HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS No. 001 PBM Employees Org Vs PBM Co. Inc. 51 SCRA 189, [5 June 1973] GR No.

L-31195, En Banc, J. Makasiar FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. [PBMEO] is a legitimate labor union. Petitioners decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent company, Philippine Blooming Mills, Co. Inc. warned the petitioners that any demonstration should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company and all those employees who belong to the first shift and are required to report for work will be dismissed if they join the demonstration. Petitioners and their members, numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration. Respondent firm charged the employees of violating the CBA No Lockout No Strike provision. Petitioners claimed that it was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech. CIR ruled in favor of the firm, thus this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of violating the CBA. HELD: While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupied a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions and such priority give these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. Property and property rights may be lost thru prescription but human rights are imprescriptible. The mass demonstration was not a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the labor union and the respondent firm. It is merely an exercise of their right of free expression, peaceable assembly and redress of grievances. Wherefore, respondent firm is directed to reinstate the eight petitioners. POLICE POWER No. 002 BALACUIT VS CFI, GR No. L-38429, [30 June 1988] EN BANC, J. GANCAYCO FACTS: At issue in the petition for review is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject ordinance is a valid exercise of police power, HELD: While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the

property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. No. 003 - LOZANO VS MARTINEZ, 146 SCRA 323, G.R. No. L-63419 (Dec 18, 1986) EN BANC, J. YAP Facts: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. Issue: Whether BP 22 is constitutional. Held: The language of BP22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or post dated, whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value. BP 22 is aimed to put a stop or to curb the practice of issuing worthless checks, which is proscribed by the State because of the injury it causes to public interests. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check which is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law publishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The statute is not unconstitutional No. 004 Del Rosario VS Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521 G.R. No. 88265 December 21, 1989 EN BANC, J. GRIO-AQUINO FACTS: This is a class suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, wherein this Court is asked to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act No. 6675), and of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto. The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private practice on the other hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are allegedly required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the latter may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and veterinarians under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6675 is null and void. HELD: There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can

neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 495.) The Court held that the Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are constitutional. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No. 005 Tablarin Vs Judge Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730, GR No. 78164 [31 Jul 1987] En Banc, J. Feliciano Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are unconstitutional. Held: Prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.