G.R. No. 154115 November 29, 2005 PHILIP S. YU vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, FACTS: Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her husband, Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. The case was filed before the RTC. During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be petitioner's illegitimate child. The trial court denied the motion. It ruled that the insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which presumably prevents insurance companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to insurance policies. It added that the production of the application and insurance contract would violate Article 280 of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry Law, both of which prohibit the unauthorized identification of the parents of an illegitimate child. Private respondent sought reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied by the trial court. Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of RTC Judge Hernandez for issuing the assailed Order. The CA ruled in favor of the private respondent. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents Tender of Excluded Evidence is proper. RULING: Yes. While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised only when the

evidence has been formally offered. For a long time, the Court has recognized that during the early stages of the development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or not, and thus' the practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should be avoided. . In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth. As observed by petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence; it was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial. In declaring that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even before they were formally offered, much less presented before it, the trial court acted in excess of its discretion. Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private respondent's tender of excluded evidence, she has rendered moot her petition before the Court of Appeals since the move evinced that she had another speedy and adequate remedy under the law. The Court holds otherwise. Section 40, Rule 132 provides: Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence must have been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been

identified and presented before the court. While private respondent made a 'Tender of Excluded Evidence, such is not the tender contemplated by the above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not formally offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said 'Tender of Excluded Evidence was a manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible by the trial court even before these were presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate remedy which private respondent could have resorted to instead of the petition for certiorari she filed before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render the said petition moot.

G.R. No. 155110. March 31, 2005 HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO vs. DMCURBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC. FACTS: In 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the owner of a residential lot covered by a TCT. David M. Consunji, Inc. transferred said lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc. (DMC) in whose favor a new TCT was issued. Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill in December, 1993, DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. The Complaint alleged that as owner DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993; that on that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the lot in question and constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then up to the present; that the reasonable rental value of said lot is P10,000.00 a month. Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He averred that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation No. 20) and so DMC has no cause of action against him. Since one of the vital issues in the case was the location of Habagat Grill, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed of three members, one a Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic Engineer representing Biraogo and the third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty of determining where precisely was Habagat Grill located, on the lot in question or on Municipal Reservation No. 1050. Biraogo was directed by

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the court to furnish the team with a copy of Municipal Reservation No. 20. Biraogo never complied. Worse, his designated Geodetic Engineer Panfilo Jayme never took oath as such and did not participate in the Relocation survey. The ones who conducted the survey were Engr. Edmindo Dida of the DENR and Engr. Jose Cordero, DMCs representative. After conducting the relocation survey on March 30, 1998, engineers Dida and Cordero submitted their report to the Court specifically stating that the Habagat Grill Restaurant was occupying 934 square meters of the lot in question. After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered a Decision on August 6, 1998 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. DMC appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court and the same was docketed in Branch 12, in Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x 26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered judgment affirming the appealed Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied in the courts Order dated April 21, 1999. Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Granting respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the court of origin had jurisdiction over the Complaint for Forcible Entry. The CA gave greater weight to the testimony of respondents real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, that Habagat Grill had been built on December 1, 1993. The appellate court opined that his testimony was credible, because he had personal knowledge of the facts he had testified to -- it was his task to know such matters. On the other hand, it was not clear in what capacity petitioners witness, Samuel Ruiz, came to know of the facts he had testified to. The CA further held that the minutes of the Urban Planning and Economic Development hearings -- submitted by petitioner to prove the construction of Habagat Grill in 1992 -- were immaterial, as these referred to another establishment. The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other documentary evidence to establish the date of Habagat Grills construction. It added that the court of origin had improperly adjudged the subject property as part of the public domain. The appellate court explained that the lower court could take cognizance of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, but not of the situational relation between the property covered by the Proclamation and the land in question. The CA further criticized petitioner for not presenting any evidence to show the basis of the latters alleged authority to build Habagat Grill on the property. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has adduced preponderance of evidence to prove that this case was filed within the one-year prescriptive period. RULING: Petitioner presented the testimony of a certain Samuel Ruiz and offered the minutes of the hearings conducted by the Urban Planning and Economic Development (UPED) to prove that the construction of the Habagat Grill began in 1992. Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the testimony of the formers real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, as he had personal knowledge of the facts. On the other hand, the two trial courts allegedly relied on the hearings conducted by the UPED in resolving that petitioner had been in possession of the property since 1992. Respondent avers that those hearings referred to a restaurant located 330 meters away, not to Habagat Grill. The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED hearing pertained to matters relating to a different establishment, the Kawayan Restaurant. Thus, the UPED minutes did not have any material bearing on the resolution of the present case. Consequently, the determination of the date of entry into the subject lot boils down to the appreciation of the testimonies of Garcia and Ruiz. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. Where the evidence presented by one side is insufficient to ascertain the claim, there is no preponderance of evidence. In criminal cases in which the quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil cases, the testimony of only one witness -- if credible, straightforward, and worthy of belief -- is sufficient to convict. With more reason then, Garcias testimony, if clear and positive, may be sufficient to establish respondents claim. Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts and circumstances to be considered by the court in determining which of the presented evidence has superior weight is the witnesses means and opportunity to know the facts to which they testify. The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following considerations: First, the Actor Rule. This rule maintains that a persons recollection of his own acts and of the attendant circumstances is more

definite and trustworthy than another persons recollection of it, especially if it was an act done in the performance of a duty, or if the other persons testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or judgment. Apart from comparative tenacity of memory, the actor usually knows better than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is generally, but not always, entitled to superior weight on that account. Thus, the execution and attestation of a will or other legal document may be so far regarded as the act of the lawyer who superintends the transactions and knows the formalities required by law, and his testimony to the circumstances will generally outweigh that of a non-professional witness. The Actor Rule has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and any other cases where a persons testimony concerning his own conduct conflicts with the testimony of a non-participating observer or with inconclusive inferences from facts proved, especially where the actor witness testifies to an act which the duties of his employment required him to perform. But it said that the testimony of one who evidently speaks rather to his custom than to his acts on the particular occasion will hardly suffice to put him in the category of those who are specially favored by the Actor Rule. Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be believed in preference to the one that had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent. Interest has effect on the power of observation of witness. Thus, it has been held that it was not remarkable that witnesses would not have observed traces of blood along the route through which the deceased was taken because said witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime was not committed in the place where the dead body was found. Similarly, the failure of witnesses to notice whether or not there were houses at the place where they say the accused maltreat the offended party was attributed as due to the fact that their attention was concentrated to what they say, and they had no interest in knowing whether or not there were houses in or around the place.

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Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who merely states the fact to be so, without adverting to any circumstances showing that his attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of the crew of a vessel that their light on the night of a collision was red, and nothing more, was easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on the other vessel that the light was white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among them when the light was observed. Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of observing accurately. This is so because, if men perceive the most insignificant facts in the most diverse ways, even when it is impossible that these facts should produce on the observer any emotion preventing him from observing with absolute calm, even much more will their impressions be diversified under circumstances calculated to produce in the onlookers excitement, fear or terror. Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness. (Citations omitted) Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given greater weight, considering that it was his task -- as the real property manager of respondent -- to know about matters involving the latters properties. In contrast, it was not explained how Ruiz could be deemed competent and credible in his testimony as to those matters. The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia -regardless of how clear, positive and straightforward it was -solely on the ground that he was not a disinterested witness. True, he was an employee of respondent; relationship, however, will not by itself determine the true worth of ones testimony. The essential test is whether such testimony is disencumbered, credible, and in accord with human experience. It cannot easily be dismissed by the mere invocation of the witness relationship with respondent. In sum, we have no reason to disagree with the CAs evaluation that, being credible, Garcias direct testimony was sufficient to establish respondents claim that petitioner had entered the premises on December 1, 1993. G.R. No. 157959 March 28, 2007 HEIRS OF VICENTE REYES vs. CA

FACTS: ISSUE: An action for partition and accounting was filed by the children of the siblings of the late Eustaquia Reyes against Magno Sarreal, Anatalia Reyes and Gloria Reyes-Paulino, Eustaquias husband and nieces, respectively, in relation to a parcel of land with an area of (7,484) square meters (the property). The property was originally registered in the name of Eustaquia under a TCT and was inherited by her prior to her marriage to Magno Sarreal. Eustaquia leased a portion of the property to ACME Abrasive Manufacturing Corporation (ACME) for a period of twenty (20) years. The contract was thumbmarked by Eustaquia as the lessor, with Magno Sarreal likewise affixing his signature to the instrument to indicate his marital consent to the transaction. Thereafter, Eustaquia purportedly sold the property to private respondents Anatalia Reyes and Gloria Reyes-Paulino in a notarized document entitled Patuluyang Pagbibili ng Lupa(Deed of Absolute Sale). In the second paragraph of the deed, Eustaquia expressly stated that the property was paraphernal or exclusive in character and did not belong to the conjugal partnership because it formed part of her inheritance. Accordingly, it was only her signature and thumbmark which appeared on the deed. Anatalia and Gloria subsequently divided the property between themselves and registered their respective shares under their own names. Eustaquia died. Subsequently, the children of the siblings of Eustaquia who predeceased her filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for partition and accounting with receivership against Magno Sarreal and private respondents herein, Anatalia Reyes and Gloria Reyes-Paulino. They allegedly just discovered that the property was clandestinely, fraudulently and unlawfully divided between private respondents who caused its registration in their names by means of simulated or fictitious and unlawful conveyances. Magno died and was substituted by his heirs as defendant. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. Private respondents appealed the decision to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this Petition. Whether or not the testimony of private respondent Gloria Reyes-Paulino was more credible. RULING: Yes. Contrary to the assumption made by the CA, the deed was clearly not nullified on the basis that it was simulated or fictitious. Rather, the ruling was that the absence of Magnos conformity rendered the deed of absolute sale fatally defective. In this regard, the evidence relied upon by the RTC to support its conclusion that the property had become conjugal and therefore required Magnos consent was principally the testimony of Monico Reyes Palmario as well as the lease agreement executed with ACME. In the present case, the CA considered only the improvements introduced by ACME during the subsistence of the latters lease to determine whether the property became conjugal. It ruled in the negative after concluding that these improvements were not at the partnerships expense, but rather at the expense of the lessee. Under the terms of the lease contract, it was the building itself that would inure to the lessor as fruits but only at the end of the lease period. At that time, however, Eustaquia had already sold the land, to private respondents. Hence, the transfer of the ownership of the building from the lessee to the lessor could not convert the land into conjugal property since the land itself no longer belonged to one of the spouses at that time. This notwithstanding, the RTC did not rely solely upon the improvements introduced by ACME in ruling that the property became conjugal. As mentioned above, it likewise gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Monico Reyes Palmario who testified that there were houses and buildings that were constructed on the property prior to the purported sale to private respondents. The CA, however, held otherwise, stating that the testimony of private respondent Gloria Reyes-Paulino was more credible, thus: The complaint, however, never mentioned any house or a building occupied by a knitting company; it confined itself only to a parcel of land and market stalls. Hence, Palmario must

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be referring to another land and his lack of certitude is confirmed by his inability to be sure of the number of houses that he was talking about. Indeed, appellant GLORIA, who is renting one of those houses or apartments from Eustaquia and Magno, and who is thus more knowledgeable of the place and hence, more reliable, declared that they are outside the land in controversy. Applying the well-known test of credibility called the actors rule, it is the witness whose action is more closely connected to the point at issue that should be given more credence. In the present case, the RTC gave credence to the testimony of petitioner Monico Reyes Palmario, who claimed he worked as carpenter on the property in question, and there were houses and buildings constructed on the property including a knitting factory. The CA, however, sustained the testimony of private respondent Gloria Reyes-Paulino, who rented from the spouses Eustaquia and Magno one of the houses or apartments, and lived therein, and who testified that these houses and buildings were on a different property. As between these two witnesses, the latter is more reliable since her act of renting and living in one of the houses or apartments makes her the actor more closely related to the point at issue, i.e., whether or not the houses were on the property in question. For while a carpenter would not concern himself with the title of the property, a lessee would normally look into the title covering the property leased, including its precise location or boundaries, and in fact Gloria ReyesPaulino testified that the lot on which the house she rented was found had a separate title. Accordingly, the CA aptly held as follows: Indeed, appellant GLORIA, who is renting one of those houses or apartments from EUSTAQUIA and Magno, and who is thus more knowledgeable of the place and, hence, more reliable declared that they are outside the land in controversy. The houses or apartments being outside the land in suit, the only improvements that should be looked into in the case at bench are the improvements

introduced thereon by the lessee AcmeAbrasive Manufacturing Corporation. Two (2) decisive facts are clearly discernible therefrom: first, no conjugal fund ever went into the construction of the improvements as they were all done at the expense of the lessee; and second, the improvements shall devolve to the ownership of the lessor only upon the expiration of the lease. Accordingly, since the property sold by Eustaquia to private respondents was paraphernal, the consent of Magno was not required and the sale cannot be held invalid on the basis of its absence.

Whether or not complainant was able to prove her charge against the respondent judge. RULING: No. In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on the complainant. While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the removal of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino: Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.

A.M.-RTJ-07-2068 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 031854-RTJ) August 7, 2007 ERLIND A. ALCUIZAR vs. JUDGE EMMANUEL C. CARPIO,O,ATTY. CRISOSTOMO S.J. UGALI, JR, and MRS. Going over the testimonial and documentary evidence DIVINAGRACIABARCELONA thus adduced during the investigation, the proof-beyondreasonable-doubt threshold required under the premises has not been hurdled. As it were, circumstances obtained and/or FACTS: credible evidence presented tended to cast a heavy cloud on Court Stenographer Erlind A. Alcuizar filed a complainants credibility and, necessarily, her case. For verified Complaint Affidavit against Presiding Judge instance, Alfredo Tayabas, a court aide, contradicting Emmanuel C. Carpio, Atty. Crisostomo S. J. Ugali Jr., complainants account of washing food containers (pyrex) Branch Clerk of Court, and Mrs. Divinagracia B. Barcelona, inside the CR, testified that [O]n August 29, 2002, after the Clerk III. Complainant Erlind Neneng Alcuizar charges [birthday] lunch, [he] and Mr. Michael Monje cleared the table them with different offenses respondent judge for sexual , brought the plates and utensils used to the comfort room harassment, while respondents Ugali and Barcelona for and washed them all inside. And then there is the misconduct. complainants allegation that on a day in October 2002, while working past the regular working hours, respondent judge Following a marathon hearing, the Investigating attempted to kiss her. This incident could not have happened Justice submitted her Report dated June 2, 2006. In it, she as the complainant narrated for the simple reason that not recommended that respondent judge be adjudged guilty once did she render overtime service for the month of of sexual harassment under of Republic Act No. October 2002. The entries in her DTR for the period which 7877, Section 3 of defines work- related sexual show her being out of the office by 5 p.m. of every harassment. working day negate the idea of overtime work. The Report also recommended the suspension from office of respondent judge for three (3) months for the offense. ISSUE: Complainant also asserted that there were instances when respondent judge touched her legs while she was working at her computer and placed his gun on top of her table. This assertions are hardly credible. Complainants working desk was inside the staff room, which the

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Investigating Justice describes as quite small for the number of personnel it houses [where] the distance of tables from an occupants chair to the next table provides only a passage for a normal sized person. It is thus unthinkable that respondent judge would be so callous and boorish as to perform the highly disgraceful acts thus ascribed to him by the complainant in the staff room during office hours in full view of branch employees. Respondent Ugali, among other court personnel, swears to not having observed respondent judge putting his gun on top of complainants table, let alone touching her legs during all the years he (Ugali) was seated beside her. If respondent judge had, indeed, made overt sexual overtures towards, and blatantly demanded a kiss from, the complainant within court premises, good sense would dictate that the matter be immediately reported to the proper authorities. Per the complainants own account, respondent Judge allegedly made his indecent advances from August 2002 to January 2003. However, she decided to make a formal complaint with this Court only in September 2003, albeit she appeared to have sought counsel from her office mates, among other co-workers in the judiciary. Reckoned from the alleged first incident, complainant herself testified that it took her more than thirteen (13) months to file this case. This seeming lack of urgency on the part of the complainant in taking concrete administrative action against a wayward judge bears heavily on her case. The Court has certainly taken stock of the fact that even after the alleged sexual harassment incidents transpired, complainant still dared to repair, in several instances, to respondent Judges chamber all by her lonesome self when the natural thing to do is to avoid occasions likely to further exacerbate an already difficult situation. What is more, complainant, by her own admission even attended the birthday party of respondent judge in his residence and, judging from photographs of smiling, clapping and swinging court staff personnel, complainant definitely appeared to be having much fun. To be sure, complainant is not exactly a picture of one recently sexually harassed by her offending host. With the view we thus take of the case, complainant has failed to prove her charge against the respondent judge with the quantum of proof required under the premises. Given this perspective, the dismissal of the complaint as against respondent judge for insufficiency of evidence is indicated. The Court, however, stresses that this ruling does not necessarily reflect on the bona fides of the filing of the

complainant, let alone what complainant perceives to be the righteousness of her grievances. However, the facts of the case and applicable jurisprudence leave no room for another kind of disposition.

Whether or not petitioner cannot be held liable for the charges on the ground that he was not caught in possession of the missing funds. RULING: No. To be caught in possession of the stolen property is not an element of the corpus delicti in theft. Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. In the case before us, these two elements were established. The amounts involved were lost by WUP because petitioner took them without authority to do so.

G.R. No. 165884 April 23, 2007 CIELITO R. GAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Ten informations for Qualified Theft were filed against Cielito Gan. Gan, being employed as an internal auditor of the Wesleyan University-Philippines, with intent of gain and without the knowledge of the said institutions representative, President, person-in-charge of the administrative and financial matters, with serious breach of confidence reposed on him by his employer did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry away monies and checks. Said accused then assigned as the internal auditor of the aforesaid Wesleyan University-Philippines, for the purpose of auditing the task performed by the accounting department thereof, as in fact said auditor did audit the cash turn over slip representing the part cash collection of a teller, for the said business day and after counting and auditing the cash, check/s embodied therein, instead of returning the same to said tellert for the final turn-over to the treasurer, said accused deliberately withheld the same without any authority to do so and pocketed the sums involved, to the damage and prejudice of the Wesleyan University-Philippines. The prosecution presented the tellers, Treasurer, Bookkepper and Accountant of the WUP. On the other hand, the accused took the witness stand for the defense. The trial court found petitioner guilty of 10 counts of Simple Theft. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalties imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE:

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