Ravikiran Peelukhana et al.

/ International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology (IJEST)

SECURING VIRTUAL IMAGES USING BLIND AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
RAVIKIRAN PEELUKHANA*
Department of computer science, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, 605014, India

SHANTHI BALA P Department of computer science, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, 605014, India

AGHILA G
Department of computer science, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, 605014, India

Abstract: The cloud virtualization technology improves the economy of scale for data centers through server consolidation, application consolidation and resources consolidation. Virtualization allows the provider to move Virtual Images from more congested host to less-congested hosts, as required. Enterprises also get improved server reliability, which in turn increases application performance. Despite these benefits, it includes major security challenges with the portability of Virtual Images between different cloud providers.The security and integrity of Virtual images is the foundation for the overall security of the cloud. Many of the Virtual images are intended to be shared by diverse and unrelated users. Unfortunately, existing approaches to cloud security built by cloud practitioners fall short when dealing with Virtual images. Secure transmission of virtual Images can be possible by providing authentication using Blind Authentication protocol (BAP). The proposed approach authenticates the allocation of virtual images using Blind authentication protocol. It provides provable protection against replay and client side attacks even if the keys of the user are compromised. The encryption also provides template protection, revocability and alleviates the concerns on privacy in widespread use of biometrics. Carrying out the authentication in the encrypted domain is a secure process, while the encryption key acts as an additional layer of security. Keywords: Cloud computing, virtual images, security, Biometric authentication.

1. Introduction Virtualization is one of the hottest topics in IT today. Cloud Computing’s multitenancy, massive scalability, elasticity; self provisioning of resources has changed the way IT does business today. Driven by the need to strengthen servers to achieve higher hardware utilization rates, boost operational efficiency, and cut costs, enterprises more recently have implemented virtualization to get on-demand access to additional computational resources. This enables them to add processing power and storage capacity on the fly as needed to respond to changing business conditions. In organizations where applications are deployed within its perimeter, the trust boundary is mostly static and is monitored and controlled by IT department. With the adoption of cloud services, the organization’s trust boundary will become dynamic and move beyond the control of IT. With cloud computing, the network system and application boundary of an organization will extend into service provider’s domain. This loss of control continues to challenge the established trusted governance and control model. Virtual machine (VM) images need high integrity as they determine the initial states of running machines with their security states. The security and integrity of VM images are the foundation for the overall security of the cloud. Current approaches to cloud security built by cloud practitioners fall short when dealing with VM images. Image publisher is mostly fretful about confidentiality, whereas service consumer is neurotic about safety. The cloud administrator is concerned with the integrity of individual images along with the security and compliance of the cloud system. To deal with eternally increasing threats, available authentication mechanisms are not strong and secure enough. Hence, we introduce the concept of securing virtual images in cloud environment using Blind authentication protocol. Administrators often fail to manage images properly,

ISSN : 0975-5462

Vol. 3 No. 4 April 2011

2857

Section 4 gives the implementation details and section 5 concludes the work.Ravikiran Peelukhana et al. and then captures it back to a new image. Injection vulnerabilities are exploited by manipulating input to a service/application such that parts of the input are interpreted and executed as code against the intentions of the programmer. First.1.jpg” wsse: Security ds:signature ds:SignedInfo ds:Reference URI: “#body” Fig. scan and patch the instance. as the time it takes to start a running instance of an image. Hence. to target a wide range of victims. Proposed architecture and its algorithm for securing the virtual images and process flow diagram are described in Section 3. 1 SOAP message sent by a legitimate client Examples of injection vulnerabilities are: SQL injection: The input contains SQL code that is erroneously executed in the database backend. 3 No. There are many techniques to implement session handling. This makes the maintenance operations time consuming. Using a virtual image as a transporter for the Trojan horse makes the hacker's job easier. is on the order of hours. ISSN : 0975-5462 Vol. Session riding/hijacking vulnerabilities are intrinsic to web application technologies and are certainly relevant for cloud computing. Conventionally. as the lack of security or integrity is not known until its first run. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a survey of virtual image security concerns. and will only run on a victim's machine if the victim's software stack satisfies its dependencies. For typical size. Vulnerabilities rampant in the state of the art cloud offerings Bernd Grobauer et al in [3] described session riding and session hijacking. 2. Virtual image sharing provides an easier way of developing and propagating Trojan horses. Cross-site scripting: The input contains JavaScript code that is erroneously executed by a victim's browser. Command injection: The input contains OS commands that are erroneously executed via the operating system. Second. 4 April 2011 2858 . the hacker must develop and test variances of his Trojan horse on different software stacks and make sure that the right version is delivered to the right victim. cloud repository it would easily take months to perform just one round of maintenance. Related Work 2. This identified injection vulnerabilities as a major threat. / International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology (IJEST) primarily because of two reasons. a Trojan horse program can only be developed and tested on the hacker's machine. Soap: Envelope Soap: Header Soap: Body Id= “body” getFile Name= “kiran.

They can also have access to sensitive data and have an impact on business continuity. 4 April 2011 2859 . compromising transit information like passwords and encryption keys. an adversary may modify a service’s WSDL so that a call to a deleteUser operation syntactically looks like a call to another operation. 1 represents a SOAP message sent by a genuine client. and a new body is created. Further machine memory can be accessed from the hypervisor.jpg” is modified and “config. 2 Body is moved to a newly inserted wrapping element As Meiko Jensen et al [4] put metadata spoofing attack aims at spitefully reengineering a Web Service’s metadata descriptions. and security staffs are often not familiar with them. an intruder can compromise user passwords and other confidential data. a VM compromised by a keystroke monitor could allow the monitoring of server hardware resources on all other VMs hosted on the same machine. Current virtualization security and management tools are very simple. / International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology (IJEST) Meiko Jensen et al [4] provided XML Signature Element Wrapping or wrapping attack where SOAP message sent by a genuine client. An adversary could manage to create a bunch of user logins that are thought to be deleted by the application’s semantics. In such a case. Here the request for the file “kiran. Soap:Envelope Soap:Header Soap:body wrapper getFile Soap:Body Wsse:Security ds:Signature Id= “body” ds:SignedInfo ds:Reference sellstocks Name= config. multiple privileged users in various roles have the ability to interact with numerous components of a virtualization deployment. thus the service executes the modified request [4]. exposing other critical data. The resulting message still contains a valid signature of a legitimate user. The administrator not only has control over the physical host. and a new body is created. Without an independent access control solution. This body contains the operation the attacker wants to perform with the original sender’s authorization. For example. without user knowledge all other VMs that are part of the virtual network can be compromised.doc” is asked for. servers are files that can be copied from the host.g. If an attacker listens such a message. 3 No. on some virtualization technologies. ISSN : 0975-5462 Vol.Ravikiran Peelukhana et al. 2 depicts the attack where the original body is moved to a newly inserted wrapping element inside the SOAP header. Indeed. but in reality are still valid. In a virtual environment. Unsecured Virtual machines (VM) can serve as back doors to the virtual data center or an entry point to inject viruses to the protected LAN. Replicating a server image is equivalent to stealing a server. Virtualization makes the problem worse. Shared internal network traffic could also be sniffed from the hosting operating system. If one VM is compromised. setAdminRights. Fig. Fig. and additionally are provided with administrator level access rights. but over all of the virtual sessions running on it. most of the tools that security staffs are familiar with do not work in the VM environment.doc” URI: “#body” Fig. e. For example.jpg” and was signed by the sender. he can perform the following attack. The SOAP body contains a request for the file “kiran. The attacker moves the original body to a newly inserted wrapping element inside the SOAP header. So any access to the virtualization host—even remote access—is critical. This inadequately regulated access to the hypervisor presents the potential for significant damage to the enterprise through the compromise of valuable information and disruption of critical services. very immature. by tracking keystrokes for all VM images.

We now present the authentication framework that achieves this goal using any biometric. Such a protocol can satisfy the conditions presented in our initial scenario. A hypervisor admin has the potential to be able to do anything to a virtual environment. The authentication protocol can run over public networks and provide non-repudiable identity ISSN : 0975-5462 Vol. 4 April 2011 2860 . which make it impossible to hold them accountable for privileged activity. The server computes the products of the locked ID with the locked classifier parameters and randomizes the results. Especially password-recovery mechanisms have shown to be weak [3]. Proposed work The proposed work deals securing virtual Images at server side in cloud environment using blind biometric authentication protocol. The server de-randomizes the sum to obtain the final result. such as hardware security module (HSM). where Alice wanted to create an account with Bob mail that required biometric authentication. The resulting randomized sum is sent to the server. The protocol is blind in the sense that does not reveal any information about the biometric samples to the authenticating server [1]. these passwords can be shared or easily exposed to unauthorized people. 3. discarding or upgrading an input’s integrity immediately).Ravikiran Peelukhana et al. / International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology (IJEST) Poor key-management procedures Bernd Grobauer et al in states that virtual machines do not have a fixed hardware infrastructure and cloud based content tends to be geographically distributed. As the protocol is based on asymmetric encryption of the biometric data. leading to the generation of weak random numbers [3]. which is compared with a threshold for authentication. These accounts may also be shared among many different operators. Unexpected input handling capability A cloud vendor should be able to systematically identify how many interfaces each service has that might receive untrusted input and how those interfaces specifically handle such input securely (for example. 2. and prove that the information exchanged between the client and the server does not reveal anything other than the identity of the client. While these hypervisor accounts have passwords. it captures the advantages of biometric authentication as well as the security of public key cryptography. or worse. which she did not trust. Blind authentication happens over two rounds of communication between the client and the server. it is more difficult to apply standard controls. privileged users with hypervisor access need to be tightly controlled. malicious acts such as removing virtual machines and destroying data [9]. he must provide a mechanism for resetting credentials in the case of forgotten/lost credentials. 2. Maneesh Upmanyu et al [1] define Blind Authentication as a biometric authentication protocol that does not reveal any information about the biometric samples to the authenticating server. because the layer of abstraction between hardware and OS kernel introduced by virtualization may be problematic for the generation of random numbers within a virtual machine environment: generation of random numbers requires a source of entropy which must somehow be provided from the hardware level. The client unlocks the randomized results and computes the sum of the products. Round 2: 1. Weak credential reset mechanisms Bernd Grobauer et al states that in situations where the cloud provider manages user credentials himself rather than using federated authentication. This activity leads to mistakes such as moving and starting a virtual machine on a production server where it should not have been. 3 No. Weak random number generation Cryptographic vulnerabilities due to weak random number generation may exist. Poor key-management procedures leads to insecure authentication while allocating virtual machines [3]. Powerful control of privileged users Like root users from the UNIX/Linux world. These randomized products are sent back to the client. the client locks the biometric test sample using her public key and sends the locked ID to the server. Virtualization may have flawed mechanisms for tapping that source of entropy or the presence of several virtual machine environments on the same host may exhaust the available entropy.cloud computing infrastructures require the management and storage of many different kinds of keys. To perform authentication. 3. Round1: 1. 3.

If any unallocated virtual image is available then it checks if Service Level Agreement (SLA) is met. If conditions are satisfied then image is sent to user as shown in Fig.3 Architecture of existing authentication procedure The existing authentication procedure consists of user requesting a virtual image by sending his credentials to the server. 4 April 2011 2861 . 3. So Alice does not want to give her biometric data in plain to Bob. the server checks the validity of the credentials and after successful validation. Bob could either be incompetent to secure her biometric or even curious to try and gain access to her biometric data. Suppose. While the authentication process is going on. it checks for the availability of the virtual image in the repository. On the other hand. for Alice. She could also repudiate her access to the service at a later time. Bob does not trust the client as she could be an impostor. Moderator will send the credentials ISSN : 0975-5462 Vol. 3 3. 3 No.Ravikiran Peelukhana et al. neither she can trust the network to send her plain biometric. / International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology (IJEST) verification. revocability of enrolled templates. the primary problem here is that. Virtual machine image repository provides image store and retrieval functions. It provides provable protection against replay and client side attacks even if the keys of the user are compromised. and alleviates the concerns on privacy in widespread use of biometrics. one can replace any compromised template. As the enrolled templates are encrypted using a key. Alice wants to create an account in Bob mail that requires biometrics based authentication. Proposed architecture Fig 4: Proposed architecture for Authentication In our proposed architecture. providing revocability. she can’t not trust Bob to handle her biometric data securely. For both parties. Existing Authentication Method Fig. The encryption also provides template protection.2. while the encryption key acts as an additional layer of security. Carrying out the authentication in the encrypted domain does not affect the accuracy. However. the network is insecure.1. user requests for a virtual image by sending his credential using Blind authentication procedure by binding the biometric sample with public key.

where the biometric sample of the user is encrypted before binding with public key. ISSN : 0975-5462 Vol. 4. The authenticating server will send its decision whether to accept or to reject based on a threshold value. / International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology (IJEST) for enrollment server. 3. 3 No. Weak credential reset mechanisms can be can be resolved by using Blind Authentication Protocol with the property of revocability of issued templates. 3. It verifies its registration. The cloud server will check for the availability of a virtual image from the image repository. With the augmented use of Federated identity and Single sign users. it will send the details to authenticating server for authentication after two rounds of process of Blind Authentication. the impostor cannot learn random scale factor as GCD is not defined for congruencies. Privileged users can be given powerful control over the resources they are authenticated and can be monitored for any inadvertent usage as their authentication mechanism is bound with their biometric trait. Biometric Authentication Protocol (BAP) eliminates the setback of weak random number generation as the server has access to a strong random number generator source there by evading man in the middle attack. he might be able to bypass the confidence test without knowing anything about the biometric or the private key. A simple modification of the protocol at the server side could thwart this attack. The server could multiply all the sums with a random scale factor and check if the returned sum is a multiple of or not. Unexpected input handling capability can be thwarted: Even if the impostor replaces the partial sums with random numbers. User is a registered person. From his view. even if Eavesdropper snoops the channel. Algorithm for proposed architecture:1. 4. The enrolled templates are encrypted using a key. Using this architecture. while allaying concerns of being tracked. 2. Blind authentication rules out these concerns by providing strong authentication procedure.Ravikiran Peelukhana et al. the user as accepted as an authentic user and the request is redirected to cloud server. Poor key-management Weak random number generation Weak credential reset mechanisms Powerful control of privileged users Unexpected input handling capability Poor key-management can be handled by binding the public key and biometric sample of the user. Client sends biometric sample and public key along with request for virtual image Moderator sends the biometric detail of user for authentication to the authentication server If new user Send biometric samples to the enrollment server If authentic then Moderator checks the availability of the virtual image If virtual image is available then If SLA is met Allocate the virtual image Else Virtual Image is not allocated Else Virtual Image is unavailable Else User is prompted for fresh registration ie goto step3 This architecture resolves the following server side concerns. credentials are sent in encrypted form along with public key he could not decipher anything. If accepted. credentials are used for all the subservices of a service provider thereby emphasizing the need for strong authentication mechanism. one can replace any compromised template. 2. 5. as for each session a random number is generated which can’t be guessed. If any Virtual image is free and SLA is met. 4 April 2011 2862 . 1. it will allocate the virtual image based on the user requirements without degrading the performance of the cloud. The biometric sample is never stored as plain thereby reducing the amount of information leakage.

If VM is available then it checks if SLA is met allocate VM otherwise send a message regretting the allocation as SLA is not met with.  Single sign on: It is an authentication process that lets a user to enter a username and password only once when they log on to a server. 4 April 2011 2863 . / International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology (IJEST)  Federated identity: Federation is the process of managing trust relationships established beyond the internal network boundaries or administrative domain boundaries among distinct organizations. Service Provisioning Markup Language (SPML) is a promising standard that helps organizations automate provisioning of user identities for cloud services. The sends it to the authenticating server to check if user is valid if he is a new user then biometric samples are sent for enrollment to the enrollment server. authentic Enrolled. send biometric samples for enrollment Enrolled. If a user has rights to use many different applications on a server.3. 3 No. Process flow diagram client Biometric test sample+public key Moderator VM manager Authenticating server Enrollment server Request VM Check if valid If new user. Service providers in cloud can use SPML to automatically provision user accounts and profiles with the utilization of service and enabling “just-in-time provisioning” to create accounts for new users by collecting biometric sample. yet have access to many applications. they need to log-in once and they are never prompted again for any username and password while they are switching between different programs or applications on that same server. ISSN : 0975-5462 Vol. if the user is authentic then the request is sent to VM manager to check for availability of VM. authentic Check for vm Check if SLA is met SLA Allocate VM SLA is met SLA not met with VM can’t be allocated as SLA is not met with Fig 5: Process flow diagram Fig 5 shows the flow of process in securing the virtual images where the client sends the client requests the virtual image by sending biometric sample and public key to moderator.Ravikiran Peelukhana et al. 3.

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