INSTRUCTIONAL NOTES

In using the Silver Bond, I highly recommend that you have all of your other instruments in place first, i.e. your Power of Attorney In-Fact, Copyright of your name, UCC-1 filing and Security Agreement. Please use the Bond over Self files if you are making a bond for a living soul to redeem his own Strawman. Alternatively, please use the Bond Over Different Strawman directory where a Third Party participates, where one living-soul redeems the debt for the strawman of a different living-soul. The signatures by the living soul and witness are signed in red ink. Be sure to also put your right thumbprint on each page by using an inexpensive red ink pad which can be obtained from any office supply store. The other places to fill in the information should be done in other color inks besides black, and are not necessarily red. There are differences in the outside of the Republic of Texas documents, as there is no notary requirement in the files for the Republic of Texas (as this is a common-law document), but inserted is a notary area for living-souls who are inhabitants of the land outside of the Republic of Texas, but the notary is used for identification only. For a major case, as dealing with the IRS, the silver bond is filed under the UCC-1, the file number from the UCC is then put it into the document. If this is sent by registered mail, insert the registered mail registration number on the silver bond as well. These numbers can then be used for commercial reference by the other parties in the case.

TIP OF THE DAY: If your name is copyrighted, upon introducing the silver bond into a court case, insert (HAND WRITE or Print on the page with your computer printer) the word COPYCLAIM, then below that, insert the word Seal written in gold ink on the front right corner of each page and the back right hand corner of the last page. Insert ON THE SPACE BELOW (hand write or print with your printer) the word By: in red ink below the Seal followed by your name written in red ink in each place. If your name is copyrighted, place the symbol to the right of your strawman name. You can use the Powerpoint files to print the Seal, Copy-Claim, your copyrighted and the space for you to sign in red ink on the bottom right hand corner of each page. Be sure to interchange the names in there with your name. To use a third party server, call the Courier section in your phone book and find the cheapest process server in your area. Another alternative is to use registered mail. If registered mail is used, be sure to keep track of your receipts. When you go to the post office, get a separate receipt for each registered mail sent and be sure to keep the returned green card for your records to show final proof of service.

The silver bond can be used in a variety of ways: It can be used to get a person out of jail, for example, with one person doing the bond of another. In this case, serve the document to the bailiff via a third party server. You can find third party servers by looking under couriers in the phone book. Use the least expensive carrier. It possibly can be used to discharge car notes, discharge student loans, can be proof of

financial responsibility in a legal case, etc. because it allows the creditor to pay with legal and lawful silver coin for the debt incurred.
The bond I have comes from an entirely different direction. If you possess twenty or more dollars in Dollars Silver Coin, you are not bankrupt. However, the courts are only dealing in bankruptcy. If you are not bankrupt, you are then not in their jurisdiction. The courts do not accept silver coin as legal and lawful tender as payment and they will refuse to put anything they do under the penalties of perjury and this should nullify their case every time through collateral estoppel. I have a follow-up letter entitled NOTICE AND DEMAND AFTER BOND DELIVERED which can be used as a follow-up and modified for your case and sent to the party to whom you sent the silver bond to begin with. Another document for your consideration, which has been proven to be very effective is the Affidavit to File Impecuniously Using 50 USC with an Attached Memorandum, a document about 30 pages, which has been proven to very effective in fighting the courts as well. Impecunious literally means without money and when you use this as a military veteran, honorably discharged or an heir of one, you are entitled to all rights and entitlements of The Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act. When this is filed into court, it forces the court to pay all fines, penalties, forfeitures, taxes, interest, court fees, jury fees, pay for an International Bar Attorney for you and you dont waive any rights. This can be absolutely dynamite when used with the Silver Bond.

DEFINITION OF TERMS CESTUY CESTUI

CESTUI, CESTUY, an Anglo-French word, meaning ii that person, which appears in the legal phrases cestui que trust, use, or vie. It is usually pronounced as cetty. Cestui que trust means literally the person for whose benefit the trust is created. The cestui que trust is the person entitled to the equitable, as opposed to the legal, estate. Thus, if land be granted unto, and to the use of A. in trust for B., B. is ccutui que trust, and A. trustee. The term, principally owing to its cumbersomeness, is being gradually superseded in modern law by that of beneficiary. Cestui que use (sometimes cestui a que use) means the person for whose benefit a use is created (see TRUST). Cestui que vie is the person for whose life lands are held by another (see REMAINDER).

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE - External evidence or evidence that is inadmissible or not properly before the court, jury, or other determining body. Several factors are relevant to determining whether the alleged introduction of extrinsic evidence constitutes reversible error: (1) whether the extrinsic material was actually received, and if so, how; (2) the length of time it was available to the jury; (3) the extent to which the jury discussed and considered it; (4) whether the material was introduced before a verdict was reached, and if so, at what point in the deliberations it was introduced; and (5) any other matters which may bear on the issue of . . . whether the introduction of extrinsic material [substantially and injuriously] affected the verdict. Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir.'86), quoted in Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180,

1190 (9th Cir.'93) (noting that "none of these factors should be considered dispositive"). When assessing prejudice claims in juror misconduct cases, this court also places great weight on the nature of the extrinsic evidence introduced. See Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1190-91; Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406-07; Marino, 812 F.2d at 506. '[R]eversible error commonly occurs where there is a direct and rational connection between the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion, and where the misconduct relates directly to a material aspect of the case.' Marino, 812 F.2d at 506

Last modified: Jan

Kevin's English law glossary: ultra vires

02 To act ultra vires is to act beyond one's powers. The term often appears in discussion of delegated legislation (see delegated legislation). Because a Statutory Instrument (SI) is issued under the authority of Parliament, a charge that one has behaved in contravention of an SI could not be refuted on the basis that the SI conflicted with some other point of common law. It may, however, be a defense to claim that the SI was issued ultra vires; that is, the Minister who issued it was acting beyond the powers conferred by the original Statute. In reality, SIs are rarely challenged this way, because very careful attention is paid to such matters when they are drafted. However, ultra vires need not be direct; a special kind of ultra vires defense is that a delegated order is oppressive; it could be argued that Parliament never intends to delegate power to anyone to make this kind of legislation. A charge that an act is ultra vires may also be leveled against legal corporations (e.g., companies). Until quite recently it was assumed that if a company acted outside the terms of its memorandum (see memorandum of association) then it was ultra vires, and contracts formed in this way were void (see void contract). Recent changes to legislation have made this charge unsustainable; company directors may be liable for breach of contract even if the contract is strictly ultra vires.

res judicata : (rayz judy-cot-ah) n. Latin for "the thing has been judged," meaning
the issue before the court has already been decided by another court, between the same parties. Therefore, the court will dismiss the case before it as being useless. Example: an Ohio court determines that John is the father of Betty's child. John cannot raise the issue again in another state. Sometimes called res adjudicata.

Collateral Estoppel Defined

The federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata [claim preclusion] and collateral estoppel [issue preclusion]. Under collateral estoppel, once acourt has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision maypreclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party tothe first case. The collateral estoppel bar is inapplicable when the claimant did not have a 'full and fairopportunity to litigate' the issue decided by the other court. Thus, a claimant can file a

federal suit to challenge the adequacy of state procedures. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the idea that 'every person asserting a federalright is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal districtcourt, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal claim arises.' Allen v. McCurry,449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980) (holding that the state law of collateral estoppel applies in civilrights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983). This is so even if 'the state court'sdecision may have been erroneous.' Id. at 101. Ordinarily, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the partyseeking to use it, or else it is waived. See, e.g., Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840F.2d 730, 35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988). The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a federal proceeding is governed bystate law. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 914-15 (9th Cir.'93), cert.denied, 114 S.Ct. 2675 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738. In California, there are four criteria for application of collateral estoppel: (1) the priorconviction must have been for a serious offense so that the defendant was motivated to fully litigate the charges; (2) there must have been a full and fair trial to preventconvictions of doubtful validity from being used; (3) the issue on which the priorconviction is offered must of necessity have been decided at the criminal trial; and (4) theparty against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party tothe prior trial. Ayers, 895 F.2d at 1271 (upholding use of collateral estoppel to prevent adefendant from bringing a S 1983 action alleging he had been illegally arrested). In Ayers,the court held that suppression rulings in the original criminal proceeding met thesecriteria. Id.

With the exception of federal habeas corpus review of state convictions under 28 U.S.C.Sec. 2254, the determination of federal constitutional questions in state court systemsmay not be reviewed or repeated in the federal systems. The Court in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 104 (1980) said that '[t]he federal courts have traditionally adhered to therelated doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,' excepting only 'a federal writ ofhabeas corpus, the purpose of which is not to redress civil injury but to release theapplicant from unlawful physical confinement.' The Supreme Court has said that claimants are not always entitled to vindicate federalrights in federal court. For example, in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 92 (1980), a criminaldefendant moved to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the FourthAmendment. The Court concluded collateral estoppel barred a subsequent Sec. 1983 suitasserting the same Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 105. 'There is . . . no reason tobelieve that Congress [through passage of Sec. 1983] intended to provide a personclaiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decidedin state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he wouldrather not have been engaged at all.' Id. at 104.

Doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel: 'Only a final judgment that is 'sufficiently firm' can be issue preclusive.' Luben Indus. v.U.S., 707 F.2d 1037, 40 (9th Cir.'83). To ascertain the 'firmness' of a judgment, courts lookto various factors, including whether the decision was tentative, whether the parties werefully heard, whether the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, and whetherthe decision was subject to appeal or was actually reviewed on appeal. Luben, at 1040(quoting Restatement (2d) of Judgments S 13 cmt. g (1982)). Luben affirmed the districtcourt's determination that an interlocutory order issued by another judge in the samedistrict was not 'sufficiently firm' because 'it could not have been the subject of an appeal.

' Id. Prior litigation by the same parties on a different cause of action has a collateral estoppeleffect only as to those issues litigated and determined in the prior action. (7 Witkin,Cal.Procedure (3d ed.1985) Judgment, section 253, p.691.) The party asserting collateralestoppel has the burden to show from the record of the prior action that the asserted issuewas previously litigated and determined. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 257-58.) In Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, a prior unlawful detainerwas resolved by a stipulated judgment. The appellate court rejected the collateral estoppeldefense, saying, 'Here, the unlawful detainer action was resolved by stipulated judgmentwhich made no mention of a relinquishment by the Pelletiers of claims arising from aretaliatory eviction. The retaliation defense was not fully and fairly litigated in an adversaryhearing, and thus was not conclusively established.' (Id. at p.1557.)

California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50Cal.3d 658, 64, 67 held that 'a stipulated judgment may properly be givencollateral estoppel effect, at least when the parties manifest an intent to becollaterally bound by its terms.' (Id. at 664, emphasis added.) The courtheld on the particular facts that 'by specifically stipulating to the issue ofliability, the parties intended the ensuing judgment to collaterally estopfurther litigation on that issue.' (Id. at 664-65, fn.2.) By so limiting itsholding the CSAA court avoided any conflict with the rule recognized in anannotation it cited, (1979) 91 A.L.R.3d 1170, 174, that a consent judgment isnot usually given preclusive effect in subsequent litigation on a differentcause of action, unless the parties manifest an intent in the consentjudgment to give it such preclusive effect. (CSAA, supra, 50 Cal.3d at 66465, fn. 2.) That general rule is based on reasoning that 'the parties to aconsent judgment generally intend merely to put an end to the litigation athand.' (91 A.L.R.3d at 1174.) It is supported also by comment e to section 27of the Restatement Second of Judgments, at 257: 'In the case of a judgmententered by confession, consent, or default, none of the issues is actuallylitigated. Therefore, the rule of this Section does not apply with respect toany issue in a subsequent action. The judgment may be conclusive,however, with respect to one or more issues, if the parties have entered anagreement manifesting such an intention.' 'In such a case the effect resultsnot from the rule of this Section but from an agreement manifesting anintention to be bound.' (Rest.2d Judgments, section 27, reporter's notes,p.269.)

A prior stipulated or consent judgment is subject to construction as to theparties' intent, and if sufficiently ambiguous may be interpreted in light ofextrinsic evidence. (United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Johansen (1969) 270Cal.App.2d 824, 837-39; see Larsen v. Beekmann (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 185,91; Ellena v. State of California (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 245, 61.) Another line of authority states that a party consenting to judgment againsthim admits those elements of the litigation 'which appears upon its face tohave been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included

therein or necessary thereto' (Code Civ.Proc., section 1911) and may suffercollateral estoppel effect unless the parties expressly reserved or withdrewthat issue from the prior judgment. (In re Marriage of Buckley (1982) 133Cal.App.3d 927, 35; Ellena v. State of California, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at261.) For example, where the defendants in a foreclosure action withdrew adefense of fraud and consented to a judgment, they 'necessarily admittedthe validity of the instruments' and were precluded from collaterallylitigating their claim they were induced by fraud to execute the instruments(Wittman v. Chrysler Corp. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 586, 91); where an ex-husband consented to a prior judgment for alimony after raising a defensethat his obligation was terminated by the wife's remarriage, he wasprecluded from relitigating whether her remarriage terminated theobligation. (Avery v. Avery (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 525, 529-30.)

Collateral estoppel does not apply to an issue which could not have beenraised in the prior proceedings. (See Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15Cal.3d 866, 871-72 ['different historical transaction']; Vella v. Hudgins,supra, 20 Cal.3d 251, 255 [limited nature of issues which may be assertedin unlawful detainer; crosscomplaints generally not allowed].) A prior judgment, arrived at by stipulation with no issues actually litigated,does not preclude another action, because the face of the judgment doesnot show the parties so intended. (See Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service,Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 263-64 [a judgment by stipulation does notcover matters not in the stipulation; failure to include sufficientlycomprehensive language in compromise offer allowed additional relief tobe granted against party who believed compromise amount excluded courtcosts].)