T H E

G R E A T

M A R C H H F L I B E R A T I O N
Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. KONEV < POLAND ACHIEVES FREEDOM

Marshal of the Soviet Union

M. V. ZAKHAROV

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SPRING OF FREEDOM IN RUMANIA

Colonel-General

A. S. ZHELTOV

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T E 3rd UKRAINIAN FRONT IN T E BALKANS H H

Marshal of the Soviet Union

A. A. GRECHKO

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LIBERATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Colonel-General

M. N. SHAROKHIN

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B T L IN HUNGARY ATE

Lieutenanf-General IS1j PROGRESS PUBLISHERS Moscow

K. F. TELEGIN

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T E FINALE H

Translated from the Russian by David Fidlon Designed by G. Dmitriyev

CONTENTS

TO THE READER I. S. Konev. POLAND ACHIEVES FREEDOM Road of Victories On the Other Side of the Border Lvov-Sandomierz Operation Before the Complete Rout of the Enemy Battles in Western Poland Comradeship-in-Arms M. V. Zakharov. SPRING OF FREEDOM IN RUMANIA . . . On the Soviet-Rumanian Border Decisive Battles Shoulder to Shoulder with the Soviet Army A. S. Zheltov. THE 3rd UKRAINIAN FRONT IN THE BALKANS From the Volga to the Danube . . Liberation of Bulgaria Assistance to the People of Yugoslavia First printing 1972 A. A. Grechko. LIBERATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA . . . An Historic Mission Assistance to the Insurgents Dukla Ahead The Pressure Increases

7 9 9 14 27 37 41 63 75 75 87 104 111 Ill 121 132 145 145 148 154 160

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Bypassing the Carpathians The Battle for Moravska Ostrava Liberation of Bratislava and Brno Forward, Towards Prague Friendship Cemented with Blood M. N. Sharokhin. BATTLE IN HUNGARY In the Flames of Battles Budapest Encircled The Enemy Counterattacks Budapest Is Free The Balaton Defensive Operation South of Lake Balaton On Vienna K. F. Telegin. THE FINALE On the Eve of the Battle The Hour Strikes Forward, on Berlin AFTERWORD

165 171 177 182 188 194 199 208 211 218 221 228 233 241 242 254 260 280

TO THE READER

Over a quarter of a century has passed since the time when having cleared the USSR of the nazi invaders the Soviet troops entered the territories of their western neighbours and brought them liberty. Many books and memoirs have been written about that great phase of the Second World W a r . 'The Great March of Liberation is a collection of articles and reminiscences written by renowned Soviet wartime and postwar military commanders. It is an account of the heroic actions of the Soviet Army which liberated many European nations from nazi oppression. The authors are Soviet marshals and generals who commanded fronts and armies, headed senior staffs, or guided Party, political, ideological and educational work among the troops during the war. Their accounts of military operations are genuine historical documents. Presenting a broad and vivid panorama of the Soviet Army's campaigns in Europe at the concluding phase of the war, this book hits hard at the falsifiers of history who want lo belittle the role played by the Soviet Union in smashing nazi Germany and make people forget the Soviet Army's great march of liberation.
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Marshal of the Soviet Union

I. S. KONEV

POLAND ACHIEVES FREEDOM

Road of Victories T h e defeat of the Wehrmacht in Poland was a momentous event of the Great Patriotic W a r of the Soviet Union and an extremely important page in the history of the Polish people. German imperialism began the Second W o r l d W a r by attacking Poland in September 1939, and though the Polish people fought with great determination the odds were too great and Poland was defeated the same month. She had no dependable allies and her bourgeois government had rejected Soviet assistance. Having established a brutal occupation regime the Germans for almost six years resorted to armed force to consolidate their domination in the country. On June 22, 1941, the nazi hordes launched their notorious Drang nach Osten from Polish territory for the purpose of destroying the world's first socialist state. Hitler intended to use the Soviet Union's vast material resources to ensure nazi Germany's victory in the Second W o r l d W a r . But these wild plans crumbled the same year. The historic victories of the Soviet troops at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and on the Dnieper, at Leningrad, in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper and in the Crimea predetermined nazi Germany's defeat. T h e hour of liberation for the nations of
9

Central and Southeast Europe from the nazi invaders was near. The Soviet Army's shattering blows at the enemy, its emergence at the borders of the countries of Central and Southeast Europe and the upsurge of the national liberation movement of their peoples, compelled the governments of the USA and Britain at long last to open a second front and to land their troops in the north of France. But even then the Soviet-German front continued to be the principal arena of struggle between the two opposing coalitions. By the summer of 1944 Germany found herself in an unfavourable political and strategic situation. Hoping for a split in the anti-Hitler coalition, the German High Command tried to drag out the war on two fronts for as long as possible. It strengthened the strategic defences on the Eastern front in an effort to hold back the advancing Soviet Army, wear it down and achieve a favourable outcome of the war. Expecting the Soviet troops to strike the main blow in the southwest the German Command concentrated its main forces between the Pripyat River and the Black Sea, deploying 111 divisions (including 24 panzer and motorised divisions, and 10 brigades) along a 1,000-kilometre front. These forces made up 40 per cent of the infantry and over 70 per cent of the panzer and motorised divisions operating on the Soviet-German front whose total length at the time was 4,450 kilometres. At the same time it took measures to strengthen the central sector of the front, where the so-called Byelorussian Balcony was defended by the fairly powerful Army Group Centre consisting of 50 divisions and three brigades. The military and political situation was more favourable for the Soviet Armed Forces, which had become the strongest in the world. After three years of fighting they had surpassed the enemy in combat efficiency, arms and in the morale of the troops. The Soviet Union had all the technical, military and political prerequisites for administering a decisive defeat on nazi Germany. Despite the heavy losses in men and weapons sustained in 1942 and 1943, the German Command still had considerable material resources and huge armed forces capable of offering serious resistance. But the Soviet Armed Forces had
10

everything they needed to carry out the fundamental tasks of the war, and the Soviet Supreme Command could now launch decisive offensive operations, not only for the purpose of driving all enemy forces out of the USSR, but also of liberating the countries of Central and Southeast Europe from nazi occupation. In the summer of 1944 and in the winter and spring of 1945 the Soviet Army conducted vast-scale offensive operations along the entire Soviet-German front, which ended in the rout of the Wehrmacht and the liberation of the countries of Central and Southeast Europe. Poland was liberated as a result of the summer-autumn campaign in 1944 and the Soviet Army's final campaign in Europe in 1945. The liberation of Poland can be divided into two phases. The first phase (June-August 1944) included the Byelorussian and the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operations which ended in the liberation of a part of Polish territory east of the Vistula and Narew rivers. The Soviet troops consolidated themselves on bridgeheads captured on the western banks of these rivers. The second phase (January-May 1945) comprised the Vistula-Oder, East Prussian, East Pomeranian, West Carpathian, Upper and Lower Silesian, Berlin and Prague offensive operations in the course of which the Soviet troops liberated the whole of Poland. Five Soviet fronts, totalling 29 field armies, five tank and six air armies and six assault artillery corps from the Supreme Command Reserve took part in the giant battles in Poland in 1944 and 1945. The Soviet troops operating in the central sector of the Soviet-German front launched two major strategic operations, Byelorussian and Lvov-Sandomierz, in June and July 1944. Their objective, as planned by GHQ, was to rout army groups Centre and North Ukraine, liberate the whole of Byelorussia and the western regions of the Ukraine, start the liberation of Poland and Czechoslovakia and to bring the Soviet troops to the borders of East Prussia. In view of the configuration of the frontline and the numerous Polessye marshes which divided the western theatre of operations in two, G H Q planned to smash the enemy groups one after another and not simultaneously. The first blow was to be dealt at Army Group Centre in Byelorussia and the second at Army Group North Ukraine.
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Justly regarded as one of the biggest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War, the Byelorussian operation was conducted by the 1st Baltic and the 3rd, 2nd and 1st Byelorussian fronts, formations of the Soviet Air Defence forces, the strategic air force, the Dnieper Flotilla and Byelorussian partisan formations. Launched on June 23 the operation was completed on August 29, 1944. Swiftly piercing the entire operational depth of the enemy defences simultaneously in six sectors, the Soviet troops surrounded and routed the main forces of Army Group Centre at Bobruisk, Vitebsk and east of Minsk. The Byelorussian Balcony collapsed under the powerful blows of the Soviet forces which by the middle of July had advanced 500 kilometres in the western direction and had come close to the Polish border. The crushing defeat sustained by the Wehrmacht in Byelorussia forced the German Command to put through a series of radical measures. The commander of Army Group Centre Field Marshal Busch, was removed from his post, and in the period from June 23 to July 15, 1944, the group was reinforced with four infantry and four panzer divisions rushed from Army Group North Ukraine, three infantry and one panzer division from Army Group North, and one infantry and one panzer division from Army Group South Ukraine. In July another six infantry and two panzer divisions and four brigades were transferred to Army Group Centre from the west. With the help of these fresh forces the German Command hoped at any cost to prevent the Soviet troops from cutting off Army Group North in the Baltic Sea area and to reestablish the front along the Niemen River. To thwart these plans the Soviet Supreme Command fed reserves into the armies advancing in Byelorussia. In the period from July 10 to 24, the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts and the Leningrad Front went over to the offensive to liberate the Soviet Baltic region. On July 13, the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive in the Lvov sector. At the same time the Soviet Command continued to reinforce the troops on the offensive in Byelorussia. On July 18 it committed a powerful group on the left flank of the 1st Byelorussian Front to action in the Lublin sector, thus ex12

tending the strategic front of the offensive and tying down enemy forces deployed from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. Having expelled the last of enemy forces from Soviet territory, the Soviet Armed Forces promptly launched preparations to fulfil their great mission of liberating the peoples of Eastern Europe from nazi tyranny. The Polish people, all Polish patriots looked forward to the day when they would be freed by the Soviet Army. Guided by the Polish Workers' Party they fought courageously against the nazi enslavers. In May 1942, amidst vicious nazi terror in Poland, the Polish Workers' Party formed the Gwardia Ludowa, its military organisation which launched active military operations against the invaders. Conducted jointly with the guerilla groups of other underground organisations, these operations strengthened the ties of the Polish Workers' Party with the country's patriotic and democratic forces. Soviet partisan detachments, which in 1942 were also fighting in Poland, conducted successful operations jointly with the Gwardia Ludowa. Formed in the underground at the close of 1943-beginning of 1944 on the initiative of the Polish Workers' Party, the Krajowa Rada Narodowa became the embryo of the people's rule of future free Poland. The Krajowa Rada Narodowa organised the Armia Ludowa, with Gwardia Ludowa as its nucleus, which subsequently absorbed many detachments of other underground Polish organisations. The establishment of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa and Armia Ludowa inaugurated a fresh phase in the popular armed struggle against the nazi invaders in Poland, and signalled the complete failure of the Polish emigre government's wait-and-see policy. In 1944, the Soviet Army's victories considerably strengthened the co-operation of Poland's patriotic forces with the USSR, and in May that year a plenipotentiary delegation from the Krajowa Rada Narodowa arrived in the USSR after crossing the frontline. The Soviet Government recognised the Krajowa Rada Narodowa as the sole legitimate representative of the Polish people and increased its assistance to fighting Poland to a still greater extent. The Soviet
13

Union's consistent defence of the Polish people's interests proved to be of great help in their struggle for liberation. Polish reactionary circles were exceedingly alarmed by the victories of the Soviet Army, the intensiiication of the national liberation movement, the establishment of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa and Armia Ludowa, the mounting prestige and influence of the Polish Workers' Party and the increased political activity of the masses. Headed by the emigre government in London, they concentrated all their efforts on frustrating the development of the national liberation movement, weakening and paralysing the people's struggle against the invaders, undermining the positions of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa and the Polish Workers' Party and erecting a wall between them and the people. Polish reactionaries launched a vicious struggle against the Polish Workers' Party and Polish democratic forces. They brutally killed many Polish patriots who fought against the nazis and supported the policy of the Polish Workers' Party. In its activity directed against the interests of the Polish people, the Polish emigre government relied on the support of the US and British ruling circles who were planning to re-establish the old, prewar order in Poland. On the Other Side of the Border The liberation of Poland began in July 1944 when, stepping up their offensive, the Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts, reached the Soviet-Polish border and crossed thp/ Western Bug River. Although the operations in Byelorussia were on the whole successful, G H Q deemed it necessary, following the rout of the enemy group at Minsk, to modify the composition and the tasks of each front, and on July 4 issued a directive to this effect. T h e 2nd Byelorussian Front (commanderGeneral of the Army G. F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council Lieutenant-General L. Z. Mekhlis, chief of staffLieutenantGeneral A. N. Bogolyubov) was to capture the area of Novogrudki and reach the Niemen and Molchad rivers not later than July 12 or 13 and then drive the enemy out of Volkovyssk and advance on Bialystok. T h e front was to be
14

reinforced with the 3rd Army transferred from the neighbouring 1st Byelorussian Front. The right wing of the 1st Byelorussian Front (commanderMarshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky, member of the Military Council Lieutenant-General K. F. Telegin, chief of staffColonelGeneral M. S. Malinin) was to advance in the general direction of Brest and reach the line Slonim-Shchara RiverPinsk by between July 10 and 12. After that the front's left wing was to smash the enemy's Lublin-Brest group of forces, capture Brest and Lublin and gain a bridgehead on the west bank of the Vistula. G H Q planned to launch this offensive, which it called the Lublin-Brest operation, in the latter half of July. In this way it intended to smash the enemy forces covering Warsaw with two blows dealt simultaneously by both wings of the front. On July 20, the 2nd Byelorussian Front which was advancing on Grodno reached the Grodno-Svisloch line in the direct proximity of the Soviet-Polish border. The German Command, however, had by that time managed to bring up about ten divisions from the rear and other sectors of the front, organise defence and undertake a series of counterattacks. In the situation the command of the 2nd Byelorussian Front ordered the second-echelon 49th Army under Lieutenant-General I. T. Grishin to go into action between the advancing 50th Army under General I. V. Boldin and the 3rd Army commanded by Colonel-General A. V. Gorbatov. As a result, the enemy resistance was crushed and in the latter half of July the troops of the 2nd Byelorussian Front began to liberate Polish territory. On July 27 the 3rd Army liberated Bialystok, one of the biggest towns in Northeast Poland, and a number of other inhabited localities. The armies of the right wing of the 1st Byelorussian Front were also developing their offensive. The 48th Army under Lieutenant-General P. L. Romanenko, the 65th Army under Colonel-General P. I. Batov and some elements under Lieutenant-General A. A. Luchinsky's 28th Army reached the Polish border between July 15 and 18 and deployed their main forces between the upper reaches of the Narew River and the Brest area. The 65th Army, whose 105th Corps under General D. F. Alexeyev captured Bialowieza on July 17, was the first to enter the territory of our ally Poland (in its present-day frontiers). On the following day the 65th
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Army seized Hajnowka, Kleszczele and Mielejgice. To meet the threat posed by the 28th Army driving on Brest and bypassing the town from the northwest, the German Command shifted to the area its operational reserves and part of the forces deployed in the Kovel-Lublin sector. Taking advantage of the favourable situation Marshal Rokossovsky struck a blow with the front's main forces, which had assembled on the left wing, in the direction of Brest and Lublin and also in the direction of Siedlce. On July 18 the front's strike force consisting of the 70th, 47 th and 8th Guards armies, the 69th Army, the Polish 1st Army, the 2nd Tank Army and the 1st Tank and 2nd Cavalry corps assumed the offensive from the area of Kovel. The blow was directed between Army Group Centre and Army Group North Ukraine, the weakest point in the enemy's defences. Forcing the German troops into a hasty retreat across the Western Bug, the 1st Byelorussian Front on July 20 reached this river, which formed the border with Poland, to the south of Brest. The Germans had permanent defences along the Western Bug. They began to build them in 1939 following the nazi occupation of Poland and renewed and strengthened them since the spring of 1943. Concentrated mainly along the western bank the defensive installations consisted of strongpoints complete with trench systems. The Germans had turned the town of Brest, which covered the approaches to the Western Bug along the W a r saw Highway, into a powerful fortified area surrounded by three defensive lines. The rear defensive line which took the Germans a long time to build passed along the western banks of the Narew and the Vistula. On the Vistula it also included the Warsaw defensive area with strongpoints covering the river's eastern bank. The enemy, however, lacked sufficient forces to occupy these defensive lines and intermediate positions well in advance, and when the Soviet troops reached the Western Bug the German Command was trying to organise defences along the river bank by deploying the retreating remnants of the forces routed west of Kovel. But it failed to concentrate the necessary troops along this line in time to meet the rapidly advancing units of the 1st Byelorussian Front. By the evening of July 20 the advanced elements of the
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47th Army under Lieutenant-General N. I. Gusev, the 8th Guards Army under Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov and the 69th Army under Lieutenant-General V. Y. Kolpakchi had crossed the river in a number of sectors and prevented the enemy from entrenching on its western bank. The Soviet drive was so swift that in some sectors the enemy had no time to demolish the river crossings thus making things easier for the Soviet troops. And so on July 20, 1944, the left wing of the 1st Byelorussian Front entered Poland's eastern regions. The 8th Guards and the 69th armies were among the first to cross into Polish territory. By capturing bridgeheads on the west bank of the Western Bug, the Soviet troops created favourable conditions for developing their offensive in the northwesterly direction on Siedlce bypassing the Brest fortified area, and in the westerly direction towards Lublin, a very important political and administrative centre in eastern Poland. At a secret meeting in Warsaw on July 21, 1944, the Krajowa Rada Narodowa decided to form the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzvolenia Narodowego) as a provisional administrative organ in Poland's liberated areas. The Committee included leaders of the Polish underground revolutionary liberation movement and leading Polish emigrants in the Soviet Union. At the same time the meeting decided to merge the Polish 1st Army formed by the Dnion of Polish Patriots in the USSR, the Armia Ludowa, which was operating behind enemy lines and a number of other partisan detachments into a single Wojsko Polski. On July 21, GHQ instructed Marshal Rokossovsky, commander of the 1st Byelorussian Front, to step up the offensive and drive the Germans out of Lublin as quickly as possible, stressing that this was vitally important for independent, democratic Poland. The obtaining conditions enabled the Soviet troops to fulfil this assignment. Late in the day on July 21 they extended their bridgeheads on the Western Bug bringing their total width to 60 kilometres and depth to 15-20 kilometres. Two major armoured formationsthe 2nd Tank Army under Lieutenant-General S. I. Bogdanov and the 11th Tank Corpsand the 2nd and 7th Guards cavalry
21367 17

corps were shifted into the area with orders to develop the offensive in the Siedlce and Lublin sector. The 1st Byelorussian Front's right-wing armies were moved to the Western Bug northwest of Brest. The 65th Army which had captured the large town and railway hub of Czeremcha was advancing westward. The 28th Army and General I. A. Pliyev's mechanised cavalry group enveloping the enemy group from the north were advancing on the important road junction of Kamenets. The 61st Army pushing on Brest from the east had captured Kobrin. In an attempt to check the swift drive of the front's rightwing troops, the enemy concentrated two strike groups west of Bielsk and Vysokoye, and lashed out against the main forces of the 65th Army in the direction of Czeremcha. At first the counterattack was successful. On July 23 the Germans managed to break into the area of Czeremcha, but shortly afterwards they were forced to fall back under powerful artillery fire, air strikes and a flanking assault undertaken by the 28th Army. Continuing their drive, the 65th and the 28th armies reached the Western Bug on July 27, enveloping the enemy's Brest group from the north and northwest. In the meantime Colonel-General V. S. Popov's 70th Army advancing on Brest from the southeast had crossed the Bug south of the town bypassing it from the southwest. The 61st Army under Colonel-General P. A. Belov was driving on Brest from the east. Launching a three-pronged offensive the 1st Byelorussian Front on July 28 captured Brest, an important communications hub and powerful strongpoint covering Warsaw. Four German divisions were smashed in this operation. The front of struggle f o r ' t h e liberation of Poland was broadening and the Soviet troops crossed the Polish border in this sector, too. The front's left wing was successfully advancing in the direction of Lublin. On July 22, the three armies of the strike force fought engagements to broaden the bridgehead on the left bank of the Western Bug and by nightfall had brought its width to 80 kilometres and depth to 50 kilometres. The 7 th Guards Cavalry Corps and 69th Army captured Chelm. In a manifesto published on July 22 in liberated Chelm, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL) deter18

mined the prospects of the revolution and outlined a programme of democratic reforms. It announced the restoration of democratic freedoms, adoption of crucial reforms, including a far-reaching agrarian reform, and proclaimed the Polish emigre government in London illegal. The Manifesto stated that henceforth Poland's foreign policy would be based on a firm alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union. The Manifesto opened a new page in Poland's history. Now the Polish people could translate into reality their ageold dream of creating a democratic, popular state. July 22, 1944, the day when the Soviet Army was conducting largescale operations to liberate Poland and the PCNL had issued its Manifesto, became the day of the founding of people's democratic Poland and has since been observed as Poland's national holiday. The statement of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR defining the Soviet Union's attitude to Poland and the treaty signed by the Soviet Government and the PCNL on July 26, 1944, tremendously enhanced the prestige of the new, people's rule in Poland and strengthened Soviet-Polish friendship. The first of these documents underlined that the Soviet Government had no intention of annexing any part of Poland or changing her social system. The second defined the relations between the Soviet Command and the Polish authorities and stated that as soon as one or another region ceases to be an area of military operations it would be placed under the control of the PCNL. In fulfilment of the GHQ directive, the commander of the 1st Byelorussian Front on July 22 set the armies and mobile formations their concrete missions and ordered them to step up the offensive. The 11th Tank Corps formerly attached to the 8th Guards Army, and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps which was advancing with the troops of the 47th Army, were united into a mechanised cavalry group under General V. V. Kryukov. The group was to advance in the general direction of Siedlce and drive the enemy out of Parczew not later than July 23. The 2nd Tank Army was assigned to enter the breach in the 8th Guards Army's zone of attack in the early hours of July 22 and to advance in the general direction of Lublin. By nightfall of the same 2*
19

day it was to reach the Wieprz and capture Lublin on July 23. Carrying out its mission the mechanised cavalry group seized Parczew and Radzy on July 23 and on the following day liberated Lukow. In the night of July 24 the group engaged the enemy for the possession of Midzyrzec and Siedlce and straddled the Siedlce-Warsaw road. By then the group was fighting 100 kilometres west of the 1st Byelorussian Front which was storming the town and fortress of Brest. In the Lublin sector the 2nd Tank Army entered the breach and by nightfall on July 22 reached the Wieprz east of Lublin between Wymysw and Jaszczw. Crossing the river overnight Soviet armoured units attacked Lublin from the north, northwest and southeast. On July 23 they broke into the city and engaged the enemy in street fighting. By July 24, acting in co-operation with the 8th Guards Army, the units of the 2nd Tank Army which the day before had been placed under the command of Major-General A. I. Radziyevsky had gained complete control of the city. In these operations the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front were supported by the 6th and 16th Air armies under Lieutenant-General F. P. Polynin and Colonel-General S. I. Rudenko. Lublin became the seat of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. In the battles for the liberation of Lublin region the Polish guerillas rendered considerable assistance to the advancing forces and swelled the ranks of the Polish Army as it made its way deeper into the country. In Siedlce, where the retreating epemy troops had been reinforced with fresh units of the 73rd Infantry Division and the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf and a number of armoured trains, fierce street fighting continued till July 31. On that day the main forces of the front's field formations reached the area and the city was liberated. The 2nd Tank Army, which had captured Lublin, made rapid headway and on July 25 reached the Vistula and drove the enemy out of Puawy. On July 26, in a fierce engagement, it liberated Dblin (lvangorod). Taking advantage of the 2nd Tank Army's progress, the 47th Army pushing in the northwesterly direction reached the Midzyrzec-Lukow line at the end of July 27. Elements
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of the 8th Guards Army emerged at the Lukow-Dqblin line and the advanced units of the 69th Army were approaching the Vistula south of Pulawy. Advancing with the Soviet forces in the first echelon between the 8th Guards Army and the 69th Army, the Polish 1st Army under Lieutenant-General Berling reached the Vistula between Dublin and Pulawy. It took over this sector from the 2nd Tank Army which launched an offensive along the right bank of the Vistula in the northwesterly direction. Reaching the Vistula on a broad front extending from Garwolin to Jozefow the field armies were unable to force this water barrier in their stride. They had no crossing means and there was a fairly powerful enemy force holding a prepared defensive line on the opposite bank. On this sector the Soviet offensive slowed down and the troops began methodical preparations for crossing the river and securing bridgeheads on its western bank. By the end of July, the troops on the right flank and in the centre of the 1st Byelorussian Front, having encircled and smashed the enemy group at Brest, were lagging behind in their advance on Warsaw. The 100-kilometre deep wedge which was formed as a result proved to be extremely unfavourable in the operational respect. Moreover, these troops had been seriously weakened and exhausted in the preceding battles and this also accounted for their slow progress. The divisions of the first line were short of fuel and ammunition whose delivery was greatly hindered because of their 500-kilometre advance to the west. On top of that, the enemy group covering the Warsaw sector had been strengthened considerably and offered stubborn resistance. Taking all these factors into account G H Q in a directive on July 27 set the 1st Byelorussian Front a fresh task, ordering it to take Brest and Siedlce and then throw its right wing into an assault on Warsaw, capture Praga (a suburb of Warsaw) between August 5 and 8 at the latest, and gain a bridgehead on the western bank of the Narew in the Pultusk-Serock area. The left wing was to seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula in the area D^blin-Zwolen-Solec. Accordingly, the 69th and 8th Guards armies and the Polish 1st Army crossed the Vistula between July 27 to
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August 4, capturing the Magnoszew and Pulawy bridgeheads which subsequently played a major role in the fighting for the liberation of Poland. The 2nd Tank Army, giving the enemy no respite, on July 27 launched an offensive out of the Dublin area in a northerly direction with the object of cutting the motor roads and railways leading to Warsaw from the east and northeast, and thus making things easier for the front's central and right-wing forces. In just one day Soviet armoured units executed a 50-60kilometre manoeuvre through the enemy's rear areas parallel to the frontline, captured Stoczek and Garwolin and posed a threat to the German troops in Praga. By nightfall on July 30 the 2nd Tank Army straddled the highway and railway connecting Bialystok and Warsaw and, emerging along the entire front to the Praga fortified area, cut it off from the main enemy forces in the east. But its attempt to take this Warsaw suburb in its stride failed. The Germans had turned Praga into a heavily fortified area. In an effort to stop the Soviet drive on the Polish capital at any cost, the German Command concentrated in Praga and northeast of it a powerful panzer force consisting of the SS Totenkopf, Wiking and Hermann Goring panzer divisions, the 19th Panzer Division and the 73rd Infantry Division with numerous special and security units. In the early days of August the enemy panzer force dealt a counterblow at the flank of the 2nd Tank Army in an attempt to cut it off from the 47th Army advancing behind it. Although the enemy failed to achieve his aim, the blow, nevertheless, forced the 2nd Tank and the 47th armies to go over to the defensive and even to retreat in some sectors. Having received insignificant reinforcements and regrouped, the front's right-wing troops overcame the enemy resistance on the Suraz-Losice line, advanced 100 kilometres to the west and at the end of August reached the Narew where in the first half of September they gained bridgeheads in the Pultusk and Serock areas. The armies on the left wing of the 1st Byelorussian Front fought bitter battles for almost a month to extend and consolidate their bridgeheads on the Vistula, south of Warsaw. On August 29, 1944, in fulfilment of G H Q orders, they reverted to the defensive on the lines they had reached, and
22

began to prepare fresh offensive operations to liberate Poland's western areas. The 2nd Byelorussian Front which had freed Biaystok continued to liberate the northeastern areas of the country and at the end of July reached the Augustw-Ostrolka line. Co-operating with the right wing of the 1st Byelorussian Front, the armies of the 2nd Byelorussian Front in the course of August reached the line Augustw-Osowiec-Zambrw-west of Ostrw Mazowieckie. In the middle of September they seized a bridgehead on the Narew in the RanWizna area, captured the oma and Ostroka fortresses where they went over to the defensive and began preparations for an offensive into East Prussia. At this juncture I should like to mention a development which sheds light on the complicated political situation that obtained in Poland at the time. \ When the Soviet troops reached the Vistula and the approaches to Warsaw, reactionary circles in Poland provoked an uprising in the Polish capital. This was done with .a definite purpose. The liberation of Poland started by the Soviet Army and Polish Army and the establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation alarmed the reactionary circles. In order to' create political difficulties for the Soviet troops who were liberating the country and prevent the Polish workers from establishing their rule, the command of the Armia Krajowa"' on August 1, 1944 issued the order to begin the uprising. The uprising was launched with the approval of the emigre government, secretly from the Soviet Command. The reactionary elements intended to gain control over Warsaw before the arrival of the Soviet troops and to transfer power to the National Council of Ministers which was set up in July^26 to counterpose the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The uprising was deliberately timed to coincide with the visit of Prime Minister Mikoajczyk of the Polish emigre government to Moscow for talks with the Soviet Government. The organisers of the uprising and their patrons in the Polish emigre circles in London hoped that Britain would
* Armia Krajowa (AK)an underground military organisation in Poland which supported the Polish emigre government in London.
23

come forward with political and military assistance. But, in effect, Britain could do very little in this respect. The Anglo-US air forces were unable to airlift adequate supplies to the insurgents, and neither Britain nor the United States could openly support the political objectives of the uprising without seriously impairing relations with the Soviet Union. The uprising was precipitated when the Soviet troops, which had reached the Vistula after having covered 500-600 kilometres in 40 days of bloody battles, were in a state of exhaustion. The supplies were lagging behind the advancing troops and the air force was unable to redeploy for lack of new landing strips. The Soviet offensive slowed down. At the same time the German Command, in its determination to prevent the Soviet troops from crossing the Vistula, a formidable obstacle on the way to Berlin, brought in fresh troops including a number of panzer divisions and dealt a series of powerful counterattacks. Throughout August the Soviet troops fought heavy battles to retain their hold on the bridgeheads on the west bank of the Vistula and to reduce the salient hanging from the north over the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front's left wing which had moved ahead of the other Soviet forces. Such was the situation at the front when the uprising broke out in Warsaw. Its organisers had, in effect, done nothing to ensure its success. Armia Krajowa had 15,000 men of whom only 2,500 were armed, and its attack on August 1, in which only 40 per cent of its troops took part, failed to produce the desired result. But the fact that the uprising had begun moved the capital's population, which longed for freedom but was unaware of the actual objectives of the organisers of the uprising, to join in the fighting. Taking into account the working people's massive support for the uprising, the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party decided on August 2 that Armia Ludowa should also join it. During the uprising the Polish Workers' Party managed to unite all democratic forces in the Insurgent Democratic Alliance, which announced its support for the Krajowa Rada Narodowa and the Polish Committee of National Liberation. A joint command of the Armia Ludowa, units of the socialists (Polish Armia Ludowa) and the Security Corps
24

(an organisation which had dissociated itself from the Armia Krajowa) was established on September 12. In view of the foolhardy actions of the Polish reactionaries, the Soviet Supreme Command declared that it could bear neither direct nor indirect responsibility for the action in Warsaw. But since the organisers of the uprising had virtually doomed to death tens of thousands of Polish patriots who had risen against the Germans in Warsaw, the Soviet Government took steps to help them. Here is what Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky wrote: "I spoke to Stalin over the telephone, reporting the situation at the front and everything relevant to Warsaw. Stalin asked whether the front was capable of immediately launching an operation with the object of liberating Warsaw. When I replied in the negative he directed us to give all possible help to the insurgents so as to ease their plight. He endorsed all my proposals concerning how we could help them."* This aid was rendered. From September 13 to October 1, 1944, the Soviet Air Force made 4,821 sorties, dropping considerable quantities of weapons, ammunition, food and medical supplies to the insurgents. Soviet guns and planes shelled and bombed German fire emplacements and troop concentrations. Swiftly regrouping and pulling up the logistic tails, the Soviet troops jointly with the Polish 1st Army crushed powerful enemy resistance and on September 14 took Warsaw's suburb Praga by storm. In the meantime, however, the Germans who had a preponderance in men and arms, had managed to split up the insurgent forces and disrupt communications between individual sectors, gradually gaining control of the situation. On the night of September 15 units of the Polish Army crossed the Vistula in an effort to break into Warsaw. Their effort, however, was not Supported by the Armia Krajowa and they were unable to gain a secure foothold on the left bank. Recalling this operation Marshal Rokossovsky wrote: "For the purpose of extending more help to the insurgents, we had decided to ferry a strong force across the Vistula, to Warsaw. Organisation of the operation had been undertaken by the Polish 1st Army HO. The time and place of
* K. Rokossovsky, A Soldier's Duty, Moscow, 1970, p. 261.
25

the landing, the plans for artillery and air support, and coordination with the insurgents had all been agreed in advance with the leaders of the uprising. "On September 16, units of the Polish Army embarked to cross the Vistula. They landed at points on the bank supposedly held by insurgent units, which was what the whole plan was based on. But these footholds were found to be in nazi hands! "The operation developed haltingly. The first assault succeeded in gaining a foothold with great difficulty. More and more forces had to be thrown into action, and casualties began to soar. Yet the insurgent leaders, far from giving any help to the assault forces, did not even try to contact them."* In the course of the fighting it became clear that Warsaw could be taken only by wide enveloping movements, and eight days later the bridgehead was evacuated. The Armia Krajowa Command rejected the Soviet proposal to have the insurgent detachments withdrawn to the right bank of the Vistula. Only the men of the Armia Ludowa crossed the river at Zoliboz. Retaining the initiative the German troops tightened the ring of encirclement. The position of the insurgents became desperate. On October 2, 1944, General Bor-Komorowsky, commander of the Armia Krajowa, signed the terms of capitulation. The adventurism of the Polish reactionaries who had provoked the Warsaw tragedy cost the Polish people almost 200,000 lives. In keeping with Hitler's instructions the Germans completely demolished the Polish capital. The heroism of the Warsaw inhabitants in the unequal battle against the nazis shall forever remain in the annals of the immortal feats of the Polish people. Thus, at the close of August the troops of the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian fronts, having fulfilled their objectives, were already entrenched along the Narew and Vistula and had secured bridgeheads on their western banks. In the successful Byelorussian operation which lasted over two months, the Soviet Army inflicted a crushing defeat on Army Group Centre, fully liberated Soviet Byelorussia, and
* K. Rokossovsky, A Soldier's Duty, p. 262.
26

reached the Narew and the Vistula rivers driving the enemy out of a fairly large part of Poland. Strategically, the enemy front had been rolled back to a depth of nearly 600 kilometres. Of the 97 divisions and 13 brigades which the enemy committed to action at different periods of the operation the Soviet troops completely smashed 17 divisions and three brigades, and another 50 divisions lost more than 50 per cent of their combat strength. The Soviet offensive in Byelorussia and Poland forced the German Command incessantly to bring up considerable operational reserves from other sectors of the front and from occupied countries. From the Baltic area and the southern flank of the Soviet-German front it transferred 19 divisions and eight brigades, not counting seven divisions and four task groups that had either been freshly formed or reactivated, and another 13 divisions and five brigades were sliifted from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Norway and other countries. In the military and political respect and in scope it was one of the biggest strategic offensive operations of the war. The four fronts which took part in it had over 2,500,000 men, more than 45,000 guns and mortars of all calibres, over 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns and about 7,000 combat aircraft (not counting the strategic air force). T h e German Command at various stages committed over 1,500,000 men, 17,000 guns and mortars, more than 1,500 tanks and assault guns and over 2,100 combat aircraft. Lvov-Sandomierz Operation The plan of the 1944 summer-autumn campaign drawn up by G H Q envisaged the rout of the German troops in the Ukraine. The 1st Ukrainian Front was to assume the offensive after the main forces of Army Group Centre had been routed in Byelorussia. Accordingly, the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front (commanderMarshal I. S. Konev, member of the Military CouncilLieutenant-General K. V. Krainyukov, chief of staffGeneral of the Army V. D. Sokolovsky) worked out the basic recommendations for the operation designed to smash Army Group North
27

Ukraine and drive all German forces out of the Ukraine. On June 24, G H Q gave its final approval to the plan and the objectives of the operation. Simultaneously it ordered the 1st Ukrainian Front, not only to chase the enemy out of the Ukraine's western regions, but also to begin the liberation of Poland. Known as the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front was part of the powerful Soviet drive in the centre of the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1944 which inaugurated the liberation of Poland's southeastern regions. At the time the 1st Ukrainian Front had seven field armies (1st, 3rd, 5th Guards armies and the 13th, 18th, 38th and 60th armies), three tank armies (1st and 3rd Guards and the 4th tank armies), the 2nd and 8th air armies,* two mechanised cavalry groups and the Czechoslovak 1st Corps. All told there were 1,200,000 officers and men, 13,900 guns and mortars, 2,200 tanks and self-propelled guns and more than 3,000 aircraft. The enemy group facing the 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of 40 divisions, including five panzer and one motorised division, and two infantry brigades. It had over 600,000 men (900,000, including the logistic units), 900 tanks and assault guns, 6,300 guns and mortars and 700 combat aircraft. On the morning of July 13 the Rava Russkaya strike group, consisting of the 3rd Guards Army, the 13th Army and the 1st Guards Tank Army, passed to the offensive, dealing the main blow from the area of Lutsk at Sokal and Rava Russkaya and skirting Lvov from the northwest. The Lvov strike group made up of the 60th and 38th armies, some elements of the 1st Guards Army, the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 4th Tank Army went over to the offensive on July 14, striking the main blow from the area of Ternopol at Lvov and further at Przemysl with' the objective of wiping out the enemy Lvov group and liberating the city. The 1st Guards and the 18th armies were advancing towards Stanislaw. From July 13 to 18 the troops of the front operating in
* The Command of the 8th Air Army arrived on July 18 and assumed control of the air corps operating in the Rava Russkaya sector, but was operationally subordinate to the 2nd Air Army until August 2, 1944.
28

both sectors sliced through the enemy defences along a 200kilometre front and advancing to a depth of 50-80 kilometres encircled and routed eight enemy divisions in the area of Brody. Soviet tank armies and mechanised cavalry groups attained the operational depth of the enemy defence and created favourable conditions for destroying the encircled forces and undertaking decisive offensive operations west of Lvov. While a part of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was routing the enemy grouping at Brody, the main forces were rapidly advancing westward to the Polish border. In this operation the Front's right wing scored particularly important successes. From July 17 to 20, 1st Guards Tank Army, the 3rd Guards and the 13th armies and General V. K. Baranov's mechanised cavalry group consisting of the 25th tank and the 1st Guards cavalry corps entered the southeastern part of Poland. On July 19, the units of the 1st Guards Tank Army under Colonel-General M. Y. Katukov, which had crossed to the western bank of the Western Bug, crushed the resistance of the enemy and pushed towards Rava Russkaya. By nightfall of the same day they crossed the Polish border at Ukhnov, Vezhba and Rechin. The right-wing troops captured a number of towns in Poland, including Jarczow and Mahnow. General Baranov's mechanised cavalry group was advancing just as rapidly in the south. Taking advantage of the successful operations of the front's two mobile groups, the 13th Army under LieutenantGeneral N. P. Pukhov reached the San River in a swift thrust. Lunging out in the general direction of Rava RusskayaLubaczow on July 21, the 1st Guards Tank Army, the 13th Army and General Baranov's group reached the San by nightfall on July 23 and secured bridgeheads on its western bank north and south of Jaroslaw. General S. V. Sokolov's mechanised cavalry group (31st Tank and 6th Guards Cavalry corps) was ordered to advance in the general direction of Zamosc in co-operation with the 3rd Guards Army. After that the group was to co-operate with the units of the 1st Byelorussian Front operating from the Krasnystaw area.
29

Threatened with encirclement as a result of a deep skirting movement executed by General P. S. Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army and General D. D. Lelyushenko's 4th Tank Army, the German forces at Lvov began withdrawing in the direction of Sambor. Lvov was liberated on July 27, following a far-Hung offensive mounted from the east by the 60th Army under Colonel-General P. A. Kurochkin and the 38th Army under Colonel-General S. K. Moskalenko, and the enveloping movement from the northwest and south carried out by Soviet armour. On the same day units of the 3rd and 1st Guards tank armies drove the enemy out of Przemysl. Operating on the left wing of the front, ColonelGeneral A. A. Grechko's 1st Guards Army and the 18th Army under General Y. P. Zhuravlev freed Stanislaw on July 27. As a result, the Soviet troops were able to widen the front of their offensive in southern Poland. By nightfall on July 27 the 3rd Guards Army and General Sokolov's mechanised cavalry group were fighting along the Wilkolas-Krasnik-Jastkowice-Nisko line, and the leftwing formations had reached the San; the 13th Army, the 1st and 3rd Guards tank armies and General Baranov's mechanised cavalry group were dealing shattering blows at the German troops on the Nisko-Sokolow-Przeworsk-DynowFredropol line, west of Dobromil, and were in firm possession of a bridgehead on the San. The armies operating in the centre and on the left flank of the front (4th tank, 60th, 38th, 1st Guards and 18th) were pursuing enemy forces retreating towards the Carpathian mountains. Army Group North Ukraine sustained heavy losses and was split in two as a result of the rout of the enemy forces at Lvov and the loss of Rava Russkaya, Lvov, Stanislaw, Przemysl and Vladimir-Volynsky. One part (4th Panzer Army), whose scattered units were putting up futile resistance, was rolling back towards the Vistula. The second (German 1st Panzer Army and the Hungarian 1st Army), was withdrawing to the southwest towards the Carpathians, since all the roads running west through Przemysl had been cut by the 3rd Guards and the 4th tank armies. A gap 100 kilometres wide, where only one reserve regiment and security and construction battalions were in action, appeared between the German 1st and 4th panzer armies. Intending
30

to establish a defensive line along the Vistula, the German Command began to transfer the headquarters of the 17 th Army, the 23rd and 24th panzer divisions from Army Group South Ukraine, and two infantry divisions and the headquarters of the 24th Panzer Corps from other sectors of the front, and also two infantry divisions and a number of separate units from Germany. By mustering these forces it hoped to prevent the Soviet troops from crossing the Vistula and the Wislok. Now the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front could undertake a swift drive deep into Polish territory, towards the Vistula in the general direction of Sandomierz. Taking stock of the situation GHQ on July 27 ordered the front to concentrate its main efforts on the right flank with the view to capturing a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula between Sandomierz and the mouth of the Wislok. GHQ indicated that this task should be accomplished in co-operation with the 1st Byelorussian Front which also received instructions to secure a bridgehead south of W a r saw. The successful fulfilment of these assignments would create favourable conditions for striking in the direction of the Silesian industrial area. For this purpose the front assembled its main forces consisting of two field (13th and the 3rd Guards), two tank (1st and 3rd Guards) armies and General Sokolov's mechanised cavalry group in the Sandomierz sector. The 5th Guards Army under Lieutenant-General A. S. Zhadov which was in the second echelon was also moved into the area. This force was to cross the Vistula along a wide front extending from Zemboyn to the mouth of the Wislok and establish a bridgehead along the Zemboyn-Ostrowiec-Konary-Wi^zownica-Polaniec line. The front's central formations were to reach the Wislok and capture Dembica and Sanok and then advance along the San to the Carpathian foothills. Since the troops would have to cross a major water barrier in their stride, the Soviet Command reinforced the field and tank armies with pontoons, engineer, construction and road-building battalions.
31

On its way to the Vistula, Colonel-General V. N. Gordov's 3rd Guards Army on July 28 and 29 in an operation carried out jointly with General Sokolov's mechanised cavalry group smashed an enemy force in the vicinity of Annopol. Towards the end of July 29 its advance units had crossed the Vistula in a number of places and established three bridgeheads north and south of the town. The 1st Guards Tank Army, the 3rd Guards Army and the 13th Army advanced towards the Vistula swiftly and in a highly organised manner. Reaching the river on a wide front on July 29, they began to cross it without pausing, using regular and improvised crossing means. Thanks to the timely arrival of front and army pontoon trains it was possible to ferry the artillery and tanks to the opposite bank together with the infantry. The crossing operation was most successful in the 13th Army's zone. There the 350th Infantry Division under General G. I. Vekhin forced the Vistula by storm north of Baranow together with the advanced elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army. The main forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army began crossing the river on August 1. By the end of the day they had extended the bridgehead to 15 km in depth and width and reached the Koprziwnica-Staszow-Polaniec line. The 1st Tank Army completed the crossing by the end of August 4. The 3rd Guards Tank Army which reached the river south of Baranow on July 30, began the crossing operation on the following day. On August 3 it had widened the bridgehead, and advancing to a depth of 20-25 kilometres reached the D^browa-Stopnica-Pacanow line. On August 1 two enemy forces struck a counter-blow along the eastern bank of the river from the north and south in the general direction of Baranow in an attempt to prevent the Soviet troops from extending their bridgeheads. The most dangerous was the attack delivered from the Mielec area by two panzer and two infantry divisions. This blow prevented part of the forces of the 13th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Army, reinforced with the 1st Guards Artillery Division, from fulfilling their main task, and until August 3 they were engaged in beating off enemy assaults. The German Command was aware of the danger of the Soviet bridgehead and decided to reduce it at whatever the cost. By August 4, the enemy force at Mielec was reinforced with
32

the 23rd Panzer Division, the 78th Infantry Division and two brigades. Simultaneously, the 88th Infantry Division and an infantry brigade were transferred to reinforce the northern group in the area of Sandomierz. In the days that followed the enemy continued to accumulate forces in front and at the flanks of the bridgehead. Everything indicated that the fighting for the Sandomierz bridgehead would be very heavy. Although the bridgehead was sufficiently deep, the Soviet troops who had come a long way were fatigued and had sustained considerable losses. The tank armies were particularly in need of rest and armour replacements. In these circumstances the Soviet Command on August 4 threw the rested second-echelon 5th Guards Army into the fighting for the bridgehead. It promptly smashed the enemy Mielec group. Some units crossed the Wislok and the main forces crossed the Vistula and reached the Szydlow-Stopnica line. The major operational bridgehead was extended and consolidated not only by committing a fresh army to action, but also by reinforcing the artillery units and intensifying the activity of field and tank armies which by then had been deployed on the bridgehead. On August 5 two field (13th and 5th Guards) and two tank (1st and 3rd Guards) armies mounted an offensive. In five days of fighting they inflicted a heavy defeat on the 4th Panzer Army and extended the bridgehead to 60 kilometres in width and depth. In its efforts to reduce the bridgehead and re-establish its defences along the Vistula, the German Command continued to reinforce its 4 th Panzer Army. By August 10 it had brought in the 3rd Panzer Corps and other formations from Cracow, and built up an assault force consisting of four panzer and one motorised division and several infantry brigades in the area of Chmielnik. Its task was to strike at Barandw, reach the Vistula, split up the Soviet troops holding the bridgehead and destroy them piecemeal. Simultaneously an enemy force striking out from the Opatow area was to take in the right flank of the 1st Guards Tank Army. But the Soviet troops were not caught unawares. The front command had seen through the enemy designs and reinforced this sector of the bridgehead with antitank artillery (one brigade and five regiments). All positions were well orga31357 33

nised. Moreover, an infantry corps of the 3rd Guards Army and the 31st Tank Corps were moved into the bridgehead to reinforce the 5th Guards Army. It was also decided to transfer the 4th Tank Army to the bridgehead from the Sambor area. On August 11 enemy panzers dealt a counterblow at Staszw at the junction of the 13th and 5th Guards armies. In the bitter fighting that lasted two days the Soviet troops firmly held their positions, inflicting heavy losses in men and arms on the enemy. At the price of enormous casualties the enemy managed to penetrate into Soviet defences to a depth of not more than 8 or 10 kilometres and his further attempts to press the offensive in the direction of Baranw ran into the unyielding resistance of Soviet infantry, artillery and tanks. The German Command then decided to change the direction of the counterattack. Concentrating their main forces west of Stopnica, the Germans dealt a fresh counterblow on August 13 with four panzer and a motorised division. In the fierce battles that continued from August 13 to 18, the Soviet troops beat off massive armour attacks, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and brought his offensive to a halt. They were able to do this thanks to timely arrival of reinforcements to assist the troops holding the bridgehead. While repelling the counterattack at Stopnica, the Front resumed its offensive to enlarge the Sandomierz bridgehead. On August 14, the 13th and 1st Guards Tank armies launched an assault out of the Klimontw area in the general direction of Oarw, and the 3rd Guards Army struck out from a bridgehead south of Zawichost in a westerly direction. On August 17 the Soviet troops encircled units of two enemy infantry divisions northwest of Sandomierz, and on August 18 liberated the town. The German Command was forced to cease its attacks in the Stopnica area and shift its panzer divisions to the Oarw area from where they struck a fresh counterblow in the southerly direction on August 19. On that day the German panzer divisions managed to link up with the force encircled northwest of Sandomierz, but failed to develop an offensive on the town itself and suffered heavy losses. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front fought on the Sandomierz bridgehead till the end of August 1944. With the
34

UWBi

f j

liberation of Sandomierz the bridgehead was expanded to 75 kilometres in width and 60 kilometres in depth enabling the front to concentrate large forces for the forthcoming drive into Silesia. I recall how heavy the fighting on the Sandomierz bridgehead was as the Germans desperately tried to dislodge the Soviet forces. On my frequent visits to the positions of the 5th Guards, 13th and 3rd Guards Tank armies when they were beating off enemy panzer attacks, I witnessed the heroism of the Soviet troops, particularly of the gunners and airmen. The situation changed abruptly each day. There were fierce battles on land and in the air but the Soviet troops always got the upper hand, and however desperately the Germans may have fought, the Soviet troops continued to strengthen their hold of the bridgehead. I remember the tank battle when the German Command committed a battalion of the new, super-heavy T-6B of Royal Tiger panzers to action. But this move, designed to take the Soviet troops by surprise was a complete failure. The battalion came under devastating fire from Soviet tanks and batteries of heavy 122mm and 152mm guns, and was routed. The Royal Tigers were too slow and became easy targets for Soviet troops. Ten undamaged Royal Tigers were captured in the battle and sent to Moscow. The fighting on the bridgehead demonstrated the invincible strength of the Soviet Army both in defensive and offensive battles and its superiority over the Wehrmacht. I have the greatest respect for the officers and men of the front who displayed great military skill and heroism in defending the bridgehead. A decisive part in repelling massive panzer attacks and consolidating the bridgehead was played by General A. S. Zhadov's 5th Guards Army which was moved into battle from the second echelon. Soviet victories in the western regions of the Ukraine and in Poland were of great political and strategic significance. In the Lvov-Sandomierz operation the 1st Ukrainian Front defeated major strategic forceArmy Group North Ukraine routing 32 divisions and completely wiping out another eight. In joint operations with the 1st Byelorussian Front the 1st Ukrainian Front liberated a large part of Poland east of

the Vistula, crossed the Vistula and gained an important strategic bridgehead at Sandomierz which became a springboard for the 1st Ukrainian Front's offensive in Silesia in the winter of 1945 that resulted in the liberation of the southern part of Poland. The co-ordinated actions of Soviet and Polish partisans were of considerable help to the Soviet troops advancing in Poland. They interfered with enemy communications, destroyed his manpower and equipment and time and again disrupted his supply services. Thus, as a result of the strategic offensive in the summer of 1944 in Byelorussia and the western Ukraine, the Soviet troops and the Polish 1st Army advanced 350-360 kilometres into Poland, liberating almost all Polish lands east of the Narew and the Vistula. By capturing strategically important bridgeheads on the Narew and the Vistula, the Soviet Army created conditions for large-scale offensive operations in the winter of 1945 in the course of which the whole of Poland was cleared of the nazis. The Polish working people enthusiastically welcomed the Soviet Army and the Polish 1st Army. The Soviet and Polish troops in the liberated areas had to deal with undisguised and secret enemies, with those who opposed the establishment of a democratic people's state and conducted intense anti-Soviet activity. The measures of the Polish Committee of National Liberation to free the whole country and establish a democratic and independent state and the Soviet Union's growing prestige with the people at large caused mounting confusion and fear among the Polish reactionaries whose activities were guided by the Polish emigre government. The reactionaries concentrated their efforts on further stimulating the activity of the counterrevolutionary forces and increasing terror against the leaders and functionaries of the Polish Workers' Party, the Polish Committee of National Liberation and members of the Soviet Armed Forces. They obstructed the agrarian reform, the establishment of a new state apparatus and the introduction of revolutionary changes in industry. Polish reactionaries did their best to prevent the patriots from joining the army and summoned the population to boycott the measures of the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish Committee of
36

National Liberation to strengthen the Armed Forces, and to desert from the army. Obeying the instructions of the emigre government in London, Polish reactionaries also tried to place themselves at the head of the national liberation movement of the Polish people. They directed all their efforts towards preventing the unification of the people's democratic forces fighting under the guidance of the Polish Workers' Party. But all their efforts were doomed to failure. Before the Complete Rout of the Enemy T h e strategic situation in Europe at the beginning of 1945 was favourable for the armed forces of the anti-fascist coalition which had an overall superiority over the enemy and firmly retained the strategic initiative. T h e Allied armies were approaching Germany's borders. From their positions along the Narew, Vistula and the Danube, the Soviet forces were getting ready to strike a final blow at the enemy. T h e worst fears of the nazi command had come true: Germany was squeezed in a vise created by two fronts, one in the east, the other in the west. Continuing to shoulder the main burden of the war, the Soviet people were making every effort to hasten the day of victory. T h e home front supplied the Soviet Armed Forces with adequate quantities of weapons, ammunition, and food. T h e tireless home-front workers and the heroic Soviet Army rallied around the Communist Party were determined to smash the enemy and force him to surrender unconditionally. The Soviet people's great victories over the fascist bloc in 1944 had a decisive impact on the international situation as a whole. The Soviet Union's international standing rose immeasurably, and its co-operation with the other members of the anti-Hitler coalition increased to a still greater extent. It had diplomatic relations with 41 countries, compared with 25 before the war. As before, the consolidation of the anti-fascist coalition was one of the principal tasks of Soviet foreign policy. De37

spite differences the alliance between the USA, Britain and the USSR in the war against the common enemy remained unshakable. At the Yalta Conference in the first half of February 1945, the Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA and Britain agreed on plans for the final defeat of nazi Germany and outlined the principles of the postwar settlement in the world. They worked out the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender and measures for transforming her into a demilitarised, democratic and peaceful state. The Conference decided to establish the United Nations Organisation. The three Heads of Government agreed that within two or three months after the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union would open hostilities against Japan. All this was achieved above all thanks to the correct policy of the Soviet Government whose efforts frustrated the attempts of nazi diplomats to split up the coalition. Germany's major military defeats and her huge losses in men and weapons, particularly on the Soviet-German front, considerably depleted her armed forces. By the beginning of 1945 she had 299 divisions and 31 brigades, totalling 7,500,000 men, of whom 5,300,000 were frontline troops, 43,000 guns and mortars, 7,000 tanks and assault guns and 6,800 aircraft. To keep up the fighting efficiency of the troops nazi leaders resorted to extraordinary measures and monstrous repressions. At this, final stage of the war, the German Command continued to keep the bulk of its forces on the Soviet-German front: 169 German divisions and 20 brigades, and 16 Hungarian divisions and one brigade. All told there were 3,100,000 officers and men, 28,500 guns, 3,900 tanks and assault guns and approximately 2,000 combat planes. It was a formidable force, yet less powerful than it had been at the beginning of 1944. Nonetheless, the enemy defences were still heavily saturated with troops and weapons. This was due to the fact that the Soviet-German front shrank from 4,450 to 2,250 kilometres as a result of the Soviet Army's successful offensive in the summer of 1944. Searching for a way out of the situation, the nazi leaders tried to split the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and made several attempts to negotiate a separate peace treaty
38

with Britain and the United States. It was these hopes that formed the basis of their 1945 strategic plan. With the greater part of its forces concentrated on the Soviet-German front, the German Command intended to stop the Soviet advance at deeply echeloned defensive lines. At the same time it planned to mount an offensive in the Ardennes and Alsace-Lorraine at the end of 1944, smash the Anglo-US forces there and gain the strategic initiative on the Western Front. In January 1945, the Soviet Armed Forces had nearly 6,000,000 men in the field, 91,400 guns and mortars, 2,993 rocket launchers, about 11,000 tanks and self-propelled guns and 14,500 combat aircraft."' Operating with the Soviet Army were Polish, Czechoslovak, Rumanian and Bulgarian troops: 326,500 officers and men, 5,200 guns and 200 tanks. The French Normandie-Niemen Air Regiment was included in the 3rd Byelorussian Front. The correlation of forces on the Soviet-German front was favourable for the Soviet Army. In 1945, the Soviet Armed Forces had to fulfil a historic task: they had to smash the Wehrmacht, complete the liberation of the countries of Central and Southeast Europe and force nazi Germany into signing unconditional surrender. Worked out by the General Staff and approved by GHQ in November 1944, the plan of the first phase of the 1945 campaign envisaged an offensive along the entire SovietGerman front, from the Baltic Sea to the Danube. The principal objective of the Soviet troops was to rout the Wehrmacht in East Prussia and Poland and reach the line running from the mouth of the Vistula to Bydgoszcz, Poznan, Wroclaw, Moravska Ostrava, Vienna and Osijek on the 15th day of the offensive. This was to be achieved as a result of the large-scale Vistula-Oder, East Prussian and West Carpathian operations. After that the Soviet troops were to mount an offensive on Berlin and Prague. The main blow was to be delivered in the Warsaw-Berlin direction in the Ostrolka-Cracow sector. Initially planned for January 20, 1945, the offensive was started earlier in view of the developments on the Western front where the Anglo-US troops had suffered a serious reversal at the hands of the
* Not counting the Leningrad Front and the 37th Separate Army.
o'.)

Germans in the Ardennes. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill asked the Soviet Government for assistance. The Soviet Union fulfilled its commitments. Although the Soviet troops had not yet completed preparations the Supreme Command ordered the fronts to go over to the offensive on January 12. This offensive opened the culminating campaign of the Great Patriotic W a r of the Soviet Union against Hitler Germany. One of the main tasks of the Soviet troops was to smash Army Group A on the defensive between the Vistula and Oder and covering Germany's vital centres reach the Oder and secure advantageous positions for striking the final blow at Berlin. As regards the political objectives of the operation, one of them was to drive all German troops out of Poland and help the Polish people reunite their lands into a single Polish state. Such was the task assigned by G H O to the 1st Byelorussian Front (commanderMarshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, member of the Military CouncilGeneral K. F. Telegin, chief of staffGeneral M. S. Malinin) and the 1st Ukrainian Front (commanderMarshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, member of the Military CouncilGeneral K. V. Krainyukov, chief of staffGeneral V. D. Sokolovsky) and strategic aviation. These fronts had 2,200,000 officers and men (not counting logistical units), 34,500 guns and mortars, approximately 6,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 4,800 combat aircraft. The German Command regarded the occupation of Poland as a matter of crucial importance and deployed on her territory, between Serock and Jaslo, its main forces consisting of 30 divisions and two brigades, totalling 400,000 men (not counting logistics support forces), 4,000 guns and mortars, more than 1,100 tanks and assault guns and nearly 300 combat aircraft. Between the Vistula and the Oder the enemy had seven permanent defensive lines extending tp a depth of 500 kilometres. The most powerful was the first line on the Vistula which was defended by the main forces of Army Group A. The other lines were not manned and were to be occupied only in the event of a Soviet breakthrough. Should that happen the Germans planned to bleed the Soviet troops white by holding them up at each line in succession and thus preventing them from reaching the Oder.
40

T h e breakthrough was thoroughly prepared. T h e Soviet forces were replenished with manpower and equipment. More than 2,500 trainloads (1,333,000 railway carriages) of troops and military supplies were brought to the front. By January 10, large quantities of ammunition, fuel and rations had been concentrated on the Vistula bridgeheads. T h e 1st Byelorussian Front had 2,479,800 artillery and mortar shells on the Magnoszew bridgehead and 1,311,900 on the Puawy bridgehead, and 55,989 tons of liquid fuel. T h e 1st Ukrainian Front had 114,336 tons of ammunition, 57,215 tons of fuel and lubricants, 47,805 tons of rations and 43,750 tons of various other freight. All told the fronts had 3-4 ammunition establishments, 4-5 refills of gasoline and diesel fuel and 9-14 refills of aviation gasoline. A vast number of troops and weapons had been concentrated in the breakthrough sectors. For example, on the Magnoszew bridgehead which had an area of 240 sq km there were nearly 400,000 officers and men, over 8,700 guns and mortars and about 1,700 tanks and self-propelled guns comprising about 52 per cent of the 1st Byelorussian Front's infantry strength and over 70 per cent of its artillery and tanks. Fire density was extremely high, from 230 to 250 guns per kilometre. T h e high concentration of troops in the breakthrough sectors gave the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts a ninefold superiority in manpower, an almost tenfold superiority in artillery, and a tenfold superiority in tanks and self-propelled guns. This correlation of forces ensured a swift breakthrough of the enemy defences and development of a swift offensive deep into enemy-held territory. Preparations for the offensive were conducted in favourable conditions. Grateful to the Soviet Army for freeing them from nazi occupation, the Polish population did whatever it could to help the Soviet troops. Battles in Western Poland We have mentioned that the Vistula-Oder operation got underway at an earlier date in compliance with the Allies' request to lessen the pressure on their troops who had been put in a precarious position by the successful German offen41

sive in the Ardennes and Vosges mountains. Accordingly, the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front went over to the offensive on January 12. The front dealt a powerful blow from the Sandomierz bridgehead with eight field armies (6th and 3rd Guards, 13th, 52nd, 5th Guards and 60th, 21st and 59th), two tank armies (3rd Guards and the 4th), three separate tank and mechanised corps (25th, 31st and 4th Guards Tank and 7th Guards Mechanised) and a Guards cavalry corps. The 21st and 59th armies and both tank armies were in the second echelon of the front's order of battle. The plan was to use the tank armies for developing the offensive in depth. The attack of the main forces was preceded by a reconnaissance in force which began at daybreak by the advance battalions after an extremely powerful 15-minute artillery softening up. Shortly afterwards they captured the enemy's first trench. Initial reports indicated that the enemy had not retreated, but remained in the zone which the Soviet Command had planned to shell. The artillery preparation began at 10.00 hours and lasted for an hour and fifty minutes. Thousands of guns, mortars and rockets ploughed up the enemy positions. Not only advanced enemy forces came under fire but also part of the operational reserves deployed in the tactical defence zone. Until midday adverse weather conditions greatly impeded the activity of the 2nd Air Army. Within two or three hours the first-echelon armies had knocked the enemy out of two organised positions of the main line of resistance. At 14.00 hours the 4th Tank, and the 3rd Guards Tank armies, and the 31st Tank and 4th Guards Tank Corps went into action actively supported by the 2nd Air Army. through main line By sunset the strike forces of resistance and reached the e. Developing their drive the advance armoured units reached the first of the enemy's rear defence lines. The enemy's defence sector was pierced to a depth of 15-20 kilometres along a 35-kilometre front in the direction of the Soviet troops' main effort. In the face of the swift Soviet offensive, particularly the assault of the tank armies, the German Command had no alternative other than piecemeal commitment of its reserves.
42

The extremely ferocious counterattack undertaken by the 16th Panzer and the 20th Motorised divisions from the Kielce area and the 17th Panzer Division from the area of Chmielnik, all of the 24th Panzer Corps, rapidly ended in their complete rout in the zone of the first line of defence. Describing the Soviet offensive, the German military historian Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote: "The blow (January 12. I. K.) was delivered with such strength that it overturned not only the first-echelon divisions but also the fairly large mobile reserves which on Hitler's categorical instructions had been moved very close to the front. The latter had already suffered casualties during the Russians' artillery preparation and there was no chance of committing them to action according to plan because of the general retreat. So many deep wedges had been driven into German positions that it proved impossible either to reduce them or to prevent them from enlarging. The front of the 4th Panzer Army was rent asunder and nothing could be done to hold up the Russian offensive. The Russian troops promptly moved their armoured , formations into the breaches and their main forces began moving towards the Nida simultaneously enveloping Kielce with their right wing.""' The main forces of the 24th Panzer Corps were thrown back to the north and together with the remnants of infantry units that had withdrawn from the main line of resistance, made an effort to hold on to Kielce, an important railway junction. But the Soviet field divisions and armour advancing on the front's right flank engaged the enemy from the march and captured this powerful strongpoint on January 15 by a combined blow from the east, south and west. In this engagement the 4th Tank, 3rd Guards and the 13th armies gave a particularly good account of themselves. The defeat inflicted on the enemy at Kielce and the fall of this important operational centre on the way to Czstochowa, consolidated the right flank of the front's main forces and created favourable conditions for developing the drive and pursuing the enemy in the direction of Wroclaw (Breslau).
* Kurt von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs, 1951, Bonn, p. 614.
43

The successful offensive of the front's main group facilitated the tasks of the left-wing troops and enabled them to push rapidly on Cracow along the northern bank of the Vistula. On January 14 two second-echelon armies (21st and 59th) were committed to action in the Cracow sector to give greater impetus to the drive on the city. A new force was in effect created for developing the offensive towards Cracow. A timely manoeuvre, it enabled the front's left wing to cut off the German 17th Army from its main forcesArmy Group A. By January 15 all the operational reserves which the enemy had concentrated against the 1st Ukrainian Front's strike force had been smashed. Fighting rearguard actions, the remnants of the routed German units of the Kielce-Radom group hastily retreated westward towards a defence line on the Pilica. On January 14 the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front mounted an offensive from the Magnoszew and Puawy bridgeheads. The main blow was delivered from the Magnoszew bridgehead by the 61st, 8th Guards and the 5th and 3rd Striking field armies, the 1st and 2nd Guards tank armies and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. The mobile formations were to go into action after the enemy's tactical defence zone had been breached. The second echelon (3rd Striking Army) was to exploit the success in the direction of Poznan. The second blow was to be delivered from the Puawy bridgehead by two field armies (69th and 33rd) and two tank corps (11th and 9th). The task of destroying the Warsaw group of the Germans and liberating the Polish capital was assigned to the 47th Army which was to attack from the area of Radzymin, the 61st and the 2nd Guards Tank armies, striking out from the Magnoszew bridgehead in the general direction of Sochaczew, and to the Polish 1st Army attacking Warsaw from Praga. The offensive was initiated by forward battalions following a powerful artillery and mortar softening up which lasted 25 minutes. Supported by a well-planned rolling barrage the forward battalions tore through the forward line of defence and forged ahead, paving the way for the main forces of the front's strike groups.
44

^ Adverse weather prevented General S. I. Rudenko's 16th Air Army from giving adequate support to the advancing forces and the burden of providing lire support was shouldered mainly by the artillery and armour. The artillery and mortar bombardment which proved to be very effective, caught the enemy by surprise. A number of enemy companies and battalions were almost entirely wiped out. On the very first day of the operation the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front broke through the main enemy's line of resistance opposite the bridgeheads, and advancing to a depth of 12-20 kilometres tore two large holes in the German defences: the one opposite the Magnoszew bridgehead was 30 kilometres wide and the other, opposite the Puawy bridgehead, was 25 kilometres wide. The German Command threw its operational reserves into battle in futile attempts to hold up the Soviet troops at intermediate and switch positions. The reserves were smashed piecemeal even before the main forces of the front's mobile formations had been committed to action, and the enemy resistance in the direction of the main effort was crushed by the end of the second day. On January 16, the 69th Army under General V. Y. Kolpakchi and the 11th Tank Corps mounted a three-pronged assault and with effective air support captured Radom, a railway junction and important industrial centre which the Germans had -turned into a powerful pocket of resistance. After that Soviet tanks crossed the Radomka and gained a bridgehead on its left bank. *The offensive in the Warsaw area was also developing successfully. General F. I. Perkhorovich's 47th Army and General P. A. Belov's 61st Army were enveloping the city from the north and south. The 2nd Tank Army under General S. I. Bogdanov, which went into action on the morning of January 16 struck at the rear at the enemy group. To avoid a possible encirclement the Germans began to withdraw. On the night of January 16, the Polish 1st Army under General Stanisaw Popawski mounted an offensive. It was given the honour of being the first to enter the Polish capital. Crossing the Vistula north and south of Warsaw, it crushed the enemy's resistance and in the morning of January 17 broke into the capital together with the Soviet troops.
45

Moscow marked the liberation of the Polish capital by saluting the 1st Byelorussian Front and the Polish 1st Army with 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns. Units which had particularly distinguished themselves in the lighting for the city were given the honorary title of "Warsaw". On June 9, 1945, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR instituted the medal "For the Liberation of Warsaw" that was awarded to more than 682,000 officers and men. By nightfall on January 17, the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts had routed the main forces of Germarj Army Group A, penetrated the enemy's operational defences to a depth of 100-160 kilometres along a 50-kilometre front, capturing Warsaw, Radom, Kielce, Radomsko, Czstochowa and a number of other industrial centres and important strongholds. The Soviet troops were now in a position to advance at a very rapid pace and to a great depth. The rout of the German troops on the Vistula and the liberation of Warsaw took the German Command by surprise. On Hitler's orders severe measures were taken against the OKH General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A. A special committee headed by Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Deputy Chief of the Gestapo, was set up to investigate the activity of Chief of the General Staff, General Guderian. Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A ColonelGeneral Harpe, who was blamed for the catastrophe on the Vistula, was replaced by Colonel-General Schorner, and the commander of the German 9th Army, General Liittwitz, was replaced by General of Infantry Busse. Liberated Warsaw was a horrifying sight. One of the loveliest cities in Europe, it was now a heap of ruins and rubble. "The fascist barbarians," stated the report of the Military Council of the 1st Byelorussian Front, "completely destroyed the Polish capital, Warsaw. With the savagery of refined sadists the hitlerites methodically wrecked block after block. Large industrial enterprises have been wiped off the face of the earth. Apartment houses have been blown up or burned. The municipal economy is ruined. Tens of thousands of inhabitants have been killed and the rest driven away. The city is dead." Towards the end of the day people whom the Germans had driven out of the city began trickling back into the devastated and almost wholly destroyed capital. On January
46

^18, Chairman of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa Bolesaw Bierut, Prime Minister Edward B. Osbka-Morawski and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army General Micha Rola-Zymierski arrived in Warsaw. On the same day the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts began the second phase of the Vistula-Oder operation. In keeping with G H O orders received on January 17, the main forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front were to continue their offensive in the Wroclaw direction, reach the Oder south of Leszno not later than January 30 and gain a bridgehead on the left bank; the front's left-wing armies were to liberate Cracow not later than January 20-22 and then mount an offensive on the Dbrowa coal basin enveloping it from the north and south. The 1st Byelorussian Front had orders to reach the Bydgoszcz-Poznan line not later than February 2-4. Accordingly, both fronts launched a swift offensive in all the specified sectors. It was a boldly conceived operation. Advance detachments pursued the retreating enemy day and night on a broad front. They manoeuvred to strike at the enemy's rear and flanks. The main forces of the tank and field armies rapidly advanced in columns and deployed for action only when it was absolutely necessary. Units were detached to repel the flanking counterattacks by large enemy groups which had remained in the rear of the advancing Soviet troops. In the course of the fighting these groups were routed and taken prisoner. Developing the offensive Spviet tank armies advanced from 40 to 45 kilometres and the field armies up to 30 kilometres a day. Sometimes tanks managed to make 70 kilometres and the infantry from 40 to 45 kilometres a day. The high offensive spirit of the troops was maintained by intensive Party and political work which was warranted by the situation at the fronts where there was every indication that the final victory over nazi Germany was now in sight. In the lulls between battles commanders, political instructors and Party and Komsomol workers took advantage of every free minute to talk to the men, read out Sovinformbureau bulletins, orders of the Supreme Command, accounts of battles and patriotic articles by Alexei Tolstoi, Mikhail Sholokhov, Boris Gorbatov, Konstantin Simonov, Alexander
47

Tvardovsky, Boris Polevoi and other Soviet writers. Front, army and divisional newspapers carried reports about military victories and the labour exploits of the home-front workers, listed the towns liberated by the Soviet troops and described the Soviet Army's mission of liberation. Commanders and political workers kept the troops informed about the distance separating them from the German border, the Oder and Berlin. Oral and printed propaganda advanced the slogans: "Forward into Germany", "On Berlin", "Into the den of the nazi beast", " W e shall liberate our brothers and sisters languishing in nazi slavery". All these measures tremendously boosted the morale and the fighting spirit of the troops. The troops strove to fulfil tHeir combat assignments and were impatient to liberate Poland, cross the German border and smash the enemy on his own territory. Another factor which enabled the Soviet troops to keep up their swift drive at Poznan and Wroclaw, was the offensive of the 2nd and 3rd Byelorussian fronts in East Prussia and the successful operations of the 4th Ukrainian Front in southern Poland. Pursuing the enemy retreating towards Poznan, the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Pilica and engaged the enemy for the Upper Silesian industrial area. On January 19, units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards and the 52nd armies reached Wroclaw and the front's left-wing armies (60th Army under General P. A. Kurochkin and the 59th under General I. T. Korovnikov) liberated Cracow, Poland's ancient capital and an important industrial and cultural centre. Forging ahead they enveloped from the south a powerful enemy grouping southwest of Czstochowa. At the same time General D. N. Gusev's 21st Army attacked it from the north. Though threatened with encirclement the Germans fought desperately to hold on to this important industrial area with its large coal mines, iron and steel plants and factories producing ammunition and synthetic fuel. Realising that drawn-out battles would result in the destruction of these enterprises and mines the Soviet Command decided to save them for the Polish people at all costs. It decided not to encircle the Germans in the Silesian industrial area, but to force them to withdraw into open country by merely threatening them with encirclement and smash
48

them there. This was to be achieved by a deep flanking manoeuvre executed by tank formations which were to act in co-operation with field armies converging on Silesia from the north, east and south. The turning manoeuvre was to be carried out by the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under General V. K. Baranov. The 59th Army strengthened with General P. P. Poluboyarov's 4th Guards Tank Corps, was ordered to continue the drive on Katowice, and the 60th Army to launch an attack along the Vistula so as to envelop the Silesian industrial area from the south. This was brilliantly executed. Bypassing the Silesian industrial area these armies forced the enemy group into a hasty withdrawal from Upper Silesia in the face of imminent encirclement. In this way the Soviet Command saved this vital industrial area from destruction. The Soviet troops completed the rout of the retreating enemy group in battles west of Silesia. From January 23 to February 7, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder on a broad front. Crossing the river at Olawa and northwest of Opole they gained and widened a bridgehead on its western bank. The 3rd Guards, the 13th and 4th Tank armies came up to the Oder northwest of Wroclaw, the 52nd Army and General V. A. Gluzdovsky's 6th Army reached it at Wroclaw and the 5th and 3rd Guards tank armies arrived at the river southeast of this city. Having secured, widened and consolidated the bridgeheads on the Oder in heavy battles, the 1st Ukrainian Front completed its offensive operation. The Germans put up a savage fight in a desperate but futile attempt to stop the Soviet troops on the Oder line. Multiplying the glory of the heroes of the Dnieper crossing, the Soviet troops fought with admirable courage and heroism to establish the bridgehead on the Oder. Thousands of soldiers were decorated for bravery and many of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Fighting just as bravely the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front on January 18 smashed the remnants of the enemy force encircled west of Warsaw and on the following day liberated Lodz, a major textile centre with a population second in size only to that of Warsaw. In this operation General V. I. Chuikov's 8th Guards Army, General V. D.
4-1357

49

Tsvetayev's 33rd Army and General V. Y. Kolpakchi's 69th Army gave a particularly good account of themselves. The offensive continued to develop at a rapid pace. After their major defeat in East Prussia and Poland, the Germans on January 26 reorganised the command of the troops. The troops operating in East Pomerania were united into the newly formed Army Group Vistula, while Army Group A on the defensive in the Berlin sector was renamed Army Group Centre. Army Group Vistula included the 2nd and 9th armies on the defensive between Elblg on the Baltic and Glogau. Army Group Centre, which consisted of the 17th Field Army and the 1st and 4th Panzer armies, was deployed between Glogau and Moravska Ostrava. All told the two groups had over 30 infantry, 6 panzer and 3 motorised divisions and 4 brigades. In view of the fact that the 2nd Byelorussian Front, the 1st Byelorussian Front's right-hand neighbour, began to advance to the northwest into the Elblg area, a gap which by January 25 reached 110-120 kilometres in width appeared between the two fronts. Finding the situation advantageous the German Command decided to counterattack with a part of the forces of the newly-formed Army Group Vistula from the north against the llank of the 1st Byelorussian Front. The Soviet Command, however, had anticipated this move and on January 25-26 the front commander shifted the 47th and 61st armies and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps to cover the front's right wing. On January 29 he moved the Polish 1st Army and the 3rd Striking Army from the second echelon and part of the units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army into the area. Together they comprised approximately a half of the front's total strength and the enemy consequently failed in his attempts. In the meanwhile the front's main forces were rapidly advancing westward and on January 29 crossed the German border. Each soldier, each Soviet citizen was filled with a sense of joy and profound satisfaction: the nazis had sown the wind and were now reaping the whirlwind. A particularly important victory was scored on January 31. On that day the 5th Striking Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Army reached the Oder in the vicinity of Kostrzyn (Kiistrin).
50

By February 3, the 1st Byelorussian Front had completely cleared the right bank of the Oder of the enemy, crossed the river and secured a bridgehead on its left bank. During the drive towards the Oder the troops of the Front encircled enemy groupings at Poznan and then at Pila (Schneidemiihl). Six armies (5th Striking, 8th Guards, the 69th and the 33rd armies and the 1st and 2nd Guards tank armies) reached the Oder along a broad front. The emergence of the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts on the Oder brought the Vistula-Oder operation, one of the biggest offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, to an end. In this operation, which was conducted along a 500-kilometre front to a depth of 450-500 kilometres, the Soviet troops advanced at a rapid pace, averaging 23 kilometres a day, with the armoured and mechanised forces moving at a speed of 30-35 kilometres. The troops of the two fronts inflicted irreparable casualties on the enemy; they routed 25 and heavily mauled 35 divisions, seizing over 1,300 tanks and assault guns, approximately 14,000 guns and mortars and more than 1,300 aircraft. To offset these losses the German Command shifted more than 20 divisions and large quantities of weapons and equipment into the zone of the offensive of the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts from other sectors of the SovietGerman, the Western and Italian fronts and from the reserve. The Soviet offensive was successful thanks to the courage, fortitude and superb military skill of the officers and men. To this we should add their profound devotion to their socialist country and unshakable confidence that nazism had not long to live. Conducted on a huge area, this long and difficult operation abounded in examples of heroism and self-sacrifice; the men were determined to fulfil their duty and they fulfilled it regardless of cost. The West German military historian, former Wehrmacht General von Mellenthin described the operation in the following words: ". .. the Russian offensive was delivered with a weight and fury never yet seen in war." Stressing that the Soviet Supreme Command had mastered the methods of organising offensive operations involving huge mechanised armies, he continued: "What happened between the Vistula
4*

51

and the Oder in the first months of 1945 is beyond description; nothing like it has been seen in Europe since the collapse of the Roman Empire. We could have confined ourselves to quoting this comment and turned to other operations were it not for the increasing number of distorted accounts by more and more writers in the West. Some historians, including the American Forrest C. Pogue and the British military historian J.F.C. Fuller who lay claim to utter sincerity, do not mention the fact that the Soviet troops launched the Vistula-Oder operation on the Eastern front eight days ahead of schedule to help the Allied forces which had found themselves in a precarious situation at the end of 1944. And although their position did improve somewhat in the beginning of January 1945, the Allies continued to view the situation with a certain degree of nervousness. There are historians who even claim that the German December offensive in the Ardennes forced the German Command not only to transfer all its reserves and draft reinforcements to the area, but also to shift considerable forces from the Eastern front, a move which weakened the German strength on the Eastern front, and enabled the Soviet troops to make such magnificent headway in their JanuaryFebruary 1945 offensive. The reason for this assertion is clear. But what is surprising is the ease with which people who are well acquainted with the official documents of the German General Staff resort to falsification. Needless to say, the German offensive in the Ardennes did compel the German Command to replenish its troops in the area with reserves and draft reinforcements. The documents of the German General Staff show, however, that from October to December 1944, that is, during the preparation for and the execution of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the German Command transferred only five and a half divisions from the Eastern to the Western front. Simultaneously it shifted 25 divisions and 11 brigades from other fronts and sectors, from wherever it considered possible to strengthen its forces on the Eastern front.
* F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 1939-1945, Lnd., pp. 333-334.
52

1956,

Now let us turn to the overall figures: 75 and a half German divisions were on the "reinforced" Western front when the Vistula-Oder operation was launched, whereas on the "weakened" Eastern front the Soviet troops were facing an estimated 179 divisions."' These figures speak for themselves. Finally, let us revert to German sources once again. "The January offensive of the Soviet troops from the Vistula line," wrote General von Manteuffel who commanded the 5th Panzer Army in the Ardennes, "had an immediate impact on the Western front. We had long been waiting with apprehension for orders to transfer our troops to the East and now we had to do so with the utmost speed." The northwestern part of Poland was liberated in the course of the East Prussian offensive operation in JanuaryMarch 1945 carried out by the 2nd Byelorussian Front (commanderMarshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky, member of the Military CouncilGeneral N. Y. Subbotin, Chief of StaffGeneral A. N. Bogolyubov). The main blow aimed at cutting off Army Group Centre from the rest of the German forces was dealt from the Ran bridgehead by three field armies (3rd, 48th and 2nd striking), one tank (5th Guards) army, one tank (8th Guards) and one mechanised (8th) corps in the general direction of Nowe Miasto, Marienburg (Malbork). Two field armies (65th and 70th) and a tank corps operating from the Serock bridgehead dealt the auxiliary blow along the Nasielsk-Bielsk line. Part of the front's forces were to envelop Modlin from the north thus ensuring cooperation with the 1st Byelorussian Front. The fog was heavy on January 14 when the strike groups of the two fronts launched the offensive. Running into desperate resistance they failed to breach the enemy's tactical defences on the first day. In the circumstances, the front commander on the second day committed the tank and mechanised corps which on January 16 jointly with the field armies broke through the tactical defence zone and advanced to a depth of 25 kilometres. On that day Colonel-General I. I. Fedyuninsky's 2nd
* 20 brigades estimated as 10 divisions.
53

Striking Army captured Putusk and the 65th Army under Colonel-General P. I. Batov took Nasielsk. The ground forces owed much of their success to the massive strikes of the 4th Air Army under Colonel-General K. A. Vershinin. On January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army under Colonel-General V. T. Volsky was moved into the zone of Lieutenant-General N. I. Gusev's 48th Army and developing the offensive in the general direction of Mawa, Lidzbark advanced 60 kilometres in 24 hours. On that day the field armies drove the enemy out of Ciechanw and Nowe Miasto, and on the following day armour in co-operation with the 48th Army's divisions captured Mawa. The 3rd Army under Colonel-General A. V. Gorbatov and the 49th Army commanded by Lieutenant-General I. T. Grishin were pushing ahead on the front's right wing. Towards the end of the first phase of the operation the Soviet troops reached the Ostrolka-Przasnysz-MlawaPlosk-Modlin line. In the second phase the front launched a swift offensive and by January 25 its mobile units reached the Vistula Lagoon (Frisches Haff). At the same time its left-flank forces came up to Torn fortress cutting the main lines of communications of Army Group Centre, which on January 26 was renamed Army Group North. On January 26 the Soviet troops captured Malbork (Marienburg) and the front's left-flank divisions besieged Torn and secured bridgeheads on the right bank of the Vistula. As a result, the right flank of the 1st Byelorussian Front was securely covered and the necessary conditions for smashing the enemy group in Eastern Pomerania were created. The beginning of February 1945 saw the Germans transferring troops from the Western to the Eastern front with the utmost dispatch to reinforce their armies shattered in the course of the Vistula-Oder and the East Prussian operations. On their part, the Soviet troops were preparing for further operations and battles. Soviet forces advancing in other sectors made considerable headway in January. Operating in the Carpathian foothills the 4th Ukrainian Front under General of the Army I. Y. Petrov advanced from 100 to 200 kilometres across Southern Poland and Czechoslovakia and reached the Biel54

sko-Biala-Zakopane-Poprad (70 kilometres west of Presov) line. In the course of the January offensive, the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts operating in conjunction with part of the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front and supported by the troops of the 2nd Byelorussian Front liberated most of Western Poland. Fighting had shifted to German territory where Soviet troops hung out placards with a laconic yet eloquent inscription: "Here she is, nazi Germany". It was her leaders that had fomented the Second World War, the bloodiest and most destructive war in the history of mankind. It was the nazi leaders who were responsible for the death of millions of Soviet people and the devastation of many of the richest parts of their country. Never forgetting this the Soviet troops struck harder and harder at the enemy and increased the pace of the offensive. Now, the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front were only 60-70 kilometres from Berlin. In the meantime, the Germans, who had been thrown back to the west, were hurriedly entrenching along the Oder and the so-called Pomeranian Wall where they hoped to stem the Soviet advance into the depth of Germany. Army Group Vistula was preparing to counterattack. To frustrate these plans the Soviet Armed Forces planned fresh blows at the Wehrmacht. In February and March the Soviet Army concentrated on smashing enemy forces defending East Pomerania, Lower and Upper Silesia and East Prussia. Soviet forces were also waging heavy battles to retain and extend their bridgeheads on the western b a n t of the Oder, and part of them were almost within reach of the Neisse. By February 10 the German Command had concentrated the 2nd and 11th armies of Army Group Vistula in East Pomerania. These armies were getting ready to deal a powerful counterblow from the north at those divisions of the 1st Byelorussian Front which had reached the Oder. The German plan was to smash the Soviet troops north of the Warta, entrench in Pomerania and retain control of the routes leading to East Prussia. This plan was to be executed by five infantry, four panzer and two motorised divisions, one brigade and a number of independent panzer and assault gun battalions.
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Having assessed the situation, G H Q ordered the 2nd Byelorussian Front to discontinue operations in East Prussia and set it the task of eliminating the East Pomeranian group, driving the enemy from the Baltic coast between the mouths of the Vistula and the Oder and capturing the ports of Gdask (Danzig) and Gdynia. Launched on February 10 the offensive developed very slowly. The 45 divisions and three fortified areas of the 2nd Byelorussian Front (not counting those of the 19th Army) were understrength (3,000-4,000 men in each division), and worn out in earlier engagements, and were short of artillery and tanks. As regards the Germans they relied on the powerful defences of the Pomeranian Wall. Built in 1933, it consisted of several well-organinsed defence lines. Trenches, numerous bunkers and pillboxes, dragon's teeth, antitank ditches, escarpments, minefields, barbed wire entanglements and other obstacles created serious difficulties for the advancing troops. As a result the Soviet forces advanced only from 40 to 60 kilometres to the north after\ 10 days of fighting and on February 19 were compelled/ to stop their drive at the Gniew-Czersk-Chojnice line. On February 17, six enemy divisions attacked the right wing of the 1st Byelorussian Front in an area southwest of Stargard. Pushing back the 47th Army some 8 to 12 kilometres the Germans captured Pyrzyce and Banie. In this situation, G H Q decided to complete the rout of the East Pomeranian group of the enemy, by committing the 1st Byelorussian Front, including its tank armies and the Polish 1st Army. A part of the Baltic Fleet ships also took part in the operation. The 1st Byelorussian Front had to suspend its drive on Berlin. Going over to the offensive the Soviet forces dealt two powerful blows, the first one was delivered in the morning of February 24 by the newly-arrived 19th Army of the 2nd Byelorussian Front from the Linde area at Schonau and Koszalin (Kslin) and on the following day its success was exploited by the 3rd Guards Tank Corps; the second blow was delivered on March 1 by the 3rd Striking, 61st and 1st Guards Tank armies of the 1st Byelorussian Front from an area southeast of Stargard in the general direction of Koobrzeg (Kolberg) and on March 2 the 2nd Guards Tank Ar56

my was committed to action to press home the offensive. On the same day the Polish 1st Army and the 47th Army assumed the offensive. These joint operations split up the East Pomeranian group and on March 5 the Soviet troops reached the Baltic coast. The Polish 1st Army played an important role in the operation. It battered down the desperate resistance of the enemy and, co-operating with General M. Y. Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 3rd Striking Army under General N. P. Simonyak, surrounded and wiped out the 10th SS Corps and the Corps Group Tettau and then broke through to the Baltic coast at Kolobzeg. The Political Department of the Polish 1st Army issued a leaflet which said: "Poland is returning to the Baltic.. . . The 'corridor' exists no longer. Poland must have and will have a long sea b o r d e r . . . . Shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army forward on Szczecin and Berlin." In recognition of the Polish 1st Army's part in smashing the enemy in Pomerania the Soviet Supreme Command bestowed the title "Pomeranian" on many of its units. Upon reaching the Baltic coast, the 2nd Byelorussian Front turned east in the direction of Danzig and the 1 st Byelorussian Front wheeled west to the lower reaches of the Oder. By the end of March East Pomerania had been completely cleared of the Germans and the troops of the 2nd Byelorussian Front were in possession of Gdynia and Danzig. The East Pomeranian operation completed, the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian fronts were given fresh tasks. While the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian fronts were smashing the enemy in Pomerania, the 1st Ukrainian Front was fighting in Lower and Upper Silesia. The Lower Silesian operation was planned at the end of January 1945 in the course of the Vistula-Oder operation as its direct continuation. The main blow was to be delivered from two large bridgeheads on the Oder north and south of Wroclaw (Breslau) with the view to encircling this strongly fortified city. Subsequently, the group which delivered the main blow was to advance directly on Berlin. At the same time the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front supported by the 4th Ukrainian Front was to rout the enemy in the Dresden sector.
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By the beginning of February 1945, the enemy had concentrated 37 divisions (seven panzer, four motorised and 26 infantry) numbering not more than 5,000 men each along the line of advance of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Of these not less than 27 were in the first echelon. The Soviet Command had learned that the enemy was hurriedly bringing up fresh troops, including the 21st Panzer and the 18th Motorised divisions from the Western Front. The Soviet troops also regrouped. In nine days, from January 29 to February 7, a strike group consisting of the 3rd Guards, 13th, 52nd and 6th field armies and the 3rd Guards and 4 th tank armies was formed on the bridgehead north of Wroclaw. On the second bridgehead (south of Wroclaw) the Soviet Command concentrated the 5th g u a r d s and the 21st armies with two attached tank corps. A third group made up of the 59th and 60th armies and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which was formed on the front's left flank, was to strike out from a bridgehead southwest of Opole (Oppeln) along the northern slopes of the Sudetes. In order to add greater weight to the blow from the very outset and smash the enemy in the first days of the fighting, both tank armies were to penetrate the enemy defences together with the first-echelon troops and then, developing the success, swoop forward to pave the way for the infantry. This decision was absolutely correct in the circumstances. Otherwise Soviet infantry divisions, worn out and considerably depleted in the preceding battles, would have been unable to fulfil their assignments, although on the whole the Soviet troops had a preponderance over the enemy in the breakthrough sectors. The group concentrated north of Wroclaw had 2.3:1 superiority in infantry, 6.6:1 in artillery and 5.7:1 in armour. The superiority of the Soviet troops south of Wroclaw was also considerable: 1.7:1 in infantry, 3.3:1 in artillery and 4:1 in armour. Only the auxiliary force on the front's left flank lacked a perceptible preponderance over the enemy forces facing it. The Lower Silesian operation was launched at 06.00 hours on February 8, 1945, after a 50-minute artillery softening up. The front lacked the necessary ammunition for a longer
58

artillery bombardment because the logistical tails were lagging behind. Nevertheless, it proved to be quite effective. Despite adverse weather which inhibited air support, the main strike force consisting of the 3rd Guards, 13th, 6th and 52nd field armies and the 4th and 3rd Guards tank armies cut through enemy defences along an 80-kilometre front, dealing blows from an area south of Gogw (Glogau) in the direction of Cottbus and Penzich. Breaching the enemy defences, the infantry and artillery advanced from 10 to 15 kilometres, while the tank armies covered from 30 to 60 kilometres in the first 24 hours of the offensive. After that the Soviet troops found it increasingly difficult to keep up the drive. In the week ending February 15, the front's right-wing armies managed to cover only 60-100 kilometres fighting all the way. Spring thaw had set in. The roads were almost impassable. The terrain was covered with forests and swamps. The retreating Germans put up a determined resistance. On February 24, having advanced from 100 to 120 kilometres, the Soviet troops reached the Neisse along a 100kilometre sector extending from its mouth to Penzich. Exe-cuting a bold manoeuvre they encircled the 40,000-strong garrison of the Wroclaw fortress and another 18,000 enemy troops in Gogw, cracking the enemy defence on the Oder at these points. The left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front mounted the U p p e r Silesian operation somewhat later, on March 15. Assuming the offensive after a devastating 90-minute artillery softening up, the Soviet troops dealt two shattering blows at the enemy: the first was delivered in the southwesterly direction from the area of Grottkau by the 21st and 4th Tank armies, the 34th Guards Infantry Corps of the 5th Guards Army and the 4th Guards Tank Corps; the second by the 59th and 60th armies, 7th Guards Mechanised and the 31st Tank corps which struck out in the westerly direction from an area north of Racibrz (Rotibor). After five days of fighting the strike groups disrupted two defence lines encircling and wiping out more than five enemy divisions at Opole (Oppeln). By March 20, the Soviet forces widened the gap to 110 kilometres, advanced 50 kilometres, reached the Sudetes foothills and crossed the German-Czechoslovak border in a number of places.
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Thus, by the close of March the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian fronts and the 1st Ukrainian Front had reached the Baltic coast and the Oder and Neisse rivers and extended the bridgehead secured on the Oder north of Frankfurt in the early days of February. In February and March the 4 th Ukrainian Front's 38th and 1st Guards armies, which were operating in the difficult conditions of the Carpathians, continued their offensive in the south of Silesia and on the approaches to Moravska Ostrava. Advancing 35 kilometres on the right flank and 75 on the left, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front reached the town where they encountered f urious resistance. In April and May 1945 the Soviet troops carried out the Berlin and Prague operations, in the course of which they liberated Poland within her present borders and completed the rout of nazi Germany. The Polish 1st and 2nd armies took part in the operations conducted by the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts. Fighting in Poland the Soviet troops displayed not only military skill in routing and smashing the enemy, but also lofty humanism and a fraternal attitude to the Polish people. This was manifested in that they prevented the Germans from destroying the old Polish capital of Cracow with its historical and cultural treasures, and also from wrecking the vitally important Silesian industrial area. It took the Soviet Army more than eight months to liberate Poland. At last, the long-suffering Polish people were free again. During the years of occupation the nazis outraged and defamed the national dignity of the Polish people methodically destroying their age-old culture. Bloody terror reigned in the country. Hundreds of thousands of Polish anti-fascists, Soviet prisoners of war and citizens of many European countries were tortured to death in nazi death camps. The whole world knows about the Auschwitz (Owicim) concentration camp near Cracow. It was a giant death factory whose barracks could hold from 180,000 to 250,000 inmates at a time. Several freight trains with prisoners arrived daily in the camp and every day from ten to twelve thousand unfortunate peo60

ple were put to death in gas chambers or furnaces. During the war the nazis killed more than four million people in Auschwitz. The Polish people hated the nazi invaders and even the most vicious repressions failed to crush their will to light back. But they lacked the strength to chase the invaders out of the country. Joyously greeting the Soviet Army, the Polish people were deeply grateful to the Soviet Union for liberating them from bloody nazi terror. "The Polish people," the leaders of the Polish Workers' Party and the government wrote, "will never forget that they obtained their freedom and the possibility to restore their state independence as a result of the brilliant victories of Soviet arms and as a result of the blood shed by many valiant Soviet soldiers." The people of liberated Poland had to embark on the difficult and vital task of rehabilitating the ravaged economy and bring life back to normal again. Thousands of wrecked enterprises, buildings and burned villages had to be built anew. Economic resources were depleted. During the war the hitlerites had destroyed about 40 per cent of the country's national wealth. But the Polish people bravely tackled these difficulties. The Provisional Government of the Polish People's Republic formed in December 1944 on the basis of the Polish Committee of National Liberation began to liquidate the consequences of the nazi occupation, drawing on the support of broad masses of the working people, primarily the working class, and on the selfless assistance of the Soviet Union. The government announced democratic freedoms and promulgated labour legislation safeguarding the interests of the working people. A new administration was established throughout Poland. First and foremost the people's government had to rehabilitate the economy. The agrarian reform, which wrought a major social change in the country, cemented the alliance of the working class and the peasants and strengthened the hegemony of the working class in this alliance, united the National Front and consolidated the foundations of the national democratic state. Rehabilitating the economy, the Provisional Government was particularly concerned with the western lands which had been seized by the Germans a long time before, and after
X

61

being liberated by the Soviet Army in 1945 were returned to Poland in keeping with the decisions of the Allied powers. But before the government could begin rehabilitating their industry and agriculture these lands had to be settled. In response to an appeal of the Polish Workers' Party, workers and peasants from the central parts of the country began to migrate to the west. By June 1, 1945, a total of 25,000 Party members had arrived there in the reunited lands on instructions from the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party, and neither the tremendous difficulties nor the resistance of reactionary elements could impede their development. By the summer of 1945 more than 260,000 people had come to stay there. The Soviet Union's sellless assistance was another important factor in the efforts to restore the economy of Poland. Soviet aid was felt in almost all branches of production. Moreover, the USSR gave Poland consistent diplomatic and political support. As soon as Warsaw was liberated Soviet and Polish troops began to restore order in the capital. The Soviet troops removed approximately 2,000,000 mines in the city and within eight days put up a bridge across the Vistula and helped to organise railway transport and communications. The Soviet Government sent the best architects, engineers and technicians to help rebuild Warsaw and undertook to pay 50 per cent of all the costs. Sixty thousand tons of wheat were delivered to the Polish capital. From February to April 1945, Poland received 45,000 tons of coal from the USSR, 280,000 tons of petroleum, about 3,000 tons of kerosine, 6,000 tons of salt, 8,000 tons of meat, 1,000 tons of fats, and 150,000 head of cattle and sheep. The introduction of popular-democratic reforms precipitated an acute class struggle which in some parts of Poland assumed the character of a civil war. The ruling circles in Britain and the USA also opposed these reforms. And reactionary elements both inside and outside Poland did their utmost to restore the prewar regime in the country. All their attempts, however, were thwarted by the Polish working people and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government could not permit the reactionary circles once again to turn Poland into an instrument of the major imperialist powers. Within a period of three decades Poland was twice
62

used as a springboard for an attack on the USSR and her liberation had been achieved at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of Soviet and Polish soldiers. On April 21, 1945, the USSR and the Polish People's Republic signed a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and postwar co-operation. Both states pledged to join efforts in bringing the war to a victorious conclusion, to do everything in their power to prevent a repetition of aggression and not to participate in coalitions directed at the other side. The treaty also provided for economic and cultural co-operation and mutual assistance in economic rehabilitation. T h e treaty strengthened the alliance and friendship between the two Slav peoples. International reaction was forced to relinquish its intentions of re-establishing a cordon satiitaire around the Soviet Union. Finally, the treaty did much to raise the international prestige of people's Poland. Comradeship-in-Arms T h e comradeship-in-arms of the Soviet and Polish peoples rests on the common features of the political and social systems of both states, unity of goals and tasks of their struggle and on their common ideology, Marxism-Leninism. Cemented by the blood shed in joint struggle against common enemies, this comradeship-in-arms has deep historical roots and manifested itself in the years of the Civil W a r and the foreign intervention in Soviet Russia. Thousands of Polish patriots fought in the ranks of the Red Army to safeguard the gains of the October Revolution. The magnificent exploits of the Bielgorod Regiment, the regiment of revolutionary Warsaw, the Lublin and Siedlce regiments and the Warsaw Hussar and Mazowiecky Uhlan regiments have gone down in history. More than 200 Polish soldiers were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for distinguished service during the Civil W a r . This comradeship-in-arms of the Soviet and Polish people manifested itself with particular force during the Second World W a r . Guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism the Soviet Union responded to the requests of the Polish patriotic forces and furnished extensive help in forming and training the divisions of the Polish Army and also in
V 63

organising guerilla warfare on occupied Polish territory. The people's Polish Army was formed and steeled in battles for the independence of Poland. It was formed on the initiative and under the direct guidance of the Polish Workers' Party for the purpose of fighting for national and social emancipation. Created with the selfless assistance of the Soviet Union Poland's Armed Forces were inspired by the heroic fight of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces against the nazi invaders. The formation of the Polish Army took place in conditions of an acute class struggle between the democratic forces headed by the Polish Workers' Party and the reactionary elements rallied,around the emigre government in London and its agents {n Poland. The emigre government headed first by General Sikorski and then by Stanisaw Mikoajczyk did everything it could to prevent the Polish people from launching an armed struggle against the Germans and propagated the "order arms" tactics. Preparing to seize power in liberated Poland and at the same time fearing that developments might take a revolutionary turn, the Polish reactionary circles connected all their plans with the policy of the Western powers, and strove to frustrate a rapprochement between Poland and her natural ally, the Soviet Union. The emigre government in London and its clandestine agents in Poland advanced the slogan of "two enemies". For them the Soviet Army was the second enemy after nazism, and, in effect, the first enemy against which their military agents in the country were being trained to fight. As the direct successor of the Communist Party of Poland, and expressing the genuine will of the Polish people, the Polish Workers' Party fully exposed the policy of the emigre government. It wrote in its programme documents that to achieve real independence the Polish people would have to rely on their alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union and that only the Soviet Union could fully guarantee the security of Poland's frontiers and her peaceful postwar development. In keeping with the interests of the Polish people and their desire of light nazism, Polish patriots headed by W a n da Wasilewska and Alfred Lampe began to organise all Polish emigrants in the Soviet Union into a national organi64

sation whose principal task would be to give prompt assistance to fighting Poland. Their efforts resulted in the formation of an anti-fascist organisation of Polish emigrants in the Soviet Union called the Union of Polish Patriots with W a n d a Wasilewska as its chairman. The Union came into being in the spring of 1943 shortly after the break in the relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish emigre government in London. The Union had set itself a number of objectives, the most important being the formation of the Polish Armed Forces. Accordingly, it approached the Soviet Government with the request to raise a Polish division in the USSR that was to become the embryo of a new army which was to embrace progressive ideology and the freedom-loving traditions of the Polish people, and rely on the alliance and friendship with the USSR. The request was granted on May 6, 1943, when the State Defence Committee passed a resolution authorising the formation of the Tadeusz Kosciuszko Polish 1st Infantry Division. Colonel Zygmunt Berling was appointed divisional Commander with Major V. Sokorski as his second-in-command in charge of cultural and educational work, and Colonel A. Siwicki as chief of staff. The tasks facing the Polish units that were being formed in the USSR were outlined by Colonel Berling in his speech at the Third All-Slav Meeting in Moscow on May 9, 1943. Condemning the political course of the London government he said: " W e understand, as understands the entire Polish nation, that the road to freedom is won not by marking time with the rifle butt on the ground, but by military exploit.""' The Soviet Government provided facilities for training officers for the Polish division at the Ryazan Infantry, Tambov Artillery and Ordnance, 3rd Leningrad Artillery, Moscow Engineering, Ryazan Automobile and the Murom Communications schools. Polish drivers were trained at special course in Bronnitsa. After six weeks of training the division received its colours and took the oath of allegiance. On July 15, the anniversary of the defeat of the Teutonic Order at Grunwald (1410), the Union of Polish Patriots presented the Polish 1st Divi* Pravda, May 10, 1943.
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sion with its colours bearing the inscription "For our freedom and yours". Then the officers and men took the oath of allegiance to their people and their allied duty. The oath included the following words: "I pledge allied loyalty to the Soviet Union which gave me the weapons with which to fight our common enemy. I pledge to maintain comradeship-in-arms with the allied Red Army."* The Polish soldiers fulfilled their oath with honour. Soviet and foreign journalists attended the ceremony. Many were surprised to see a well organised and trained military unit equipped with modern weapons, of which 80 per cent were automatic or semi-automatic. Besides infantry units the divisifrn4iad antitank, machine-gun, artillery, mortar and tank elements. The well-known Sunday Times correspondent Alexander Werth subsequently wrote that "the fire power of this division was seven times greater than that of a regular division of the Polish Army in 1939".** While the Polish 1st Infantry Division was undergoing intensive military training, several thousand more Polish volunteers of call-up age arrived at its camp near Ryazan. As a result it became possible to raise other Polish military units. On August 10, 1943, the State Defence Committee in response to the request of the Union of Polish Patriots agreed to form a 40,000-strong Polish army corps on the territory of the USSR. Its decision to this effect also envisaged the establishment of a school for Polish officers with training facilities for 750 men. On September 1, 1943, the Polish 1st Infantry Division was dispatched to the frontline and on October 12 it passed its ordeal by fire. Advancing with the 33rd Army of the Western Front, it breached the enemy's powerful defences at Lenino near Orsha, drove a deep wedge into his positions and reached the designated lines. For meritorious action in the battles at Lenino 239 Polish officers and men were decorated with Soviet orders and medals. Captain Juliusz Hubner was made Hero of the Soviet Union. This title was posthumously conferred on Captain Wadysaw Wysocki and Anela Krzywo.
* Pravda, July 17, 1943. ** A. Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945, N.Y., 1964, p. 657.
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To mark the victory at Lenino the Polish People's Republic established the medal "For Distinguished Service on the Field of Glory". The battle at Lenino became a factor of great significance in the Polish people's fight for national liberation. The news of the Polish division's victory swiftly spread throughout occupied Poland, inspiring the Polish patriots to fight with still greater courage and heroism against the nazis. The inhabitants of Lenino, a small town in Byelorussia, and the surrounding villages erected a monument in memory of the officers and men of the Polish division who had been killed in battles on Soviet territory in October 1943. A museum of Soviet-Polish comradeship-in-arms was opened in Lenino on the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Polish Army. Memorial meetings are held each year on October 12 at the common grave of the Polish soldiers. The development of the Polish Armed Forces continued in 1944 and 1945. In March 1944, the 1st Army Corps was transformed into the Polish 1st Army which already numbered 96,000 officers and men. In June the formation of a tank corps was started and in September of a mixed air corps. Shortly afterwards the Polish 2nd Army was formed under General Karol Swierczewski. It participated in the Berlin and Prague operations as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Thanks to Soviet assistance the formation and the combat training of the revived Polish Army was conducted at a pace which would have been simply impossible under any other conditions. Moreover, the Soviet Government transferred several headquarters of air and armoured units and military schools to the Polish Army. Towards the end of the war the Polish Army numbered over 400,000 officers and men. It had 3,740 guns and mortars, 432 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 584 combat aircraft. The Polish Army was a well-equipped, efficient fighting force. Up to May 1, 1945, the Soviet Union supplied the Polish Army with 303,000 rifles and carabines, 106,500 submachineguns, 18,800 machine-guns of all types, 6,798 antitank guns, 4,806 mortars, 3,543 guns of all calibres, 673 tanks and self-propelled guns, 630 aircraft of all types, 11,750 motor vehicles and a large number of other vehicles and weapons.
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These figures do not include Soviet aid in weapons, equipment and ammunition to Polish partisans and the Warsaw insurgents. In addition to supplying the Polish Army with arms, ammunition, transport and communication facilities and other equipment, the Soviet Government assigned a large number of officers and military experts to serve in its ranks. The Polish armies fought courageously for the freedom and independence of the Polish people. The Polish Army took part in the liberation of Warsaw where the tragedy of the Polish soldier had begun and where he returned with victory. It fought on the shores of the Baltic, on the banks of the Oder and Nisa Luzicka and took part in the battle for Berlin. I have a good knowledge of the role played by the Polish 2nd Army in the Berlin operation, and the events of those days are still f r e s h i n my memory. Having regrouped on the night of April 22 aftd ascertained the location of the junction between General Koroteyev's 52nd Army and the Polish 2nd Army, the enemy Grlitz group, advancing along the Spree, attacked the 52nd Army's 48th Infantry Corps in an effort to reach Spremberg. Probably the German Command did not know that its forces at Spremberg had been wiped out and ordered the Grlitz group to link up with them. In any case, if the Spremberg group had not been smashed the left flank of the Soviet troops would have found themselves in a near-critical position. In the morning the enemy's assault group of two divisions and about 100 panzers launched an offensive. It breached the defences of the 48th Infantry Corps and advancing 20 kilometres to the north reached the rear of the Polish 2nd Army. At the time the Polish 2nd Army's right-flank divisions which were fighting next to General A. S. Zhadov's army were successfully advancing westward. The German group took in the army's left Hank and cut into its logistic tails which were stretched out and on the move. The blow disrupted co-operation and communications between some of its divisions. It was a difficult situation even for a battle-hardened army, and all the more so for the Polish 2nd Army because the Berlin operation was its first battle. Nevertheless, Polish officers and men displayed great courage, and after some confusion caused by the breakthrough they turned
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the front 180 degrees and engaged the enemy with mounting determination and fortitude. Measures were taken to seal the breach and then wipe out the enemy Grlitz group. It was clear that the German Command undertook this fairly powerful counterblow in an effort to create a critical situation on the entire left flank of the Soviet troops and frustrate the operation in the main, Berlin, sector. But this was something it was now absolutely powerless to do. The counterblow caused not the slightest change in the main plans of the Soviet Command whose decision to smash the enemy's Spremberg and Cottbus groups on the flanks of the Soviet breach by throwing considerable forces into action was absolutely justified in the circumstances. By nightfall on April 24 the Polish 2nd Army and the 52nd Army, two corps of the 5th Guards Army and the 4th Tank Corps managed to slow down the offensive of the Grlitz group, which had advanced 33 kilometres towards Spremberg, and then in a fierce engagement bring it to a halt. I recall another development that undoubtedly had a political colouring. When, in preparation for the Berlin operation,. the Polish troops began replacing part of the Soviet 13th Army, the German troops, including SS units, reacted to their arrival with wild threatening cries. They simply could not reconcile themselves to the fact that the Poles whom they had oppressed for six years as people of a lower race were now advancing on Berlin. It was this mood, apparently whetted from above, that accounted for the desire of the Germans to strike a blow primarily at the Polish Army, for the ferocity of their offensive and for the strength which in this critical hour for Germany the nazi leaders managed to concentrate against the Poles. And when in conjunction with Soviet troops the Polish forces under the hero of the Civil W a r in Spain General K. Swierczewski dealt a shattering blow at the Grlitz group all of us were doubly satisfied. As I see it, this example of comradeship-in-arms merits the attention of Soviet and Polish writers. The comradeship-in-arms of the Soviet and Polish troops became steeled in the battles against the hitlerites. Fighting shoulder to shoulder they covered the long road from Lenino in Byelorussia to the Elbe.
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It was a great triumph for the Marxist-Leninist ideas of proletarian internationalism, and proved that the policy of the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish people of consolidating their country's independent existence in alliance with the USSR and strengthening Polish-Soviet friendship was absolutely correct. Cemented by blood shed on many fields of battle, the comradeship-in-arms of Polish and Soviet patriots was a political and military factor which engendered the inviolable friendship of the two nations. In appreciation of the heroism of the Polish soldiers the Soviet Government conferred orders and honorary titles on many units of the Polish Army. For gallantry in the battles against the nazi invaders 29 Polish units were awarded Orders of the Red Banner, of Kutuzov, Alexander Nevsky and the Red Star. The Tadeusz Kosciuszko Polish 1st Infantry Division received two awards. The titles Warsaw, Praga, Pomerania, Koobrzeg were bestowed on 28 units. On ten occasions Moscow fired salutes honouring the heroic Polish \ o o p s . More than 5,000 Polish officers and men received Soviet combat Orders. The anti-fascist struggle of the Polish Resistance was a part of the fight waged by progressive, genuinely democratic and revolutionary forces against nazism and its allies. The tasks of the national liberation movement in Poland were formulated by the Polish Workers' Party and consisted in mobilising the people for the fight against the nazi invaders and, using all and every means, striking shattering blows at the Wehrmacht. Motivated by internationalist ideas people of many nationalities joined the Polish Resistance. Anti-fascists from almost all European countries felt themselves duty-bound to fight the nazis on Polish soil where the roads of war had brought them. Mobilising the Polish people for the fight against the invaders the Polish Workers' Party attached great importance to the participation of Soviet citizens who had joined the Polish patriotic forces in this struggle. As a rule they were Soviet officers and men who had escaped from P O W camps and whose military experience, hatred for the enemy and preparedness to fight nazism to the last turned them into staunch allies of the Polish people. There were Soviet citizens with the partisan detachments of Gwardia Ludowa, and
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from January 1944 with the partisan units of Armia Ludowa. Many of them became famous partisan commanders. Separate Soviet partisan detachments were formed within Gwardia Ludowa and in Armia Ludowa in 1943 and particularly in 1944. These detachments fought with great courage for the liberation of Poland shoulder to shoulder with the Polish patriots of Armia Ludowa. Very important was the political work conducted by Soviet partisans among the Polish population. They explained that the Soviet Army and Soviet partisans were fulfilling a mission of liberation in Poland and propagandised the ideas of fraternal friendship of the Polish and Soviet peoples. At the request of Polish anti-fascists three partisan units and a detachment totalling 1,863 people, all of them Poles, who were with Soviet partisans, were formed and outfitted on Soviet territory in the autumn of 1943. They were subordinated to the Polish Partisan Movement HQ established on April 8, 1944 with Aleksander Zawadzki at the head. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Partisan Movement HQ took an active part in forming these detachments, which upon entering Polish territory became part of Armia Ludowa. As the struggle inside Poland grew in scope and intensity the stronger became the organisation of the Armia Ludowa. Separate partisan groups, detachnjents and units were united into1 partisan brigades, each numbering a thousand men and over. An important role in the Armia Ludowa was played by detachments formed by the Polish Partisan Movement HQ which reinforced Armia Ludowa by deploying five fresh partisan brigades in Poland. By 1944, Armia Ludowa had grown into a formidable fighting force consisting of 16 partisan brigades and several detachments numbering about 60,000 men in all. The partisans derailed and blew up trains carrying troops and armaments from Germany to the Eastern front, attacked German units, police and gendarmerie and disrupted supply service. Armia Ludowa gained control of whole regions in occupied Poland. Soviet and Polish partisans tied down large enemy forces. There were engagements in which up to 10,000 partisans took part. In the spring of 1944, as the Soviet-German front ap71

proachcd Polish territory, several Soviet partisan detachments crossed the Bug and launched military operations in close co-operation with Armia Ludowa partisan units. On the night of February 9, 1944, the almost 2,500-strong Kovpak 1st Ukrainian Partisan Division under P. P. Vershigora forced the Bug and conducted a raid which took it 2,500 kilometres across the Rzeszw and Lublin wojewodztwos, the eastern part of the Warsaw wojewodztwo and the southeastern section of the Biaystok wojewodztwo. In this operation Soviet partisans co-operating with Polish partisans and the local population fought over 100 battles in which the invaders sustained heavy losses in men and weapons. There were other Soviet partisan detachments operating jointly with Polish partisans on Polish territory, including N. A. Prokopyuk's detachment, the Alexander Nevsky partisan bnit commanded by V. A. Karasev, detachments under Captain Kunitsky, Senior Lieutenant Sankov and Captain Chepiga, a partisan formation under Colonel Shangin and detachments commanded by Artyukhov, Yaremchuk, Andreyev and others. Operating from bases in the Lipsk and Janw forests 3,000 Soviet and Polish partisans controlled a large part of Lublin wojewodztwo where the nazi rule had been practically overthrown. On orders from the German Command the 154th and 174th divisions and units of the 213th Division and SS, gendarmerie and police units totalling from 25 to 30 thousand men with Luftwaffe support surrounded the forests in an attempt to wipe out the partisans. In the fierce fighting which lasted for many days the partisans managed to break out of the ring and continued to help the Red Army and the Polish 1st Army to liberate occupied Poland. Co-operating with Polish patriots the Soviet partisans inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. In the period from March to May 1944 they destroyed 38 panzers and armoured cars, 149 motor vehicles, wrecked 4 armoured trains, derailed 53 German troop trains and killed a large number of the enemy troops. The Soviet Command rendered substantial assistance to the Polish patriots. Beginning with the summer of 1944 Soviet planes regularly dropped weapons, ammunition and uniforms to the Polish partisans. From May 27, 1944, to
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January 16, 1945, the Soviet Air Force carried out 70 air raids in which 99 planes took part. In the period from May to September 1944 the Soviet Air Force parachuted 3,179 submachine-guns, 1,297 rifles, 167 machine-guns, 50 antitank rifles, 31 mortars, 4,413 mortar shells, 7,912 grenades, 12,960 kilograms of explosives and 479 uniforms for the partisans operating in Poland. The operations of the Soviet troops against the Germans in Poland were an earnest of Polish-Soviet friendship. Six hundred thousand Soviet officers and men were killed in the fighting for Poland's freedom and independence. Paying tribute to the great role played by the Soviet troops in the liberation of Poland the government of People's Poland and the Polish Army Command decorated 36,000 Soviet officers and men with Polish Orders and medals. In token of their respect for the Soviet Army, the Polish people built monuments to the fallen heroes, collected gifts for its soldiers, nursed the wounded in hospitals, and donated their blood. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet people and the Soviet Armed Forces the people of liberated Poland and other European countries were able to solve their crucial problems without outside interference. The Polish people assumed power in the country and under the guidance of the Polish Workers' Party took to the socialist road of development. Having victoriously ended the Great Patriotic W a r the Soviet people embarked on peaceful socialist construction. Attaining outstanding successes in this direction they went over to building communist society and thus greatly stimulated the development of the world revolutionary process. The Soviet Union's successes in communist construction and the headway made by other fraternal countries in building socialism are a source of inspiration for the working people in countries still oppressed by capital. That is why the imperialists, who would have liked to frustrate or at least slow down the building of socialism in European and Asian countries, are continuing their intrigues against the socialist community. To achieve their objectives the imperialist aggressors are even resorting to arms and are conducting a vigorous ideological struggle. World developments show that the slightest relaxation of revolutionary vigilance on any sector of the anti-impe73

rialist front exposes that sector to the threat of an offensive by reaction which every now and then conducts a test of strength in an effort to find a weak link. Therefore it is necessary to be still more vigilant. And it is the historical duty of the armed forces of the socialist community, of all the fraternal Warsaw Treaty countries, of all socialist countries to redouble their efforts to avert another world war. The socialist countries and their armed forces are consolidating their friendship, unity and co-operation to be in a position to give a deserved rebuff to any aggressor. We trust that world peace can be established. But this trust is not founded on hope alone. Indeed it is a conviction based on a thorough knowledge of the international situation and the balance of forces on the world arena, on the preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces to safeguard the gains of the socialist countries and their national interests. To be able to cut short any aggressive move by the imperialist countries it is necessary to continue strengthening the might of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries and the socialist camp as a whole by all possible means. In the face of increasing international tension and the threat of war the CPSU considers itself duty-bound to still further enhance the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union and develop and perfect its Armed Forces. The measures taken by the Party in recent years have immeasurably augmented the fighting capacity of the Soviet Army and Navy. "The Soviet Army is a mighty, formidable and invincible fighting force. It has the best weaponry in the world. Soviet soldiers, from marshal to private, from admiral to seaman, have an excellent knowledge of military science and of the superb military equipment entrusted to them, they are people boundlessly loyal to our Party and to the communist cause."* Soviet-Polish friendship was conceived and tempered inthe flames of bitter battles against the nazi invaders in the period of heavy trials for both peoples. This comradeshipin-arms is growing stronger with each passing day.
* Fifty Years of Great Achievements of Socialism, Report by L. I. Brezhnev, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1967, p. 84.

Marshal of the Soviet Union

M. V. ZAKHAROV

SPRING OF FREEDOM IN RUMANIA

On the Soviet-Rumanian Border On March 26, 1944, a momentous event took place in the Great Patriotic W a r : raining shattering blows upon the enemy the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the Prut, the state border of the USSR, on an 85-kilometre-wide sector. From vineyard-covered knolls the men saw the silvery ribbon of the river. Now, at last they were standing on the same border from where the enemy began his rapacious drive into Soviet territory 33 months earlier. It is impossible to forget the joy that lit up their faces, slightly bronzed by the cool spring winds and the March sun. Exhausted by almost unceasing battles and lack of sleep the men gave way to jubilation. For a thousand days and nights the Soviet troops battled the enemy with only one thought in their mindto drive the nazi hordes out of their country. For a thousand days and nights they unflinchingly faced death, emerged victorious in unequal battles and fought to their last drop of blood for every inch of their land. A n d for just as many days and nights the home-front workers toiled without rest to keep the front supplied with arms, ammunition, and "food, and waited for the hour when the last German soldier would be driven out of the country.
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And now there was a sector of the Soviet border, the first small sector that had been cleared of the enemy. One had to be there, with the infantrymen and the gunners, with the tankmen and the fliers, with the sappers and the signalmen, with all those who battered and pursued the enemy, to sense the full depth of their joy. The nation celebrated victory. In a matter of hours the whole country and Soviet Army heard the news that the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front had reached the Soviet state border. Newspapers and the radio highlighted the names of the heroes who had distinguished themselves in battles, and artillery salvoes thundered in Moscow as the capital saluted the glorious troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued an order of the day listing the names of troop commanders and awarding honorary titles to units for meritorious action. All the troops of the Front who had crossed the Dniester, liberated the town of Beltsy and reached the state border were formally commended. This victory evoked tremendous enthusiasm at the home front. Newspapers reported numerous fresh labour exploits of factory workers and farmers. This news still further raised the morale of the Soviet Armed Forces. It was a splendid manifestation of the unity of the Army and the whole peoplethe source of invincible strength of the socialist state. At the time the 2nd Ukrainian Front was under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev with Lieutenant-General of the Armoured Troops I. Z. Susaikov as member of the front's Military Council and the author as chief of staff. Assessing the situation brought about by the Front's successful operations, its commander justly thought it necessary to prepare for fresh bitter battles, since the emergence of the Soviet troops at the Rumanian border was only the beginning of the Soviet Army's great mission of' liberation with the complete victory over the enemy as its ultimate goal. In his order of the day to the 2nd Ukrainian Front on March 26, 1944, Marshal Konev underlined that the country's high assessment of its victories made it incumbent on the Soviet troops to strike heavier and still more devastating blows at the enemy, unceasingly toughen their fighting spirit and multiply their victories. v
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Indeed, the front's units fought with courage and determination. Pressing home their offensive they destroyed covering detachments and centres of resistance. Smashing through the enemy defences in different sectors they split up his troops, cut into the tlanks and rear of his groupings, isolated them from each other and forced his reserve mobile detachments into erratic manoeuvring. The combat skill of the Soviet troops was exceptionally high. Frequently small elements and units would get the best of superior enemy forces. On one sector the retreating German and Rumanian units entrenched themselves on the western bank of a river, mined the crossing and kept it under fire of heavy machine-guns and mortars. A tank battalion under Captain Okunevsky resolutely attacked the crossing, just when the Germans and the Rumanians were completing preparations to defend the crossing and considered themselves out of danger. But the first Soviet tanks supported by intensive fire from rearward vehicles attacked over the crossing. Thrown into confusion by this unexpected move it took the enemy some time to realise that Soviet sappers had already cut the wires connecting the mines. This was done by a group under Lieutenant Goltsev and passed unnoticed by the enemy. As a result, the German and Rumanian troops on the western bank were routed. In another sector the enemy left a covering detachment, while the main forces tried to escape across a river. A platoon under Lieutenant Lyubashin moved into attack positions. Taking stock of the situation the lieutenant decided to outwit the enemy. Ordering a squad to open heavy fire, he ordered the other troops to bypass the coppice where the Germans had taken cover. Concentrating on the sector from which the squad was firing and expecting an attack from that direction the Germans returned the fire. Meanwhile the Soviet troops had completed their manoeuvre and cut into the rear of the enemy. Many Germans were killed and the rest took to flight disregarding their pistol-brandishing officer. The Soviet Army's swooping offensive caused confusion and panic in the enemy camp. At the time when the Soviet troops reached the SovietRumanian border, the foreign press carried reports shedding light on the situation inside Rumania. For instance, it was
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reported that the German Command was shifting Hungarian and Rumanian troops from the Hungarian-Rumanian border to the Russian front and taking every precaution to isolate Hungarian units from the Rumanian troops. The Germans established full control over all Rumanian and Bulgarian towns lying on the coast of the Black Sea, commandeered all crossing means on the Danube from Budapest to Galami. The whole of Rumania was occupied by the Germans and the Rumanian Army swarmed with German "instructors". There were German garrisons in many parts of Rumania and German troops controlled airfields, railways and all lines of communications. The newspapers also reported that Ion Antonescu, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Rumania, had been summoned to Hitler's main headquarters. Judging by articles in Rumanian newspapers and the measures taken by the Rumanian authorities it was clear that the appearance of the Soviet troops on the Prut caused panic and confusion among the Rumanian ruling circles. The Rumanian Defence Minister General Pantazi, ordered the mobilisation of fresh reserves: evidently these consisted of people who had earlier been considered unfit for military service. There were also reports that reinforcements were arriving at all Bulgarian and Rumanian ports and that measures were being taken to strengthen the defence installations and the air defence system. Nazi propaganda was doing its utmost to distort the true objectives of the Soviet Army. It should be noted that certain sections of the Rumanian population accepted the lies spread by the nazi propaganda at their face value. As a satellite of nazi Germany, Rumania figured very prominently in the plans of German Command. Supported by the leaders of bourgeois-landowner parties, Rumania's fascist government headed by Ion Antonescu plunged the country into the war against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the day Germany launched her attack. In the first month of the war Rumania sent 13 divisions and nine brigades to the Soviet-German front, and by November 1942 a total of 26 Rumanian divisions were in action against the Soviet Army. In keeping with the numerous commitments and treaties binding Antonescu's government to the government of nazi Germany, Rumania
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delivered oil, food and many other commodities to Germany. From the autumn of 1940 to August 23, 1944, the day Rumania withdrew from the war on Germany's side, she supplied the nazis 10,316,000 tons of oil, 1,378,000 tons of grain and seeds, 75,147 tons of meat and large quantities of other commodities and raw materials. Thus, Rumania's fascist government had turned the country into Germany's economic appendage. And when at the close of 1943 the Soviet Army delivered a shattering blow at the enemy on the left flank of the Soviet-German front Hitler demanded from his henchman Antonescu a fresh military effort in the face of the mounting danger. Antonescu's letter of reply of November 15, 1943, is well worth quoting since it disclosed the full extent of the plight to which his fascist government had condemned the Rumanian people. "Your Excellency," Antonescu wrote, "I have always been frank with you, and I shall also be frank in replying to your question: should we not immediately make a fresh military effort in the face of the approaching d a n g e r ? . . . In 1942, NRumania acting jointly with the Wehrmacht in the fight against the Bolshevik army made the biggest contribution of all the European countries: 26 divisions consisting of picked troops equipped with the best a r m s . . . . We lost 18 divisions on the Don and at Stalingrad where they were encircled by Soviet f o r c e s . . . . In the fighting in the Kuban area eight divisions lost 25 per cent of their armament in a year, counting only those arms that had been delivered from Rumania". Seven of these divisions are at present cut off in the Crimea and the strength of the eighth, which was formed of the forces that had remained after the Don operation, has been reduced by a third . . . as a result of the fighting in the Nogai steppes. To date we have lost a quarter of a million men, not counting convalescents, and the equipment we have lost would have been enough to outfit approximately 20 divisions.... We are suffering sacrifices by using up all our production and military imports to maintain our units in the field and also the occupation troops and those guarding the c o a s t . . . . We are forced to issue summer uniforms to troops mobilised inside the country, particularly the recruits. . . . I do not know whether the truth about the
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Rumanian participation in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has always been told you; that this war has cost Rumania 300,000 million lei; that during this period we gave Germany more than 8 million tons of oil, thus threatening our own national stocks, as well as the deposits themselves. . . . " The Rumanian dictator was too late in making his tearful admissions: the Soviet forces were standing at the Rumanian border. The time had come for Antonescu to answer not only to the Soviet people for the crimes committed against them, but also to the Rumanian people for the catastrophe into which he had plunged them. Planning the plunder of the temporarily occupied regions of the Black Sea coast between the Southern Bug and the Dniester and between the Dniester and the Prut, the Rumanian fascists did not think that one day they would be held responsible for their deeds. Special teams formed with the permission of the Royal Rumanian government loaded lathes dismantled from Soviet factories and farm machinery stolen from collective and state farms on Rumania-bound ships and trains. The fascist marauders stole everything they could lay their hands onpaintings and sculptures from palaces and museums, stage sets, costumes and music scores from theatres, hospital equipment, personal belongings and domestic utensils and then sold their loot in Bucharest shops opened for that purpose. According to Rumanian figures, the value of the property taken out of the USSR by the Rumanian fascists towards the end of the war, amounted to 948,000 million lei (at the prewar rate of exchange). Withdrawing in haste from Soviet villages, the German and Rumanian fascists tried to obtain written statements from the peasants that they had never robbed, killed or tortured Soviet people. Those bandits, murderers and rapists wanted to appear innocent of any crimes and were in deadly fear of the Soviet Army's entry into Rumania. In his statement on June 18, 1945, Colonel-General Jodl disclosed that at an operational meeting which took place at the time Hitler said that he would have rather lost the Byelorussian forests than Rumanian oil. This made it clear why Army Group A, which covered the Balkan theatre when the Soviet troops reached the Rumanian frontier, consisted
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of 64 divisions of the total of 251 divisions deployed on the Soviet-German front. Nevertheless, the enemy was forced to retreat under the overwhelming onslaught of the Soviet Army. Realising the hopelessness of their position, the enemy forces particularly the Rumanian troops began surrendering in increasing numbers. Reeling under the crippling assault of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the enemy committed fresh Rumanian regiments to action on an important sector of the front. But the Rumanians were unwilling to light. A few hours before they were to go into action the men of a newly arrived Rumanian battalion shot their commanding officer Captain Anazolescu and dispersed. A group of 63 Rumanians took refuge in a school and then surrendered to Soviet scouts. There were increasing cases of German troops fleeing from their positions together with the Rumanians under the powerful blows of the Soviet forces. The fighting on the Prut and the approaches to it left no doubt in anyone's mind that the enemy would be unable to stand up to the Soviet assault. The Geimans were fully aware that their positions in Rumania were becoming more and more precarious. An order was issued to evacuate Bucharest, but it was the bourgeoisie and those who plundered the temporarily occupied parts of the USSR that left the capital, while the workers preferred to remain. In the northern regions of Rumania it was chiefly the landowners who lied to the west of the country, but the peasants stayed behind. Discontent with the fascist government continued to grow and the morale of the Rumanian troops was virtually shattered. Lieutenant-General S. G. Trofimenko's 27th Army was the first to cross the Prut. On January 27 and 28, that is, on the second and third day upon reaching the state border, it forced the river and secured bridgeheads on its western bank. Later, the right-wing divisions of Lieutenant-General K. A. Koroteyev's 52nd Army also crossed the river. Their uniforms sodden and feet bruised after an arduous march along miry roads, the Soviet troops kept arriving on the bank of the Prut. And there as if by a miracle their fatigue disappeared. For those men who had crossed the Mzha
6-1357 81

and the Vorksla, the Northern Donets and the Bug, the Dnieper, the Ingulets and the Dniester, the Prut was just another water barrier. The road to the west had been a difficult one, but every step forward wrested yet another yard of their native land from the enemy. On rafts and dinghies, on bundles of reeds, wooden barn gates, logs and barrels they crossed the Prut under enemy fire. And when they reached the opposite bank they were on enemy territory. The main forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front crossed the Prut in the wake of the advance units using the bridges thrown by sappers and the front's organic crossing means. The first thing that struck the eye was the extreme poverty and desolation of the Rumanian villages. Tiny huts, their windows plugged with rags or boarded up with plywood, seemed to be half-buried in the ground, and not a person in sight. But one by one old folk, women and children appeared from round the corners of huts and from holes in the ground, and came forward to meet the Soviet troops. Witnesses of one of the grimmest tragedies that had ever shaken Rumania, they described how German and Rumanian troops crossed the Soviet border in June 1941. On tanks, crosscountry vehicles, cars, motorcycles and horse-drawn carriages the Germans and Rumanians flooded the Moldavian steppes. They were drunk and happy. There were many of them, hundreds of t h o u s a n d s . . . . And then, mud-spattered, unshaven, barefooted and frightened to death they fled westward evoking a feeling of repulsion and contempt in all honest Rumanians. It was true that a part of the Rumanian population was afraid of the Soviet troops. Fascist propaganda had painted the Soviet Army as a gang of cutthroats. But the Soviet troops who crossed the Prut in the wake of the advanced units moved in strict formation maintaining unflagging military and moral discipline. The first Rumanians who saw the Soviet troops were amazed by their kind, friendly attitude. The news spread quickly and villagers began to leave their hiding places in the forests where they had fled for safety. With unconcealed wonder they gazed at the columns of troops, guns and tanks. The strict discipline of the Soviet forces evoked the admiration of the simple folk who, with bitterness in their hearts,
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compared this march with what the Germans and Rumanians had done in 1941. People who had succumbed to propaganda and having slaughtered their cattle lied in panic and confusion leaving their belongings behind, also began to return to their native villages. On April 2, 1944, the Soviet Government issued a statement setting forth the main aspects of the Soviet policy towards Rumania. "The Soviet Union is making it known that in pursuit of the German armies and their allied Rumanian troops, the advancing Red Army units have crossed the Prut in a number of sectors and have entered Rumanian territory. The Red Army Supreme Command has ordered the advancing Soviet units to pursue the enemy until he is routed and capitulates. "At the same time the Soviet Government declares that it does not intend to take over any part of Rumanian territory or alter the existing state system in Rumania, and that the entry of the Soviet troops into Rumania is dictated solely by military necessity and the continuing resistance of the enemy forces.""' This statement was of major political and international significance, since it clearly showed that the Soviet Union's sole intention was to smash nazism as quickly as possible, that it had no plans of aggrandisement and that the liberated people were completely at liberty to take their destiny into their own hands. Besides, it further strengthened the antiHitler coalition and gave greater impetus to the struggle of the Rumanian democratic forces against fascism. On April 10, the State Defence Committee passed a resolution elaborating on the Soviet Government's foreign policy statement. Setting concrete instructions governing the behaviour of the Soviet troops and the Soviet Command on Rumanian territory, the resolution said in part: "The Red Army has entered Rumania not as a conqueror but as the liberator of the Rumanian people from nazi oppression. It has no aims other than to smash the German armies and destroy nazi Germany's rule in the countries she had enslaved."
* Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoi voiny. Dokumenty i materiay. (Soviet Foreign Policy in the Period of the Patriotic War, Documents and Materials), Vol. II, Moscow, 1946, p. 105.
6*

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This resolution was dispatched to the Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front with instructions to issue an appeal to the Rumanian people reaffirming the main points of the Soviet Government's statement. The State Defence Committee ordered the front's Military Council to exercise general supervision over the establishment of civilian administration and control its activity throughout the liberated areas of Rumania. It was also envisaged to establish a Soviet military administration which would function in line with the principles listed in the resolution of the State Defence Committee. Fulfilling the instructions of the State Defence Committee, the military councils of the front and the armies, political departments and Party organisations launched extensive explanatory work among the Rumanian population and the Soviet troops. With no past experience to draw upon the Soviet Command found this job to be a very difficult one. The right sort of relations had to be established with the population living in the liberated areas of a country whose government was still at war with the USSR. Soviet troops were friendly to the people and respected their customs and gradually normal relations were established between the Soviet troops and the population. The humaneness of the Soviet soldiers, their disciplined behaviour disproved the falsehood, disseminated by the nazi propaganda. Life in the liberated towns and villages returned to normal. The working people quickly realised that the Soviet Army had entered Rumania with no ill will and warmly welcomed their liberators. There was more than enough proof of this. Mina Ungureanu, a clergyman, said: "I have seen for myself how well the Red Army behaves, and I am prepared to cross the frontline to tell all Rumanians, military and civilian, that they have no reason to fear the Red Army." "Only those who trusted the German propaganda feared the arrival of the Red Army," said Ion Lazar, a peasant from Coneleau, "but we, old men, who had fought side by side with the Russians against the Germans in 1916, were not afraid of the Russians. We know that the Russians are our friends. In 1877 they also helped us to win independence." Many similar statements thanking the Soviet troops for
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liberating the Rumanian people from the nazi yoke are recorded in documents and other materials. Though the position of the Antonescu clique could be described as absolutely hopeless, it resisted with the desperation of the doomed. Encouraged and abetted by Antonescu's government the leaders of the bourgeois-landowner parties tried to conclude an armistice with the governments of the western powers on conditions that Rumania would retain her fascist order and the bourgeois-landowner system. In the meantime the Soviet Government drew up the armistice terms agreed upon with the allies and presented them to the Rumanian Government on April 12. They included the following six points: "1. Complete break with the Germans and joint struggle of the Rumanian troops and the Allied troops, including the Red Army, against the Germans with the view to re-establishing Rumania's independence and sovereignty. "2. Re-establishment of the Soviet-Rumanian border in keeping with the terms of the 1940 treaty. "3. Reparations for direct damages caused to the Soviet Union by Rumania's military actions and occupation of Soviet territory. "4. Return of all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war and internees. "5. The Rumanian Government will create conditions enabling the Soviet troops and also the other Allied forces to move freely in any direction on Rumanian territory if the military situation will make this necessary, and facilitate their movement by placing all available transport facilities, both ground and water and also air, at their disposal. "6. Agreement of the Soviet Union to declare the Vienna awards null and void and to help liberate Transylvania.""' Though the fascist regime in Rumania, just as Hitler's regime in Germany, was on the verge of an inevitable downfall, the Antonescu clique rejected the generous Soviet terms
* Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza . . . , Vol. II, pp. 174-175. The Vienna awards of 1938 and 1940 were decisions made in Vienna by nazi Germany and fascist Italy following a secret deal with Horthy's Hungary, under which parts of Czechoslovakia and Rumania were ceded to Hungary. After the Second World War, the peace treaty with Hungary concluded in Paris on February 10, 1947, declared the Vienna awards null and void.
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thus dooming the Rumanian people to fresh suffering in a war which was completely at odds with their interests. The Rumanian ruling circles intensified their vicious propaganda against the Soviet Union and its army in an effort to stiffen the resistance of the Rumanian Army and make things as difficult as possible for the Soviet troops in the country. But nothing could now deceive honest Rumanians who had felt the humaneness and the friendliness of the Soviet soldiers. Only one party, the Communist Party of Rumania, correctly appraised the situation in the country. At the beginning of the war it assumed an internationalist stand foreseeing the inevitable failure of Hitler's aggressive plans. Now it stepped up its efforts to unite the people in the fight against fascism. Operating in the underground the Rumanian Communists strove to make their country quit the war as an ally of Hitler Germany. The warmer the welcome given the Soviet troops in Rumania, the more desperate became the position of the enemy who continued to resist the advancing Soviet forces. Proof of the shattered morale of Hitler's troops was in their letters. "I shall not be surprised if my hair turns grey," wrote Rotenfiihrer Herbert Wansel of the SS Totenkopf Division to his relations. "It's like being in hell. We are facing an enemy who is armed to the teeth, strong and brave." He goes on: " W e are not living like human beings. I have not slept five nights in a row. The Russians are bringing up one panzer after another, company after company. Soon they will attack. And their attacks are our death." A German corporal bitterly admitted: "Now we have come to understand what our victorious march in 1941 was really worth. There is no disputing the horrible truth. Russian vengeance is treading at the heels of our retreating troops. Some of them welcome this retreat hoping to God that it won't be long before the war ends. Others are waiting for a chance to be listed as missing. Neither our retreat nor being taken prisoner will save us from retribution." Breaking down enemy resistance, the 2nd Ukrainian Front continued its sweeping offensive liberating town after town and village after village. By the middle of April 1944, the Soviet troops had liberated 800 towns and villages, including the towns of Botoani, Dorohoi, Radau^i, Suceava, Falti86

ceni and others, and reached the Radauti-Pa?cani-OrgeyevDubossary line. T h e command of the German Army Group A decided to undertake an offensive in an effort to throw the Soviet forces back across the Prut. On May 30 GermanRumanian force consisting of over 10 divisions mounted the attack. In a week of savage battles four German panzer divisions (14th, 23rd, 24th and Gross Deutschland), three infantry divisions (3rd, 11th and 79th) and a mountain division (the Rumanian 18th) sustained heavy casualties. As a result of these battles the front became stabilised on a sector 320-370 kilometres northeast of Bucharest along the line Straz-north of Jassy-Orgeyev-Bendery-Ovidiopol. Decisive Battles Events on the Rumanian economic and political scene began to develop at a particularly fast rate following the entry of the Soviet troops into the country. A n d the catastrophic position into which Antonescu's government had plunged Rumania became fully manifest. Thousands of Rumanians whom the fascist government had sent to fight against the Soviet Union were dying on the battlefields for a cause that was absolutely alien to the Rumanian people. In the country itself there was increasing poverty and nazi pillage had reached new heights. Infuriated by their military defeats the nazis intensified their terror against the civilian population as the Soviet troops drew closer to the Soviet-Rumanian border. T h e "friendship" between the nazis and the Rumanian fascists was splitting at the seams. Rumania's economy was deteriorating. Her factories and industrial enterprises were closing down due to the shortage of raw materials, and workers were left without means of subsistence. The shortage of food and consumer goods made the working masses sharply dissatisfied with the policy of the fascist government and with Rumania's war against the Soviet Union. Similar sentiments prevailed in the countryside where the Germans were plundering the peasants. T h e Soviet Army's victorious westward drive gave the Rumanian people the opportunity to put an end to the criminal policy of the Antonescu government. Realising this the
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working class and the peasantry were anxious to make use of this opportunity. On February 20, 1944, a group of Braila workers attending a lecture which abounded in anti-Soviet attacks walked out of the hall. The Rumanian Central Police Headquarters received numerous reports like this one: "One gets the impression that the majority of the workers, even those who had never been in contact with communist ideology, are pleased with the successes of the Bolsheviks and would react favourably if the existing social system were overthrown." And another one: "The Russians are on the side of the peasants and not the landowners. That is why the peasants rejoice at the news of the successful offensive of the Bolshevik troops in Rumania." Yet fascist propaganda continued to poison the minds of a section of the working people with lies and slander about the Soviet Union and its Army. The Communist Party of Rumania fought staunchly for the unification of the country's patriotic forces. Provocateurs tried to undermine the Party from within and the terror, which the fascist government had unleashed in the country to fetter the activity of the patriotic forces, was directed above all against the Communists. Nevertheless, the Rumanian Communists preserved and even strengthened their ties with the masses, drawing increasing numbers of people into the anti-fascist struggle. This activity gained in scope particularly after the Soviet Army's historic victory in the battle of Stalingrad which became the turning point in the war against Hitler Germany. First and foremost it resulted in the formation, early in 1943, of the anti-Hitler Patriotic Front which besides the Communists included the Ploughmen's Front, the Union of the Patriots, and Madosz (Democratic Union of Hungarian Working People which had been organised in 1934 and vigorously supported the Communists) and a part of the local organisations of the Social-Democratic Party. Even some bourgeois groups joined the anti-Hitler Patriotic Front after they had become convinced that the nazis had lost the war. On June 20, 1944, the National Democratic Bloc was formed. It was a coalition of the Communist, Social-Democratic, National Peasant and National Liberal parties. But even after the bloc had been formed the Communist Party of Rumania had to cope with the difficult task of overcoming
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the resistance of the bourgeois-landowner parties. "It was only the swift advance of the Soviet Army and the intensification of the anti-fascist struggle of the masses under the guidance of the Communist Party of Rumania," Rumanian historians emphasise, "that forced the leaders of reactionary parties to agree to the formation of the National Democratic Bloc." Having no alternative other than to accept the terms of the Union, the leaders of the National Peasants and National Liberals in effect sabotaged the platform of the National Democratic Bloc and kept up their contacts with Antonescu. The bourgeoisie and the landlords participated in the efforts to overthrow the fascist government solely in the hope of retaining their rule and privileges, calculating at the same time that the country would be occupied by Anglo-US forces. This filled the Rumanian king and his retinue with the hope that they would be able to preserve the existing order and enabled the fascist government to remain in power and continue the war. The Soviet troops had a difficult task before them. Taking advantage of the terrain of the southern theatre of military operations, the Germans established a system of defence whose right flank continued to rest on the Dniester, although the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front under General of the Army R. Y. Malinovsky held a number of bridgeheads on its western bank. The 2nd Ukrainian Front which was operating in the centre came up against permanent defences extending from Targu Neam^ to Targu Frumos. The left flank of the nazi defences abutted on the craggy Carpathian mountains. In the operational depth the enemy had well-organised positions deep behind the firing lines, and there was a heavily fortified position called the Focani Gate covering the main lines of communications used for shifting troops to the Danube lowland. The task of keeping the Soviet troops out of Rumania and the Balkans was assigned to Army Group South Ukraine"' which included German and Rumanian troops deployed along a 600-kilometre front between the Carpathians and the Black Sea. The sector between the Prut and the sea was
Army Group A was renamed Army Group South Ukraine on April 5, 1944.
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held by the German 6th and Rumanian 3rd armies under General Dumitrescu. The area between the Prut and the Carpathians was defended by the German 8th and the Rumanian 4th armies under General Whler. The Rumanian Command organised its ground forces into the 3rd, 4th and 1st armies. Two of them were with Army Group South Ukraine and were directly subordinate to the German Command. The 3rd Army held positions on the right wing of Army Group South Ukraine between the Black Sea and Bendery. The 4th Army's main forces were deployed between Jassy and the Seret River on the left flank of Army Group South Ukraine. As regards the 1st Army, it was stationed inside the country with the assignment to guard her territory and frontiers. Let us take a closer look at the enemy's defences. Taking advantage of the Soviet peaceful proposals and of the available time the enemy managed to build powerful defences in the way of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. They were particularly formidable and deep in the line of advance of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Here the enemy had a large number of reinforced concrete emplacements. No less powerful was the defence line between the Prut and the Seret. In the Jassy sector there were four defensive lines 80 kilometres in depth. The first line passed along the hills north of Jassy, the second ran along the Bahlui and included the powerful strongpoints of Targu Frumos and Podul IloaieiJassy, the third followed the northern fringes of the forest covering the top of the Mare mountain range. The fourth line was the Focani fortified area. The enemy had fortified all hills and strengthened the steep slopes of valleys and precipitous river banks, the spurs of the Mare range and extensive forests. Every square yard of the ground seemed to be covered with trenches, pillboxes and bunkers, antitank ditches, minefields and barbed wire. The German Command believed that the Jassy-Kishinev group could feel safe behind an impenetrable shield. The tactical defence zone facing the 2nd Unkrainian Front had two lines from 8 to 15 kilometres in depth. In the most vulnerable sectors the defences were 19 kilometres deep. The main line of resistance which had a depth of eight kilometres consisted of three and in places of four lines of trenches connected with one another by a system of com90

munication trenches. The trenches had dug-in and advanced foxholes and machine-gun emplacements heavily protected by wire obstacles and minefields. Bunkers and ferroconcrete turrets covered the most vulnerable sectors. Tactical heights were crowned with resistance strongpoints with perimeter defences, consisting of several lines of trenches and wellorganised machine-gun positions. Targu Neamf, Targu Frumos and Jassy fortified areas were the main strongpoints of the second defence line, which passed along the southern bank of the Bahlui parallel to the frontline. With its marsh-ridden floodplain, muddy bottom and oozy banks the river was in itself a formidable barrier which neither tanks, artillery nor motor vehicles could cross without bridges. Moreover the line was heavily fortified. It had two, and in some sectors, three lines of trenches and pillboxes with walls up to 1.5 metres thick. Each embrasure had a steel shield which could be lowered in the face of point-blank fire. Each pillbox had a fan-shaped sector of fire partly overlapping the fire sector of the neighbouring pillbox. In this way the enemy could keep every inch of the open territory under fire. The fortified areas also had numerous field defences heavily covered by anti-personnel and antitank obstacles. According to reports of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reconnaissance there were 94 pillboxes and 135 bunkers comprising 7 permanent defences per 1 kilometre of the 33-kilometre defence sector of Jassy. These figures speak for themselves. Furthermore, the northeastern approaches to central Rumania were protected by the Mare range whose wooded spurs spreading out for many kilometres had well-prepared defences. The natural 80-kilometre passage between the Carpathians and the Danubethe Focani Gateproviding the most convenient route into the interior of Rumania had even more powerful defences. Determined to prevent the Soviet troops from advancing deep into Rumania the enemy had created a powerful system of defences and, as could be assumed, was fully confident of success. In the meantime the Soviet troops were preparing major ollensive operations of strategic importance. Drawing up the operational plan for the summer of 1944, G H Q decided
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to strike the main blow in the centre of the Soviet-German front, in Byelorussia, which offered the shortest route to the vital centres of nazi Germany and, above all, to Berlin. The German Command had failed to assess the situation correctly. Expecting a Soviet offensive in the south, the nazis gave no thought to the possibility of it being launched in the centre and in the northwest of the Soviet-German front with the result that the Soviet drive in Byelorussia in June 1944 took them by surprise. In an attempt to remedy the situation they hastily transferred 28 divisions to Byelorussia from other sectors of the front, including three divisions from Army Group South Ukraine. When the Soviet troops mounted an offensive in the Lvov-Sandomierz direction, the German Command was forced to bring up 17 divisions, of which eight were transferred from Army Group South Ukraine. Simultaneously the Baltic and Leningrad fronts went over to the offensive. Thus, the strategic situation at the front just before the beginning of the Jassy-Kishinev operation offered the Soviet troops an excellent opportunity of striking a shattering blow at the enemy forces in the south. The military and political objective of the operation was to rout Army Group South Ukraine, complete the liberation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and force nazi Germany's ally, Rumania, to quit the war. GHQ planned to achieve this objective with two powerful blows so as to encircle and rout the main forces of Army Group South Ukraine in the area of Jassy, Kishinev and Bendery. Once this was accomplished the Soviet troops were to continue their offensive into the interior of Rumania. Besides the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the operation was to involve the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the Black Sea Fleet under Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky and the Danube Flotilla commanded by Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov. Air support was to be furnished by the 5th and 17th Air armies, the first under Colonel-General S. K. Goryunov and the second under Colonel-General V. A. Sudets. The 2nd Ukrainian Front began to prepare the JassyKishinev operation under the command of General of the Army R. Y. Malinovsky. The author remained as chief of staff and Lieutenant-General of the Armoured Troops
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I. Z. Susaikov continued at his post as member of the front's Military Council. Colonel-General N. S. Fomin was put in command of the front's artillery, and the armoured and mechanised forces were placed under the command of Colonel-General A. V. Kurkin. Having 50 per cent more men and weapons than the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the 2nd Ukrainian Front was to play the main role in the operation by undertaking a drive towards the central part of Rumania. A powerful and highly mobile strike force was formed to ensure the successful outcome of the operation. The first echelon included five field armies whose success was to be exploited by a tank army, two separate tank corps and a cavalry corps. The second echelon and the reserves consisted of one army and two separate infantry corps. The strike force was to breach the enemy defences on a 16-kilometre sector between the Trgu Frumos and the Jassy fortified areas and then push ahead in the general direction of Vaslui and Focani. The 52nd Army and the 18th Tank Corps were to reach the area of Hui where they were to link up with the main forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front striking the main blow from the Kitskan bridgehead. To give the initial blow added strength the Soviet Command planned to deliver it with the maximum number of men and weapons. For this purpose the first-line divisions were reinforced with 40-50 tanks which were to furnish direct support to the infantry. On the front commander's order the divisional commanders were to use these tanks only in massive attacks on key strongpoints. It was planned to pursue the offensive at a rapid pace. But this could be done provided the troops would be able swiftly to breach the main line of resistance and the defensive lines behind it. To facilitate this task the enemy defences in the sector of the planned breach were thoroughly reconnoitred. This enabled the Soviet Command to ascertain their weak and strong points and ascertain the location of key resistance centres which had to be suppressed and captured if the breakthrough operation was to be successful. The front commander and myself as chief of staff accompanied the GHQ representative Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko on his frequent field trips to reconnoitre the terrain and organise the attack.
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A great deal of attention was attached to instructing the troops in methods which would enable them to take the enemy's second line of defence along the southern bank of the Bahlui in their stride. It was not deep, but presented a serious barrier to tanks because of its swampy valley and muddy bottom. The least delay in crossing it would have prevented the 6th Tank Army from going into action on schedule. In view of this the front commander ordered the 206th Infantry Division, which had been reinforced with a large number of tanks, to break through the enemy's main line of resistance as swiftly as possible, seize a crossing in the vicinity of Podul Iloaiei (25 kilometres west of Jassy) and hold it until the arrival of the tank army. A group of liaison officers with instructions to radio the capture of the crossings and the forcing of the river by the infantry was attached to the division's advance units. Since it could not be expected that all the birdges would fall into Soviet hands undamaged, a large number of crossing means had to be made available to enable the troops to cross the Bahlui without delay. This was done thanks to the excellent work of the engineer troops under LieutenantGeneral A. D. Tsirlin. Roads were reconnoitred and oblique aerial photographs were taken of them to a depth of 150 kilometres inside enemy positions. These photographs were issued to all tank crews. Tank drivers made several trips on foot along the routes leading from the starting positions to the forward line of defences. The front HQ likewise took measures to ensure uninterrupted troop control. The command and staff exercises of the 6th Tank Army and the 27th and 53rd armies which were conducted to determine the best methods of troop control during the fighting in the operational depth proved to be very useful in this respect. Communications were to be maintained by radio, telephone and aircraft. Thorough preparations were conducted by the 3rd Ukrainian Front now under the command of General of the Army F. I. Tolbukhin, with Colonel-General S. S. Biryuzov as his chief of staff and Lieutenant-General A. S. Zheltov as member of the Military Council. In keeping with the operational plan the front was to cut through the enemy defences south of Bendery and then its three left-flank armies were
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to strike at Opaz, Selemet and Hui and thus securely cover the strike force from the south. It should be noted that the direction for the main blow of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was exceptionally well chosen. "Very thoroughly, without haste we weighed all the pros and cons of each direction," wrote Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov. "The map spoke in favour of the Kishinev line of advance. The terrain seemed to answer all the requirements of an offensive operation: plenty of space for the armour; numerous low hills which would provide cover for the troops occupying starting positions, and on the right there was the Prut which would protect us against flanking blows. But the main thing was that the Germans had their picked troops here. Deployed in close battle formation they would undoubtedly be heavily mauled during artillery softening up. Moreover, by striking the main blow out of this area, we would be able to act in closer co-operation with the 2nd Ukrainian Front which in all probability would advance on Jassy and then mount a drive through the Focani Gate." Still, it was decided to launch the assault from the Kitskan bridgehead. This decision was taken in view of the fact that the German Command considered an attack from the Kitskan bridgehead impossible since it knew very well that it was dangerous to concentrate major forces in that area. Moreover, the Dniester at Kitskan had very steep banks and the nearby Lake Botno with its marshy lagoon was in itself a serious obstacle. Taking all this into account the German Command completely ruled out the possibility of a Soviet offensive from Kitskan. That was why the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front decided to strike the main blow from Kitskan, knowing that its unexpectedness guaranteed its success. The Supreme Command agreed with the arguments advanced by the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in favour of attacking from the Kitskan bridgehead. But to carry out this plan it was necessary to put in a lot of work to mask the troops and prepare them for the operation. The talented commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, General of the Army Tolbukhin, his chief of staff Colonel-General Biryuzov and other officers of the front excellently prepared the
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troops for the Jassy-Kishinev operation and brilliantly carried out the bold and carefully elaborated plan. This historic battle, which played a decisive role in the liberation of Rumania, began on August 20, 1944, and those who took part in it will never forget the dawn preceding the operation. The night seemed to drag on interminably. In the morning a heavy dew fell on the ground and a thick mist concealed the depressions in the terrain. Occasionally the silence was rent by enemy aicraft bombing the hill where the 2nd Ukrainian Front had its forward OP. Then came the order for the troops to be ready for attack and the silence was shattered by the roar of engines. Everybody from private to general, waited for the first artillery shots and the order to attack which would follow. 06.05 hours. The first gentle rays of the early morning sun played upon the scarred earth. One could hardly imagine that within 400 metres of the hill the army commanders had their OPs and that corps and divisional commanders had taken up positions on the very fringe of the forward line. Nothing indicated that the Soviet troops were about to mount an offensive. The heroic sappers and all the other troops who were about to go into attack had made an excellent job of concealing the preparations at a constant risk to their lives. Yet the enemy seemed to have sensed something and his planes intensified their strikes at the forward line. But there was nothing now that could alter the planned course of events. 06.10 hours. A thunderous roar split the air and the ground shook as 4,000 guns and mortars of all calibres let loose a hurricane of fire on the breakthrough sector in the main line of the enemy's defence. A wall of earth, smoke and flames leaped into the air as the rocket launchers opened up. The ground heaved and moaned for 90 minutes. . . . When the artillery preparation slackened the air force went into action. Groups of the famous IL attack planes swooping low over the heads of the infantry disappeared into clouds of smoke and dust, strafing and bombing the enemy positions to open the way for the ground troops. Even before the assault had been launched the Soviet troops had already taken scores of prisoners. Stunned and frightened to death German and Rumanian soldiers dashed for the Soviet positions yelling "Hitler kaput! Antonescu kaput!"
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By now the nazi propaganda had but a weak effect on Hitler's troops. The powerful blows delivered by the Soviet troops had deprived them of their faith in Hitler and his victory. According to the testimony of war prisoners, many Rumanian soldiers searched for Soviet leaflets and crossed over to the side of the Soviet Army at the first opportunity. Descending like an avalanche on the enemy, the Soviet soldiers were determined to make short shrift of the nazis and liberate Rumania and her people. And once again we cannot but note the high moral qualities of the Soviet soldiers. Fighting inside a country which for three years had fought on the side of Hitler Germany and having covered the long and arduous road from the Volga to the Prut, the Soviet soldiers, who had seen horrible atrocities committed by the hitlerites refrained from vengeance and violence. The 3rd Ukrainian Front went over to the offensive also in the morning of August 20, after the 2nd Ukrainian Front had launched its attack. Reliably blocking the enemy airfields, the Soviet Air Force seized the initiative reducing Luftwaffe activity to the minimum. Soviet pilots dealt shattering blows at the enemy's defences, and when they were through, the artillery went into action. In his reminiscences S. S. Biryuzov painted a very vivid picture of the initial phase of the battle. "In the rear and to the left of us," he wrote, "we heard the roar of tanks as they approached the advance line. From the CP we could see the second-line infantry units, their bayonets and helmets gleaming, making their way along the trenches. And in front rose a solid wall of fire, smoke and earth. The grass turned dark from the smoke and flames, and the air rasped the throat like a file. "At 08.55 hours the artillery feinted transfer of fire to the depth of the enemy defence and Soviet troops raised dummy soldiers over the parapet of the first trench. Expecting an attack the surviving enemy soldiers crawled out of their shelters to repel it. Just then the artillery transferred its fire back to the forward line of the enemy's defence. Later, prisoners testified that this bombardment caused the heaviest casualties among the enemy t r o o p s . . . . "The actual attack was launched at 09.43 hours. The machine-guns covering the assault spoke up in unison. The smoke and the dust at the approaches to the enemy's defence
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line had partly settled and from the CP we could clearly see our infantry wading through small bogs to skirt the beech groves. Here and there bandages whitened in the distance as the first wounded were dressed.. . . "Then the tanks moved forward, and after them the infantry again." It was a staggering blow. Within 45 minutes the enemy had been knocked out of his first line of trenches and although in some sectors he put up a desperate fight the onslaught of the 3rd Ukrainian Front forced him to roll back. Wading through all obstacles, the Soviet infantry and tanks continued their advance. The commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front General of the Army Tolbukhin attached the utmost importance to committing fresh divisions, particularly armoured and mechanised, with the least possible delay and succeeded in doing this with enviable determination and persistence. The armour and infantry, supported by a double wall of artillery fire, advanced at an exceptionally fast pace. Acting in close co-operation with the artillery and tanks, the infantry swiftly broke through into the depth of the enemy's main line of resistance. By noon the 27th Army's first-line divisions, which had breached the enemy's defence northwest of Jassy, reached the Bahlui, seized two bridges, crossed the river and broke into the second line of the enemy's defence creating favourable conditions for moving the tank army into the breach well in advance of schedule. The report that the assignement had been fulfilled came in within a few hours. This was so unexpected that Malinovsky on hearing the news from me ordered to have the report checked. There was no mistake, however. Reliably covered from the air, the 6th Tank Army, accompanied by a separate antitank artillery brigade from the 27th Army moved into the breach. By the end of the day it had reached the third defence linethe Mare ridge where in the difficult mountainous and forest country it encountered the powerful resistance of enemy panzers and infantry. Nevertheless, despite the dogged resistance put up by German and Rumanian troops, the operation was a major success. Commending the mass heroism of the Soviet troops, the Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front issued an
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appeal which said in part: "Comrade privates, sergeants and officers, your actions have been exemplary and you have broken through powerful and deeply-echeloned enemy defences.... Redouble your strength and efforts to fulfil the set task " As was expected, the appearance of a huge number of Soviet tanks on the battlefield threw the enemy into confusion. Explosions rose in a wall in front of this avalanche of armour as the artillery cleared the way for it. The enemy fought back, and at times with considerable determination. On the southern bank of the Bahlui, the Great Rumania 1st Tank Division, the flower of the Rumanian Army, mounted a counterattack. But it failed to withstand the onslaught of the Soviet troops and the commander of the Rumanian 4th Army reported to his superiors: "The Rumanian 1st Tank Division is in a very serious position and its supply units are falling back in d i s o r d e r . . . . " Soviet troops fought with great courage and self-sacrifice. In an engagement for a hill the Soviet troops found themselves in a difficult position. Panzers attacked in overwhelming numbers and only a surprise counterattack could save the situation. The first to realise this was tank commaner Lieutenant Andrienko. His tank cut into the midst of the panzers. First he crippled an enemy panzer with point-blank fire and then hit a Panther which began to spin in circles. Its crew attempted to flee but were mowed down by machine-gun fire. In this lightning engagement, the tank commanded by Guards Lieutenant Andrienko (driver Suslov, gunner Shevchenko and radio operator Mostovshchikov) set ablaze or crippled five panzers, two armoured personnel carriers, wiped out an antitank rifle detail and flattened three machine-gun emplacements with its tracks. The tank of Guards Senior Lieutenant Tsvetkov destroyed three bunkers with gun fire and tracks and flattened several antitank guns. And when an enemy shell set the tank on fire its crew consisting in addition to the Senior Lieutenant of driver Senior Sergeant Urkov, gunner Senior Sergeant Rakhmanin and radio operator Sergeant Koryan bravely fought the flames and managed to take the tank out of the line of fire. On very numerous occasions Soviet troops would break into enemy trenches and take many prisoners. Frequently, 7*
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Soviet soldiers would fire at the panic-stricken enemy from captured weapons. Unfortunately the roads of war are never smooth and blood is always spilt in battles. Many Soviet soldiers died in the fighting to liberate Rumania. After the artillery preparation company commander Lieutenant Shemigon was the first to jump out of the trench to lead his men into attack. The enemy position was taken, but suddenly a machine-gun spluttered from a surviving emplacement. It was dangerous to slacken the speed of the attack and the officer dashed at the lead-spitting embrasure sealing it firmly with his body. The hero was killed but his company continued its sweeping assault. We could name many other officers and men, among them Sergeant Shevchenko, who blocked the embrasure of enemy pillboxes repeating the feat of Alexander Matrosov. The first stage of the operation involving the penetration of the enemy defence and the encirclement jointly with the 3rd Ukrainian Front of his Jassy-Kishinev grouping was completed on August 24. The liberation of the towns of Roman, Bacu and Brlad prevented the enemy group, which had been taken into a ring by a pincer movement, from retreating either to the west or the southwest. A belt from 60 to 80 kilometres wide was formed between the inner and the outer perimeters of encirclement. All this created favourable conditions for destroying the encircled forces and achieving the ultimate objectives of the operation. Further events were influenced by the fall of Antonescu. On August 24, the new Rumanian government announced Rumania's withdrawal from the war on the side of Germany and declared war on her. To give the reader a better idea of what the Soviet forces had accomplished at this phase of their mission of liberation in Rumania it is necessary to describe, even if briefly, the further course of military developments and to name the Soviet armies involved and state the time and place of their operations. After August 25 the 2nd Ukrainian Front advanced at a very fast pace to the south and the southwest. At the same time very heavy fighting continued in the Soviet rear where the enemy made desperate attempts to break out of the encirclement.
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A giant ring had been closed around five German corps of the 6th and 8th armies. In effect, the enemy forces were encircled in two large areas east and west of the Prut. They were not fully isolated from each other and the German units east of the Prut were doing their best to force the river and break through to the Carpathians. The operation to wipe out the encircled forces was conducted by the 52nd and the 4th Guards armies, and until August 26 by the 18th Tank Corps acting in close co-operation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The Soviet troops split up enemy units and then smashed them piecemeal. Operating on the left bank of the Prut, the 4th Guards Army wiped out over 6,000 officers and men and took approximately 10,000 prisoners in the course of August 25 and
26.

After that the 4th Guards Army had in the main completed its operations on the left bank of the Prut since the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front decided to wipe out the enemy group encircled southwest of Kishinev with his own forces. The dividing line between the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts reached the Prut at Kotumori and then followed the river. The 4th Guards Army fighting on the front's left flank advanced along the river's eastern bank cutting off the enemy force from the west and depriving it of river crossings. This manoeuvre was all the more important because the German Command was chiefly concerned with retaining the crossings on the Prut. The 4th Guards Army could frustrate the enemy's plans and remain in full control of the crossings. But during the offensive some of its units dealing shattering blows at the enemy crossed the line dividing the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. When that happened the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Fron.t suggested that the 4th Guards Army be shifted to the western bank. GHQ consented and issued a corresponding order to Malinovsky. Unfortunately, this manoeuvre enabled several tens of thousands of the enemy with tanks and artillery to break out of the Kishinev pocket and retreat across the Prut. As a result, the 52nd Army operating in the vicinity of Hui found itself in a difficult position caused by the emergence of considerable enemy forces in its rear.
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To remedy the situation the Soviet Command hastily threw considerable reserves into action and managed to cut off the enemy's retreat routes to the Carpathians. But the battle against the enemy forces which had broken into the rear of the Soviet troops led to loss of time and additional difficulties. Despite the enemy's savage resistance, the Soviet troops wiped out the main forces of the Hui group by the end of August. Several thousand troops, however, managed to break through to Vutcani and cut front and army routes, creating serious difficulties for the front's units and supply trains. The 4th Guards Army moving on Brlad received orders to mop up the forests along its route. To smash the enemy force which had managed to infiltrate across the river, the 27 th Infantry Corps and a part of the forces of the 7th Guards Army were brought in from the reserve. Thanks to the decisive measures carried out by the Soviet troops, the enemy was fully destroyed in the first days of September. Meanwhile, the front's main forces continued their vigorous drive deep into Rumania. Advancing simultaneously towards the Carpathians and Focani, they concentrated their main effort along the Focani line of advance which was the most crucial of the two. Thrown into confusion by the encirclement of its 6th Army and a large portion of its 8th Army and also by Rumania's withdrawal from the war against the USSR and her declaration of war on nazi Germany, the command of Army Group South Ukraine managed to organise a stable defence only in the Carpathians. Here, in the Carpathian sector, the 40th and the 7th Guards armies and a mechanised cavalry group came up against furious resistance. Concentrating on roads and on mountain passes, several divisions of the German 8th and the Hungarian 2nd armies made use of the mountainous and wooded terrain to hold back the Soviet drive. As a result, the front's right-wing troops only partly fulfilled their task, though well enough to cover the main strike force against an enemy attack from the Carpathians. The main burden of the fighting in the Focani-Bucharest line of advance was shouldered by the 6th Tank Army whose successes were consolidated by the 27th Army. The second-echelon 53rd Army launched a decisive drive on
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Bucharest from the Brlad-Bereti line at dawn on August 26. Continuing its swift advance in the southerly direction, the 6th Tank Army in the evening of August 26 struck out at Focani, fought its way through the Focani Gate and headed for Ploeti and Bucharest. Subsequently, the 27th and 53rd armies also swept through the Focani Gate. On August 24, Bucharest came under attacks by individual German combat units and supply elements which had been deployed in the vicinity and united into a group under the command of General Stagel. This group was hastily transferred from its positions at Bucharest to Ploeti, but the 6th Tank Army overran the enemy's defences and in the morning of August 30 in a joint operation with Rumanian patriots took Rumania's oil centre by storm. Several days earlier, on August 27, when the 6th Tank Army had already broken through the Focani Gate, the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front ordered the 6th Tank Army to mount "a decisive offensive using one corps to capture the Ploeti area and two corps to capture Bucharest by nightfall on August 29". The reactionary majority in the Rumanian government opposed the entry of the Soviet troops into Bucharest and their further advance to the south and west. In the evening of August 29, the head of the Rumanian government Lieutenant-General Sanatescu declared that his government would have preferred to undertake the task of wiping out the German forces in the areas not occupied by the Soviet Army. The Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, however, turned down this proposal. It knew that the Rumanian reactionaries intended to give the Germans free passage to the west and were secretly negotiating with the Allies to have them drop a parachute task force in the Rumanian capital. GHQ ordered the Soviet troops to enter Bucharest, clear the area of the German forces and cut short the manipulations of the external and domestic reaction. In the morning of August 31, the population of Bucharest joyously welcomed the Soviet troops. Thus, the offensive operation, which was the first and decisive step in the liberation of Rumania, ended in the capture of the oil-rich Ploeti region and the entry of Soviet troops into Bucharest.
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T h e Jassy-Kishinev operation promptly developed into an offensive designed to liberate the whole of Rumania from the nazi invaders. Shoulder to Shoulder with the Soviet Army T h e working people of Rumania regarded the Soviet Army as their liberator and it is impossible to describe in a short article the magnificent welcome it received in all Rumanian towns and villages. But its entry into Bucharest deserves special mention. Bucharest environs had small houses immersed in greenery, and narrow streets joining the broad highways leading to the city centre. Traffic troops directed the endless stream of tanks, guns, vehicles and infantry columns to the central part of the Rumanian capital. The men moved through a corridor of people who had flooded the streets. Here and there traffic would come to a stop and happy, excited Rumanians would climb on a tank or a motor vehicle to welcome the Soviet soldiers. Women embraced and kissed the soldiers and there were smiling, happy faces everywhere. "Hurray for the Russian Army!" Rumanian soldiers entered the capital together with the Soviet troops, with the Tudor Vladimirescu 1st Rumanian Division leading the way. T h e volunteer division named after Tudor Vladimirescu was formed as f a r back as 1943. On February 2, 1943, a group of Rumanian prisoners of war asked the Soviet Government to be allowed to fight as volunteers against nazism. T h e State Defence Committee consented. It was decided to raise a volunteer division named after the Rumanian national hero Tudor Vladimirescu on Soviet territory. In the Russian-Turkish W a r of 1806-1812 he commanded a Rumanian volunteer detachment which fought on the side of the Russian forces. In 1821, Tudor Vladimirescu led a popular uprising against the wealthy landowners and the Turkish yoke in Walachia and was killed in action. T h e Tudor Vladimirescu Division was formed in Ryazan Region. Its commander was Colonel Nikolae Cambrea with Iacob Teclu as his chief of staff. On March 28, 1944, when
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the Soviet forces had already entered Rumania, GHQ ordered to have the division transferred to the firing lines. By then it had been fully organised, armed and trained. This was good news for its officers and men. On March 30 they took the oath of allegiance and pledged to avenge themselves on the nazis for the rape of their country and for the countless sufferings they had brought to the Rumanian people, and solemnly swore to strengthen the friendship with the Soviet people and their Army. The division was transferred by rail to the 2nd Ukrainian Front where it concentrated and continued training in the area of Dzygovka. In addition to small arms it received 256 guns and mortars. By August 10 it was a battleworthy formation numbering 9,587 officers and men. And now they were marching through the streets of Bucharest together with the Soviet troops. The arrival of the Soviet Army was marked by spontaneous meetings in many parts of the capital. Warmly greeting their liberators, the people of Rumania pledged to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops against the fascists, for freedom and democracy. "The entry of the Soviet troops into Bucharest," Rumanian historians write, "once and forever dashed the hopes of the hitlerites to recapture the city and consolidated the victory of the popular uprising. It deprived the German Command of the possibility of making a fresh attempt to seize Bucharest. At the same time the entry of the Soviet Army into Bucharest thwarted the efforts of the reactionary majority in the government to bring US and British troops into our country." One such meeting in the capital was addressed by G. Apostol who on behalf of the Communist Party of Rumania told the Soviet troops: " W e are grateful to the glorious and heroic Soviet Army, the liberator army, which jointly with our beloved Rumanian Army will clear our country of the hitlerite barbarians." Bitter battles lay ahead in which the Soviet and Rumanian troops would have to liberate the whole country from the hitlerites, and fighting shoulder to shoulder rout the common enemy. And this comradeship-in-arms strengthened with each passing day.
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Now that the Soviet troops had entered Ploeti and Bucharest the command of the 2nd Ukrainian Front had to broaden its co-operation with the Rumanian forces. In a statement broadcast on the night of August 24, the Soviet Government reiterated that the Soviet Union "intends neither to claim any part of Rumanian territory, nor change the existing social system in Rumania, nor in any way infringe on Rumania's independence. On the contrary, the Soviet Government considers it necessary jointly with the Rumanians to re-establish Rumania's independence by liberating Rumania from the nazi yoke".* The Soviet Government also emphasised that the Rumanian Army had to take a direct part in liberating the country. "If the Rumanian forces cease military operations against the Red Army and pledge to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army in the war of liberation against Germany for Rumania's independence," the statement continued, "then . . . the Red Army would not disarm them; it would allow them to keep all their arms and would do everything in its power to help them fulfil this honourable task.""'* Some Rumanian units had turned against the Germans in the Carpathian sector even before the Soviet troops entered Bucharest. On August 25, the 2nd Ukrainian Front HQ reported to GHQ: "The Rumanian 3rd Frontier Regiment has placed itself under the command of the 40th Army and is fighting against the German 3rd Mountain Division in the area of Gura-Gumore and Vama. The regiment has already turned over an estimated 350 prisoners irf war and trophies to us." Other Rumanian units had also gone over to the side of the Soviet Army to fight against the Germans. In the meantime the Rumanian 1st and 4th armies deploying on the Transylvanian border found themselves in trouble: the Germans were concentrating major forces in Northern Transylvania intending to smash the Rumanians and establishing a continuous defence from Brila in the Transylvanian Alps to the Danube. The Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front had foreseen that it would have to come to the assistance of the Rumanians. This contingency and also the need to assist the 4th Ukrainian Front pushing
* Vneshnyaya politika Sovelskogo Soyuza . . . , Vol. II, p. 172. ** Ibid., p. 165.
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across the Carpathians into Slovakia, which was gripped by a popular uprising, were also envisaged in the GHQ Directive of September 5, 1944. The Directive pointed out that the principal objective of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was to cross the Transylvanian Alps and the southern part of the Carpathian Range and reach the Satu Mare-Cluj-DevaTurnu Severin line. To achieve this its main forces were to strike out from the south through Braov and Sibiu at Cluj, while the 40th and the 7th Guards armies were to mount an offensive from the east. To block the way to the 40th and the 7th Guards armies, the Germans reinforced their 8th Army in the Eastern Carpathians with reserve units. On many sectors Soviet and Rumanian troops fought shoulder to shoulder. The heroism of the Soviet officers and men inspired the Rumanians to fight with still greater courage and determination. The Rumanian and Soviet soldiers had a difficult task to fulfil. As military operations shifted into Transylvania, the German Command made desperate attempts to throw the Soviet divisions and particularly the Rumanian troops back across the Carpathians. On September 5, five German divisions attacked the Rumanian 4 th Army which had only began assembling in Transylvania foreseeing a possible offensive of German-Hungarian forces in the southeasterly direction. The army's main forces were still on route to the line of defence and the covering units fell back under enemy pressure. On the first day they retreated 20 kilometres and in some sectors up to 40 kilometres. In the next two days the Germans forced the Rumanians to retreat another 20-25 kilometres. The Rumanian 4th Army was threatened with complete defeat. In view of the situation the Rumanian 4th and 1st armies, the 4th Army Corps and air corps were with the agreement of the Rumanian Government placed under the operational control of the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The Rumanian 4th Army was to act in conjunction with the 27th Army, the Rumanian 1st Army with the 53rd Army, the Rumanian 4th Corps with the 75th Infantry Corps and Rumanian air units which had 113 operating aircraft of various types were placed under the command of the 5th Air Army. The Rumanian divisions assigned for action against the German forces were under strength and had from 6,000 to
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10,000 men each. Moreover, they had low-quality fire arms, very few guns and mortars and no armour. The Rumanian Command had only two heavy artillery regiments, and the two armies and the independent corps had 100 howitzers and 480 light and antitank guns. At the same time most of the men of the Rumanian 1st Army, for example, were untrained recruits and volunteers over 45 years of age. Fighting together with the battle-steeled Soviet soldiers they acquired experience and courage and frequently got the best of the enemy. We have not forgotten the battles in which the mutual assistance, genuine comradeship-in-arms of the Soviet and Rumanian soldiers were manifested to the full. On numerous occasions Soviet forces came to the assistance of the Rumanian troops and as a rule helped them to win the engagement and fulfil the set tasks. In co-operation with the Rumanian units the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front cleared the central regions of Rumania and advanced 250 kilometres in the centre and on the left wing. The 2nd Ukrainian Front received a fresh assignment from GHQ. It was to reach the line Bistria-Cluj-Lugoj, and liberate the whole of Rumania. After that its main forces were to reach the Tisza on the Chop-Szolnok sector, not later than October 7-10 and help the 4th Ukrainian Front to cross the Carpathians and capture Uzhgorod. In^three days of fighting the 53rd Army jointly with the Rumanian 1st Army liberated some 80 towns and villages. The Soviet forces completed the liberation of Rumania on October 25, 1944, in a joint operation with the Rumanian 4th Army which ended in the capture of the towns of Satu Mare and Carei. In keeping with a decision of the Rumanian Government August 25 is observed as Rumanian People's Army Day. An important development took place during the final phase of the fighting for the liberation of Rumania. After talks in Moscow, the USSR, United Kingdom and the USA concluded an armistice with Rumania on September 12. It was signed on behalf of the Allied Powers by Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky who arrived from the front on that day.

The armistice with Rumania was brought about by the great victories of the Soviet Army and constituted a fresh blow at nazi Germany. This diplomatic act ushered in a fresh stage in the development of Soviet-Rumanian relations and opened the road for Rumania's socialist development. News of the armistice evoked particular enthusiasm among Rumania's democratic forces. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Rumania appealed to the nation to light for the country's democratisation, rehabilitation and independence and underlined the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union. "The Rumanian people," the appeal said in part, "will be able to liberate their country, rehabilitate and develop their economy and live in freedom and happiness only if they have friendly relations with the great Soviet nation."* And so Rumania, Hitler's most important satellite which provided the German Command with the greatest number of troops for the war against the Soviet Union, was taking a new road of development. The Rumanian forces which had fought against the Soviet Army shared the bitter fate of the German troops and felt the power of the blows dealt by the Soviet troops. That these were indeed shattering blows may be seen from the results of the Jassy-Kishinev operation. On September 5, the following entry appeared in the log of Army Group South Ukraine: "The encircled corps and divisions of the 6th Army must be regarded as irretrievably lost. There is absolutely no hope that the encircled units will be able to break out. This is the biggest catastrophe ever sustained by an army group. Five corps HQs (4th, 7th, 30th, 44th and 52nd) and 18 divisions (9th, 15th, 62nd, 79th, 106th, 161st, 257th, 258th, 282nd, 294th, 302nd, 306th, 320th, 335th, 370th, 376th and 384th infantry divisions and the 153rd Training Field Division) have been lost. Moreover, only insignificant elements have been left of the 10th Motorised Division and the 13th Panzer Division." This list of battered enemy formations should be supplemented by the 76th Infantry Division whose remnants were routed at Hui while trying to escape across the Seret, and the 46th Infantry Division some units of which managed to
* Scnteia, September 21, 1944.
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cross the Carpathians. Thus, the Wehrmacht lost 22 divisions in the operation. The armistice agreement reaffirmed the inviolability of the Soviet Union's frontier with Rumania established by the agreement of June 28, 1940. Rumania's withdrawal from the war on the side of nazi Germany and her entry into the war on the side of the antiHitler coalition was indisputable proof of the catastrophic worsening of Germany's military and international situation. Soviet forces displayed mass heroism and courage in the battles for the liberation of Rumania. More than 10,000 officers and men were awarded Orders and medals and many were made Heroes of the Soviet Union for meritorious conduct during the August battles. The Soviet Armed Forces fulfilled their internationalist duty with honour. The joint actions of the Soviet and Rumanian forces against nazi Germany laid the foundation for a lasting friendship between the Soviet and Rumanian peoples. Born in those difficult days and tested in the flames of war this friendship is indeed the most loyal and the most durable.

Colonel-General

A. S. ZHELTOV

THE 3rd UKRAINIAN FRONT IN THE BALKANS

From the Volga to the Danube T h e Southwestern Front, which was established in October 1942 and renamed the 3rd Ukrainian Front in October 1943, began its battle road on the banks of the ancient Russian rivers, the Volga and the Don. This road, abounding in heroic exploits performed by Soviet soldiers to the glory of the socialist country, came to victorious end in May 1945 in the foothills of the Alps. In November and December 1942, the front's troops passed their first ordeal by fire in the brilliantly executed joint operation with the Don and Stalingrad fronts which led to the encirclement and rout of a m a j o r group of German forces at Stalingrad and the shattering defeat of the Royal Rumanian 3rd Army and the Italian 8th Army on the Don. In 1943, the troops of the front participated in the liberation of the Ukraine east of the Dnieper and then made a swift thrust across this river. Its glorious regiments and divisions routed the enemy forces in the snow-covered Don steppes, battered them in the spring thaw at Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye and Nikopol, and smothered them in the Dnieper marshes. It was the third spring of the war. T h e Soviet forces were locked in fierce battles with the German troops which had been hurled back from their much-lauded Eastern W a l l
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along the Dnieper and fighting desperately were rolling westward, losing one defensive line after another. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was advancing along the Black Sea coast. It consisted of the 57th Army (commanderLieutenant-General N. A. Gagen, member of the Military CouncilMajor-General L. P. Bocharov, chief of staffMajorGeneral P. M. Verkholovich), the 37th Army (commander Lieutenant-General M. N. Sharokhin, member of the Military CouncilMajor-General I. S. Anoshin, chief of staff Major-General A. K. Blazhei), the 6th Army (commander Lieutenant-General I. T. Shlemin, member of the Military CouncilMajor-General V. Y. Klokov, chief of staff Major-General F. D. Kulishev), the 28th Army (commanderLieutenant-General A. A. Grechkin, member of the Military CouncilMajor-General A. N. Melnikov, chief of staffMajor-General S. M. Rogachevsky), the 46th Army (commanderLieutenant-General V. V. Glagolev, member of the Military CouncilMajor-General P. G. Konovalov, chief of staffMajor-General M. Y. Birman), the 8th Guards Army (commanderColonel-General V. I. Chuikov, member of the Military CouncilMajor-General Y. A. Doronin, chief of staffMajor-General I. K. Kravtsov), the 5th Striking Army (commanderLieutenant-General V. D. Tsvetayev, member of the Military CouncilMajor-General I. B. Bulatov, chief of staffMajor-General I. i. Varfolomeyev). Air support was provided by the 17th Air Army (commanderColonel-General of the Air Force V. A. Sudets, deputy commander for political affairsMajor-General of the Air Force V. N. Tolmachev, chief of staffMajorGeneral N. M. Korsakov). For a considerable span of time I was member of the front's Military Council. The front was a formidable force and the morale of its officers and men was extremely high. There were more than 130,000 Communists among them and they formed the front's backbone which united the huge mass of troops, cemented their fighting spirit and led them forward. It should be said, however, that the front was short of mobile forces, having only the 23rd Tank Corps under Major-General A. O. Akhmanov and a mechanised cavalry group commanded by Lieutenant-General I. A. Pliyev. The spring rains and floods hampered the manoeuvrability of the troops who made their way forward knee-deep in
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water and melting snow. Horses fell from exhaustion. Motors choked and died. The artillery got stuck in the mud. But the offensive continued. The troops were determined to reach the state border. For more than two and a half years the enemy ravaged their land and imposed unbearable conditions on the population of the temporarily occupied regions. Each and all of them thought only of the time when their country's territorial integrity would be restored from the forbidding cliffs of Karelia in the north to the mouth of the Danube in the south. . . . The hour was approaching when the Soviet troops would fulfil their historic mission and drive the enemy out of the Soviet Union. The men were certain of the success of the offensive. Reminding the troops that the Germans had failed to hold on to their positions on the Volga, Don, Donets and Dnieper, the front's Military Council was confident that they would be unable to hold on to the Bug. "Forward across the Bug to complete the liberation of the Soviet Ukraine and Moldavia," proclaimed its address to the troops. The news that on March 26 the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the right-hand neighbour of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, had reached the Prutthe border between the Soviet Union and Rumaniacaused jubilation among the men and imbued them with the urge to follow suit as quickly as possible. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front entered the territory of Moldavia early in April. On April 12 they liberated Tiraspol, crossed the Dniester in the stride and gained bridgeheads on its right bank. An attempt was made to continue the offensive in the direction of Komrat and smash the enemy forces between the Dniester and the Prut in southern Moldavia. But the 57th, 37th and 46th armies due to heavy losses in previous engagements failed to crack the enemy defences. Early in May, front commander R. Y. Malinovsky ordered the troops to assume the defensive along a line extending from Dubossary in the north to the mouth of the Dniester. The spring offensive of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, which was a part of the Soviet Army's general offensive in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, ended in a major victory. The front routed the southern flank of the Wehrmacht and liberated Odessa and Nikolayev, two important Black Sea ports. As a result, the Black Sea Fleet was able to take up bases 8 15 37
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on the northwestern coast of the sea. Occupying a line along the lower reaches of the Dniester, the divisions of the 3rd Ukrainian Front acquired advantageous positions for launching offensive operations in Moldavia and Rumania and created a direct threat to regions of considerable political and military importance for Germany. The Soviet forces could now render direct assistance to the peoples of the Balkan countries occupied by the nazi invaders. With the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts on the defensive, G H Q changed their commanders in preparation for further operations. R. Y. Malinovsky was put in charge of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Under this experienced commander, who knew all the. subtleties of modern warfare, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front dealt smashing blows at the enemy for 13 consecutive months. Courageous and invariably eventempered, he was always in the midst of battle sharing the joys of victories and the bitterness of reverses with the men. And of course, the troops were sorry to see him go. At the same time General F. K. Korzhenevich was assigned to the post of chief of staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front General of the Army F. I. Tolbukhin took over as commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, with Colonel-General S. S. Biryuzov as his chief of staff. Prominent commanders with vast experience of fighting at Stalingrad, the southern Ukraine and in the Crimea, they prepared and carried out the Crimean offensive operation in the summer of 1944. The liberation of the Crimea and its major naval base Sevastopol, deprived the Germans of their last strongholds on the Soviet Black Sea coast. It was the summer of 1944 and life was returning to the liberated Ukraine and part of Moldavia. People emerged from dugouts and began to build houses, repair roads and plough the fields. Meanwhile the 3rd Ukrainian Front was preparing fresh blows at the enemy. There was a steady flow of replacements, weapons and other supplies. The troops were regrouping, consolidating their positions and undergoing combat training. We were guided in our work by instructions from GHQ representative Marshal S. K. Timoshenko who co-ordinated the operations of the fronts. His activity was closely connected with the 3rd Ukrainian Front ever since the libera114

tion of the Donbas. He took part in co-ordinating and organising the front's rapid breakthrough to the Dnieper and the crossing of this major water barrier in the autumn of 1943, the operations to enlarge the captured bridgeheads and then the development of the offensive in the south of the Ukraine west of the Dnieper. The German Command attached great importance to the southernmost sector of the Soviet-German front. Conveniently situated in the system of strategic defence, this sector, according to Hitler's plans, was to cover Rumania's vital centres, her oil-bearing regions and the "gates to the Balkans". In view of the above the German Command concentrated a major group of forces there. They included the reactivated German 6th Army and the Royal Rumanian 3rd Army forming Army Group Dumitrescu, and also the German 8th Army, the Royal Rumanian 4th Army and the German 17th Separate Corps united into Combat Group Wohler. All these forces comprising 47 divisions and 5 brigades were merged into Army Group South Ukraine under Colonel-General Hans Friessner. The front s staffs and troops made a thorough study of the defences which the enemy had been strengthening for four months. The German herded the population of nearby villages to dig trenches and antitank ditches on the bank of the Dniester. By the middle of August they established deeply-echeloned defences with a ramified system of trenches. The villages nearest the Dniester were turned into strongpoints. The enemy went to particularly great pains to strengthen his lines facing the front's bridgeheads. Here the Germans had two lines of defence. The first consisted of four lines of trenches and communication trenches, the layout of the second line was approximately the same. The density of the enemy's troops in the zone of the 3rd Ukrainian Front's defences was one division per 12 kilometres and 8-10 guns and mortars per one kilometre of the frontline. But it was much higher opposite the bridgehead south of Tiraspol (Kitskan bridgehead) where the enemy concentrated one division per 8 kilometres of the frontline and from 25 to 26 guns and mortars per one kilometre of the frontline. The German Command kept hammering into the minds of its soldiers that they had no right to retreat. Subsequently, prisoners testified that the troops were ordered to "resist the
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strongest enemy pressure and hold the lines to the last man". In keeping with the Supreme Command s plan the 2nd Ukrainian Front was to play the main role in the forthcoming Jassy-Kishinev operation. By the time the operation began the 8th Guards Army and the 6th and 28th armies had been detached from the 3rd Ukrainian Front and shifted to the northern Ukraine and Byelorussia. This left the front with only four field armies, an air army and two mechanised corps. The concept of the operation was to encircle and destroy Army Group South Ukraine by concentric blows delivered by the two fronts. In their reminiscences written in recent years some war veterans say that the Military Council of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was not unanimous in the choice of the direction of the main blow and that the front commander allegedly insisted that it should be delivered by the adjacent flanks of his and the 2nd Ukrainian fronts. This is not true. In April, when the Soviet troops were still fighting to secure a bridgehead south of Tiraspol, the front command was already planning to use it as the springboard for the future offensive. With time the Military Council became absolutely certain that it had made the correct decision and its plan was approved by ghq. As regards the Kishinev line of advance, the command in keeping with the plan, merely simulated troop concentration in the zone of the 5th Striking Army to distract the enemy's attention from the direction where the front's main forces were going to mount the attack. Measures were taken to mislead the enemy into believing that an infantry and a mechanised corps and an assault artillery division had been shifted to the Kishinev direction. In July and August, after dusk the enemy was allowed to spot the movement of motor columns in the Dubossary-Tiraspol sector where a dummy defence system was being established with a false radio network. The Soviet Command achieved its objective. Expecting the Soviet troops to deliver the main blow in the Kishinev direction General Friessner concentrated 14 German divisions against the 5th Striking Army. He discovered that the front was delivering a heavy blow from a bridgehead south of Tiraspol only when the Soviet offensive was already under way. Even then he took it for an auxiliary operation and
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began to transfer his troops from the Kishinev salient only on the third day of the Soviet offensive. All Soviet units were being thoroughly prepared for the offensive in the army rear and on training sites. At roundthe-clock combat exercises the troops were taught to crack and penetrate powerful permanent defences, fight in trenches and inhabited localities, beat off panzer attacks, cross rivers and entrench on new lines. This training was essential since in the period from April to July an estimated 100,000 replacements arrived at the front from the liberated areas of the Ukraine west of the Dnieper and Moldavia. These men had lived through nazi occupation but had not taken part in the fighting. It was, therefore, necessary to put them through a full course of combat training under the supervision of experienced veterans. No less important was the political aspect of the training programme. The troops were to fight in Rumania which had been Hitler's war ally for three years. This circumstance was duly reflected in the political work conducted among the troops, based on the Soviet Government's statement of April 2 and the resolution of the State Defence Committee of April 10, 1944, concerning the conduct of the Soviet troops in foreign countries. These documents clearly stated that the USSR claimed no part of Rumania and did not intend to change her social system, that the Soviet troops were entering Rumania solely out of military considerations arising from the continued resistance of the enemy forces. These statements cut the ground from under the nazi propaganda which was spreading the lie that the Soviet Union wanted to deprive Rumania of her sovereignty. Entering the territory of a foreign state the Soviet Army brought freedom to its people, thus fulfilling its internationalist duty. The commanders and political workers had no illusions that everything would go off smoothly and anticipated hostile acts on the part of Hitler's henchmen and the local reactionary-monarchist circles. In these circumstances the Soviet troops were constantly on the alert and prepared for action. The character of the forthcoming operation crystallised in the course of the preparations. The front's Military Council
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decided that the main blow should be delivered in the centre by the adjoining flanks of the 37th and 57th armies reinforced by two mechanised corps. They were to strike out from the Kitskan bridgehead and south of Bendery in the general direction of Opaz, Selemet and Hui to meet the main blow of the 2nd Ukrainian Front whose main forces were advancing on Jassy, Vaslui and Falciu. The enemy grouping at Jassy and Kishinev was to be encircled and wiped out on the seventh or eighth day of the operation. Deployed in the Kishinev sector, the 5th Striking Army (commanderColonel-General N. E. Berzarin, member of the Military CouncilMajor-General I. B. Bulatov, chief of staffMajor-General A. M. Kushchev) was to hold on to its positions and should the enemy start retreating it had orders to capture Kishinev by dealing converging blows from the north and east. The left-flank 46th Army was assigned to cover the front's main blow and to co-operate with Lieutenant-General A. N. Bakhtin's task force supported by the Danube Flotilla under Admiral S. G. Gorshkov in cutting off and smashing the Royal Rumanian 3rd Army. On July 31 Tolbukhin and I reported our decision at GHQ to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Simultaneously, commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, General of the Army Malinovsky reported his decision to the Supreme Commander in the presence of the member of the front's Military Council Colonel-General I. Z. Susaikov. J. V. Stalin found it possible to reinforce the 3rd Ukrainian Front with two mechanised corps and aviation. Our plans were approved and a corresponding directive was issued on August 2, 1944. The offensive was to begin on August 20. Upon our return from Moscow the preparations for the offensive went into higher gear. I recall the days when we impatiently waited for the order to complete the liberation of Soviet Moldavia and extend a hand of fraternal assistance to the Rumanian people. At meetings organised on the eve of the offensive the men assured the Communist Party and the Soviet Government that they would do their utmost to defeat the enemy. In the early hours of August 20, the 2nd and the 3rd Ukrainian fronts went into action. Subjected to massive air and artillery strikes the enemy in the sector of the main blow wavered and panicked, sustaining heavy losses in men and
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equipment. Prisoners testified that the thrust from the Kitskan bridgehead was a complete surprise and that the Soviet fire was so heavy that some men went mad. From our OP on the belfry of Kitskan Monastery, we watched the concerted attack of the 37th Army's first-echelon divisions. On the first day of the operation the 37th and 57th armies commanded by the experienced generals M. N. Sharokhin and N. A. Gagen cracked the first line of the enemy's defence in the sector of the main blow and in some places wedged into his second line, advancing to a depth of 10 kilometres and widening the breach to 40 kilometres. Four enemy divisions were almost completely routed. Assessing the state of its troops in those days the command of Army Group South Ukraine noted in its log that the Soviet troops breached the front in two sectors on the first day of the offensive and that the "situation was serious". Taking advantage of the initial success, the front commander ordered the mobile forcesthe 7th and the 4th Guards mechanised corps under generals F. G. Katkov and V. I. Zhdanovinto action in the morning of August 21. Co-operating with the field divisions of the advancing armies they smashed the 13th Panzer Division and towards nightfall widened the breach to 100 kilometres along the front and to 30 kilometres in depth. In the next two days the mobile forces advanced from 75 to 115 kilometres into the enemy positions. Army Group Dumitrescu was sliced in two: the German 6th and the Rumanian 3rd armies were completely cut off from each other, and the Soviet striking force was about to cut the communications of the German 6th Army. In the night of August 22, the 46th Army's task force under Lieutenant-General A. N. Bakhtin crossed the Dniester lagoon, drove the enemy out of the town and fortress of Akkerman, and completely encircled the Rumanian 3rd Army. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were also advancing successfully. On August 21, they captured Jassy, an important administrative centre in Rumania and struck out southward along the western bank of the Prut. In the night of August 22 the German Command ordered its Kishinev group to withdraw in the general direction of Kotovskoye and Hu$i and further south across the Prut to avoid encirclement. But it was too late. Advancing swiftly the Soviet mechanised corps reached the crossings on the
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Prut at Leu?eni and north of Leovo on that day and established defences facing northeast. The enemy's routes of retreat within the zone of operations of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were cut and on August 24, the front's mobile forces linked up with the advance units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Hu?i-Falciu sector, thus sealing the ring around the enemy Kishinev group. Events unfolded with lightning speed as the Soviet troops gained their objectives in all sectors. Resolutely pursuing the retreating enemy the 5th Striking Army took Kishinev by storm on August 24. Once again the Soviet flag raised by Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. Belsky fluttered over the capital of Soviet Moldavia. Meanwhile, the 46th Army operating northwest of Akkerman completely routed the Rumanian 3rd Army consisting of three divisions and one brigade. Operating in conjunction with the neigbouring front the 3rd Ukrainian Front concentrated its main efforts on reducing the surrounded and fiercely resisting German grouping. Hoping to avoid unnecessary bloodshed the Military Council of the 3rd Ukrainian Front drew up an ultimatum. In the morning of August 27 Soviet political officers Major A. N. Ratnikov, Captain K. P. Vasilyev and Lieutenant B. S. Gopkin delivered it to the command of the encircled forces east of Minzhir, in the zone of the 37th Army, on a sector held by the 195th Infantry Division. As a result 15,000 enemy officers and men surrendered in the area in just one day. By nightfall on August 27 the Soviet troops had crushed the resistance of the enemy east of the Prut. But a large enemy force managed to break through the line held by the 52nd Army and headed southwest in an attempt to cross the Carpathians and reach Hungary. But this group too was subsequently destroyed. The offensive of the two fronts ended in the rout ef Army Group South Ukraine. The 3rd Ukrainian Front alone captured or destroyed 145 aircraft, 420 tanks, over 4,000 guns and mortars, more than 20,000 motor vehicles and large quantities of other military equipment. Over 100,000 prisoners, of whom 63,200 Germans were taken. Hitler's clique lost one of its satellites when Rumania withdrew from the war on Germany's side. The destruction
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of Army Group South Ukraine radically altered the strategic situation in Balkans in favour of the Soviet Army. Completing the liberation of Soviet Moldavia and Izmail Region, the 3rd Ukrainian Front drove the German invaders out of Rumania's eastern regions and on September 5 reached the Rumanian-Bulgarian border. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were sweeping across Rumania's central and western regions towards the Hungarian and Yugoslav borders. Paying tribute to the heroism of the troops of the two Ukrainian fronts, I should like to note that the brilliantly conceived and executed Jassy-Kishinev operation vividly manifested the high efficiency of Soviet generals and the courage and initiative of all the soldiers. Liberation of Bulgaria T h e Soviet offensive on the southern flank of the SovietGerman front and the rout of Army Group South Ukraine created favourable conditions for liberating the people of Bulgaria, where crucial developments were already taking place. It was fully apparent to the Bulgarian reactionary circles that the Soviet Army's victories had fundamentally changed the situation and that their policy of complicity with nazi Germany was a complete failure. T h e closer the Soviet troops drew to the Bulgarian border, the greater became the confusion of the anti-popular Bulgarian government which finally resorted to political manoeuvring. On August 26 it proclaimed Bulgaria's full neutrality and stated that if remnants of the Wehrmacht routed in Rumania entered Bulgaria they would be disarmed and treated according to the provisions of the Hague Convention. This was brought to knowledge of the representatives of the German Command in Bulgaria. But the Bulgarian Government did not live up to its commitments. German forces were allowed to remain in Bulgarian Black Sea ports; and those stationed in other parts of the country were given a chance to withdraw with their weapons and other equipment. Whenever the Germans were unable to take along their heavy armaments and equipment, the Bulgarian Government accepted them in lieu of pay121

ment under a trade agreement with Germany. Later, this fact was corroborated by German General Schneckenburger. He said that the Bulgarian authorities only simulated the internment of the German forces. The Germans were not disarmed and continued to control sea and river ports, airfields and communications in the country. There was no longer any doubt that Bulgaria's neutrality proclaimed by Bagrianov's government was false. The reactionary anti-popular forces in the country were against effecting a radical turn in their policy, and not intending to discontinue their co-operation with Hitler Germany, were doing their best to win time and hang on to their positions. Yet, official Bulgarian propaganda prominently played up the proclamation of neutrality and claimed that the Soviet Government had expressed its approval of the Bulgarian Government's policy. In this way the reactionary circles hoped to deceive the Bulgarian people and achieve their own anti-popular objectives. On August 30, 1944, TASS issued an important statement saying that Soviet official circles "consider the neutrality proclaimed by the Bulgarian Government absolutely inadequate in the existing situation". In response, the Bulgarian reaction undertook another manoeuvre. On September 2, Radio Sofia announced the formation of a new government headed by Kosta Muraviev which shortly afterwards issued an official declaration with numerous pledges of adherence to "neutrality". But it lacked the most important thinga statement announcing its open, full and immediate break with Germany. Moreover, it came to light that with the generous consent of Muraviev's government 112 German naval vessels were allowed to take refuge in the port of Ruse on the Danube. Near Varna and Burgas the Germans sank dozens of their warships whose crews were permitted to return to Germany. Obviously, the new Bulgarian Government was also incapable of breaking off relations with Germany, of taking the only step that would extricate Bulgaria out of the morass into which her profascist ruling circles had plunged her. This being the case, the Soviet Government in a note on September 5 announced that the USSR was in a state of war with Bulgaria. All the troops of the front welcomed this decision. The men realised that the Bulgarian people wanted
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to be free of the nazi yoke and were waiting for the arrival of the Soviet troops. On top of everything, the Bulgarian rulers were playing a double game. Without severing relations with Hitler's clique they were soliciting support from the Soviet Union's allies the USA and Britainwhere certain circles were hoping to frustrate the liberation struggle of the Bulgarian people. The US and British monopolies were determined to help the reactionary Bulgarian regime to remain in power and impose their "aid" on the Bulgarians. The historian J. F. C. Fuller wrote in his 7 he Second World War that as far back as 1943 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had a grandiose plan of arming 45 Turkish divisions for invading Bulgaria. Churchill himself admitted in his memoirs published after the war, that he personally tried hard to get into the Balkans ahead of the Russians. At the time the Allied Command committed an unfriendly act designed to impede the Soviet offensive. It ordered its planes to drop magnetic mines in the Danube. Although this did not stop the Soviet drive, it did handicap transportations and the manoeuvres of the front's troops and led to human casualties which will always lie on the conscience of those who wanted to prevent a Soviet offensive into the Balkans. But there was also another Bulgaria, the Bulgaria of the working people. Bound with Russia by age-old ties of friendship and solidarity, language and culture, the Bulgarian people impatiently awaited the Soviet troops. Partisan warfare dared up with still greater force. Led by the Communist Party the Bulgarian patriots fought against the invaders with unflagging courage throughout the occupation. They blew up ammunition dumps, derailed troop trains, wrecked communication lines and attacked German garrisons. And now, with the Soviet troops at Bulgaria's doorstep, the national liberation struggle tremendously increased in scope and scale. Guiding this struggle the Communists were preparing the people for an armed uprising and seizure of political power. The Bulgarian working people were determined to change the order of things in the country and to throw the ruling clique, which had isolated itself from the people, onto the rubbish heap of history.
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Taking advantage of the favourable situation and determined to smash the German troops as swiftly as possible, thus helping the Bulgarian people to drive out the invaders, GHQ ordered the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the Black Sea Fleet to resume operations, cross the Rumanian-Bulgarian border and reach the Ruse-Razgrad-Turgovishte-Karnobat line. Those days reminded the Soviet troops of the events of the past century, when the victorious Russian army under generals Skobelev and Dragomirov helped the Bulgarian brothers to cast off the Turkish yoke under which they had been languishing for many centuries. And now a hand of friendship was again extended to the Bulgarian people, but this time by the peoples of the socialist Soviet state. Preparations for the offensive were conducted under the supervision of Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko who had been in charge of preparations for the Jassy-Kishinev operation. Details were worked out by the Military Council of the front headed by front commander Tolbukhin. Control was in the hands of experienced commanders and political workers, such as member of the Military Council General V. M. Layok, chief of staff General S. S. Biryuzov, chief of the Political Department I. S. Anoshin, chief of the front's artillery General M. I. Nedelin, chief of the front armoured forces General F. V. Sukhoruchkin and chief of logistics General A. I. Shebunin. Some very important factors had to be taken into consideration. At the time the Royal Bulgarian Army numbered 450,000 officers and men (five field armies and two separate corps, totalling 30 divisions and brigades), and the Bulgarian Air Force had five air regiments with over 400 aircraft. It was hard to predict what this force would do. Moreover, it was necessary to take into account that 20 Turkish divisions and brigades were ready to invade Bulgaria from Turkey in Europe. Anything could happen, even though-the front Military Council had information that the situation in Bulgaria was favourable. The partisan struggle was mounting and the desire to break off relations with Hitler Germany was becoming more and more manifest among the units and formations of the Bulgarian government forces. Deserters from the Bulgarian 4th Infantry Division reported that the people were waiting for the Soviet troops to liberate them.
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In Moscow we spoke to Georgi Dimitrov who supplied us with information that enabled us to assess the situation in Bulgaria with a much greater degree of accuracy. This meeting was held at J. V. Stalin's advice at Georgi Dimitrov's flat in a very informal atmosphere in the presence of his family and closest associate V. Kolarov. Georgi Dimitrov told us a great deal about Bulgaria and his words carried a firm belief in victory, in the correctness of Lenin's ideas and embodied inexorable logic. We were deeply impressed by his stirring account of the revolutionary struggle of the Bulgarian working people, about the possibility of an uprising in the country and about the attitude of the Bulgarian people to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army. It was a vivid picture of the revolutionary situation in Bulgaria and we took it into account in formulating our final decision. In keeping with the front commander's instructions the troops were to advance in single-echelon formation with the 46th Army (General I. T. Shlemin) driving on Razgrad, the 57th Army (General N. A. Gagen) on Shumen, and the 37th Army (General M. N. Sharokhin) on Dulgopol. On the fifth day of the operation the advance forces were to reach the line Ruse-Razgrad-Turgovishte-Karnobat and stop there. The front was to launch the offensive without an artillery and air preparation. Primary importance was attached to the swift seizure of the ports Varna and Burgas on the Black Sea. This task was assigned to the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps under General V. I. Zhdanov. Preparations for the operation were in effect conducted while the troops were still advancing towards the RumanianBulgarian border and lasted until September 8. As regards educational work with the troops, it was based on the Soviet Government's note declaring war on Bulgaria and stressing the need to complete the rout of the German forces. To explain the liberatory mission of the Soviet Army the Command published "Instructions for Red Army Personnel in Bulgaria". They reminded the men of the long-standing friendship binding the Bulgarian and Russian peoples and underlined that the Soviet soldier entered Bulgaria as a great and noble knight covered with the glory of the victorious march from the Volga to the Danube. "You have caught up with the enemy here and here you
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are duty-bound to wipe him off the face of the earth and liberate the Bulgarian people for all time from the Germanfascist hordes," the instructions said. Fully aware of the concept and character of the forthcoming offensive the Soviet troops impatiently waited for the order to cross the Rumanian-Bulgarian border and extend a hand of friendship to the Bulgarians in their hour of need. The order, which was read to the troops several hours before the offensive was to begin, said in part: "Soviet soldiers. Ahead lies Bulgaria whose rulers had sold their country to the Germans and plunged the Bulgarian people into a war which is alien to their interests. The hour of reckoning with Hitler's bandits and their base henchmen has arrived. "The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front will cross the Rumanian-Bulgarian border and striking a swift blow will rout the enemy, destroy the hitlerite invaders in Bulgaria and liberate the fraternal Bulgarian people from the German-fascist yoke." The front Military Council issued an appeal to the population and the Bulgarian Armed Forces: "Bulgarians, the Red Army has no intention of fighting against the Bulgarian people and their army since it regards the Bulgarians as a fraternal people. The Red Army has only one task, that of smashing the German troops and hastening the establishment of world peace. It is essential, therefore, that the Bulgarian Government should stop serving nazi Germany's cause, immediately break off all relations with the Germans and go over to the side of the coalition of democratic countries." The appeal drew a distinct line between the ruling clique, which had plunged the country into a catastrophe, and the people who had borne the full burden of enslavement, and were now fighting for liberation. The purpose of the appeal was to announce the entry of the Soviet troops into Bulgaria, to explain the tasks which the Soviet Union had set itself in the war and to give moral support to the Bulgarian patriotic forces which had begun an armed uprising. The Military Council was certain that these words would evoke a positive response from the Bulgarian working people and the progressive, patriotic elements of the old Bulgarian
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Army. It was confident in the great magnetic force of the ideas of fraternity and internationalism. Subsequent developments showed that it had been correct in its conclusions, assessments and measures. In the morning of September 8 the Soviet troops in combat formation crossed the border without encountering any resistance. In Silistra, live kilometres inside Bulgaria, thousands of people, many with llowers, baskets of grapes and other foodstuffs, cheered as the Soviet troops marched into the town. The people were in their Sunday best and the firemen had sprayed the streets with water to keep down the dust. On hand were city mayor Boris Kodzhabashev, member of the district council Petr Drumev, commander of the local garrison Lieutenant-Colonel Sviatoslav Pintiev and other officials. Soviet troops received rousing welcome in other Bulgarian towns and villages. For example, the peasants of Kalipetrova built an arc with a sign in Russian reading "Welcome Red Army Fighting Men and Commanders" and hung out red Hags on either side of the road leading to the village. The first meetings with Bulgarian friends greatly relieved the state of tension of the Soviet troops and at the same time gave them additional moral strength to fulfil the tasks that lay ahead. Meeting with no resistance from the Bulgarian Army, Soviet forces, advancing along the Black Sea coast, made very rapid progress during the day wiping out German garrisons in towns and ports. It was a triumphant march. On the following day the advance units covered 120 kilometres and reached the line Ruse-Lomtsi-Karnobat-Burgas. Just as the people of Bulgaria the Bulgarian Army gave the Soviet troops a tremendous welcome. The scene was the same everywhere. As the Soviet troops came close to the positions of the Bulgarian forces the latter greeted them with cheers of "Hurray", "Glory to the Red Army" and "Long live Bulgaria and the Soviet Union". Then followed firm handshakes and fraternal embraces. Some Bulgarian units asked the Soviet Command for permission to fight together with the Soviet Army. On the night of September 8, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front received information that Radio Sofia
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reported an armed uprising in the country and the formation of the Fatherland Front government headed by Kimon Georgiev. The new government severed relations with nazi Germany, declared war on her and asked for an armistice with the Soviet Union. It appointed a degelation consisting of member of the Politbureau of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) Dimitr Ganev, Professor Dimitr Mikhaechev and Colonel Slavchev to contact the Military Council of the 3rd Ukrainian Front to ascertain the final terms of the armistice which would end the war and to plan joint operations of Soviet and Bulgarian troops. On September 9, GHQ ordered the front commander to complete deployment of the troops along the designated lines by 21.00 hours and cease all military operations in the country by 22.00 hours. Neither time nor events can erase the memory of the exciting and warm meetings with Bulgarian friends. BulgarianSoviet friendship was a source of joy for the Soviet troops who viewed the numerous monuments erected as a tribute to the Russian soldiers who had fought at Shipka and Pleven, as proof of the amicable relations between Bulgaria and Russia. So profound was the gratitude of the Bulgarian people for the assistance which the Russian brothers had rendered in the war against Turkish oppression that the dark forces of reaction did not dare to destroy these monuments even in the darkest days of the nazi occupation. The Soviet Command received hundreds of telegrams and letters welcoming the arrival of the Soviet forces. The enemies of the Soviet and Bulgarian people went to all lengths to undermine this great and sincere friendship. On September 9, 1944, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army A. S. Shcherbakov telephoned me from Moscow. "Comrade Zheltov," he said, "report the situation to me. The western press is trumpeting that" the Soviet troops are allegedly establishing socialist order in Bulgaria. Is that true?" I told him that revolutionary sentiments were running high among the masses and that the partisans were returning to their homes in towns and villages. I assured him naturally that the command and the troops are not interfering into Bulgaria's internal alfairs in any way and reported that the
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Fatherland Front People's Committees, which emerged during the revolution as the new organs of power, were establishing order in the localities. Shcherbakov said that the troops had to fulfil their direct task and that the favourable situation in the country should not lead the front command astray. Turning to Bulgaria's internal affairs he said that they were the concern of the Bulgarian people, and mentioned that the Allies had been making inquiries in this connection. I reassured him that the Military Council correctly understood this problem and would not deviate from the instructions of the Soviet Government. To study the situation on the spot chief of the front Political Department I. S. Anoshin and I went to Varna, which in those days figured prominently in the western reactionary press. After two days of talks with members of the local Fatherland Front Committee we could rest assured that I had correctly reported the situation to Moscow. As soon as Varna was liberated the Fatherland Front set up a People's Committee, which appointed a burgomaster, organised a security service and assumed full control in the city. Similar measures were taken in other cities and regions. All this testified to the strength and the scope of the revolution which put an end to the old, unpopular order and the monarchist-bourgeois principles and passed judgement on Bulgarian traitors in Hitler's employ. The entry of the Soviet forces into Bulgaria was a powerful external factor that hastened the popular revolution and the victory of the armed uprising of the working people under the guidance of the Communists. On September 9, 1944, all power in the country passed into the hands of the people who launched a patriotic war against the Germans and their henchmen. That day inaugurated the comradeship-in-arms of the Bulgarian People's Army and the Soviet Army. Emphasising the importance of this fact, Georgi Dimitrov said: "The combination of the popular uprising of September 9, 1944, and the victorious advance of the Soviet Army in the Balkans not only ensured the victory of the uprising, but gave it greater strength and scope." Rejoicing with the liberated Bulgarian brothers and sincerely wishing them happiness, the Soviet troops shared their confidence in the bright future that awaited their country.
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But the war was continuing and other Balkan nations were waiting to be liberated by the Soviet Army. The Germans were yet to be driven out of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia. And in Bulgaria, too, there were many crucial problems facing the front Military Council. On September 9, Dimitr Ganev, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) flew from Sofia to the front's HQ with a detailed report about the progress of the armed uprising and important news about the situation in the country. He confirmed reports that German forces were trying to disarm Bulgarian units in Serbia and produced fresh information about the concentration of considerable German forces northwest of Sofia, at Vidin. Evidently the Germans were preparing to attack Sofia with the view to holding on to a part of the Bulgarian territory, retaining control over the routes leading to the German troops in Greece. This was an obvious threat to the Bulgarian revolution and to the country's western regions. On behalf of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) Dimitr Ganev requested front commander Tolbukhin immediately to move his troops to cover the western regions of Bulgaria and ensure the safety of Sofia and the southeastern parts of the country. This task could be carried out in co-operation with the Bulgarian People's Army. On September 17, the Bulgarian Government placed its army under the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The new army received all-round organisational assistance and was supplied with weapons and other equipment. Even earlier, on September 4, the Soviet Air Force parachuted a large quantity of submachine-guns, rifles, machine-guns and ammunition for the Bulgarian National Liberation Insurgent Army in the area of the village of Kaln. This help played an important part in the formation of the battleworthy 1st (Sofia) Division of the National Liberation Insurgent Army which subsequently made its legendary march on Sofia and consolidated the victory of the September uprising. Events succeeded one another at a rapid pace. On September 12, a powerful German mechanised and panzer grouping broke out of the Zajear area in Yugoslavia into Bulgaria where it clashed in a fierce engagement with the Georgi Benkovsky and the Mikhailovgrad partisan detach130

ments. At the height of the fighting the Soviet 57th Army came to their assistance. Simultaneously, the 37th Army and the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps, which had entered the southeastern regions of the country, reliably covered the front's southern Hank. The 17th Air Army was being hastily shifted to airfields in Sofia, Plovdiv and Lom. These timely measures eliminated the threat of the German occupation of Sofia. Towards the end of September all German troops had been cleared out of Bulgaria and the Fatherland Front Government was in full control of the country. The Bulgarian Army was able to reorganise and begin preparations for joint action with the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The nazi leaders' plans to preserve Bulgaria as an ally of the fascist bloc collapsed as did the hopes of the US and British monopolists to turn her into their base in the Balkans. These military and political results were consolidated in the course of diplomatic negotiations. On October 11 the USSR, USA and Britain presented their preliminary armistice terms to the Bulgarian Government. On the same day, the Bulgarian Government accepted them in a reply addressed to Marshal Tolbukhin. In the middle of October a Bulgarian government delegation headed by Foreign Minister Petko Stainoff arrived in Moscow to negotiate and conclude an armistice with the Soviet Union, Britain and the USA. The Soviet side at the talks, which took place from October 26 to 28, included V. M. Molotov, A. Y. Vyshinsky, V. A. Zorin, K. V. Novikov, A. A. Lavrishchev, Colonel-General A. S. Zheltov and Rear Admiral N. O. Abramov. The British delegation consisted of Ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr and Lieutenant-General James Gammell. Charge d'Affairs George Kennan represented the USA. The armistice was signed. Bulgaria had been fully liberated, but the war was still on. In the course of the next eight months Soviet and Bulgarian forces took part in a number of offensive and defensive operations in Yugoslavia and Hungary/'1' The Soviet troops maintained close and very friendly contacts with Bulgarian soldiers. We saw them in action, on
* During this period the Bulgarian forces were under the operational command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. J131

the march and at rest and each time we noted with pleasure that they were loyal friends and comrades-in-arms. I have the warmest recollections of commander of the Bulgarian Army General V. Stoichev, his deputy for political affairs General S. Atanasov and other prominent Bulgarian commanders, all of whom were brave and experienced officers and devoted patriots. The units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front carried their banners across Bulgaria with a sense of having performed their noble duty to the end. For exemplary fulfilment of combat assignments in battles against the nazi invaders during the liberation of Rumania and Bulgaria and for meritorious conduct in action a large number of officers and men were decorated with Orders and medals. Another 56 names were added to the list of Heroes of the Soviet Union. Many officers of the front field HQ, and army and corps commands were awarded the highest government decorations and promoted. In a decree on September 12, 1944, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR promoted General of the Army Tolbukhin to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Assistance to the People of Yugoslavia Having made thousands of friends in liberated Bulgaria, the Soviet Army continued its westward drive together with the troops of the Bulgarian People's Army to crush the last strongholds of the Wehrmacht. In those memorable September days of 1944 the Soviet Army scored a series of brilliant victories along the entire front. Its sweeping offensive inexorably reduced the territory under nazi control. But, as subsequent events showed, Germany's ultimate defeat was still a long way off and the war went on with unabating ferocity. By October the German Command had army groups E and F comprising about 30 divisions in Southeast Europe. Army Group F (12 divisions) and five Hungarian divisions, totalling 300,000 men, were stationed in Yugoslavia. In addition armed bands headed by traitors Paveli, Nedi, Rupnik and Mihajlovi numbering 270,000 men were operating in the country. Facing the 3rd Ukrainian Front was Combat Group Serbia, the main German grouping in the area.
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The German Command was determined to hold on to this strategic area in view of its crucial importance for the entire Balkan group and also for the so-called Alpine Fortress with its military-industrial base in South Germany, Austria and Hungary, which the group covered from the south. It was clear that the destruction of this group would require a major effort on the part of the Soviet Army and the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. It was also taken into account that the German forces in Yugoslavia were being reinforced by troops from Army Group E which were being pulled out of Greece. These troops particularly the German 1st and 7th Mountain Infantry divisions were well trained and armed and had already fought in mountainous and wooded country. By then the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia had freed a considerable part of the country and forced the invaders and their henchmen to keep to the principal cities and routes. Soviet victories in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia created favourable conditions for liberating Yugoslavia. An agreement signed by Marshal Josip Broz Tito and the Soviet Government provided for joint operations of Soviet and Yugoslav forces. The Supreme Command of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia was anxious to establish close co-operation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front as quickly as possible. By the middle of September the Yugoslav 24th Division reached the Danube and linked up with the Soviet 57th Army. A common front of action was being formed. Ahead lay Yugoslavia, an enchanting mountainous country whose freedom-loving people led by Communists had been fighting for freedom and independence for three and a half years already. Aided by Yugoslav traitors the German invaders ravaged the country, persecuting and killing patriots without trial. But nothing could subdue their determination to resist the nazis. The Soviet people rendered selfless political support and material assistance to the people of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Government repeatedly came out in support of the Yugoslav Resistance. It welcomed the decision of the Second Session of Anti-Fascist People's Liberation Veche of Yugoslavia (November 1943) to establish legislative and executive organs of power and give new Yugoslavia a federal struc133

ture. In its statement of December 14, 1943, the Soviet Government said that this decision would give still greater impetus to the Yugoslav people's struggle against Hitler Germany. In the autumn of 1944, the Soviet Union supplied the People's Liberation Army with 96,515 rifles, 68,423 light and heavy machine-guns, 3,797 antitank rifles, 512 anti-aircraft machine-guns, 4,429 guns and mortars (including anti-aircraft guns), 491 combat aircraft, 65 tanks, 1,329 wireless sets, 11 evacuation and surgical hospitals, and large quantities of ammunition, uniforms, equipment and other supplies. The Yugoslav 1st Separate Infantry Brigade was formed in the Soviet Union and fully armed with Soviet weapons. Later it was incorporated into the 23rd Division of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. The formation of a Yugoslav tank brigade was started in the USSR on September 7, 1944. An air group of 350 combat aircraft under General A. N. Vitruk was made operationally subordinated to the High Command of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. The group covered the army's land operations and trained flight crews and technical personnel. To accelerate the delivery of supplies to the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Command established large transfer bases in Sofia and Crajova (Rumania). These centralised measures were carried out on authorisation of GHQ by the Soviet military mission headed by General N. V. Korneyev with the Main Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. On orders from the Supreme Command the 3rd Ukrainian Front handed over additional quantities of fire arms, ammunition, and rations to the Yugoslav units. We gave the Yugoslavs large stocks of captured weapons which had been repaired at Soviet field and army repair centres. The timely assistance extened by the Soviet people played an important role in the liberation struggle of the fraternal Yugoslav people. It vividly manifested the awareness of the Soviet people of their internationalist obligations, and their sincere, warm feelings for the peoples of Yugoslavia. To fulfil the main task, that of smashing the German forces in Serbia and liberating Belgrade, the front Military Council had to tackle unknown and quite complicated prob134

lems. First, it was necessary to establish close co-operation of three armiesSoviet, Bulgarian and Yugoslavan entirely new experience for the command of the front. This meant achieving unity of action and sharing with the Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops the vast combat experience of the Soviet Army and its experience in Party and political work. There were certain distinctive features in the front's relations with the Bulgarian and Yugoslav armies. While the Bulgarian 1st Army immediately came under the operational control of the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the Yugoslav forces remained directly subordinated to the command of the People's Liberation Army and were separated from the Soviet troops by the enemy. This gave rise to difficulties in organising co-operation with the Yugoslav forces. All problems concerning the joint actions of the Soviet and Yugoslav troops in the forthcoming operations were resolved at a meeting between Marshal Tolbukhin and the front's staff officers and the Yugoslav group of generals with Marshal Tito at their head. The plan of the Belgrade Operation in which four Yugoslav corps would participate was approved by all parties concerned. Yugoslav troops operating in the area of Belgrade and Ni were to prevent the enemy from reaching the line Kragujevac-Urosevac-Knjaevac from the south. Given a favourable situation they would seize Ni and undertake active operations to tie down the detachments of Nedic and Mihajlovic south and southwest of Belgrade. It was more difficult to organise the co-operation between Bulgarian and Yugoslav forces in the Ni sector. At the time there was still no official consent from the Yugoslav side to the entry of Bulgarian troops into Yugoslavia, although the Bulgarian 2nd Army, consisting of eight divisions and three brigades, was to take part in the offensive in the Ni sector. This consent was given at a meeting between a Bulgarian government delegation and Marshal Tito's delegation which was also attended by chief of staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front General Biryuzov. It laid the foundations for the military co-operation of the fraternal Bulgarian and Yugoslav armies that developed and strengthened in subsequent battles. The Belgrade Operation was launched to smash the main forces of Army Group F, liberate Serbia, including Bel135

grade, and cut the communication routes of Army Group E, thus preventing its withdrawal from the south of the Baikal} Peninsula. These objectives were to be achieved by blows delivered simultaneously by the 3rd Ukrainian Front, part of the forces of the 2nd Unkrainian Front's 46th Army and the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in the Belgrade direction, and by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian units driving at Ni and Skopje. The 3rd Ukrainian Front, which had enormous combat experience, was to spearhead the assault. Its 57th Army and the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps with reinforcing units were to deliver the main blow from the Raduj evac-KulaVidin sector in the general direction of Belgrade to meet the army corps of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia advancing from the south and southwest. On the right flank they were covered by the 10th Guards Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front's 46th Army and on the left flank by the divisions of the 2nd Bulgarian Army. The offensive of all three armies was to be covered by the 17 th Air Army. Soviet flotilla under Vice Admiral S. G. Gorshkov was operating on the Danube. We were pressed for time since the operation was scheduled to begin at the close of September. By then, the 57th Army had already deployed on the Yugoslav border, while the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps, which was taking in reinforcements and completing repairs in the vicinity of Burgas, was only just preparing to be transferred to the Belgrade sector. The 37th Army was still covering the southern and southeastern regions of Bulgaria. Party and political work played an important part in the preparations for the offensive. The front's Military Council called upon the men to act in close contact with their Bulgarian and Yugoslav friends and to employ their combat experience, skill and persistence to the full in attaining the set tasks. It was impressed on the Soviet soldiers that they would enter Yugoslavia as liberators and that they should perform their mission with honour. In the interests of the forthcoming operation the 17th Air Army began to support the actions of the units of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia as early as September 15. It attacked enemy communication routes leading from Greece to Belgrade wrecking troop trains and motor convoys.
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The operation got under way on September 28. The 75th, 68th and 64th infantry corps under experienced generals A. Z. Akimenko, N. N. Shkodunovich and I. K. Kravtsov had to penetrate fairly powerful enemy defences and cross the difficult East Serbian Mountains. This stage of the offensive lasted almost a fortnight. But once the enemy resistance had been crushed, they pierced his border defence line along an 85-kilometre sector between Brza Palanka and Zajear. By October 10 the Soviet troops reached the valley of the Velika Morava, crossed the river in their stride and gained bridgeheads on its western bank at Markovac and Velika Plana. Now they were 150 kilometres from Belgrade. Units of the 13th and 14th army corps of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia were fighting their way from the south and southwest to link up with the Soviet forces. With the emergence of the Soviet troops in the Velika Morava valley it became possible to commit the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps to action. Having covered 400 kilometres the corps' brigades assembled at Archar in Bulgaria. On October 9 they mounted a 160-kilometre drive towards the Valley of the Morava and completed it by nightfall on October 10 in the area of Petrovac. At the same time the 46th Army's 10th Guards Infantry Corps reached the left bank of the Danube north of Belgrade and captured Panevo. The local population, whose hospitality was just as warm as that of the Bulgarians, supported the offensive of the Soviet troops on Yugoslavian territory. And the joy with which townsfolk and villagers, both young and old, welcomed the Soviet forces is indelibly imprinted in the memory of the veterans of those battles. Though there was fighting all around Yugoslav peasants, workers and townsfolk welcomed the Soviet forces with gifts of fruit and wine. They were proud if a unit HQ were set up in their home or to offer lodgings to Soviet officers and men whom they gave the best rooms and make as comfortable as possible. For example, when the units of the 113th Infantry Division smashed the enemy and entered Negotin they were welcomed with ringing bells and church services. Slogans lauding the Red Army and the Soviet Union were written on housewalls. At first shopowners and barbers refused to take money from Soviet soldiers saying that the freedom which they had
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brought the Yugoslav people was worth more than money. The whole town turned out for the funeral of the killed Soviet soldiers and covered their graves with flowers. On October 5, units of the 19th Infantry Division entered Zajear and knocked the Germans out of a number of city blocks. Braving bullets the inhabitants came out to meet the Soviet soldiers, showed them the location of enemy fire emplacements and shortcuts to neighbouring streets. The same happened in Knjaevac which was liberated by the troops of the 1st Guards Fortified Area. For several days in a row delegations from neighbouring villages kept arriving in the town to thank the Soviet troops. The successful operations of the 57th Army's infantry corps created favourable conditions for the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps. Its brigades crossed the Velika Morava and mounted a two-pronged offensive on Belgrade along the Velika Plana-Topola-Mladenovac-Belgrade and Velika Plana-Smederevo-Belgrade lines of advance. Overwhelming the enemy in the Topola area they linked up with the units of the 1st Proletarian Corps of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia. On October 14, the Soviet and Yugoslav forces breached the outer perimeter of Belgrade at Mount Aval. Co-operating with infantry divisions they surrounded 20,000 enemy troops southeast of the city. In the meanwhile, the 2nd Bulgarian Army and the Yugoslav troops supported by the 17th Air Army had liberated Ni. The operation entered its decisive stage as battles flared up for the liberation of Belgrade. An enemy force of 20,000 men with 40 panzers and 170 guns and mortars defended the city proper. Many buildings had been adapted for perimeter defence. The whole city was mined and divided into several resistance centres. Taking all these factors into account and wishing to lessen the possible damage to the city, the Soviet Command decided to breach the defence perimeter around the city on a narrow sector by a concerted blow of Soviet and Yugoslav forces, reach the bridge across the Sava, split up the garrison and destroy it piecemeal. The main blow was to be delivered by the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps, 236th and 73rd Guards infantry divisions of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the Yugoslav 1st, 6th, 5th and 21st divisions in the direction of Banijski-Vis, Avtokomanda, Slavia Square and the Kalemegdan Fortress, with four Yugo138

slav divisions delivering the auxiliary blow in the direction of ukarica, Topider, and the Central Railway Station. Fierce battles raged from October 14 to 19 as the Germans put up a stubborn resistance. Gradually the Soviet troops gained the upper hand and on October 19 together with the Yugoslav forces wiped out the 20,000-strong German group which had been encircled southeast of Belgrade. On the following day Kalemegdan Fortress, the last nazi stronghold in the city, was taken by storm. The Yugoslav capital was free. Jubilant crowds filled the streets to give a rousing welcome to the Soviet and Yugoslav troops. Fighting shoulder to shoulder to liberate Belgrade they multiplied the best traditions of the historical struggle of the two Slav peoples and gave them a new class content by placing them at the service of the working people. During the storm of Belgrade the front commander ordered seven engineer battalions to demine government and official buildings and historical monuments, the water supply and sewage systems, power stations, the port and other buildings and installations which the enemy had intended to blow up. Soviet sappers removed mines from 845 of them, thus saving Belgrade from destruction. "For our peoples," wrote Josip Broz Tito in those days, "the liberation of Belgrade is of historic significance above all because the land of these long suffering peoples is an arena where the sons of the great Soviet Union and the worthy sons of Yugoslavia had jointly shed their blood. This still further cemented the blood brotherhood of the Yugoslav peoples with the peoples of the Soviet Union."* The Belgrade operation was very important both politically and strategically. It ended in the rout and destruction of the greater part of Combat Group Serbia. The troops of the front smashed a considerable part of the forces of Army Group E, cleared a large portion of Serbia of the German invaders, and liberated the capital of Yugoslavia Belgrade. The enemy lost about 100,000 men killed and taken prisoner. The People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia also destroyed or took prisoner a large number of enemy troops. The operation deprived the German Command of the possibility of pulling out its troops stationed in Greece to the
* Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza .. ., Vol. II, p. 359.
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northwest by way of the Velika Morava valley, and they had to take to difficult paths and came under the blows of the People's Liberation Army and Yugoslav partisans. With the liberation of Belgrade and Serbia, the Yugoslav people and their army formed a united front of struggle. They acquired a reliable home front with large manpower and material resources which considerably facilitated the operations of the People's Liberation Army at the final stage of the war. The Yugoslav Government highly assessed the Soviet Army's role in the liberation of Belgrade. For courage and valour the Anti-fascist Veche of the People's Assembly of Yugoslavia awarded Orders and medals to over 2,000 Soviet officers and men. Thirteen of them were made People's Hero of Yugoslavia, including commander of the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps, LieutenantGeneral Zhdanov, commander of the 73rd Guards Infantry Division, Major-General Kozak, commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front Marshal of the Soviet Union Tolbukhin. Soviet Orders and medals were awareded to 300 commanders and men of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia who had fought together with the Soviet troops. Commemorating the fraternal assistance rendered by the Soviet troops to the Yugoslav people in liberating Belgrade, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in its decree of June 19, 1945 established the medal "For the Liberation of Belgrade" which was awarded to all the men who had participated in the operation. The title of "Belgrade" was bestowed on 20 units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front for exemplary action, and 30 units were awarded Orders. The Belgrade Operation was a striking embodiment of the unity of the objectives pursued in the struggle of the freedom-loving peoples, their comradeship-in-arms. The joint operations of the Soviet, Yugoslav and Bulgarian troops vividly manifested the international solidarity of the countries which had fought against fascism.

As the war continued the 3rd Ukrainian Front took part in a number of heavy battles. In the last seven months of the war they participated in the Budapest offensive opera140

tion, repelled powerful German counterblows at Lake Balaton and carried out the Vienna offensive operation. I should like to mention only the major engagements in Hungary and Austria where the front concluded its campaign of liberation. G H Q re-oriented the 3rd Ukrainian Front to the Budapest line of advance in October 1944. Its zone of operations lay in the Danube Plain where extremely difficult battle conditions were aggravated by the autumn and winter slush. Entering Hungary in October 1944, the Soviet troops fighting heavy battles crossed the Danube and gained bridgeheads on its western bank south of Budapest at the towns Mohacs and Apatin. Fighting heroically the 57th Army and then the 4th Guards Army established an operational bridgehead 180 kilometres wide and 50 kilometres deep towards the end of November. In the last ten days of December the Soviet troops struck two blows from this bridgehead. The first was delivered by the 4th Guards Army, the 46th Army, the 18th Tank Corps and one cavalry corps. These forces outflanked Budapest from the west and linked up with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front at Esztergom. The auxiliary blow was delivered by the 57th Army at Kaposvar and Nagybajom. The front's main forces drove a wedge in the enemy's defences from the south between Budapest and Lake Balaton. As a result, a 200,000-strong group of German and Szalasi forces was surrounded in the Hungarian capital. Thereupon, the German Command undertook a series of attempts to rout what it called Tolbukhin's armies (57th, 46th and 4th Guards armies). In the latter half of January, the Germans even managed to cut the 3rd Ukrainian Front in two and reach the Danube south of Budapest on the Adony-Dunapentele sector. But all these attempts ultimately ended in failure. Early in February, reinforced by the 26th Army, the troops of the front beat off the enemy's attacks, and wiped out the force that had broken through to the Danube. After that the front took part in smashing the enemy group in Budapest. In four months (from November 1944 to February 1945), the 3rd Ukrainian Front inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and created conditions for completing the liberation of Hungary. In the middle of February G H Q ordered the
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front to carry out the Vienna offensive operation. It reinforced the front with General V. V. Glagolev's 9th Guards Ariny numbering 100,000 men according to the new tables of organisation and then, when the operation had got under way, reinforced the front's troops with the 6th Guards Tank Army under General A. G. Kravchenko. At the beginning of March, when the preparations for the Vienna operation were at their height, the Germans who had not given up their plan of smashing the 3rd Ukrainian Front, undertook a series of heavy attacks at the Soviet defences between lakes Balaton and Velencei, and also in the zone of the Soviet 57th Army and the Bulgarian 1st Army. The most dangerous was the blow delivered by the 6th Panzer Army SS north of Lake Balaton. But its divisions ran into the powerful defences which the front had established during the operation to neutralise the breakthrough to the Danube. In this sector the panzers were stopped by devastating artillery fire from 4,000 guns. Just as unsuccessful was the enemy's panzer assault into the Nagybajom area. In the latter half of March the 3rd Ukrainian Front crushed the enemy's resistance west and southwest of Budapest, and on April 4, reached the Austrian border completing the liberation of Hungary. Ahead lay Austria, Hitler's last stronghold. Setting the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts their missions, G H Q ordered the 4th and 9th Guards and the 6th Guards Tank armies to liberate Vienna and reach the Tulln-St. Polten-Lilienfeld line by April 12-15. The 46th Army (2nd Ukrainian Front), which was to advance through Bratislava along the northern bank of the Danube, was also to participate in the battle for Vienna. The 3rd Ukrainian Front's 26th, 27th and 57th armies and the Bulgarian 1st Army were to reach the Miirz, Mur and Drawa rivers. Pursuing the enemy the troops of the right wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front advanced in.the direction of Sopron. On April 3 they drove the Germans out of the strongly fortified town of Wiener Neustadt. After that they were ordered to advance on Vienna. Having enveloped Vienna from the east, south and west, the three armies on April 6 began the storming of the Austrian capital. Furious fighting continued round the clock. The German Command was determined to hold the city "until all means would be exhausted". The
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Austrian capital fell to the Soviet forces on April 13 and the remnants of the mauled German divisions lied to the Alps. Mounting a pursuit the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the beginning of May came up to the foothills of the Eastern Alps, emerged on the Linz-Bruck-Graz line where they linked up with the American and British troops. Thus the liberation mission of the 3rd Ukrainian Front came to an end. The war had been won. News that the war was over went to the hearts of the Soviet troops who were deeply grateful to the Communist Party which in the grim war years rallied the people, filled them with unshakeable confidence in victory and having mobilised them to the sacred war brought it to a victorious conclusion. As a veteran of these battles, I should like to say that in those action-packed months the Soviet soldiers fulfilled their internationalist duty to the working people of the occupied countries with honour and dignity. True to their Soviet character they gave everythingexperience, skill and when necessary their livesto achieve victory. Their morale was always high, their heroism astounded the world. The peoples of Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria welcomed the victorious troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front as liberators who had faced death and hardships to fulfil their mission of liberation. Many of them fell in battle far away from home. But they did not die in vain. The peoples of the liberated countries have deep affection and respect for the Soviet soldiers. This affection is embodied in thousands of memorials erected in their honour in these countries, and is manifest in the strengthening fraternal and friendly feelings of the peoples of the socialist countries. It is materially embodied in the magnificent gains which these countries have made thanks to the labour, wisdom and will of their peoples. As Soviet Armed Forces routed the nazi hordes fulfilling their mission of liberation, they cemented their militant alliance with the people's armies of many countries. The men of the 3rd Ukrainian Front fought shoulder to shoulder with Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Rumanian forces. This was one of the most important factors of the firm alliance-in-arms of the socialist countries which finally evolved into the military organisation of the Warsaw Treaty countries, a reliable bulwark of peace and security of the peoples.
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Marshal of the Soviet Union

a. a. g r e c h k o

LIBERATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

An Historic Mission T h e spring and summer of 1944 brought great tidings to the Soviet people: the Soviet Army had driven the invaders out of almost all the temporarily occupied areas of the USSR and started liberating the neighbouring European countries from the nazi yoke. T h e nation intently followed the course of the war and the magnificent deeds of its sons who had crossed its borders and were fighting to achieve their noble and highly humane goals. At the time I was in command of the 1st Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front which was advancing on Czechoslovakia. T h e men were in high spirits. They were proud of having been honoured with the task of liberating the peoples of Czechoslovakia with whom the peoples of the Soviet Union maintained the most friendly, genuinely fraternal relations over the course of many centuries. T h a t the Soviet Army would be set the task of liberating Czechoslovakia and countries in Central and Southeast Europe, did not come as a surprise to the troops. Internationalism, solidarity with enslaved peoples and mutual assistance of the working people have always been and shall always be one of the fundamental features of a genuinely socialist state. In their documents of the early period of the war the Communist Party and the Soviet Government noted that the
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day would come when the Soviet Army would have to fulfil its great mission of liberation and unequivocally pointed out that the Soviet people's fight for freedom would inevitably fuse with the struggle for liberation waged by other peoples, and that the enslaved nations would rise in arms against Hitler's tyranny; they would become the Soviet Union's staunch allies and, therefore, helping the European peoples in their struggle for liberation would be one of the Soviet Army's cardinal tasks in the war. Wearing down and mauling the German armies on the territory of the USSR, the Soviet Army fulfilled both its patriotic and internationalist duty from the very outset of the war. The Soviet Army launched its campaign of liberating European states in the spring of 1944. By that time the international prestige of the Soviet Union had risen to an unprecedented height. Fighting courageously against the black forces of nazism and reaction in the grimmest war history had ever known, the USSR demonstrated its enormous viability, the advantages of its political and economic system, cohesion of its peoples and unconquerable military might, and indicated the only road that would lead the enslaved peoples and countries to freedom and independence. These factors further strengthened the international positions of the Soviet Union and tremendously envigorated the activity of the world's anti-fascist forces. A grave crisis had gripped the nazi bloc. At the end of August 1944, Rumania withdrew from the war as Germany's ally and had joined the fight against nazism. Bulgaria and Finland followed suit shortly afterwards. In this extremely unfavourable situation, the nazis turned their eyes towards Czechoslovakia basing their political, economic and strategic plans on the continued occupation of the country. By seizing Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939, nazi Germany acquired exceptionally advantageous positions in the centre of Europe. Subsequently, the Wehrmacht turned Czechoslovakia into a springboard for attacking Poland and then the Soviet Union. Germany's rulers who had always nourished plans of occupying Czechoslovak lands, often repeated that he who controlled Bohemia, controlled the heart of Europe. With Czechoslovakia's raw materials and industrial base at her disposal, nazi Germany was able to augment her war137 0 15
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industrial potential to a tremendous extent. And when the Soviet troops forced the enemy to roll back to the western borders of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, with her ramified communications system, became a vital link connecting the northern and southern groups of German forces operating in the Warsaw-Berlin and Budapest-Vienna sectors. That was one of the reasons why the German Command intended to hold on to Czechoslovakia, the first country nazi Germany had occupied, for as long as possible. The last shells and bombs in 1945 exploded on Czechoslovak territory and the last tank battles were also fought there. The Wehrmacht's major defeats on the Soviet-German front and the depletion of its manpower resources, forced the German Command to revert to defensive strategy in an effort to prolong the war and win time. Hitler's politicians hoped that insurmountable contradictions would split the anti-fascist coalition. This, they thought, would save the Third Reich from complete destruction. At the same time nazi Germany herself had not exhausted all her possibilities in the war; 178 of the Wehrmacht's most battleworthy divisions (including the Hungarian 21st and 5th)3,600,000 officers and men, 34,500 guns and mortars, 4,400 panzers and assault guns and 2,400 combat aircraftwere fighting desperately against the advancing Soviet Army. In the situation that had taken shape by the end of the summer of 1944, the Soviet G H Q was firmly in control of the strategic initiative and could fix the time and place for its next blow with relative ease. In other words, it forced the enemy to fight when and where it wanted. In the centre of the Soviet-German front the Soviet troops had made considerable headway and reached the Prussian borders and forced the Vistula. But the flanks were lagging behind. In this connection the Soviet Command ordered the troops operating in the western sector to consolidate their positions and prepare for a major strategie operation. In the southwestern sector, particularly where the Soviet troops were approaching the Czechoslovak borders, the offensive continued. Analysing the campaign which resulted in the liberation of Czechoslovakia, Soviet military historians usually divide it into three stages. The first stage (September-December
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1944) consisted of operations to help the national uprising in Slovakia and drive the Germans out of the eastern and southeastern Slovakia. In the second stage (January-April 1945), the invaders were chased out of Czechoslovakia's central regions. The Prague offensive operation (May 1945), the third stage, culminated in the liberation of the whole of Czechoslovakia. In its course the Soviet troops came to the assistance of the inhabitants of Prague who were heroically fighting the Germans on barricades in the city. The Soviet offensive operations in Czechoslovakia, in which I took part from the first to the last day, lasted over eight months, from September 1944 to May 1945, and were characterised by extremely bitter fighting, particularly during the first stage. It should be noted, however, that before launching these operations the Soviet Government had to resolve a number of military, political and diplomatic issues. Czechoslovakia, it will be recalled, was a member of the anti-Hitler coalition and her government in exile had normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance to formulate principles guiding the relations between the Soviet Command and the Czechoslovak administration in the liberated parts of the country. These principles were laid down in the Agreement on the relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Administration signed in London on May 8, 1944.* This document, drawn up on the basis of the principles of friendship, co-operation and non-interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, was a splendid example of international relations of a new type: treating a smaller state as an equal, a great socialist power which was involved in a bitter war, committed itself not to interfere in the former's internal affairs. It was also significant that the draft of the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement was formulated by the Czechoslovak side and accepted by the Soviet Government without any amendments. The Soviet side undeviatingly fulfilled all the terms of this agreement. Explanatory work was conducted among the
* Sovetsko-chekhoslovatskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoi Olechcstvcniioi Voiny 1941-1945 godov (Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations in the Period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945), Moscow, 1960, pp. 160-162.
10*

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troops which entered the territory of friendly Czechoslovakia. Soviet officers and men were taught to respect the fraternal Czechoslovak people and were under strict orders not to interfere in any way in the activity of official Czechoslovak organs. Undoubtedly these measures still further strengthened the spirit of fraternity between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Assistance to the Insurgents T h e Soviet Army's m a j o r victories and its relentless advance towards the Czechoslovak borders greatly stimulated the struggle of the Czechs and Slovaks against the nazi invaders. This struggle particularly gained in scope in Slovakia in the spring and summer of 1944. On August 29, 1944, when the waves of the national liberation movement threatened to overthrow Hitler's puppet Joseph Tiso, a large German punitive force entered Slovakia for the purpose of "restoring order". Its arrival set off the popular uprising which the Communist Party of Slovakia and the Slovak National Council had been preparing for a long time. Fighting furiously against the invaders, the Communists of Czechoslovakia were well aware that only the Soviet Union could consistently safeguard the rights of the Czechoslovak people and fulfil its historic mission of fighting imperialism and nazism to the end. In view of this the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on more than one occasion approached the Soviet Government with requests to help the popular anti-fascist movement in the country in one way or another. These requests were always met. Weapons, equipment, ammunition and military specialists and Party workers were sent to the eastern areas of Czechoslovakia. In response to the requests from the head of the Foreign Bureau of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Klement Gottwald, the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, in a number of resolutions passed in April and June 1944 specified how it intended to help the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia organise the partisan movement in the country.
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Partisan cadres to be dispatched to Czechoslovakia were trained at special schools run by the Ukrainian Partisan Movement HQ. At the time Rudolf Slnsk, later General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, was the Party's representative in Kiev. Patriots from the Czechoslovak Corps raised in the USSR underwent training at partisan schools. Upon the conclusion of the training programme mixed groups of Soviet and Czechoslovak partisans were sent to Czechoslovakia. A total of 404 Soviet and Czechoslovak partisans divided into 24 groups were dropped on Slovak territory in July and August 1944. These groups became the nuclei of partisan detachments and formations. Towards the end of August dozens of partisan units totalling nearly 15,000 people were operating in Slovakia. By the middle of September, when the Slovak uprising, the biggest uprising of the Second World W a r , was already under way, an insurgent army numbering at first 22,000 men, then 60,000, of whom, 15,000 took part in the fighting, had already been raised in the country. The partisans and the insurgents had only light arms, while the enemy had tanks, artillery and aviation. Moreover, the Germans had much greater combat experience, and gradually increased their pressure. In this connection Zdenk Fierlinger, the Czechoslovak Ambassador to the USSR, asked the Soviet Government on August 31 for direct military assistance to the Slovak people. Several days later Klement Gottwald in a note "Concerning Events in Slovakia" transmitted to the Soviet Government emphasised that "a powerful armed people's war" guided by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was developing in Slovakia. The leadership of the Slovak national uprising included K. midke, J. Sverma, Gustav Husk, now First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and L. Novomesk. The situation called for decisive actions. But the way was blocked by the Carpathian Mountains, where every hill and mountain passage had been turned into formidable strongpoint. The Carpathians figure prominently in military history as a stumbling block to many armies. They confronted many
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military commanders with a difficult choice, just as they did the Soviet Command. But G H Q had begun to work on the problem well in advance. On July 30, when the 1st Ukrainian Front was engaged in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, its two leftwing armies (1st Guards and 18th), which had reached the Carpathian foothills, were united into an independent group which became known as the 4th Ukrainian Front. The front commander Colonel-General I. Y. Petrov, later promoted to the rank of General of the Army, received instructions to prepare the troops and staffs for a major offensive operation, involving the crossing of the Eastern Carpathians. The newly-formed front was reinforced by armour, artillery, air force and other units from the G H Q reserve, and also by the 3rd Mountain Infantry Corps (three divisions) which had previously fought in the Caucasian and Crimean mountains, two mountain engineer brigades and mountain pack units. Shortly afterwards the 4th Ukrainian Front was set the task of continuing the offensive in the southwesterly direction. In the course of the drive they were to smash the enemy in the foothills, capture the passes of the Main Carpathian Range leading to Humenn, Uzhgorod and Mukachevo and then enter the Hungarian plain. The offensive was scheduled to begin on August 28. But two days before that date, when preparations were practically completed, GHQ cancelled the operation. This was done in view of the substantial changes that had taken place in the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. At the close of August 1944, the Soviet troops smashed the powerful Jassy-Kishinev group of enemy forces and Rumania was forced to withdraw from the war. This offered the 2nd Ukrainian Front very favourable opportunities for undertaking a swift offensive in the southwesterly direction. Moreover, the Soviet troops advancing north of the 4 th Ukrainian Front had surged far ahead and engaged the enemy at the Vistula bridgeheads. Consequently, there were real possibilities for a double envelopment of the Eastern Carpathians. Since a frontal attack was no longer necessary the crossing of the Carpathians could be carried out at the cost of much smaller losses.
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But then a general uprising broke out in Slovakia and the situation again changed drastically eliciting the following reaction on the part of the Soviet Government. On September 2 the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front received the following directive from GHQ: "In view of the increasing partisan movement in Slovakia and the mounting struggle of separate regular units of the Slovak Army against the German invaders . . . you shall prepare and carry out an operation at the junction of the 1st and 4th Ukrainian fronts with the view to striking out from the Krosno-Sanok area in the general direction of Preov, reaching the Slovak border and linking up with the Slovak forces." Agreement was also reached that the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps which had been raised behind the lines of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the end of August 1944 and the Slovak forces operating in the enemy rear northeast of Preov, would also take part in the operation. On the following day G H Q ordered the 4th Ukrainian Front to strike out with one infantry corps out of the Sanok area in the general direction of Komaca also for the purpose of reaching the Slovak border and linking up with the Slovak troops and partisans fighting against the Germans. To assist the 1st and 4th Ukrainian fronts, the 2nd Ukrainian Front on G H Q orders launched an offensive in the general direction of Cluj, Satu Mare and Nyiregyhza. At the same time weapons and other equipment were dropped to the insurgents. On the night of September 17, the Czechoslovak 1st Fighter Aircraft Regiment was rebased to the liberated part of Slovakia."" At the end of September the Czechoslovak 2nd Airborne Brigade was airlifted from the USSR to Slovakia. On orders from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the operation involving the crossing of the Carpathians was to be carried out by the 38th Army (commander Colonel-General K. S. Moskalenko, members of the Military CouncilMajor-Generals A. A. Yepishev and F. I. Oleinik, chief of staffMajor-General V. F. Vorobyev). Delivering the main blow in the direction of Odiko, Dukla Pass, Pre* Sovetsko-chekhoslovatskiye otnosheniya . . . , p. 200.
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ov, the army was to advance from 90 to 95 kilometres within live days. Three infantry, one tank and one cavalry corps, and the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps were also to take part in the operation. Air support was to be provided by a part of the forces of the 2nd Air Army. The 107th and 30th corps of the 1st Guards Army (commanderA. A. Grechko, members of the Military Council Major-General K. P. Isayev and Colonel M. V. Shevyakov, chief of staffLieutenant-General A. G. Batyunya) which were to take part in the operation in the sector of the 4th Ukrainian Front, were to advance at M. Bukovsko-Komaca co-ordinating their actions with those of the 38th Army. Part of the forces of the 8th Air Army were to provide air support. G H Q gave four or five days to complete the preparations for the East Carpathian operation. Few other operations of such scope and scale had been organised within such a short space of time. Only the most essential problems of organisation and supply could be solved. But there was a factor that should not be overlooked. Elaborating the operational plan and fixing the deadlines, the command took into account that the East Slovak Corps (two divisions) was active behind the enemy's line 70-80 kilometres from the forward line. Its task was to attack his rearward positions and capture the Dukla and Lubkovsky passes to open the way across the Carpathians for the advancing Soviet troops. But the corps was disarmed by the Germans on September 1 and 2. They were able to do this because a part of the commanding officers had a pro-nazi orientation. General Malr, who was made corps commander by the bourgeois emigre government, did not alert the troops when the time had come to revert from words to action, and even declared the operation premature. Persuading the troops not to take part in it he even urged them to surrender their arms to the Germans. The commander of the 2nd Infantry Division was also a confirmed pro-nazi. Upon learning that Hitler's forces were approaching the positions of the Slovak units, deputy corps commander Colonel Viliam Talsk, who was to take over complete command, boarded a plane for the 1st Ukrainian Front's HQ without giving any instructions to the troops.
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The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front Marshal Konev reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin on his meeting with Talsk: "Today, 1.9.44, Colonel Viliam Talsk of the Slovak Army General Staff came to see me. . . . "In view of the German occupation of Slovakia he wants my instructions concerning the further conduct of the Slovak troops. "Colonel Talsk said that in the event of a Soviet westward drive, the Slovak 1st and 2nd divisions deployed on the border from Nizk Radop to Tyli could advance eastward to link up with the Soviet Army. "Colonel Talsk believes that the 1st Division under Colonel Markus would comply with Talsk's orders, but he is not too confident in the commander of the 2nd Division and its men. . . . " In the meantime General Malr, who had left for Bratislava, conveyed to the Corps HO his "explanation" of the situation. He asserted that the German forces that had invaded Slovakia would not open operations against the Slovak divisions. With their leadership gone the utterly confused Slovak soldiers were unable to offer organised resistance to the Germans. The Slovak Corps had ceased to exist. The Soviet Command, however, did not know this and continued preparations. Taking advantage of the broken relief of the Carpathian foothills, an enemy force consisting of the German 1st Panzer Army and the Hungarian 1st Army (they were part of Combat Group Heinrici which in its turn was a component of Army Group A) had established a formidable 50-kilometre long defence line facing the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 4th Ukrainian Front. There were also many powerful intermediate lines and switch positions along the numerous ridges running behind the main line of resistance. On the border, which followed the Main Carpathian Range, the enemy had established field fortifications and also permanent strongpoints covering the mountain passes. When the 38th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 4th Ukrainian Front went over to the offensive, the balance of forces was as follows: 1.5:1 in artillery, 3.2:1 in armour and self-propelled guns and 2.5:1 in combat aircraft in favour of the Soviet forces while the enemy had a 1.2:1
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superiority in manpower. The Soviet troops had a numerical preponderance only in the breakthrough sectors, eight kilometres wide in the zone of the 38th Army and 4.5 kilometres wide in the zone of the 1st Guards Army. Dukla Ahead On a fine morning of September 8 the 38th Army went over to the offensive following a powerful artillery and air preparation. One of the biggest mountain operations of the Second W o r l d W a r got under way. T h e enemy's forward line was pierced by midday and it was possible to commit a tank corps, a cavalry corps and the Czechoslovak Army Corps to action in order to press home the initial success. T h e front commander issued the corresponding order. But then the unexpected happened: the Soviet troops operating on the left flank failed to take the small town of Krosno, an important railway junction, in their stride. It was captured only after four days of fighting. In the meanwhile the corps had to bypass the town along rutty and heavily taxed roads, and were unable to go into action on schedule. This enabled the enemy to slow down the Soviet drive. T h e German Command urgently shifted reinforcements into the sector of the main blow. W h e n the 38th Army went over to the offensive it had three enemy divisions facing it, but by September 14 there were already seven. T h e newlyarrived enemy forces included two panzer divisions and an assault gun brigade. Their arrival had a very serious impact on the course of the fighting, since it gave the enemy a more than twofold superiority in armour. Fighting became drawn out, although the Soviet and Czechoslovak troops fought with exceptional courage. T h e following episodes show how determined they were to break through to the insurgents. On the night of September 10 units of the Czechoslovak 1st Corps under General Ludvik Svoboda, who had replaced the incompetent General Bohuslav Kratochvil, captured the tactically important hill 534.0 and in the vicinity of Teodorvka cut the highway leading to Dukla. But the
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enemy brought considerable forces into the area and counterattacking incessantly was on the verge of breaking through into the rear of the Czechoslovak troops. In the circumstances they were forced to withdraw. Fierce fighting broke out for the hill which changed hands several times until it was finally recaptured by a battalion under Hero of the Soviet Union Senior Lieutenant A. Sochor of the Czechoslovak Corps. In this engagement the Czechoslovak troops fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet 183rd Infantry Division, 111th Tank Brigade and the 11th Guards Antitank Artillery Brigade. Jointly they breached the enemy's defence between the villages of Lysa Gora and Glojsce. On the night of September 11, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under Lieutenant-General V. K. Baranov entered the breach and cut into the rear of the enemy. This bold, and I would even say risky, manoeuvre was intended to achieve a turning point in the fighting. Within 24 hours the cavalry units wedged into the enemy defences to a depth of 18-20 kilometres, crossed the Polish-Czechoslovak border at Nizk Polanka and Barane and entered Slovakia. The other units, however, were unable to support and develop the cavalry corps' success. Throwing their panzers into action the Germans managed to cut off the corps from the army's main forces and several days later it had to fight its way out of the encirclement. The 1st Guards Army went over to the offensive on September 9, following a 50-minute artillery softening up. The density of the artillery fire was not too great on its breakthrough sector, and adverse weather grounded the air force. It did not take the enemy long to stiffen resistance and measures had to be taken to build up the blow from the depth. Advancing not more than 10 or 20 kilometres, neither army could fulfil its task on schedule. Limited as it was, their success, nevertheless, had an important impact on further developments. The threat of a Soviet breakthrough in the Krosno-Dukla sector forced the Germans urgently to withdraw a considerable part of their troops operating against the insurgents. To prevent the Soviet forces from widening the breach the German Command brought in the
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357th Infantry Division and a number of regiments, including a panzer regiment, from Slovakia. This saved the uprising from being crushed just as it was beginning to gain momentum. The struggle in Slovakia continued and so did the Soviet offensive. It was obvious that sustained attacks in the initial directions by the original forces would bring little success. So, the 38th Army was reinforced with the 4th Guards (commanderLieutenant-General P. P. Poluboyarov) and the 31st (commanderMajor-General V. Y. Grigoryev) tank corps (both from the reserve) which were concentrated on the army's left flank where the auxiliary blow was being dealt. In the morning of September 18 the tank corps went over to the offensive. Taking to narrow mountain passes they broke through in the western direction. On September 20, they captured the important resistance centre of Dukla and engaged the enemy forces defending Dukla pass. In this engagement the Czechoslovak tank battalion gave an excellent account of itself. The 1st Guards Army was reinforced with the 3rd Mountain Infantry Corps (commanderMajor-General A. Y. Vedenin) and the 11th Infantry Corps (commander Major-General M. I. Zaporozhchenko). Meanwhile, G H Q ordered it to strike the main blow in the Komaca-HumennMichalovce direction and acting in close co-operation with the 38th Army reach the Czechoslovak border within a few days. The 4th Ukrainian Front's 18th Army under Lieutenant-General Y. P. Zhuravlev was also ordered to attack. Great courage and determination were displayed by the officers and men of the Czechoslovak Corps who fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops. In an act of mass heroism, they captured Mount Girov (height 694.0) where the Germans had put up permanent defensive installations. The Czechoslovak 1st Infantry and tank brigades seized this extremely powerful resistance point by storm. Describing this engagement in his reminiscences Ludvik Svoboda wrote that Senior Lieutenant Richard Tesaik in his T-34 tank was the first to reach the top of the height. For this feat he was made Hero of the Soviet Union.*
* L. Svoboda, Ol Buzuluka do Pragi Moscow, 1963, p. 297.
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(From Buzuluk to Prague),

Soviet soldiers supported the operations of the Czechoslovak infantry and the Czechoslovak troops assisted the Soviet forces. On September 28, 1944, the Soviet 359th Infantry Division under Colonel P. P. Kosolapov was attached to the Czechoslovak Army Corps and for several days acted under the command of General Svoboda. As part of the Czechoslovak Corps, the division fought in the Zyndranov-Vny Komarnik sector, and took part in the fighting for Mount Kiera and other enemy resistance points at the Czechoslovak border. Czechoslovak citizens rendered valuable assistance to the Soviet troops in this and subsequent periods. They not only gave the Soviet troops a rousing welcome, but also volunteered to be their guides, took care of the wounded and repaired roads and bridges. There were some excellent guides, among them Vasil Kauba, Andrej Krikunov, Andrej Bobek. On October 6, the 67th Infantry and the 31st Tank corps of the 38th Army and the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps captured Dukla pass. At last the Czechoslovak soldiers entered their homeland as liberators. It was not only stirring, but also an extremely important historical event. With it the Czechoslovak people associate the beginning of a new epoch in the life of their country. October 6 is annually celebrated as the anniversary of the Czechoslovak People's Army. This date has gone down in the history of Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship. "For ever with the Soviet Union! Only with the Soviet Union and never otherwise!" This slogan, Klement Gottwald underlined, was born in Dukla in the grim battles in which Soviet and Czechoslovak forces fought shoulder to shoulder. Throughout October the 4th Ukrainian Front engaged in strenuous battles for the possession of the Main Carpathian Range, its passes and western slopes. The biggest gains were made on the front's left flank where the Hungarian 1st Army was on the defensive. It was gripped by a serious crisis engendered by the threat of a deep flanking movement from the south by the 2nd Ukrainian Front and partisan activity in the rear. Things reached such a state that in the middle of October its commander General Bla Mikls who intended to withdraw the Hungarian forces from the war went over to the Soviet troops. The German Command managed
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to avert the catastrophe, but not the hurried retreat of the Hungarian army. On October 14 Soviet forces completed the liberation of the Soviet Ukraine. It was an event of tremendous importance. Four days later, on October 18, after five days of fighting for Russky Pass the 1st Guards Army crossed the Main Carpathian Range on a 30-kilometre sector. In this engagement Colonel I. D. Dryakhlov's 167th Infantry Division fought with particular bravery. The 18th Army which had captured Uzhoksky and Veretsky passes also crossed the range. Major-General A. I. Gastilovich's 17th Separate Guards Infantry Corps reached the southwestern slopes of the Carpathians somewhat earlier and on October 16 knocked the enemy out of Rakhov, a major strongpoint in the Tisza valley. As a result, the Soviet troops crossed the Main Carpathian Range along a 275-kilometre front and advanced 50 kilometres into Czechoslovakia. It was a major victory and on October 18 Moscow saluted the glorious troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front with 20 volleys from 224 guns. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief conferred the title "Carpathian" on the 3rd Mountain Infantry Corps under Major-General Vedenin, the 17th Guards Infantry Corps commanded by Major-General Gastilovich, and 38 other units of the 4th Ukrainian Front. On behalf of the Slovak people, their army and partisans, the Slovak National Council sent a telegram of congratulations to the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front. " W e assure you," it said, "that in our just fight against the German aggressors we shall act with no less determination than hitherto. We are eagerly looking forward to the day when we shall join your troops in their campaign against our common enemy." The offensive gained momentum. On October 26, the 18th Army liberated Mukachevo and" Uzhgorod, the principal city in the Transcarpathian Ukraine. In the battles for Uzhgorod the 5th Guards Tank Army displayed excellent fighting qualities. The first to break into the city were tank companies commanded by Senior Lieutenants Obrotkin and Krasovsky. The East Carpathian operation was completed on October 28, 1944, with the emergence of the Soviet troops to the
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Wislok River west of Medzilaborce, Sobrance and Chop. What were its overall results? One of the most important results was the liberation of the whole of the Transcarpathian Ukraine and the ensuing major political changes that took place there. The First Congress of People's Committees of the Transcarpathian Ukraine which opened in Mukachevo on November 26, complying with the will of the people, voted for the secession of the Transcarpathian Ukraine from Czechoslovakia and her accession to the Soviet Ukraine, and in June 1945 the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia signed a treaty to this effect. Thus the age-old dream of the Ukrainian people of seeing all the Ukrainian lands united became a reality. Combat Group Heinrici sustained a crushing defeat and was forced to retreat along the entire front, its right-flank forces rolling back almost 200 kilometres. The Soviet troops took 31,360 prisoners and captured 912 guns and mortars and 40 panzers and assault guns. But perhaps the most important result of this operation was that it overturned the calculations of the German Command to bring the Soviet drive to a halt on the East Carpathian line. Surmounting tremendous difficulties, the Soviet forces crossed a number of mountain massifs depriving the enemy of the most advantageous defensive line covering Czechoslovakia from the east. An entirely new situation took shape in the Carpathian-Prague direction offering the Soviet forces a favourable opportunity to advance deep into Czechoslovakia. By diverting major enemy forces, the Soviet troops rendered inestimable assistance to the Slovak patriots who were able to stand up to the enemy onslaught for two months. In the course of the uprising the Soviet Command delivered large quantities of arms and ammunition to the insurgents. Many partisan detachments were fully armed with Soviet submachine-guns and machine-guns. A large number of heavily wounded Slovak regulars and partisans were evacuated to Soviet field hospitals. The Soviet Command helped partisan headquarters to organise efficient control over their forces. At the request of the Foreign Bureau of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia a team of experienced partisan commanders headed
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by Colonel A. N. Asmolov arrived in Slovakia, and shortly the Slovak National Council put Colonel Asmolov in charge of the Main Headquarters of the Slovak Partisan Movement. T h e Soviet troops and the Czechoslovak Corps paid a heavy price for the results achieved in the East Carpathian operation. Soviet losses were 21,000 killed and 89,000 wounded, and the Czechoslovak Corps lost 844 officers and men killed and 4,068 wounded. For heroism and courage in action thousands of officers and men of the 38th, 1st Guards and 18th armies and the 17th Guards Infantry Corps were decorated with Orders and medals. T h e title of Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred on about 30 of them, including infantrymen V. N. Golovan, and I. A. Naidenov, gunner V. F. Barannikov, pilot N. V. Mamai, cavalryman S. D. Karitsky, sapper M. S. Cherkasov, and aidman M. P. Grishchenko. The Pressure Increases T h e Soviet forces did everything they possibly could in those incredibly difficult conditions. They crossed the Carpathian ridges which the Russian troops could not negotiate in the First World W a r , smashed the enemy's armies manning what seemed to be impenetrable defences and came to the assistance of the Czechoslovak people. To continue the offensive the Soviet Command had to put through a range of preparatory measures. It was necessary to bring in fresh replacements, pull up the supply trains, remarshal the units and provide them with everything they needed to keep up their shattering blows at the enemy. Moreover, the troops were acutely in need of rest. In view of the changed situation it was also necessary to modify the operational plan. The Germans had managed to. capture Banska Bystrica, the political and military centre of the Slovak uprising and the insurgent army had ceased organised resistance. In keeping with the decisions of the Communist Party of Slovakia the patriotic forces took to the mountains to continue the partisan warfare. In these conditions, it was necessary to find more suitable methods to enable the Soviet forces to achieve their objec160

tives. Direct blows involving the crossing of mountain ridges and frontal attacks on which the Soviet Command decided in September in order to link up with the insurgents as quickly as possible, were to be replaced by operations in which manoeuvring was to be employed on a much broader scale. Having crossed the Eastern Carpathians, the Soviet troops reached the Western Carpathians, another serious obstacle to their further progress. In view of the situation prevailing at the time, the Carpathian-Prague direction was not decisive. The main battles were fought in the Warsaw-Berlin and the BudapestVienna directions. Accordingly, the immediate tasks of the 4th Ukrainian Front were to assist its left-hand neighbour, the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which was conducting a major offensive in the area of Budapest. The 1st Guards Army had orders to push on Michalovce and emern and the 18th Army on Trebiov. In its turn the 2nd Ukrainian Front was shortly to take a direct part in driving the Germans out of Czechoslovakia. Its right-wing armies which were advancing to the northwest to envelop Budapest from the north, were rapidly approaching the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border. The enemy group facing the Soviet troops in the Carpathian-Prague direction consisted of the German 1st Panzer and 8th armies and the Hungarian 1st Army totalling about 30 divisions. The Soviet troops had 60 divisions facing them. Since a Soviet division was smaller in strength, the two sides were equal in infantry, with the Soviet forces having a slight superiority in artillery, tanks and aircraft. The theatre of operations abounded in lakes and rivers. The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front would have the difficult task of crossing the ern Voda, Laborec and Ondava rivers, while the 2nd Ukrainian Front's right-wing armies were to force the Tisza, Ipel' and Gron. In this connection the troops were urgently supplied with crossing facilities and trained in the methods of crossing mountain rivers. All Party and political work with the troops was centred on these aspects of the coming offensive. The Communists and Komsomol members, whose numbers were rapidly increasing, gave the commanders every support. By November 1, 1944, 60 per cent of the officers and men of the 4th and 2nd
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Ukrainian fronts were either Communists or Komsomol members. The right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front assumed the offensive on November 7 on the 27th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The enemy stubbornly hung on to his defensive lines and the Soviet troops made slow progress, 3 or 4 kilometres a day. By November 25 they had advanced not more than 60 or 65 kilometres.. . . To be able to continue the offensive it was necessary to make a pause to regroup the forces and bring up the artillery and supplies. On December 5, all the right-wing armies resumed active operations and within four days advanced more than 70 kilometres in some sectors. By nightfall on December 8, Lieutenant-General I. A. Pliyev's mechanised cavalry group, which had entered the breach in the enemy's defences, reached the Ipel' at Hud'ag on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border. On December 12, the 10th Guards Cavalry Division under Colonel V. V. Nikiforov gained a small bridgehead on the opposite, Czechoslovak, bank of the river. Subsequently, the Soviet troops fought heavy battles to consolidate and extend the bridgehead. At approximately the same time Lieutenant-General M. V. Volkov's 9th Guards Mechanised Corps of the 6th Guards Tank Army which was commanded by ColonelGeneral A. G. Kravchenko reached the border south of the Slovak town of ahy and captured it on December 14. Towards the end of the third week of December five field armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 7th Guards Army under Colonel-General M. S. Shumilov, the 53rd Army under Lieutenant-General I. M. Managarov, the 27th Army under Lieutenant-General S. G. Trofimenko, the 40th Army under Lieutenant-General F. F. Zhmachenko, the Rumanian 4th Army under General Avramescu, and one tank army were fighting in Slovakia. The mass expulsion of the invaders from Slovakia in which the local population took an active part began. When units of the 5th Guards Tank Corps broke into Levice the townsfolk welcomed them with red flags and took part in clearing the city blocks of the German troops. The Slovak partisans and the local inhabitants helped the 27th Army to liberate Rimavsk Sobota.
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The inhabitants of Luenec sent messengers across the frontline with timely information about the German defences on the approaches to the town. Slovak partisans supplied the Soviet Command with information about the defences on the Vah, and about the German defence system in ilina and Bratislava. Some Slovaks risked their lives to help Soviet aidmen evacuate the wounded from the battlefield. Many of them worked in Soviet hospitals. Vasilij Goljany and Michal Krazina from the village of Konora in Slovakia carried six heavily wounded Soviet soldiers off the field of battle. Their fellow villager Jozef Bars brought nine wounded Soviet officers and men to a first-aid station and continued to help the Soviet troops even after he had received a head wound. The 18th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front went over to the offensive on November 20 and the 1st Guards Army launched its drive on November 23. The offensive developed successfully despite difficult mountain conditions and adverse weather. The 1st Guards Army crossed the swollen ern Voda and Laborec rivers and captured Humenn and Michalovce, large towns and important strongpoints in the enemy defences. Major-General V. F. Gladkov's 318th Mountain Infantry Division distinguished itself in the fighting for Humenn, particularly its infantry battalion under Major I. M. Saraichev. With a swift attack it captured the bridge across the Laborec and was the first to break into the town. Michalovce fell to the 167th Infantry Division which co-operated with the 31st Guards Tank Brigade and the 1511th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment. By the end of November both armies reached the Ondava, which had flooded its banks as a result of heavy rains, and crossed it with the most vigorous assistance on the part of the local inhabitants. But once again the Germans gradually forced the Soviet offensive to a standstill. In the latter half of December the front took up defences on the StropkovSenja line. Nevertheless, the November-December offensive of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front had attained its general objectives. The enemy was firmly tied down in the Carpathian-Prague direction and could not afford to shift any forces from this area to other li1
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sectors. The enemy lost 68,000 officers and men in prisoners alone. A large area of Slovakia and some of her major towns were liberated. The further the Soviet troops advanced into Czechoslovakia the friendlier became their relations with the local population. The Soviet troops helped villagers and townsfolk to erase the aftermaths of the German occupation, to repair schools and hospitals, and wherever necessary assisted the population with food. The November-December offensive created very favourable conditions for striking fresh blows at the German forces in Czechoslovakia, inasmuch as the 2nd Ukrainian Front had enveloped their southern flank to a considerable depth. Many Soviet officers and men were decorated with Orders and medals for meritorious performance of duty. Among others, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred upon Sergeant-Major U. Rybak, a scout of the 1st Guards Army. He took his first prisoner on June 23, 1941, and by the end of the war, he and his group had 48 prisoners to their credit. Many political problems cropped up as more and more regions of Czechoslovakia were liberated, including the issue of the country's future which became the focal point of struggle between the reactionary and the democratic forces. Unable to gain complete control over the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps, the reactionary members of the Czechoslovak emigr government in London decided to dissolve it gradually and replace it with a so-called rear-area army on the territory of the Western Ukraine and Slovakia which had been liberated by the Soviet Army. Arriving in Khust with a delegation of the Czechoslovak emigr government the "commander of liberated territory" General A. NiborskHasal began to recruit soldiers for a future army. He formed a reserve regiment numbering 2,000 officers and men, a sapper battalion, a headquarters company and stopped the dispatch of replacements to the Czechoslovak Corps fighting the Germans. Since the liberated territory of the Transcarpathian Ukraine and Slovakia was still a battle zone, the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front, acting in keeping with the Soviet-Czechoslovak Agreement of May 8, 1944, demanded that the "commander of liberated territory" cease his
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illegal activity behind the firing lines and promptly shift the newly-formed units to the Czechoslovak 1st Corps. This step frustrated the efforts of the Czechoslovak bourgeois emigrants to use the situation to further their spurious goals. Bypassing the Carpathians The Soviet Union ushered in 1945, the last year of the war, in a favourable political, economic and military situation. Commenting on the Yalta Conference of the Heads of Government of the Three Allied Powers held from February 4 to 11, Pravda wrote on February 13, 1945, that the Conference "had fully agreed on and worked out the timing, extent and co-ordination of still more powerful blows to be dealt at the very heart of Germany . .. from the east, west, north and south". Thanks to the heroic labour of the Soviet Union and the consistent organisational activity of the Communist Party, the country's war industry was steadily increasing production, supplying the Soviet Army with growing quantities of military equipment and armaments. Led by experienced commanders the battle-tested Soviet soldiers were prepared to mount an offensive on a hitherto unprecedented scale. For her part, nazi Germany was heading towards her doom. By the beginning of 1945 she was completely isolated politically. W i t h the loss of occupied territories, Germany's industrial production declined by approximately a third in six months. T h e enormous losses sustained in action and shortage of manpower resources reduced the numerical strength of Wehrmacht on the Eastern front. By January 1945 it consisted of 3,100,000 officers and men. G H Q was planning to complete the rout of the W e h r macht. In the first stage of the offensive the Soviet forces were to smash the German troops on the East Prussian, Warsaw-Berlin, Carpathian-Prague and Budapest-Vienna directions in approximately six weeks. T h e Soviet Army was to advance the westerly and northwesterly directions and penetrate to a depth of 600 or 700 kilometres into Germany. In this operation the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts were to smash the German forces operating in Czechoslovakia.
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Striking out from the line Jaslo-Ondava River-southeast of Koice-Turna-northwest of Levice-Estergom they were to reach the Cracow-Nowy Targ-Poprad-Zvolen-Komrno line and then come up to the Moravska Ostrava-Brno-Znojmo line. The Soviet forces advancing in the Carpathians had to break down the resistance of five enemy armies: the German 6th and 8th armies, the Hungarian 1st Army, the 1st Panzer Army and part of the forces of the 17th Army. The German Command vigorously strengthened its defences, hastily built diverse fortifications on all convenient natural lines, mainly along mountain ranges and river banks. At the same time it was making an all-out effort to raise the considerably declined staying power of the troops. The 4th Ukrainian Front had been set the task of smashing the enemy forces facing it, crossing the Western Carpathians and reaching the approaches to the Moravska Ostrava industrial area. The main blow was to be delivered by the front's right-wing 38th Army. It had been transferred from the 1st Ukrainian Front and was to strike out in the general direction of Cracow. The 1st Guards Army was to push on Lubotin and Nowy Targ and the 18th Army on Poprad and ivec. As regards the immediate task of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, it was to push ahead towards the Brezno-Bansk Stiavnica-Komrno line, dealing the main blow along the Komrno line of advance with the view to cutting the communication routes of the enemy's Budapest group. Later, it was to push on Bratislava, Vienna and Brno. It was obvious that the idea was to bypass the Carpathians from the north and south and in doing so G H Q had in effect returned to its earlier plan. The balance of forces in the area of the 4th Ukrainian Front which had a whole month to prepare for the offensive was more favourable. It had 50 per cent more officers and men, 80 per cent more artillery, 120 per cent more tanks and self-propelled artillery, and 170 per cent combat aircraft than the enemy. The 2nd Ukrainian Front had a fairly large superiority only in artillery (2.1:1). The breakthrough of the 6th Guards Tank Army and the 7th Guards Army in the direction of Komrno was skilfully organised and executed. To catch the enemy unawares, the Soviet troops were secretly assembled on a small bridgehead
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at Parkan on the western bank of the Gron and went over to the offensive at 03.00 hours on January 6, 1945, without an artillery softening up. The success of the attack, naturally, depended on the organisational skill of the commanders and courage on the part of the troops. The surprise blow delivered by the two Guards armies north of the Danube yielded considerable results. In two days of fighting they advanced 40 kilometres and reached Komrno. Though they failed to capture this inhabited locality and gain possession of the crossings on the Danube, their attack was highly effective. On January 2, the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went into action. The troops penetrated the enemy defence but then made slow progress in their efforts to ascend the icy slopes of the Slovensk Rudohorie. Nevertheless, by the end of February they hurled the enemy 100 kilometres back and liberated a large number of towns including Pleivec, Luenec, Roava, Bezno and Jelava. The 40th and 27th armies, whose drive was supported by the Rumanian 4th and 1st armies, made the greatest headway. The winter with heavy snowfalls and the mountain and forest terrain left their imprint on the nature of the military operations. Frequently the troops had to skirt or envelop powerful strongpoints, airdrop troops, employ assault teams and send numerous scout teams behind enemy lines. Pleivec was taken by Major-General A. D. Rumyantsev's 51st Infantry Corps (40th Army) after a deep envelopment from the northwest. The 42nd Guards Infantry Division (same army) under Colonel F. F. Bochkov captured Bezno jointly with a partisan detachment under A. M. Sadilenko. Executing an enveloping movement Major-General A. I. Semenov's 33rd Infantry Corps (27th Army), knocked the enemy out of Luenec. The Corps carried out this operation with the assistance of an infantry battalion under Captain F. A. Chekusov, which seized the village of Slovak, a major strongpoint in the enemy's defence on the approaches to the town. The town of Roava was captured by units of the Rumanian 4th Army on January 23. The successful operations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were commended in an order of the Supreme Commander-inChief and combat decorations were awarded to the units which had particularly distinguished themselves in action.
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Operations to liberate Czechoslovakia were also conducted by the 4th Ukrainian Front, whose 18th Army under MajorGeneral Gastilovich opened an offensive on January 12. On the same day the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck out of the Sandomierz bridgehead, opening the Vistula-Oder operation. Two days later the 1st Byelorussian Front went into action. Under their powerful blows the Germans hastily withdrew to the west, thus creating favourable conditions for the offensive of the main forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The 38th Army breached the enemy's defences on January 15. Demoralised by the powerful artillery preparation and air strikes the enemy was unable to offer serious resistance to the strike force. Prisoners of war testified that some enemy units in the breakthrough sector lost up to 50 per cent of their effectives in the course of the artillery and air blows (8th Air Army). Towards the end of the first day of the offensive, the enemy began to withdraw in the direction of Cracow. Thereupon, the commander of the 38th Army committed his mobile group which had advanced more than 60 kilometres by the end of the third day of the operation. On January 18 the 1st Guards Army struck a powerful blow at the enemy positions in the mountains east of Preov. Now the entire 4th Ukrainian Front operating on a 170kilometre sector was in motion. On the following day the army liberated Preov, an important administrative centre of Czechoslovakia. The 129th Guards Infantry Division and its commander Major-General T. U. Grinchenko particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for Preov. Realising that they could not crush the defences on the approaches to Preov by a frontal attack, Grinchenko found another way of driving the Germans out. On his orders a small assault group consisting of self-propelled artillery elements and submachinegunners under the deputy commander of the 320th Guards Infantry Regiment Major Y. L. Rotin approached Preov unobserved and broke into it from the north. Caught unawares by this bold manoeuvre the enemy hastily withdrew from the city. The Soviet offensive rolled deeper and deeper into Czechoslovakia. In joint battles on Czechoslovak soil the Soviet forces and the troops of the Czechoslovak 1st Corps
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further cemented their comradeship-in-arms. For three weeks in January this corps was attached to the 1st Guards Army and I once again saw its gallant commander General Svoboda, whom I had come to know during the fighting for Kiev. I first met him in October 1943, when the Czechoslovak 1st Separate Brigade under his command was incorporated into the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the time I was second in command of the front and frequently visited the brigade. Deployed on the Lyutezh bridgehead it was preparing to take part in the liberation of the Ukrainian capital. Colonel Svoboda often spoke of his impressions of the battles for Sokolovo in the vicinity of Kharkov where his separate Czechoslovak battalion had passed its first ordeal by fire repelling the blows of a large panzer force. Ludvik Svoboda received the Order of Lenin for this operation and Otakar Jarosz was posthumously made Hero of the Soviet Union. In the fighting for Kiev which began on November 3, 1943, I had to co-ordinate the actions of Soviet and Czechoslovak forces, which, frankly speaking, did not require much effort on my part. Displaying courage and high efficiency, the brigade commander skilfully led his men and acted in close co-operation with the adjacent infantry divisions. Recommending Ludvik Svoboda for decoration we were justified in writing: "For courage and efficient command of the troops deserves to be awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd Class." Our meeting in January 1945 was also warm and friendly. He was just as hale and vigorous as a year before, but everything about him spoke of greater determination and severity. The war leaves its imprint on men. His grief over his killed friends was intensified by a father's sorrow: a few days earlier he learned that the nazi hangmen had tortured and murdered his 17-year-old son Mirek in the Mauthausen death camp. He was also worried about his wife and daughter from whom he had no word since the summer of 1939. My meetings with General Svoboda's comrades-in-arms Jaroslav Prochzka, Otakar Ryti and other Czechoslovak officers made a deep impression on me. These ardent patriots had an excellent knowledge of military matters and a deep hatred for nazism. Many of them have become high-ranking commanders of the Czechoslovak People's Army.
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Special mention must be made of the rank-and-file Czech and Slovak soldiers who fought with great courage and determination for the freedom of their country. I saw them in action many times and they deserve every praise for the way they fought. They were men of indomitable will and bravery who carried their battle standards through all the difficulties and trials with honour and glory until final victory over the enemy. The units of the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps gave an excellent account of themselves in the January battles. Fighting bravely and resolutely they liberated 43 villages and towns, including Bardejov and Zborov, in the first two days of the offensive. We were sorxy to have to part with Ludvik Svoboda, when at the end of January the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps was transferred to the operational command of the 18th Army. The latter half of January brought considerable successes to the 4th Ukrainian Front which liberated hundreds of inhabited localities in Slovakia and southern Poland. The 38th Army drove the enemy out of Nowy S^cz in Poland and the 18th Army liberated Koice, the second biggest town in eastern Slovakia. In his orders of the day on January 19 and 20, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief commended the front's units which had distinguished themselves in action, including the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps. But the tendency to transfer the main effort from the mountain belt to more open country made itself felt at this stage of the operation, too. The offensive was still under way when a number of units were transferred from the centre and the left wing of the front to the zone of the 38th Army which had advanced 70 or 80 kilometres farther westward than the other troops of the front. Thus, at the end of January and in February the 18th Army, which included the 17th Guards Infantry Corps under Lieutenant-General N. V. Medvedev and the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps, was the only army of the 4th Ukrainian Front that continued the offensive in Czechoslovakia. On January 27, the 18th Army advancing along the Vh valley liberated Levoa. In this operation the Czechoslovak 3rd Infantry Brigade gave a splendid account of itself. A day later the enemy was knocked out of Poprad. The units which distinguished themselves in action received the title of
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"Poprad", and the 8th Infantry Division under Colonel N. S. Ugryumov, which drove the enemy out of the city, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. At the end of J a n u a r y and in February the front's rightflank 38th and 1st Guards armies captured a number of Polish towns. On February 12 they liberated Bielsko, an important industrial town and centre of resistance, and engaged the enemy on the approaches to the Moravska Ostrava industrial area. T h e offensive of the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts carried out in January and February was yet another major step on the way to the complete liberation of Czechoslovakia. In some sectors the Soviet troops advanced 225 kilometres bringing long-awaited freedom to 1,400,000 people living in the Koice, Preov and Bansk Bystrica regions. T h e blow in the Komrno direction played an important part in wiping out the enemy forces in Budapest. During the offensive in Czechoslovakia the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts (not counting the 38th Army which had been fighting in Poland) lost 16,000 officers and men killed and more than 50,000 wounded. T h e Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps lost about 1,000 officers and men killed and wounded. Eight times Moscow saluted the victories of the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts. Military decorations marking the mass heroism of the officers and men were attached to the colours of 149 units, of which more than 40 received titles of honour depending on the name of the city they had helped to liberate. The Battle for Moravska Ostrava T h e first six months of fighting in Czechoslovakia resulted in the liberation of hundreds of towns and villages. But millions of Czechs and Slovaks were still waiting to be delivered from the nazi yoke. T h e invaders controlled the country's major industrial centres manufacturing armaments, military equipment and ammunition for the Wehrmacht. T h e Soviet Army, therefore, had a particularly important task to fulfilas quickly as possible to drive the Germans out of the regions supplying the Wehrmacht with weapons. In the spring of 1945, an event took place in the political
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life of the Czechoslovak people that had a vital impact on their future. The Soviet Army's victories tremendously stimulated the national liberation struggle headed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. On April 4, the Czechoslovak Government in London resigned and was replaced by the Government of the National Front headed by left SocialDemocrat Z. Fierlinger with Koice as its temporary seat. The programme of the Government of the National Front, which came to be known as the Koice Programme, was announced on April 5 at the first session of the Council of Ministers. It called for an agrarian reform, democratisation of the social system and nationalisation of key industries and banks thus undermining the material foundation of bourgeois rule. The participation of Communists in the new government was a guarantee that it would carry out its programme and act in the interests of the people. The Koice Programme was received with approval by the Czechoslovak working people. Beginning with the spring of 1945 the Soviet Command planned military operations in Czechoslovakia with an eye to the fact that the end of the war was clearly in sight. Soviet troops were 60 kilometres from Berlin, preparing to deal the final blow at the enemy. But to ensure the success of the offensive in the Berlin sector, G H O decided first to smash the enemy's powerful flank groups, one of which operating northeast and the other southeast of the German capital. The 4th, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts received orders to wipe out an enemy strategic force in west Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Specifically, the 4th Ukrainian Front was to push to the southwest and liberate the Moravska Ostrava region, Czechoslovakia's principal industrial centre; the 2nd Ukrainian Front, advancing in the northwesterly direction, was to drive the enemy out of the economically no less important regions of Bratislava and Brno. One of this front's armies which was operating south of the Danube was to co-operate with the 3rd Ukrainian Front in liberating Vienna, the capital of Austria. After that, the front was to mount an offensive in the general direction of Plzen. The German Command attached great importance to the retention of the Zorau-Jablonka-Brezno-River Gron defensive line which its forces had occupied in March 1945.
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Should the Soviet troops succeed in breaking through from both directions into an area north of Brno, they would be in a position not only to skirt the Western Carpathians, but also to surround the Germans in the mountains and strike out directly at Prague. With the loss of the Ruhr and Silesia, the Moravska Ostrava region was the last coal and iron and steel base in Hitler's hands and its loss would strike hard at Germany's war production. Taking this into account the Germans made a tremendous effort to strengthen their defences here. The most difficult task was assigned to the 4th Ukrainian Front's right-wing forces. Their job was to breach the Oder defensive belt consisting of three lines of permanent defences, each from two to three kilometres deep. The defensive lines facing the 2nd Ukrainian Front passed mainly along the Gron, Nitra, Vah and Morava rivers and were also very formidable. On the defensive in Czechoslovakia in the zone of the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts were the 1st Panzer Army, the Hungarian 1st Army::" and the 8th Army. These three armies had 22 divisions, including four panzer divisions, totalling nearly 350,000 officers and men supported by 3,300 guns and mortars, 220 panzers and assault guns and 270 combat aircraft. Reinforced with troops drawn from G H Q reserves the Soviet forces had an almost twofold superiority in men, a more than threefold superiority in artillery, a twofold superiority in tanks and self-propelled artillery and a more than fourfold superiority in aircraft. On March 10, the 4th Ukrainian Front went over to the offensive, its 38th and 1st Guards armies striking the main blow. A blizzard had broken out grounding the air force and sharply lowering the effectivity of the artillery softening up. As a result the enemy defences were not fully reduced. The attacking units lagged behind the schedule. Battles became drawn out and seven days later the command brought the offensive to a stop in order to modify the operational plan. It was decided to concentrate the front's main effort on the right flank of the 38th Army, thus enabling the Soviet troops to bypass the most powerful defences and at the same time take full advantage of the
On March 23, 1945, the Hungarian 1st Army was disbanded and its zone was taken over by the 1st Panzer Array.
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successful operations of the right-hand neighbour, the 60th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, to press home the offensive on Moravska Ostrava from the north. This plan was carried out. After regrouping the Soviet forces resumed their attacks and carried the enemy defences with the effective support of the 8th Air Army which struck shattering blows at the enemy. As a result of the heavy fighting in March, the 4th Ukrainian Front, which at the end of the month had been placed under the command of General of the Army A. I. Yeremenko, advanced to within 20 kilometres of Moravska Ostrava. On April 2, the 38th Army forced the Oder south of Raciborz and gained an important bridgehead on its western bank. For ten successive days three panzer and three infantry divisions pounded the junction of the 38th and 1st Guards armies in a futile attempt to reduce this bridgehead which later played an important role in the development of the Soviet drive. Organic to the 38th Army, the Czechoslovak 1st Separate Tank Brigade fought with great courage, particularly in the bitter engagements on the west bank of the Oder where tank battalion commander S. Vajda met a hero's death. Skilfully commanding his men in organising a rebuff to numerous enemy counterattacks, he personally crippled three armoured vehicles and several guns, machine-guns and mortars with fire from his tank. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to this gallant son of the Czechoslovak people. Attaching great importance to the liberation of the Moravska Ostrava industrial region, G H Q carried out a series of measures to strengthen the 4th Ukrainian Front. In the first two weeks of April Colonel-General P. A. Kurochkin's 60th Army was incorporated into the front. It also received considerable manpower and material replenishments which gave it a substantial preponderance in men and weapons in the main directions. The front's task as specified by GHQ was to capture Opava and Moravska Ostrava and then continue its drive on Olomouc for a linkup with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front advancing from the south. Thus, by threatening the enemy with encirclement the Soviet forces were to achieve a decisive turning point in the fighting.
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On April 15 the front resumed the offensive. The radio reported that the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts were fighting on the approaches to Berlin and the realisation that victory was close at hand tremendously boosted the morale of the troops. On April 22 the 60th Army attacked and captured Opava, a major industrial town and road junction which the Germans had turned into an important resistance centre on the approaches to Moravska Ostrava. For efficient command and courage ColonelGeneral P. A. Kurochkin was made Hero of the Soviet Union. The fighting for Moravska Ostrava entered its crucial stage on April 26. Observing the battlefield from the CP of the 4th Ukrainian Front the members of the Czechoslovak Government Klement Gottwald, Zdenk Fierlinger and Ludvik Svoboda spoke highly of the combat efficiency of the Soviet troops who were storming the town and the skill of their commanders. The concern displayed by the Soviet Command for the national wealth of the Czechoslovak people throughout the fighting for the liberation of Czechoslovakia was most vividly manifested in the battle for Moravska Ostrava. When the fighting had shifted close to the city the 60th, 38th and the 1st Guards armies received the order to attack along narrow sectors but with overpowering force as a measure to prevent the Germans from blowing up mines, factories and communications. As a result, the Soviet troops virtually sliced through the enemy defence and overwhelmed the German troops. Moravska Ostrava, the principal seat of the Czechoslovak mining, iron-and-steel and engineering industries, was liberated on April 30. The Germans were unable to destroy its industrial enterprises and escape with their loot. While the Soviet troops were fighting for Moravska Ostrava and doing their best to save as many of the city's buildings and factories from destruction as possible, the US Air Force flattened the koda factories in Plzen, just a few days before the US troops entered the city. Several days earlier US planes wrecked a large engineering works in Prague. Clearly these massive air strikes directed not at the German troops but at important industrial and cultural centres in Czechoslovakia undertaken in the course of the
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last days of the war were absolutely unnecessary from the viewpoint of military strategy since Germany's fate had already been sealed. Their sole purpose was to undermine the economy of Czechoslovakia, weaken her industrial potential and consequently her ability to compete on world markets. The day when Moravska Ostrava was giving a hero's welcome to its liberators, the Soviet troops scored another outstanding victory. Pushing ahead in the Western Carpathians where conditions were extremely arduous, the 18th Army liberated ilina and adca, important road junctions and enemy resistance centres. It was only a few months earlier that these towns were the scene of heavy fighting between the Slovak insurgents and German punitive forces. The battles for Moravska Ostrava and ilina further strengthened the comradeship-in-arms of the Soviet and Czechoslovak people. The Czechoslovak 1st Tank Brigade and Czechoslovak 1st Mixed Air Division fought side by side with the Soviet troops. Pilot Frantiek Maichran from the Slovak town of ilina and aerial gunner Serafim Ponomarev from the Russian village of Melekhovo, Ryazan Region, and pilot Jan Bok from Bezno and aerial gunner Valeri Dorofeyev from the village of Glinishche, Ivanovo Region, fulfilled combat missions in their 1L-2 planes. ilina was liberated by the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps in cooperation with part of the forces of the 17th Guards Infantry Corps. The courageous activity of the local patriots considerably facilitated the task of the Soviet and Czechoslovak forces in the fighting for Moravska Ostrava. 1 could quote many examples but one episode is particularly fresh in my memory. During the battles for the city two Czechoslovak youths M. Skora and Ola volunteered to cut the detonating cord leading to a bridge across the Ostravice. They fulfilled their mission but were killed near the, bridge. The Germans also set ablaze the tank for which the young patriots undertook to open the way to the opposite bank. This tank (it belonged to the Czechoslovak 1st Tank Brigade and was under the command of Nikolai Ivasyuk) now stands in one of the city squares as a symbol of Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship, and the bridge which the young heroes had saved from destruction now bears their names.
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For meritorious action in the fighting for Moravska Ostrava and ilina 92 units of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps received high military decorations. T h e Order of Suvorov 2nd Class was awarded to the Czechoslovak 1st T a n k Brigade, and the Order of Alexander Nevsky was presented to the Czechoslovak 3rd Infantry Brigade. T h e Soviet Government bestowed the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on the Commander of the 128th Guards Mountain Infantry Division Major-General M. I. Koldubov, commander of the 71st Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, Lieutenant-Colonel G. K. Bagyan, company commander, 81st Infantry Division, Senior Lieutenant I. G. Chernov, a sniper of the 183rd Infantry Division Sergeant-Major V. M. Bezgolosov and other officers and men who had particularly distinguished themselves in the fighting for Moravska Ostrava. T h e liberated city opened its arms to the Soviet troops. People in their best clothes thronged the streets with cries of welcome and gratitude. T h e joy of the fraternal people deeply touched the hearts of Soviet officers and men. It was the best possible reward for their courage and the difficulties which they had to overcome in the fight against nazism. Pursuing the enemy, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front reached the ternberk-Ronov-Vsetin line, on May 1-4. T h e liberation of Moravska Ostrava was the turning point in the fighting in Czechoslovakia. Deprived of the powerful Moravska Ostrava fortified area, the German troops were unable to establish a sufficiently durable and stable defence. Liberation of Bratislava and Brno At the end of March the 2nd Ukrainian Front launched an attack in the Bratislava-Brno direction where the situation was more favourable for developing offensive operations. T h e enemy was becoming demoralised and lacked the necessary reserves. T h e main blow in the breakthrough sector was delivered by the joint flanks of the 53rd and the 7th Guards armies. Once again this was done very originally. In the night of March 24, 12 advance battalions simulating reconnaissance
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crossed the swollen Gron, took the enemy by surprise and secured a bridgehead on its opposite bank. Under the cover of darkness pontoon units threw several bridges across the river and the armies' main forces were able to cross the river on the first day of the operation. On the following day the front commander threw the 1st Guards Mechanised Cavalry Group into a determined drive into the operational depth of the enemy positions. The Germans failed to stop the Soviet assault on the itava, Nitra, Vh and Morava rivers. Supported by Colonel-General S. K. Goryunov's 5th Air Army, the cavalry under Lieutenant-General I. A. Pliyev and the infantry divisions of the field armies were a step ahead of the enemy troops, preventing them from establishing defences on advantageous lines. The ground forces were effectively supported by sailors landed by the Danube Flotilla. Major-General S. T. Shmuilo's 10th Guards Cavalry Division crossed the Nitra first. The Vh, on whose western bank the Germans had one of their best defensive lines, was crossed almost simultaneously by units of the 1st Guards Mechanised Cavalry Group (at the town of alja) and the units of the 7th Guards and the 53rd armies. Each day Soviet forces freed hundreds of large and small inhabited localities. On March 25, the 51st Infantry Corps, 40th Army, drove the Germans out of Bansk Bystrica. Guns thundered in Moscow in salute to the 2nd Ukrainian Front which liberated the towns of Komrno, Nov Zmky, Surany, Vrble, Nitra, Galanta, Trnava, Glogovec and Senec. On April 1, clearing the tasks of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, G H Q ordered the front commander to liberate Bratislava not later than April 5 or 6. In the meantime units of the 25th Guards Infantry Corps were drawing near the eastern environs of Bratislava. According to reconnaissance reports, chiefly submitted by the partisans, there was a large garrison in Bratislava prepared for a sustained defence. There were barricades in the streets, reinforced concrete fire emplacements and anti-personnel and antitank obstacles. The roads leading to the city were mined and blocked with concrete and other obstacles. This could draw out the fighting in the city proper, and to avoid this the front commander decided to combine a fron178

tal attack with a deep enveloping movement from the northwest. The honourable task of liberating the capital of Slovakia was assigned to the 7 th Guards Army which in the night of April 3 began to storm its way through the enemy fortifications in the east and southeast of the city. The 4th Guards Airborne Division under Colonel N. V. Yeremin and MajorGeneral Y. P. Grechany's 409th Infantry Division, the first formations to break into the city, displayed great courage and skill. Meanwhile, the army's right-flank units were enveloping Bratislava from the northwest. The threat of an imminent encirclement compelled the enemy forces to withdraw in haste across the Morava river. Bratislava was liberated and the red flag of victory was raised over the city centre. People celebrated their liberation for several days. There were spontaneous mass meetings in city squares, wherever Soviet soldiers appeared. The Slovaks warmly thanked the Soviet Army for driving the nazi hangmen out of their land. Pushing ahead to the northwest, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front soon afterwards crossed the Morava, the last major river on the way to Prague. Reaching the river ahead of the Soviet forces, the Mechanised Cavalry Group crossed it in its stride at Breslav in the face of heavy enemy resistance. The 53rd Army forced the Morava on April 12 and on the following day liberated Hodonin on its western bank. The townsfolk greeted the arrival of the Soviet troops with church bells ringing. The 7th Guards Army also pierced the enemy defences on the western bank of the Morava. Now the Soviet troops had every opportunity to press home their attack in the direction of Brno and Prague. An extremely ramified system of fortifications covered the approaches to Brno, a major administrative and industrial centre and an important communications hub. The German Command had moved in considerable forces from other sectors, including two panzer, two infantry, one motorised and one cavalry division into the city. The commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front built up a powerful strike force consisting of the 53rd Army, 6th Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Mechanised Cavalry Group. 1* 2
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His plan provided for a double envelopment of the city by mobile forces to be executed in combination with a frontal attack by infantry divisions. Here, too, this manoeuvre could cut the duration of street battles and consequently lessen the possible damage to the city. We have already said that the local population, particularly the partisans, contributed much to the success of the Soviet operations in Czechoslovakia. Just before the offensive on Brno the Czechoslovak partisans in a daring operation captured a commander of one of the German units defending Brno. The Soviet Command modified its plans on the basis of the information which he disclosed at the interrogation at the 53rd Army HQ. The battle for Brno began on April 23. Fighting desperately the Germans threw their reserves into action and counterattacked. But to no avail. The 53rd Army gained possession of the Pratzen, the site of the Battle of Austerlitz (1805). Austerlitz (now Slavkov) was liberated later. On April 25, Soviet infantry, armoured and cavalry divisions blockaded Brno and attacked the city after nightfall. From the southwest the blow was struck by the 4 th Guards Cavalry Corps under Lieutenant-General F. V. Kamkov and units of the 7th Mechanised Corps under Major-General F. G. Katkov. The 6th Infantry Division commanded by Major-General I. F. Obushenko broke into the city from the south. Major-General I. M. Afonin's 18th Guards Infantry Corps liberated the eastern part of the city and the 6th Guards Tank Army drove the Germans out of its northeastern part. The enemy was routed in a brief space of time. As soon as the guns fell silent jubilant crowds with red and national flags filled the streets of Brno. Showering the Soviet troops with the first spring flowers the inhabitants invited them to their homes and took their photographs. Thousands of Soviet officers and men displayed great bravery in the fierce battle for the city. Seven new Heroes of the Soviet Union, including tank platoon commanders Junior Lieutenant P. I. Filimonov and Lieutenant P. I. Syutkin and tank commander A. S. Nikitin appeared in the 7th Mechanised Corps of the 6th Guards Tank Army, alone. The airmen of the 5th Air Army fought just as courageously. One of the squadrons of the 4th Guards Attack Air Division was under the command of Hero of the Soviet
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Union Guards Captain Georgi Beregovoi, now a famous cosmonaut. His squadron pounded the enemy at Brno, Bratislava, Znojmo and other Czechoslovak towns. Killed in action at Brno, the commander of the 34th Guards Regiment Major P. I. Ivanov was posthumously made Hero of the Soviet Union. This title was also conferred upon a number of topranking officers, including Lieutenant-General I. M. Managarov, Colonel-General of the Air Force S. K. Goryunov, Lieutenant-General of the Armoured Forces A. O. Akhmanov, and Colonel-General of Artillery N. S. Fomin. After liberating Brno the 6th Guards Tank Army and the 53rd Army struck out at Olomouc to meet the 4 th Ukrainian Front advancing from Moravska Ostrava. To avoid encirclement the German 1st Panzer Army withdrew in haste from the Olomouc salient. The military and political results of the March and April Soviet offensive in Czechoslovakia were very important. Advancing from 150 to 350 kilometres the Soviet troops completed the liberation of Slovakia and began to chase the enemy out of Moravia. The Czechoslovak people were once again full masters of their key industrial regionsMoravska Ostrava, Bratislava and Brno. More than 4,300,000 Czechs and Slovaks regained their freedom and independence with the help of the Soviet Army. Now the task was to fully reestablish the sovereign Czechoslovak state. The vigorous offensive operations of the three Ukrainian fronts disintegrated the entire left wing of the enemy's front. In March and April the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts routed 15 enemy divisions, took 130,000 prisoners, captured 3,500 guns and mortars, 600 panzers and assault guns and over 640 aircraft, and destroyed a large number of enemy officers and men and a huge quantity of military equipment. Soviet losses were 38,400 killed and about 140,000 wounded. The Czechoslovak 1st Corps lost 774 officers and men killed and 3,730 wounded. It must be said that the Czechoslovak patriots intensified their military operations to assist the Soviet drive. In January 1945 the underground Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party passed a resolution which said in part: "It is impermissible that our people should passively wait for the Red Army to liberate them. This would leave an indelible stain on their honour. . . . The Czech people
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must themselves work for their liberation. Immediate preparations for military actions is their most urgent task. . . . " W h e n spring arrived newly-formed partisan detachments were already harrassing the communications of Army Group Centre in many parts of Bohemia. They were most active in the Bohemian-Moravian Heights, the Podbrady region, southeast Bohemia and in the vicinity of Prague. Underground national committees which became centres of the patriotic forces began to appear in towns and cities. T h e local population increased its sabotage of all measures which the German Command tried to put through. T h e Communists, who strove to turn the mounting partisan movement into a national armed uprising, continued to be the guiding and the most consistent force of the Czech anti-fascist Resistance movement. Soviet partisans did much to help the Czech patriots, and as far back as the autumn of 1944 a number of joint SovietCzechoslovak partisan detachments and brigades crossed from Slovakia into Moravia. Beginning with March 1945 they were reinforced with parachute troops commanded by prominent specialists in partisan warfare. At the time 30 Soviet planes were regularly servicing the partisans. Forward, Towards Prague The liberation of Czechoslovakia was completed when the Third Reich had in effect ceased to exist. T h e emergence of the Soviet Army and the troops of the western Allies on the Elbe cut Germany and her armed forces in two. On April 30 Hitler committed suicide, and on May 2 the Soviet troops took Berlin. Though the nazi beast was breathing its last it was still dangerous. T h e German forces were putting up a particularly vicious and organised resistance in Czechoslovakia and in the northern regions of Austria. Therefore the Prague operation of the Soviet troops cannot be regarded as symbolic, as some Western military historians are inclined to do. On May 1, 1945, when the 1st, 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts started preparations for the operation, they faced Field Marshal Schorner's Army Group Centre and part of
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the forces of Army Group Austria, totalling 62 divisions, including 16 panzer and motorised, and a large number of independent brigades, regiments, battalions and other units. This 900,000-strong enemy force had approximately 10,000 guns and mortars, more than 2,200 tanks and assault guns and nearly 1,000 aircraft. The three fronts which were to carry out the Prague operation had a 2.3-fold superiority in men, a threefold superiority in artillery, a fourfold superiority in aircraft and an equal number of tanks. What was most important, however, was the high morale of the Soviet officers and men and their vast experience in destroying the enemy. In planning the operation the Soviet Command naturally took into account the low morale, inadequate troop control and the difficult supply situation of the enemy forces. What hopes were the rulers of nazi Germany entertaining in these circumstances? There are documents showing that already in the beginning of May Hitler's successor Gross Admiral Doenitz, himself a diehard nazi, and his government were still hoping to achieve a favourable turn in the war if not on the battlefield, then by diplomatic means. They had not given up their illusory hope of an "inevitable" armed clash between the Anglo-US forces and the Soviet Army. Firmly convinced that this would happen they held on to the Schleswig area and Denmark in the north, and to Bavaria, Bohemia and northwestern Moravia in the south. These areas had munition plants and food stocks, and were held by considerable military forces which Doenitz and his following intended to preserve intact and only at the very last moment surrender them altogether to the Anglo-Saxons. There are facts showing that their calculations were not entirely unfounded. One of them is Winston Churchill's notorious order to Field Marshal Montgomery: "I telegraphed to Lord Montgomery directing him to be careful in collecting German arms, to stack them so that they could easily be issued again to the German soldiers whom we should have to work with if the Soviet advance continued."51' Doenitz's government was undoubtedly aware of the feelings nurtured in Allied circles. On May 2, it met in special
* Daily Herald, November 24, 1954.
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session and passed the decision to continue the war on the Eastern front and to terminate military operations against the Anglo-US forces. Subsequently, it came to light that the headquarters of Army Group Centre had drawn up a plan providing for a stage-by-stage troop withdrawal. In effect it was a plan of surrender to the American forces. But the Soviet Command frustrated the plan with timely and decisive measures. The occupation of the central and western areas of Czechoslovakia was essential to the political calculations and concrete military plans worked out by the Anglo-US ruling circles. On April 30 Winston Churchill outlined these plans in a letter to US President Harry Truman: "There can be little doubt that the liberation of Prague and as much as possible of the territory of Western Czechoslovakia by your forces might make the whole difference to the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia, and might well influence that in near-by countries.""' Churchill requested that this extremely important political consideration would be brought to the attention of General Eisenhower. On May 4, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Europe General Eisenhower sent a letter to Chief of the Soviet General Staff General of the Army Antonov informing him of his intention to move the US forces in Czechoslovakia beyond the agreed demarcation line of Karlovy Vary, Plzen and eske Budjovice and station them along the line formed by the Vltava and Elbe rivers. In other words, he intended to occupy the whole of Western Czechoslovakia, including Prague. Obviously, the Soviet Command could not accept such a departure from the original terms. On the following day G H Q sent a letter to General Eisenhower asking him to refrain from advancing east of the agreed demarcation line to avoid an intermixing of the troops since the Soviet Command had already concentrated its forces and, in effect, had begun operations to clear both banks of the Vltava of the enemy. Involved as it was, the military and political situation was further aggravated by an armed uprising which flared up on May 5 throughout Bohemia, and particularly in Prague. Realising the full extent of the danger of mass armed action
* W. Churchill, The Second World War, Lnd., 1954, Vol. VI, p. 442.
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in the rear of the German troops, commander of Army Group Centre Field Marshal Schorner ordered his forces to crush the Prague uprising with all the means at their disposal. The German Command rushed the SS Panzer Division Das Reich from the north, the SS Panzer Division Wiking from the east and a reinforced regiment from the south to help the Prague garrison. Street battles broke out between the insurgents and superior enemy forces. Prague Radio broadcast an appeal of the insurgents: "Request of the city of Prague to all Allied armies. The Germans are advancing on Prague from all directions. German panzers, artillery and infantry are in action. Prague urgently needs assistance. Send planes, tanks and weapons. We need help immediately." The Soviet Command responded promptly and mounted the offensive on Prague a day ahead of schedule. In planning the Prague operation, G H Q decided to take advantage of the enveloping positions occupied by the three Ukrainian fronts with regard to Army Group Centre. Striking powerful flanking blows they were to encircle and compel the group's main forces to capitulate. Two converging blows were to be delivered at Prague, one from an area northwest of Dresden by the 1st Ukrainian Front, and the other from an area south of Brno by the 2nd Ukrainian Front. At the same time the 4th Ukrainian Front and the central units of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts were to attack from the east with the view of splitting up and capturing the enemy group in the shortest possible time. A part of these fronts' forces was to form an exterior front of envelopment and link up with the US troops on the Karlovy Vary, Plze, eske Budjovice line. The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front Marshal I. S. Konev formed a strike force. Consisting of the 13th, 3rd Guards and the 5th Guards field armies under colonelgenerals N. P. Pukhov, V. N. Gordov and A. S. Zhadov and the 4th and 3rd Guards tank armies under colonel-generals D. D. Lelyushenko and P. S. Rybalko, it was to strike the main blow and envelop Prague from the west and southwest. The tank armies were to liberate the Czechoslovak capital on the sixth day of the operation. Air support was to be provided by the 2nd Air Army under ColonelGeneral S. A. Krasovsky.
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The second blow was to be struck from an area northwest of Gorlitz in the general direction of Prague by the 28th Army under Lieutenant-General A. A. Luchinsky and the 52nd Army under Colonel-General K. A. Koroteyev. The Polish 2nd Army under Lieutenant-General Swierczewski would deal the third blow from the area of Nieswicz. The commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front ordered the 53rd, 7th Guards and the 6th Guards Tank armies and the 1st Guards Mechanised Cavalry Group to strike out directly at Prague. Colonel-General V. V. Glagolev's 9th Guards Army, which had been transferred from the 3rd Ukrainian Front, was to bypass Prague and drive on Plzen, while the 46th Army under Lieutenant-General A. V. Petrushevsky was to push towards eske Budjovice and form an exterior front of envelopment. The initial task of the 40th and Rumanian 4th armies was to mount an attack in the Olomouc direction. Air cover was to be provided by the 5th Air Army. At the outset of the Prague operation the 4th Ukrainian Front (60th, 38th, 18th and 1st Guards armies) and the rightflank forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were to smash the enemy's Olomouc group and then push towards Prague. Small yet powerful mobile groups were formed in the front and in the 38th Army to develop the success of the offensive. One such group included the Czechoslovak 1st Separate Tank Brigade. The Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps continued to remain under the operational control of the commander of the 18th Army, fighting on its left flank. The Czechoslovak 1st Mixed Air Division and the 8th Air Army of which it was a part supported the offensive in the Olomouc Prague direction. Preparations for the Prague operation were completed swiftly largely as a result of the effective Party and political work carried on among the troops. The 1st Ukrainian Front went over to the offensive on May 6 with both tank armies going-into action simultaneously with the field armies. This made it possible to deliver the blow with maximum force and proved to be one of the most interesting features of the front's actions in this operation. On the following morning the front commander committed the remaining armies to action. The 2nd Ukrainian Front also launched an offensive concentrating its main effort along the Jihlava-Prague line of advance,
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Developments followed each other in lightning succession. On Doenitz's order a preliminary protocol on Germany's capitulation was signed in Reims, and Schorner was instructed to surrender. But claiming that these were false rumours about Germany's capitulation he declared that the war against the Soviet Union would continue. In defiance of instructions he began to withdraw his troops to the west, and the Soviet Command had to take measures to bring the Field Marshal to his senses. On May 8, after shattering the enemy forces at Olomouc, the 4th Ukrainian Front launched an offensive on Prague. In general, May 8 is regarded as the decisive day of the entire Prague operation. Having taken Dresden, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crushed the enemy's resistance in the Ore Mountains and carrying his border defences poured into Czechoslovakia on a broad front from the north. The 4th Ukrainian Front liberated Hranice, Olomouc and Poleov and the 2nd Ukrainian Front drove the enemy out of Jaromice, Znojmo, Hollabrunn and Stockerau. On that day Major-General I. P. Yermakov's 5th Guards Mechanised Corps smashed the headquarters of Army Group Centre northwest of Prague. Troop control of Army Group Centre was disrupted and its commander Field Marshal Schorner fled to the west. At dawn on May 9 Lieutenant-General Y. Y. Belov's 10th Guards Urals Volunteer Tank Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army broke into Prague from the northwest. Almost at the same time the 3rd Guards Tank Army entered the city from the north. The advance units of the 3rd Guards and the 13th field armies reached the outskirts of Prague in the wake of the 1st Ukrainian Front's mobile forces. By 10.00 hours the Soviet troops with the vigorous assistance of the population had cleared the city of the enemy. On the same day units of the 4 th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts entered the capital of Czechoslovakia. The first tanks of the Czechoslovak 1st Tank Brigade appeared in Prague just before dawn on May 10. Several hours later the Government of the National Front arrived in Prague from Koice and immediately began to fulfil its functions. The dawn of freedom once again rose over Prague and the whole of Czechoslovakia. Routing the last major enemy
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group which had refused to capitulate the Soviet troops took 860,000 prisoners, including 60 generals, and 9,500 guns and mortars, 1,800 panzers and assault guns and 1,100 aircraft. T h e three Ukrainian fronts lost 8,000 officers and men killed and 28,000 wounded. In this operation the Soviet military commanders once again demonstrated their art of winning battles and the Soviet troops their combat efficiency. In appreciation of the courage and heroism of its troops the Soviet Government awarded combat Orders to 260 units, of which over 50 received honorary titles. Struck to commemorate the great victory the medal "For the Liberation of Prague" was awarded to 400,000 officers and men. A large number of Soviet officers and men received Soviet and Czechoslovak military decorations and those who distinguished themselves most were made Heroes of the Soviet Union, among them commander of the 10th Guards Urals Volunteer Tank Corps Lieutenant-General Y. Y. Belov, commander of the 55th Guards Tank Brigade Colonel D. A. Dragunsky and tank platoon commander V. S. Derevyanko. Friendship Cemented with Biood In the course of their eight months' heroic fight for the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet troops captured 1,200,000 prisoners, 18,100 guns and mortars, about 3,200 panzers and 1,900 planes, and destroyed a very large number of enemy officers and men and a vast amount of equipment. T h e Soviet Army lost about half a million officers and men wounded and another 140,000 Soviet heroes killed on the land of the fraternal Slovak and Czech peoples. At the same time it is impossible to estimate the measure of heroism and self-sacrifice of the Soviet home-front workers who kept the Soviet troops supplied with everything necessary to ensure the complete rout of the enemy forces in Czechoslovakia. All Czechoslovak people also put up a determined fight against the invaders. According to incomplete data, over 100 partisan detachments totalling nearly 40,000 men operated in the country during the war. Two m a j o r anti-fascist insurrections took place in Czechoslovakia, the Slovak
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national and the Czech uprisings in which scores of thousands of patriots were involved. About 360,000 Czechs and Slovaks fell in the fight for their freedom and national independence. It was the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia that proved to be the most vigorous political force in the country and which made the greatest-contribution to the people's liberation struggle. Twenty-five thousand Communists gave their lives for the happiness of their people. The liberation of Czechoslovakia in the Second World W a r was manifestly an international effort by Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish and Rumanian troops. The battle for Czechoslovakia gave fresh proof of the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces, the high organisational abilities of their commanders and the combat efficiency of their men, and enriched Soviet military art with invaluable experience. In this respect the major offensive operations carried out by the Soviet troops are of particular interest. There were several such operations involving either one, two or three fronts, and each was unique in itself. The East Carpathian operation is interesting from the point of view of the experience of the breakthrough across the Main Carpathian Range. The most characteristic feature of the November-December offensive of the 4th and 2nd Ukrainian fronts was the crossing of several mountain rivers. The West Carpathian operation, in my opinion, is interesting because at its outset the Soviet troops delivered blows along the entire front of the offensive and then, adapting themselves to the mountain and forest terrain, continued their drive along different directions. The Moravska Ostrava operation of the 4th Ukrainian Front involved the penetration of permanent enemy defences. The Bratislava-Brno operation executed by the 2nd Ukrainian Front is notable for the swift manoeuvre tactics of major mobile formations. The Prague operation of the three Ukrainian fronts, as I see it, will go down in history as an example of how a major strategic result can be obtained within the shortest possible time. Generally speaking, the combat experience acquired during the battles for the liberation of Czechoslovakia has
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enormously enriched the theory and practice of troop control in the specific conditions of a mountainous and, in the concluding stage, of a typically European theatre of operations. Throughout the 250-day offensive in Czechoslovakia the Soviet troops displayed high morale, patriotism and loyalty to their internationalist duty and merited high praise from the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. Over 950 units of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts were awarded military decorations for courage, mass heroism and military achievements. The Czechoslovak 1st Separate Brigade was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd Class, the 3rd Brigade received the Order of Alexander Nevsky and the 4th Brigade was decorated with the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, 2nd Class. The Order of the Red Banner was conferred on the Tudor Vladimirescu Rumanian Volunteer Infantry Division. More than 30 times Moscow saluted Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish and Rumanian troops. To commemorate the breakthrough across the Carpathians and the liberation of many Czechoslovak cities, 158 units received titles of honour depending on the name of the city they helped liberate. Thus the Carpathian, Koice, Preov, Zvolen, Bratislava, Prague and other divisions came into being. Thousands of officers and soldiers were decorated with Orders and medals and many were made Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war the Czechoslovak nation had to make a great effort to restore its war-ruined economy. And once again the Soviet people came to its assistance. On June 1, 1945, Radio Prague announced that the Soviet Command considerably increased supply rations for Prague, Brno, Moravska Ostrava and a number of other cities. A total of 48 industrial enterprises formerly owned by the nazis were turned over to the Czechoslovak Government by the Soviet Command. The Czechoslovak people gave a tremendous farewell to the Soviet troops returning home from hospitable Czechoslovakia. The working people expressed-their gratitude to the Soviet Army in all manner of ways. Textile workers gave civilian clothes to a whole division of demobilised soldiers. In Brno 100,000 people poured into the streets to bid farewell to Soviet soldiers. Scores of thousands of people were on hand to wish good luck to the departing Soviet troops. Many Soviet commanders were made honorary citizens of Czechoslovak towns.
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During the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia in November 1945, the Brno newspaper Slovo Naroda (People's Word) wrote: "We shall always remember the Soviet soldiers because many of their dead comrades have been buried in our land. Maybe, in their home country they have heard very little about their younger Slav sister Czechoslovakia, but they did not hesitate to give their lives for her freedom. Having died in battle these warriors shall always be with us, for they have fused their destiny with that of the westernmost Slav land which shall never betray them." The liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army had a truly historic impact on the future of her people. It cleared the road for democratic reforms, consolidated the position of the working masses, primarily of the Czechoslovak working class as a whole and overturned the imperialists' plans regarding Czechoslovakia. "May 9 is our greatest and biggest national holiday," said Klement Gottwald. "On that day in 1945, an end was put to hitlerite occupation which threatened the very existence of the Czech and Slovak people. At the same time that day is a historical turning point when the Czech and Slovak peoples entered a new and the greatest epoch in their history, an epoch of genuine national freedom and independence, an epoch of people's rule, an epoch of the labour of the masses, an epoch of socialist construction."* President Ludvik Svoboda, Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Hero of the Soviet Union, in reply to a telegram of congratulations on the occasion of his election to that post, wrote to me: "I like to recall our comradeshipin-arms in the Second World War, in the fight against nazism. . . . The foundations of the lasting union and friendship of our peoples were laid in that fight "** We, former participants in the liberation of Czechoslovakia, like all Soviet people, firmly believe that the friendship of our fraternal peoples which was cemented with the blood shed in joint battles during the last war, will continue to strengthen with each passing year for the welfare of both countries and the entire socialist community.
* Pravda, May 8, 1950. ** Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), April 14, 1968.
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In August 1968, the Soviet troops once again entered the territory of Czechoslovakia in fulfilment of their internationalist duty. Twenty-three years earlier they liberated the Czechs and Slovaks from nazism. This time the Communist Party and the Soviet Government set them the task of protecting the fraternal Czechoslovak people against the threat of counter-revolution, against the intrigues of the dark forces of reaction and imperialism. In acute postwar clashes with the bourgeois classes the Czechoslovak working people chose the socialist road of development. But the reactionary forces refused to put up with this state of affairs. They began intensive preparations for taking the country out of the socialist community and throwing her into the lap of imperialism. Taking advantage of the temporary weakening of Party control over state and public activities, and manipulating with such words as "improvement" and "humanisation" of socialism and "broadening" of democracy, the counter-revolution violently attacked the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the socialist system in an attempt to restore capitalism in the country with the help of ideological, economic, political and even military forms of struggle. With time historians will meticulously investigate the interrelation of all developments and disentangle all the threads of the conspiracy leading from diverse anti-communist headquarters and centres to Czechoslovak will find out the code-name of the operation which international reaction had undertaken against socialist Czechoslovakia. But Communists-internationalists, educated in the spirit of proletarian solidarity, knew exactly where they should stand with regard to the events in Czechoslovakia simply by answering the question which Lenin had always posed in such cases: "Who benefits from this?" From the very outset it was obvious that the developments in the country had been precipitated by counter-revolutionary, anti-socialist forces. This was manifest from the enemies' efforts to push Czechoslovakia off the socialist road of development, force her to withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and so forth. The designers and organisers of the
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"quiet counter-revolution" based their future plans not only on the weakening of the socialist camp, but also on its complete disintegration. In view of the increasing threat to Czechoslovakia's socialist gains, the Soviet troops and their allies, the armies of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Poland on August 21, 1968, came to the assistance of their Czechoslovak brothers. In Czechoslovakia the Soviet troops showed that they were dedicated propagandists of communism's great ideals. Their truthful, convincing words, their warmhearted behaviour became a powerful weapon in the struggle for the minds and hearts of the people. In word and deed they made it clear that they came to Czechoslovakia as the true and selfless friends of the working people, as stout defenders of their class interests. The mighty forces standing guard over socialism, peace and the freedom of the peoples thwarted the designs of Czechoslovakia's enemies. And the same will happen wherever the doomed capitalist world hurls a challenge to the all-conquering socialism.

Colonel-General

m. n. s h a r o k h i n

BATTLE IN HUNGARY

It was September 1944, and the autumn was kind and generous in Rumania. People were tasting the joys of a free life. Carts laden with the fruits of that bountiful autumn rumbled along the roads raising clouds of dust in their wake. Golden vineyards covered the hill slopes. T h e villagers gave the Soviet soldiers the traditional bread-and-salt welcome. Soon the Soviet troops would again clash with the enemy in bloody battles, for there were still peoples and nations to be liberated from the nazi yoke. H u n g a r y was waiting her turn. A f t e r the brilliantly executed Jassy-Kishinev operation at the end of September 1944, the Soviet troops pushed forward first in the southwesterly direction and then in the westerly and northwesterly directions and reached the Yugoslav and Hungarian borders on a broad front. T h e first to cross into H u n g a r y at the end of September 1944 were the divisions of the 18th T a n k Corps, 53rd Army, 2nd Ukrainian Front. T h e battle for H u n g a r y was fierce and long. T h e H u n garian ruling circles had played the basest role in the tragedy of their country by involving her in the Second World W a r against the wishes of her people.
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For a long period the Hungarian fascists with Regent Mikls Horthy at their head had been rendering substantial military and economic assistance to Hitler in the war against the Soviet Union, and it was their policy that enabled the German imperialists to gain complete control over the Hungarian economy. Needless to say, the Hungarian Government believed that by co-operating with nazi Germany it would be able to further its own aggressive plans. It thought that in return for its support for Hitler it could extend its control over the neighbouring countries occupied by the German troops. After seizing Czechoslovakia, the nazis gave a part of Slovakia and the Transcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary. In August 1940, Hungary took Northern Transylvania away from Rumania. This enabled Hitler to gain complete control over fascist Hungary. At the beginning of 1939 she joined Hitler's Anti-Comintern Pact and in November 1940 the Hungarian Government officially allied itself with nazi Germany by joining the Tripartite Pact, that is, the aggressive military bloc formed by nazi Germany, fascist Italy and militarist Japan. The Hungarian bourgeoisie and landowners succeeded for a period to poison the minds of a considerable part of the population, particularly young people, with chauvinistic propaganda and embroiled the country in the war against the Soviet Union. On June 27, 1941 Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union. She rejected the Soviet Union's persistent and repeated suggestions to maintain neutrality. By May 1942 there were over 200,000 Hungarian troops on the GermanSoviet front. In the initial period of the war the Hungarian troops were on occupation duty on Soviet territory seized by the Wehrmacht, but later directly participated in military operations. At first, when the nazis were advancing on the Eastern front, Horthy's clique closed its eyes to the possible disastrous consequences of its policy. The Wehrmacht's crushing defeat at Stalingrad and the rout of the Hungarian 2nd Army at Voronezh stimulated the growth of anti-war sentiments among the working people and their disenchantment with the ruling elite's pro-German policy. In 1943 the
13

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Smallholders' Party was already calling for a break with nazi Germany. Needless to say, the Communist Party voiced this demand on the very first day of the war. Forced to operate underground, it directly appealed to the people to pull the country out of the war and depose the Horthy regime. In 1942 the Hungarian Communist Party put forward a programme for the establishment of a united people's front. But the treachery of the right wing of the Social-Democratic Party, the brutal terror that was rampant in the country and the spread of chauvinistic ideas through the fascist propaganda media impeded the formation of a national front of struggle. Thrown into consternation by the advance of the Soviet Army which was approaching Hungary's border, the increasing anti-military and anti-German sentiments among the Hungarian population and the manoeuvres of Kallay's government to make good its escape from the foundering nazi ship, Hitler's government adopted energetic measures to prevent Hungary from quitting the war. In March 1944, Hitler's troops occupied Hungary. The SS forces which took over Budapest launched ruthless reprisals against the patriots, many of whom were arrested by the Gestapo and taken out of the country. Dme Sztojay, former Hungarian envoy in Berlin, was appointed head of the government on agreement with Horthy. The occupation of Hungary and the formation of a new government, however, did not strengthen the positions of the nazis in the country as it was hoped they would. The rout of the German troops in Moldavia and Rumania's withdrawal from the war, her declaration of war on Germany and Hungary aggravated the situation in Hungary to a still greater degree. Debating the question whether or not Hungary should sever relations with Germany, the Hungarian Government on August 25, 1944 recorded the following: "The fact is . . . that the Anglo-Saxons do not waht the Russians to occupy Hungary. They would have liked the Hungarians to keep back the Russians until the Anglo-Saxons occupy Hungary."* The Hungarian Government decided to hold up the Soviet offensive with the help of the Wehrmacht until
* Dezs Nemes, Magyarorszag felszabadulsa, 1960, p. 306.
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Hungary would be occupied by the Anglo-US forces. Simultaneously it decided to invade Southern Transylvania. Prime Minister Dme Sztojay was replaced by ColonelGeneral Gza Lakatos who in Horthy's opinion was better suited to prepare the ground for a rapprochement with Britain and the USA. Nevertheless, these feverish measures could not decisively influence the course of history. The Soviet offensive continued and the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were already fighting on the Hungarian border. The Hungarian Communists, workers and all other patriotic forces intensified their efforts to wipe out fascism and overthrow the Horthy regime. In May 1944, a Hungarian National Independence Front was formed, but its appearance did not lead to the establishment of a genuinely united front of struggle because of the treachery of the right-wing leaders of other parties. Still, the Hungarian Communists continued their activities among the patriotic workers and raised partisan detachments. But the rigid security measures enforced in the country restricted their efforts to a considerable extent. The situation at the front, the letters written by soldiers at the firing lines and the hardships in the country caused fresh outbreaks of dissatisfaction with the government's policy, strikes and increasing sabotage of military production and food deliveries to the firing lines. It was obvious to the Hungarian ruling circles that the entry of the Soviet troops into the country and the mounting anti-war struggle on the domestic scene would eventually bring down the regime. To avert the danger Horthy approached Britain and the USA with a proposal to sign a peace with Hungary. But nothing could be done in the situation. The Allies told Horthy's men that since the Soviet troops were all set to cross into Hungary, the issue had to be taken up with the Russians. On October 1 a Hungarian delegation headed by General Gabor Faragho arrived in Moscow to negotiate an armistice. He put forward the following terms: immediate cessation of hostilities, participation of the US and British forces in the occupation of Hungary, and unimpeded withdrawal of Hitler's troops.
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These terms were wholly unacceptable for the Soviet Government. The Hungarian Government's double-dealing policy, which had landed the country in an extremely precarious situation, showed that Horthy and his clique had no intention of severing relations with Hitler Germany and pulling Hungary out of the war on her side. It was obvious that only a swift and determined Soviet offensive into Hungary would compel her to quit the war and help the Hungarian people to get rid of German nazism and Hungarian fascism. Such was the political situation in Hungary on the eve of her liberation from the German occupation. The German Command was aware that the loss of Hungary would create favourable conditions for the entry of the Soviet troops into Austria and Czechoslovakia and open the road into Germany's southern industrial areas with their numerous war plants. Hungary herself played a very important role in nazi Germany's war effort. She supplied her war plants with bauxites and had considerable resources of oil in the Nagykanisza area. With the loss of Rumania, Hungary became almost the only source of natural oil for Germany. She was also one of the main suppliers of food for the Wehrmacht. On May 31, 1944, Hitler declared that the retention of Hungarian territory was of such vital importance for Germany that it was simply impossible to overestimate it. That was why the German Command decided to hold on to Hungary at whatever the cost. In September 1944 when the Soviet troops were still some distance away from Hungary, the Wehrmacht began to put up defensive installations along her eastern border at a great pace. It also concentrated major German and Hungarian forces there. When the Soviet Army was about to enter Hungary it had before it Army Group South and part of the forces of Army Group F. To prevent the Germans from consolidating their positions in Hungary and thus prolonging the war, the Soviet Command ordered the 2nd Ukrainian Front under Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Y. Malinovsky (chief of staffColonel-General M. V. Zakharov, member of the Military CouncilLieutenant-General of the Armoured Forces
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I. Z. Susaikov) immediately to launch an operation with the view to smashing this enemy group. T h e front consisted of 40 infantry divisions, three tank, two mechanised and three cavalry corps, two fortified areas and one tank brigade. It had 10,200 guns and mortars, 750 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,100 aircraft. Moreover, two Rumanian armies (21 divisions) and the Tudor Vladimirescu 1st Volunteer Division, were under its operational control. T h e land forces were supported by an air army. In November 1944, the 3rd Ukrainian Front under M a r shal F. I. Tolbukhin (chief of staffLieutenant-General S. P. Ivanov, member of the Military CouncilColonelGeneral A. S. Zheltov), and later the Danube Flotilla under Rear Admiral G. N. Kholostyakov joined the 2nd Ukrainian Front in smashing the enemy in Hungary. T h e battle for Hungary lasted over six months, in the course of which the Soviet troops carried out a number of offensive and defensive operations characterised by extremely bitter and intense fighting. In the Flames of Battles On entering Hungary, the 2nd Ukrainian Front knocked the enemy out of a large number of towns, including Gyula and Mako. On October 6, Soviet troops in the centre of the front, where the main blow was struck, launched the Debrecen operation for the purpose of smashing the enemy group in the Cluj-Oradea-Debrecen area and liberating the eastern part of Hungary and the northern part of Transylvania. T h e enemy had considerable panzer forces there and fierce fighting continued up to October 28. Battering down the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the Soviet troops in the face of powerful counterattacks liberated Debrecen on October 20. In the meantime General I. T. Shlemin's 46th Army fighting on the front's left flank crossed the Tisza, liberated Szeged and gained a bridgehead between the Tisza and the Danube, and its left-flank divisions reached the Danube at Baja.
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In the course of the Debrecen operation the 2nd Ukrainian Front advanced from 230 to 275 kilometres into Hungary, liberated her eastern and southeastern regions and a large number of inhabited localities. The offensive of the 2nd Ukrainian Front contributed to the success of the 4th Ukrainian Front, whose troops under the command of General of the Army I. Y. Petrov liberated the towns of Mukachevo and Uzhgorod in the Carpathians and reached the Chop area to cover the 2nd Ukrainian Front from the north. On October 27, 1944, the State Defence Committee of the USSR issued a statement to the effect that the Red Army entered Hungary "not as a conqueror, but as the liberator of the Hungarian people from the nazi oppression" and that it had no objectives other than routing the German armies and overthrowing nazi Germany's rule in the occupied countries. Explaining this statement the Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front drew up an appeal which was brought to the knowledge of the broadest sections of the Hungarian population. All Hungarian patriots, primarily the Communists, welcomed this document and referred to it in the course of their activity. These measures tremendously facilitated the day-to-day efforts of the Soviet Command to elucidate the Soviet Union's policy with regard to Hungary. For decades the Hungarian people had been intimidated with all sorts of fabrications about the "horrors of Bolshevism", and it was of the utmost importance, therefore, to prove by word and deed that the Soviet soldier represented the Soviet people who were fulfilling a mission of liberation and safeguarding peace and justice. Broad sections of the Hungarian population displayed increasing respect and trust for the Soviet Army. Soviet troops helped the peasants to repair farm machinery. They built and repaired bridges and shared fuel and lubricants with the local population. This was Lenin's proletarian internationalism in action, which brought the Soviet and Hungarian peoples closer together. Besides ending in a major strategic victory for the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the Debrecen operation had a major impact on political developments. The Soviet Army's crushing
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blows hastened the progress of the talks between the Soviet Government and the Hungarian delegation. On October 11 Hungary, on the one side, and the USSR and its Allies, on the other, signed preliminary armistice terms. Hungary was to remain independent and other states were not to interfere into her internal affairs. The Hungarian army was to join the war against Germany. The Soviet Union agreed to help the Hungarians in this respect. Yet, Horthy and his clique did not venture completely to sever relations with Hitler. They turned down the proposals of the representatives of the People's Front to form an anti-Hitler government, and did not order the Hungarian Army Command to enter into contact with the Soviet Command. Moreover, in an order of the day informing the Hungarian 1st Armoured Division about the agreement reached with the Soviet Union, the Horthy clique said that those who intended to continue to fight against the Soviet Army were at liberty to go over to the German side.51" On October 16, in compliance with Hitler's demands, Horthy relinquished his post as Regent in favour of Szalasi, the chief of the Hungarian fascists. The German Command and Szalasi managed to remain in control of the Hungarian Army which was fully subordinated to the Germans. It was clear that with Szalasi's advent to power, Hungary would continue to fight on Germany's side and that only military methods could force it to quit the fascist coalition. Upon the conclusion of the Debrecen operation, G H Q ordered Marshal Malinovsky to strike out with the 2nd Ukrainian Front's left wing towards the northwest and reach the Budapest area. This task was assigned to the 46th Army under General Shlemin, and the 2nd and 4th Guards mechanised corps. Going into action these two corps advanced 100 kilometres in the area between the Tisza and the Danube, and on November 2 reached the outskirts of the Hungarian capital. But they failed to break into the city. Likewise unsuccessful was the attempt to capture Budapest by a blow from the east. Obviously, only a more powerful group would be able to drive the enemy out of this heavily fortified city. In the
* Dezs Nemes, Op. cit., p. 92.
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circumstances the offensive on Budapest was temporarily suspended. Budapest was defended by a 250,000-strong garrison and there were powerful defensive lines with a ramified system of fortifications on the city's outskirts. On top of that, the Soviet troops were exhausted by almost three months' of non-stop offensive operations, and the delivery of ammunition and fuel was handicapped by heavy rains and stretched communications. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front resumed the offensive after regrouping and bringing up reserves on December 5. This time it was planned to take the city by a twopronged attack with the 7 th Guards Army under General M. S. Shumilov, the 6th Guards Tank Army under General A. G. Kravchenko and General I. A. Pliyev's mechanised cavalry group enveloping it from the north, and the 46th Army and the 2nd Guards Mechanised Corps from the southwest. The thrust of the front's strike force from the north was to be covered by the 53rd Army. By December 9 the troops operating in the central sector advanced 60 kilometres and reached the Danube north of Budapest. The 46th Army, which had crossed the river south of Budapest, gained a bridgehead and came close to Ercsi where it was stopped by the enemy on the Margareten Line. While the 2nd Ukrainian Front was fighting on the approaches to Budapest, the adjacent 3rd Ukrainian Front on G H Q orders began shifting its main forces to the Budapest and Vienna direction and concentrating them on the left bank of the Danube at Baja, Sombor and Subotica to cooperate with the 2nd Ukrainian Front in routing the enemy forces in Hungary. To fulfil this task the Soviet troops would have to cross the Danube north of the mouth of the Drava and gain a bridgehead on its western bank from where they would be able to deploy their main forces. By the end of October the front had two field armies: the 37th, which was stationed in Bulgaria and practically did not participate in the operation, and the 57th, and also the 17 th Air Army. The front was to be reinforced with the 4th Guards Army from GFIQ Reserve which was due to arrive at the end of November. The Danube-crossing oper202

ation was assigned to the 57th Army under my command. It was the first of the Soviet forces fighting in the southwestern sector to cross the Danube in its middle reaches and enter western Hungary. In this connection I should like to give a more detailed account of the 57th Army's actions at this stage of the operation. Early in November 1944, Marshal Tolbukhin told me that the 57th Army would have to cross the Danube on a sector between Baja and the mouth of the Darva, gain a bridgehead on its western bank, and reach the BataszekMcseny-Pecs-Papa line to enable the front's main forces to deploy on the bridgehead and launch an attack to the northwest in the general direction of Szekesfehervar. Subsequently, the 57th Army was to strike the main blow at Kaposvar and Nagykanisza with the objective of smashing the enemy south of Lake Balaton and covering the front's main forces against a blow from the southwest. At the same time Marshal Tolbukhin underlined that the success of the operation would largely depend on the element of surprise in forcing the Danube and seizing a bridgehead essential for routing the enemy in western Hungary. We know that while a breakthrough of permanent defences is a difficult operation, a penetration coupled with the crossing of a major water barrier is a particularly involved form of action. And so I, as army commander, and the army Military Council as a whole, had a lot to think about. We were well aware that only the success of the army's action would enable the front to move its main forces into battle and rout the enemy in western Hungary, and first and foremost, smash his group in Budapest. Moreover, it would create favourable conditions for ploughing up the entire system of German defences in the south. The 57th Army consisted of three infantry corps: the 75th Corps under General A. Z. Akimenko which had already reached the Danube and organised defences on its eastern bank; the 64th Corps commanded by General I. K. Kravtsov, which was on its way from the area of Belgrade, and the 6th Guards Corps, which was being shifted from Bulgaria into the Sombor area, and where it was due to arrive on November 20 or 21. The 9th Artillery Division and the 32nd Mechanised Brigade, both attached to the army, were also en route.
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On November 5 and 6, 1944, the commander of the 75th Corps, the commanders of the 233rd and 74th infantry divisions Colonel T. I. Sidorenko and Colonel K. A. Sychev and I reconnoitred the Danube in the sector of the crossing. We established that the areas of Batina and Apatin were the best suited for the purpose, since both afforded the possibility of concealing the approach to the river although the Danube here was 600-800 metres wide and in places, due to the spring floods, was even a 1,000 metres wide. At Batina on the precipitous opposite bank there were two, and in places three lines of interconnected continuous trenches. The heavily fortified hills 205 and 206 formed the backbone of the enemy's defence. The enemy turned all the towns and villages, and particularly the numerous wine cellars, into very formidable strongpoints. At Apatin numerous canals cut the Danube floodlands, which were covered with marshes and woods. In the 57th Army's area the enemy had a number of units equal in strength to about two divisions supported by panzers and nearly 25 artillery batteries. Another infantry division was deployed in the depth of the defences. The relatively small troop density was due to the fact that the main forces of the enemy were concentrated in the area of Budapest against the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. At the same time the enemy did not expect that the 3rd Ukrainian Front would be able to transfer its forces from Yugoslavia as such short notice. In keeping with the decision taken by the 57th Army's command and approved by the front commander the 75th Infantry Corps was to make a sudden crossing of the Danube at Batina and Apatin and secure bridgeheads on the opposite bank without waiting for the army's main forces to assemble. It was dangerous to postpone the crossing since the enemy might have foreseen these plans and brought up large reinforcements. The advance units of the 75th Infantry Corps were to force the river in the night of November 7 and gain a bridgehead where its main forces would be able to deploy and then go into action. The corps fulfilled the assignment with honour. Taking to fishing boats, launches and barges converted into ferries, units of the 233rd and 74th divisions swiftly
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crossed the river and immediately went into action to expand the small bridgeheads gained by the advance elements. By November 12, the main forces of the 75th Infantry Corps had assembled on the western bank of the Danube. They expanded and consolidated the bridgeheads making them large enough to accommodate the main forces of the 64th Corps which had reached the area by then. Resisting stubbornly, the enemy frequently counterattacked in an effort to throw the Soviet troops back into the river. From the Army CP in the area of Bezdn, commander of the front artillery General M. I. Nedelin, commander of the 17th Air Army General V. A. Sudets and I had a good view of the battle for Batina and hills 205 and 206. Time and again the Soviet troops broke into enemy trenches but were forced to retreat under the blows of the counterattacking infantry and panzers. I recollect that a red flag appeared on hill 206 on Soviet Artillery Day. It was hoisted by Lieutenant K. L. Legostayeva, commander of the Medical Platoon of the 211th Guards Regiment, who killed three Germans in the process. For this act of heroism she was awarded the Order of the Red Banner which I personally presented to her. I know of many acts of courage and heroism performed by the Soviet troops during the fighting on the Danube but I shall confine myself to relating those which are most firmly fixed in my memory. In those days the name of Sergeant V. Obodovsky was spoken with respect in his 704th Infantry Regiment. One of the first to land on the opposite bank the subunit under his command attacked the enemy and in a hand-to-hand encounter wiped out the Germans in the first trench and then broke into the second, seizing a small adjoining area. At dawn the enemy attacked the group. For a while Obodovsky and his men managed to keep the Germans back with submachine-gun fire. But it was an unequal battle and the Soviet soldiers were surrounded. One by one they dropped out of the fighting as the enemy tightened his ring. Obodovsky was wounded eleven times but kept on fighting. He died but not before he had ordered his men to hold on to the last. And they managed to hold on to their position parrying all enemy counterattacks. For gallantry on the battlefield Vasily Obodovsky was posthumously made Hero of the Soviet Union.
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The details of another exploit were related to me by commander of the 73rd Guards Infantry Division General S. A. Kozak. The 4th Company of the 214th Guards Regiment under Captain I. F. Pigin crossed the Danube and gained a small bridgehead in the vicinity of Batina railway station where it was counterattacked by a company of Germans supported by four panzers. Pigin's men opened fire from machine- and submachine-guns to cut off the infantry from the panzers which at the same time came under fire from Soviet antitank rifles and an antitank gun. Two panzers were hit and came to a stop spouting columns of smoke. The other two turned back and the infantry hit the ground. After a short artillery bombardment the attack was resumed. This time the Germans broke into the trenches. Firing pointblank Pigin and his men engaged the enemy in a fierce hand-to-hand fighting using their bayonets, rifle butts and even entrenching spades. Killing several Germans with his submachine-gun Pigin ran out of ammunition. Seeing this four Germans pounced on him but he shot three of them with his pistol and clubbed the fourth. Though seriously wounded Pigin kept on fighting. Inspired by his courage the men beat off another three attacks. For bravery in action Captain Ivan Pigin was made Hero of the Soviet Union. Another man who displayed great courage in these battles was Sergeant Major N. Y. Yereshchenko of the 6th Company, 214th Regiment. With a small group he crossed the Danube and killing a score of Germans occupied their trenches. Recovering from surprise the enemy pelted the group with grenades, three of which Yereshchenko caught and hurled back at the Germans. Yereshchenko's group repelled several attacks before the Germans managed to break into the trenches. In hand-tohand fighting Yereshchenko shot five enemy soldiers from his submachine-gun and clubbed another on with its butt. The group beat off eight counterattacks before reinforcement arrived. For outstanding performance of duty Nikolai Yereshchenko was made Hero of the Soviet Union. For two weeks the 57th Army waged heavy battles on the west bank of Danube, enlarging the bridgeheads to accommodate the front's main forces. Realising the full extent of the danger, the German Command began bringing in troops
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from Italy, including the Brandenburg Division, the 13th Mountain Division and a brigade of assault guns. The Soviet troops virtually gnawed their way through the enemy defences driving the Germans out of wine cellars and stone buildings with grenades, bayonets and gun fire. On November 25, the second-echelon 6th Guards Infantry Corps (three divisions) and the 32nd Mechanised Brigade went into action on the 57 th Army's right flank. Simultaneously, the 21st Infantry Corps of General G. F. Zakharov's 4th Guards Army made a surprise crossing of the Danube at Mohacs which it captured and linked up with the 57 th Army. The commitment of the second echelon of the 57th Army and units of the 4th Guards Army enabled the Soviet forces to expand the bridgehead to 50 kilometres in width and 25-30 kilometres in depth. It was now possible to throw the entire 4 th Guards Army into battle. It crossed the Danube and developing the success of the 21st Guards Corps reached the Tolna-Apar-Kiss Vszer line on November 29. By then the 57th Army had smashed the 13th Mountain Infantry Division and captured Pecs, a large industrial centre, and the towns of Virgosem, Villany, and Harkny. By the end of November 1944, the 57th and the 4th Guards armies were in possession of a large strategic bridgehead 180 kilometres wide and 50 kilometres deep. The success was considerable. This bridgehead enabled the 3rd Ukrainian Front to mount a resolute offensive west of the Danube at Szekesfehervar in December and jointly with the 2nd Ukrainian Front surround and destroy the enemy forces at Budapest. During the fighting on the bridgehead the Soviet troops routed over five enemy divisions. The Germans lost 32,000 officers and men, 100 panzers and assault guns, over 450 guns and mortars and 56 aircraft. The Soviet troops also captured 2,000 prisoners, 20 panzers, 200 guns and a large quantity of other weapons and equipment. The crossing of the Danube and the 57th Army's offensive were supported by the 17th Air Army, whose aircraft flew 800 sorties on November 21 and 22 alone. All in all its aircraft made more than 5,000 sorties covering the offensive of the Soviet troops and destroying enemy manpower and equipment.
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Budapest Encircled In the first days of December the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front continued their drive into Hungary and advanced 60-80 kilometres in the face of heavy enemy resistance. On December 12, the 4th Guards Army reached Adony-Lake Velencei-southeastern bank of lake BalatonSiofok line and linked up with the 46th Army on the right flank. Here the Soviet drive was brought to a halt by the stubborn resistance of the enemy manning the permanent Margareten Line. T h e 4th Guards Army began to prepare for a breakthrough. In the meantime the 57th Army advancing in the Nagykanisza sector liberated the large towns of Tamasi, Kaposvar and Szigetvar. On December 9 it reached the line running from the southern bank of Lake Balaton through Keresztur-Mesztegne-Nagykorpad-Babocsa-Barcs and captured Virovitica, an important communication centre south of the Drava. Now the 57 th Army had come right up to Nagykanisza, Hungary's oil-producing region, threatening to deprive the Germans of their fuel-supply source. Moreover, the Germans were faced with another danger: the main routes connecting the German forces operating in Hungary with their Balkan group in Yugoslavia and Greece passed through Nagykanisza. Taking this into account, the Germans hastily formed a powerful group, with the 2nd Panzer Army as its core, to cover Nagykanisza. Using the retreating troops and fresh forces shifted from Army Group F they firmly occupied the defences along the Keresztur-Marcali-Nagybajom-Vizvr line where they managed to hold up the offensive of the 57th Army. T h e attempt of the Soviet troops to pierce the enemy defences at a go ended in failure. T h e 57th Army waged extremely bitter battles at Nagybajom situated on the main routfe leading from Kaposvar to Nagykanisza. T h e Germans had turned Nagybajom into a powerful defence centre with several lines of trenches and diverse obstacles. Subsequently Nagybajom changed hands several times and was liberated by the Soviet troops only in March 1945. Having suspended its drive the 57th Army went over to the defensive in the middle of December. Now its task was
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to cover the operations of the front's main forces advancing on Szekesfehervar from the west and south. The emergence of the 3rd Ukrainian Front west of the Danube created favourable opportunities for the two fronts to co-operate in encircling the enemy in Budapest. This was the main task which GHQ set the Soviet troops on December 12, 1944. At the time the 2nd Ukrainian Front had 39 divisions, two fortified areas, six tank, mechanised and cavalry corps and 14 Rumanian divisions. The enemy force facing the front had 26 divisions of which seven were panzer and motorised divisions. The 3rd Ukrainian Front had 31 divisions, one fortified area, one marine brigade, four tank, mechanised and cavalry corps and also the Bulgarian 1st and the Yugoslav 3rd armies. Facing them were 25 enemy divisions, including six panzer and motorised divisions and two brigades. In the forthcoming operation the Soviet troops were to surround and wipe out the enemy in Budapest by simultaneous blows from the northeast and southwest. The 2nd Ukrainian Front was to strike its main blow out of the Sahy area, north of Budapest, and advance towards the west and southwest with the view to smashing the enemy and reaching the Danube at Neszmly and Esztergom, thus cutting off the retreat routes to the northwest for the enemy forces in Budapest. At Esztergom the 2nd Ukrainian Front was to link up with the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was to advance on Budapest from the east. The offensive of the 7th Guards and the 53rd armies and the 6th Guards Tank Army, which were delivering the main blow, was supported by General S. K. Goryunov's 5th Air Army. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was to pierce the Margareten Line, striking its main blow in the area of Lake Velencei in the general direction of Bicske and to reach the Danube on the Esztergom-Neszmly sector. Here it was to link up with the adjacent front and cut off the enemy's routes of retreat from the Hungarian capital. Part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front's forces were pushing towards Buda from the west to link up with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front driving on Pest from the east. The main blow of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was delivered by the 46th Army, which had been detached from the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 4th
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Guards Army, the 18th Tank Corps, the 2nd Guards and 7th mechanised corps, the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and the 17 th Air Army. The fronts went over to the offensive on December 20, 1944. Battering down the tenacious resistance of the enemy, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front with artillery and air support ploughed through his defences at Lake Velencei, smashed a large force at Szekesfehervar and came up to Esztergom on December 26. The advancing troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front repulsed a massive panzer counterblow in the area of Szakalosi, wiping out 7,000 and capturing 7,500 prisoners and 55 panzers, and destroying about 150 panzers and a large quantity of other weapons. On December 26 the 6th Tank Army and the 7 th Guards Army reached the Danube at Esztergom where they linked up with the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. On December 26 General Shlemin's 46th Army reached the western suburb of Buda and the Danube north of Budapest to form, together with the 18th Tank Corps, an inner ring of encirclement. The 4th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps hurled the enemy 60 kilometres to the west and formed an outer ring of encirclement. As a result, 12 enemy divisions, special units and headquarters totalling over 188,000 officers and men were surrounded in Budapest. The fighting for the Hungarian capital was extremely ferocious. But even then the Soviet troops found it possible to display great humanism. In an effort to prevent losses among the civilian population and material damage to the city, the Soviet Command offered the encircled enemy forces to capitulate. The German Command, however, not only turned down this offer but basely killed the Soviet truce envoys Captain Mikls Steinmetz, a Hungarian by birth who had spent the greater part of his life in the USSR and was a Soviet officer, and Captain I. A. Ostapenko. Reporting the details of this premeditated murder, Sovinformbureau wrote on December 31, 1944: "This is an unprecedented crime in the history of modern wars. Since time immemorial truce envoys have enjoyed the right of immunity. This right is traditional. It is written down in the Hague Convention of 1907 'Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of W a r on Land'. Hitler's butchers have
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again demonstrated to the world their utter contempt for laws. They brazenly trample all conventions and treaties which Germany has signed.'' The German Command deliberately violated international law guaranteeing the immunity of truce envoys, and in so doing completely disregarded the fact that the Hungarian capital and its population would suffer heavily as a result. This vile act aroused the wrath of the Soviet troops, making them all the more determined to crush the enemy as quickly as possible. T h e responsibility for the lives of the civilian population and the damage done to Budapest now rested with the German Command. The Enemy Counterattacks We have already said that the German Command attached great importance to Hungary, particularly to her capital, Budapest. T h e Germans continued to fight back with the viciousness and desperation of a wounded beast. T h e encircled troops were forbidden to surrender. In an effort to help them break out of the ring the German Command shifted troops from the Western front and concentrated them on the outer ring of encirclement. In J a n u a r y 1945, having assembled major panzer forces, the Germans struck three consecutive counterblows at the Soviet troops, compelling them to put off the liquidation of the enemy in surrounded Budapest. T h e first blow was delivered on J a n u a r y 2 from an area southeast of Komrno at Bicske and Buda at the right flank of the 4th Guards Army by five panzer and three infantry divisions. T h e blow fell on General S. A. Bobruk's 31st Guards Corps. Concentrating a powerful group in this sector the enemy had a ninefold superiority in infantry, a 17-fold superiority in armour and assault guns and an 11fold superiority in artillery and mortars. As a result of this powerful blow delivered on a narrow sector, the Germans pierced the Soviet defences in the zone of the 80th Guards Division. Marshal Tolbukhin ordered the commander of the 4th Guards Army to seal the breach with two infantry divisions, the 18th Tank and the 1st Mechanised corps and several artillery regiments. A fierce
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battle ensued in which the 17th Air Army took part. Its pilots fought heroically and not only covered the 4th Guards Army from enemy blows, thus helping it to hold on to its positions, but also struck massive blows at the enemy. The fighting to prevent the Germans from breaking through to Budapest lasted several days. At the price of enormous casualties they wedged into Soviet defences to a depth of approximately 30 kilometres and seized Esztergom. After that their offensive bogged down. Likewise unsuccessful was an attempt of part of the German forces in Budapest to break out of the encirclement and link up with the troops advancing from Komrno. This attempt was thwarted by the 46th Army in co-operation with the 2nd Ukrainian Front's 7th Guards and the 6th Guards Tank armies which attacked the enemy along the northern bank of the Danube in the direction of Komrno, thus creating a threat to the rear of the enemy group driving on Budapest. As a result the German Command had no alternative other than to transfer a part of the forces from the Budapest sector to defend the right bank of the Danube from Esztergom to Komrno. Nevertheless, the German Command still entertained hopes of breaking the blockade around Budapest. The Germans struck their second blow on January 7 from an area northwest of Szekesfehervar. Subsequently their attack forked out. The purpose of this manoeuvre was clear. By driving from the northwest at Bicske and from the southwest at Zamj they intended to encircle the Soviet troops in Bicske and then by a combined effort of the two groups to break through to Budapest to relieve their surrounded forces. The main blow was delivered at Zamj by the 3rd Panzer Corps (three panzer, one infantry and one cavalry divisions) in the area of the General N. I. Biryukov's 20th Guards Corps. The Germans had a threefold superiority in men, a fourfold superiority in artillery and mortars and a sixfold superiority in armour and assault guns. The attack on Bicske was launched by the 4th Panzer Corps in the defensive zone of the 31st Guards Corps. The Germans launched their attack on Zamj in the morning of January 7 after a brief artillery softening up. Over 120 panzers with infantry attacked the 5th Guards
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Airborne Division of the 20th Corps on a narrow sector. At the same time the enemy went over to the offensive in the area of the 31st Corps. In both sectors the Germans encountered a well-organised resistance and heavy artillery fire. The Soviet troops staunchly absorbed continuous enemy attacks. In the area of Zamj, however, the Germans managed to wedge into the positions of the 20th Guards Corps and seize the inhabited localities of Srkeresztes and Mih. On January 11, an estimated 100 panzers and nearly two infantry regiments pierced the Soviet defences on a narrow sector and captured Zamj. But there artillery and air strikes and counterattacks by the reserves brought the German offensive to a stop. In five days the enemy penetrated only seven kilometres into the defences of the 20th Guards Corps of the 4th Guards Army. The enemy drive at Bicske likewise fell short of its objective. Once again I cannot but mention the names of those whose deeds and truly legendary heroism in the battle for Hungary multiplied the glory of the Soviet Army. A group of panzers attacked a battery of the 1963rd Antitank Regiment. Within 30 minutes Soviet gunners destroyed several vehicles but about 20 managed to come almost right up to the battery, sweeping the gunners with fire from guns and machine-guns. Many were killed but the rest continued to fight against heavy odds. Ten panzers made for the positions held by a platoon under S. I. Yermolayev. Crippling nine Tigers the men ran out of ammunition and, with the exception of Komsomolmember Yermolayev, were either killed or wounded. Clutching a bundle of antitank grenades he hurled himself under the caterpillars of the remaining vehicle. For this feat he was posthumously made Hero of the Soviet Union. Several days earlier, on January 8, Private Mazurkevich of the 84th Guards Division performed a no less heroic exploit. A panzer spitting shells and bullets was heading straight for his trench. Mazurkevich hurled two grenades. But when they failed to stop the vehicle, he leaped out of the trench and jumped on the panzer and covered the muzzle of the machine gun with his body. A minute later the panzer was smashed. Though the first and second counterblows did not produce
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the desired results the German Command continued its efforts to relieve the troops surrounded in Budapest. Their situation was worsening due to heavy losses and a shortage of food and ammunition. In these circumstances the German Command decided to regroup its forces and strike another, more powerful counterblow at the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. This time it planned to deliver a massive panzer attack out of an area southwest of Szekesfehervar with the view to piercing the Soviet defences between lakes Velencei and Balaton. After that the enemy was to push in the general direction of Danapentele, reach the Danube and split the front in two. Then the Germans intended to make a thrust along the Danube in the northerly direction, smash the ring around their Budapest group and jointly with it wipe out the 4th Guards and the 46th armies. Subsequently the German Command planned to reorientate the main forces of the assault group to the south to enable it to co-operate with the 2nd Panzer Army, which was to counterattack Kaposvar from the east, and also with part of the forces of Army Group F, advancing from the southern bank of the Drava along the Danube to the north, in annihilating the 57th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and securing a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Danube. The operational concept of the German Command should be given its due. It was both bold and elaborated to the last detail, and the German Command had sufficient forces at its disposal to believe in its success. On a 35-kilometre sector from Srkeresztes to Lake Balaton the Germans assembled five of their best panzer divisionsthe 1st, 3rd and 23rd, the SS 5th Panzer Division Wiking and the SS 3rd Panzer Division Totenkopfa brigade of assault guns, a battalion of Royal Tigers, an infantry division and four brigades. This force had nearly 600 panzers and assault guns and over 1,200 artillery guns and mortars. Confronting the enemy in the direction of the main blow was the 135th Infantry Corps (4th Guards Army) under General P. V. Gnedin, and units of the 1st Guards Fortified Area commanded by General S. I. Nikitin. At 08.30 hours on January 18 following a powerful 30minute artillery preparation 150 panzers and 60 armoured personnel carriers attacked the positions of the 135th
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Infantry Corps northwest of Lake Balaton. To pin down the Soviet forces, the enemy threw part of its infantry and panzers into an assault along the entire front of the 4th Guards Army. Utilising their preponderance in the direction of the main blow, the Germans penetrated the defences of the 135th Infantry Corps on a 20-kilometre sector and advanced to a depth ranging from 16 to 30 kilometres. The Soviet troops found themselves in a difficult situation. Committed piecemeal to action without the necessary artillery preparation, and experiencing a shortage of tanks, General F. G. Katkov's 7 th Mechanised Corps could not stop the enemy. In the face of the determined resistance of the Soviet troops the enemy, feeding fresh forces into battle, on January 19 crossed the Srvz Canal and on the following morning reached the Danube between Adony and Dunapentele. Separate groups of panzers managed to break through to Dunafldvar where the 3rd Ukrainian Front had its HQ. Meantime the 3rd Panzer Division and infantry units pressed back the 135th Infantry Corps and the troops of the 1st Guards Fortified Area and advanced to the southeast between Lake Balaton and the Srvz Canal. Enemy units reached the Siofok-Mezkomr-Cece line on the right flank of the 57th Army. The situation became critical for the Soviet forces. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was cut in two. A 50-kilometre gap unoccupied by the Soviet troops appeared between Lake Balaton and the Danube. The Germans were poised over the right flank and rear of the 57th Army and some units had broken through to Szekszrd, threatening the crossings at Mohacs and Baja. These crossings were vital for the 57th Army's supply system. Though so far the enemy refrained from attacking the 57th Army head on, the threat to its rear created a tense situation, particularly in units and elements on the defensive at Szekszrd, Pcs and Dombovar. On January 20 chief of army supplies General T. T. Kobzar reported to the Commander of the 57th Army that German saboteurs were wrecking communication lines and bridges and Scattering anti-vehicular obstacles on the roads. There were cases of Soviet supply units being fired at when they were being redeployed during the night hours.
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To cover the right flank and the rear of his troops and also to assist the 4th Guards Army, the commander of the 57th Army in the period from January 19 to 21 shifted the 233rd and the 236th infantry divisions, the 32nd Mechanised Brigade and the 160th Artillery Brigade into the area of the Kapos and Elus canals, along which they took up positions facing the north to prevent the enemy from cutting into the rear of the 57th Army. Units of the 135th Corps which had withdrawn into the zone of the 57th Army and incorporated in it, also took up defences along the canals. A reserve regiment, a convalescent battalion, officers' training courses and all army road-building units augmented by antitank artillery were shifted into the area of Szekszrd to consolidate the defences deep behind the lines of the 57th Army. Member of the army Military Council General G. G. Galiyev with a group of staff officers also went there. In the night of January 19, Marshal Tolbukhin summoned me to the phone. He wanted to know my opinion concerning the possibility of withdrawing the 57th Army to the opposite bank of the Danube. I reported that the German troops who had broken through to the Danube were within 25-30 kilometres from the 57th Army's crossings, while its main forces were 120-150 kilometres away from them. It followed, therefore, that the enemy would reach the crossings long before the Soviet troops. This would put the army in a very serious position. Moreover, the 2nd Panzer Army, which so far had not gone over to the offensive, would not fail to do so as soon as the Soviet troops began to retreat (incidentally, that was exactly what it had planned to do). Then the retreating forces would have to fight their way out of encirclement. There was only one answer to his question: the withdrawal of the 57th Army across the Danube was completely out of the question; all it could do was to remain on the defensive along the line which it occupied. Then Marshal Tolbukhin asked: "What would you do if the Germans manage to take your army in a ring?" "I'll take up perimeter defence in the mountains south of Pcs and remain on the defensive until you come to our assistance, We have enough ammunition and food."
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"Your decision is correct," the front commander said encouragingly. "On our part we will prevent the Germans from reaching the crossings and from encircling you." Later, I was told that Marshal Tolbukhin telephoned me on orders from Stalin who had raised the question of withdrawing all the front's troops to the opposite bank of the Danube. Prompt and efficient measures had to be taken to prevent the advancing enemy forces from linking up with the Budapest group. Accordingly, Marshal Tolbukhin decided to concentrate the front's main forces on the Kissvelencei-GrfDanube line and to establish a new defence line between Lake Velencei and the Danube. The 1st Guards Mechanised Corps under General I. I. Russiyanov, the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps under General S. I. Gorshkov and the 113th Infantry Division of the 57th Army were rushed to the area. Simultaneously an all-out effort was made to stop the Germans advancing along the Danube and the Srvz Canal, and prevent them from cutting into the rear of the 57th Army and reaching the crossings at Baja and Mohacs. With this aim in view the front command established another defensive line. Its right flank abutting on the Danube eight kilometres north of Dunafldvar, it passed through Cece and then along the southern bank of the Elus Canal to the southern shore of Lake Balaton. This line was taken up by the 30th and 133rd Infantry corps, 18th Tank Corps and the 135th Infantry Corps of the 57th Army. As a result the enemy offensive in this sector was halted on January 22. In the zone of the 4th Guards Army the situation remained tense, as the enemy persisted in his efforts to break through to Budapest. By January 25, having brought into the sector three SS panzer divisions and a battalion of Royal Tigers, 220 panzers all told, the enemy broke through into the Vly-Vereb area some 20-25 kilometres from Budapest. To plug the breach the Soviet Command hastily transferred the L04th Infantry and the 23rd Tank corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which were attached to the 3rd Ukrainian Front. This armoured shield firmly blocked the way to the advancing enemy forces, and on January 26 their drive on Budapest was also brought to a stop. Sustaining heavy casualties in men and armour, the Germans were forced to go over to the defensive.
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Budapest Is Free Having heavily mauled the enemy group in defensive battles, the 3rd Ukrainian Front went over to the offensive on J a n u a r y 27. Its task was to smash the forces which had broken through to the Danube and those operating on the approaches to the Hungarian capital. T h e blow from the north between Lake Velencei and the Danube in the general direction of Srsd was delivered by the 104th Infantry, 23rd Tank and 5th Guards Cavalry corps, all of the 4th Guards Army. From the south the drive on Srsd was launched by the 30th and 133rd infantry corps and the 18th Tank Corps which on J a n u a r y 28 were placed under General N. A. Gagen, commander of the 26th Army. T h e 135th Infantry Corps of the 57th Army made a thrust in the direction of Abo. T h e Germans put up a determined resistance but failing to withstand the Soviet onslaught began withdrawing to the west on the first day of the offensive. On J a n u a r y 29, the Soviet forces reduced the wedge northeast of Lake Velencei. In six days the 3rd Ukrainian Front had eliminated the threat of an enemy breakthrough to Budapest, and drove out the Germans from almost the entire territory which they had captured in the course of their third counterblow. T h e 17th Air Army supported the Soviet offensive and its shattering blows contributed much to the success of the operation. Those who participated in the battles for the liberation of Hungary recall with gratitude the sailors of the Danube Flotilla which delivered supplies to the troops and transferred reserves from the east to the west bank. Beating off attacks on the outer ring of encirclement, the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts continued their efforts to reduce the almost 200,000-strong enemy group surrounded in Budapest. In a directive on J a n u a r y 18 G H Q set the 2nd Ukrainian Front the task of driving the enemy out of the western part of the city. As a result the 3rd Ukrainian Front could wholly concentrate on smashing the enemy forces which were trying to break through to the surrounded group. In other words, its task was confined to fighting on the outer ring of encirclement. Operations in the city itself were conducted by a specials

ally-formed Budapest task force under General I. M. Afonin who was later wounded in action and replaced by General I. M. Managarov. I shall not give a detailed account of the fighting in the Hungarian capital since much has already been written and will be written about it by those who had taken a direct part in it. I should only like to emphasise that it is an extremely difficult task to take a large, heavily fortified city defended by a major enemy force by storm, and that only highly skilled, battle-hardened troops are capable of fulfilling it. The Soviet troops who stormed Budapest had accumulated vast experience in conducting such operations. They had fought in Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Odessa, Kharkov and Voronezh and knew how to dislodge the enemy from huge stone buildings that had been turned into fortresses. And, indeed, every building in Budapest had been turned into a fortress. There were barricades in all streets and squares and permanent fire emplacements in all houses. The enemy resisted violently. The garrison's considerable stocks of rations and ammunition were regularly replenished by air. It was only from January 9, after the Soviet troops had seized the city race course which served as a landing strip for enemy planes, that the Germans were deprived of this opportunity. Its combat capacity sustained at a high level by Hitler's promise of assistance, the doomed garrison fought back tooth and nail. But neither fortifications, nor the violent resistance, nor the enemy's desperate attempts to break the ring of encirclement could stop the Soviet forces. Fighting for each city block, for each house and displaying unsurpassed courage they fulfilled their internationalist duty, routed the enemy group and on February 13, completed the liberation of the Hungarian capital. Hungarian patriots, including officers and men who had gone over to the Soviet side, took part in the fighting for Budapest. At first they were united into companies which were incorporated into various Soviet units. Later these companies were merged into the Buda Regiment under the command of Hungarian Colonel Oszkr Vrihzy. During the fighting for Buda the 2,500-strong regiment lost nearly 600 officers and men killed and wounded.
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The participation of the Buda Volunteer Regiment in the battles for the liberation of Budapest was in itself a manifestation of the Hungarian people's desire to cast off the nazi yoke as quickly as possible and to withdraw from the war in which the Hungarian bourgeoisie had embroiled them. The loss of Budapest deprived the German Command of a very important fortified area. The Soviet troops took 138,000 prisoners and seized a vast quantity of military equipment. From January 2 to February 13 alone, the enemy lost more than 70,000 officers and men killed and also 800 panzers, assault guns and armoured personnel carriers, and some 280 aircraft in the fighting for the Hungarian capital. In the course of the Budapest operation the anti-war struggle of the Hungarian patriots led by the Communist Party of Hungary acquired still greater proportions. The population disobeyed evacuation orders. The peasants sabotaged food deliveries, and the Szalasists were unable to mobilise the population to take part in building fortifications. The mass desertion from Szalasi's army was another factor that gave added impetus to the people's resistance movement. The population willingly sheltered deserters and young men who sought to avoid conscription. There was a marked increase in the activity of armed Resistance groups and partisan detachments. And though their activity did not acquire a broad scale, its political significance was considerable. It showed the population that the complete expulsion of the invaders from the country could be attained only by a determined armed struggle conducted with the firm support of the Soviet Army. The provisional Hungarian government moved from Debrecen to Budapest a month after its liberation. Thanks to the assistance of the Soviet Union, which furnished the Hungarian population with large quantities of provisions and a considerable sum of money, and the daily solicitude of the Soviet forces for the needs of the local population, life in the liberated areas of Hungary gradually returned to normal. The presence of the Soviet Army held the reactionary forces in check, but rural and urban areas were in the grip
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of an extremely bitter class struggle. Several years passed before popular rule finally triumphed in the country. With Budapest liberated, a considerable portion of the country was still under the nazi jackboot, and the Soviet troops were preparing for fresh battles. The Balaton Defensive Operation On February 17, 1945, G H Q issued a directive instructing the headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts to prepare and carry out an operation in the Vienna direction. It ordered the Soviet troops to smash Army Group South and complete the liberation of Hungary and the eastern part of Austria. The operation was scheduled to begin on March 15. At the concluding phase of the war the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts were to play a major role in the final rout of nazi Germany. T h e success of the Soviet Army in the main, Berlin, sector largely depended on the outcome of the offensive on Vienna. It was clear that a rapid advance of the Soviet divisions in the southeast and the rout of the major Army Group South in Hungary and Austria, would take them right up to Germany's southern industrial regions. In these circumstances the German Command had a lot to think about. But just as the headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts had started to prepare for the Vienna offensive operation, G H Q issued a fresh order instructing the two fronts to establish deeply-echeloned defences along their present lines and at the same time to continue preparations for the drive on Vienna. T h e Soviet Command had learned that the Germans were concentrating forces for another m a j o r counter-offensive in western Hungary. On February 17, 1945, a large panzer force dealt a heavy blow at the 7th Guards Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front out of the Komrno area north of the Danube, and compelled the Soviet troops to withdraw to the eastern bank of the Hron. Reconnaissance established that the SS 6th Panzer Army, which formerly operated in the Ardennes on the Western Front, had taken part in these battles. Its transfer
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to Hungary showed that the German Command attached great importance to the counterblow in the southeast. At the end of February reconnaissance reported that a large number of panzers had been concentrated against the 3rd Ukrainian Front northeast of Lake Balaton. Thus, despite the German Command's efforts to conceal the movement of its forces, the Soviet Command managed to get timely information about the location of the enemy group, and the direction of its main blow and also to find out approximate time when it would go over to the offensive. Later it became known that the German Command decided to undertake this fresh large-scale operation in Hungary in order to strengthen its position in the country and in Austria, to retain Nagykanisza oilfields and also to prevent the entry of the Soviet troops into Austria with her major munitions plants. In general, these were the old plans of holding on to the most important strategic and economic regions. At the beginning of 1945 there were over 600 munitions plants in Austria. Each month they produced 850 panzers and armoured vehicles and over a thousand guns, and each year Austria made 9,000 aircraft, 17,000 engines and a large quantity of other equipment and ammunition for the Wehrmacht. In 1945, the author of this article saw a large number of munitions factories, most of them located under the ground, in Bruck, Graz, Leibnitz and many other Austrian cities. Besides using Austria's economic potential in the war against the USSR, Hitler also used her manpower resources: more than 1,500,000 Austrians had been conscripted into the Wehrmacht. Getting ready to launch a fresh counter-offensive in the area of Lake Balaton, the Germans intended to split, encircle and wipe out the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front with a massive panzer strike, reach the Danube and recapture Budapest. They calculated that this operation would enable them not only to retain their hold on western Hungary, Austria and southern Germany, but would also force the Soviet Command to shift a part of its troops from the Berlin direction to the south. Should the counteroffensive succeed, the German Command intended to transfer its panzer forces from Hungary to the central sector of
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the Soviet-German front with all possible speed and improve the situation in the Berlin direction. The counter-offensive was to take the form of three converging blows. The main blow was to be delivered by the SS 6th Panzer Army and the 6th Field Army between lakes Velencei and Balaton in the southeasterly direction with the object of reaching the Danube at Dunapentele-Dunafldvar-Szekszard and cutting the 3rd Ukrainian Front in two. After that the two armies were to advance to the north and south along the western bank of the Danube and in co-operation with the 2nd Panzer Army and part of the forces of Army Group E surround and reduce the fragmented units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The second blow was to be delivered by the 2nd Panzer Army from the Nagykanisza area to the east at Kaposvar, against the 57th Army. The third blow was to be struck by part of the forces of Army Group E from the southern bank of the Drava against the Bulgarian 1st Army under General Stoichev and the Yugoslav 3rd Army, in the direction of Pcs and Szekszrd to meet the 6th Panzer Army. The Germans planned to attack the 3rd Ukrainian Front with a group consisting of 31 divisions, including 11 panzer divisions, and a number of battalions of Royal Tigers, totalling 431,000 officers and men, 877 panzers and assault guns, 5,630 guns and mortars and 850 planes. Once again the 3rd Ukrainian Front had to tackle urgent tasks. Simultaneously with preparations for an offensive it had to organise positions for a sustained defence, wear down the enemy, and then mount an offensive, smash the German group and press on Vienna. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive the front had five field armies (4th Guards, 26th, 27th, 57th and Bulgarian 1st), the 17th Air Army, two tank, one mechanised and one cavalry corps. All told it had over 400,000 officers and men, nearly 7,000 guns and mortars, 400 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,000 aircraft. The front commander decided to concentrate the main defence efforts between lakes Velencei and Balaton, where the Germans were most likely to undertake vigorous operations. Here, the German forces were only 30 kilometres from the Danube and a thrust in this sector would be particularly telling. Since it was clear that the German Command placed its
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stakes on panzer attacks, the Soviet Command established deeply-echeloned antitank defences with the 4th Guards, the 26th, 57th and the Bulgarian 1st armies in the first echelon, and the 27th Army in the second. Two tank, one mechanised and one cavalry corps, possessing a large amount of weapons and equipment, and a number of separate artillery regiments and large units were held in reserve. The 4th Guards Army under General N. D. Zakhvatayev was to thwart an enemy breakthrough from the area of Szekesfehervar to Budapest; the 26th Army had orders to block the way to the enemy striking out of the Polgard towards Dunafldvar; the 57th Army was to prevent an enemy penetration in the Kaposvar sector by establishing firm defences south of Lake Balaton. Holding defences on the left of the 57th Army, the Bulgarian 1st Army was to prevent the enemy from crossing to the northern bank of the Drava. The rearward line, as we have already said, was held by the 27th Army under General S. G. Trofimenko. This line passed between Lake Velencei and Dunapentele. Air support was to be provided by the 17th Air Army. Organising a rebuff to the counter-offensive, the troops of the front put in a vast amount of work to consolidate their positions and establish additional lines. They built several defensive zones consisting of two and sometimes three positions with interconnected trenches. The overall depth of the main zone ranged from 6 to 8 kilometres, and the second zone was established 12 kilometres from the forward edge of the battle area. Army defensive zones consisting of several trenches were from 25 to 30 kilometres deep. Front defensive zones were established in the rear of the armies, wherever there was enough space. Needless to say, the most formidable defences were established on the approaches to the forward line where the density of the minefields was as high as 750 antitank and 700 anti-personnel mines per one kilometre of the front. In armour-vulnerable directions the density of antitank and anti-personnel mines was 2,700 and 2,500 respectively per one kilometre of the front. The overall depth of all types of obstacles varied from 12 to 15 kilometres. The organisation of antitank defences received primary attention in all armies. These defences extended to a depth of 30 kilometres. The average density of antitank artillery
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was 15 to 20 guns per one kilometre of the frontage. All divisions and armies constituted antitank artillery reserves and mobile obstacle-installing teams with adequate stocks of mines for manoeuvring with antitank means. All headquarters, from bottom to top, worked out plans of defensive operations, taking into account the possible variants of the enemy's counter-offensive. Marshal Tolbukhin personally took up all questions of co-operation between armies, divisions and the various arms of the service. At the end of February 1945 he inspected the state of preparedness of the 57 th Army and was satisfied with measures that had been taken to strengthen the defences and repel the enemy attack. At the same time he pointed out that the army's main task was to prevent a breakthrough in the Kaposvar direction, wear down the attacking forces and then go over to the offensive which was scheduled to take place in the near future. He made it clear that parallel with defensive measures the army should also prepare for an offensive and set aside large reserves for that purpose. He also told me that the army would be reinforced by an infantry corps from the front reserve. After that the front commander summoned the commanders of the 57 th, the Bulgarian 1st and the Yugoslav 3rd armies to a meeting in Szigetvar where all questions concerning the co-operation of the front's left-wing forces in the event of a German offensive were thoroughly discussed and agreed. He warned the army commanders that the enemy would shortly launch an offensive. The commanders and the various headquarters held exercises during which the enemy's actions and tactics in the preceding battles were analysed. The principal emphasis was made on organising co-operation in fighting the panzers. Replenishments which lacked combat experience were put through rigorous training to avoid possible tank-sickness. As the defensive preparations continued, the commanders, Party organisations and political departments conducted extensive educational work, mainly for the purpose of sustaining the high morale of the troops, their state of preparedness and high military discipline, and coupled it with explanation of the tasks they would have to accomplish. It was of the utmost importance to instruct every private, sergeant and officer in combat methods, and to organise
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insurmountable defences. The men were informed about the methods and fighting tactics employed by the Germans in the course of offensive operations: massive panzer attacks on narrow sectors and the infiltration of small groups of submachine-gunners to raise panic behind the lines. In an appeal to the officers and men the Military Council summoned the men to stand fast and expressed confidence that they would fulfil their mission with honour. As the front prepared for defence, the influx of officers and men into the Party increased. In February 1945, a total of 374 men were accepted to full or probationary Party membership in the 64th Corps of the 57th Army alone. It was March 1945, and the end of the war was in sight. Berliners could even hear the thunder of Soviet artillery. The day was drawing near when the Soviet troops would begin their assault on the citadel of nazism. Such was the situation when the mortally wounded enemy launched his last counter-offensive. . . . As the Soviet Command had expected, the Germans went over to the offensive on the southern wing of the SovietGerman front almost simultaneously from three directions: between lakes Velencei and Balaton, from the Nagykanisza area in the direction of Kaposvar, and from the area of Donji Mikoljac and Valpovo at Pcs and Szekszrd. Early in the morning of March 6, the Germans delivered a powerful artillery and air preparation in the sector of the main thrust. The earth groaned and heaved with the explosions of thousands of shells and bombs. Panzers and infantry attacked 30 minutes later. The heaviest blow fell on the Soviet 26th Army deployed between Seregeies and Lake Balaton. It was spearheaded at the positions of the 30th Infantry Corps and the troops of the 1st Guards Fortified Area on the defensive between Lake Velencei and the Srvz Canal. Here the Germans attacked with two panzer and two infantry divisions. The blow west of the Srvz Canal, at the positions of the 135th and 104th corps on the left flank of the 26th Army, was delivered by two Hungarian tank divisions and one Hungarian infantry division along the Srvz Canal at Simontorna and Ozora. The first line of the attacking forces alone had 300 panzers and assault guns. It was a fierce battle from the outset. Thousands of guns
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and hundreds of planes pounded the enemy. Firing pointblank submachine-gunners and antitank gunners inflicted huge losses on the attacking forces. The enemy continued his desperate drive and in some sectors managed to wedge into Soviet positions to a depth of 3 or 4 kilometres. By the end of the first day the Germans captured Seregeies, but failed to pierce the main line of resistance. On the following morning the enemy threw fresh forces into action in an all-out effort to reach the Danube. On that day up to three infantry divisions and 200 panzers supported by powerful air strikes attacked the 26th Army which resisted tenaciously widely resorting to fire at the panzers from ambushes. The army and the front commands were building up forces by feeding reserves into action and transferring artillery units from the unattacked sectors of the front. On March 6 and 7 three antitank artillery regiments, an infantry division and the 18th Tank Corps were shifted to the area of Lake Velencei and Seregeies. In the morning of March 7 General S. I. Gorshkov's 5th Guards Cavalry Corps drawn from the front reserve and two self-propelled artillery regiments of the 208th Brigade went into action to repulse an attack west of the Srvz Canal-Ozora sector. Thanks to these measures the enemy could wedge into Soviet positions to a depth of not more than 4-7 kilometres. In two days of fighting the enemy lost over 4,000 officers and men and more than 100 panzers. On March 8, 9 and 10 the Germans threw the fresh SS 2nd Panzer Division and the 9th and 3rd panzer divisions into action. In some important sectors the density of panzers and assault guns was as high as 40 to 50 per kilometre of the front. A savage battle raged on the plain between Lake Velencei and the Srvz Canal. The 30th Infantry and the 18th Tank corps put up a particularly great fight and managed to limit the enemy's advance in this direction to a few kilometres. The most difficult situation developed in the zone of the 135th Infantry Corps to the west of the Canal where on March 9 the enemy broke through to a depth of 20 kilometres. In these circumstances the front commander ordered the 27th Army, which was reinforced by the 30th Infantry
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Corps detached from the 26th Army, an infantry division transferred from the 33rd Infantry Corps, one mechanised and two tank corps and a self-propelled artillery brigade to take over the sector extending from Lake Velencei to the Srvz Canal. The 26th Army received instructions to stand firm on the Srvz Canal-Lake Balaton line. It was reinforced by all but one divisions of the 33rd Infantry Corps, which replaced the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps on the defensive along the Elus and Kapos canals. T h e Soviet troops deployed along the Cece-Simontorna line were reinforced by a self-propelled artillery brigade, a tank regiment and two antitank artillery regiments. On March 10 and 11 the enemy continued to push ahead along both banks of the Srvz Canal. Throwing about 450 panzers into battle the attacking forces managed to wedge into the defence of the 27th Army to a depth of 10 kilometres. West of the canal they seized the town of Simontorna. On March 14 the German Command committed its last reserves, the 6th Panzer Division and part of forces of the Totenkopf Division into action. For two days this group numbering more than 300 panzers tried to breach the Soviet defences, but it was brought to a stop at the army rearward defensive line and failed to reach the Danube. On March 15, the offensive in the main sector bogged down. Losing over 500 panzers and assault guns and an estimated 45,000 officers and men killed and taken prisoner, the enemy was forced to go over to the defensive. In ten days of fighting the enemy advanced 15 kilometres in the area of Lake Velencei and 30 kilometres west of the Srvz Canal, but failed to reach the Danube, the main objective of the operation. T h e counter-offensive in the area between lakes Velencei and Balaton was a complete failure. It only added thousands of dead and crippled to the horrifying list of casualties sustained by Germany as a result of the policy of her adventuristic ruling circles. South of Lake Balaton The enemy's second blow was delivered at Kaposvar, out of the Nagybajom area. Spearheaded against the 57th Army, it was undertaken by the 2nd Panzer Army consisting of
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five divisions and two assault gun brigades. All told approximately 70,000 enemy officers and men were concentrated in the area. The 57th Army's seven infantry divisions and one mechanised brigade occupied a defensive zone south of Lake Balaton. Extending for 120 kilometres, it ran from Zamrdi on the lake's southern shore to Keresztr and then further south of Nagykorpad. The army's main forces were assembled in the Kaposvar direction where the enemy was most likely to attack. The first line consisted of the 6th Guards and the 64th infantry corps deployed in double-echelon formation. The 104th Infantry Division, the 32nd Mechanised Brigade, one tank regiment and two self-propelled artillery regiments constituted the Army's reserve. According to reconnaissance reports the Germans were bringing up reserves and preparing to strike out in the Kaposvar direction. At 07.00 hours on March 6, 1945, following a powerful artillery and air preparation, three enemy divisions supported by panzers launched an attack in the zone of General I. K. Kravtsov's 64th Corps. The blow was aimed at the junction of the 73rd Guards and 299th infantry divisions under generals S. A. Kozak and N. G. Travnikov in the Nagybajom-Kuts sector where the enemy had a considerable troop and weapons density: up to four infantry battalions, 20-25 panzers and 120 guns per kilometre of the front. To develop the success, the German Command had a motorised division in the second echelon. From the 57th Army CP we had a good view of the panzers breaking the way for the infantry. Luftwaffe planes swarmed in the sky. Something like 30 panzers, their guns blazing, fanned out towards the positions held by the 956th Regiment of the 299th Infantry Division. Two infantry regiments supported by 35-40 panzers and assault guns attacked the division's 958th Regiment. Four infantry regiments with panzers struck a blow at the 73rd Guards Division north and south of Nagybajom. A curtain of smoke, fire and dust rose over the battlefield. The earth and the air trembled with the roar of hundreds of guns and mortars. By midday the Soviet troops began to pull back to the second line of defence. A very difficult situation developed in the zone of the 299th Division whose battle formation
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had been split by the attacking forces. Its 958th Regiment withdrew from the third position and having deployed to face the north was fighting on a switch position. The 956th Regiment, retreating to the third position, had lost contact with the divisional commander. Reporting the situation to Marshal Tolbukhin I requested air support. "There's nothing I can do in this respect," he replied. "All aircraft are beating off the enemy in the main direction. You'll have to rely on the forces at your disposal, and under no circumstances allow the enemy to break through to Kaposvar." All I could do in the situation was to throw the second echelon of the 64th Corps, the 113th Infantry Division, into the fighting. This division was activated on the basis of the 5th Volunteer Division of the Frunze District, Moscow. At the same time I ordered the 31st Regiment of the Bulgarian 1st Army's 12th Infantry Division to move into position and take in the flank of the attacking forces. Fighting flared up with renewed force. Colonel P. N. Naidyshev's 113th Division abandoned its trenches and charged under cover of tanks and artillery. There were several interminable minutes when the dust and earth raised by exploding shells concealed the attacking infantry from view and only the thunderous "hurray" of thousands of Soviet troops vibrated in the air. Developments on the battlefield followed the pattern of the recent exercises. But now they were fighting against a real enemy. In this engagement the gunners commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. F. Ivanchenko gave an excellent account of themselves. Holding their ground in the face of 15 panzers, they engaged the enemy in a life-and-death battle. When most of the gun crews were either dead or wounded Senior Lieutenant Ivanchenko personally destroyed another two p a n z e r s . . . . He was killed, but the enemy failed to pass through the battery's positions. For heroism in action Senior Lieutenant Andrei Ivanchenko was posthumously made Hero of the Soviet Union. On March 6 the enemy was brought to a stop by a counterattack launched by the 113th Division and the Bulgarian 31st Regiment. At Jak the enemy forces were hurled back 1.5-2 kilometres.
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In the evening I arrived at the 64th Corps CP situated in the area of Kiskorpad to take stock of the situation, and talked to the commander of the 113th Infantry Division which was operating in the main direction. Both General Kravtsov and Colonel Naidyshev reported that their troops were ready for combat and determined to repel the enemy. Concentrating the main effort in the zone of the 64th Corps, the enemy planned to advance on Kiskorpad and Samajm with the view to cutting the road in this area and developing the assault on Kaposvar. In this connection the Soviet Command in the night of March 6 reinforced the 64th Corps with a tank regiment, a self-propelled artillery regiment, two antitank artillery regiments and a mobile antitank mine-laying team. The 104th Infantry Division and the 32nd Mechanised Brigade of the army reserve were also rushed to strengthen the defences in the Kaposvar sector. Bringing up reserves the German Command resumed the offensive on March 7. On that day the most strenuous trials fell to the lot of the 113th Division. It repulsed 15 attacks by five infantry regiments and 50-60 panzers and assault guns which tried to break through to Samajm and straddle the Kaposvar highway. The Soviet troops fulfilled their assignment. The enemy failed to pierce the division's positions and managed to capture only a few trenches in isolated sectors. On that day Senior Sergeant Afanasi Smyshlayev, a Communist, performed an immortal deed which was brought to the knowledge of every soldier of the 57th Army. It was related in an address of the Military Council that was read out in the trenches and artillery batteries. Senior Sergeant Smyshlayev died a hero's death at the inhabited locality of Balzka (north of Jak) where a company of the 1288th Infantry Regiment was on the defensive in the main sector of the German offensive. All the officers of the company had been either killed or wounded and squad leader Senior Sergeant Smyshlayev assumed command over the surviving twelve men. The Germans hurled 12 panzers and 150 infantrymen in an attempt to dislodge Smyshlayev's group, and then followed up with several attacks in a row although they had already lost scores of men. Finally, one of the panzers managed to come close to
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the trenches. One arm hanging limp at his side, Smyshlayev was wounded in his good arm just as he was about to throw a grenade. Now there was only one way of stopping the panzer. He rose to his feet and pressing the grenade to his body threw himself under the monster's stracks. The explosion that crippled the panzer killed the hero. The remains of Afanasi Smyshlayev, bearer of the Order of Glory, Hero of the Soviet Union, were buried in Hungary. The grateful citizens of Kiskorpad built an obelisk, which has always fresh flowers at its foot, in memory of the fearless Soviet soldiers.... On March 8 and 9 the Germans continued their savage attacks in the Kaposvar sector but encountering the stiff resistance of the Soviet forces were unable to make any progress. In this period they lost 30 panzers and nearly 2,000 men killed. And again Soviet soldiers performed unforgettable acts of heroism for the sake of the freedom of the Hungarian people. Sergeant Ivan Nelyubin, a gunner of the 239th Separate Antitank Battalion, repeated the exploit of Afanasi Smyshlayev. Breaking the way for the submachine-gunners four panzers with a Royal Tiger in the lead made for the flank of the Soviet troops where Sergeant Nelyubin's antitank gun was positioned in a masked emplacement. Fired point-blank his first shell smashed the Royal Tiger's track. The panzer began to spin, giving Nelyubin a chance to fire his second shell which pierced its side plating. The Germans however had detected the gun's position and showered it with shells and bullets. Within a few minutes the entire crew, with the exception of Nelyubin, was put out of action. But the battle continued and he crippled another panzer. Just then a shell from an assault gun fired at close range exploded nearby. Heavily wounded by a flying splinter, Nelyubin tried to fire another shell. But it was too late. The panzer had already reached the gun. And so Nelyubin with a grenade in either hand hurled himself at the armoured vehicle. His comrades buried him with military honours. At the grave of Hero of the Soviet Union Sergeant Ivan Nelyubin they pledged to avenge his death. The list of heroes and their feats could be continued. But these two examples give a sufficiently full idea of the
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courage of the Soviet soldiers and their determination to give their lives for the sake of their internationalist duty. Sustaining a setback in this sector, the Germans tried to breach the Soviet defensive at other points. Three times in March they changed the direction of their blows in the zone of the 57th Army. But encountering the resolute resistance of the Soviet troops and sustaining heavy casualties the Germans stopped their offensive operations on March 22 and reverted to the defence. At this juncture I should like to say a few words about the performance of the friendly Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops. Here is just one example. In the night of March 5 an enemy force totalling three infantry divisions made a surprise crossing of the Drava at Doni Miholjac and Yalpovo, pushing the Bulgarian 3rd Infantry Division and the Yugoslav 12th Corps from the river to the north. By March 8 the Germans had gained two bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Drava. As a result, the enemy threatened to cut into the rear of the 57th Army and seize the river crossing at Batina and Mohacs. T h e task of wiping out the enemy force was assigned to General P. Artyushchenko's 133rd Infantry Corps reinforced with a tank regiment and a regiment of rocket launchers. Russian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops attacked the enemy and hurling his heavily mauled units across the Drava on March 20 restored the situation. T h e Balaton operation ended in complete victory for the Soviet troops. T h e offensive of the Germans in this area was their last major operation in the Second W o r l d W a r . The hopes of the German Command fell through. T h e Soviet victory not only foreshadowed the liberation of the whole of Hungary, but also enabled the Soviet troops to enter and liberate Austria. On Vienna Sustaining very heavy casualties in the Balaton operation the German Command urgently reinforced and strengthened its 6th Field Army, 6th SS Panzer Army and a Hungarian corps holding the Esztergom-SzekesfehervarSimontorna-Siofok line. South of Lake Balaton the 2nd
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Panzer Army continued its offensive operations unitl March 22 with the view to tying up the 57th Army and the Bulgarian 1st Army and compelling the Soviet Command to withdraw a part of its forces from the main sector. The German Command feared that the 57th Army might strike into the rear of its main group; for it jutted out far to the west and could cut all the westward retreat routes of the enemy. It was for this reason that the German Command tried to create the impression that its troops were conducting vigorous operations in the area. Despite the huge losses in manpower and weapons incurred in the Balaton operation, the enemy still had enough forces to conduct large-scale battles after the arrival of replenishments. The troops and weapons density on the Esztergom-Szekesfehervar-Simontorna-Siofok line was one division per 8-10 kilometres of the frontage, and 1215 guns and 3-4 panzers per one kilometre of the frontage. The enemy occupied well-organised, convenient positions in the mountains and woods. Villages and towns were adapted for perimeter defence and intermediate lines were being built in the rear. Facing the enemy on the Esztergom-Gant sector was the 46th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, consisting of 12 infantry divisions with 2,680 guns and mortars, 165 tanks and assault guns. The 3rd Ukrainian Front consisted of the 4th Guards Army, the 26th and 27th armies, and the 9th Guards Army drawn from the G H Q Reserve, all deployed between Gant and Siofok; the 57th Army and the Bulgarian 1st Army, which were stationed south of Lake Balaton and further along the Drava, were facing the 2nd Panzer Army; and General A. G. Kravchenko's 6th Guards Tank Army was in action west of Budapest. As the Vienna operation was about to begin, the situation that had developed at the front offered the Soviet troops an opportunity for smashing the main forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army which had wedged into their positions northeast and southeast of Lake Balaton in the course of the March offensive. It was necessary, therefore, to wipe out the enemy in the area of Lake Balaton and only then mount an offensive on Vienna. In the circumstances, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front decided to strike the main blow with the right234

dank 9th and 4th Guards armies from an area north of Szekesfehervar. Their task was to penetrate the defences in the Zamj-Kocher sector, reach the Vrpalota-Veszprm area, close the ring around the enemy forces and destroy them south and southwest of Szekesfehervar in co-operation with the 27th and 26th armies. After that the Soviet troops were to develop their offensive on Papa, Sopron and Vienna. The 27th and 26th armies were to advance on Polgardi (northeast of Lake Balaton) to join the 9th and 4th Guards armies in destroying the enemy. The 2nd Ukrainian Front's 46th Army under General A. V. Petrushevsky was to attack in the Vienna direction. Advancing south of the Danube in the general direction of Gyr, it had orders to press the enemy troops to the river and rout them west of Esztergom in co-operation with Rear Admiral G. N. Kholostyakov's Danube Flotilla. North of the Danube General M. S. Shumilov's 7th Guards Army was advancing on Bratislava. Fresh battles lay ahead. The 9th and 4 th Guards armies went into action on March 16 after a powerful artillery softening up, but made slow progress. Realising that should the Soviet troops capture Szekesfehervar and close the ring around the entire main German group southeast of Balaton, the German Command transferred considerable forces to the sector of the main blow. In the face of desperate resistance the Soviet troops advanced at a slow pace. By March 18 they managed to wedge into the enemy defences only to a depth of 10-12 kilometres along a 35-kilometre front. The field armies failed to encircle and smash the 6th Panzer Army due to shortage of tanks. The Soviet forces in the sector of the main blow had a 4:1 superiority in artillery and 9:1 superiority in men. But as regards tanks the ratio was 1:1, and in some sectors it was in favour of the Germans. Other adverse factors were bad weather, the hilly and wooded terrain, impassable roads and the spring floods which interdicted air and artillery operations. In many places the accompanying artillery had to be hauled by the man. In these conditions most of the fighting was done by the infantry. Having realised that the Soviet troops could encircle and smash the 6th Panzer Army, the German Command steadily
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reinforced its divisions facing the front's main group with panzers and motorised infantry shifted from other sectors. On March 19 Marshal Tolbukhin committed the 6th Guards Tank Army to action to speed up the offensive leaving the German Command with no choice other than to withdraw its forces under cover of strong rearguard units. In the other sector the 27th and 26th armies assumed the offensive on March 20 and on the following day reached the line Polgrdi-Lepsny-east of Lake Balaton. The 6th Guards Tank Army advanced in the face of stubborn resistance and numerous bitter counterattacks. By nightfall on March 21 it had pressed the main forces of the 6th Panzer Army into an area between Szekesfehervar, Polgardi and Lake Balaton, but was unable to close the ring around them. Sending out powerful panzer covering detachments to the north and east the enemy managed to pull considerable forces out of the pocket. On March 23, the front's right-wing troops gained possession of Szekesfehervar and Veszprm and continued to push ahead towards Vienna. On March 25, they advanced 80 kilometres, drove the enemy out of Vrpalota and reached the Ppa-Devecser line. On March 17 the 46th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went over to the offensive. It sliced through the enemy's positions south of the Danube and co-operating with the Danube Flotilla pressed the enemy's Esztergom-Tovaros group (4 divisions) to the river, smashed it and captured Esztergom, a powerful resistance centre in the system of German defences. Continuing to push ahead south of the Danube, the 46th Army routed the enemy at Gyr, captured this large town and on April 5 crossed into Austria at Bruck. After that the 46th Army crossed to the northern bank of the Danube at Bratislava with the assistance of the Danube Flotilla and continued its offensive to the northwest in the direction of Stockerau (north of Vienna), severing the enemy's retreat routes from the Austrian capital. The successful offensive in the Vienna direction enabled the 2nd Ukrainian Front to capture Bratislava and develop its drive at Brno and further into Czechoslovakia. In the meantime the 3rd Ukrainian Front was pushing ahead in high gear. On March 28 its troops forced the Raba and captured Csorna and Srvr. The heaviest battles took
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place on the Austro-Hungarian border at Sopron and Wiener-Neustadt, both important road junctions and resistance centres on the approaches to Vienna. Crushing the resistance of the enemy the Soviet troops captured these towns in the period from April 1 to 4. The successful operations of the front's main forces enabled the 57th Army and the Bulgarian 1st Army to launch active operations south of Lake Balaton. On March 29 they pierced the enemy defences and on the following day the 57th Army reached the approaches to Nagykanisza, while the Bulgarian divisions emerged on the SomodyVzvr line (south of Nagykanisza). As the Soviet Command expected, the German Command intended to hold on to Nagykanisza at all costs and turned it into a powerful resistance centre. When the 64th Corps failed to take the town in its stride, the army command decided to smash the entrenched enemy with three converging blows: while part of the troops of the 64th Corps were to strike a frontal blow, its main forces would envelop the town from the northwest and the 133rd Corps would launch an attack from the southwest. The plan was carried into effect. Taken by surprise the enemy troops fled in haste leaving the oil refineries and other enterprises intact. Towards the end of April 2 the 57th Army gained possession of the town and the adjoining oilfields. Pursuing the enemy, the 57th Army completed the liberation of Southwestern Hungary on April 4. Subsequently the 57th Army mounted an offensive on Graz and ended the war in the Eastern Alps. And so, on April 4, 1945, after 200 days of fighting the Soviet troops liberated the whole of Hungary. To commemorate the occasion the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic proclaimed April 4 a national holiday. Some years later Jnos Kdr declared: "Grim centuries, bitter recollections of oppression and slavery have taught the Hungarian people to value April 4 and consider it the greatest of their holidays... . Thanks to the victory of the Soviet people, of the Soviet fighting men, freedom triumphed in Hungary." Hungary's liberation from nazism started her people on the road of national independence, freedom and democracy.
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The Provisional Hungarian Government, which was established in December 1944, launched intensive activity to restore industrial enterprises and carry out the agrarian reform. The Communist Party of Hungary, which was in the forefront of the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of the country, consolidated its ranks and embarked on large-scale work to educate the masses and draw the working people into the building of a new life in which there would be no capitalists and landowners. Although the war was still in progress and the Soviet people were themselves experiencing serious difficulties, they rendered all possible assistance to the Hungarian people in their efforts to restore industrial enterprises, roads, bridges and communications lines. Large quantities of food and medicine were delivered to Budapest. In March alone, the Soviet Union sent 15,000 tons of grain, 3,000 tons of meat and 2,000 tons of sugar to the Hungarian capital. The Soviet soldier considered himself duty-bound to help their class brothers. Deszo Nemes, a figure prominent in Hungarian public affairs, wrote that "many Budapest children escaped a hungry death thanks to the Soviet soldiers who gave them their bread, and thanks to the meals issued by the Soviet Army's field kitchens. The Soviet Army also established contact with the provinces".* The Hungarians were sincerely grateful to the Soviet people and their heroic army for helping them cast off the loathed nazi yoke and launch the building of a new life. Emphasising this Deszo Nemes wrote: "Henceforth, wherever there are graves of Soviet soldiers and monuments honouring the memory of fallen Soviet officers and men, they will remind us that many sons of the Soviet people had given their lives for the freedom of the Hungarian people, that many Soviet mothers, widows, brothers, sisters and children are mourning the dead heroes. The profoundly grateful Hungarian people will preserve these graves and monuments as reminders of the bitter struggle that had been waged for the liberation of our country. Our liberated people pay tribute to the fallen heroes not by passively honouring their memory, but by deeds, by building a new life. And in doing so they are perpetuating the memory of those who
* Deszo Nemes, op. cit., p. 174.
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had shed their blood and sacrificed their lives to open the road for Hungary's democratic development.""' Visiting Hungary after the war, we, veterans of the battle for Hungary, received a most cordial welcome wherever we went. The Hungarian people carefully look after the graves of the Soviet fighting men and the numerous monuments erected in honour of the fallen Soviet heroes. Flowers never wither at these sacred places. Many Soviet soldiers lie buried in the centre of the Kaposvar city park. This cemetery is surrounded by rustling birches and weeping willows which were planted by the local Young Pioneers many years ago. The people of Hungary have the warmest feelings for the Soviet people who have opened for them the road leading to the establishment of a new great society. But let us return to those stern last days of the war. The Soviet troops continued their victorious drive on Vienna. Having lost the battle for Hungary, the German Command had no intention of surrendering the Austrian capital without a fight. It took timely measures to prepare the city for defence and fortified all the approaches to it. Antitank ditches, dragon's teeth and mine obstacles protected the city's outer perimeter. The beautiful bridges across the Danube were mined. The 6th SS Panzer Army on the defensive in the city consisted of six panzer divisions and infantry forces totalling three reinforced divisions. The Soviet force which had been concentrated for the attack on Vienna consisted of the 4th and 9th Guards armies and the 6th Guards Tank Army, all of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, and the 46th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 4th Guards Army and the 1st Guards Mechanised Corps were to drive the enemy out of the eastern and southeastern parts of the city, and the 9th Guards and the 6th Guards Tank armies were to envelop Vienna, cut off the enemy's escape routes to the west and capture the southern and western parts of the city. The 46th Army was to attack the Austrian capital from the north. On April 6, the first day of the battle for Vienna, Soviet advance units broke into its environs and engaged the enemy in street fighting. In an effort to save the Austrian
* Deszo Nemes, op. cit., pp. 229-300.
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capital with its numerous monuments from destruction, Marshal Tolbukhin summoned the Viennese to assist the Soviet Army in liberating the city and preventing the invaders from razing it to the ground. The appeal evoked an instantaneous response among the Viennese who did their best to safeguard the city's magnificent buildings and other great works of architecture. Crushing the tenacious resistance of the enemy, the Soviet forces liberated Vienna on April 13. In the battle for Vienna the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front alone killed over 19,000 enemy officers and men, took more than 47,000 prisoners and captured 650 panzers and assault guns, and more than a thousand guns and mortars. Pushing deeper into Austria the Soviet troops enveloped the enemy group operating in Czechoslovakia from the south, thus creating favourable conditions for the liberation of Prague. Moreover, the Soviet successes in Hungary and Austria enabled the Yugoslav troops to conduct successful offensive operations. By mid-April 1945, the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts reached the Morava-Stockerau-St. Poelten-left bank of the Drava line, covering a distance of 150-250 kilometres with heavy fighting. During their 30-day offensive the two fronts smashed 32 enemy divisions, took over 130,000 prisoners and captured or destroyed more than 1,300 panzers and assault guns and 2,250 field guns. Towards the end of the war the Soviet forces in Austria reached the Linz-Hieflec-Klagenfurt line where they linked up with the Anglo-US forces. The liberation of the eastern part of Austria by the Soviet troops vastly contributed to the independence of Austria, which in 1938 became the first victim of nazi aggression. The Austrian Government, which was formed in April 1945, included members of the Communist Party of Austria. It issued a decree proclaiming Austria's independence. Time will obliterate the memory of many events of those days, but the great exploit of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who had liberated many countries of Europe and Asia from the nazi yoke will live forever in the hearts of mankind. The coming generations will proudly recall and honour the memory of the Soviet heroes who performed miracles of bravery fulfilling their internationalist duty.

Lieutenant-General

k. f. t e l e g i n

THE FINALE

Over a quarter of a century has passed since the victory over nazi Germany. Years will come and go, new generations will be born, and the edifice of communism will have acquired its ultimate majestic forms. But the memory of this great victory will always live in the hearts of people. Just as all progressive mankind is doing now, they will cover the graves of the heroes of the anti-fascist struggle and the monuments erected in their honour with flowers, and in solemn silence will bow their heads in tribute to the courage of the Soviet people who played the decisive role in ridding mankind of the nazi plague. Twenty million killed on the battlefields, tortured to death and annihilated on occupied territories or burned or massacred in death camps. Such was the price in human lives paid by the Soviet people for their victory in the Second World W a r . Nazi Germany's war for world domination ended in total defat. Guided by the Communist Party, the Soviet people stopped Hitler's aggression and then smashed the monstrous nazi war machine. T h e Soviet people bore the brunt of the blow delivered by Hitler's armoured divisions. They withstood the onslaught, squared their mighty shoulders, routed
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the enemy and brought the war to a victorious conclusion in Berlin. They fulfilled their historical mission of liberation, their internationalist duty as defined by Lenin. T h e fresh wind from the east dispelled the smoke and the stench of war and scattered nazism's ominous clouds hanging over Europe. T h e sun of freedom, peace and friendship warmed the people with its life-giving rays and illuminated the road to a new life, to socialism. The peoples of the world acclaim the Soviet people, their heroic army, and extol their magnificent exploit performed for the sake of all mankind. In the final phase of the Great Patriotic W a r I had the honour of participating in the concluding battles in the course of which the Soviet troops advanced from the Vistula to Berlin. I witnessed the fall of the Third Reich and the signing of the historical act of capitulation by nazi Germany. T h e task which the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the Supreme Command had set the Soviet Army for the first half of 1945 was to conduct an offensive along the entire front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains, during which it was to build up the power of its blows, rout the enemy's main forces in a single campaign and raise the banner of victory over Berlin. The fulfilment of this task depended on the success of the interconnected Vistula-Oder and East Prussian strategic operations. On the Eve of the Battie T h e thunder of the Byelorussian operation had died down. In 66 days the Soviet troops operating in the central, Warsaw-Berlin sector, wiped out powerful enemy forces driving the last of the invaders out of their homeland. The Soviet Army, including the 1st Byelorussian Front (I was a member of its Military Council), crossed into the neighbouring European countries on a historical mission of liberation. The 1st Byelorussian Front came up to the Vistula and promptly captured the Magnoszew and Pulawy bridgeheads on its western bank. T h e eastern part of Poland was liberated.
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The world was moving towards 1945. Proud of their successes the Soviet troops were determined to fulfil the great task of completing the rout of nazi Germany and raising the banner of victory over Berlin. A great role in this effort was played by the 1st Byelorussian Front which was orientated on Berlin. Heavy fighting was still in progress on the Narew, at Pultusk and Serock, between the Western Bug and the Vistula, at Modlin, east of Warsaw and on the bridgeheads, but G H Q had already ordered the front's command to start working on the plan of another giant offensive. GHQ's strategic and political concepts staggered one's imagination. It planned to launch a most decisive offensive simultaneously along the entire Soviet-German front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains. The 1st Byelorussian Front was to liberate the capital of Poland, cross her western part and in a swift westerly thrust reach the Oder. An honourable, but difficult assignment. The German forces would fight desperately for each of the 600 kilometres that separated the 1st Byelorussian Front from Berlin. The Wehrmacht had sustained tremendous casualties in men and weaponry, but its fighting spirit was still fairly high as a result of the nazi propaganda and the German Command's harsh discipline-enforcement measures. The numerous defensive lines, including permanent fortifications along the old German border, the major water barriers, which had to be forced and, finally, the rapid pace of the forthcoming offensive imposed a great responsibility on the troops and the front command. The 1st Byelorussian Front had every prerequisite for accomplishing its assignment. The morale and fighting spirit of the men were exceptionally high and they had efficient commanders and political workers who had acquired vast experience in fighting the enemy all the way from the Volga to the Vistula. And though the Soviet forces were now fighting in foreign countries, they were never actually separated from the warm embrace of their native land whose home-front workers kept them adequately supplied with weapons, equipment, ammunition, clothing and food. There was nothing the Soviet people would not do to help their Armed Forces fulfil their great and just cause. Now everything depended on how effectively these means 1* 6
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would be used, on the ability of the generals, on the creative energy of the officers, political and Party organisations, on all the Communists of the front. Preparations for the operation took place in an unusual and involved political situation. For the first time in the course of the war the Soviet Army was to conduct an offensive in a foreign country, on the land of the fraternal Polish people, which had become the arena of a bitter class and political struggle between the forces of democracy and the Polish and international bourgeois reaction. The principal agents of the international reaction were the Polish emigr government, reactionary political groups abroad and in Poland herself and the armed detachments they had organised in the country. All these forces launched a vicious attack on the Polish Committee of National Liberation which had assumed power over the territory liberated by the Soviet Army in co-operation with the Polish 1st Army. Apart from launching malicious nationalist propaganda the reaction resorted to provocations and acts of terror against the representatives of the Committee of National Liberation and the Soviet Army. They tried hard to sow dissension between the Polish and Soviet people, defame the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union and cause unrest in the minds of the people. Disguised in Red Army uniforms underground detachments raided villages and by looting and raping tried to discredit the Soviet Army. They spread false rumours about the Polish Army in the hope of splitting the Soviet-Polish comradeship-in-arms and preventing the genuinely patriotic sections of the people from joining it. The situation in the rear of the front's troops was uneasy. It was obvious that no time should be lost in rendering effective, comprehensive support to the new, democratic Polish Government. In these involved conditions the Front Military Council had to act on its own initiative and carry through a range of urgent measures. Besides taking steps to strengthen the fraternal friendship of the Polish and Soviet peoples, and expose the man-hating nazi ideology, the Front Military Council decided to establish law and order behind the front's lines by forming military commandants' offices in provinces, districts, and towns as connecting links between
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the local authorities and the Soviet Command. They energetically assisted the representatives of the new government and democratic organisations in setting up organs of local administration, in conducting political and cultural and educational work among the population and mobilising the people to help the Soviet Army and the Polish 1st Army in their further struggle against nazi Germany. The commandants' offices operated in keeping with rules and instructions drawn up by the front Military Council and approved, with certain amendments, by the General Staff. Similar instructions were dispatched to other fronts for reference. The Military Council set up Military Commandants' Administration and shortly afterwards a number of political departments. The commandants' offices were staffed by carefully selected army commanders and political workers who had been selected and trained by the Military Council and whose political grounding and high moral qualities made them eligible for the job. Relying on these institutions, the Military Council swiftly consolidated the front's rear, cleared it of armed bands and effectively assisted the local administrative and political bodies in launching political and cultural and educational activity. The front Political Department opened a section for conducting work among the population and published Wolnosc (Freedom), a newspaper which came out 26 days a month. Through the political sections of the commandants' offices, the Military Council explained the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government with regard to Poland, the Soviet Army's liberation mission and told the Polish people about life in the Soviet Union and the heroic struggle of its people against nazi Germany, and impressed upon them that the rout of the enemy was in the common interests of both the Polish and the Soviet people. These measures, including Soviet economic assistance, laid the foundation for the inviolable friendship and fraternity of the two nations. The vigorous assistance of the Polish population created favourable conditions for preparing the forthcoming operation. The military councils and political bodies had their hands full in the period of the preparation of the Vistula-Oder operation.
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For instance, they intensified the ideological work with troops in keeping with the instructions of the Party Central Committee and the Supreme Command to deal a series of crushing blows that would complete the rout of the Wehrmacht, and bring the war to a victorious conclusion in Berlin. The preparations for the coming offensive swung into high gear. It was of the utmost importance to conceal the arrival of the numerous reinforcements, artillery, air and engineer units and large quantities of weapons, to assemble them in the designated areas, check on their condition and combat effectiveness, and also to acquaint the new arrivals with the situation, the mission which they would have to fulfil and the front's fighting traditions. All this, of course, required an enormous amount of work. The co-operation of all elements and units had to be raised to a higher level. In this connection a very important role was attached to rehearsing the operation on maps and terrain mock-ups at the front, army, corps and divisional HQ, and to tactical exercises on terrain similar to that in the zone of the offensive and the enemy's defensive areas. No less important were conferences and joint exercises of all arms held on a much broader scale than previously to co-ordinate their actions. The front HQ issued maps with uniform codes, common reference points and a uniform table of light and radio signals to the commanders of all units and elements. Of inestimable assistance were handbooks and leaflets put out by the front HQ and the commands of the various arms jointly with the Political Department and approved by the Military Council. These publications advised rillemen, submachine-gunners, tank crews, artillery gunners and sergeants how to act in offensive engagements, and advised the officers of the ground forces how to maintain co-operation with the air force, tanks, accompanying and supporting artillery and so forth. Logistical activities also came under careful attention of the front's command and political agencies which drew extensively on the experience gained in the course of the Byelorussian operation. This experience, however, had to be adapted to the conditions of the coming operation. First, it was decided to site the front and army depots and dumps as close as possible to the forward line and to establish ammunition, fuel and food stocks for the duration of the first
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phase of the operation (10-12 days). The medical administration was ordered to evacuate all the wounded and sick from divisional medical stations and most of the army hospitals, and make them ready to advance with the troops, and to shift a part of the front's surgical hospitals closer to the firing lines and thus be able to accommodate the wounded arriving directly from the frontline medical stations during the first days of the operation. Taking into account that the offensive was scheduled for January, the coldest month of the year, the front's medical administration on the initiative of its chief, Major-General A. Y. Barabanov, a splendid organiser, and his assistants laid in a supply of Vishnevsky's anti-shock injections for the entire personnel of the assault groups. The front's logistical establishments were busy receiving and delivering to the troops an unprecedented amount of military freight while the troops and supply units were moving to new lines from the Dnieper and the Pripyat. Thanks to the heroic efforts of the home-front workers the front received a vast volume of freight transported by 1,259 trains, or more than 68,460 cars. On top of that another 923,300 tons of freight and 100,290 men were brought into the area by motor vehicles of GHQ and front reserves. It was not only necessary to receive all this freight, but to deliver it up to the troops and reliably conceal it. To quote just one example. By January 10 a total of 3,791,700 shells and mines, which had been transported in 3,289 railway cars, were securely sheltered from enemy artillery and air strikes on the small Magnoszew and Pulawy bridgeheads. Approximately 56,000 tons of fuel and lubricants were delivered to the troops or stored up. By January 1 on Military Council's instructions, the troops had their uniforms, footwear and equipment examined and repaired, and the state of preparedness of the logistical services had been checked. The front had a very efficient logistical administration headed by Lieutenant-General N. A. Antipenko, Chief of Staff Major-General M. K. Shlyakhtenko, and V. N. Dutov, G. T. Donets, N. K. Zhizhin, S. P. Kudryavtsev, A. G. Chernyakov and others. At the time it was all routine work for them and its actual volume was shortly forgotten. But now, looking over the documents of that period, one is amazed
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at the scope and significance of the combined efforts of the officers and men who had coped with that titanic task on the small bridgeheads right in front of the enemy. As regards the engineers and sappers, their effort was an act of heroism in itself. They virtually ploughed up the entire territory of the bridgeheads: like beavers, they built earthen shelters on the marshes complete with trenches and approach passages, dugouts, access ramps and command and observation posts. On the 7-kilometre breakthrough sector of the 69th Army on the Pulawy bridgehead, they had to conceal in trenches and approach passages eight infantry divisions, 2,178 guns and mortars, 512 tanks and self-propelled guns, 197 rocket launchers, 18 engineer battalions, and on a 15-kilometre sector they sited 750 army and 520 artillery observation posts with their numerous motor vehicles, tractors and military supplies. At the same time the troops received combat training which in the reserve and second-echelon units lasted from eight to ten hours daily, and was conducted only at night secretly from the enemy. It was, of course, impossible fully to camouflage all the preparations, for the number of troops and the amount of equipment which had to be brought up to the Vistula and then transported to the opposite bank was much too great. But it was necessary to mislead the enemy, and this was accomplished largely thanks to the front commander, his chief of staff and the political bodies. From January 5 and 6 reconnaissance battalions carried out daily reconnaissance in force with artillery support to throw the enemy off the scent. In keeping with a rigid schedule the officers of the armies and divisions that were brought into the bridgehead reconnoitred their operational areas and offensive sectors dressed as infantry soldiers. Troops and weapons were moved into position only at night under the strict surveillance of staff officers and workers of the Political Department. During daylight hours planes checked the camouflage of the troops and road traffic. Moreover, the command imitated concentrations of troops on secondary sectors. To mislead the enemy divisional, army and front newspapers spoke about the importance of strengthening the defensive positions, about the troops competing in building the best dugouts, shelters, and fire emplacements and about
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the need to hold on to the bridgehead until spring arrived. Scouts planted these newspapers behind enemy positions. All trench loudspeakers played music and songs at full blast to drown the roar of motors and the clatter of tracks when the troops approached the river and crossed to the bridgeheads. The issuance of all written orders concerning the offensive, radio broadcasts and motor traffic to and from the bridgeheads were subject to a rigid timetable. The air force had orders to prevent enemy reconnaissance planes from reaching the rear of the Soviet positions, and also to reliably cover troops concentrations and the crossings on the Vistula. The engineers camouflaged the weapons transported by rail to the unloading areas. And they made an excellent job under the guidance of the efficient and dedicated chief of engineers Major-General A. I. Proshlyakov. Tanks, rocket launchers, artillery, heavy mortars and other military equipment were loaded on flatcars, covered with hay, building materials and camouflage tarpaulin and delivered to their destination. Political workers were present at all stages of the unloading operations, controlled the transportation of troops and equipment to assembly areas and their movement to the bridgeheads. Their job was to ensure the fulfilment of the Military Council directives and raise the vigilance of the men so that the preparations for the offensive would remain a closely-guarded secret. There was another important problem to be solved. It was necessary to establish commandants' offices and train their staffs for work in the liberated parts of Poland and subsequently in Germany and to determine their future areas of operation. The front command had accumulated certain experience in this field. But taking into account that the part of Poland which the Soviet troops were to liberate was three times as large as that they had already liberated and that the German zone which was to come under Soviet occupation under the Yalta Agreements was also fairly large, the job that lay ahead was a formidable one. It was assigned to the military councils of the armies which had to establish a fixed number of commandants' offices. Members of military councils and chiefs of political departments (8th Guards ArmyM. M. Pronin and M. A. Skosyrev, 3id Striking ArmyA. I. Litvinov and F. Y. Lisitsyn, 5th Striking
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ArmyF. Y. Bokov and Y. Y. Koshcheyev, 69th Army A. V. Shelakovsky and N. Y. Vishnevsky, 61st Army D. G. Dubrovsky and A. G. Kotikov, 47th ArmyN. P. Korolev and M. K. Kalashnik, 33rd ArmyR. P. Babiichuk and S. I. Pasha, 1st Guards Tank ArmyN. K. Popel and A. G. Zhuravlev, 2nd Guards Tank ArmyP. M. Latyshev and M. M. Litvyak) and the army commanders should be given their due in this respect. Displaying energy and a high sense of Party responsibility, they established the commandants' offices in good time, staffed them with qualified personnel and then guided their daily activities. It is impossible to list all the aspects of the preparations for the offensive and to estimate the amount of work performed. But it can definitely be said that all concerned did their best to ensure the success of the operation and to live up to the trust and the hopes which their country had placed in them. The front command invariably followed the principle that the foundation of the success of a military assignment is laid in the preparatory period and depends not only on the experience, and organisational ability of the commanders, but also on the purposeful and effective work of political organs, Party organisations and all Communists. The initiative of the political workers, their creative approach in solving diverse tasks and ability to steer all activity in the required directions inspired the Military Council with confidence. By 1945 the political bodies, Party organisations and Communists possessed vast experience. Yet it was up to the front Military Council and the Political Department to guide their day-to-day work in the existing situation. As in the previous operations, Party and political activity was conducted in two principal directions: first, its purpose was to strengthen the structure of primary Party and Komsomol organisations and raise their ideological level and combat efficiency. Operational plans may be elaborated to the last detail, commanders capable and courageous and weapons powerful, but it is the fighting man inspired by the Communists and Komsomol members who will perform acts of heroism and in the final count determine the outcome of the battle. Secondly, it was intended to intensify and raise the effectivity of all ideological and educational work among the troops. The more effective this work and the higher its
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level, the higher the morale, organisation and discipline of the troops, the greater their efficiency with military equipment and weapons and the preparedness to surmount all difficulties on the way to final victory. And that meant the attainment of victory at the cost of minimum human and material losses. These two main trends in the activity of the political bodies were manifest in all practical measures and yielded excellent results both during the preparations for the offensive and in the course of the offensive itself. The Political Department re-established over a thousand lower Party and Komsomol organisations, which had ceased to exist in the course of the Byelorussian operation and during the fighting at Warsaw and on the bridgeheads, trained Party agitators for each platoon, staffed all units with political workers, Party and Komsomol secretaries and built up a reserve of Party and Komsomol secretaries, deputy commanders for political affairs for the subunits in the political departments of all divisions and armies. Great importance was attached to the last measure, for it made it possible to replace the losses sustained by the Party and political cadres in the course of the fighting. It should be noted that these losses were considerable: in the course of the Vistula-Oder and the Berlin operations they amounted to 917 and 1,164 respectively, for the Communists were always in the front ranks of the attacking forces. With no ready reserves it would have been difficult to conduct uninterrupted Party and political work and to sustain the morale and the fighting spirit of the troops at a high level. One can judge of the great ideological force which the Communists and Komsomol members represented from the following figures. In the 1st Guards Tank Army of the 433 commanders of tanks and self-propelled guns 258 were Communists and 85 Komsomol members, and of the 542 tank drivers 137 were Communists and 141 Komsomol members. The 69th Army had 25,528 Communists and 14,628 Komsomol members. In the 89th Guards Infantry Division, 5th Striking Army, 30 to 35 per cent of the men were either Komsomol members or Communists. They were an active fighting and political force and the military councils, political bodies and commanders worked hard to employ it with the utmost efficiency and raise its
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ideological level and activity. Their efforts yielded good results. Setting examples of bravery and self-sacrifice the Communists and Komsomol members were always in the forefront of the attacking troops. I have preserved the notes of a talk given by a company Party secretary of the 5th Striking Army. He said: "If your hand falters think of Yasnaya Polyana and the nazi swine defiling the grave of the man who had multiplied the glory of Russia (the troops had been shown a newsreel of what the German troops had done to the grave of the great Russian writer Lev TolstoiAuthor), think of destroyed Minsk and Stalingrad, think of the hunger and suffering of children, women and old folk in heroic Leningrad, think of Maidanek which you have seen with your own eyes and the fields covered with huge purple cabbage-heads grown on the bones and ashes of 600,000 of our brothers, fathers, mothers and sisters who met a horrible death at the hands of the nazis, think of all this, and your hand will not falter and your heart will become harder than steel. If a tear dims your eye and your heart softens preventing you from taking careful aim at the enemy and from being in the front of the attacking troops, think of the brutally murdered Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, Liza Chaikina and Yuri Smirnov, think of the children's corpses on the edge of the roads and that goldenhaired girl with clots of blood on her body and wide open eyes gazing with surprise at the world as though asking: 'What for? What for?'. Think of all this, and your tears will dry, timidity will pass and courage will return. Your eyes will become keen and you will have no mercy for the enemy. You will go forward undaunted to tear out the poisoned fangs of the nazi predator so that your own life and the lives of your children, relations and near ones, and the life of our nation would be peaceful, joyous and happy.. . ." Such words steeled the hearts of the men and it was not in the least surprising that in the course of the operation which lasted 21 days they advanced 570 kilometres sweeping everything out of their way in bloody battles. A sacred and lofty cause carried them on the wings of victory to the cherished goal, to Berlin. The great ideological influence exercised by the Communists introduced substantial modifications into the plans and calculations of GHQ both concerning the lines to be reached and timetable of the operations.
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Their ideological influence and the force of their example won the admiration of the men, immeasurably raised the prestige of the Party in their eyes and augmented the flow of applications for Party membership. Hundreds and thousands of new Party members replaced the killed and wounded. The day of the offensive was drawing near. And here I would like to mention another important event in the life of the front. In the middle of November 1944, Marshal Rokossovsky was transferred to the post of commander of the 2nd Byelorussian Front, and the 1st Byelorussian Front was placed under the command of Marshal Zhukov, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces. Frankly speaking all those who had covered the road from Moscow and the Volga under Rokossovsky's leadership found it hard to part with a man whom they respected for his deeply humane qualities and military talent and with whom it was a pleasure to work. Marshal Zhukov was a wellknown figure at the front, which he frequently visited as representative of GHQ. The officers had a very high opinion of his generalship, the boldness of his operational concepts, organisational skill and firm will. At the same time they wondered how soon would he be able to establish complete understanding and businesslike friendly relations with his subordinates, such as they were when Rokossovsky was in command. Realising that Rokossovsky would find it difficult to part with his closest associates with whom he had established close ties of friendship while in command of the front, Zhukov suggested that he should also have them transferred to the 2nd Byelorussian Front. But Rokossovsky declined this offer on the grounds that such a step on his part might hurt the feelings of the officers of the 2nd Byelorussian Front where he was confident the command personnel would be just as friendly, efficient and capable of fulfilling any assignment. Looking ahead I must say that Zhukov consistently upheld the high spirit of creativity and cohesion of the front's command and skilfully directed all its efforts towards the fulfilment of major combat assignments. He prepared the operation with utmost care, studying and checking all its aspects to the minutest detail and rehearsing it on terrain mock-ups and maps with the commanders of all the arms,
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chiefs of services and army commanders. W h e n the operation was launched he demanded strict observance of the schedule and execution of orders, and came down hard on the careless and the incompetent. And although his actions were fully justified they were not to the liking of some of the commanders. The success of the operation depended on each army fulfilling its assignment to the letter, on its precise co-operation with artillery, armour and air force, and any delay on one or another sector had an immediate impact on the others. In general, the front's commanding officers had every respect for Zhukov's driving power and determination, for his vast organisational abilities and efficiency which he displayed to the full in the final battles of the Great Patriotic W a r . His genuinely Russian character, simple behaviour when in company during the few free hours which he had and the willingness with which he would join in a folk song won the hearts of all and helped create a healthy, efficient atmosphere in the front H Q . The Hour Strikes GHQ's unexpected order to launch the offensive at an earlier date in view of the serious setbacks sustained by the Allied forces in the Ardennes, called for a tremendous effort on the part of the front's officers and men to complete the preparations ahead of the original' schedule and at the same time make it impossible for the enemy to find out the H hour. On one occasion the Military Council was alarmed by a report that a man who had arrived with the reinforcements raised on previously occupied territory testified that he had been recruited by the retreating Germans. His assignment was to get himself transferred to the army in the field, discover the day and the hour of the Russian offensive in this sector, cross the frontline and report to the German Command. In this connection the front command introduced a range of organisational measures and intensified political activity with the view to heightening vigilance and secrecy discipline. Tension reached its height on J a n u a r y 13 and 14, when the first-echelon divisions were moved into the bridgehead,
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the artillery, mortars, tanks and self-propelled guns took up assault positions and tank armies were brought to the crossing sites. The troop and weapons density on the bridgehead was exceptionally high: 400,000 men, more than 8,700 guns and mortars, approximately 1,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, a large number of tractors, motor vehicles, and carts with military equipment and ammunition were assembled on the 240 sq km of the Magnoszew bridgehead. Almost every square metre of land was occupied. Had the enemy discovered such a vast concentration of troops and equipment and delivered an artillery counterattack the Soviet forces would have sustained heavy casualties. But everything went off well thanks to a high level of organisation, discipline and rigid camouflage measures. It is impossible to forget the last hours before the offensive. Gathered in compact groups the men listened intently to the appeal of the Military Council summoning them to strike a devastating blow at the enemy. There was a solemn silence when the battle colours were brought into the trenches and officers and men on bended knee kissed their fabric, pledging to fulfil their duty to the end. At 08.30 hours on January 14 a hurricane of fire and steel descended on the enemy positions sweeping away the skilfully constructed fortifications and pounding men and material into pulp. Approximately 30 minutes later the forward battalions went into action. I was at the CP of the commander of the 8th Guards Army and together with the other officers waited with great expectation for the first reports to come in. The tactic of employing forward battalions was first tested by the Don Front whose troops smashed the surrounded forces under Paulus. This tactic was further elaborated in other offensive operations and yielded positive results, first, because it misled the enemy as regards the actual scale and the purpose of the offensive, and second, because it enabled the Soviet Command to save a tremendous quantity of ammunition compared with the number of shells expended in a 2- or 3-hour long artillery preparations. This time, too, our expectations materialised. The forward battalions broke into the first, and in places, into the second line of trenches opening the way for the main forces. It was a devastating blow which shattered the widely advertised "unassailable defence on the Vistula". The Soviet
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troops mounted a swift offensive to the west and so great was their driving power that it spelled disaster for the German forces operating in the Berlin sector. On January 17 GHQ received a report which said that the mobile forces had enveloped the enemy group in Warsaw from the north and the field armies made a wide turning movement from the south. As a result of these manoeuvres the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front gained possession of Warsaw. It was brought to the knowledge of the Party, the Government and the entire Soviet nation, that the nazis "had destroyed the Polish capital, Warsaw, with the ruthlessness of refined vandals . . . tens of thousands of inhabitants have been annihilated, the rest driven out. The city is dead". On January 17 the front Military Council issued an order of the day which said in part: "Today, the fourth day of the fighting has been crowned with another glorious victory. The victorious banners of the Soviet Army and the Polish 1st Army are fluttering high over Warsaw. The mighty bastion of the Warsaw defence on the Vistula has fallen, the capital of the friendly Polish people, the key to the gates of Berlin, has been liberated." Commending the officers and men for splendid performance of duty, the Military Council continued: "Men, Germany is near. The enemy has suffered heavy losses and is rolling back gradually. Our victory is near, but we have to fight for it, to exert all our strength and act with military skill and utmost vigilance. Raise the victorious banners still higher. Do not let the enemy come to a halt. Still faster ahead, into Germany, towards final victory." Elated by their victory at Warsaw, the troops quickened their pursuit of the enemy. Moving into open terrain the 1st and 2nd Guards tank armies, and separate tank, mechanised and cavalry corps cut the enemy's retreat routes, and dealt shattering blows at his logistical establishments and the arriving reserves. The infantry, artillery and cavalry gave the retreating enemy no respite. In round-the-clock operations Air Force pilots pounded the enemy wherever he tried to offer resistance to the ground forces or to evade their blows. With remarkable energy the sappers, signalmen and logistical units ensured the unimpeded advance of the Soviet troops into Germany, on Berlin. The Soviet troops passed the Pietrkw-Zychlin-Lodz line
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on the :ixth day instead of the 11-12th day as planned by GHQ. Making the most of the successfully developing operations and the high morale of the troops, G H Q on January 17 ordered the front to capture the Bydgoszcz-Poznan line by February 2-4. But Poznan with its 62,000-strong garrison was besieged on January 23 and capitulated on February 23. Now there were favourable prospects for continuing the drive towards the Oder though they were somewhat marred by increasing interruptions in the supply of ammunition and particularly fuel due to the inability of the logistical tails to keep up with the advancing forces. GHQ repeatedly inquired whether the front command had sufficient forces and supplies at its disposal to continue the drive, or whether it would be expedient to make a brief pause. It was clear to the military councils of the armies and the front that the enemy would take advantage of even the briefest pause in the offensive to move the troops arriving from the West and the Baltic area into position on the powerful permanent defences along the old German border, and then it would require tremendous efforts and considerable time to break through them. Taking this into account the front Military Council unhesitatingly replied that the front would continue the offensive and that every effort would be made to surmount the difficulties and reach the Oder and the immediate approaches to Berlin. The Military Council was confident that the front's officers, rankand-file soldiers, political workers and Communists would not be deterred by any difficulties. On January 29 the front's mobile units reached the old Polish-German border, ploughed through dragon's teeth and fire traps of the permanent defences, dashing the hopes of the German Command to hold these powerful defences. On the same day the front Military Council reported to the State Defence Committee and GHQ: "Your orders to overturn the enemy forces facing the front with a powerful blow and in a rapid thrust emerge on the Polish-German border have been fulfilled. "In seventeen days of offensive operations the front advanced over 400 kilometres. The whole of western Poland in the zone of the 1st Byelorussian Front has been cleared of the enemy, and the Polish population has been freed after five and a half years of nazi oppression.
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"Due to our swift advance the hitlerites were unable to wreck cities, industrial enterprises, railways and highways, to drive away and annihilate the Polish population, and to ship cattle and food out of the c o u n t r y . . . . "Having fulfilled your order to liberate our brothers, the Poles, jointly with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Byelorussian fronts, the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front are determined together with the entire Red Army to win complete and final victory over Hitler's Germany as swiftly as possible." In the meantime the front continued its offensive. By January 31 the advance units of the 1st and 2nd Guards tank armies, the 5th Striking and the 8th Guards armies and General M. P. Konstantinov's cavalry reached the Oder. They crushed the resistance of the enemy and on February 2 drove him out of the middle reaches of the river and gained bridgeheads on its western bank in the area of Kostrzyn (Kstrin). Advancing 570 kilometres in 21 days the front routed the enemy's central grouping and his operational reserves and breached the last line of the powerful defences on the Oder directly covering the capital of the Third Reich. Now the bayonet of the Soviet soldier was pointed at the heart of the nazi predator. The hour of retribution was drawing near. Once it had crossed the Oder the front received instructions to suspend its drive on Berlin and switch its main effort against the enemy in East Pomerania. With the enemy routed and his forces shattered and disorganised, it seemed that there were favourable conditions for seizing the capital of nazi Germany. In these circumstances some generals regarded the decision to discontinue the drive on Berlin as absolutely unwarranted. But there were important reasons for not undertaking a non-stop offensive on Berlin. Lenin wrote that in examining one or another development "we must take not individual facts, but the sum total of facts, without a single exception.. .".* And that was exactly what some generals who were all for a non-stop offensive on Berlin did not do.
* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 272.
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At the beginning of February the enemy divisions routed in the Berlin sector had not yet been reinforced. They had not established a powerful defence line along the Oder and were still building fortifications between the Oder and Berlin. Neither had they completed the organisation of defences around Berlin and in the city itself. All this held out promising prospects for the Soviet troops. But, and that was very important, the Soviet troops had reached a point where they had to make a break in their offensive: first, they had sustained heavy casualties during their offensive in the course of which they covered 570 kilometres, combat vehicles were in disrepair, the delivery of ammunition and fuel was handicapped, since the supply trains had fallen behind hundreds of kilometres, and moreover, the men were exhausted and had to be rested and reorganised. Second, the front had jutted far ahead (160 kilometres on the right flank) of the adjacent fronts, particularly the 2nd Byelorussian Front. In these circumstances the enemy group in East Pomerania could take in the exposed right flank of the 1st Byelorussian Front. In the meanwhile, the German Command was building up Army Group Vistula consisting of 23 infantry, 6 panzer and 6 motorised divisions, 6 brigades, 9 combat groups and skeletonal divisions, and the garrisons of 6 fortresses. This army group was even stronger than the one Hitler had pitted against the Central Front in 1943 during the fighting for Kursk Bulge. Obviously, the front had to eliminate the threat to its right flank before it could resume its advance on Berlin. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief thought likewise. It so happened that I was with Marshal Zhukov when Stalin rang him up from Moscow on January 25. Replying to Stalin's query concerning his plans in the circumstances, Zhukov said that he intended to continue the drive towards the Oder in the direction of Kostrzyn (Kstrin) and gain bridgeheads. He said that the enemy was demoralised and was unable to offer serious resistance and that the front's right wing was deploying to face the enemy group in East Pomerania. Stalin replied that this plan should be postponed until the 2nd Byelorussian Front concluded its operation in Eastern Prussia, otherwise the 1st Byelorussian Front would break
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away from its right-hand neighbour to a distance of over 150 kilometres. According to Field Marshal Keitel's testimony, in February and March 1945 the German Command intended to launch a counter-offensive out of the Pomeranian bridgehead against the Soviet forces advancing on Berlin. It planned that Army Group Vistula striking out of the Grudziadz area would breach the Russian front and advancing along the valleys of the W a r t a and Netze rivers would take in the rear of the Soviet forces at Kostrzyn. T h e Germans delivered their blow and two of the front's right-flank armies fell back under its impact. T h e danger was averted only after the Soviet Command threw two tank and two field armies (including the Polish 1st Army), a cavalry corps and almost the whole of the front's air force into action. Forward, on Berlin The preparations for the culminating operation of the war took place in unusual circumstances. February and March were taken up by operations to avert the serious threat from the German troops in Pomerania which involved almost three-quarters of the front's forces and consumed a considerable part of the material resources intended for the Berlin operation. Moreover, it was necessary to shelter, clothe, feed and render medical aid and provide transportation facilities for endless streams of Soviet, French, British, US and other P O W s freed from nazi concentration camps and hundreds of thousands of repatriates. T h e front had neither a special staff nor readily available transport means to cope with this task. But it managed to find additional reserves and resources to be able to take the matter in hand. These crowds of emaciated people, many of them seriously ill, were a ghastly sight. There were many American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch soldiers among them. But they had received f a r better treatment than Soviet POWs. They were allowed to receive food parcels through the Swiss or the Swedish Red Cross and were assigned to lighter work. In this way the nazi leadership intended to further its far-reaching plan of concluding a separate peace
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with Britain and the US and even involving them in the war against the USSR. As regards Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav inmates of concentration camps, they had been reduced to a position of slaves who were tortured, driven to complete exhaustion and then killed. No words could describe the joy of these people at meeting their liberators. Hugging them, weeping with happiness they poured out their heartrending story of woe and suffering, their longing for the near and dear ones, for their homes, of all the tortures, humiliation and pain that had fallen to their lot. The swift Soviet drive from the Vistula to the Oder caught the German population and the local authorities by surprise. Many people fled in panic to the west, but a considerable part of the population, particularly in Western Poland, Meklenburg and Branderburg provinces remained, though they were terrified by the arrival of the Soviet troops and the reprisals to which they thought they would be subjected. The Military Council had expected that the troops would be met with hatred on the part of the German population which would launch a vigorous armed struggle behind the lines. The majority of the Germans, however, were aware that nazism was doomed and were fully resigned to their fate. They even willingly helped the commandants' offices to put through all measures aimed at establishing order, returning life into its normal course and assisting the Soviet units. The behaviour of the Soviet forces rapidly dispelled whatever fears the local population might have had. Of course, there were some who had every reason to dread the arrival of Soviet troops. Wealthy Germans had hoarded property looted from the peoples of the occupied countries, particularly Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Russians, and many burghers had slaves from among POWs whom they mercilessly exploited. Moreover, in all towns and villages there were glaring posters, appeals and handbills summoning the population to "fight to the end" against the looming "Asiatic communism", to struggle for the "salvation of the Aryan race" and to organise an armed struggle and acts of terror behind Soviet lines. But the war had ended for the Germans. Realising the futility of further resistance and that they had
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been deceived by the hitlerites they searched for ways of establishing contacts with the Soviet troops. Such sentiments clashed head-on with the interests of the nazi ringleaders who resorted to the most subtle methods of fanning nationalistic feelings and hatred for the Russians and inciting the people to struggle vigorously against the Soviet forces. It was in this period that the Soviet Army first came up against the operations of Himmler's underground "Werwolf" bands. The motto of this organisation was "Hatred is our commandment, vengeance is our battle cry". The tasks assigned to the "Werwolf" were formulated with the utmost clarity in Hitler's order "Organisation of the Defence of Berlin" issued on March 9, 1945, and which had fallen into the hands of the front Command. The order said that volunteers imbued with "fanaticism and hatred and prepared to turn the German land into a hell for the Bolsheviks" would continue the war behind Soviet lines employing "all means of military cunning and craftiness". Operating at night they were to "ambush trains, messengers and motor vehicles, attack weakly guarded depots, railways and command posts, and sabotage communications lines". One can judge of the bestial image of this organisation by the following excerpt from its rules: "So long as I wear a brown shirt I am a vicious hunter. We all belong to the Fhrer. We are wolves. Our job is to hunt. . . . " Reports from various areas informed the Soviet Command of the appearance of bands of men in Soviet and Polish uniforms who burned houses and engaged in banditry and violence. Malicious rumours were set afloat alleging that the Russians "were conducting brutal reprisals" against the population, raping women, killing children and driving everybody without exception to "hard labour in Siberia" and so on and so forth. This was obviously the work of the "Werwolf" and the Military Council detached special troops to wipe out these bands and intensified its explanatory work among the population. As a result the enemy's efforts to whip up a "guerilla war" behind Soviet lines fell through. A month later the Soviet forces smashed the "Werwolf" with the vigorous assistance of the German population. The hitlerites also infiltrated a fairly large number of
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spies recruited from among traitors and Soviet POWs into the rear of the Soviet Army. Most of them, however, gave themselves up and the rest, failing to find support even among the German population, were swiftly apprehended. The pace of the Soviet offensive convinced the German population that their country had lost the war, that Hitler was dragging them into an abyss and that they had to search for a way out of the situation. And they found this road thanks to the Soviet troops' humane attitude to the vanquished and the extensive explanatory work conducted by the Soviet Army's political bodies. While preparing the Berlin operation the Soviet Command had to take into account the intrigues of the reactionary circles of the Western Allies, and the hitlerites' increasing efforts to conclude a separate peace with them. In those days the capital of the Third Reich was the centre of the main developments of the war. The nazi ringleaders had no doubt that the fall of Berlin would spell the collapse of the Third Reich and the nazi regime and that they would be called to account for all their bloody crimes. They likewise realised that their sternest judge would be the Soviet people who had shouldered the main burden of the war and whose territory was the arena of the most terrifying nazi atrocities. The political and practical measures of nazi ruling circles were, therefore, directed towards holding up the Soviet armies along the Oder-Neisse line at whatever the cost and preventing them from entering South Austria and Germany through Czechoslovakia and Hungary. But doubting their ability to do so, the hitlerites hoped to win time and put off their hour of doom by stiffening resistance and fomenting differences between the members of the anti-Hitler coalition. They planned to win over the Western ruling circles and to throw their combined forces against the Soviet Army. As a last resort, they intended to surrender Berlin to the British and US forces before it would be taken by the Soviet troops. These intentions were disclosed in April in an order of the day issued by the commander of the German 9th Army covering the approaches to Berlin. He ordered his men to fight the Russians with "fanatical self-sacrifice" and to
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disregard the British and US tanks that might appear behind their lines. Characteristic in this connection was the admission made by Jodl, one of the chief nazi war criminals, to the Soviet Command. He said that the General Staff realised that the outcome of the battle for Berlin would be decided on the Oder and therefore shifted the bulk of the forces of the 9th Army defending Berlin to the forward line. The urgently formed reserves were to be assembled north of Berlin from where they would be able to strike a counterblow at the flank of Marshal Zhukov's forces. To achieve its ends the German Command concentrated more than a million men, over 10,000 guns and mortars, nearly 1,500 panzers and assault guns and more than 3,300 combat aircraft, to cover Berlin. The Wehrmacht was hastily organising powerful defensive lines and turning towns and villages into strongpoints with both field and permanent fortifications. The nazis intensified their efforts to contact the Soviet Union's Allies, particularly after the death of President Roosevelt, and were transferring the most battle-worthy forces from the western front to the east. At the same time Britain and the USA were engaged in activity incompatible with their Allied commitments. Viewing the swift Soviet drive towards Berlin, into southeast Europe and the Balkans as a threat to their imperialist objectives, British and US ruling circles concentrated their efforts at the final phase of the war not on hastening the rout of Germany but on saving the reactionary regimes in the liberated countries and the nazi regime in Germany herself. Instead of fulfilling the decisions of the Yalta Conference on Germany's unconditional capitulation and the establishment of clearly defined occupation zones, British and US reactionary circles launched hectic activity which clashed with these decisions. Winston Churchill laid bare the substance of their policy in his memoirs. Admitting that Germany had been defeated in the east and that her military power had been destroyed, he arrived at the conclusion that this circumstance "had brought with it a fundamental change in the relations between Communist Russia and the Western democracies...", and set forth a programme for the Western powers in which he emphasised the following points: "First,
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that Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger to the free world. Secondly, that a new front must be immediately created against her onward sweep. Thirdly, that this front in Europe should be as far east as possible.""' And here is another cynical and frank opinion of this die-hard champion of a crusade against communism. In a message to President Roosevelt of April 1, 1945, Churchill wrote: "The Russian armies will no doubt overrun all Austria and enter Vienna. If they also take Berlin . .. may not this lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible, and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it. This also appears sound on military grounds."** Hence the Allies' efforts to end the war in Italy and give the German Command a chance to shift its troops against the Soviet Army. In view of the above it was easy to understand the positive response of the Anglo-US Command concerning the nazis' offer to surrender in the west and to continue the war in the east, and the efforts of the ruling and military circles of these countries to rely on the pronazi government which was formed early in May by Admiral Doenitz at Hitler's behest. It is with indignation that one reads Churchill's admission that he had ordered Lord Montgomery to carefully collect German arms that might be used in the fight against the democratic movements in Italy and France and also to arm the Germans in a fresh crusade of the "free world" against Communist Russia. On its part, however, the Soviet Union rigidly adhered to its noble policy: complete the destruction of the nazi war machine, and the nazi state apparatus, punish the war criminals, eliminate the foundations for the resurrection of the spirit of German militarism and chauvinism, and rid mankind of the threat of sanguinary tragedies similar to the two into which German militarism had plunged the world within the lifetime of a single generation. But first the Soviet troops had to take Berlin. Judging
* W. Churchill, The Second. World War, Vol. VI, p. 400. ** Ibid., p. 407.
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by the developments during the final phase of the war, it could not be clearer that this mission devolved solely on the Soviet people and their army. Wherever the Allied Forces set foot they created conditions for the restoration of reactionary regimes and persecuted democratic organisations of the working people, and intended to do the same in Germany, in Berlin. Leipzig was a case in point. It was captured on April 25 and immediately the US Command banned the National Committee "Free Germany" which had emerged from the underground, ordered it to vacate its premises and clear the streets of all its leaflets and posters on the threat of arrest and trial. The much-lauded "Western democracy" showed its fangs. Taking into account the far-reaching plans of the Western reactionary circles, the Soviet Government and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in a letter of April I, 1945, informed the Allied Command that the Soviet troops would take Berlin and begin their offensive in the latter half of May if circumstances would not warrant another decision on their part. Indeed, preparations for such a giant operation could be completed only in the latter half of May and the State Defence Committee geared all its plans accordingly. But the situation worsened and GHQ had to take "another" decision. To prevent the Allies from closing their criminal deal with the nazis and carrying through their plans of occupying Berlin and to make it impossible for the German Command to complete the construction of powerful defensive belts around Berlin which it intended to man with recruits and forces shifted from the west, the Soviet Command had had no alternative other than to cut the preparation period to the minimum, and to launch the offensive without waiting for the arrival of all the necessary troops and equipment. The Communist Party found the necessary reserves of strength in the heroic Soviet people at home and at the front. In less than a month the Soviet troops were in the main prepared in the military, material and moral respects to fulfil their assignment. After hearing a report of chief of the front Political Department S. F. Galadzhev on the growth of the Party ranks and the consolidation of Party cells and Komsomol organisations, the Military Council had every reason to be
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satisfied with the activity of all political bodies and Party organisations. In March 1945, 5,807 people were accepted to full and another 5,890 to probationary Party membership; the ranks of the Komsomol organisations swelled by approximately the same number. Figures for April were 6,849 and 6,413 respectively. The following fact manifested the desire of the men to identify themselves with the Party's cause and to take part in the last battle of the war as Communists. On the night of April 15 over 2,000 men applied for Party membership. Many of those who were killed in the fighting had their written applications for Party membership in their pockets, or in their Komsomol card. They did not have the time to submit them to company or battalion Party secretaries. Their applications were written in an almost identical manner and could be summed up as follows: I request the Party organisation to accept me to membership in the Communist Party. In the battles for its ideals, for my country I will act as befitting a Communist. My wish is to enter Berlin a Communist, and if I am killed I want to be considered a fighter who fought and died as a Communist. . . . Three fronts, the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian, were to participate directly in the Berlin operation. Compared with the two or three months that had been allotted for the preparation of previous offensive operations, the organisation of the Berlin operation, according to GHQ instructions, was to be completed within 13-15 days despite the great importance that was attached to it. An extremely difficult assignment considering that the fronts had carried out such major offensives as the Vistula-Oder, Upper Silesian, East Pomeranian and the East Prussian operations only in March and early in April (2nd Byelorussian Front). The troops covered 570 kilometres fighting the enemy for every metre of the way. They executed involved manoeuvres, crossed many rivers, cracked permanent defences and sustained heavy losses in men and weapons. Now, instead of resting, they were to go into battle again. The operation had to be prepared very thoroughly. It was necessary to assemble all the required manpower and material resources and to pull up the lagging supply trains which, moreover, had to be reorganised in keeping with
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the requirements of the forthcoming operation. A vast quantity of supplies had to be brought from the Soviet Union, from areas situated thousands of kilometres away from Germany. And everything was delivered on time thanks to the heroic efforts of the home-front workers, railwaymen, the front's logistical units, the command, political bodies, Party organisations and each Communist. The realisation of the importance of the operation helped people mobilise all their strength, multiplied their energy and boosted their morale in ever increasing measure. The forces that were to take part in the offensive on Berlin were greater than in any previous operation. The three fronts involved had over 2,500,000 officers and men, over 42,000 guns and mortars, 6,200 tanks and selfpropelled guns, 8,300 combat aircraft and more than 1,000 rocket launchers. The artillery density in the designated breakthrough sectors was 250 guns of calibres ranging from 76mm upward. In the opinion of some people a heavy concentration of men and weapons was scarcely justified, since it resulted in heavy congestion of troops and weapons and consequently led to unnecessary casualties. They maintain that the Berlin operation could have been carried with smaller forces and fewer losses if GHQ had correctly assessed the situation on the central sector (Kstrin-Berlin) and had thrown the 1st Byelorussian Front into an attack on Berlin in conjunction with the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In a way they are right. But only in a way. The fact of the matter was that the Soviet forces had to contend with a large strategic group occupying a powerful deeply-echeloned defence system in the Berlin sector. Moreover, the German Command was enforcing serious measures to stiffen the resistance of its troops. But that was not all that the Soviet Command had to take into consideration. It could not overlook the fact that the Wehrmacht had in effect denuded the Western front and was surrendering towns to the Allies either without resistance or by telephone as had happened in Osnabrck, Manheim, Kassel and other towns. By April 11, the advance units of the US Army had already reached Magdeburg and were emerging on the Elbe in a wide front. Neither could it ignore a report from the Soviet represen268

tative with the Joint Staff of Allied Forces that the Allies were planning a major airborne operation. Later 1 heard about it from General James M. Gavin, commander of the US 82nd Airborne Division. In a moment of frankness at a reception given by the Military Council of the 1st Byelorussian Front to mark the 28th anniversary of the Soviet Army he told me that at the end of April and the beginning of May General Eisenhower's staff was hurriedly preparing to land his division and the British 1st Division on airfields in the vicinity of Berlin and to occupy it before the arrival of the Soviet forces. Calling the Russians an amazing nation, he said that in the opinion of the Anglo-US Command the Soviet troops, who had carried out such a deep and swift operation from the Vistula to the Oder, would be unable to mount another offensive earlier than the middle of May. But they surprised everybody by routing the Germans and taking Berlin. General Gavin wanted to know wherein lay the strength and courage of the Russians. I told him that to discover the source of their moral and physical strength which enabled them to win that terrible war, it was necessary to understand the character of the Soviet people, to see clearly what they were fighting for and what they were defending. Returning to the events under discussion I want to stress that these were facts indicating that the nazis and the Western Allies were about to close their deal. On April 17, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief sent the following cable to HQ of the 1st Byelorussian Front: "Hitler is weaving a web in the area of Berlin to cause differences between the Russians and their Allies. To tear this web the Soviet troops have to take B e r l i n . . . . We can do it, and we must do it." GHQ ordered Marshal Konev to move his tank armies on Berlin to help the 1st Byelorussian Front capture the city as quickly as possible. But we made an error in our calculations. The commanders and political workers, and for that matter, all the troops were over-confident in victory. They were firmly convinced that the enemy would be crushed in a few days and, therefore, in fixing the timetable of the offensive no one doubted that it would be observed. This time, however, the Soviet troops had to deal with a defence whose composition, depth and troop and weapons
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density made it quite unlike any other they had encountered in previous operations. The German Command in good time positioned its troops throughout the depth in the most vulnerable sectors, and stationed a vast number of anti-aircraft weapons adapted for ground defence. There were also national and political aspects to be reckoned with. Berlin was not just another city, but the capital of Germany and that meant that its future and the future of the entire nation would be decided in the forthcoming battle. The nazi clique launched a frenzied campaign aimed at inducing nationalistic sentiments among the German people, scaring them with the looming "sufferings and horrors of enslavement", "physical extermination", and "desecration" of all institutions and objects of national veneration. They were made to believe that Germany had some sort of a "secret weapon" that would save her from "Asiatic communism" and, according to Hitler, would enable the Wehrmacht to wipe out the Soviet Army. On March 9, 1945, the German troops were ordered to "defend the capital to the last man" and to do so "with fanaticism and imagination, with resort to all means of misleading the enemy, military cunning and craftiness . . . on land, in the air and under the ground". Hitler demanded that the Soviet troops should not be given a moment's respite, that they should be worn down and bled white in the dense system of strongpoints, and defence and resistance centres, and by assault groups operating behind their lines. He ordered the German troops to attack and annihilate the Soviet troops, to hold on at whatever the cost, to each city block, house, fence and shell hole. . . . It was inevitable that these measures inflamed chauvinistic feelings of a part of the German population, officers and men and bolstered their morale. On top of that the nazis had no mercy to all those who would not swallow the nazi propaganda and held that the speediest downfall of hitlerism was the greatest boon for the nation. The history of the last months of the nazi dictatorship is a bloody chronicle of the tragedy of thousands of German families, of the officers and men who had been shot or tortured "for disobedience", "for loss of the German spirit", for desertion and for attempts to surrender. Court martials meted out brutal punishment, and a refined system of control was
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established over the "thoughts" of officers and men. Special SS groups had orders to shoot on the spot any person who left his position without orders or tried to surrender. "Any person, whether private or officer, who will retreat will be shot on the spot." Such was Hitler's order. The realisation of the inevitable defeat and the brutal reprisals filled part of the officers and men with a sense of despair and doom. These feelings were described by a prisoner of war who said: "Soldiers are in a hopeless position. If you run back you'll be shot by nazi covering detachments. If you attempt to cross over to the Russians you may also be shot, and if you manage to reach them, then your family will be shot. The only thing you can do is to sit in the trench, shoot and wait for death." So the hitlerites fought with the desperation of the doomed. Unfortunately, however, the Soviet Command did not give this factor the attention it deserved. It is also necessary to mention the difficulties of fighting in such a large city as Berlin, each of whose 600,000 stone buildings had been turned into a fortress. The Soviet troops had to fight on the ground, under the ground and in the air. The front was all around and they did not face an army as such. It dissolved in the form of armed nazis and Volkssturm fighters, spread out in small groups and struck blows from ambush, house debris, basements, lofts and sewer wells, infiltrated into the rear of the Soviet troops along sewage conduits and subway tunnels and hit back from any convenient point. The front had many armies and divisions with plenty of experience in street fighting, but not of the type which took place in Berlin. Moreover, the front had been reinforced with units that had not fought in large cities before. Tank armies and corps who were in their element only in open country, joined in the battle for Berlin. Here tanks had to operate either singly or in small groups in narrow corridors formed by stone buildings where they were exposed to faustpatronen strikes. In the course of the preparation, the Soviet Command attached serious attention to acquainting the officers and men with the plan of Berlin and training assault groups. Instructions and handbooks on street fighting were issued to the men of all the arms. This definitely proved to be a great asset to the men. But it was the indomitable bravery of all
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soldiers, from general to private that in the final count brought victory to the Soviet forces. The battle split up into thousands of isolated engagements that were fought in basements, on each landing, under the ground, in streets and squares. Frequently groups of soldiers would find themselves trapped in fire pockets, their way blocked by barricades, powerful strongpoints and an impenetrable curtain of hot lead and steel. What fighting spirit, what courage the Soviet troops had to have to win this battle. Only people who could clearly see their aims and objectives, people who were not afraid to look death straight in the face, who were willing to fight to the last breath could have performed such an exploit. Heroism became an attribute of each officer and soldier. Even when it became clear to all that the war was about to end, even then the sense of duty and the desire to hasten the hour of victory suppressed the instinct of self-preservation and summoned the men forward into the last attacks. Many soldiers were killed or wounded in the last days and hours of the war. It was a hard-fought victory. The three fronts which took part in the Berlin operation lost 304,887 men killed, wounded and missing (the latter being those buried under the debris of buildings or drowned during the crossing of rivers). The Germans crippled or burned 2,156 tanks and self-propelled guns, smashed 1,220 guns and mortars and destroyed 527 aircraft. It was a victory which had been wrested from the enemy not only by the unprecedented heroism of the troops, but also by the living, steadfast might of the Soviet people, by their firm adherence to their ideological principles. It was a victory of the whole Soviet Union which hurled trainloads of tanks and guns, planes and ammunition over vast distances so that its army would be able to smash the enemy in his own lair, Berlin. Spurred on by his heart to fulfil his noble mission of liberation and end the war, the Soviet soldier knew that his way home lay through Berlin and he did not spare himself to hasten his homecoming. With steel-hearted fury, scorched by the holocaust of the last days of the war, he threw himself into this battle fighting his way through solid curtains of fire and death-dealing metal, through obstacles of stone and concrete, that stood between him and victory.
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It was an exploit which merited the greatest of praise, and high government decorations were awarded to 820,000 officers and men of the 1st Byelorussian Front. Four hundred of them were made Heroes of the Soviet Union. The Soviet troops entered Germany with conflicting emotions. They were immeasurably proud of their country, of the might of the Soviet Army and boundlessly happy. But they could never forget that the enemy had trampled and despoiled their land. They could not forget the blood of the Soviet people, the ashes of the razed towns and villages, factories and fields. And they fought with implacable fury. The front Military Council justly reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that in Germany the troops displayed still greater courage and fortitude. No less profound was their sense of proletarian internationalism. Most of the Soviet soldiers who entered Germany were proudly conscious of the great mission of liberation which they were fulfilling, and considered themselves internationalists. The Soviet soldier fulfilled his internationalist duty. The battle was still raging, but Soviet field kitchens were already issuing food to German children, women and old folk. A Soviet regimental commander brought milk, meat, cereals and butter to a Berlin hospital where 200 children were dying from malnutrition. While SS cutthroats were continuing their desperate resistance in the top floors of a building, Soviet infantrymen asked the tank crews and gunners not to demolish it because old people and children were hiding in its basement. A signals team consisting of Nastya Olekhova, Tossya Grigoryeva, Tamara Rzhenovskaya and Senior Sergeant Malyshev heard the loud weeping of children trapped in a blazing four-storeyed building. Nastya Olekhova dived into the conflagration, reached the second floor and leaning out of a window managed to drop one of the children into a cape stretched out by her friends. She found the second child, too, but was overcome by the smoke and lost consciousness. Risking his life Malyshev rushed to the rescue and brought both the child and Olekhova out of the blazing inferno.
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During a fierce encounter with SS troops defending one side of Eisenstrasse near Tiergarten, Soviet soldiers heard a child's wail coming from a wrecked transformer pillar. Moved by the plaintive cry Sergeant Trifon Lukyanovich crawled to the pillar and there he saw a pathetic picture: a flaxen-haired girl was crying bitterly on the breast of her dead mother. He tore the girl away from the corpse and though wounded himself managed to carry her to safety. Soviet soldiers saved the lives of many German children. There is a majestic monument to the Soviet soldier-liberator in Treptow Park in Berlin. A giant sculpture of a Soviet soldier with a child in his arms rises over the graves of thousands of Soviet troops who gave their lives so that life would triumph over death, and light over darkness. An allegorical figure of their motherland, her head lowered in grief, mourns their death. The Soviet soldiers came to Germany not only to punish the nazis for their horrible crimes, but also to extend a fraternal hand to the German working people. Ordinarily a soldier is a fighting man with a narrow military speciality. In Germany, however, the Soviet soldier became a statesman, a diplomat called upon to administer the country and assume the responsibility for the life and future of the German nation. He came to Germany as a citizen of the great Soviet Union, a political fighter. He had no clemency for the nazi hangmen, but his heart went out to the working people. And in all his activity he was guided by Lenin's precepts. Let us take a look at some of the wartime documents of the nazi leaders in which they bared their bestial hatred for the Soviet people. On June 29, 1941, Hitler instructed Goring, who was in charge of plundering the USSR, to enforce all measures necessary to ensure the maximum utilisation of the discovered resources and economic power in the interests of the German war economy. Goring, who was dissatisfied with the progress of plunder in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union, told a conference of Reich Commissars for the occupied territories which took place on August 6, 1942: "You are being sent there not to work for the well-being of the peoples entrusted to you, but for the purpose of extracting everything a v a i l a b l e . . . . I intend to plunder, and to do it efficiently...." As far back as June 20, 1941, two days before Germany's
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treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, Alfred Rosenberg, one of the most sinister of Hitler's associates, addressing a conference on the "eastern problem" said: " W e do not see at all why we should be compelled to feed the Russian p e o p l e . . . . We know that this is a bitter necessity which lies beyond any sentiment. Without a doubt . . . there are very hard years ahead for the Russians." Naturally, such directives and instructions were zealously enforced. On October 10, 1941, for example, Field Marshal von Reichenau issued an order, which Hitler characterised as an example to be followed: "The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war . . . is an equally misunderstood humanitarian a c t . . . . " Soviet people have not forgotten Hitler's instructions to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground, not to allow a single inhabitant out of "surrounded Moscow" and that "a vast sea must appear which would forever conceal the capital of the Russian people from the civilised world". The Huns of the 20th century, who had also prepared the same fate for Leningrad, destroyed such lively cities as Minsk, Sevastopol, Stalingrad and Voronezh, wiped thousands of towns and villages off the face of the earth, and robbed and doomed hundreds of thousands of Soviet people to death from starvation and exposure to the cold. But now, aware of their approaching downfall and knowing that they would have to pay for all their crimes on Soviet territory, the nazi leaders mounted a hysterical propaganda campaign designed to scare the Germans into believing that the Russians would establish a reign of terror in the country. The newspaper Schwarze Korps in huge letters frontpaged a "warning" to the population: "Remember that in case of defeat only children, women and invalids will remain alive" and they would be condemned to poverty, oppression and a hungry death. Under the ruthless "scorched earth" policy, the people slaughtered cattle and destroyed their property and stocks of food. Terrified by the swiftly advancing Soviet troops, the population fled in panic across the Oder. Many were left without shelter, food and clothing and the Military Council of the front took urgent measures to supply them with all vital necessities and turned over to them the stray cattle herded by the Soviet troops, and seeds. Sincerely
18*

27 5

grateful to the Soviet Army, these people were most helpful in bringing life to normal in the rear and smashing the Werwolf bands and apprehending their agents. But it was Berlin, with its millions of inhabitants, that was the object of the greatest concern for the Soviet Command which was fully aware that the crumbling nazi military and state machine would leave the wrecked city in a state of chaos. Life in Berlin would be completely disorganised bringing hunger and suffering to the people. During the first days of the fighting in the environs of Berlin it became clear that the population, particularly the numerous refugees from the east, were in for great difficulties. People had nothing to eat for several days, since all food shops and storehouses were either empty or destroyed by special SS details. Prisoners of war and local inhabitants disclosed that the situation in the central regions was even more desperate. In an effort to save what had remained of Berlin, and to prevent the civilian population from being exposed to hunger, thirst and other privations, the front Military Council proposed on April 23 that the German High Command and the Command of the Berlin defence should cease their useless resistance. Simultaneously, army military councils and chiefs of front administrations received instructions to supply the population of Berlin with daily rations amounting to 150-200 grammes of bread, 25 grammes of meat, 400 grammes of potatoes, 10 grammes of sugar, 5 grammes of fats (only for children) and 2 grammes of coffee, the maximum the front could allot at the time. These rations were much too scanty but they could not be increased as long as the fighting continued and it was impossible to bring in supplies from across the Oder. But when the battle ended the State Defence Committee endorsed the proposal of the Military Council to augment the rations, and on May 8, 1945, the average daily norm was raised to 400-500 grammes of bread, 50 grammes of cereals, 60 grammes of meat, 15 grammes of fats and 20 grammes of sugar. Vegetables were rationed depending on the available resources. On May 11 the front Military Council divided the rations into categories giving priority to the working class which would have to bear the principal burden of restoring Berlin and play the leading role in laying the foundations for a
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new life in the new, democratic Germany. First-category rations were also issued to scientists, engineers and technicians, teachers, certain sections of the intelligentsia, directors of major industrial and transport enterprises, leading specialists, the leadership of democratic organisations, and antifascists who had been freed from nazi concentration camps and those who had engaged in underground activity. By May 15 approximately 1.5 million ration cards had been issued to Berliners. Shops and bakeries were repaired. The front and its armies assigned over 1,500 officers and political workers, together with a large number of motor vehicles to ensure the normal supply for the population. Children were placed under special care and received special rations. From May 31 to June 19, the Soviet troops transferred 7,000 cows to the dairy farms around Berlin. Part of the animals were stray cattle but the bulk were from the front's herds. As a result, a total of 70,000 litres of milk were made available to the children and the city hospitals by the close of the month. How unlike were the measures the nazis intended to employ against the Soviet children. Under the General Plan Ost all hospitals for children, kindergartens and creches on Soviet territory were to be closed, voluntary sterilisation was extensively advertised and nothing was done to curtail child mortality. The nazis also planned to enforce a rigorous policy of genocide, mass deportation and introduce other monstrous measures with the view to exterminating the Soviet nation or bringing about its gradual extinction. The Berliners were overwhelmed by the generosity of the Soviet people. I recall the morning of May 15, when all members of the Military Council and top-ranking officers of the front Political Department and Logistical Service headed by A. I. Mikoyan and chief of the Soviet Army's Logistics A. V. Khrulev personally inspected the distribution of the new rations. The supply of food for the population was not the only problem that faced the Soviet Command. Berlin lay in ruins, without electricity, heating, water and gas, without city and railway transport. Decomposing human and animal corpses and the tremendous shortage of medical personnel and hospital accommodations (only about 2,000 medical workers had been registered and hospitals could accommo277

date a mere 8,500 people) could have easily led to epidemics of typhus, cholera and dysentery. Thousands of Soviet officers and men worked day and night to avert the disaster. By June 20 the capacity of the power stations which had dropped almost to zero was brought up to 100,000 kw, feeding electricity to thousands of communal enterprises and 33,000 residential buildings; 85,000 houses, not counting communal enterprises, had their water supply restored; 3,000 lamps lit up the streets and the number of hospital accommodations was increased to 31,700. Musical life came into its own with the opera, drama, operetta, the philharmonic and cinemas daily playing to 100,000 Berliners. Soviet films about the rout of the German forces at Moscow, Stalingrad and in the battle of the Kursk Bulge made a tremendous impression on the people. They showed them what had actually happened in these battles to the "invincible" Wehrmacht and where the source of the might and strength of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces lay. It is impossible to describe in detail the colossal assistance which was made available to the German people. Berlin and the other cities of the present-day German Democratic Republic owe the rapid pace of their restoration not only to the participation of the Soviet people in this effort, but also to the tremendous, decisive role played by all the active progressive forces of the German nation itself. Above all this applies to the anti-fascists guided by the tested fighters and great sons of their people and the international workingclass and communist movement comrades Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht and their trusted colleagues. With the assistance of the Soviet Government and Military Command, they managed to rally all the healthy elements of the German people and breathe new life into the demolished cities, wrecked industrial enterprises, into the entire economic and cultural activity of their industrious nation and lead it towards a new, genuinely democratic society. In this connection Walter Ulbricht wrote in his Zur Geschichte der neuesten Zeit-, "Were it not for the dedicated and selfless activity of the working people and the consistent assistance and recommendations of Soviet officers and men, the German anti-fascists would have been unable to cope in that time with the great tasks of rehabilitating the econ278

omy. Confronted with the need to tackle problems connected with the economy, finance, agriculture, construction and the distribution of labour power, many Germans with gratitude recall how the officers of the Soviet Military Administration and commandants' offices in towns and villages, drawing on their vast experience, patiently, day after day helped them in their work, offered competent advice and explained involved questions which the German anti-fascists in view of their inexperience in administrative activity had to solve for the first time." Among the Soviet officers mentioned by Walter Ulbricht, many were experienced specialists whom the Communist Party and the Soviet Government assigned for work in the Military Administration, and their assistance to the German comrades and to the Soviet military personnel in Germany was extremely necessary. It was in their joint struggle and work that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic laid the foundation of their fraternal friendship. Hermann Matern, a prominent figure in the new Germany, paid tribute to the Soviet Armed Forces and citizens in the following words: "The population (GermanEd.) does not have a concrete idea of the tremendous efforts exerted by Soviet generals, officers and soldiers to normalise life for us, Germans, to overcome the aftermath of the catastrophe and to guide Germany on to a new r o a d . . . . Huge difficulties had to be overcome, for the very life of the population depended on that. Many of these Soviet people injured their health in the struggle which they conducted against economic dislocation for the sake of the German people." On May 2, 1945, Soviet guns fired their last shots in Berlin. Battering down the resistance of the enemy, the Soviet forces reached the Elbe in the period from May 3 to 8. On May 8, nazi Germany conceded its complete defeat and surrendered unconditionally.

afterword

This collection of articles by top-ranking Soviet military leaders deals with military operations in almost all the vital sectors of the enormous Soviet-German front at the final phase of the Great Patriotic W a r of the Soviet Union against nazi Germany. The Soviet Armed Forces meritoriously accomplished their mission of liberating millions of people in nazi-enslaved European countries and of the German people whom the hitlerites had turned into an instrument of their aggressive war. These articles illuminate features that were common to all the operations conducted by the Soviet Army at the timecommunity of national and international tasks, patriotic duty to the Soviet people and internationalist duty to the working people of Europe and the whole world. The authors, all of whom had played an active role in these historic events, show how the Soviet Union's might accumulated in the course of socialist construction was employed to strike the death blow to nazism and its war machine, the main bulwark of international reaction and counter-revolution. T h e operations of the Soviet Army and N a v y which led to the liberation of Rumania, Hungary, Poland, Czecho280

Slovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Austria from the nazi invaders actually demonstrated the internationalist character of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. It was only natural, therefore, that the internationalist actions of the Soviet Army have gone down in history under the name of the great march of liberation, which fully reflects the substance, the objectives and the character of the Armed Forces of the socialist Soviet state. A comparison of the operations of the Soviet Army in Central and Southeastern Europe and those of the AngloUS forces in Western Europe will immediately bring out the great difference between them. Workers and peasants in foreign countries greeted the Soviet Army as their liberator, but the collaborationists and fascist hangers-on went into hiding or fled with the remnants of Hitler's troops to escape punishment for their crimes. The insurgent working people of Sofia and Bucharest and many cities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other countries welcomed the arrival of the heroic Soviet troops. T h e victory of the Soviet Army freed the masses from the nazi invaders and created favourable conditions for democratic transformations. T h e atmosphere of political confidence in the Soviet Union, the upsurge of the activity of the masses of people led by anti-fascist fighters, and other factors accelerated the democratisation of social life and the establishment of People's Democracies in Central and Southeastern Europe. A totally different situation developed in those parts of Europe which were being liberated by the Anglo-US forces. The Anglo-US Command disarmed and dissolved guerilla detachments even in areas which had come under their control prior to the arrival of the Allied troops. T h e presence of US and British troops in Western Europe strengthened bourgeois rule and furthered and deepened capitalist exploitation. T h e British and American garrisons which were maintained for a long time in the West European countries hampered the activity of the progressive forces which had risen on the crest of the anti-fascist movement and had won undisputed authority with the people. T h e Soviet Army's operations in Central and Southeastern Europe were notable not only because their political objectives were the liberation of the countries in that part
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of the continent, but also because of their gigantic scale, the intensity of the fighting and the genuinely mass heroism of Soviet soldiers. To ensure the success of these operations the Soviet Command assembled exceptionally large and powerful groups in the main strategic sectors. Suffice it to quote the following example: the 1st Ukrainian Front alone, which made a deep thrust from Lutsk to Sandomierz and played an important role in the liberation of Southern Poland, had concentrated 80 divisions, 10 tank and mechanised corps, nearly 14,000 guns and mortars, 2,200 tanks and more than 2,800 combat aircraft in preparation for the offensive in July 1944. And in January 1945, when the 1st Byelorussian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts launched an offensive out of the Vistula bridgeheads to complete liberation of Poland, they had 2,204,000 men (including the logistical establishments), more than 32,000 guns and mortars, about 6,500 tanks and self-propelled guns and nearly 5,000 combat aircraft. In other words they had half the total number of tanks and a third of the artillery and aircraft which the entire Soviet Army had at the time. In effect, all Soviet forces operating on the Soviet-German front took part in the mission of liberation which carried them far into Europe: 750 kilometres from Brest on the Soviet border to the Elbe; 1,100 kilometres from Jassy to Vienna and the western part of Czechoslovakia, where the 2nd and the 3rd Ukrainian fronts fought their last battles of the war; 650 kilometres from the Prut to Belgrade, and 500 kilometres to Sofia. The Soviet troops had to fight heavy battles for every kilometre of their westward march. Goebbels' propaganda machine worked overtime trying to scare the German people with Siberian P O W camps, and the loss of their Fatherland, and at the same time tried to make them believe that Hitler had a secret weapon which would save the Third Reich from total destruction. Cowards and would-be deserters were punished without mercy. With the fanaticism of the doomed the nazi leaders continued to feed their troops into an absolutely futile fight. On their part, the Soviet forces fought with still greater courage and determination to hasten the destruction of the Wehrmacht. Under the command of experienced officers they cracked enemy fortifications, repelled counterattacks and
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inexorably moved towards the goal set by the Party and the Government. At times they had to pay a heavy price for their westward drive. There were times when the Soviet forces had to take to the offensive without completing preparations, for the situation demanded immediate action. And, indeed, how could they wait until all the troops, artillery, tanks and other equipment were fully assembled, when insurgent Slovaks needed urgent assistance, or when the Prague workers were being killed on the barricades. The Soviet Army also went over to the offensive ahead of schedule in response to a request of the Allied Command whose troops were in a desperate situation in the Ardennes. The Soviet Army's victorious march of liberation testified to the efficiency of its commanders and rank-and-file soldiers. In those days Soviet military art was enriched by numerous methods of fighting and effective use of all the arms in the most diverse terrain conditions and in various time limits. The front and army commands became highly skilled in concentrating large groups of forces for breaching permanent defences. In some offensive operations infantry divisions covered from 25 to 30 kilometres and tank and mechanised troops from 40 to 45 kilometres a day. The Soviet forces fought in towns and densely populated areas which demanded still closer co-operation between infantry units and artillery, tanks and engineer troops. Many cities and urban areas were taken as a result of skilful manoeuvring and encirclement of their garrisons which were either wiped out or taken prisoner. That was how the enemy forces were routed in Budapest, Wroclaw, Berlin, Poznan and other towns. Army Group Centre, the last major enemy force in Czechoslovakia, was also routed in this way. The authors give a good idea of how the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces directed the operations of the fronts. G H Q and the commands of the fronts acted in close contact. Their work was marked by mutual understanding, rhythmical pace, carefully considered decisions and a high degree of organisation. It was in those days that the comradeship-in-arms of the Soviet troops and the troops of the Central and Southeast European countries, which eventually chose the socialist road
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of development, took shape and passed its first test in battle. Continuing to develop this comradeship-in-arms acquired a new foundation, namely the ideological unity of their peoples and the Communist and Workers' Parties which came to power in their countries. The appearance and consolidation of this fraternity in arms have gone down in history as an example of the materialisation of Lenin's principles of proletarian internationalism. In the culminating phase of the Great Patriotic W a r Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian troops joined the Soviet Army in the great mission of saving mankind from the nazi plague. It is only natural, therefore, that the armies of the European socialist countries consider that officially the date of their formation goes back to the period when they fought-against the nazi invaders. Documents and reminiscences of war veterans give an idea of the tremendous work put in by the Soviet Command to train the fraternal armies in the methods of modern warfare, and in the use of sophisticated military equipment. Special mention should be made of the military co-operation between the Soviet Army and the Polish Army and the Czechoslovak Corps which entered Poland and Czechoslovakia together with the Soviet troops. Some countries which had been liberated by the Soviet Army severed relations with nazi Germany and entered the war against her. For them, liberation from the nazi invaders signified liberation from pro-Hitler cliques, which, in defiance of the will of their nations, had sent troops into an adventure in the east, or had rendered extensive material assistance to Germany. The new political forces which came to the fore in these countries guided their development along the road of democracy. The Soviet Army fulfilled its mission of liberation with regard to the German people, too. It fought against the armed enemy, against those who invaded the USSR on Hitler's orders. It clashed in a life-and-death struggle with the looters and rapists who had established the so-called new order in many European countries. Its men knew that it were the German imperialists with their political vanguard, the National Socialist Party, the party of Hitler, Bormann and Hess, who had inveigled the German nation into the war. The people of the Soviet Union had never identified
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the German people with the true organisers of the aggression, and the soldiers who had been deceived by nazi propaganda with the SS hangmen. The German people paid a frightful price for allowing themselves to be led astray. But a considerable section of the population began to see the error into which they had fallen. A few years after the war the first workers' and peasants' state in Germany's historythe German Democratic Republiccame into being on the territory which, in keeping with the decision of the Potsdam Conference, came under temporary occupation of the Soviet Army. Enough time has passed, over a quarter of a century, since the Soviet Army completed its great march of liberation, to assess the Soviet state's historical role in determining the future of many European and Asian nations. At the same time it is also possible to assess the great significance of the revolutionary changes carried out by the people in the liberated countries under the guidance of MarxistLeninist parties. A number of European and Asian countries broke away from the capitalist world and formed the world system of socialism. The achievements of the socialist countries engendered a fresh wave of anti-communism in the bourgeois camp. In it the United States is the main anti-communist force and champion of another campaign against the socialist countries. The United States has become the world centre of militarism and reaction. On its initiative and with its active participation hotbeds of local wars have appeared in various parts of the world. In recent years the imperialists made a number of attempts to restore capitalism in some socialist countries by directly or indirectly interfering in their domestic affairs, by trying to sow discord among them and by supporting internal counter-revolutionary elements. They are placing their biggest stakes on exploiting the ideology of nationalism and petty-bourgeois individualism which will continue to live so long as a decisive struggle is not launched against it. Events in Czechoslovakia have shown that the imperialists have not abandoned their efforts to tear young socialist states out of the socialist community. They chose Czechoslovakia because of her strategic position in the defence system of
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the Warsaw Treaty states. But the intrigues of the imperialist reaction and its agents were cut short by the determined actions of the Warsaw Treaty states. The anti-Soviet forces sustained yet another defeat. And they are in for a still more humiliating beating if they ersist in their efforts, for the Soviet Union and other raternal socialist countries have the strength to bridle any and all gamblers from the aggressive imperialist camp. Today the lessons of the Second World W a r and the joint struggle of the people against the nazi invaders are particularly instructive. The interests of all socialist countries persistently call for the consolidation of the international unity of the working people and the education of the workers and peasants in the spirit of internationalism. Socialist internationalism, one of the greatest achievements of the communist and working-class movement, has played an important part in the development and consolidation of the socialist revolution in Russia, in the victory over nazism and the formation of a democratic and socialist system in a number of countries in the postwar period. Genuine international unity of the working people can arise only on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Nationalism, dogmatism and revisionism are incompatible with, and hostile to, socialist internationalism. Therefore, unity cannot be achieved through ideological concessions, and deviation from Marxist-Leninist ideology undermines the foundations of the international unity of the working people. The military co-operation, which came into being in the joint struggle against the nazi aggressors, rests on the firm foundation formed by the community of interests of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In modern conditions it developed into a great fraternity of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries which are reliably guarding the security of all socialist countries and world peace. The Soviet soldiers and the soldiers of other armies, who had fought in the ranks of the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist forces to liberate the peoples of Europe and Asia from foreign invaders, had not shed their blood in vain. It cemented their comradeship-in-arms into an indestructible alliance of socialist states which is capable of

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thwarting any threats on the part of the imperialist aggressors. "For a quarter-century now, mankind has been safeguarded from world war. That is another historic achievement of the peoples, to which the Soviet Union and its foreign policy have made a considerable contribution. However, the forces of aggression and militarism may have been pushed back, but they have not been rendered harmless. In the postwar years, they have started more than 30 wars and armed conflicts of varying scale. Nor is it possible to consider the threat of another world war as having been completely eliminated. It is the vital task of all the peaceable states, of all the peoples, to prevent this threat from becoming reality."*

* 24th Congress of the CPSU, House, Moscow, p. 36.

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