civil society on the one hand and the security forces on the other hand in order to provide stable environments for sustainable development.47 Also in some less resilience fragile states, the reform of these institutions is an essential process of effecting change in the way the security establishment is governed.48 It also addresses a range of resilience levels as it tackles both post conict and non-post conict countries via peace building efforts. The oft-employed ad hoc approach of aid to fragile states has led to an overwhelming dominance of humanitarian aid within difcult environments. The largest aid instrument by DFID in the LICUS was humanitarian aid at 34 per cent as opposed to 11 per cent in non-LICUS.49 This has been notably because of a bid to tackle disasters that have already occurred and to bypass the states.50 The concern with humanitarian aid is that it may be at odds with longer-term developmental goals.51 In bypassing government structures, humanitarian aid may fail to address fragility in itself, as it does not deal with capacity.
Fragility and initial conditions efcient (FICE) aid allocation

State fragility based aid allocation addresses the specicity and extent of fragility in the relevant countries. Additionally, it takes into account the initial conditions in these countries so as not to penalise states for factors beyond their control. This allows for useful distinctions within this group of countries that is often treated as homogeneous. The expectation is that more aid is allocated to the countries with the more fragile states. This analysis is based on a simple relationship between aid and state fragility and initial conditions, controlled for the basic country characteristics of population and income and
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focuses on aid volumes specically. Its ethos mirrors that of Collier and Dollar, in that aid is scarce, donor agencies have a responsibility to use it as effectively as possible to reduce poverty with the additional aim of improving security outcomes.52 However, it is not intended to limit donor engagement but rather serve as a guide for structured aid allocation to inuence not only development but also security, as donors quite often have more country specic information and pre-existing relationship patterns.
According to McGillivary and White, a good pattern of aid allocation must be primarily in proportion to its need, in any given country.53 This is the case in this model where this need is dened by fragility levels. In McGillivary, the Collier and Dollar, McGillivray and White and Llavador and Roemer models are examined along with the resulting aid allocation levels.54 They are largely found to allocate less aid than the actual aid allocations, even though some countries, including Honduras, Lesotho and Uganda55 as well as Ethiopia, India, Nigeria and Pakistan56 do receive more. It is important also to acknowledge that research on the subject is very young and emerging.57 Likewise with the fragility efciency allocation model, some countries receive less aid than would otherwise be the preferred case; however, the most fragile states receive more total aid under the system than their actual allocation. The particular innovation with a fragility-based system is that the countries being addressed have very low capacity and are therefore what is widely termed poor policy countries. As was discussed earlier aid allocation has generally favoured the countries with the best policies because of the implication that these countries have the best absorptive capacity levels. As Chauvet and Collier rightly note, aid can be an effective component for building capacity both directly and indirectly.58 When it is efciently channelled, it can enable long term planning as opposed to crisis management, as is the forte of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, these vulnerable countries require particular consistency and commitment in aid ows not least of all, in light of their lagging performance on the MDGs as well as their aid dependence.59 Security Sector Transformation or Reform necessarily aims to address consistent and long-term break down of governance in fragile states. Therefore, it is a complex process as a fundamental shift in the way security is conceived and a resolute pursuit of an inclusive governance agenda is necessary to transform these countries into stable and secure environments, where development can thrive.60 The intricate steps that the process entails will require a strategic and systematic funding procedure given the particularly unstable environments involved.
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Findings
In this analysis, actual aid allocations are compared to fragility and initial conditions efcient (FICE) allocations for the very fragile states that constitute the priority group in this assessment as well as the LICUS. The central goal is reducing state fragility by strengthening capacity and resilience. Therefore, allocation here should have the largest impact on fragility reduction. The allocation does not use policy as criteria for aid allocation as this marginalises
the most fragile states, which will also tend to have the lowest levels of policy performance. Although better policy is important to raise growth levels and best utilise investment, cutting aid allocation to these countries is unlikely to enable a means of improvement. Our ndings conrm that the FICE allocation allocates a substantially higher proportion of total aid to the most fragile states than the actual ODA aid allocation. The total actual ODA allocation to the very fragile states in 2002 was US $19,244.5 m compared to the FICE aid allocation of US $22,148.7 m. The differences in the two sets of allocations have been both in increases to certain countries and decreases to others. Figure 1 illustrates the differences and highlights greater consistency in accordance to fragility and initial conditions, which has given rise to the higher aid volumes than the Actual ODA allocation. Aid darlings like the militarily strategic countries including Egypt and Pakistan, receive substantial actual allocations, which are decreased under the FICE allocations, as they are not deemed the most fragile of the group. This is an interesting picture given that both these countries are not formally democracies and it points to the fact that formal democratic governments need not necessarily heighten resilience. Additionally the aid darlings so called because of their stronger policy performance are allocated less under the fragility efcient mechanism and include Ethiopia and Uganda. The smaller states that are also prone to being aid orphans, such as Comoros, Equatorial Guinea and Gambia, on account of their size are some of the largest gainers under the FICE allocations.61 Additional aid orphans include non-post conict countries such as Central African Republic, Chad, Haiti, Lao PDR, Sudan and Guinea which have had their allocation increased under the FICE allocations.62 Even though the post-conict countries such as Sierra Leone and Rwanda are considered aid darlings,63 the FICE allocation leaves allocation a little higher than actual levels as these countries are amidst attempts to rebuild shattered livelihoods and are concurrently at the greatest risk of relapse into conict.
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Figure 1. Fragility and initial conditions efcient and ODA allocation to VF states. Source: Human Development Report 2004.
The newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also largely recipients of higher allocations under the FICE measure. This may be attributed to the fact that they are on the brink with very fragile states, largely at the mercy of low resilience levels as the recent64 revolutionary movements have indicated. As the measure is devoid of political considerations it allocates higher aid volumes to the Arab states including Iran, Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia on the basis of fragility and initial conditions. See Table A2.5 for data on FICE aid allocation as compared to actual aid allocation for the very fragile states. It is again clearly necessary that political considerations be taken into account, hence, the earlier caveat that this analysis represents a guide that is only useful when used with the specic information available about particular countries. The allocation system is strengthened in a consistent higher allocation for the Banks own LICUS, where they are actually allocated US $6773.9 m as compared with US $9919 m under the FICE allocation system. As for the Very Fragile States in Figure 2, we see a more consistent FICE aid allocation leading to higher aid disbursements than the Actual ODA allocation. See Table A2.5 for data on FICE Aid Allocation as compared to Actual Aid Allocation for LICUS. It is important to note that the end suggestion is not that these gures are the most appropriate. Clearly countries like Congo Dem Rep. and Congo require substantial increases in aid allocation but suffer decreases in the FICE allocation mechanism because they are competing with some countries that are worse off and/or have been hitherto marginalised by the system as well as having comparatively more favourable initial conditions. Likewise, larger countries including Bangladesh and Indonesia have suffered slight decreases to their allocation under the FICE allocation. Based on the desperate connes of current aid volumes, there is the need for a push for a substantial increase in their levels all round.
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Figure 2. Fragility and initial conditions efcient and ODA allocation to LICUS. Source: Human Development Report 2004
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Professor Picciotto and Howard Mollett for valuable comments.
Endnotes
1. Donovan et al., Countries at Risk of Instability. 2. Ibid. 3. Chauvet and Collier, Development Effectiveness in Fragile States; World Bank, World Bank Group Work. 4. Dollar and Levin, The Forgotten States. 5. Ibid. 6. Alexander, Judge and Jury. 7. Save the accepted very fragile states that were not included in the Fragility Index computation namely Afghanistan, Liberia, Iraq, North Korea and Somalia. 8. Picciotto et al., Striking a New Balance. 9. Ibid. 10. Capacity Fragile refers to a state that is very weak in capacity but strong in resilience. 11. Resilience Fragile refers to a state that is very weak in resilience but strong in capacity. 12. The countries in the World Bank low and middle income categories for which published data on all the variables being used are available. 13. World Bank, World Bank Group Work; DfID, Why we need to work more effectively 14. From the States construct. 15. Commercial legislation is focussing on developing state institutional capacity. Available at: http://www.imnsr. com/DisplayNewsEn.aspx?id 4914 (accessed on 13 May 2005). 16. Scott Castle, the General Counsel to the Coalition Provisional Authority justied the Coalitions economic endeavours in Iraq based on the premise that Theres a close nexus between the economic health of Iraq and the security of Iraq. Free Market Iraq? Not so Fast by Daphne Eviatar, New York Times, 10 January 2004. 17. Picciotto et al., Striking a New Balance. 18. Alexander, Judge and Jury. 19. At least initially. 20. Alexander, Judge and Jury. 21. Collier and Dollar, Development Effectiveness. 22. Goodhand, Violent Conict. 23. UN Report, In Larger Freedom, March 2005. 24. UNDP, MGDs in Crisis. 25. HLFHM, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 26. Moreno-Torres and Anderson, Fragile States. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. HLFHM, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. UNDP, MGDs in Crisis; Millennium Declaration. Available at: http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm (accessed on 15 April 2005). 37. Merlin, Service Delivery in Difcult Environments. 38. Ibid. 39. Collier and Dollar, Development Effectiveness. 40. Goodhand, Violent Conict. 41. Donovan et al., Countries at Risk of Instability.
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ESAU Working Paper 2. Overseas Development Institute, London. Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2000. Security Sector Reform. Brief 15, Bonn. Chalmers, Malcolm, 2000. Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective. Saferworld, London. Chauvet, L. and Collier, P., 2004. Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds. Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University. Collier, P. and Dollar, D., 2002. Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction. European Economic Review 26 (6), pp. 1475 1500. Collier, P. and Dollar, D., 2004. Development Effectiveness: What have we learnt?. The Economic Journal 114 (496), pp. 244 271. Collier, P. and Hoefer, A., 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers Oxford, Oxford University Press. Collier, P., Elliot, L., Heger, H., Hoefer, A., Reynal-Querol, M. and Sambanis, N., 2003. Breaking the Conict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Oxford University Press and the World Bank, Washington DC and New York. DfID, 2005. Why we need to work more effectively with fragile states. Department for International Development, London: UK. Available at:.http://www.dd.gov.uk/pubs/ les/fragilestates-paper.pdf (accessed on 18 February 2005). DfID, 2000. Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: High Risks for Donors, High Returns for Development. Report on an International Symposium, Department for International Development, London. Dollar, D. and Levin, D., 2005. The Forgotten States: Aid Volumes and Volatility In Difcult Partnership Countries (1992 2002), For DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difcult Partnerships. Donovan, Nick, Smart, Malcolm, Moreno-Torres, Magui, Ole
42. Collier and Dollar, Development Effectiveness. 43. Guillaumont and Chauvet, Aid and Performance. 44. Collier and Dollar, Development Effectiveness. 45. Ibid. 46. Collier and Hoefer, Greed and Grievance in Civil War; Collier et al., Breaking the Conict Trap. 47. Olonisakin, HIV/AIDS. 48. For example, see Hendrickson and Karkoszka, The Challenges of Security Sector Reform; Armaments,
Disarmament, and International Security; Hendrickson et al., Security Sector Reform and Development Cooperation; DfID, Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure; Bonn International Center for Conversion, Security Sector Reform; Chalmers, Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries; and Ball, Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform. 49. Merlin, Service Delivery in Difcult Environments. 50. Ibid. 51. Moreno-Torres and Anderson, Fragile States. 52. Collier and Dollar, Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction. 53. McGillivary and White, Development Criteria. 54. McGillivary, Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses; Collier and Dollar, Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction; McGillivray and White, Development Criteria; Llavador and Roemer, An Equal Opportunity Approach. 55. Collier and Dollar, Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction. 56. McGillivary and White, Development Criteria. 57. McGillivary, Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses. 58. Chauvet and Collier, Development Effectiveness in Fragile States. 59. Dollar and Levin, The Forgotten States. 60. Olonisakin, HIV/AIDS. 61. Dollar and Levin, The Forgotten States. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. 2005.
References
Alexander, N., 2004. Judge and Jury: The World Banks Score card for borrowing governments, Citizens Network on Essential Service 2004. Available at: http://www. servicesforall.org/html/otherpubs/judge_jury_scorecard. pdf (accessed on 18 March 2005). Ball, Nicole, 1998. Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government. Saferworld, London. Beynon, J., 2003. Poverty Efcient aid Allocations- Collier/Dollar Revisited, Economic and Statistics Analysis Unit.
Kiso, Jan, Zachariah, George, (2005) Countries at Risk of Instability: Risk Factors and Dynamics of Instability. Prime Ministers Strategy Unit Background Paper. Foreign Policy, 2005. The Failed States Index Foreign Policy, July/August. Goodhand, J., 2001. Violent Conict, Poverty and Chronic Poverty. CPCR Working Paper No. 6, Manchester and Birmingham. Guillaumont, P. and Chauvet, L., 2001. Aid and Performance: A reassessment. Journal of Development Studies 37(6), pp. 66 92. Hendrickson, Dylan and Karkoszka, Andrzej, 2002. The Challenges of Security Sector Reform, Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2002, pp. 175 201. Hendrickson, Dylan and Karkoszka, Andrzej, 2002. Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Hendrickson, Dylan et al., 2000. Security Sector Reform and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence. Report to the OECD/DAC, Paris.
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Moreno-Torres, M. and Anderson, M., 2004. Fragile States: Dening Difcult Environments for Poverty Reduction. Working paper by Poverty Reduction in Difcult Environments Team, Department For International Development, London, UK. Olonisakin, F., 2005. HIV/AIDS and the Challenges of Peacebuilding & Security Sector Governance in West Africa: A Research Agenda. Conict Security and Development Group, Kings College, London. Picciotto, R., Alao, C., Ikpe, E., Kimani, M., Slade, R. 2005. Striking a New Balance, Donor Policy Coherence and Development Co-operation in Difcult Environments Background Paper commissioned by the Learning Advisory Process on Difcult Partnerships for the Development Assistance Committee for the OECE, London. UN Report of the Secretary General, 205, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Freedom and Human Rights for All. September 2005, United Nations, New York. UNDP, 2005. MDGs in Crisis: A UNDP Discussion Paper on the Nexus between Conict, Crisis and MDGs. UNDP, New York. World Bank, 2002 World Bank Group Work in Low Income Countries Under Stress: A Taskforce Report, World Bank. Available at: http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/ licus/documents/licus.pdf (accessed on 16 September 2004).
High Level Forum on Health MDGs, 2004. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Fragile States. Abuja World Health Organisation and World Bank, Washington DC. Llavador, H.G. and Roemer, J.E., 2001. An Equal Opportunity Approach to the Allocation of International Aid. Journal of Development Economics 64 (1), pp. 147 171. McGillivary, M., 2003. Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses of Aid Allocation, Approaches, Issues and Consequences. United Nation University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki. McGillivary, M. and White, H., 1994. Development Criteria for the Allocation and Aid and Assessment of Donor Performance, CREDIT Research Paper No. 94/7, University of Nottingham, Nottingham. Merlin, UK, 2005. Service Delivery in Difcult Environments: Transferable Approaches from the Humanitarian Community, Draft Paper, March.
APPENDIX 1 Data denitions and sources Security Degree of ConictsIntensity and Frequency in 2003 Conict Barometer 2003, 12th Annual Conict Analysis, 2nd Revised Edition Heidelberg Institute on International Conict Research (HIIK) Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, http://www.hiik.de/en/barometer2003/index.htm
Conicts with Armed Conict 1989 2002 Uppsala Conict Database (14/12/04) http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php
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Wars in Low Income countries, 1998 2003 On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security: A Report of the Commission for Weak States and US National Security. Jeremy M. Weinstein, John Edward Porter, and Stuart E. Eizenstat. Washington: Center for Global Development, 2004, 79 pp. http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full_Report.pdf
Severe Political Change the Global IDP Project/Norwegian Refugee Council-Regional Database on Causes and Background of Displacement from 1998 2002 Refugee Figs. Refugee Population by Origin, 2003 UNHCR, 2003 Global Refugee Trends, Overview of Refugee Populations, New Arrivals, Durable Solutions, Asylum Seekers and other persons of concern to UNHCR, 2004. Population Data Unit/PGDS Division of Operational Support UNHCR Geneva, www.unhcr.ch/statistics
Legitimacy and Resilience Voice and Accountability 2002 Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality, Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS): 1996 2002, KKZ (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton) http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/ Corruption Perception Indices 2004, Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2004
Political Freedom 2003, Table of Independent Countries, Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page 237&year 2003 Capacity Economic ManagementInation, GDP Deator (Annual %) 2003 World Development Indicators 2004, World Bank www.worldbank.org/data Social Services DeliveryFull Immunization (Measles) of 1 year olds (%) Human Development Report 2004, United Nations Development Programme http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_54_1_1.html
Challenging the discourse on fragile states Social Services DeliveryAdult Illiteracy (15 AND Above) %2002 Human Development Report 2004, United Nations Development Programme http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_HDI.pdf HIV Prevalence Rates (% ages 15 49) 2003 Human Development Report 2004, United Nations Development Programme
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http://pooh.undp.org/maindiv/hdr_dvpt/statistics/data/indic/indic_69_1_1.html Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book 2004 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ac.html Tax Revenue as a % of GDP 2001 World Development Indicators 2004, World Bank www.worldbank.org/data
Structural conditions Per Capita Income GDP Per capita 2003 US $ Human Development Report 2003 http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic_9_1_1.html Debt-GDP Ratio, ODA per capita 2003 US $ http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_186_1_1.html
Primary Product Dominance Food, Agricultural Products, Fuels, Ores and Metals as a % of total exports, 2001 Structure of Merchandise Exports 2001 World Development Indicators 2004, World Bank www.worldbank.org/data
Inequality Inequality measureGini Index Human Development Report 2003 http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_138_1_1.html
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Infant MortalityNo of deaths (infants aged between birth and one year) per 1,000 live births http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_125_1_1.html Undernourished (by FAO estimates) as a % of total population- 2000 United Nations Statistics Division 15 October 2004
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID 566&fID r5&cgID Landlocked (L)/Not Landlocked (NL) Holt, Rinehart and Winston (HRW) World Atlas http://go.hrw.com/atlas/norm_htm/world.htm Development GDP per Capita Annual Growth (%) Human Development Report 2004 http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_125_1_1.html Human Development Indices 2004 Human Development Report 2004 http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_8_1_1.html
APPENDIX 2
Table A2.1. Very fragile countries Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 26 70 19 19 67 28 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 36 77 14 7 59 27 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 98 8 93 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 2 92 1 7
Very fragile Countries Algeria Angola Bangladesh Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Congo, Dem. Rep. of the Cote dIvoire Ecuador Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia
Per capita ODA 2002 11.5 32 6.3 26.1 35.3 40.2
17 65 31 54
12 12 15 81
15.7 27.9 43.5 115.5
21 30 31 23 85 34 72
18 48 24 16 29 16 54
85 90 47 86 82
21 10 35 14 17
15.8 65.3 16.9 18.2 42 57.7 18.9 43.6
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Table A2.1continued
Very fragile Countries
Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 28 30 36 29
Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 16 24 13 35
Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 65 72 44
Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 35 28 54
Per capita ODA 2002
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Guatemala Guinea Haiti Indonesia Iran, Islamic Rep. Of Lao Peoples Dem. Rep. Lesotho Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Macedonia, TFYR Mauritania Mauritius Nepal Niger Nigeria Pakistan Rwanda Saudi Arabia
20.7 29.9 18.9 6
29 107
31 51
91
1.7 50.3 42.5
36 57 68 57 29 25 44 19 25 23
48 38 39 61 16 16 38 19 8 41
30 27 95 100 14 98 91
70 73 67 3 ( ) 85 3 10
1.9 135.2 126.6 19.8 14.9 25.9 2.6 14.3 43.1 1.1
Table A2.1continued Very fragile Countries Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 40 13 100 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 18 15 91 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 97 53 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 3 76 Per capita ODA 2002
Sierra Leone Sudan Swaziland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Togo Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Venezuela Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe
74.2 10.7 23.1
28 72 50 27 52 34 17 39 42 22
37 58 33 12 56 38 29 38 29 24
90 87 50 92 32 89 86 62
7 13 43 8 67 13 14 38
4.7 27.2 10.6 25.5 9.9 7.4 2.3 30.2 59.9 15.6
Note: Low-income countries are in italics and middle-income countries are in Roman text. Source: Human Development Indices 2004.
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Table A2.2. Capacity fragile countries

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Capacity fragile countries Belize Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Cape Verde Dominican Republic Ghana Guinea-Bissau India Jamaica Mali Mongolia Mozambique Namibia Papua New Guinea Philippines Sao Tome and Principe Senegal
Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 74 26 37 22 68 35 55 77 16 60 41 81 38 49 49 95 41
Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 55 14 51 9 31 26 43 45 15 39 32 67 24 48 49 44 31
Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 94 9 81 85 22 27 64 91 47 98 8 49
Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 1 6 91 19 96 34 16 75 64 36 8 52 2 50 51
Total ODA 2002 22.2 220.3 37.6 472.7 92.2 156.7 652.8 59.4 1,462.70 24.3 472.1 208.5 2,057.60 135.1 203.3 559.7 26 448.8
Per capita ODA 2002 88.6 33.6 21.2 37.4 203.1 18.2 31.9 41 1.4 9.2 37.4 81.5 111 68.9 36.4 7.1 166 45.5
Table A2.2continued Capacity fragile countries Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 Total ODA 2002 Per capita ODA 2002 14.7 26.9
South Africa Suriname
31 45
34 21
37 22
63 78
656.8 11.6
Note: Low-income countries are in italics and middle-income countries are in Roman text. Source: Human Development Indices 2004. Challenging the discourse on fragile states 119
120
Table A2.3. Resilience fragile countries

Eka Ikpe
Resilience fragile countries Albania Antigua and Barbuda Armenia Azerbaijan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina China Colombia Djibouti El Salvador Fiji Gabon Georgia Honduras Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Malawi Malaysia Maldives Morocco
Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 43 68 47 51 27 59 26 21 63 41 65 39 39 53 67 46 30 43 43 97 67 37
Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 19 60 30 44 22 26 29 20 45 27 71 59 27 37 46 47 27 39 25 114 88 32
Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 14 39 93 78 10 62 41 55 98 65 74 32 81 76 67 90 19 35
Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 86 61 6 17 90 38 58 44 2 35 26 68 19 24 33 10 79 38 66
Total ODA 317 14 293.5 349.4 681 587.4 1,475.80 441 77.8 233.5 34.1 71.9 312.6 434.9 534.3 188.3 393.1 186 377.1 85.9 27.5 636.2
Per capita ODA 100.9 192.1 95.5 42.1 78.8 142.3 1.1 10.1 112.3 36.4 41 55.1 60.4 64.1 100.3 12.2 12.5 36.7 31.8 3.6 88.9 21.2
Table A2.3continued Resilience fragile countries Oman Paraguay Russian Federation Sri Lanka Tanzania, U. Rep. of Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Viet Nam Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 35 43 24 43 24 49 30 47 60 Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 57 31 35 36 17 45 30 47 56 Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 84 84 69 25 83 19 15 92 Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 15 15 22 74 17 82 84 7 Total ODA Per capita ODA 14.7 9.9 9 18.2 34 48.8 9 8.5 15.9
40.8 56.7 1,300.90 344 1,232.80 475 635.8 40.5 1,276.80
Note: Low-income countries are in italics and middle-income countries are in Roman text. Source: Human Development Indices 2004
121
122
Eka Ikpe Table A2.4. FICE and actual aid allocation to LICUS FICE allocations (US$ MN, 2002) 526.3 429.9 436.2 419.7 327.9 389.3 589.1 420.5 438.6 399.6 277.4 379.1 187.2 501.0 266.1 452.0 441.6 640.2 340.4 403.0 387.6 398.6 421.8 445.7 9919.0 30184.9 40103.9 Total aid ODA (US$ MN, 2002) 421.4 172.1 59.8 233 32.5 419.8 806.7 1,068.80 230.4 60.5 312.6 249.6 59.4 155.7 434.9 278.3 298.5 313.8 203.3 353.4 168.4 51 189.4 200.6 6773.9 33330 40103.9
LICUS Angola Burundi Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Congo, Dem. Rep. of the Cote dIvoire Eritrea Gambia Georgia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Haiti Honduras Lao Peoples Dem. Rep. Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Sierra Leone Tajikistan Togo Uzbekistan Zimbabwe Sub-total to LICUS Sub total to non LICUS Total
Source: Human Development Indices 2004
Challenging the discourse on fragile states Table A2.5. FICE and actual aid allocation to very fragile states Very fragile states Algeria Angola Bangladesh Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Congo, Dem. Rep. of the Cote dIvoire Ecuador Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia Guatemala Guinea Haiti Indonesia Iran, Islamic Rep. of Lao Peoples Dem. Rep. Lesotho Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Macedonia, TFYR Mauritania Mauritius Nepal Niger Nigeria Pakistan Rwanda Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Sudan Swaziland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Togo FICE allocations (US$ MN, 2002) 464.3 526.3 615.1 429.9 390.6 416.8 174.0 436.2 419.7 327.9 389.3 589.1 420.5 377.9 533.5 346.2 438.6 566.0 399.6 501.6 379.1 501.0 894.9 634.3 452.0 398.9 322.6 370.3 428.6 340.8 400.4 441.6 640.2 760.3 395.1 566.8 403.0 492.7 400.2 366.9 387.6 398.6
123
Total aid ODA (US$ MN, 2002) 361 421.4 912.8 172.1 486.9 631.9 92.2 59.8 233 32.5 419.8 806.7 1,068.80 216 1,286.10 20.2 230.4 1,306.70 60.5 248.7 249.6 155.7 1,308.10 115.8 278.3 76.4 10.4 276.6 355.4 23.9 365.5 298.5 313.8 2,143.70 356.1 26.9 353.4 350.9 24.7 80.8 168.4 51
124
Eka Ikpe Table A2.5continued
Very fragile states Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Venezuela Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe Sub-total to VF states Sub-total to non VF states Total
FICE allocations (US$ MN, 2002) 384.2 474.3 421.8 497.7 380.6 405.0 445.7 22148.7 17955.2 40103.9
Total aid ODA (US$ MN, 2002) 637.9 483.8 189.4 57.1 583.7 640.6 200.6 19244.5 20859.4 40103.9

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Conflict, Security & Development

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14678800601176543 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800601176543

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Conict, Security & Development 7:1 April 2007

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Dening state fragility

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

The state of the debate

Challenging the discourse on fragile states 89

DPCs Togo Uruguay Yemen Zimbabwe

The model: a basic explanation

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Characteristics of fragile states

What do fragile states look like?

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Middle-income fragile states and low-income fragile states, different?

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Fragility, development and security

Why is looking at only fragility insufcient to explain outcomes?

Low security No. (%) 27 (61)

State fragility and poverty

State fragility and the millennium development goals

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Aid allocation in fragile states

Aid allocation: the emerging consensus on aid in fragile states

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Fragility and initial conditions efcient (FICE) aid allocation

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Inequality Inequality measureGini Index Human Development Report 2003 http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_138_1_1.html

Per capita ODA 2002 11.5 32 6.3 26.1 35.3 40.2

15.7 27.9 43.5 115.5

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

15.8 65.3 16.9 18.2 42 57.7 18.9 43.6

Very fragile Countries

Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 28 30 36 29

Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 16 24 13 35

Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 65 72 44

Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 35 28 54

Per capita ODA 2002

20.7 29.9 18.9 6

1.7 50.3 42.5

74.2 10.7 23.1

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Table A2.2. Capacity fragile countries

Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 74 26 37 22 68 35 55 77 16 60 41 81 38 49 49 95 41

Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 55 14 51 9 31 26 43 45 15 39 32 67 24 48 49 44 31

Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 94 9 81 85 22 27 64 91 47 98 8 49

Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 1 6 91 19 96 34 16 75 64 36 8 52 2 50 51

South Africa Suriname

Table A2.3. Resilience fragile countries

Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 43 68 47 51 27 59 26 21 63 41 65 39 39 53 67 46 30 43 43 97 67 37

Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 2002 19 60 30 44 22 26 29 20 45 27 71 59 27 37 46 47 27 39 25 114 88 32

Primary exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 14 39 93 78 10 62 41 55 98 65 74 32 81 76 67 90 19 35

Manufactured exports as % of merchandise exports 2002 86 61 6 17 90 38 58 44 2 35 26 68 19 24 33 10 79 38 66

40.8 56.7 1,300.90 344 1,232.80 475 635.8 40.5 1,276.80

Challenging the discourse on fragile states

Source: Human Development Indices 2004