W.E.B.

Du Bois Institute

Blind Date Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Expanded Edition. by Charles Taylor; Amy Gutmann Review by: Louis Menand Transition, No. 67 (1995), pp. 70-81 Published by: Indiana University Press on behalf of the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2935257 . Accessed: 14/01/2012 06:14
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Liberalism theallure culture and of

LouisMenand
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of an Recognition, expanded edition of a book originally published in 1992, is a collection of essays on political theory and the philosophy of culture. Its centerpiece is an essay by the philosopher Charles Taylor called "The Politics of Recognition," which was commissioned on the occasion of the founding of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton in 1990. Amy Gutmann, a professor of politics and the director of the center, has contributed a substantive introduction. The responses to Taylor's essay in the original volume were by SusanWolf, a philosopher; Steven C. Rockefeller, a professor of religion; and Michael Walzer, whose speciality is political thought. The new edition prints two additional replies, both by philosophers: a long essay by Jiirgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," written for the German edition and translatedfor this one by Shierry Weber Nicholson; and a somewhat shorter commentary by K. Anthony Appiah. The book is essentially an attempt to get multiculturalism romantically involved with liberalism, and for most of the way, it has about it much of the painful awkwardness, pretend cordiality, and willingness to overlook minor blemishes of a blind date. The final contribution, by Appiah, is the philosophical equivalent of a cold shower. Appiah is a fellow who knows the match for the well-intentioned mistake it clearly is, and, so that there will be no misunderstanding later on, he is eager to be the first to declare the evening a failure. For the truth is that liberalism, although basically a really nice person, is a nerd, and multiculturalism is much too glamourous and emotionally demanding an item for it to handle. The troubles in the relationship are of two types. The first has to do with the apparent incompatibility between liberal principles and multiculturalistaims. This incompatibilitycan be treated as a theoretical matter. As such, the problem is not even remotely unfamiliar-the history of liberalism is, in

Discussed in this essay

Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, expanded edition, CharlesTaylor,editedby Amy Gutmann, Princeton: Princeton Press University

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ter for Human Values could not have selected a more qualified candidate. Charles Taylor has long been troubled by liberalism's incompatibility with more morally substantive, or prescriptive, political philosophies. His sense of the nature of the antagonism goes back at least to his work on Hegel (1975), in which he dwelt on Hegel's distinction between sittlichkeit and the Kantianconcept of moralitdt-the distinction between concrete ethics and abstractmorality. Multiculturalismis For Kant, Taylor explained, the sources possibly more flash of moral obligation are transcendental, than substance, for universal. They trump the demands a parthe reason that ticular society makes on a particularmember of it: they are what enable individuals "culture" is virtually to resist community norms in the name useless as a category of conscience, and they are thus abstract of analysis and formal-quite literally, nonexistent. Hegel, by contrast, locates the source of underneathall that unsexy procedural- moral obligation within the actual practices of the social group. It is to the comism, reallyis. The seconddifficultyis not so tracta- munity in which they are situated, rather identified Ap- than to some abstractimperative, that inble. This is the difficulty by is which is that multiculturalism dividuals are morally obligated; it is from piah, for moreflashthansubstance, the the community that their identity as morpossibly reason that "culture" is virtually useless al agents derives; and it is the integrity as a category of analysis. At a certain dis- and survival of the community, as an ethtance, and with the light behind it, the ical entity, that their actions are meant to concept looks pretty firm and inviting; ensure. From this contrast, Taylor formulated but once we get up close and attempt to describe it, it dissolves into an unstable what he called "Hegel's dilemma for and nearly indiscriminate mass of partic- modern democracy": ularities. Difference doesn't stop at the The modern level of culture. It keeps on going, and it ideology equalityand of total of leadsto a homogenization soparticipation of goes all the way down. This shakes men loosefrom their traciety. 0 * * ditionalcommunities, cannotreplace but them as a focus of identity.... The only real cure In commissioning a thinker to ponder the diffor this malady,a recovery meaningful of task of squaring multiculturalism with societypreferentiation,is closed modern for to liberalism, the Princeton University Cenciselybecause its commitment ideologies of

a manyrespects, historyof effortsto work with a seriesof towardaccommodations similar seductions-and the firstsix writersin thebookbringto the taskof solving it all the dialecticalskill their distinguishedreputations suggest.Their generalline is that thingswill be fine if liberalism manage getjusta littlemore can to hip-or, alternatively,if multiculturalismcanbe madeto seehow hipliberalism,

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whichconstantly it towards hopress greater Some whichremogeneity. of thedifferences main depreciated, arebreeding are and grounds in alienation resentment. and Others fact for thegapandbecome of identity. These fill foci areprincipally or ethnic national differences. But theytendto be exclusive divisive. and Theycanonlywith difficulty thebasis form of a differentiated society.

to so completea degreethat it makesno senseto talk aboutthem as autonomous, monadic entities.Identityis independent, and derived,sociallyconstituted, socially This reconception of sociallydependent. the self is what Taylorproposes use to to address crisisin which liberalism the now findsitself.

Liberalism's insistence on treating people equally, on endowing each person This is the dilemmaTaylor'ssubsequent with the same basket of inalienable rights work has attempted reasona way out and with access to the same neutral and to status-blind procedures, is linked, Taylor of. He discovered what he believesto be suggests in "The Politics of Recognithe key in the natureof the self, a topic tion," to the substitution of "dignity" for he explored lengthin Sources theSelf: "honor" in the Western system of values, at of TheMaking theModern of (1989). a development he dates around the end Identity The purpose, part,of thatworkwas to of the eighteenth century. Honor is a valin showthatmodern language ue associated with hierarchy. It is always philosophical is poorlyequipped describe moral invidious, since its whole purpose is to to the constitutionof the modernself; and in distinguish the exceptional individual from the unexceptional herd. An honor would be meaningless, as Taylor points Honoris always out, if every cow got one. But dignity invidious, since its (Taylor cites Rousseau as its most influwhole purpose is to ential modern spokesman) is something every cow can get. Dignity is a universal distinguish the and egalitarianvalue, a status to which all exceptional individual persons can, and should, aspire. Taylor from the unexceptional has named this principle "the ethic of auherd thenticity"-the belief that an individual's highest aspiration should be "to be ministeringto this inadequacy,Taylor herself." What that aspiration demands the elementin his think- of the rest of the group is the condition perfected crucial which is the elementon which the Taylor calls "recognition." ing, "The It is not hard to see, on these terms, essayin Multiculturalism, Politicsof turns.This is the assertion how we get from liberalism to multiculRecognition," that individualityis not monological- turalism. Though Taylor doesn't use it, which is the way, Taylor thinks, it has the American example is the clearest. In consistently been figured in modern the 1950s and 1960s, a sequence of groups thought-but dialogical. People don't sought recognition from the rest of the generatethemselves;they are generated society: first African Americans, then with others, and women, then gay Americans. It was the socially,in interaction

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for staiedgrievanceof each of these groups peoplefeel demeaned beingwhatthey that its memberssuffered discrimination are. This is the pointat which culturegets liberaldemoby virtueof characteristics to cratictheoryis supposed countas neu- wavedonto the stage.Traditional liberal tone deaf.Liberalism, tral-that is, skincolor,gender,or sexual theoryis culturally The preference. aimof theirpetitionswas in a word,don'tsurf.This impercipience not to be recognized theirdifferences aboutstyleis the reasonliberalism such is for a nerd,but it is also the very essenceof but preciselyto have theirdifferences set is at naught. They did not, in the main, its genius.Liberalism a politicsfor soarguethat the sourceof the dignitythey cieties whose culturalgroundis perpetsought lay in their blackness,their fe- ually in motion-in other words, for societies. When values, and tastes, maleness,or their gayness;they argued modern that it lay in theirpersonhood. The goal moresare endlesslyfungible,as they are democracies-andparticof thoserightsmovements equity; the in the capitalist was in was and rhetoric universalist; the policies ularly,andparadigmatically, the Unitinto being were, by and ed States-for a politicaltheory to assothey brought ciate itself with a specificset of cultural large,liberal. of What some members these groups normsis suicidal.The traingoes rushing on discovered, though,afterthey hadgained on, andthe theoryis left standing the and platform. accessto the neighborhoods, schools, with none is the equivaAssociating with lent, at a certain level, of associating At the business of all; and this is why liberalismnot only removingcultural acceptsthe coexistenceof incommensuobstacles, liberalism rableconceptions the good life but acof turned out to be the tually encourages incommensurabilpowerless ity. Where manyflourish,none canrule: its to everynormativity, own dancehall. from which discrimination This is the model of liberalpluralism, workplaces hadonce excludedthem, was that liberal which picturessociety as a diversityof withoutmupolicy had landed them some distance cultural operating grouplets, that shortof theirgoal.Theyrealized even tualinterference, situated all withina civWhen circulating in the civic out though legal obstaclesto their recogni- ic space. tion as equalshadbeen removed,cultural space,everyoneis a universalist, neuand obstacles And at the business of tralprocedure the norm;insidethe chois persisted. neutralism suspended, is and removing cultural obstacles, liberalism sengrouplet, turnedout to be powerless. turnedout, communalnormsprevail. It in fact, to be worse than powerless;for arisesnot (contrary Multiculturalism freedomsof to the way it is conventionally by defendingthe individual presented) to speechandbelief, liberalism protectsthe in response socialdivision;it arisesin of It bigotrythatdeniesmembers thosefor- responseto integration. is becausethe excluded groups their dignity as groupletsno longer exist, becausepeomerly if ple's life pathsaremore likely than ever persons.Paperequalityis meaningless

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to be the same, that culturehas become a politicalissue.When women suddenly makeup a majority American of college studentsand a rapidlygrowing fraction of the professoriate, traditional the cultureof the academy becomesa problem. When AfricanAmericans suddenlyturn asjunior partners white-shoe law in up cultureof the profirms,the traditional fessionalworld becomesa problem.Pluralismno longer qualifiesas a solution because thereis no longera bunchof sepcommunal arate folkways,a groupof discreteandindependent paths,for peolife to retreatto. Opting out of the mix ple has become less and less possible. The dancehallsareall torndown, andculture has floodedthe civic space. It is clear to Taylor that clinging to whathe callsthe monological conception of the individual-the conceptionassociated with Locke (in political theory), Smith(in economictheory),andKant(in moral theory)-leaves liberalism uneto or quipped address, evento understand, the new dispensation. individual If identity is achieved only dialogically, through interaction with others,it makesno sense to regardrecognitionas somethingthat can be adequately securedby the guaranteeof individual aurightsandpersonal back, tonomy.When peopleseeprojected in theircultural imrelations, demeaning of themselves, cannotbe saidto ages they haveequalaccessto dignity,even though they mayhavethe right to vote, to speak their minds, and to buy a house where they choose. For their basic right to be themselveshas been compromised. The culturefromwhich they drawtheir selfdefinitionhas relegatedthem to secondclassstatus. Thus the multiculturalist obsession-

so baffling exasperating traditional and to liberals-with the politicsof representation. The way women are subordinated in pornography, way AfricanAmerthe icansare stereotyped the commercial in is media,the way homosexuality demonized in the discourseof some religious the voiceshavebeen groups, waymarginal excluded fromthe literary canon,the way racistor sexistspeechcreates hostileena the vironment, way anall-white,all-male committeeor country club Congressional orcomparative literature sends department a message:the deep absorption these in

Taylor's intention is to bend liberalism to the multiculturalist critique, but not to break it
issuesstemsfromthe convictionthatit is in culture, and cultural relations, that identityis rooted. The challengeto liberalism obvious. is Forhow canliberalism acceptthe dialogicalconception individuality atthe of and, same time, countenance expressions which, although they are damagingto
people's self-image, liberalism is in principle sworn to protect? If liberalism genuinely cares about recognition, how can it ignore, on the grounds that values and preferences must be regarded as incommensurable and therefore beyond the reach of politics, cultural conditions that cause the diminishment and oppression of those who are different?What is the virtue of "neutrality" when you are losing the war?
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Taylor's intention, in "The Politics of Recognition," is to bend liberalism to the multiculturalist critique, but not to break it. He wants to relax what he calls "the rigidities of procedural liberalism," but not to abandon the liberal principles he regards as fundamental. Most of his respondents express admiration for his reformulation of liberalism as a philosophical matter; but it is significant that none of them, not even the most sympathetic, is willing to endorse the central prescriptive proposal of his essay. This prescription has to do with the problem of Quebec. Taylor is Canadian, and he has been involved with Canadian political issues not only as a philosopher (some of his writings on the subject are collected in Reconciling Solitudes: the Essays on Canadian Federalismand Nationalism [1993]) but as a politician, as well. From 1961 to 1971, he was active in the formation of the New Democratic Party in Quebec, and he ran for public office (and met defeat) four times. It is therefore not surprising that in selecting a specific example of the conflict between liberal constitutionalism and cultural particularism, he turns to the case of French-speaking Quebec. French-speaking Quebecois wish to pass certain laws currently proscribed by the Canadian Charter of rights: they would like, for instance, to require all commercial signs to be written in French. These Quebecois, as Taylor sees it, have a specific conception of the good life as a life rooted in a French-language culture, and they do not wish to risk the survival of this culture on the doctrine of liberal individualism. They want to be able to balance the right of (in this example) free speech against the desire to reproduce a

French-language community from one generation to the next. Taylor thinks that, to a degree that would encompass the commercial sign case, they should be allowed this option. (It is easy to see, in the background of his reasoning, the Hegelian sittlichkeit). Taylor regards this solution as a salutary mutation of liberalism, one which allows communities to weigh "the importance of certain forms of uniform treatment against the importance of cultural survival, and opt sometimes in favor of the latter." This amounts, he explains, to a rejection of pure procedural liberalism in favor of a liberalism "grounded very much on judgments about what makes a good life-judgments in which the integrity of cultures has an important place." And he predicts that this is an adaptationliberalismwill find it necessary to make in many societies in the future. No one in this volume appearsto agree. The principle of cultural survival is met with considerableskepticism by the other contributors, and the reason is not hard to guess. It is that none of Taylor's respondents is Canadian, and so for them, his proposal evokes exactly the pluralist model that is no longer a plausible option in most democraticsocieties. Where there are no discrete subcultures already there, down on the ground, to preserve, separatist exceptions to liberal constitutionalism would seem to entail a high degree of top-down social engineering, a kind of cultural gerrymandering, and it is impossible to see how this can be brought off in a country like the United Statesor what purpose would be served if it could. The unpersuasiveness, to non-Canadians, of Taylor's doctrine of cultural survivalism is also a reminder that political

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philosophy brings us only to the outer gestion is that Canadians may have their door of most societies, and that once in- own reasons for choosing differently. A very similar argument is advanced side, we find that historical circumstances tend to be highly controlling. The United by Steven Rockefeller, who adverts to Statesis not Canada-or Germany, or the John Dewey's idea that liberal democracy former Yugoslavia, or (to take a can of is, in itself, "the expression of a distinct truly mixed paint) Trinidad. Multicul- moral faith and way of life," and by Jiirturalist talk that assimilates theoretically gen Habermas, who suggests that "[t]he the situation of the Kurds to the situation universalism of liberal principles is reof (say) gays in the military, as though flected in a procedural consensus, which there were some abstract formula, some must be embedded in the context of a single correct attitude, that would con- historically specific political culture duce to social justice in each case, is too through a kind of constitutional patriothigh off the ground to be of much use to ism"-in other words, that loyalty to the anyone except professional multicultural liberalism of one's own nation-state contheorists. forms to the notion of sittlichkeit. Amy This is a point implied by Michael Gutmann and Susan Wolf offer slightly Walzer in his reply to Taylor. At the bot- more prescriptive responses, but theirs, tom of Taylor's argument, Walzer sug- too, seem to derive from a conception of gests, are two versions of liberalism: one liberalism as a politics already capable of specific moral force: Gutmann suggests that liberalism requiresus to tolerate hate How can agnosticism speech, but does not require us to respect about values count as it, and Wolf proposes that the study of its own "culture" should be a protected a value? prerogative of every "group." Message: we care. envisions a state committed to a proceFrom a multiculturalist point of view, duralist, value-neutral position; the sec- all this just looks like philosophical ond envisions a state committed to the sleight-of-hand. How can liberalismpressurvival of a distinctive national culture ent itself as the solution to the very probor set of subcultures. Walzer thinks that lem it virtually admits to being the cause the second version of liberalism (the ver- of? How can agnosticism about values sion that allows for normative choice) is count as a value? How can tolerance for preferableto the first version (the neutral multiple conceptions of the good life conproceduralist model). But he also thinks stitute the basis for a good life? How can that the first version of liberalism can be we be content with contentlessness? The chosen "out of" the second, and that this answer of these five respondents seems to is precisely what has happened in the be that although it would be a mistake to United States. Americans have chosen a roll back liberal proceduralism in the porights-based, proceduralist liberalism as litical sphere, the multiculturalists are the political system that best embodies right to insist that we do need to give, a their idea of the good life. The tacit sug- lot more public attention to culture. More

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want their signs in Frenchpreciselybecause that's the languageFrench-speaking Quebecoishave alwaysused. There canhardly anyotherjustification, be since thereis no evidencethat Frenchis a cul0 * * turallysuperior language(whateverthat would mean) to English. So that when closesherremarks observing This freshconcernmanifests itselfon two Gutmann by societiesand comlevels. The firstis the emphasison sen- that "[m]ulticultural sitivity-reflected, for example,in Gut- munitiesthat standfor the freedomand mann'sremarks aboutthe harmsdoneby equalityof all people rest upon mutual hatespeechandthe needto be outspoken respect for reasonable intellectual, politin criticismof it, and in Habermas's de- ical, and culturaldifferences,"it seems fair attentionto culture is, presumably, the the Princeton CenUniversity verything ter for HumanValueswas established to produce.

Educational multiculturalismtends to be a kind of vacuum-packed, spillproof cultural survivalism

as sexualharassment fenseof lawsagainst from a commitmentto arisingnaturally social equality. This attitude seems, as insist, entirely many of the contributors consistentwith-indeed, probablyunimaginableapartfrom-the modernliberaloutlook,which makes seeingthrough
the presuppositions of all one's actions and ideas a supreme virtue. Just because we intend no offense does not mean offense isn't taken, and no liberal worthy of the name would claim that "this is the way women (or any other group) have always been portrayed" is a justification for continuing to portraywomen the same way now. Sensitivity so defined, though, is the reason liberalism is so hopelessly at odds with multiculturalist notions like cultural survivalism. French-speaking Quebecois

to ask what in the world she has in -mind as an example of a reasonablecultural difference. The Rushdie affair, for instance, is cited by Taylor as though it were an easy case for multicultural-leaning liberals: we know this is wrong. But it is easy only for the philosophically accidental reasonthat the penalty prescribedis death. Would it be "reasonable"for an Islamic society to jail the author of a work like TheSatanicVerses? have him fired from To his position? To ban the book? To issue a public condemnation? If you think none of the above, you probably think that liberalism beats cultural self-regulation in pretty much every case. The one arenain which liberalismdoes allow genuinely multicultural inroads to be made-and this is the second level on which the new liberal concern with culture manifests itself-is education, since educational institutions are already acknowledged to be the site for the official reproduction of culture. Here the tendency has been to undertake a mini-edition of the pluralist model: curricula are packaged off-"mosaicized," if that's a word-along the lines of cultural difference, with the idea that some free-floating universalist conception like understand-

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of ing (the equivalent the old civic space) animatesand sustainsthe whole enterprise.The aimsof this strategyarearticulatedby Wolf. Its assumptions exare plodedby Appiah. Foreducational multiculturalism tends to be a kindof vacuum-packed, spill-proof cultural survivalism.Wolf's consideration of the subjectis built aroundthe remarkpopularly attributed SaulBellow to about"the Zulu Tolstoy"-a remark inas meaningthatnot all cultures terpreted have producedworks equivalentto the finest productsof European cultureand thattherefore all cultures not meritequal and appreciation. Wolf concoctsa study in scenario which Bellow is imagined deof fending,to his University Chicagocolthe leagues, implicitelitismof thisremark cultureis more by arguingthatEuropean of deserving ourattention simplybecause it is "our culture";and she takes "Bellow" (a figureby now made entirelyof straw)to taskin the following terms: Hesays,referring white, to culture, European " "Thisis ourculture.Buttheaudience not is all white,andis notall descended Eurfrom What he make all those does other opeans. of in bodies theroom? It is notclear-perhaps is notdetermiit nate-whether sort the offailure recognition of here as depicted is better interpreted a literal exclusionAfrican-Americans and of othersfrom theaudience or whether should it ... we see as a patronizing to those willingness accept memberstheUniversity Chicago outlying of of as Eurwhites, honorary communityhonorary Either opeans probably honorary (and males). is way,thissortoffailureof recognition exin institutremely pervasive oureducational a tions,andit constituteslevelof insultand in need immediate damage remedy. of

If this sort of thinking is so pervasive, it is not clear why Wolf had to make an example of it up in order to attack it. But the point of her critique seems to be that culture is something that is divided up for Americans by country of origin. Since fewer than ten percent of Americans are foreign-born, though, there would appear to be a high degree of assumption entailed in any effortto remodel a curriculumalong these lines. An American whose skin is black has no more necessary cultural relation to Africa than an American whose skin is not black does-or than a lategeneration French American, like me, has to France. These histories do not get carried in the genes. Wolf surely knows this

"Culturalidentities" are exactly what many people struggle to escape from, and what, in the end, they often define themselves not with, but against
perfectly well; but in identifying the demand for multicultural curricula with Americans whose ancestors are non-European, she is leaning on the very biological essentialism she would presumably want the Bellows of the world to reject. For there are two problems with mosaic curricula and with the notion of official recognition of distinctive cultural formations generally. The first is put in a nutshell by Appiah: "Between the politics of recognition and the politics of compulsion, there is no bright line." There is

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no practical way to preventthe sentence "This is the culture of AfricanAmericans" from being understoodas "This must be the culture of AfricanAmericans." veryelegantpoint,which Appiah's is surelyratifiedfor every readerof this bookby his or herown experience, that is "cultural identities" exactly are whatmany from,andwhat, peoplestruggleto escape in the end, they often definethemselves not with, but against.This observation is consistentwith the dialogical perfectly conceptionof identity;but it is also subversiveof the claimthatcultures worare thy of officialprotectionandpublicveneration.

becomeobligations(extendindividuals) ed to groups).But it is not obviouswhy the uglinessassociated with hyper-individualism-the "I havea right.. ." syndrome-is suddenlymade beautifulby into the companyof a being introduced like community. Group alleconcept gianceis not a sentimentwith a terribly attractive history. In any case, groupallegianceis hard to erectalong culturallines,becauseculturallinesin modernsocietiesaredifficult to find and impossibleto keep straight.
Modern culture is not like a mosaic; it's more like a Rubik's Cube. The only thing prescriptive to be said about it is that the greater the number of people who have access to it, the greater the number of interesting and unpredicted combinations it will be possible to produce. But we are never likely to get anything like a generalizablepattern;for putting severalitems together in one place always involves rearranging the items everywhere else. For example, the culture of womenthe values, tastes, behaviors, images, language-patterns, and so forth that can arguably be associated with women-obviously develops in response to the culture of men. Most people who talk about women's culture tend to define its qualities as socially undervalued in comparison with the qualities of male culture. But if we were somehow to give equal status to women's culture, to arrange for it to be no longer regarded as subordinate to male culture, it would change its character. So would male culture. I take the point of the famous double epigraphs in Du Bois's The Souls of Black Folk-the lines of European poetry set alongside the notes of the sorrow songsto be that the culture represented by the

The deeperdifficulty, touchedon also by Appiah, is the question of whether whenwe talkaboutculture aretalking we aboutanythingdefinitiveat all. Human beingsproduceculturein the samesense

The European sentiment of liberty is not the same without the African sentiment of oppression to set
beside it
that they producecarbondioxide: they can'thelp it, but the stuffhas absolutely no valence in itself. It'sjust there. The moment culture gets introducedinto a philosophical paradigm, though, it tends to acquirea discreteness found nowhere in experience. rushingto de-reifythe In individual, politicalthinkershave ended us(sometimes upreifyingcultureinstead and ing the termscommunity orgroup) have insertedcultureinto the spot individual once occupied.Individuals become culand ture-bearers, thusrights(possessed by

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one is substantively on dependent its relation to the culturerepresented the by other, and that if the relationchanged, thosecultures would lose theiridentities. The European sentimentof libertyis not the samewithout the Africansentiment of oppression setbesideit. But the only to reasonthe sentimentof oppression Afis ricanis the historical of contingency slavto ery. Livingcultureis a response living conditions. When conditions change,the proper placefor the cultureis a museum. When did liberalsbecome so nostalgic that they preferredto live by an older relics? generation's is Culture appealing liberals to because it sounds a rich,vibrant, like humanthing, all loadedupwith values,butwithoutany of the supernatural of connotations terms like belief or faithor the innerlife-ter-

rifyinglyunglamourous thingsliberalism of course,be caughtdeadbefore would, to going out with. Culturepromises supthe sortof moralcontent,minus plyjust all thoseunhealthy transcendental claims, that liberaltheoryhas alwaysbeen criticizedfor lacking.Multiculturalism paris becauseit providesa ticularlyappealing, values,and to celebrate way to relativize theirincommensurability, over again. all If liberals could get into the multiculturalist act, they think, they could show themselvesto be the concerned,community-spirited,value-friendlypersons they reallyare,withoutceasingto be tolerant and reasonable. But they are not wanted themulticulturalist andthey in act, are betteroff stayingat home. No, they shouldlearn,reallydoes meanno.

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