LUIS EWING S NEW THRESHOLD LEGAL ARGUMENT ABSOLUTELY PROVES THAT SAME-SEX MARRIAGES ARE 100% ILLEGAL, UNLAWFUL

& UNCONSTITUTIONAL!*

From Luis Ewing at <rcwcodebuster@gmail.com, (253) 226-3741

LUIS EWING S RCW 4.24.500 & RCW 4.24.510 GOOD FAITH REPORTING OF CHRISTINE GREGOIRE S ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS TO LEGALIZE THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF SODOMY BY SPONSORING OR PROMOTING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LEGISLATION WHICH COULD POSSIBLY SUBJECT HER TO POTENTIAL CHARGES OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT, MALFEASANCE OF OFFICE, MISFEASANCE OF OFFICE & PERJURY OF HER OATH OF OFFICE TO UPHOLD THE LAWS OF THE STATE, THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION AND MOST IMPORTANTLY THE COMMON LAW!* RCW 4.24.500 Good faith communication to government agency--Legislative findings--Purpose. Information provided by citizens concerning potential wrongdoing is vital to effective law enforcement and the efficient operation of government. The legislature finds that the threat of a civil action for damages can act as a deterrent to citizens who wish to report information to federal, state, or local agencies. The costs of defending against such suits can be severely burdensome. The purpose of RCW 4.24.500 through 4.24.520 is to protect individuals who make good-faith reports to appropriate governmental bodies. [1989 c 234 1.] And; RCW 4.24.510 Good faith communication to government agency--Immunity. A person who in good faith communicates a complaint or information to any agency of federal, state, or local government regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency shall be immune from civil liability on claims based upon the communication to the agency. A person prevailing upon the defense provided for in this section shall be entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in establishing the defense. [1989 c 234 2.] And; *SUBJECT: CHRISTINE GREGOIRE WHO AS A WOMAN IS NOT NOW AND IN FACT HAS NEVER REALLY BEEN THE LEGAL OR LAWFUL GOVERNOR OF The State of Washington FIRST OF ALL HAS NO LEGAL OR LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO INITIATE OR FINALIZE ANY LEGISLATION OR LAWS THAT WOULD AFFECT THE RIGHTS OF ANY MAN AND SECOND, EVEN IF SHE WERE A MAN, CHRISTINE GREGOIRE HAS NO LEGAL OR LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO LEGALIZE THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF SODOMY, A CRIME AGAINST NATURE WITHOUT VIOLATING THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF BOTH CONSTITUTIONS!* *LUIS EWING BRINGS FORWARD A NEW THRESHOLD LEGAL ARGUMENT WHICH CLEARLY SHOWS THAT SAME-SEX MARRIAGES ARE ILLEGAL &. UNCONSTITUTIONAL!*

The Israelites ought not to follow the manners of the Egyptians and Canaanites, the marriages that are unlawful. Leviticus 18 BECAUSE SODOMY IS STILL A COMMON LAW CRIME YOU CAN NEVER MAKE SAMESEX MARRIAGES LEGAL! NEVER! SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CANNOT LEGALIZE THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF SODOMY! SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE DESCRIBED THE INFAMOUS COMMON LAW CRIME AGAINST NATURE: as an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a crime not fit to be named." Bowers v. Hardwick, 278 U.S. 186 (1986). SAME-SEX MARRIAGES IS 100% ILLEGAL UNLAWFUL AND VIOLATIVE OF THE COMMON LAW AND THEREFORE IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL! SAME-SEX MARRIAGES VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF BOTH .THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION! Until the STATE OF WASHINGTON REPEALS RCW 4.04.010 . . . and RCW 9A.04.060 AND THE COMMON LAW in the . STATE OF WASHINGTON it would be A VIOLATION of . . . THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES of both THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. and the STATE CONSTITUTION to even purport to even try to submit any legislation to allegedly LEGALIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES! The Washington State Constitution reads in part: SECTION 23 BILL OF ATTAINDER, EX POST FACTO LAW, ETC. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed. The U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 reads: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. The CrR 1.1 Decisional law of the State of Washington clearly show that the SAMESEX MARRIAGE LAW would clearly violate the EX POST FACTO CLAUSES of both the WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION. and THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAW LEADS HOMOSEXUALS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN LEGALLY COMMIT SODOMY THE RCW 4.04.010 & RCW 9A.60.040 COMMON LAW CRIME AGAINST NATURE AND THEREFORE THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAW DOES NOT GIVE FAIR WARNING OF THEIR EFFECT AND PERMIT MORALLY DEPRAVED AND SICK INDIVIDUALS TO RELY UPON THEIR MEANING UNTIL EXPLICITLY CHANGED . . . IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE COMMON LAW STATUTES RCW 4.04.010 & RCW 9A.04.060 AND. CrR 1.1 & CrRLJ 1.1! EX POST FACTO CLAUSE [2] The ex post facto clauses forbid the State from enacting laws which impose punishment for an act which was not punishable when committed or increase the quantum of punishment annexed to the crime when it was

committed. U.S. Const. art. 1, section 10, cl. 1; Const. art. 1, section 23; see Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 101 S. Ct. 960 (1981) (and cases cited therein). Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual s right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated. Weaver, at 30. [3] A law violates the ex post facto clause if it: (1) is substantive, as opposed to merely procedural; (2) is retrospective (applies to events which occurred before its enactment); and (3) disadvantages the person affected by it. See Weaver v. Graham, supra at 29; Collins v. Youngblood, ___ U.S. ___, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30, 110 S. Ct. 2715 (1990). ...The constitution prohibits ex post facto laws . For a law to be ex post facto, it must detrimentally alter the standard of punishment called for by a prior law, not by a prior administrative practice which was not required by that law. See Warren v. United States Parole Comm n, 659 F.2d 183, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); see also Watson v. Estelle, 886 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1989) (and cases cited therein). The reason for this is clear. One of the primary justifications of the ex post facto clause is that legislative Acts [should] give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed. (Citations omitted.) Weaver, at 28-29; see also Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1546, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985). PERSONAL RESTRAINT OF POWELL, 117 Wn.2d 175, 184, 185, 192 [Nos. 57041-8, 57196-1, 57253-4. En Banc. August 1, 1991.] And; The ex post facto clauses of both the state and federal constitutions prohibit the state from enacting any law which imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable when committed. U.S. CONST. art. 1, section 10; CONST. art. 1, section 23; State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488, 496, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994). Ex post facto laws are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to the very principle of sound legislation. James Madison, The Federalist No. 44 (1787) in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, AND JOHN JAY at 227 (Bantam Books 1982). In principle [e]very law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal. . violates the clause. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L. Ed 658 (1798) (Chase, J.). This due process principle applies equally to judicial decisions. [W]here a court overrules a prior decision so as to enlarge the scope of criminal liability, the new rule must be applied prospectively only. State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 489, 681 P.2d 227, 30 A.L.R. 4th 975 (1984). The rule equally applies when the new rule deprives a defendant of a previously available defense. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S. Ct. 68, 70 L. Ed. 216 (1925) (ex post facto clause prohibits any new law which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. STATE v. VALENTINE, 132 Wn.2d 1, 53, 935 P.2d 1294 (May 1st, 1997). And; B. Ex Post Facto The United States Supreme Court defined ex post facto laws as those falling within the following four categories: 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th Every law that alters the legal rule of evidence and receives less, or different testimony, than the law

required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798), quoted in State v. Clevenger, 69 Wn.2d 136, 141, 417 P.2d 626 (1966). STATE v. SLIDER, 38 Wn. App. 689, 694, 688 P. 2d 538 (September 24, 1984). And; [4] A statute is ex post facto when it inflicts a greater punishment for the commission of a crime than that which was originally annexed to the crime when committed. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1796). JOHNSON v. MORRIS, 87 Wn.2d 922, 927, 557 P.2d 1299 [No. 44193. En Banc. December 23, 1976.] And; [8] The ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions prohibit the state from enacting any law which imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable when committed, or which increases the quantum of punishment for the offense after the crime was committed. U.S. CONST. art. 1, section 10; CONST. art. 1, section 23; State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 496. [9, 10] In In re Powell, 117 Wn.2d 175, 185, 814 P.2d 635 (1991), this court held: A law violates the ex post facto clause if it: (1) is substantive, as opposed to merely procedural; (2) is retrospective (applies to events which occurred before its enactment); and (3) disadvantages the person affected by it. See Weaver v. Graham, [450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981)]; Collins v. Youngblood, [497] U.S. [37], 111 L. Ed. 2d 30, 110 S. Ct. 2715 (1990). ...This court held in Ward that the sole determination of whether a law is disadvantageous is whether the law alters the standard of punishment which existed under prior law. Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 498. See also California Dep t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 131 L. Ed 2d 588 (1995) (where the Court refused to hold that the ex post facto clause forbids any legislative change that has any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner s punishment); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 US. 282, 293, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed. 2d 344 (1977) (even though it may work to the advantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto). ...[12] Article 1, section 23 of the Washington Constitution provides, No bill of attainder shall ever be passed. Article 1, section 10 of the Federal Constitution provides that No state shall . . . pass any bill of attainder . The bill of attainder clause was intended to prohibit trials by the Legislature, and it forbids the imposition of punishment by the Legislature on specific person. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442, 445, 85 S. Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1965). A bill of attainder is a legislative act which applies to named individuals or to easily ascertained members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial. State v. Scheffel, 82 Wn.2d 872, 881, 514 P.2d 1052 (1973) (citing Brown). The prohibition on bills of attainder prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. Landgraf v. USA Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994). In order for a legislative enactment to be deemed a bill of attainder, it must (1) specify the affected persons, (2) inflict punishment, and (3) lack judicial trial. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847; 104 S. Ct. 3348, 82 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1984). STATE v. HENNINGS, 129 Wn.2d 512, 524, 525, 526, 527 (July 1996). And; Ex Post Facto. The expost facto clauses of the Federal and state constitutions forbid the State from enacting any law which imposes punishment for an act which was not punisheable when committed or increases the quantem of punishment annexed to the

crime when it was committed. Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 496; U.S. Const. art. 1, section 10; Const. art. 1, section 23. A law violates the ex post facto clause if it (1) is substantive, as opposed to merely procedural; (2) is retoactive; and (3) disadvantages the person affected by it. Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 498 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1990)). A law is disadvantageous when it alters the standard of punishment that existed under prior law. Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 498. We must determine whether the new law permits the imposition of a more severe punishment than was allowed when the crime was committed. State v. Edwards, 104 Wn.2d 63, 70-71, 701 P.2d 508 (1985). STATE v. HARTKE, 89 Wn. App. 143, 146, 948 P.2d 402 (December 18, 1997). And; A statute violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws, see U.S. Const. art. 1, section 10, cl. 1; Const. art. 1, section 23, if it imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable when committed or increases the punishment that was annexed to the crime when it was committed. Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 496; State v. Watkins, 76 Wn. App. 726, 732, 887 P.2d 492 (1995). The prohibition against bills of attainder is derived from U.S. Const. art. 1, section 10 and Const. art. 1, section 23. A bill of attainder is a legislative act that applies to named individuals or to easily ascertained members of a group in such a way that it inflicts punishment on them without a trial. State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 759, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) (citing Scheffel, 82 Wn.2d at 881). In other words, the Legislature is prohibited from singling out disfavored persons and inflicting summary punishment for past conduct. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d at 759. CITY OF RICHLAND v. MICHEL, 89 Wn. App. 764, 773, 774, 950 P.2d 10 (January 22, 1998). And; THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAW DOES NOT GIVE FAIR WARNING THAT IF YOU GET CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF SODOMY THAT YOU CAN STILL BE CHARGED CRIMINALLY FOR COMMITTING THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF SODOMY! Until the STATE OF WASHINGTON REPEALS RCW 4.04.010 and RCW 9A.04.060 AND THE COMMON LAW in the STATE OF WASHINGTON it would be A VIOLATION of THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES of both THE U.S. CONSTITUTION and the STATE CONSTITUTION to even purport to even try to submit any legislation to allegedly LEGALIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES! THOSE IN OUR STATE LEGISLATURE AND IN OUR CONGRESS THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE A COMMON LAW RIGHT TO COMMIT SODOMY WHILE WORKING IN OUR STATE CAPITALS AND IN WASHINGTON D.C. TO ALL STATE LEGISLATURES AND TO ALL OUR SENATORS AND CONGRESSMAN, IF YOU ARE CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF SODOMY IN OUR STATE CAPITAL, YOU CAN NOT ONLY BE CHARGED WITH RAPE, BUT YOU CAN AND WILL BE CHARGED WITH THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF SODOMY! SODOMY IS STILL IN FACT AND LAW A COMMON LAW CRIME AND A CRIME AGAINST NATURE! SODOMY VIOLATES GODS LAW! SODOMY IS STILL A COMMON LAW CRIME PURSUANT TO RCW 4.04.010 AND RCW 9A.04.060 !

Washington incorporated this common law into territorial law in 1881 by statute, and upon statehood territorial law became law of the state. Code of 1881, section 1; CONST. art. XXVII, section 2. See also RCW 4.04.010 ( The common law shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state. ) Shall is imperative. State v. Krall, 125 Wn.2d 146, 148, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994). STATE v. VALENTINE, 132 Wn.2d 1, 41, 935 P.2d 1294 (May 1997). And; Apparently, you people in our State Legislature are under the false impression that you can no longer be prosecuted in Washington State for sodomy because those who have wrongfully infiltrated our State Legislature who attempted to sneak in sexually deviant and immoral laws in criminal attempts to repeal the Sodomy laws in 1975 1st Sess., page 817, ch. 260, enacted June 27, 1975, effective, in violation of the Common law! Our State Legislature did NOT repeal the Sodomy statute!! NONE OF YOU HAVE THE STANDING TO REPEAL THE COMMON LAW. <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/senate-approves-bill-legalizes-sodomy-andbestiality-us-military <http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2011/12/02/Right_Wing_Sodomy _Repeal_Bestiality_OK/ <http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-mayor-pushesequal-rights-of-marriage-for-2654955.php NONE OF YOU HAVE THE STANDING TO REPEAL THE COMMON LAW. LUIS EWING IS HAPPY TO INFORM YOU THAT WHEN OUR SENATE AND LEGISLATURE PRETENDED TO PASS A BILL TO LEGALIZE SODOMY AND BESTIALITY, THEY REINSTATED THE MORE HARSHER PUNISHMENTS OF THE COMMON LAW! THERE IS SOLID CASE LAW THAT COMPLETELY OVERCOMES THE PRETEND REPEAL OF THE SODOMY LAWS! The legislature may not abolish a common law right without setting up some reasonable substitute. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396 (December 7, 1986). "Those [sodomy] statutes stand unrepealed, unabridged and unaltered and should be held to declare the law of this state." State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (Jan. 1975). "The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution." State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 P. 182 (1928). Substantive [common] law [rights] prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights and remedies are effectuated. State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 501, 527 P.2d 674 (1974).

See Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 Yale L.J. 33. 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 539, 2050, Effect of repeal of statutes upon remedies. The Territorial Code of 1881 is the only valid Statute law, as adopted by the legislature, prevails over a restatement thereof in the code. RCW 1.04.020-.021. STATE EX REL. ETC. v. MERCER ISL., 58 Wn. (2d) 141, 144 (April 20, 1961.) And; The State of Washington incorporated this common law into territorial law in 1881 by statute, and upon statehood territorial law became law of the state. Code of 1881, section 1; CONST. art. XXVII, section 2. See also RCW 4.04.010 ( The common law shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state. ) Shall is imperative. State v. Krall, 125 Wn.2d 146, 148, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994). State v. Valentine, 132 Wn.2d 1, 41, 935 P.2d 1294 (May 1997). And; The statute of 13 Eliz., which we have adopted, is said to be declaratory of the common law, which is in force, as we understand it, in the State of Washington by virtue of of the Code. Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 502-503 (January 13, 1892). And; The statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, which is a part of the common law of this state (Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500-502, 28 Pac. 1109, 28 Am. St. Rep. 56, 15 L.R.A. 784). Bates v. Drake, 28 Wash. 447, 455 (April 2, 1902). Hence, the common law, as adopted by our legislature in 1863, in so far as the same was not incompatible with our conditions, including the statute law of England as it existed at the Date of the Declaration of Independence, became the common law of the late Territory of Washington, and, by virtue of the constitution, the law of this state, and still continues to be the law, except as it has been modified by legislative enactment. Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 28 Pac. 1109, 29 Pac. 927, 28 Am. St. 56, 15 L.R.A. 784. Richards v. Redelsheimer, 36 Wash. 325, 328 (December 20, 1904). And; It held, however, that the rule, as it existed in England at the date of the Declaration of Independence, became a part of the common law of the State. Compton v. Evans, 200 Wash. 125, 128 (August 11, 1939). And; The common law, so far as it is not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States, or of the state of Washington, nor incompatible with the institutions and condition of society in this state, shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state. Construing this statute, we have held that the term common law, as therein used, includes not only the unwritten law of England as it was administered by its courts, but also the general statutes of that common wealth modifying and interpreting the unwritten laws which were enacted prior to and in force at the time of our Declaration of Independence. Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500. 28 Pac. 1109, 29 Pac. 927, 28 Am. St. 56, 15 L.R.A. 784; Bates v. Drake, 28 Wash. 447, 68 Pac. 961; Richards v. Redelsheimer, 36 Wash. 325, 78 Pac. 934. Garret v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351, 353-354 (January 28, 1939). And; The common law prevails in this state, so far as it is not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this state, nor incompatible with the institutions and conditions of society. (Rem. Rev. Stat., 143 [P.C. 8252]; Cf. Laws of 1863, p. 88, 1; Code of 1881, 1; Laws of 1891, p. 31, 1; 2 H.C. 108.). The common law of England, including the

English statutes in force at the time of the Declaration of Independence, as adopted by the territorial law of 1863, continues to be the law of this state, except so far as modified by statute. See Bates v. Drake, 28 Wash. 447, 68 Pac. 961; Garret v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351, 284 Pac. 343, 68 A.L.R. 254; Compton v. Evans, 200 Wash. 125, 93 P. (2d) 341. In re Hudson, 13 Wn.2d 673, 684-685 (June 8, 1942). And; THIS STATE IS COMMITTED TO THAT DOCTRINE. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing, 188 Wash. 396 [No. 25813. En Banc. December 7, 1936.] The legislative repeal of a statute which is merely declaratory of the common law, in the absence of a new statute stating some other rule, leaves the common law in effect. In 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 525, 2043, the rule is stated as follows: However, a right of common law nature which is further embedded in statutory terms exists as an enforceable right exclusive of the statute declaratory of it, and therefore the right is not expunged by the repeal of the statute. State ex rel. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Frater, 18 Wn.2d 546, 553, 140 P.2d 272, at 275 (July 19, 1943). SODOMY, THEREFORE REMAINS A CRIME UNDER THE COMMON LAW. THEREFORE THE REPEAL OF THE 1533 BUGGERY ACT REQUIRES US, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY STATUTE, TO USE THE COMMON LAW: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buggery_Act_1533 State ex rel. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Frater, supra, very clearly states that The legislative repeal of a statute which is merely declaratory of the common law, in the absence of a new statute stating some other rule, leaves the common law in effect. In 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 525, 2043, the rule is stated as follows: However, a right of common law nature which is further embedded in statutory terms exists as an enforceable right exclusive of the statute declaratory of it, and therefore the right is not expunged by the repeal of the statute. 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 525-526, 2043, Effect of repeal under common law principles of construction and interpretation In general, the rule is stated as follows. However, a right of common law nature which is further embedded in statutory terms exists as an enforceable right exclusive of the statute declaratory of it, and therefore the right is not expunged by the repeal of the statute. Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65, 290 Pac. 438 (1930); In re Sloan s Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935); Hanlon v. Partridge, 69 N.H. 88, 44 Atl. 807 (1899); Matter of Steinway, 31 App. Div. 70, 52 N.Y. Supp. 343 (1898); Chippewa Falls v. Hopkins, 109 Wis. 611, 85 N.W. 553 (1901); Harper v. Middle States Loan, Building & Construction Co., 55 W.Va. 149, 46 S.E. 817 (1904). In many instances the courts to avoid the common law rule that rights of action dependent solely upon a statute are lost by its repeal have declared certain statutory rights to be an extension of common law rights and thus not lost by the repeal of the statute. Thus, the right of an automobile of the defendant has been held not to be dependent upon guest statutes but exists extrinsic of the statute and is not lost by it s repeal. Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 293 Pac. 62, 77 A.L.R. 1327 (1930); Siller v. Siller, 112 Conn. 145, 151 Atl. 524 (1930); Manusa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144. 3 A. (2d) 839 (1939).

1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 525-526, 2043, Effect of repeal under common law principles of construction and interpretation In general, the rule is further stated as follows. When however, the repeal does not contemplate either a substantive common law or statutory right, but merely the procedure prescribed to secure the enforcement of the right, the right itself is not annulled but remains in existence enforced by applying the new procedure. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 66 L.Ed. 514, 42 Sup. Ct. 214 (1922); People v. Clark, 283 Ill. 221, 119 N.E. 329 (1918). 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 526-527, 2044, Effect upon vested rights goes on to say However, a right which has become vested is not dependent upon the common law or the statute under which it was acquired for its anusertion, but has an independent existence. Consequently, the repeal of the statute or the abrogation of the common law from which it originated does not efface a vested right, but it remains enforceable without regard to the repeal. Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 57 L.Ed. 773, 33 Sup. Ct. 428 (1912); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 76 L.Ed. 866, 52 Sup. Ct. 435 (1932); Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina, 81 Fed. (2) 513 (CCA 4th, 1936); Arnold & Murdock Co. v. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 251, 145 N.E. 342 (1924); Department of Banking v. Foe, 136 Neb. 422, 286 N.W. 264 (1939); see Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 54 L.Ed. 1001, 30 Sup. Ct. 621 (1909); cf. Gastineau v. Meyer, 131 Cal. App. 611, 22 P. (2d) 31 (1933). 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 537-538, 2050, Effect of repeal of statutes upon remedies goes on to say. However, where the right exists at common law, a statutory remedy to enforce the same right is usually cumulative and although the statutory remedy is lost by the repeal of the statute, the common law remedy may still be enforced. This is similar to the rule that the repeal of the statute declaratory of a common law right does not divest the common law right. See 2043, supra. Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65, 290 Pac. 438 (1930); Jewett v. City Transfer & Storage Co., 128 Cal. App. 556, 18 P. (2d) 351 (1933). 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 537-538, 2050, Effect of repeal of statutes upon remedies goes on to say The repeal of the remedy or of the mode of procedure to secure it does not destroy the substantive right which the remedy sought to enforce, but the right remains enforceable under the new procedure irrespective of the repeal. People v. Clark, 283 Ill. 221, 119 N.E. 329 (1918). See Drainage Dist. No. 7 of Washington County v. Bernards, 89 Ore. 531, 174 Pac. 1167 (1918). IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE LEGISLATIVE REPEAL OF A STATUTE WHICH IS MERELY DECLARATORY OF THE COMMON LAW, IN THE ABSENCE OF A NEW STATUTE STATING SOME OTHER RULE, LEAVES THE COMMON LAW IN EFFECT. THEREFORE, SODOMY IS STILL A CRIME UNDER THE COMMON LAW. 1 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed), p. 525, 2043 clearly states that A RIGHT OF COMMON LAW NATURE WHICH IS FURTHER EMBEDDED IN STATUTORY TERMS EXISTS AS AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT. EXCLUSIVE OF THE STATUTE. 1 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed), p. 525, 2043 clearly states that THE RIGHT IS NOT EXPUNGED BY THE REPEAL OF THE STATUTE!

The legislature may not abolish a common law right without setting up some reasonable substitute. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396 (December 7, 1986). BLANCHARD v. GOLDEN AGE BREWING CO., 1881 Wash. 396 (December 7, 1986) CLEARLY STATES THAT THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT ABOLISH A COMMON LAW RIGHT WITHOUT SETTING UP SOME REASONABLE SUBSTITUTE! THEREFORE, THE LEGISLATURE IS REQUIRED TO SET UP A NEW SODOMY STATUTE PURSUANT TO BLANCHARD v. GOLDEN AGE BREWING CO., 188 Wash. 396 (December 7, 1986). 1 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed), p. 525, 2043 clearly states that THE RIGHT IS NOT EXPUNGED BY THE REPEAL OF THE STATUTE! THEREFORE, THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF SODOMY IS NOT EXPUNGED BY THE REPEAL OF THE STATUTE! "Those [sodomy] statutes stand unrepealed, unabridged and unaltered and should be held to declare the law of this state." State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (Jan. 1975). In order to become vested, the right must be a contract right, a property right, or a right arising from a transaction in the nature of a contract which has become perfected to the degree that the continued existence of the [sodomy] statute cannot further enhance its acquisition. Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 17 L.Ed. 805 (U.S. 1864); Bibb. Hall, 101 Ala. 79, 14 So. 98 (1893); Creighton v. Pragg, 21 Cal. 115 (1862); Leach v. Commercial Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 1154, 213 N.W. 517 (1927); Thompson v. West, 59 Neb. 677, 82 N.W. 13, 49 L.R.A. 337 (1900); People v. Common Council, 140 N.Y. 300, 35 N.E. 485 (1893); Ewing v. Van Wagenen, 6 Wash. 39, 32 Pac. 1009 (1893); State v. Bridges, 22 Wash. 64, 60 Pac. 60, 79 Am. St. Rep. 914 (1900). Thus, a laborer s right to sue for contracted wages cannot be divested by repeal. McCann v. New York, 52 App. Div. 358, 65 N.Y. Supp. (1900). The public Service Commission could not under its authority to change rates, annull a prior contract rate. City of New York v. Inter-Borough Transit Co., 257 N.Y. 20, 177 N.E. 295 (1931). The repeal of the Teachers Tenure Act could not affect a permanent contract formed prior to the repeal. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 82 L.Ed. 685, 58 Sup. Ct. 443, 113 A.L.R. 1482 (1938). A private corporation is in the nature of a contract between the state and the corporate body and cannot be destroyed by the repeal. City of Frederick v. Groshon, 30 Md. 436 (1869). See Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 Yale L.J. 33. 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 527-528, 2044, Effect upon vested rights. "The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution." State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 P. 182 (1928). In Allen v. Office Employees Int l Union, 53 Wn.2d 1, 329 P.2d 205 (1958), the Washington State Supreme Court once again held that the constitution and by-laws of an organization constitute a contract between a member and the organization, and that the terms of such constitution and by-laws are enforceable and are the measure of the relative

rights and privileges of the parties. In the course of the opinion, the court quoted approvingly from a California case which it found appropos to the situation: The law was succinctly stated by the California District Court of Appeals in Harris v. National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewarts, 98 Cal. App.2d 733, 221 P.2d 136, in the following paragraph: The constitution of the Union constitutes a contract with the members and is the measure of the authority conferred upon the organization to expel or otherwise discipline them. [Citing cases]; Accord: Leo v. Local Union No. 612 of International Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wn.2d 498, 174 P.2d 523 (1946). Allen v. Office Employees Int l Union, 53 Wn.2d 1, 329 P.2d 205 (1958). Likewise, the Valid Washington Constitution of January 28th, 1889 as reviewed, approved and ordered to be published by the 50TH Congress on January 19th, 1889 in Senate MIS. DOC. NO. 55 on January 28th, 1889, is in fact and law A CONTRACT that is binding upon all of the officers of this court to uphold. Therefore, all judges in all courts in all 50 plus States are required by their CONTRACTUAL OATHS OF OFFICE TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION TO STRIKE DOWN ANY AND/OR .ALL ILLEGAL UNLAWFUL FRAUDULENT AND. IMMORAL ATTEMPTS TO LEGALIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES OR BE SUBJECT TO FORMAL CRIMINAL CHARGES OF OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT. MALFEASANCE OF OFFICE MISFEASANCE OF OFFICE NONFEASANCE OF OFFICE AND PERJURY OF THEIR OATHS OF OFFICE TO UPHOLD THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS THE LAWS OF THE STATE. THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMON LAW! IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO DECLARE THE MEANING OF WHAT IS WRITTEN, AND NOT WHAT WAS INTENDED TO BE WRITTEN. J.W. Seavey Hop Corp. v. Pollock, 20 Wn.2d 337, 348-49, 147 P.2d 310 (1944), cited with approval in Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d at 669. [3] Washington follows the general theory of contracts, focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement rather than the less precise subjective intent of the parties not otherwise manifested. Absent fraud, deceit or coercion, a VOLUNTARY signatory is bound to a signed contract even if ignorant of its terms. Sherman v. Lunsford, 44 Wn. App. 858, 861, 723 P.2d 1176 (1986). See Lyall v. DeYoung, 42 Wn. App. 252, 256-57, 711 P.2d 356 (1985), review denied, 105 Wn.2d 1009 (1986), and cases cited therein. Therefore, the parties are bound by the contract as signed and the parol evidence cannot change the contract, only aid in its interpretation. WELL TRUST v. GRAND CENTRAL, 62 Wn. App. 593, 602, 815 P.2d 284 (August 26, 1991). And; State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 Pac. 182 (1928) makes it crystal clear that The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a. [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution! THE COMMON LAW SAYS THAT ONLY A MAN CAN MARRY A WOMAN AND ONLY A WOMAN CAN MARRY A MAN! THE COMMON LAW SAYS THAT A MAN CANNOT MARRY A MAN NOR CAN A WOMAN CANNOT MARRY A WOMAN! THE COMMON LAWS SAYS THAT ALL CITIZENS HAVE A VESTED RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS TO KEEP MARRIAGE LICENSES AVAILABLE ONLY TO THOSE OF THE OPPOSITE SEX!

State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 Pac. 182 (1928) makes it crystal clear that The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a. [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution! Therefore, all Washington Christians who are the true Israelites have . A VESTED RIGHT to demand that all Judges of this State and all other States uphold their SWORN OATH to uphold their . CONTRACT to uphold the U.S. Constitution, their State Constitution, the laws of the State and the laws of the United States . or be subject to criminal charges of MALFEASANCE OFFICE . MISFEASANCE OF OFFICE NONFEASANCE OF OFFICE AND . . . PERJURY OF THEIR OATHS OF OFFICE and are SUBJECT TO RECALL AND REMOVAL FROM ALL PUBLIC OFFICES for their failure to strike down any fraudulent and illegal and unlawful attempts to draft, enact or pass any SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LEGISLATION. Does anyone remember what the SIX COPS WENT TO JAIL FOR who stood by and watched RODNEY KING take a beating???? Any individual Citizen or registered voter has A COMMON LAW RIGHT .to bring formal charges of OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT. MALFEASANCE OF OFFICE MISFEASANCE OF OFFICE NONFEASANCE OF OFFICE PERJURY OF THE ATTORNEYS OATH PERJURY OF THE PROSECUTORS OATH PERJURY OF THE JUDGES OATH AND. PERJURY OF THE GOVERNORS OATH OF OFFICE against any PUBLIC OFFICIAL who participates in the ILLEGAL UNLAWFUL . . . AND IMMORAL attempts to legalize the heinous crime against nature SODOMY by attempting to legalize SAME-SEX MARRIAGES! THAT S RIGHT SODOMY IS STILL A CRIME UNDER THE COMMON LAW! The legislature may not abolish a [common law] right without setting up some reasonable substitute. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396 (December 7, 1986). It is undisputed that DEMOCRACY is THE HIGHEST FORM OF COMMUNISM THAT EXISTS! TWO (2) CONSENTING ADULTS HAVE NO LEGAL OR LAWFUL PRIVACY RIGHTS TO COMMIT A CRIME PERIOD! TWO (2) WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT PERIOD! A MOB RULE OR MAJORITY VOTE CANNOT MAKE A CRIME AGAINST NATURE LEGAL OR LAWFUL! Even if Legislators and Senators were able to obtain a majority vote in favor of making SAME-SEX Marriages legal, the Washington State Supreme Court Judges have A SWORN DUTY pursuant to their. CONTRACTUAL OATHS OF OFFICE to uphold the laws of the State, the laws of the United States, the U.S. Constitution and the State Constitutions to strike down SAME-SEX Marriages as violative of the Common Law pursuant to MARBURY v. MADISON! In Marbury v Madison, the court said (John Marshal), in part;

"It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is....the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case; this is the very essence of judicial duty. Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cr.)137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). In Puget Sound Gillnetters vs. Moos, 88 Wn.2d 677, 687, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977) this court said: It is the duty of judges to declare and not to make the law. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15. Puget Sound Gillnetters vs. Moos, 88 Wn.2d 677, 687, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977). "Those [sodomy] statutes stand unrepealed, unabridged and unaltered and should be held to declare the law of this state." State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (Jan. 1975). "The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution." State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 P. 182 (1928). I AM HAPPY TO TELL YOU THAT BOTH THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE LAW. HOLDS THAT THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE DID NOT MAKE SODOMY LEGAL BY THEIR ALLEGED AND PURPORTED AND PRETEND AND FRAUDULENT ATTEMPTS TO REPEAL THE SODOMY STATUTE! SODOMY IS STILL AND WILL ALWAYS BE A CRIME UNDER THE COMMON LAW! THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE HAS NO LEGAL OR LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO REPEAL THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTE. Because 1 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed), p. 525, 2043 clearly states that A RIGHT OF COMMON LAW NATURE WHICH IS FURTHER EMBEDDED IN STATUTORY TERMS EXISTS AS AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT EXCLUSIVE OF THE STATUTE, THE RIGHT IS NOT EXPUNGED BY THE REPEAL OF THE STATUTE! Therefore, even if you FAKE JEWS in the Washington legislature go forward with your unlawful and criminally corrupt attempts to REPEAL THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTE the CrR 1.1 & CrRLJ 1.1 decisional laws as cited by 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed), page 525, 2043, clearly holds that THE COMMON LAW exists as an enforceable right exclusive of the statute, the right is not expunged by the repeal of the statute. Therefore, if you FAKE JEWS in the Washington legislature pretend to repeal the death penalty statute, the common law takes over and prevails the repealed statute. HOWEVER, NO LEGISLATOR OR SENATOR HAS THE STANDING TO REPEAL THE COMMON LAW! THE COMMON LAW PUNISHMENT FOR SODOMY STILL IS DEATH! The man also that lieth with the male, as one lieth with a woman, they have both committed abomination: they shall die the death, their blood shall be upon them. Leviticus 20:13 THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE HAS NO LEGAL OR LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO REPEAL THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTE.

SODOMY WILL FOREVER REMAIN A COMMON LAW CRIME AGAINST NATURE!! THE DEATH PENALTY WILL FOREVER REMAIN THE COMMON LAW. PUNISHMENT FOR SODOMY! NONE OF YOU HAVE THE STANDING TO REPEAL THE COMMON LAW! Both THE COMMON LAW and the CrR 1.1 DECISIONAL LAWS OF THIS STATE HOLDS THAT THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT TAKE AWAY A COMMON LAW RIGHT WITHOUT SETTING UP AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE BY STATUTE! In my opinion, the legislature may take away from the courts, as now established, the power to protect certain rights and to exercise certain remedies, provided that it supplies a reasonably adequate remedy in the place of the one abolished, BUT BY THE SAME TOKEN THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT ABOLISH A COMMON LAW RIGHT AND ITS REMEDY WITHOUT SETTING UP SOME REASONABLE SUBSTITUTE. To attempt to do so is to deny due process of law within the meaning of both the state and Federal constitutions. Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 42 S.Ct. 214; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S. Ct. 124, 27 A. L. R. 375; New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, L. R. A. 1917D, 1: Hanfgarn v. Mark, 289 N. Y. S. 143; In re Opinion of Justices, 211 Manus. 618, 98 N. E. 337. THIS STATE IS COMMITTED TO THAT DOCTRINE. The question, while not very clearly set forth, was necessarily decided in State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466, and State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 Pac. 645, L. R. A. 1917d, 10. THE RULE WAS CLEARLY STATED AND FOLLOWED BY THIS COURT IN THE CASE OF CASCO CO. V. THURSTON COUNTY, 163 Wash. 666, 2 P. (2d) 677, 77 A. L. R. 622. BLANCHARD v. GOLDEN AGE BREWING CO., 188 Wash. 396, 426, 427 [No. 25813. En Banc. December 7, 1936.] And; Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 426, 427 [No. 25813. En Banc. December 7, 1936, makes it very clear but by the same token THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT ABOLISH A COMMON LAW RIGHT AND ITS REMEDY WITHOUT SETTING UP SOME REASONABLE SUBSTITUTE, therefore the Legislature is required by the CrR 1.1 and the CrRLJ 1.1 decisional law of t his State to enact a New Sodomy statute and the decisional law under RCW 4.04.010 and RCW 9A.04.060 tells us that we are required to use the common law of England which only prohibited Anal Sex between men and bestiality. For protection of the public this new Sodomy statute should also prohibit men from performing sodomy on Women for the protection and safety and health of the general public. First, because the intentional infecting of a woman s vagina with another man or another woman s feces is likely to cause a vaginal infection and is far more likely to spread STD s such as AIDS. Second, because equal protection of the law requires that we treat both sex equally, therefore if we prohibit men from performing sodomy with another man, then we must prohibit men from performing sodomy with women.

The original common law statutes in England which we adopted only was directed at the man and only prohibited Anal Sex and Bestiality Exclusively and was NOT directed at the woman, however, since these descendants of the Egyptians and mixed Breed Canaanites who are in fact the Revelations 2:9 and Revelations 3:9 have not evolved and wish to bring us back to the days when their Neanderthal Ancestors were participating in the unlawful marriages as defined by the common law at Leviticus Chapter 18, we must enact a reasonable substitute, a New Sodomy Statute to protection Women from AIDS, vaginal infections and other sexually transmitted diseases, therefore this New Sodomy Statute should be written to also have a provision that specifically prohibits men from performing sodomy with women. The original common law statutes of England which we adopted originally had no provisions regarding blow jobs or fellatio or cunnilingus, mainly because the main purpose of the original Sodomy Statutes of England and Great Britain were directed at men to prohibit men from having sex with other men, we need to fill in these obvious gaps that were directed at men only and add a specific provision to the New Sodomy Statute specifically prohibiting men from giving other men oral sex and finally that men are not allowed to have any sexual contact whatsoever. All public kissing by men kissing other men in public would be specifically not allowed period. This would not violate equal protection of the law because a homosexual man would have the same rights to get a blow job from a woman that a heterosexual man has. This would not violate equal protection of the law because a homosexual man would have the same rights to perform fellatio or or oral sex that a heterosexual man has. Note: A father may kiss his son in a fatherly way. This New Sodomy Statute would NOT prohibit women from doing anything with other women, except that they may NOT engage in Sodomy by any other means, including all of the many various artificially made sexual devices toys. This would be consistent with the common law because women were taken from the rib of man, women are to be our helpmate as defined in Genesis 2:20 through Genesis 2:25. GOD MADE ADAM AND EVE! GOD DID NOT MAKE ADAM AND STEVE! Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 426, 427 [No. 25813. En Banc. December 7, 1936, ABSOLUTELY REQUIRES THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A NEW SODOMY STATUTE. THIS STATE IS COMMITTED TO THAT DOCTRINE. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing, 188 Wash. 396 [No. 25813. En Banc. December 7, 1936.] "Those statutes stand unrepealed, unabridged and unaltered and should be held to declare the law of this state." State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (Jan. 1975). "The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution." State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 P. 182 (1928). IN FACT UNDER BLANCHARD v. GOLDEN AGE BREWING CO., 188 Wash. 396 (December 7, 1986), THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE HAS A DUTY IMPOSED BY THE DECISIONAL LAWS OF WASHINGTON STATE TO ENACT A NEW SODOMY STATUTE PROHIBITING SODOMY BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT

ABOLISH A COMMON LAW RIGHT WITHOUT SETTING UP SOME REASONABLE SUBSTITUTE. THIS STATE IS COMMITTED TO THAT DOCTRINE. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing, 188 Wash. 396 [No. 25813. En Banc. December 7, 1936.] And see the American University Law Review, 24-835, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, at 837: "In statutory review cases, litigants derive legal rights from the statute. Congress, then, has created the right and in doing so has authorized standing to protect the right. By contrast, in the non-statutory review cases the Constitution or common law is the source of the legal rights which the litigant seek to vindicate. No congressional authorization is necessary in the form of a statutory right because of the existing legal protection. In fact, unlike statutory review, where claimants seek enforcement of a statute enacted for their protection, the non-statutory plaintiff typically seeks to have the statute declared unconstitutional." And; BY THE RECONSTRUCTION ACTS THE PEOPLES STATUS, LEGAL CHARACTER OR STANDING WAS CHANGED FROM ELECTORS TO. REGISTERED VOTERS. The Washington State Legislature NEVER HAD and. STILL HAS NO LEGAL and NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY to ever change the laws, much less make any amendments or repeals of any statutes contained in the Revised Code of Washington, because. REGISTERED VOTERS HAVE NO STANDING TO CHANGE LAWS PASSED DURING THE TIMES OF THE TERRITORIES BY THE LAWFUL ELECTORS. and this is the real reason why THE LEGISLATURE is being .HELD IN ABEYANCE BY THE CODE REVISER S OFFICE! REGISTERED VOTERS HAVE NO STANDING TO CHANGE LAWS THAT WERE ENACTED BY THE LAWFUL ELECTORS DURING THE TIMES OF THE TERRITORIES! But the legislature specifically disclaimed any intention to change the meaning of any statute. The compilers of the code were not empowered by congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing so ... ...the act before us does not purport to amend a section of an act, but only a section of a compilation entitled REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON, WHICH IS NOT THE LAW. Such an act purporting to amend only a section of the prima facie compilation leaves the law unchanged. En Banc. PAROSA v. TACOMA, 57 Wn.(2d) 409 (Dec.22, 1960). PAROSA v. TACOMA, CLEARLY STATES THAT: THE COMPILERS OF THE CODE WERE NOT EMPOWERED BY CONGRESS TO AMEND EXISTING LAW. PAROSA v. TACOMA, GOES ON TO SAY: SUCH AN ACT PURPORTING TO AMEND ONLY A SECTION OF THE PRIMA FACIE COMPILATION LEAVES THE LAW UNCHANGED. I decided to personally check on this so called repeal of Washington s Sodomy Laws and obtained A CERTIFIED COPY of Laws of Washington 1975 1st Ex. Sess., page 817, ch. 260, enacted June 27, 1975, effective July 1, 1976, TO VERIFY AND CONFIRM

WHETHER THE SODOMY STATUTE WAS IN FACT LAWFULLY OR LEGALLY REPEALED AND I DISCOVERED THAT THE SODOMY STATUTE WAS NOT LEGALLY OR LAWFULLY REPEALED! The legislative repeal of a statute which is merely declaratory of the common law, in the absence of a new statute stating some other rule, leaves the common law in effect. In 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p 525, 2043, the rule is stated as follows: However, a right of common law nature which is further embedded in statutory terms exists as an enforceable right exclusive of the statute declaratory of it, and therefore the right is not expunged by the repeal of the statute. State ex rel. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Frater, 18 Wn.2d 546, 553, 140 P.2d 272, at 275 (July 19, 1943). "Those [sodomy] statutes stand unrepealed, unabridged and unaltered and should be held to declare the law of this state." State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (Jan. 1975). "The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution." State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 P. 182 (1928). IT IS THEREFORE UNDISPUTED THAT SODOMY IS STILL A COMMON LAW CRIME! WHEN THE FACTS AND THE LAW SHOW THAT ONLY A SECTION OF A THE MERE COMPILATION ENTITLED REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON, WHICH IS NOT THE LAW, WAS REPEALED AND NOT THE UNDERLYING SESSION LAW, SENATE BILL OR HOUSE BILL, SUCH AN ACT PURPORTING TO REPEAL ONLY A SECTION OF THE PRIMA FACIE COMPILATION LEAVES THE LAW UNCHANGED! PAROSA v. TACOMA, 57 Wn.2d 409 (Dec. 22, 1960). See also Parosa v. Tacoma, 57 Wn.(2d) 409, 411, 412, 413, 415, 421 (Dec.22, 1960), which reads: The original code committee, created by Laws of 1941 chapter 149, p. 418, consisted of the State Law Librarian, the law librarian of the University of Washington, and the executive secretary of the judicial council. By section 2 of that, the committee was directed to adopt a complete re-compilation of the statute law of the state, but was not endowed with power to change the law. Two mimeographed volumes, containing the work product of the committee s employed staff, were deposited in the office of the secretary of state, but the text thereof was never presented to the legislature. The committee never approved it. One member alone recommended the adoption of the compilation as a prima facia code. A majority of the committee, in a report to the legislature dated January 13, 1949 strongly opposed adoption even as a prima facia code primarily because of the failure of its employed staff to observe its admonition not to tinker with the meaning of the statutes. Nevertheless, the two volumes then resting in the offices of the secretary of state were adopted by reference only as a prima facie compilation of the state s statute law. Laws of 1950, Ex Ses., chapter 16, p.33. But the legislature specifically disclaimed any intention to change the meaning of any statute. The compilers of the Code were not empowered by Congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing so ... Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 161, 79 L. Ed. 254, 55 S. Ct. 46. The text of section 2 of the act (Laws of 1950, Ex. Ses., chapter 16, p.33) is as follows: The contents of said code shall establish prima facie the laws of this state of a

general and permanent nature in effect on January 1, 1949, but nothing herein shall be construed as changing the meaning of any such laws. In case of any omissions or any inconsistency between any of the provisions of said code and the laws existing immediately preceding this enactment, the previously existing laws shall control. Such is but a statement of the law relative to the standing of a compilation of statutes. In the event of a discrepency between the law enacted by the legislature and a compilation, the legislative acts control. Parosa v. Tacoma, 57 Wn.(2d) 409, 411, 412, 413, 415, 421 (Dec.22, 1960). And; To understand what the framers intended, we look to the right as it existed at the time of the constitution s adoption. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 645, 771 P.2d 711, 780 P.2d 260 (1989). The Washington Supreme Court In construing section 21, this court has said that it preserves the right as it existed at common law in the territory at the time of it s adoption. Pasco, 98 Wn.2d at 96. The Territorial Code of 1881, ch. 1, 1, stated: The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States and the organic act and laws of Washington Territory, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this territory. Territorial Code of 1881, ch. 1, 1. The Territorial Code of 1881 is in fact and law the only valid. Statute law, as adopted by the legislature, prevails over a restatement thereof in the code. RCW 1.04.020-.021. STATE EX REL. ETC. v. MERCER ISL., 58 Wn. (2d) 141, 144 (April 20, 1961.) And; THE TERRITORIAL CODE IS THE STATUTE LAW THAT PREVAILS OVER THE RESTATEMENT THEREOF IN THE REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON! BLACKSTONES COMMENTARIES STATES THAT THE ANTI-SODOMY LAWS IN ENGLAND WERE WORDED IN THE CONJUNCTIVE AND STATED THAT .SODOMY WAS BOTH A CRIME AGAINST NATURE AND . . . A SIN AGAINST GOD. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buggery_Act_1533 The Code of 1881 later states that [a] ll offenses at common law, which are not hereinafter defined by statute, are indictable and triable in the district courts of this territory. Ch. LXVII, 782. Statute law, as adopted by the legislature, prevails over a restatement thereof in the code. RCW 1.04.020-.021. STATE EX REL. ETC. v. MERCER ISL., 58 Wn. (2d) 141, 144 (April 20, 1961.) And; State ex rel. etc. v. Mercer Island, 58 Wn.2d 141, 144 (April 20, 1961), makes it crystal clear that the Territorial Code of 1881 Ch. LXVII, 782, which is the Statute law as adopted by the Washington legislature prevails over the restatement thereof in the Revised Code of Washington at RCW 4.04.010 and RCW 9A.04.060. RCW 4.04.010 reads:

RCW 4.04.010 Extent to which common law prevails. The common law, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of the state of Washington nor incompatible with the institutions and condition of society in this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state. [1891 c 17 1; Code 1881 1; 1877 p 3 1; 1862 p 83 1; RRS 143. Formerly RCW 1.12.030.]. RCW 9A.04.060 Common law to supplement statute. The provisions of the common law relating to the commission of crime and the punishment thereof, insofar as not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes of this state, shall supplement all penal statutes of this state and all persons offending against the same shall be tried in the courts of this state having jurisdiction of the offense. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 9A.04.060.] RCW 9.01.120 Civil remedies preserved. The omission to specify or affirm in this act any liability to any damages, penalty, forfeiture or other remedy, imposed by law, and allowed to be recovered or enforced in any civil action or proceeding, for any act or omission declared punishable herein, shall not affect any right to recover or enforce the same. [1909 c 249 44; RRS 2296.] RCW 9.01.160 Application to existing civil rights. Nothing in this act shall be deemed to affect any civil right or remedy existing at the time when it shall take effect, by virtue of the common law or of the provision of any statute. [1909 c 249 43; RRS 2295.] Further, Washington State Court Rule CrRLJ 1.1 SCOPE, provides that. RULE 1.1 SCOPE These rules govern the procedure in the courts of limited jurisdiction of the State of Washington in all criminal proceedings and supersede all procedural statutes and rules that may be in conflict. They shall be interpreted and supplemented in light of the common law and the decisional law of this state. These rules shall not be construed to affect or derogate from the constitutional rights of any defendant. CrRLJ 1.1 The Territorial Code of 1881, ch. LXVII, 782 specifically embodied criminal common law, and the crimes that were traditionally prosecuted thereby. Code of 1881, ch. LXVII 782. THEREFORE SODOMY IS STILL IN FACT AND LAW A COMMON LAW CRIME! THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAW ALSO VIOLATES MANY PEOPLES RIGHTS UNDER THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THESE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS ARE SUBJECT TO ABUSE BY CLOGGING OUR COURTS WITH FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS INITIATED BY THOSE WHO WOULD HARASS FLOWER SHOPS AND WEDDING GOWN SHOPS AND BAKERIES AND CHURCHES AND CATERERS WHO REFUSE TO PROVIDE SERVICES FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGES! THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE AND THE GOVERNOR HAVE NO LEGAL RIGHT AND NO LAWFUL RIGHT TO ENFORCE SUCH ABOMINABLE LAWS SUCH AS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BY SUING ANY STATE LICENSED CORPORATION OR CHURCH THAT REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN YOUR UNLAWFUL MARRIAGES PURSUANT TO LEVITICUS 18!

ALL OF THESE BUSINESSES HAVE A RELIGIOUS RIGHT TO REFUSE TO PROVIDE ANY SERVICES TO THE MORALLY DEPRAVED AND SEXUALLY DEVIANT INDIVIDUALS! THE STATES HAVE NO RIGHT TO IMPOSE LAWS FOREIGN TO THE COMMON LAW SUCH AS SODOMY OR BESTIALITY UPON EVERYONE ELSE! THE STATES HAVE NO RIGHT TO FORCE THE PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE BY SOCALLED TOLERANCE OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IN THE PERMITTING OF SODOMY OR BESTIALITY. NO ONE HAS A VESTED PRIVACY RIGHTS TO COMMIT THE COMMON LAW CRIME AGAINST NATURE CALLED SODOMY PERIOD! The legal argument that two consenting adults have a right to privacy to do whatever they want to do to each other. Under article 1, section 7 of our Washington State Constitution is nothing more than legal gymnastics and twisting the meaning of legal principles to try to legitimize or justify desires to commit sexually deviant and perverted crimes against nature in direct violation of the common law. CAN TWO (2) CONSULTING ADULTS CLAIM A RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER ARTICLE 1, SECTION OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION TO: 1. COMMIT A BANK ROBBERY? 2.) COMMIT SHOPLIFTING? 3.) COMMIT ROBBERY OF A CONVENIENCE STORE? 4.) COMMIT ARSON? If two consenting adults don t have A RIGHT TO PRIVACY under article 1, section 7 of the State Constitution to commit the crimes of bank robbery, shoplifting, robbery of a convenience store or arson, what gives them the right to commit the heinous crime against nature called SODOMY???? TWO (2) CONSULTING ADULTS DO NOT HAVE ANY PRIVACY RIGHTS TO COMMIT A CRIME PERIOD! TWO (2) CONSENTING ADULTS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO COMMIT CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A CRIME PERIOD! SODOMY IS A CRIME PERIOD! TWO (2) CONSENTING ADULTS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO COMMIT CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SODOMY THE HEINOUS CRIME AGAINST NATURE IN VIOLATION OF THE COMMON LAW! TWO (2) CONSULTING ADULTS DO NOT HAVE ANY PRIVACY RIGHTS TO COMMIT THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF SODOMY PERIOD! THEREFORE A MAN COULD NEVER LEGALLY OR LAWFULLY. CONSUMMATE THE MARRIAGE WITHOUT COMMITTING A CRIME AGAINST NATURE IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE COMMON LAW!

A MARRIAGE CONTRACT IS NOT A VALID CONTRACT UNTIL THE MARRIAGE IS CONSUMMATED! IT IS IMPOSSIBILITY AT LAW FOR A MAN TO CONSUMMATE A MARRIAGE CONTRACT WITH ANOTHER MAN BECAUSE THEY CANNOT HAVE ANY. CHILDREN OR OFFSPRING! IT IS IMPOSSIBILITY AT LAW FOR A WOMAN TO CONSUMMATE A MARRIAGE CONTRACT WITH ANOTHER WOMAN BECAUSE THEY CANNOT HAVE ANY CHILDREN OR OFFSPRING! HAVING CHILDREN IS SPECIFICALLY AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSUMMATION OF A MARRIAGE. IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE COMMON LAW HOLDS THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACT IS NOT VALID UNTIL IT IS CONSUMMATED! 1) THE FIRST ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSUMMATING A MARRIAGE CONTRACT IS THAT YOU HAVE TO HAVE SEX WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT TWO MALES CAN NEVER DO WITHOUT COMMITTING SODOMY. THE HEINOUS CRIME AGAINST NATURE IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF. THE COMMON LAW. 2) THE SECOND ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSUMMATING A MARRIAGE CONTRACT IS THAT THE MAN AND WOMAN PROCREATE AND CREATE AN OFFSPRING OR CHILDREN WHICH IS AN IMPOSSIBILITY FOR TWO MEN OR TWO WOMEN TO DO! IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE COMMON LAW HOLDS THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACT CAN BE ANNULLED AT ANY TIME IF THE MARRIAGE IS NOT CONSUMMATED! THEREFORE, IF TWO MEN MARRY EACH OTHER, THEIR PRETEND MARRIAGE IS VOID AB INITIO AND NUNC-PRO-TUNC BECAUSE THEY CAN NEVER LEGALLY OR LAWFULLY. CONSUMMATE THE MARRIAGE! A MARRIAGE CONTRACT THAT IS NEVER LEGALLY OR LAWFULLY CONSUMMATED IS THE SAME AS AN ANNULLED MARRIAGE! ANNULLED MEANS YOU WERE NEVER MARRIED! ANNULMENT MEANS THAT YOU WERE NEVER MARRIED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE! Further, in 1961, all nine MEN of the Washington State Supreme Court ruled EN BANC i.e., UNANIMOUSLY. that THE REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON IS NOT THE LAW. THEREFORE, EVEN IF YOU PRETENDED TO PASS A PHONEY RCW STATUTE PRETENDING TO MAKE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES LEGAL, IT WILL NEVER BE LEGAL OR LAWFUL BECAUSE THE RCW STATUTES ARE NOT THE LAW! PROHIBITING SAME-SEX MARRIAGES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTIONS OF THE LAW PROVISIONS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT! A HOMOSEXUAL MAN HAS THE SAME RIGHTS TO MARRY A WOMAN THAT A HETEROSEXUAL MAN HAS! A LESBIAN WOMAN HAS THE SAME RIGHTS TO MARRY A MAN THAT A HETEROSEXUAL WOMAN HAS!

IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE DISCRIMINATION TO PROHIBIT A MAN FROM MARRYING A MAN BECAUSE WE ALSO PROHIBIT A WOMAN FROM MARRYING A WOMAN! THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IS NOT VIOLATED BY PROHIBITING BOTH SEXES FROM ENGAGING IN UNLAWFUL MARRIAGES EQUALLY! A SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CONTRACT WOULD ALWAYS BE SUBJECT TO ANNULMENT BECAUSE A MAN CANNOT LEGALLY HAVE SEX WITH ANOTHER MAN! A SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CONTRACT WOULD ALWAYS BE SUBJECT TO ANNULMENT BECAUSE A MAN CANNOT PROCREATE AND HAVE BABIES WITH ANOTHER MAN! ANNULMENT MEANS YOU WERE NEVER MARRIED! ANNULMENT MEANS YOUR MARRIAGE NEVER EXISTED! THEREFORE, ACCORDING TO THE LAW, PEOPLE OF THE SAME-SEX WOULD NEVER BE LEGALLY OR LAWFULLY MARRIED IN FACT OR LAW! UNTIL EITHER OR BOTH A MAN OR A WOMAN CAN PROVIDE PROOF THAT THEY CONCEIVED A CHILD BY ANAL PENETRATION AND HAD THE FIRST ANAL DELIVERY IN ALL THE KNOWN HISTORY YOUR PHONY PRETEND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CONTRACTS WILL NEVER BE LEGALLY OR LAWFULLY CONSUMMATED UNDER THE COMMON LAW! Washington incorporated this common law into territorial law in 1881 by statute, and upon statehood territorial law became law of the state. Code of 1881, section 1; CONST. art. XXVII, section 2. See also RCW 4.04.010 ( The common law shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state. ) Shall is imperative. State v. Krall, 125 Wn.2d 146, 148, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994). STATE v. VALENTINE, 132 Wn.2d 1, 41, 935 P.2d 1294 (May 1997). And; "Those statutes stand unrepealed, unabridged and unaltered and should be held to declare the law of this state." State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (Jan. 1975). "The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution." State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 P. 182 (1928). .the controlling statute which was a territorial enactment and antedates the constitution itself. Territorial laws have a specific constitutional sanction and approval which subsequent state statutes do not have. Art. XXVII, section 2, of the state constitution provides: All laws now in force in the Territory of Washington, which are not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitation, or are altered or repealed by the legislature: Provided, That this section shall not be construed as to validate any act of the legislature of Washington Territory granting shore or tide lands to any person, company or any municipal or private corporation. For a territorial statute to be invalid upon the ground that it is repugnant to this Constitution, it is necessary that there be some provision of the constitution which can be said to conflict with it. Thus, as an example, the territorial act providing for the extra judicial settlement of claims arising out of the relocation of roads became invalid by necessary implication in the light of Art. 1, section 16, of the constitution which vested eminent domain proceedings exclusively in the courts. State statutes are continuously

subject to scrutiny as to the propriety of their titles or the number of their subjects and are invalidated when the courts are not satisfied with them in this regard. Not so territorial acts. They are validated by the constitution itself. Thus, the territorial legislative technique of enactment is put beyond the reach of the court upon such grounds. Our constitutional forefathers were aware of the contempt statutes. They put no provision in the constitution repugnant to them. Under the validating provision in the constitution, the act of adopting it constituted a formal validation of the territorial acts in question. I think the courts are neither above the constitution nor the constitutionally validated territorial contempt statutes. STATE v. ESTILL, 55 Wn.2d 576, 582 [Nos. 33729, 33730. En Banc. February 4, 1960.] And; TERRITORIAL ACTS ARE VALIDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF. STATE v. ESTILL, supra. Gee, RCW Volume 0 Washington Constitution didn t exist in 1881???? It is undisputed that THE TERRITORIAL ACTS OF 1881 ARE VALIDATED BY THE 1878 WALLA WALLA CONSTITUTION! EVEN YOUR RCW 38 MILITIA & MILITARY AFFAIRS SUPREME COURT IN STATE v. ESTILL, SUPRA, has clearly acknowledged that TERRITORIAL ACTS ARE VALIDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF is a crystal clear recognition that THE 1878 WALLA WALLA CONSTITUTION as approved and ordered to be published 50,000 copies by the 50th CONGRESS on January 28, 1889 IS THE ONE (1) AND ONLY VALID WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION! It is undisputed that Congressional Records clearly shows that the the 1878 Walla Walla REAL Constitution for The State of Washington as approved by the 50TH CONGRESS 2d Session. SENATE MIS. DOC. No. 55. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. JANUARY 28, 1889. Presented by Mr. Voorhees, referred to the Committee on Territories, and ordered to be printed, to accompany Senate bill No. 185., which has never been repealed, is the one (1) and only Washington Constitution that was approved and ordered to be published by Congress! When a State forms a constitution, which is approved by Congress, it is estopped to deny its validity. The action of Congress cannot be inquired into, for the judicial is bound to follow the action of the political department. White v. Hart, 39 Ga., 306; Powell v. Boon, 43 Ala.l, 459" Luther v. Borden et al., 48 U.S. 1 (1849). And; In 1936, the Washington State Supreme Court clearly stated that Washington Territory became a State on February 22, 1889, six months prior to their alleged drafting of the phony RCW Volume 0 Constitution of July 4, 1889. "By the enabling act of Congress, passed Feb 22, 1889, the territory of Washington became The State of Washington. Ryan v. State, 188 Wash. 115, 61 P.2d 1276 (Wash, 1936). It is undisputed that the Washington State Supreme Court in Ryan v. State, supra, admitted that we became a State based upon the 1878 Walla Walla Constitution because it is the clearly recognized as the one (1) and only Washington Constitution that was reviewed, approved and ordered to be published in the Congressional Record as the

Constitution for the State of Washington, and because the other phony constitution that is contained in Volume 0 of the Revised Code of Washington did NOT even exist yet! This then existing qualification was recognized by the Washington Constitution upon its adoption in 1889 via art. XXVII, section 2, which recognized and retained all territorial laws then in effect. See Wash. CONST. art. XXVII, section 2; In re Bartz, 47 Wn.2d 161, 167, 287 P.2d 119 (1955); State v. Estill, 55 Wn.2d 576, 582, 349 P.2d 210, 89 A.L.R.3D 1251 (1960) (Mallery, J., concurring) (noting the provisions of WASH. CONST. art. XXVII, section 2, and stating: Territorial laws have a specific constitutional sanction and approval which subsequent state statutes do not have. ). GERBERDING v. MUNRO, 134 Wn.2d 188, 208, 209 949 P.2d 1366 [No. 65059-4. En Banc.] (January 8, 1998). And; TERRITORIAL LAWS HAVE A SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL SANCTION AND APPROVAL WHICH SUBSEQUENT STATE STATUTES DO NOT HAVE. GERBERDING v. MUNRO, supra. It is undisputed that THE TERRITORIAL CODE OF 1881 is based upon THE 1878 WALLA WALLA CONSTITUTION! The Washington State Supreme Court has clearly stated that. TERRITORIAL LAWS HAVE A SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL SANCTION AND APPROVAL WHICH SUBSEQUENT STATE STATUTES DO NOT HAVE clearly proves that the PHONY RCW WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION contained in VOLUME 0 of the REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON is just a mere RCW statute. WHICH IS NOT THE LAW as is so clearly stated in PAROSA v. TACOMA, 57 Wn.2d 409 (Dec. 22, 1960). The Territorial Code of 1881, ch. 1, 1, stated: The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States and the organic act and laws of Washington Territory, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this territory. Territorial Code of 1881, ch. 1, 1. "Those [sodomy] statutes stand unrepealed, unabridged and unaltered and should be held to declare the law of this state." State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (Jan. 1975). "The court has no authority to abrogate by rule a [common law] right guaranteed by the constitution." State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 P. 182 (1928). The Territorial Code of 1881 is the only valid Statute law, as adopted by the legislature, prevails over a restatement thereof in the code. RCW 1.04.020-.021. STATE EX REL. ETC. v. MERCER ISL., 58 Wn. (2d) 141, 144 (April 20, 1961.) And; The Code of 1881 later states that [a]ll offenses at common law, which are not hereinafter defined by statute are indictable and triable in the district courts of this territory. Ch. LXVII, 782. THEREFORE SODOMY IS STILL A COMMON LAW CRIME IN WASHINGTON STATE! In his concurring decision in the Bowers v. Hardwick, 278 U.S. 186 (1986) case, Supreme Court Justice Burgher wrote:

"...the proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient roots.' Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law....During the English Reformation when powers of the ecclesiastical courts were transferred to the King's Courts, the first English statute criminalizing sodomy was passed. Blackstone described 'the infamous crime against nature' as an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a heinous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a crime not fit to be named." ...To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching." Bowers v. Hardwick, 278 U.S. 186 (1986). <http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/history/history.htm <http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/wilde/wildelawpage.html <http://truthtellers.org/alerts/judaismhomosexuality.html It is undisputed that both RCW 4.04.010 & RCW 9A.04.060 clearly provides that THE COMMON LAW is still in effect in the State of Washington. Therefore, any attempt by the Washington Legislature to legalize SAME-SEX marriages would violate the common law pursuant to both RCW 4.04.010 & RCW 9A.04.060. Therefore, any attempt to legalize SAME-SEX marriages within the State of Washington without first repealing both the statutory protections of the common law as provided by both RCW 4.04.010 & RCW 9A.04.060 and the common law itself in it s entirety, would be violative of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Washington and therefore unconstitutional! However, because the Washington State Legislature is being held in abeyance by the Code Reviser s Office, it can NEVER legally or lawfully repeal the Sodomy Statute! Therefore since Sodomy is still a Common Law Crime, the Washington State Legislature could NEVER legally or lawfully legalize. SAME-SEX marriages! THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS DO NOT GIVE FAIR WARNING THAT TWO (2) CONSENTING ADULTS DO NOT HAVE ANY PRIVACY RIGHTS TO COMMIT THE COMMON LAW CRIME OF SODOMY IN VIOLATION OF. THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF BOTH THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION! UNTIL THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE REPEALS BOTH RCW 4.04.010 . & RCW 9A.04.060 SAME-SEX MARRIAGES VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION! UNTIL THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE REPEALS BOTH RCW 4.04.010 . & RCW 9A.04.060 SAME-SEX MARRIAGES VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE OF THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION! However, you can NEVER repeal the common law!

NO WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATOR HAS THE LEGAL STANDING TO REPEAL THE COMMON LAW! RICHARD SANDERS of the WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT. laid it out very well in State v. Valentine, 132 wn.2d 1, 53, 935 p.2d 1294 (may 1st, 1997), that UPON STATEHOOD THAT THE TERRITORIAL LAW BECAME THE LAW OF THE STATE. PAROSA v. TACOMA, 57 Wn.(2d) 409 (Dec.22, 1960), further makes it clear that CONGRESS NEVER EMPOWERED THE STATES WITH ANY AUTHORITY TO CHANGE THE MEANING OF ANY STATUTE and that when they amend a mere section of the prima facie compilation of the Revised Code of Washington IT LEAVES THE LAW UNCHANGED, therefore, since the Washington Legislature only repealed a mere section of the RCW statute for Sodomy, it leaves the Sodomy law unchanged and therefore SODOMY IS STILL A CRIME IN WASHINGTON STATE! SINCE SODOMY IS STILL A COMMON LAW CRIME, YOU CAN NEVER MAKE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES LEGAL OR LAWFUL! SINCE SODOMY WILL ALWAYS BE A COMMON LAW CRIME, YOU CAN NEVER MAKE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES LEGAL OR LAWFUL! As an American Citizen, I have A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT to . THE REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES and to DEMAND THAT ALL OF YOU TO REPENT AND START FOLLOWING GODS LAW! Sincerely, Luis Ewing PS - Any further attempts to legalize SAME-SEX marriages will result in me releasing to the Public my legal briefings proving that Women do NOT now and in fact have NEVER had the Right to Vote or Run for Public Office or Hold any Public Office, which will clearly show that Christine Gregoire was NEVER legally or lawfully the Attorney General of this State and that she is NOT now and has NEVER been the Governor of Washington State! ***************** I have the FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE REDRESS OF MY GRIEVANCES . to publicly state MY OPINION as to all the following regarding THE SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF THE VIPER who are those .WHO CALL THEMSELVES THE JEW but who are NOT THE JEW . but are from THE SYNAGOGUE OF SATAN under the following sections of THE REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON to wit: I have the Constitutional RIGHT to informational picket and distribute these flyers to all members of the public here in this YAHOO GROUP and THE INTERNET by E-MAIL to inform them that a certain ilk of people who are those who call themselves the Jew, but who are NOT the Jew as is clearly stated in Revelations 2:9, Revelations 3:9 and John 8:44 and are in fact the Mixed Breed Canaanites and Neanderthal Men who have infiltrated our Washington State Legislature in order to form a secret steering committee in criminal conspiracy and collusion to make criminal attempts to legalize criminal acts against

nature in violation of the common law are in fact breaking the laws of the State of Washington pursuant to the following authorities to wit: RCW 9.81.120 Constitutional rights--Censorship or infringement. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize, require or establish any military or civilian censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon freedom of the press or freedom of speech or anusembly within the meaning and the manner as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States or of the state of Washington and no regulation shall be promulgated hereunder having that effect. [1951 c 254 19.] RCW 10.14.020 (1) Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning course of conduct. RCW 10.14.020 (2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to infringe upon any constitutionally protected rights including, but not limited to, freedom of speech and freedom of anusembly. RCW 9A.50.060 Informational picketing. Nothing in RCW 9A.50.020 shall prohibit either lawful picketing or other publicity for the purpose of providing the public with information. [1993 c 128 8.] A law criminalizing speech is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment ''if it sweeps within its prohibitions constitutionally protected free speech activities.'' City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19, 26, 992 P.2d 496 (2000); City of Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wn.2d 923, 925, 767 P.2d 572 (1989); City of Everett v. Moore, 37 Wn. App. 862, 864-65, 683 P.2d 617 (1984); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). In recognition of their enormous powers as law enforcement officers of the Jewish Police State, police and FAKE JEWS must be prepared to endure more criticism than would a private individual. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 at page 454 (1987) overturned the conviction of a person who shouted pick on somebody your own size to a police officer in the course of his duties. The freedom of individuals to oppose or challenge police action and all of you FAKE JEWS . . . without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a JEWISH police state. Houston v. Hill, supra, at pages 462-463. While police, no less than anyone else, may resent having obscene words and gestures directed at them, they may not exercise the awesome power at their disposal to punish individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful, but protected by the First Amendment. Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990). Accord, MacKinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995) (chalk drawing saying A Jewish police state is more expensive than a welfare state - we guarantee it is constitutionally protected criticism of police and defendant properly refused to stop writing); Bufkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1990) (the Jewish officer or Jewish Judge could not arrest defendant for calling him a faggot ). *AUTHORITY TO PRACTICE LAW WITHOUT ADMISSION by the WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT: RCW 2.48.190; RCW 38.38.256; 5 U.S.C. 500 (b); RCW 34.05.428 (1)(2); RCW 4.92.100; RCW 4.96.020; RCW 11.94.010; RCW 64.36.035; RCW 26.16.090; RCW 26.25.010; RCW 26.21.005 (19)(a); RCW 26.21A.005 (21)(a); RCW

26.26.011 (19); RCW 26.27.021 (16); RCW 26.27.041; 18 U.S.C. 1154; 18 U.S.C. 1161; 18 U.S.C. 2265; 25 U.S.C. 1301; 25 U.S.C. 1903 (4); 25 U.S.C. 1903 (8); 25 U.S.C. 1911 (a)(b)(c); 25 U.S.C. 1901 -1963 ( ICWA ); 25 U.S.C. 3631; 43 U.S.C. 1602; 44 Fed. Reg. 67584 to 67595 (1979); 26 CFR 305.7871-1 (a); 26 U.S.C. 7701 (a)(40)(A); 31 CFR Subtitle A, 10.3; 8 CFR Ch. 1, 292.1; 8 U.S.C. 1401 (b); 25 U.S.C. 465; RCW 2.48.170; RCW 2.48.180 (7); APR 1.1 (a); GR 24 (b)(8); Sections 3275 & 3276 of the Territorial Code of 1881; 28 U.S.C. 1333; 28 U.S.C. 1652; FRCP Rule 64; RCW 4.04.010; RCW 1.12.030; RCW 9A.04.060; RCW 9.81.120; RCW 10.14.020 (1); RCW 10.14.020 (2); RCW 9A.50.060; 31 CFR Subtitle A; 31 CFR Subtitle A, 10.3; 8 CFR Ch. 1, 292.1; 8 CFR 292.1-3; 25 CFR 20; 14 CFR 300.1-6, 302.11; 12 CFR 19.3; 16 CFR 1024.61; 7CFR 273; 7 CFR 50.27; 35 U.S.C. 31-33; 57 CFR 1.34; 5 CFR part 1201; 32 CFR 12.40, 12.45; 45 CFR 205; 21 CFR 1316.50; 20 CFR 802.201 (b), 802.202; 20 CFR 501.11; 45 U.S.C. 3153; 45 U.S.C. 151; 20 CFR 725.362 (a), 725.365, 725.366 (b); 46 CFR 201.21; 38 CFR 14; 12 CFR 308.04; 18 CFR 385.2101; 29 CFR 2700.3 (b); 31 U.S.C. 731-32; 4 CFR 11, 28, GAO Orders 2713.2, 2752.1 and 2777.1; 13 CFR Part 10; 31 U.S.C. 330; 49 CFR 1103; 49 CFR 1103.3; 12 CFR 747; 29 CFR 1200; 49 CFR 821, 831, 845; 29 CFR 2200.22); 13 CFR 121.11, 134.16; 42 U.S.C 406 (a); 20 CFR 416, subpart O; 29 CFR 1614.605; 40 CFR 124, 164.30, 22.10; Schoonover v. State, 116 Wn.App. 171, 64 P.3d 677 (March 11, 2003); Lowell Bar Anus n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27 (Manus., 1943); U.S. v. Tarlowksi, 69-2 U.S.T.C., DC. E. DIST. N.Y.) 305 F.Supp. 112 (1969); In re Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn. 1995); Oregon State Bar. v. Ortiz, 713 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Or.App. 1986); People By Lefkowitz v. Lawrence Peska Anusoc., 393 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (1977); Pulse v. North American Land Title Co., 707 P.2d 1105 (Mont. 1985); Cain v. National Bank and Trust Co., 268 N.W. 719, 723 (N.D. 1936); Louisiana Bar Anus n v. Edwin, 519 So.2d 93 (La. 1988); Oregon State Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); In re Joseph Children, 470 S.E.2d 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Sequa Corp. v. Lititech, Inc., 780 F.Supp. 1349, 1352 (D. Colo. 1992); Taylor v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 874 P.2d 806, 809 (Okla. 1994); State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 371 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Ariz. 1962); State ex rel Indiana State Bar Anus n v. Indiana Real Estate Anus n Inc., 191 N.E.2d 711 (Ind., 1963); Ingham County Bar Anus n v. Walter Neller & Co., 69 N.W.2d 713 (Mich., 1955); Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.E2d 855 (Mo., 1952); Cowern v. Nelson, 290 N.W. 795 (Minn., 1940); Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows Inc., et al., 377 P.2d 334, 340 (Ore., 1962); LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 368 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948); Conway-Boque Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Anus n, 312 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1957); Lawyers and The Realtors: Arizona s Experience, 49 ABAJ 139 (Feb. 1963); 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257, AT 264 (N.J. - 1970); Board of Immigration Appeals; Bureau of Indian Affairs; Department of Agriculture; Department of Commerce; Department of Health and Human Services; Public Health and Human Services; Department of Justice; Department of Transportation; Department of Veteran Affairs; Internal Revenue Service; U.S. Customs Service; The Judiciary Act of 1789, September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, CHAP. XX Sec. 35, 28 U.S.C. 1654, the Sixth Amendment and First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article 1, section s 1, 2, 22, 29 and 30 of the Washington State Constitution, CrR 1.1, CrRLJ 1.1, CrR 1.3 (a) and ARLJ No. 7. See also CR 82.5 (a) & RCW 13.34.240. * CAVEAT WITH OPT OUT AND REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS HERE: This E-Mail is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510 to 18 U.S.C. 2521;

RCW 9.73.030 (1)(a)(b); RCW 9A.52.110; RCW 9A.52.120; RCW 9A.52.130 and RCW 9.73.020 and is legally privileged and you do NOT have my consent for forward this email to anyone. The information contained in this E-Mail is intended only for use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or attorney or agent responsible to deliver it to the Sendee, please destroy the E-Mail after advising by reply that you erroneously received this EMail. The receipt by anyone other than the designated recipient does NOT waive the lawyer or of-counsel client privilege, nor will it constitute a waiver of the workproduct doctrine. Any information obtained in violation of RCW 9.73.030; RCW 9A.52.110; RCW 9A.52.120; RCW 9A.52.130 and RCW 9.73.020 is inadmissible in court pursuant to RCW 9.73.050 and further, anyone who forwards this e-mail to anyone else without my express prior written consent is liable for civil monetary damages under Washington law pursuant to RCW 9.73.060 and criminal penalties under RCW 9.73.080. The information contained in this transmission is privileged and confidential and may be hazardous to your preconceptions. FREE DISTRIBUTION: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed free only to those specific recipients listed above who have previously expressed an interest in receiving the information for research and educational purposes and have made a prior request for said information. If the reader of this message is not the intended addressee, the reader is hereby notified that any consideration, dissemination or duplication of this communication is strictly prohibited. RCW 9.73.030 (1)(a)(b)(C); RCW 9.73.050; RCW 9.73.060 and RCW 9.73.080 This message is being sent to you in compliance with the current Federal legislation for commercial e-mail (H.R.417 SECTION101Paragraph (e)(1)(A)) AND Bill s.1618 TITLE III passed by the 105th U.S. Congress. REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS: This message cannot be considered SPAM as long as it includes: 1) contact information, and 2) a way to be removed from future e-mailings. If this e-mail communication has reached you in error, or should you wish to be permanently removed from the mailing list, PLEASE SEND ME AN E-MAIL REQUESTING THAT I REMOVE YOU FROM MY E-MAIL LIST AND I WILL REMOVE YOU WITHIN 72 HOURS FROM MY RECEIPT OF YOUR E-MAIL although it may take me 4 to 5 days to catch up to your e-mail because I get so many e-mail request s for my FREE FLYERS from all over the U.S. or please return to the below listed address asking me to remove you to Luis Ewing, c/o General Delivery, (City of) Copalis Crossing, The State of Washington [98536] or call and leave a message with your E-Mail address and request to be removed at (253) 226-3741 Thank you!