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We will talk about Pareto Efficiency The Free-Market Argument: Competitive Markets are Efficient Equality-Efficiency Trade off The Interventionist Argument Market Failure: An introduction to the chapters to come.
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Examples of GE models
We will mostly work with simple examples of general equilibrium models. You already know the exchange economy in the Edgeworth box. We will talk about the so-called Robinson Crusoe economy: One input, one consumer. And the 2x2 production model with two consumers: 2 goods, 2 inputs, 2 consumers
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Production Efficiency
Robinson can spend an hour of leisure or he can spend an hour gathering 3 coconuts. Since he has 12 hours available per day, he could spend 12 hours of leisure and zero hours of gathering coconuts. This is production efficient, because he spends every hour available to him to produce the maximum amount of leisure. Similarly he could spend all his time gathering coconuts and then ending up with 36 coconuts per day. Again this would be production efficient.
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36 coconuts The slope of the PPF is also called the marginal rate of transformation (MRT leisure for coconut): in order to produce one additional coconut Crusoe Slide 8 sacrifices 1/3 hr of leisure.
leisure
8 Production possibility set in Crusoes problem plays a role similar to the budget set in the consumers problem.
Pareto Efficiency
What we just did graphically can be expressed in Math. Need to find tangency point between PPF and Indifference curves:
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Crusoe has 8 hrs left for catching fish. Since f = 2 lf1/2 , Crusoe can catch 4*21/2 fish when he wants to produce 2 coconuts also. Repeat with various amounts of coconuts, and you get the whole PPF. Or, more generally, use amount of coconuts as a parameter to find out how many fish Crusoe can produce for any given number of coconuts.
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Given amount of coconuts requires lc=c2 units of time. Since lf = 12 lc , time left to produce fish is lf =12 - c2. Given this amount of time to catch fish, amount of fish caught is f = 2 lf1/2 = 2 (12 c2)1/2 . We now can relate any produced amount of coconuts to a maximum amount of fish: PPF is f = 2 (12 - c2)1/2 . The PPF looks likes this:
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Concave PPF
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To find slope of PPF, take derivative of equation describing PPF with respect to c.
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Summing Up
We have looked at a very simple economy with production. We have learned how to find the PPF if there is only one input. We have learned how to find the Pareto efficient allocation of goods if there is only one consumer: (1) MRS = MRT and (2) need to be on PPF. In order to determine what is Pareto efficient we need production efficiency. Production efficiency is a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency.
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Consumption Efficiency
You already know consumption efficiency from the exchange economy. A distribution of goods is consumption efficient if it is not possible to reallocate these goods and make at least one person in the economy better off without making someone else worse off.
For two people and two goods, consumption efficiency translates into MRS1Y for X=MRS2Y for X, so that there are no further gains from trade. 23 Slide
Trade
- 1 unit of good Y + 1 unit of good X and same off
1 1 unit of good Y 1.5 units of good X After trade, both people are better off
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Generalization of Argument
It is easy to see that we can also find mutually beneficial trades if MRS1Y for X<MRS2Y for X. There are no further gains from trade, however, if MRS1Y for X=MRS2Y for X. If MRS1Y for X=MRS2Y for X then we have a consumption efficient allocation. The same logic applies to any two people in the economy and any two goods, so we can easily generalize this rule for many people.
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Production Efficiency
An allocation of inputs (K and L) is production efficient if it is not possible to reallocate these inputs and produce more of at least one good in the economy without decreasing the amount of some other good that is produced.
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In any case, we consider the existing labor force and capital stock as fixed elements that will not be affected by anything we do in our analysis.
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Isoquants of X labor
Amount of labor devoted to production of good X
Good X
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Moving to e.g. this point from point A we can produce more of both goods.
Good X
labor
This point is production efficient: in order to produce more of X we have to reduce production of Y and vice versa.
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How much labor, how much capital should be used in the production of both goods?
Analogy to the consumption efficiency. Noting that the slope of the isoquants is the marginal rate of technical substitution of capital for labor, production efficiency occurs when MRTSXK for L=MRTSYK for L.
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X=30, Y=10
labor PPF
30
Good X
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It costs society MCX $ to produce an additional unit of good X. This money must come out of the production of good Y. A decrease in the production of good Y by one unit frees up MCY $. So the amount of good Y that society must sacrifice to produce one more unit of good X is MCX/ MCY. Hence MRTY for X = MCX/MCY.
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PPF
X,Y
Person 2s highest utility given X and Y Keep person 1 at Good X this utility level.
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Good X
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Good X
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To be more specific assume that MRSY for X=2 and MRTY for X=1. If we want to produce one more unit of good X, we have to give up one unit of good Y. Both consumers are the same off if they give up two units of good Y and receive one more unit of good X. But this means that we will make both of them better off by producing two more units of good X and sacrificing 2 units of good Y! Only if MRS=MRT is such a reallocation not possible. Slide 49
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Exercise
Suppose there are 2 consumers, Ara and Bahar, and two goods, good X and good Y. Aras utility function is given by UA=XY and Bahars utility function is given by UB=X1/4Y3/4. Both goods are produced with labor and capital and good Xs production function is fX=(KXLX)1/2 while good Ys production function is fY=(KYLY)1/2. Suppose there are 8 units of labor and 8 units of capital in this economy. It can be shown that the PPF for this economy is given by Y =8-X.
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Exercise Contd
If half of the amount of capital and half of the amount of labor is used to produce good X, and both Ara and Bahar receive the same amount of both goods would this be Pareto efficient?
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Answer
We need to check:
Production efficiency: MRTSX= MRTSY Consumption efficiency: MRSA= MRSB Product Mix efficiency: MRSA= MRSB=MRT
Production Efficiency MRTSX capital for labor =MPLX/MPKX=KX/LX=1 MRTSY capital for labor =MPLY/MPKY=KY/LY=1 Yes, production efficient.
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Answer Contd
Consumption Efficiency Note that 4 units of good X and 4 units of good Y are produced. This means both Ara and Bahar each receive two units of good X and two units of good Y. MRSAra Y for X =MUXA/MUYA= YA /XA=1 MRSBahar Y for X =MUXB/MUYB= YB /3XB=1/3 MRSAra Y for X is not the same as MRSBahar Y for X . No, not consumption efficient.
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Answer Contd
We do not have consumption efficiency. We dont have to check for product mix efficiency, because if one of the conditions is not satisfied, we already know that the allocation cannot be Pareto efficient.
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Exercise Contd
Suppose both goods are produced with a capital to labor ratio of 1, and 5.5 units of good Y are produced and 2.5 units of good X. Moreover, Ara receives one unit of good X. How many units of good Y must Ara receive and how many units of good X and good Y must Bahar receive for the allocation to be Pareto efficient?
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Answer
Production efficiency: We have 8 units of labor and eight units of capital. If for both goods the capital labor ratio is equal to one, then KX/LX=1= MPLX/MPKX and KY/LY=1= MPLY/MPKY so MRTSX capital for labor = MRTSY capital for labor Moreover 5.5= 8 2.5, so we are on the PPF. So production efficient.
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Answer Contd
Next we need to ensure that consumption efficiency and product mix efficiency are satisfied. For consumption efficiency MRSAra Y for X = MRSBahar Y for X We know that XB =2.5 1=1.5, YA + YB = 5.5 YA /XA=YB /3XB. YA /1=(5.5- YA) /(3*1.5) YA =1, YB = 4.5, XB =1.5.
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Answer Contd
For product mix efficiency MRS = MRT, YA /XA=YB /3XB = 1. The allocation KX=LX=2.5, KY=LY=5.5, XA=1 , XB=1.5 , YA=1, YB= 4.5 is Pareto efficient. We have shown that with this allocation of resources and consumption goods all three conditions of Pareto efficiency are satisfied.
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Competitive Equilibrium
Now that we understand Pareto efficiency in a general equilibrium model with production, we want to find out if the competitive equilibrium in this model is Pareto efficient. First discuss what happens in the competitive equilibrium, then determine whether its Pareto efficient.
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Reading Suggestion
Amarty Sen, one of the Nobel Prize winners in Economics, has an article that examines the first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The title is The Moral Standing of the Market, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds) (1985), Ethics & Economics, pp.1-19, Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited. Slide 67
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Which state of the world would Rawls advocate? State 1, the because
State 1 State 2 State 3 Person 1s utility Person 2s utility Person 3s utility
least wellX=10,Y= X=20,Y=2 X=40,Y=3 off person in 20 0 0 state 1 has the highest 8 20 53 utility compared to 10 5 10 the least well-off persons in 12 15 7 the other states.
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Exercise
Annies utility: U=4X1+3X2X3 Bernds utility: U=2X1 X2 +5X3
Good X1 X2 X3
Annie 5 3 1
Bernd 1 3 5
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Questions
a) Is this allocation envy free? b) Is this allocation Pareto efficient? c) Find an envy-free allocation, that is a Pareto improvement over the first allocation. d) Do you think that the allocation in c is desirable? Why or why not?
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Answer to a)
Annie gets 4*5+3*3*1=29. Bernd gets 2*1*3+5*5=31. Annie envies Bernd, because with Bernds consumption bundle Annie would get 4*1+3*3*5= 49. Bernd envies Annie, because with Annies bundle he gets 2*5*3+5*1=35. The allocation is not envy-free.
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Answer to b)
The original allocation is not Pareto efficient, we have just seen, that both people would be better off if they switched bundles with each other.
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Answer to c)
We can switch the bundles and then both people will not envy each other anymore. This allocation is a Pareto improvement over the original allocation, because both people are better off than before. We could also give Bernd all of good 1 and Annie all of good 3. This is still envy-free. And theyll both be better off than with their initial bundle. Annie:4*0+3*3*6=54. Bernd: 2*6*3*+0=36.
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Answer to d)
The allocations in c) are desirable, because we can make both people better off. On the other hand, inequality between Annie and Bernd increases.
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Consumers and Producers are price takers. If not, people have market power (e.g. oligopoly, monopoly, monopsony). Producers face DRS or CRS technology. If not, natural monopoly. Symmetric information. If not, people can take advantage of their superior knowledge. Markets may not exist, or may not be efficient. Private goods. If not, markets provide too little of public goods and goods with positive externalities and too much of goods with negative externalities.
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Assumptions in FFTW