Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany

Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions, Edinburgh 2003 Workshop 16: Politics and Memory

Eric Langenbacher

Department of Government/Center for German and European Studies Georgetown University Washington, DC, USA

Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany I. Introduction Collective memory has become one of the foremost intellectual concerns in recent years, illuminating numerous analyses of diverse countries. No country, however, has been affected (or studied) as much as postwar Germany, the quintessential example of country with a past that wont go away. Indeed, almost all authors writing about that case emphasize the importance of memory for a proper comprehension of its cultural and political life (e.g., Brady 1999, Merkl 1999). Despite this substantial attention, the current corpus of literature has produced neither a full understanding of the dynamics and impact of memory in general, nor a proper portrait of the evolution of and political influence of memory in Germany. Three shortcomings exist. Theoretically, most authors rely on psychological, or more specifically, psychoanalytic notions like trauma, repression, mourning and workingthrough, applied to both individuals and collectivities. Today, however, these concepts are over-utilized and extremely stretched. 1 Apart from unexamined or too hurriedly dismissed problems intrinsic to the approach, like the questionable application of precepts developed at and for an individual mind onto a collectivity, these frameworks do not address several core issues that are essential to understand the evolution and political impact of memory. The two biggest lacunae are an under-theorization of the dynamics of discursive competition and the actors that represent memories in public discussions and debates, and, a failure to disentangle and specify the distinctive components of memory. Methodologically, almost all analyses employ various types of qualitative data and interpretive methods, largely abjuring the use of quantitative alternatives.2 This is due, on
1

Particularly problematic works include Dominick La Capra. Revisiting the Historians' Debate: Mourning and Genocide. History and Memory, 1997; Eric L. Santner. Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory and Film in Postwar Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990; Caroline Wied mer. The Claims of Memory: Representations of the Holocaust in Contemporary Germany and France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. For a summary of the problems of these approaches, see Tillmann Moser. Die Unfhigkeit zu trauern: Hlt die Diagnose einer berprfung stand? Zur psychischen Verarbeitung des Holocausts
in der Bundesrepublik. Psyche 46 (5) 1992, pp. 389-405. 2 Notable exceptions include Bodo von Borries. Das Geschichtsbewutsein Jugendlicher: Eine

reprsentative Untersuchung ber Vergangenheitsdeutungen, Gegenwartswahrnehmungen und Zukunftserwartungen von Schlerinnen und Schlern in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Weinheim: Juventa Verlag, 1995; Hermann Kurthen. Antisemitism and Xenophobia in United Germany: How the Burden of the Past affects the Present. In Antisemitism and Xenphobia in Germany after Unification, edited by H. Kurthen, W. Bergmann and R. Erb. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997; Elisabeth Noelle -Neumann,

the one hand, to the great resonance memory has received in the more humanistic disciplines, and, on the other, to the lack of serious attention among social scientists towards memory and, more generally, towards cultural phenomena. Not surprisingly, the ability to speak about or generalize for a country as a whole has been circumscribed, even if ambitious, system-wide statements are constantly proffered. Thus, a quantitative corrective is rather useful and necessary today. 3 Empirically, the German case has been misunderstood and insufficiently analyzed. Above all, there has been a rather exclusive focus on one memory (of Nazi German crimes, epitomized by the Holocaust), its repression over much of the postwar period and the eventual (if only partially successful) process of working-through. 4 The following table summarizes the dominant view: Table 1: Dominant Narrative of the Holocaust-centered Memory
Period 1. Repression 2.Nascent Breakthrough 3.Increasing Visibility 4.Fragile Prominence Dates 1949(45)-early 1960s Early 1960s-1979 1979-1990 Characteristics Silence, inability to mourn/second guilt, lingering pathologies, path-dependent deficits Isolated but increasingly frequent flare-ups, slow increase in salience, heroic 68er generational efforts Greater incidence and prominence of public controversies, mediatization, societal extensiveness, real public debate, yet persistence of problematic positions Greatly increased salience, larger public-political prominence and societal extensiveness, continuous debate and discourse, yet not without problems

1990-present

Authors have neglected more positive evidence regarding the working through of this memory in the earlier postwar years, other memories, either of different generative events or alternative interpretations of the Nazi period, and the competition for dominance
Demoskopische Geschichtsstunde: vom Wartesaal der Geschichte. Osnabruck: Fromm, 1991; Felix Phillip Lutz. Das Geschichtsbewutsein der Deutschen: Grundlagen der politischen Kultur in Ost und West. Kln: Bhlau, 2000; J. Pennebaker, D. Paez and B. Rime, ed. Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997. 3 Of course, quantitative forms of data and statistical analyses also have limitations, mainly regarding the degree to which nuances of opinion can be captured. Thus, an ideal methodological strategy for issues of memory would be one of triangulation, combining and complementing qualitative and quantitative methods. This is exactly the strategy employed in the larger project on which this paper is based, where the statistical analysis of the survey is combined with various discourse analyses and numerous intensive interviews. Space constraints do not allow for a full examination of these data in this paper. 4 Canonical works include: Theodor Adorno. What does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean? In. Bitburg in Moral and Historical Perspective. G. Hartman, ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.; Alexander and Margarethe Mitscherlich. The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior. New York: Grove Press, 1975.; Ralf Giordano. Die zweite Schuld oder Von der Last Deutscher zu sein. Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1987. For an overview of this dominant perspective see: Andrei S. Markovits and Beth Simone Noveck. West Germany. In The World Reacts to the Holocaust, edited by D. S. Wyman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

among representatives of these memories. Moreover, due to the predominant use of qualitative forms of data, few, unreliable or overly pessimistic statements regarding the actual impact of memory on the political values of average Germans exist. 5 This paper directly addresses these shortcomings. It introduces a new conceptual framework that identifies the analytically distinctive elements of memory regimes and incorporates dynamics of competition and power. The framework also generates several more specific research questions, which are tested through the statistical analysis of an original representative survey commissioned in August 2000. In the end, the paper simultaneously furthers the understanding of memory in Germany today and supports the more general conclusion that memory is a crucial influence on political life. II. Memory Regimes 1. Components of Memory Regime s The basic assumption and point of departure is that political culture and values affect real political outcomes and that memory is both a constitutive component of a political culture and an important attitudinal influence. Beyond these assumptions, which are also hypotheses to be tested through the German case, several other preliminary distinctions are useful. The concept of the past captures everything that actually happened before the present but is a hypothetical category. History, in contrast, is what we actually know or retrieve from the past. It is communicated to us in written, oral or visual formats. This distinction is important because not everything that actually happened in the past is recorded and passed down. History encapsulates the recorded facts of the past, coupled with a thin layer of interpretation and value-based judgment. This thin interpretive element concerns what the writer of history decides to include in the historical account (selection bias) and how that account is framed, i.e., the historical narrative. Following Pierre Nora (1989) there is a further distinction between history and memory. Memory is an intensification of history, consisting of some facts about the past coupled with thick interpretive eleme nts: selection, deeper narrativistic framing, value dimensions and lessons. Completing this scheme, myth lies beyond memory (Olick and

See Micha Brumlik, et.al.. Umkmpftes Vergessen: Walser-Debatte, Holocaust-Mahnmal und neuere deutsche Geschichtspolitik . Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 2000; Mark Fisher. After the Wall: Germany, Germans and the Burden of History. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995; Jane Kramer. The Politics of Memory: Looking for Germany in the New Germany. New York: Random House, 1996.

Levy 1997). Although myth may have some factual referent or cause in the past, this empirical link is extremely tenuous, often non-existent. It is almost pure interpretation or belief. It is, of course, rather difficult to achieve mythical status, whereas memory is a more attainable goal. In a sense, memory is a way of packaging and operationalizing shared history and becomes the means by which history becomes an influential conditioning or causal force within a political culture. If memory starts to become an evocative political force, a variety of other components arises and accompanies it, which together comprise a memory regime: Table 2: Components of a Memory Regime
Synchronic Dimension Collective Memories Lessons/Value Connections Supportive Ethical and Moral Discourse Diachronic Dimension Master Historical Narrative of Causes of Generative Events Master Historical Narrative of the Memory from Generative Events to the Present

At any point in time the synchronic dimension contains the specific collective memories, asserted lessons, value connections and supportive ethical/moral discourses. The diachronic dimension encapsulates two master historical narratives concerning the causes of the events that generated the memories and the history of the memory from that point to the present or the narrative of coming to terms with the past. Although these elements are distinct, they are also intimately interconnected and essential supports for the others. For example, the narrative explaining how the generative events arose greatly influences the supportive ethical discourses that justify retaining the memory in the present and implies certain lessons. Regarding the first synchronic dimension, for collective memories, the thick interpretive aspect is crucial. Collective memories are widely shared interpretations of specific historical events that contain a strong affective dimension. It is history made relevant and resonant with individuals: value-laden, emotionalized and politicized history. Authors also note cognitive, orientational and, especially, identity forming functions (Lutz 2000). Jan Assmann writes that memory is normative, providing a sense of togetherness; one remembers in order to belong and this memory has the character of a duty (1995, 52). In all of this, affect and emotion are especially characteristic and

distinguish memories from other political attitudes and values where the degree of emotional investment can be much lower. This thick interpretive characteristic further implies that the perspective of the present, current values in other domains, greatly determines the over-arching memory: collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past ... it adapts the images of ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present (Schwartz 1982, 376). As a result, contemporary actors always interpret and distort history fro m their own tendentious perspective to produce memories, which, consequently, say much more about the present than the past. But this overstates the case and implies that memory is dependent on other contemporary values or structures, being neither an auto nomous part of the political culture nor an independent variable. Yet, there are limits to presentist interpretations of history, boundaries as to what can be made out of a past. Good historical research always strives to get into the minds of historical actors and empathetically understand their motivations, life-world and behaviors, and not (just) apply todays standards. These processes of historical verification check presentist interpretive excess. Moreover, collective memories greatly determine many values in the present through the second synchronic element. These lessons, prescriptions and proscriptions (Olick and Levy 1997) influence or suggest particular political values. Value conversion and especially connection (Rochon 1998) are especially operative, processes in which actors link memories to preferred values and attitudes. Hence, a better conceptualization of the relationship is one of recursive interplay between history and the present. History through collective memory influences present values, which in turn, reinforce and re-package memory within the limits of the historical record. The third component of the synchronic dimension is supportive ethical and moral discourses. These are supplemental arguments and justifications for the memories and the lessons contained in the memory regime. They are perhaps the least distinctive overall component, using arguments from current values in other political cultural domains, from the connected historical explanations and narratives or from more general moral and ethical precepts. Nevertheless, this is where much of the action of a memory regime surfaceswhere the value connections and moralizing take place, as well as some of the most vigorous debates. For example, many in Germany argue that memory of the

Holocaust must be sustained because the genocide was a violation of basic civilizational or ethical norms against murder. Others stress that memory of the Holocaust implies the necessity of democracy and tolerance, i.e., progressive and desirable values. Turning to the diachronic dimension, the meanings embedded in these memories are highly accessible because they are based on widely experienced historical events, usually collectively defining cases of shared trauma like World Wa r II or the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Schuman and Scott characterize such events as those that rip the larger existential fabric of our being- in-the-world and thus leave an indelible impression (1989, 361). As a recent review of social-psychological studies concludes: collective memories are most likely to be formed and maintained about events that represent significant long-term changes to peoples lives (Pennebaker and Banasik 1997, 17). Salient memories emerge from these kinds of highly influential, but discrete events, such as a war or a revolution, rather than large swaths of time, a concept (the state) or a group (women). This delimited focus, existential importance and emotional content are major reasons for their comprehensibility and accessibility to all members of a political culture. Somewhat paradoxically, memories are also always based on and imply a particular (master) historical narrative that encompasses a grander sweep of history. Memories of discrete events are a kind of shorthand and trigger for a more detailed historical narrative. This first master narrative explaining the generative events on which the memory is based is the first component of the diachronic dimension. Although the interpretation embedded in such a narrative is thin compared to that of a memory, there is substantial variation in how authors construct this narrative with divergent implications for the present. For example, very different memory regimes result from intentionalist explanations of the Holocaust that emphasizes deep political cultural causes versus functionalist accounts of bureaucratic dynamics and contingent events. The second diachronic component is a narrative of what happened to the collective memory between the time of the generative events and the present. This is the history of the memory, its view of itself, or better the view of the elite representatives of the memory regarding the trials, tribulations, success or failure of the memory over the course of time since the generative events. This kind of self- image greatly influences the other elements of the current memory regime. If this narrative is one of previous failure

of the memory to become widely resonant then the relevant actors may change or radicalize their views of the causes of the event or the derived lessons. This is an argument for the necessity of the memory in the present, a tactic in the competition for cultural dominance, as well as a motivating force for the representatives of the memory. 2. Types of Memories and Actors Collective memories are inter-subjective or shared interpretations of commonly experienced historical events. 6 Orientational variability, highlighting the essential diversity and pluralism of any political culture determined by diverse socio -economic and geographic circumstances, among other factors, means that multiple memories, like multiple values, circulate. These may be different interpretations of a specific event or different generative events. For these reasons, Markovits and Reich talk about memory clusters in a countrys memory map (1997, 34) and Young (1993) even advocates replacing the collective memory term with collected memory. Moreover, memories hang together with an array of other political values and demographic factors, producing a variety of memory publics, differentiated by variables such as education, generation, region of residence or partisan identification. 7 Pluralism also manifests itself in various types of shared memories. Assmann and Frevert (1999) note first the communicative memory, at the level of interpersonal networks of friends, colleagues and families, which is determined through close face-toface interaction. A more general variant of communicative memory is the generation or cohort, where notions of commonly experienced crucial periods, socialization and entropy are central. Next is collective memory, an intensification of the generational memory attempting to transcend the generation to gain broader influence. It is political
6

Of course, each individual has memories of what s/he experienced. Halbwachs, the seminal theorist of collective memory, made strong but problematic assertions that only social memories exist because personal memories are nothing without the communal dimension.. He writes: Our memories remain collective, however, and are recounted to us through others ... in reality we are never alone (1992, 23). Later: a person remembers only by situating himself within the viewpoint of one or several groups and one of several currents of collective thought (33). Halbwachs thoughts were path breaking, looking at the importance of affective groups, stressing the social aspect of human memory and intimating the competition that may arise from various group identifications and loyalties. But there are also limitations, especially the extreme group emphasis and the relative absence of the individual.. 7 Non-attitudes, in the context of memory, forgetfulness, are also potential issues. However, in contrast to the distinction between memory and forgetting that permeates much of the literature distinctions should be made between those for whom no collective memories resonate (classical non-attitudes), those who consciously forget a particular memory and those who accept different memories. Determining the composition and proportions of such groups must be central empirical concerns.

and instrumentalized, necessary simplifications the more ambitious and general the claim for dominance. Finally there is the cultural memory, which is the most general level directed towards a mythical past and strongly ritualized (Kirsch 1999, 30). It is needed: ... In order to transport experiences and knowledge over the generations, and thereby to build up long-term memory. Whereas the collective memory reaches this stabilization through a radical reduction of content, high symbolic intensity and strong psychic affect, the cultural memory supports itself on external media and institutions (Assmann and Frevert, 49). This last cultural variant is the first that is explicitly divorced from individual experiences of some sort, becoming highly abstract, institut ionalized and canonized. Others prefer terms like postmemory (Hirsch 1997), a hypermediated cultural construction of a vicarious past to capture this type (Sicher 2000, Young, 2000). These conceptualizations also point to the possibility that some variants can be passed on to posterity once the individuals who experienced the generative historical events pass away. On the end of the spectrum of hypothetical memory regimes, memory meets myth: Figure 1: Types of Memories
I--------------------------I------------------------I-------------------------I------------------------I Communicative Generational Collective Cultural Myth Memory Memory Memory Memory Low Degree of Generality and Acceptance High

This typology also helps to answer the question as to when shared memories begin, especially after a traumatic episode. Numerous authors note that a post-traumatic period of silence, repression or latency is a common individual and collective reaction to a traumatizing historical episode (Fogelman 1988; Allen 1995). In such contexts collective memory, based on discourse and verbalization, cannot exist. Eventually, many affected individuals will verbalize and share their suffering and loss, a development that many see as central to processes of individual coping and collective healing, rehabilitation and justice, pointing to a further therapeutic function of memory (Hirsch 1995; Kritz 1995; Ricoeur 1998; Booth 2001).8 However, given the lingering and often permanent effects

A collective dimension is vital to provide the forum necessary for verbalization, concretization, acknowledgment, recognition and empathy of a trauma that a victim experienced. There can be no healing, no working-through without the recognition and valuation that a collective memory provides. Obviously, this therapeutic function is only operative when the historical referent is some sort of traumatic event, or

of the traumatic past, many victims may feel uncomfortable speaking beyond the communicative level of the more intimate group, which limits the memorys potential resonance in the larger political culture. Often more widely shared memories, such as the collective variant, need to be represented by proxies or successor generations. Two implications follow. First, even if affected individuals are in the latency stage and unable to directly shape discourses of shared memories, others can represent their voices from the very outset of the post-traumatic period. For example, many Holocaust survivors were silent until the 1960s, yet others, like the U.S. and Israeli governments, American Jews and international organizations provided representation and helped to forge memory from the outset of the postwar period (Maislinger 1990; Shafir 1999). Second, even if affected individuals limit their verbalized memories to the communicative arena, others can contribute to the generational, collective and cultural variants, i.e., various types of memory circulate simultaneously. The most important of these proxies or representatives of memory belong to the elite and are responsible for the majority of visible action and wider influence. Young writes: If societies remember, it is only insofar as their institutions and rituals organize, shape, even inspire their constituents memories. For a societys memory cannot exist outside of those people who do the rememberingeven if such memory happens to be at societys bidding, in its name (1993, xi) The privileged interpreters of memory regimes, memory editors (Irwin-Zarecki 1994, 179), and socializing agents are politicians, journalists, religious and social leaders, artists, teachers and intellectuals. Three subsets of the more general elite, their more specialized arenas and their resulting discourses are especially important. An academic/ intellectual variant conceives of memory more as a theoretical construct, a description and explanation of the historical events and of the reactions to them. This is the perspective and domain of the intellectual observer of the memory regime and the textual products conform to the standards and methodol gy of academic scholarship. Memories o are also a public-political interpretation of the past that imply various lessons, which are, in turn, applied to political debates of all kinds. This is the view and arena of the classical politically engaged critical community (Rochon), which are central for issues
negative experience that approaches but does not reach traumatic status. Given the frequency of such experiences worldwide and the tendency for countries to dwell on such, this function arises often.

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of memory, given the existential gravity of the generative events, the large degree of embedded emotion, therapy and interpretation and the centrality of leadership in affecting the values of mass publics. Memories are quintessential ground for the morally motivated and engaged vanguard that is characteristic of the critical community concept. These two groups produce slightly different versions of the memory. The political variant, for example, does not contain the explicit methodological and strong theoretical components of the intellectual version, even if many residues are visible. However, it is often difficult to disentangle precisely the two types, given that often many intellectual practitioners intervene extensively in the public-political sphere and because normative concerns derived from public-political engagement greatly influence such authors academic work, which is true in general, and particularly in the German case. Moreover, critical actors often use and need the discursive ammunition produced by more academic work, for example, in constructing master historical narratives. Thus, although these two arenas are distinct, actors often intervene in a third, overlapping domain, the public or media realm (Kirsch 1999; Wolfrum 1999, 2). At the aggregate level, all of these forces and elite actors converge most visibly in this arena, where the public transcript (Scott 1990) of the memory regime becomes the most visible and influential. Although most memory regimes and their elites are overwhelmingly national, there are many cases where international actors participate extensively. Various factors determine such participation, such as the nature of the generative event (civil strife versus an international conflagration), whether the victims or their descendants live outside of the country (and have achieved voice) and the degree of permeability that the political culture displays. Such influences characterize even more the purer intellectual arena, given the extensive internationalization of intellectual and academic work. Whatever their composition, elite actors are the ones that hammer out and validate the politically acceptable memory regime, the public transcript of memory. How these leaders interpret and package meaning, as well as how they assert the various lessons and connected values that ought to flow from the memory greatly affect average citizens (Zaller 1992). Conversely, elite interpreters respond to the memories and opinions from below, either from individuals or from particularly aware and interested groups, the memories and interpretations of which these actors aggregate, interpret and represent.

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There may be a disjunction between the public transcript or elite discourse and a hidden, mass one (Scott). Such a disjunction is one potential source for change if some members of the elite shift conceptions to correspond better to popular discourses. 3. Competition and Dominance Precisely because memories are cultural constructs and shared interpretations with potential influence on political values and outcomes, power and competition are central. Connerton observes: For it is surely the case that control of a societys memory largely conditions the hierarchy of power ... our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order (1989, 1, 3). Participants in various debates certainly acknowledge this. Strmer, a major figure in the German Historians Debate, observed: whoever fills the memory, forms the concepts and interprets the past wins the future in a land deprived of history (Mushaben, 1998, 4). Power stems from the degree of dominance that representatives of a memory achieve in a political culture. The following typology of value regimes and power situations also models different memory regimes: Figure 2: Heuristic Continuum of Value Regime Power9 ********* ********* ********* *********
********* ********* Heterogeneity Competitive non-dominance Low Degree of Power High Plurality Dominance Hegemony Unanimity

* * * *

* * * *

****** ****** ******

***** ***** ***** *****

****** ****** ****** ****** **

***** ***** ***** ***** *****

An assessment of power and dominance results from looking at how many memories circulate, how widely people hold a specific memory and the depth of attachment. Acceptance among the more general elite and better-educated classes matters immensely, but also among mass publics, which is the test of the success of the elite actors. Importantly, this power is premised on a congenial context. A lthough every country has salient collective memories and memory regimes, in some cases memory may be an
9

In this heuristic model stars represent individuals holding values and boxes represents competing values.

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un-influential force on political values and an unimportant component of a political culture. These are low memory political cultures in contrast to high memory ones where memory is a frequent and influential force on political life. Countries can be mapped on two continuous dimensions of macro context and memory regime power: Figure 3: Heuristic Map of Political Cultures and Memory Regimes
High Memory Context

Heterogeneity

Unanimity

Low Memory Context

Given a high or even medium memory context, the potential power involved motivates elite representatives of various memories to compete in pursuit of maximizing the dominance of their preferred memory. Competition may be between divergent interpretations of one period or between memories based on different periods, where much of the action revolves around arguing for the salience of one event versus another. In addition, in lower memory contexts, critical elites may act to change the context in order to make memory a more resonant and salient concern. Here the clash is more generally about memory versus forgetting. Indeed, there can be competition over each of the components of a memo ry regime and change in one may affect the others. For example, there has been substantial debate in Germany as to what the overriding lesson from the memory of the Holocaust is: nie wieder Krieg (never again war), nie wieder Auschwitz (never again Auschwitz), or, according to current CDU leader Merkl, nie wieder Sonderwege (never again unilateralism). In any case, the goal of memory representatives is to achieve the maximum breadth of acceptance and depth of attachment among the elite more generally a nd mass publics. It also means achieving policy objectives and institutionalization in school curricula, memorials and texts. Like any value-based conflict, the competition is vigorous because the actors believe intensely in what they are representing, their identities often are invested in them, and compromise is problematic. Moreover, actors use both positive

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and negative tactics and arguments. De-legitimizing and demonizing the opposing memory and its representatives, i.e., making them taboo, occur frequently. Struggles over memory may be the most vigorous, zero-sum and uncompromising of all political cultural conflicts because of the higher degree of emotion involved, the importance of the generative historical events and the potential power that victory entails. Normative commitment, existential importance and power are reasons for perpetual dynamism, for elites to constantly (re) enter discursive struggles. Other sources of dynamism include generational change based on altered socio -economic structures and different socialization processes. In fact, most authors assign the greatest weight to processes of generational change (Platt and Dabag 1995; Mushaben 1998). A particular memory is always more poignant if individuals personally experienced the generative events and may lose relevance for younger cohorts with no such experiences. Memories, in contrast to other inherited attitudes, may be especially prone to losing relevance, given the on-going saga of history. There is an in-built potential for exogenous change through more recent and accessible events and the shared memories based on them. However, there are also important forces of conservation. Because memories are on the more emotional side of the ideational spectrum (increasing their accessibility), actors can make them resonate longer and more deeply. Recall also that dominant memories are based typically on highly traumatic or foundational events, so they can remain relevant long after the generation of witnesses pass away. Supportive public discourse that maintains exposure to the memory, coupled with pedagogical measures, can sustain a particular memorys dominance for some time. Sanctification and institutionalization are arguably more easily achieved than for other values, given the importance of memorials. III. Rethinking the German Case 1. Changing Memory Regimes in Postwar Germany An application of the memory regime framework, in particular the precept of competing memories, leads to a substantially different and more comprehensive perspective of the evolution of postwar German memory. In the years after Unification in 1990, for example, some conservatives tried to push the more recent memory of the East German dictatorship, purportedly in order to relativize the memory of the Nazi regime. Today, even though most Germans recognize the nastiness of communism, they believe

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that Nazism was simply much nastier. The more crucial point is that the proffered memory of communism was thoroughly defeated by representatives of the Holocaust centered memory, who successfully defended its dominance by convincing most Germans of the greater severity and importance of their preferred memory. 10 However, there was an earlier and more important victory for advocates of the Holocaust-centered memory over the memory of German suffering during World War Two and its aftermath. In the earlier postwar decades this latter memory, based on the experiences of aerial bombardment of cities and civilians, the ethnic cleansing of about 14 million Germans from then-Eastern Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and the mass rape of German women by members of the Red Army, resonated broadly with the population (Heinemann 2001; Moeller 2001; Naumann 1998; Nawratil 1999; Neumann 2000). Other studies show that this memory, already declining in the 1970s, was thoroughly defeated and supplanted by representatives of the Holocaust-centered memory in the prominent elite- level discursive clashes (like the Historians Debate) of the mid 1980s and defended vociferously ever since by the victors of those discursive competitions. This re-thinking of the dynamics of postwar memory makes the new discussions about this memory of German suffering in 2002-2003, spurred by the work of authors like Grass (2002), Friedrich (2002), Sebald (2003) and a flurry of media attention, much less difficult to comprehend. 11 These discussions are not novel, as many authors and commentators have asserted, but are rather the re-emergence of nevercompletely defeated memories. A modified periodization of the evolution of postwar memory follows:

10

This memory was also advocated by many Eastern German victims of the Stasi making for strange bedfellows. Michael Geyer. The Long Good-bye: German Culture Wars in the Nineties. In The Power of Intellectuals in Contemporary Germany, edited by M. Geyer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 11 See Another taboo broken, The Economist, November 23, 2002; Peter Schneider, In Their Side of World War II, the Germans Also Suffered, The New York Times , January 18, 2003. Christopher Rhoads, Behind Iraq Stance in Germany: Flood of War Memories, The Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2003.

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Table 3: Revised Chronology of Memory Regimes in Postwar Germany

Regime/Phase 1. Dominance of German-centered memory 2.Introduction of new memory/ Competing, plural memories 3. Battle for Dominance/ Rise of Holocaust-centered memory 4. Dominance of Holocaust-centered memory 5. Renewed Competition Dates 1945-late 60s Late 50s late 70s Late 70s 1990 Characteristics Concentration on self, inner-directed working through of German suffering, Germans-as-perpetrators downplayed, establishment of conditions for subsequent extension of processes Beginnings of extension of working through to Nazi victims, generational interventions, greater though limited diffusion of processes through society Rise to prominence of Holocaust conception of the past, almost dominant, though resis tedcreating public-political debates, mediatization, extensive diffusion; internationalization Past=Holocaust achieves dominance, older conception of the past withers, constant discourse, wide diffusio n in society, continuous public debate Return of German-centered memories; notable for the empathy extended and the resonance amongst leftists; too early to draw firm conclusions

1990-2002

2002-

2. The Contemporary Nature and Impact of Memory A. Preliminary Considerations Still missing is a quantitative analysis of the nature and impact of memory on the political values of Germans today, which also tests the utility of the memory regime framework and, even more generally, the impact of memory in a political culture. What memories exist, how dominant are they and for whom? Specifically, who subscribes to the Holocaust-centered memory regime and who to the German-centered one and what divergent attitudinal effects result? More generally, does memory exert an independent impact on the political values of contemporary Germans? In order to answer these questions, I formulated and implemented an original survey of German citizens between the ages of 14 and 60 in 1999-2000.12 A brief word regarding the most important demographic influences on or correlates of memory is necessary, as well as the expected relationships. These factors are dually
12

After extensive question formulation and pre-testing efforts conducted over the course of field research in 1999-2000, including several focus groups and trial administrations to high school classes, the public opinion firm FORSA (Berlin) implemented the survey between August 10th and 14 th , 2000. The survey representatively sampled the three age groups discussed above, 14-25, 26-40 and 41-60. Five hundred respondents were tapped in the first and last groups. The middle group was over-sampled with 1000 respondents, for a total n of 2000. I then pooled the three samples, using a weighting corresponding to the actual proportion of these cohorts in the total 14-60 population of the Federal Republic (based on 1998 official data), resulting in a data set with a total of 2,746 data points. The reason for not including the oldest (60+) cohort who experienced the Nazi period, is that I am concerned with the transmission and future of memory, divorced from actual experiences, which is quickly occurring as this oldest group passes away.

16

important, largely explaining which types of respondents support various memories in the first set of analyses, as well as entering the calculations of the possible influence of memories on political values as control variables. This enables more certain and valid conclusions regarding the impact of memory through a comparison with the other factors. Mass-Elite Differences: It is likely that higher education leads to greater exposure to elite messages (through the mass media and quality press), leading to greater acceptance of the elite validated memory and political values, even if passively absorbed. Moreover, greater education should lead to a higher likelihood that memory will influence more political values and opinions and will more often arise as an attitudinal influence. Similarly, higher levels of income or higher status occupations (both related to higher levels of education) should also result in greater acceptance of the socially desirable opinions as well as a greater impact of memory on these political values. Education and income are variables that capture class position and thus gr eater proximity to and receptivity towards the elite and its dominant messages. 13 Partisan Identification: In previous decades conservatives tended to represent the German-centered memory regime, whereas the Left came to advocate the Holocaustcentered one. In addition, conservatives tended to downplay or minimize the impact of this past, whereas leftists embraced this influence more readily. Thus, I expect that leftists more frequently and more deeply hold the Holocaust-centered memory and conservatives accept it to a lesser extent and confine the Nazi pasts impact to fewer political domains. Given its importance in the past and the possibility that support for collective memories may be a product of partisanship rather than an autonomous attitudinal influence, this background factor may be the one of the most powerful predictors. Generation: Previous studies strongly suggest that generational differences may also play a prominent explanatory role. Based on data from 2000 and using the ages 15-30 as the critical socialization years, I identify three cohorts from successor generations. The youngest is the millennial generation (14-25 years old), socialized after Unification. The centrality of Unification in 1990 characterizes the middle Wende generatio n (26-40). The third and oldest group is the 68er generation (41-60), the old student rebels, even if the younger members of this cohort did not come of age until the 1970s. Previous studies found that older individuals typically accepted the Holocaust-centered memory regime less than younger ones. Of course, the oldest cohort (60+ in 2000) was not included the survey. Even among members of successor generations the pattern may still hold because older citizens still had less formal instruction concerning the Third Reich than younger ones. Moreover, younger respondents came of age after the Holocaust-centered interpretation supplanted previously dominant memories. Thus, younger citizens may support the newer memory regime to a greater degree than older ones and it may exert a greater influence on the political thinking of this group. 14
13

In the survey, there were 9 income brackets based on monthly income (in Marks), ranging from under DM 1000 to DM 7,500 and more, so that an increase in income indicates a change from the lower to the next higher bracket, e.g., from the 2,500-under 3,500 bracket to the 3,500-under 4,500 one. 14 Conversely, the 68er generation distinguished itself by its radicalism and heightened sensitivity towards issues of memory and, as a consequence, may be closer to the dominant memory regime than younger

17

East-West Residency: Since Unification authors observed substantial attitudinal differences between the populations of the two parts of the country. Western Germans may accept the dominant memory regime (a Western creation) more than Easterners, for whom the communist dictatorship may be the more salient period, or for whom East German anti-fascist socialization may determine historical interpretations today. It is currently difficult to specify expected relationships, given evidence for the shrinking of this divide and the centrality of Nazism in the historical socialization of the GDR. Nevertheless, I expect that Westerners accept the Holocaust-centered memory regime to a greater extent than Easterners. Other Factors: Several other factors play an explanatory role in related studies. Corresponding to greater rejection of xenophobia and anti- Semitism and a greater acceptance of pacifism and human rights, women may be closer to the elite- validated memory regime than men. Religious affiliation and church attendance could explain some variance, 15 given evidence that frequent church- goers are more tolerant towards ethnic minorities, and, thus, may more greatly support other progressive views. B. Investigating and Explaining Tenets of the Memory Regime i. General Assessments and Salience of Historical Periods One of the first tasks of representatives of a particular memory is to convince their audiences that the memorys generative events ought to be the most influential for the present. For the Holocaust-centered memory, this means that Germans must accept the overall salience of the Nazi period and assess this past negatively. Germans today do not unequivocally condemn the past as completely negative. Forty percent think it is partially negative and partially positive and a further 35% think it was more positive than negative. Only 14% think that it is predominantly negative. 16 The oldest cohort (41-60) has an even more positive view (38% more positive than negative) than the youngest (1425) group (30%) and conservatives are slightly more positive than leftists are. Eleven percent of CDU supporters assess the past very positively (confirmed by a significant correlatio n of r = .125) versus 5.4% of SPD and Green sympathizers. As for the salience of historical periods, a plurality chose the Third Reich (34%), even though the questionnaire included the contemporary period (hardly historical), which

respondents. Younger respondents, having thought less about the past and whose reality is more distant from that period, may resist these interpretations and be farther away from the elite-validated view. 15 Affiliation also captures North-South differences (North=Protestant, South=Catholic), another historically important cleavage that periodically exerts strong explanatory power today (von Borries 1995). 16 Based on the relative strengths of statistical software programs, I used SPSS for all calculations except for the logit and multinomial logit models reported later, for which I used the STATA program. I re-coded and transformed many of the raw data for the statistical analysis. Please see the author for more details.

18

29% selected. The next most frequent response was the Federal Republic from 1949 to 1990 (24%). An alternative interpretation is that two-thirds of the sample chose periods other than Nazism, clear evidence for the intrusion of more recent history and for a recency effect. The expected generational relationship also surfaces: almost 40% of the youngest group chose the Third Reich versus under 30% for the oldest cohort. Looking at several correlations, 17 other expected relationships appear. Workers (r = -.103) and people with only a Hauptschulabschlu (high school degree, r = -.115) tend not to choose this period, whereas students (r =.161) and those with the Abitur (university entrance exam, r =.114) are more likely to choose it. Although almost all of the partisanship variables were significantly correlated in expected directions, the sizes of the coefficients were smallthe correlation between the choice of the Nazi period and CDU partisans was r = -.070, SPD r = .053, but Greens r = .106. There were few other significant or strong correlations for any of the other historical periods. Partisanship appears as a weak predictor, which is also the case for other factors like gender and religiosity. 18 Another way to tap the issue of salience is to ask respondents to assess the importance of the Nazi past for both contemporary Germany and for their personal political worldviews. Sixty-two percent of the sample (with few cohort or partisan differences, but with richer respondents more often thinking it is collectively influential) thought the Nazi past was very or rather important for the country. In contrast, only 40% thought the past was important for their own political worldviews. Twenty percent of the 41-60 group and only 13% of the 14-25 one thought it was personally very important. These results indicate fascinating attitudinal contradictions. Despite evidence that the Nazi period is not unequivocally salient and more recent periods are gaining resonance, a large majority still thinks this past is influential for present politics. This recurs in other questions, revealing a simultaneous personal distancing but support for impersonal collective impact.
17

This statistic indicates if observed differences in descriptive statistics are real (significant) or strong (size of coefficient). I used Pearsons r and report only those statistically significant at the p = .05 level or better. 18 I also ran logit regressions on these responses, transformed into dichotomous variables. Being a type of maximum likelihood estimation, this statistic deals with probabilities. To interpret the coefficients, I use predicted probabilities. For those choosing the Third Reich as the most salient period both income (15%) and younger age (29%) increased the probability of choosing this period, whereas those with a Volksschule education were less likely to (12%) choose it. Assessing the past more negatively (17%), thinking it is more important for the countrys present (19%), seeing it as an unprecedented relapse (13%) and advocating the continuation of debates (23%) all increased the probability of being selected.

19

ii. Memories and Supportive Discourses Two different question formulations get to the heart of competing memo ries: Table 4: Competing Memories (1)
Many Germans consider the Third Reich to be one of, if not the most important period of German history. Nevertheless there are various interpretations of this epoch. With which of the following three statements do you most closely agree? (in %) Total Sample The Hitler regime was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism and criminality. 29.6 Many Germans supported the Nazis and were involved with their crimes. Countless Germans were victims of the Nazi regime and many Germans 23.4 experienced suffering, pain and loss. The vast majority of Germans were neither victims nor perpetrators, but 39.9 bystanders, passively standing by, doing little for or against the regime. None of the above 2.5 Dont Know 3.0 No answer 1.6

Table 5: Competing Memories (2)

The Nazi period was a terrible time. Many people suffered. Despite the chronological coincidence many people believe that the nature of suffering of different groups differed substantially. Above all, the suffering that Jewish victims experienced through discrimination, expulsion and murder is considered different than what Germans themselves experienced through dictatorial repression, bombing and expulsion. Which of the following statements do you agree with? (forced choice, in %) Total Sample Suffering and death are suffering and death. All were victims of the dictatorial and 31.2 criminal Nazi regime and are comparable. A basic difference exists between the experiences of Jews and Germans. They 59.8 cannot be compared. Other (specify) 2.7 Dont Know 4.3 No answer 2.0

The Holocaust centered memory does not predominate in the first alternative, with a plurality choosing the more neutral bystander interpretation, a kind of safe, middle position. 19 The second question, however, shows twice the number of respondents choosing the latter option, representing the Holocaust-centered memory rather than the German-suffering position. A more detailed breakdown of the response distributions for the second question, crosstabulated with the demographic variables of greatest interest, shows interesting relationships. Cohort differences are weak, but partisanship on the extremes (note the slight difference between SPD and CDU sympathizers), education and income differences appear to be strong differentiating factors.

19

There were no significant relationships between any of the other variables and the bystander response option, pointing to the questionable inclusion of this category.

20

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Competing Memories (2) (in %)

Suffering Comparable 31.2 30.0 31.1 31.8 29.7 14.8 31.9 35.2 30.1 36.5 34.9 23.5 39.4 20.2 35.1 30.3 29.8 32.8 38.6 29.9 22.2 Basic Difference 59.8 63.2 59.4 59.4 65.6 77.9 61.8 60.6 61.2 51.9 53.8 67.5 48.2 73.1 53.3 61.3 62.3 57.1 49.2 65.6 70.8

Total 14-25 26-40 41-60 PDS Green SPD FDP CDU CSU Hauptschule Abitur Arbeiter Student East West Male Female 2500-3500 DM 5500-6500 DM 7500 + DM

Correlations show that those who answered that Nazism was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism were wealthier (r = .102), think the past is rather important for Germany (r = -.113) and believe that there is basic difference between the experiences of Germans and Jews (r = .157). Moreover, these respondents also advocate a continuation of debates about the past, rather than a final line (r = .213). Again, the partisanship variables were highly significant and the directions in the expected ways, but the sizes of the coefficients were rather small (CDU r = -.072, CSU r = -.045, SPD r = .080, Green r = .099). Conversely, those who choose the German victim option tend to think the past is less important for the present (r = .105), to not choose the Third Reich as the most salient period (r = -.114), to not see a basic difference between the experiences of Germans and Jews (r = -.109) and to advocate a final line being drawn over the past (r = .136). This group is less educated, with those having a Hauptschulabschlu less likely to choose this option (r = .102). The same partisanship pattern exists as for the other response option, although fewer significant results pertained, and other expected demographic predictors, such as gender, religiosity or East-West residency, were insignificant correlates.

21

One of the most crucial supportive ethical and moral discourses of the Holocaust memory regime regards the disdain of closure and the necessity of continuing discussion about the Nazi past and Holocaust, which critical actors also assert as a kind of lesson. It is highly important to study whether respondents think these memories should continue to be influential in the present, captured in a version of a question regarding the desirability of drawing a final line over the past. This variable also turns out to be the strongest and most consistently influential historical predictor in many of the subsequent statistical analyses and thus deserves detailed attention. Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Drawing a Final Line over the Past
For many years, there has been quite a lot of discussion about the Nazi past and its impact on the present. One hears quite different positions. On the one side are those who think that continued debate is highly important. On the other side are those who believe that drawing a final line over the past is timely and appropriate, in order to concentrate on the present and future. Which position do you agree with? (in %)20 Continued Debate 41.3 36.0 38.1 46.6 73.4 67.8 47.5 35.2 37.8 23.1 31.5 49.5 27.8 56.3 43.1 40.3 41.7 40.2 37.8 46.4 50.5 Final Line over Past 51.0 55.2 52.3 47.4 21.9 26.8 47.9 62.0 56.0 69.2 59.6 43.8 61.3 38.7 46.9 53.1 50.9 51.0 54.8 50.4 45.4

Total 14-25 26-40 41-60 PDS Green SPD FDP CDU CSU Hauptschule Abitur Arbeiter Student East West Male Female 2500-3500 DM 5500-6500 DM 7500 + DM

Overall, the 10-point difference between the two positions mirrors the results from most surveys over the last 25 ye ars. The additional gap between the youngest and oldest cohorts in terms of advocating a continuation of debates is perhaps evidence for an berdru (excess) effect. Partisanship, education, occupation and income show very

20

For the total sample, 2.6% were indifferent, 3.4% didnt know and 1.9% gave no answer.

22

polarized relationships, with leftists, better-educated respondents with higher status occupations and higher income supporting continued debates. Conservatives, those with less education, lower status occupations and lower incomes support a final line. Correlations support these differences. Indeed, no other historical variable was as significantly or strongly correlated with more variables. Event though the sizes of the coefficients are small, the directions of the relationship are in expected directions. Table 8 Demographic Correlates for Attitudes towards Final Line over the Past21
Continued Debates significance coefficient .002 -.059 .022 -.044 .000 .091 .000 .102 .000 .130 .000 .087 .038 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.041 -.055 -.111 .072 -.121 .146 Final Line significance coefficient .017 .046 .003 .000 .000 .034 .051 .007 .007 .000 .002 .000 .002 .025 .003 -.058 -.092 -.118 -.042 .039 .053 .054 .095 -.063 .089 -.106 -.043 -.063

14-25 26-40 41-60 PDS Green SPD FDP CDU CSU Hauptschule Abitur Arbeiter Student East/West (East=1) Gender (male =1) Income

.000

.099

iii. Explaining the Memories and Support for the Final Line Several more sophisticated statistics can determine what factors, both demographic variables and the other historical questions, drive these memories and opinions regarding the final line over the past. I expect that the background factors largely explain memories, but it is also interesting to see if the other historical questions exert influences independent of the demographic factors. If so, this would be evidence that history and memory constitute an autonomous part of a political culture. After converting the responses on the memory and final line questions into dummy variables, I ran logit regression models.

21

Empty cells denote insignificant correlations. This is a selection of significant correlations.

23

Table 9: Logit Regression on Nazism as Unprecedented Relapse into Barbarism

Independent Variables Third Reich as most salient period Continued debates about the Past are necessary Income Highest educational level: Volkschule (high school) Partisan Identification (left to right) Constant Coefficients .296 1.034 .071 - .295 - .067 5.223 Interpreted Coefficients 0.140 0.508 0.143 -0.125 -0.120 P>z .010 .000 .012 .048 .050 .621

By far the greatest statistical effect is from those advocating the continuation of debates about the Nazi past, who are 51% more likely to choose this interpretation. Moderate effects are also apparent from the other historical variables, so that those choosing the Third Reich as the most salient epoch exhibit a 14% greater likelihood of choosing the relapse response. An increase in income leads to a 14% greater likelihood of choosing the relapse into barbarism answer and moving from the left to right on the partisan identification scale produces a 12% lower probability of selecting this option. More right-wing people are less likely and wealthier respondents are more likely to choose this interpretation, confirming expectations. Those with only a Volks- or Hauptschule education exhibit a 13% lower probability of choosing this memory. Even more robust results arise from the logit regression on the response option Germans were also victims. Those with the Abitur were 20% less likely to choose it, whereas those with a Volksschule education exhibited a 20% greater probability. Advocating a continuation of debates (22% lower probability) and choosing the Third Reich as the most salient period (30% lower) had quite large effects in the expected inverse directions. Likewise for the second formulation, and the option suffering and death are comparab le, those who thought that Nazism was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism exhibited a 24% lower likelihood and those advocating continued debates led to a 31% lower probability of selecting it. Finally, an increase in income leads to a 20% lower probability of thinking suffering is comparable. As these results indicate, even though many of the posited background characteristics are influential in the expected directions, the historical variables also play important and independent explanatory roles.

24

Turning to the final line question, taking the response option support for a continuation of debates about the Nazi past as the dependent variable: 22 Table 10: Logit Regression on Support for Continued Debates about the Nazi Past
Independent Variables Assessment of the Past (positive to negative) Third Reich as most salient period Importance of Past for Germany (high to low) Nazism as unprecedented relapse into barbarism Suffering and death are comparable Income Age Highest educational level: Abitur (university entrance) Highest educational level: Volkschule (high school) Partisan Identification (left to right) Constant Coefficients .217 .467 -.553 .966 -.643 .060 -.021 .284 -.268 -.092 41.033 Interpreted Coefficients 0.193 0.221 -0.653 0.441 -0.300 0.120 -0.269 0.104 -0.113 -0.165 P>z .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .033 .000 .062 .062 .006 .000

In this rather robust model, the influences of the demographic variables were all in the expected directions but the sizes of the effects on the probabilities are much lower than for the other historical variables included. Thus, on the one hand, higher income (12%) and having the Abitur (10%) both lead to a greater probability of advocating continued debates; whereas ha ving only a Volksschule education (11%), a more right wing partisan identification (17%) and being younger (27%) lead to a lower likelihood. On the other hand, choosing the Third Reich as the most salient historical period (22%), ascribing more importance to that period for the present (at a rather impressive 65%), thinking Nazism was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism (another large 44%) all lead to a greater probability of advocating continued debates. Conversely, thinking that suffering was comparab le leads to a 30% lower likelihood of advocating continued debates.

22

There were also very strong correlations regarding this question. Those advocating a continuation of debates assigned a greater importance to history in the present (nationally r = -.337 and personally r = .314). Advocates of the final line ascribed less importance to the Nazi past ( nationally r= .331 and personally r = .326). Students (r = .146) and those having studied at the university (r = .165) were more likely to take this position, whereas workers (r = -.121) and those with Hauptschulabschlu ( r =-.111) were less likely.

25

Another logit regression on the second response category (supporting a final line) shows similar relationships. Younger respondents (23%), those with a Volksschule education (12%) and more right wing individuals (17%) exhibit a greater likelihood of choosing this response. As before, the historical variables are even stronger predictors. Choosing the Third Reich as the most salient period and thinking it was a relapse lead to a 18% and 40% lower probability of choosing the final line response. Believing that the period is less important for the present country (at a quite large 61%) and that suffering was comparable (at 31%) result in a greater likelihood of selecting this response. These analyses show that there is a very clear nexus of inter-related demographic variables, historical factors and memories, especially evident regarding the final line question. The tenets and perspectives of the Holocaust-centered memory regime clearly hang together in the expected ways for both those who accept and those who resist it. Education, income, age and partisanship continued to play important explanatory roles and the results largely support the hypothesized relationships. However, ma ny of the demographic background variables were either not significant predictors or exerted influences only as large as other historical variables. These results indicate a large degree of autonomy for historical and memory factors in mass belief and political cultural systems. B. The Impact of the Past on Contemporary Political Values i. Current Political Attitudes and Values The first task is to look at current political attitudes and values and to select several (most likely) political domains where effects of the past plausibly arise. I choose three domains: foreign policy, domestic constitutional structures and more general political values. For foreign policy, there are two formulations that look at the role of different and possibly competing le ssons arising from the past (furtherance of human rights and a just war against a dictatorial regime) and one taps support for the movement towards European unity. For domestic and constitutional structures, I look at attitudes towards the 5% electoral threshold, legal bans on Nazi symbols and the use of referendums. Finally, two questions ask about the connection between the Nazi past and general value orientations, such as the importance of freedom and democracy or whether Germany continues to have a special responsibility towards victims of Nazism:

26

Table 11: On a scale of 1-5, where 1 indicates complete agreement and 5 disagreement, what do you think about the following statements?
agree comp letely 1. Germany should pursue a foreign policy that furthers human rights, peace and freedom. 2. Freedom is a more important value than pacifism. Sometimes freedom loving democracies have to fight dictatorships that abuse human rights. 3. At the federal level, parties need 5% of the votes in order to gain seats in Parliament. This law was created so that radical parties could not enter Parliament. Today Germany is a stable democracy. The 5% law is therefore unnecessary today. 4. At the federal level, there have been no referendums up to now, because leading politicians thought that only this would hinder extremist positions. Today that is no longer a danger and referendums should be accepted. 5. Since the establishment of the FRG and former GDR, Nazi symbols, such as the Hitler salute have been banned. Todays Germany no longer needs such bans. 6. After WWII, a movement towards European integration was established, among other reasons, in order to anchor Germany internationally. That is still today an important argument why Germany should continue to pursue European integration. 7. Because of the Nazi past, todays Germans have a special responsibility towards the victims. 8. Because of Germanys Nazi past, freedom, democracy and peace are especially important values. 76.1 agree somewhat 12.7 agree moderately 5.5 agree little 0.9 agree not at all 0.9 dont know 2.0 no answer 1.9

27.0

21.5

24.0

7.1

13.8

3.9

2.8

19.7

6.2

9.3

7.8

49.6

4.6

2.8

42.8

20.2

20.6

5.7

6.1

2.6

2.0

12.9

3.4

6.2

6.5

65.6

2.9

1.9

41.6

26.0

19.7

3.3

2.9

3.9

2.6

36.6

19.5

20.2

9.1

9.6

2.8

2.1

69.9

15.0

7.6

1.6

2.1

1.5

2.0

27

Large, sometimes massive, majorities agree with the progressive or elite-sanctioned views, i.e., those value connections posited by the (critical) elite. 23 Almost 90% agree completely or somewhat that a human rights-based foreign policy should be pursued and 68% support building Europe (although the just war question is not as unequivocal). Except for the greater use of referendums, which is supported by most, majorities are for the retention of restrictions such as the 5% electoral threshold. The questions regarding whether Germany continues to have a special obligation to the victims of Nazism and whether freedom and democracy are important values, are particularly clear as the impact of the Nazi past is already included in the question. Here, 56% and 85% agree completely or somewhat. In fact, when the responses for all eight questions are aggregated, out of a possible score of 40, indicating complete agreement with progressive views, the mean is 30.4, the median is 31 and the mode is 32. For the index used in later calculations, out of a possible score of 25, the mean was 20.4 and both the median and mode were 21. Few demographic differences arise with two exceptions: Table 12: Advocacy of Human Rights-Based Foreign Policy (in %)
Total 14-25 26-40 41-60 PDS Green SPD FDP CDU CSU Hauptschule Abitur Arbeiter Student East West Male Female 2500-3500 DM 5500-6500 DM 7500 + DM
23

completely agree 76.1 67.0 74.0 82.4 90.6 88.6 83.6 84.5 78.5 92.3 74.8 82.3 75.7 82.9 83.4 78.3 80.4 78.2 78.0 81.9 89.6

somewhat agree 12.7 18.6 13.4 9.2 7.8 8.7 11.4 12.7 15.0 5.8 13.4 12.6 14.6 12.0 9.7 14.2 12.9 13.8 14.2 12.2 7.5

moderately agree 5.5 8.6 5.9 3.6 1.6 2.0 3.4 2.8 5.3 8.6 3.9 6.3 4.3 5.1 5.6 5.1 5.9 5.5 4.1 1.4

agree little 0.9 1.6 0.8 0.6

Agree not at all 0.9 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.9 2.0 0.3 3.0 0.9 1.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.4

0.5 0.6 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.2 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.5

Determining the progressive response option was straightforward for most questions, but, for some I made plausible judgments. I coded a just war against a dictatorial regime progressive, as well as supporting restrictions on referendums and advocating the continuation of a ban on Nazi symbols.

28

Table 13: Building Europe Still Important

Total 14-25 26-40 41-60 PDS Green SPD FDP CDU CSU Hauptschule Abitur Arbeiter Student East West Male Female 2500-3500 DM 5500-6500 DM 7500 + DM completely agree 41.6 33.8 34.2 53.4 50.0 47.2 48.6 52.1 53.1 29.4 43.7 45.8 42.3 38.9 44.8 44.5 44.7 44.3 39.3 49.3 57.4 somewhat agree 26.0 30.6 29.1 21.0 16.1 38.2 28.4 32.4 22.4 41.2 26.0 29.6 28.5 35.4 22.3 288.8 28.4 26.6 33.6 22.9 20.6 moderately agree 19.7 24.6 22.9 14.6 24.2 14.1 18.0 9.9 19.5 29.4 22.1 20.4 18.8 20.4 24.5 20.4 18.2 24.1 19.1 18.4 17.2 agree little 3.3 5.0 3.3 2.4 3.2 2.1 2.8 4.2 2.9 2.6 3.1 3.8 4.4 5.3 3.3 4.5 3.0 3.3 6.7 1.4 agree not at all 2.9 2.0 3.0 3.2 6.5 1.4 2.2 1.4 2.1 5.5 1.0 6.5 0.9 3.1 3.0 4.2 2.0 4.6 2.7 3.3

It appears that income and age differences are the most important here, as well as some partisan effects. Regarding human rights-oriented foreign policy, there is a 15-point gap between the youngest and the oldest groups (with the middle one almost exactly half way between) strongly agreeing, whereas there is only a 5-point gap between CDU and SPD voters, but an 11-point gap between the lowest and highest income brackets. In the building Europe question, there is a 20 point gap between youngest two groups and oldest, with the older respondents more strongly agreeing, an almost 20 point gap between the highest pro- Europe and the lowest rather anti-Europe income brackets, but only a 4 point one between CDU and SPD sympathizers. Similarly there are 13- and 17point differences in the last two general value questions, with the middle cohort closer to the youngest in terms of special responsibility to victims and closer to the older on the importance of freedom and democracy (but few other differences). Thus, it appears that the older cohort is significantly closer to elite- validated positions. ii. Testing the Impact of Memory I carried out several sets of analyses to look at the potential causal influences of the memories on current political attitudes. Initial correlational analysis showed that attitudes

29

in many of the political domains are related to each other and to various background variables. The exceptions for which few significant correlations arose are the questions regarding the tradeoff between pacifism and just wars, the 5% electoral threshold and on continuing the ban on Nazi symbols. Further statistical analyses using these questions as dependent variables (multinomial logistic regressions) confirmed these initial findings, with the memory and historical variables remaining statistically insignificant. 24 The remaining political value questions exhibited numerous and strong correlations with each other and with demographic and historical variables.25 A factor analysis substantiated these findings, pointing to the existence of three factors. The strongest, loading on the continued responsibility towards victims of Nazism question, also contained the two foreign policy questions, the Europe question and the freedom and democracy general value question. The 5% threshold and ban on Nazi symbols comprised the second factor and the third was simply the referendum question. 26 Testing explicitly for impact of memory, I constructed an index from the five political value questions that comprised the first factor presented above with higher scores

24

These findings may disconfirm the expectations that memory affects attitudes in these overlooked political domains, in particular those regarding domestic constitutional structures. However, the situation may be more complicated. Large proportions and even majorities support the socially desirable views informed by the Holocaust-centered memory regime. Moreover, few correlations or statistically significant regressors of any kind emerged for these questions. For example, neither age, nor education, nor partisan identification were correlated or significant predictors.
25

For example, regarding human rights in foreign policy, those assigning a greater importance of the past for the present country (r = .107), those advocating the building of Europe (r =.325), responsibility towards victims (r = .194), peaceful values (r= .334) and the continuation of debates (r = -.161, final line, r = .119) supported the furtherance of human rights, as did those with higher income ( r = -.104) and having studied at the university (r = -.105). High school students and those with a Hauptschulabschlu did not. Building Europe (6) was correlated with people seeing history more positively (r = -.108), assigning a greater importance to history in the present country (r = .110), as well as accepting responsibility towards victims (r= .274), and supporting peaceful values (r = .289). Furthermore, those seeing a basic difference between German and Jewish suffering (r = -.100) and advocating the continuation of debates (r = -.158) supported the European project. 26 I used principal component analysis with the varimax roation method and Kaiser normalizations, which converged in 6 iterations. The factor scores for the first factor were .708 for the responsibility question, .683 for building Europe, .560 for human rights foreign policy, .489 for democracy as an important value and .426 for the just war question. For second factor, the values were .803 for the 5% threshold and .726 for the ban on Nazi symbols. The third factor produced a score of .860 for the referendum question. Various regressions on these other factors proved to be extremely weak, perhaps due to the lack of variation in the dependent variables (the indices).

30

indicating greater support for progressive, elite-validated attitudes. 27 Using this index as the dependent variable, I ran a multivariate linear regression model. 28 Table 14: Linear Regression on Current Political Value Index
Beta (Standardized) Importance of Nazi Past for Present Country Importance of Nazi Past for Personal Worldview Sex (Male=1) Age Income Suffering is Comparable Continuation of Debates about the Nazi Past Housewife/husband Highest educational attainment: Abitur Adjusted R= .131 -.122 -.072 .074 -.146 .051 -.061 .186 .085 .049 Significance .008 .112 .110 .000 .222 .125 .000 .092 .236

The findings are clear: the historical variables perform as well as often as the demographic ones. Those who think that the Nazi past is important for the present country also hold more progressive attitudes. The strongest and most significant effect on values comes from those who advocate a continuation of debates. Regarding the demographic controls, the negative coefficient for age indicates that older people are closer to elite validated positions (partisanship was so insignificant that it was eliminated from later models). Income and education do not play big explanatory roles, but the German-centered memory variable does (approaching statistical significance). As another test of the influence of memory, I ran multinomial logit models29 for each of the individual value questions, the findings from several of which I report below. 30
27

Reliability analysis obtained an adequate Cronbach alpha score of .5144. The score increased to .5659 when question 2 (the just war) was eliminated, but I decided to leave it, in order to have greater variation on the dependent variable. The basic multivariate linear regression model is: Y= + X1 + ... Xn + e. 28 This a powerful statistic with high validity and reliabilty for large databases, that allows for the inclusion of many independent variables and that is appropriate for this kind of dependent variable.I ran various models that included a full range of demographic controls, as well as the historical and memory variables of greatest theoretical interest. The model presented here is the most parsimonious one, containing only the most significant regressors and the highest possible R.
29

Again, these models achieve the maximum and parsimonious explanatory power. I present only the interpreted results; the full sets of results are available upon request. This technique simultaneously estimates binary logits for all comparisons among outcome categories. Another possible statistical

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Regarding the furtherance of human rights in foreign policy: Age is significant and the interpreted coefficient shows a rather large positive effect in each category. Younger respondents exhibit a 53% greater probability of only agreeing somewhat (category 2) versus agreeing completely (category 1). Thus younger people are less likely to advocate a foreign policy based on the furtherance of human rights. Income, for several response options, exerts rather large effects in the expected direction: greater income (meaning moving from a lower to a higher monthly income bracket) leads to greater probability of agreeing more strongly with a human rights-oriented foreign policy. Thinking Nazism was an unprecedented relapse to barbarism leads to a 14% lower likelihood of agreeing somewhat versus strongly whereas believing suffering was comparable leads to a 29% higher probability of agreeing only moderately (category 3) with the human rights-based foreign policy. Ascribing less importance to the Nazi past in the present country, leads to a greater likelihood of disagreeing, with a 38% greater probability of agreeing moderately and a 82% greater probability of strongly disagreeing versus strongly agreeing.

For the question on building Europe, the demographic control variables exert a rather marked influence: Younger people tend to disagree more than older respondents do. For the young, there is a 54% greater probability of only somewhat versus completely agreeing. Higher income leads to a greater acceptance of Europe.

However, here too, the historical variables exert influence. Those who think that the Third Reich was an unprecedented relapse express a greater probability of strongly agreeing with the European project, whereas believing suffering was comparable leads to greater disagreement. Ascribing less importance to the Nazi period leads to a 20% greater probability of only moderately agreeing and a 35% greater probability of agreeing not at all with Europe.

technique is ordered probit, which produce broadly similar results. I chose to report the multinomial logit results because they are a little more intuitive, and also safer. 30 This is an appropriate and unbiased statistic for ordinal dependent variables with only a few response options, even if the low number of predictors the models can accommodate constrains efficiency. The number of parameters is exceptionally large and it will take only a small number of independent variables (in contrast to conventional linear regression models), in a sense, forcing parsimony. This statistic calculates the effect of the independent variable on the probability of whatever category being chosen in relation to the baseline (1) category, holding all other independent variables constant. I again use predicted probabilities to interpret the coefficients, even though the interpretation is less clear than with binary logit models: the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable on the outcome category being chosen in relation to the baseline (1=strongly agree) category.

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Finally, for the question on whether freedom, democracy and peace are especially important values because of the Nazi past: Again, younger respondents tend to disagree that because of the past, freedom, democracy and peace are especially important values for contemporary Germany. Greater income leads to a 42% lower probability of agreeing little versus strongly agreeing. Believing that Nazism was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism prompts respondents to agree more strongly with this value. It leads to rather large decreases in the probability of somewhat (26%), moderately (21%) agreeing and somewhat disagreeing (58%) in relation to strongly agreeing. On the other hand, believing that suffering is comparable led to an 18% greater likelihood of agreeing only somewhat and a 31% greater probability of agreeing not at all, versus strongly agreeing. Finally, ascribing less importance to the past led to a greater probability of somewhat agreeing (17%), somewhat disagreeing (71%) and strongly disagreeing (62%), versus the strongly agreeing baseline category.

These analyses reveal strong substantiation tha t memory is an important influence on the political values and attitudes of contemporary Germans. In almost all of the statistical calculations using the foreign policy, support for Europe and general value questions, the memory and historical variables exerted autonomous influences, despite the inclusion of multiple control variables. In many cases the memory variables perform as well or better than the demographic factors. Moreover, almost all of the relationships (with the exception of age) are in directions expected by the representatives of the dominant memory regime: greater acceptance of the Holocaust-centered memory leads to more progressive values. In sum, the major theoretical contention of this paper, that memory is an important influence on current political values, has been substantiated. C. Summary The most important findings from this quantitative analysis are the following: 1. The Nazi period is the most salient period for a plurality (about 35%) of Germans today. Almost two-thirds chose more recent periods, which, however, included the current period (the unified country from 1990). This shows that more recent historical periods are starting to intrude on the shared memories of contemporary generations. 2. There is also evidence for the existence of competing memories. A quarter to a third of respondents chose the German-centered memory in the two formulations (that

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Germans were also victims of Nazism and that the suffering of Germans was comparable to other groups). Nevertheless, there is also support for the partial dominance of the Holocaust-centered memory, with two-thirds of the sample believing that there was a basic difference between the experiences of Germans and Jews during the Third Reich. 3. These memories, especially the Holocaust-centered one, are not superficially but rather intensely held, as the questions ascribing importance to the past for the present country attest, and as the strong causal role many of these questions played in subsequent statistical calculations reveals. 4. As for demographic variables, in almost every case, the direction of the relationship was as expected. More leftist, better-educated respondents with higher incomes and higher status occupations were closer to elite-validated or progressive views and vice versa. Indeed, age/generation, income and education turned out to be the most important background factors in the various statistical analyses. This is clear evidence that the mass-elite difference is salient regarding acceptance of the current memory regime and that generation is still a powerful differentiating force. It bears repeating that the partisanship variable was a surprisingly weak explanatory factor. Any real differences are on the extremeswith Green and PDS sympathizers closer to the progressive views. Although CDU voters do not fully accept this memory regime, the distance is slight, as is that with the other catchall party, the SPD. It appears that the effects of partisanship have weakened and are washed out by elite-mass and generational differences. Other factors like East-West residence, gender and religiosity played similarly weak roles. 31 6. Finally and perhaps, most importantly is the issue of the impact of the various memories and other historical variables on the political values and attitudes in the political domains. Here the evidence is unequivocal: these factors greatly influence the political thinking of contemporary generations of Germans especially in the realms of foreign policy and general political worldviews. Many of the historical and memory questions, especially the final line question, were consistently statistically significant and exhibited substantial effects, as the coefficients demonstrated. In fact, these effects were often as strong if not stronger than the most important demographic predictors.
31

Space constraints do not allow for a full presentation of these data, or better, these non-relationships.

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III. Conclusions This empirical analysis of the German case strongly supports the various theoretical contentions outlined previously, above all, that memory strongly and independently influences current political value orientations. The tenets of multiple and competing memories proved valid, producing a much more detailed and complex picture of the evolution of memory regimes over the postwar period and the degree of dominance of the current memory regime in Germany. Moreover, representatives of the dominant discourse are either correct or have been extremely successful in arguing their position: those who accept the dominant discourse and memories are also much more progressive in their political value orientations. They also tend to be better educated, richer and older. The Holocaust-centered memory appears influential, but only for a (large) minority of the population, i.e., it does not appear to be as clearly and unequivocally dominant as many observers conclude. Actually, mixed evidence emerges from the quantitative analysis. For example, only a small plurality chose the Third Reich as the most salient period, yet large majorities believe it plays a substantial role in the politics of their country and a sizable plurality thinks so for their personal political worldviews. Moreover, the final line question was greatly divided, even though big majorities in other questions supported the continuation of many (educational) efforts and advocated special responsibility towards victims. Above all, it is paradoxical that so few people chose the Holocaust-centered memory in the first formulation (Nazism was an unprecedented relapse into barbarism) and that, in the second formulation, even 30% thought suffering was comparable, yet rather big majorities chose the progressive elite sanctioned responses in the political value question battery. This last point is key. When explicitly asked about values because of the past (in the questions concerning special responsibility towards victims and the importance of freedom and democracy) or when the role of the past was only implicit, big majorities accepted the progressive view, because of the Nazi past. There are various resolutions to this paradox. Some respondents may support progressive values independently of any collective memories they may share. Others may support alternative memories or an advocacy of a final line because they have already reflected on, worked through or

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internalized the Holocaust centered memory, not because they want to repress or evade it. Finally, instead of having the Germans -as-bystanders/German victim interpretations of the Nazi period in mind when, for example, they support the continuation of the ban on Nazi symbols, they may actually have been thinking of the Holocaust-centered memory. This is to say that many respondents may have switched interpretations of the Nazi past sometime between the earlier and later questions of the survey, a finding t hat was substantiated by the more qualitative forms of data not reported here. In sum, Germans have been convinced by elite representatives of the Holocaustcentered memory regime to support and internalize it to a very large degree. Nevertheless, this dominance faces some threat from the older memory of German suffering. The continued support for this memory goes a long way to explain the resonance that the renewed discussions of these memories elicited in 2002-2003. These findings also incidentally support the contentions of the predominately leftist leaders of these discussions, that the (far) right has monopolized representation and interpretation of the German-centered memories which need to be re-appropriated and connected to more progressive values and ends. Finally, this analysis supports the utility of the memory regime framework, both in furthering understanding of the German case and making the case for the more general importance of memory as an influence on political values and culture. It should be applied to an array of other countries, producing similar advances in knowledge.

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