FB11001 - Bounded Rationality &moral Hazards

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)
Summary of Understanding and Synopsis on the Topics of Bounded Rationality & Private Information and Moral Hazards & Performance Incentives
Bounded Rationality & Private Information

The chapter perambulates over the topics of Bounded Rationality with the initial emphasis of the topic being given to Motivation1, in addition to Coordination the other central problem to any Economic Organization and Management is Motivation, Motivation problems arise because individuals have their own concerns and interests, which are rarely perfectly aligned with the interests of other individuals, to the intra and inter groups to which the individual may belong to and the society as a whole. The Coordination problem deals with the following things under its ambit : a) What deliverables are to be met b) How they should be achieved and c) What key deliverable each individual must deliver, at the macro organizational level the problem is who makes what decisions and with what pertinent and relevant information the individual possesses to make those decisions and how readily the required information is made accessible, whereas the Motivation Problem is to ensure that that everyone involved in the team willingly does his part at the individual level and accurately delivering feedback of the outcome of the task which they are doing in order to ascertain to the decision maker that he can take appropriate decisions, also it is key that the individual who is assigned the task carries it out himself in the planned manner by the decision maker. To explore the topic in detail assumptions that individuals will do what they perceive to be in their own individual interests is given importance throughout , this amalgamates into informing us that not only is the decision maker privy of how he is affected but also how others are affected by decision taken. The chapter further elucidates the importance of Contracts2, which are prima facie agreements made by two or more people which are voluntary in nature and accepted by both the parties entering into a contract when they both see their advantage, which on further decomposing will be seen to be mutually beneficial as well, more so these contracts which have been entered into can be modified to suit individual needs and interests.
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Definition of the word Motivation is as per the assigned topic paper Ch. 5 Page no 126. A Contract is as per the economic definition and may not necessarily be formal contracts with the power of law behind them. When people recognize their mutual interests and agree to modify their behavior in such a way that it will be mutually beneficial.
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So to deal with the problem of Motivation, it is expressed that a perfect contract, henceforth called a Complete Contract would be impervious to solve the problem, a complete contract would specify all sets of actions each party is liable to and arrange the realised costs and benefits in case of all foreboding contingencies. This is concomitant that both parties are inclined to abide by the contract terms. So this elucidates that if the original plan were an efficient one, a complete contract would implement an efficient outcome, therefore with this idealised mind-set we find that Motivation Problems primarily arise because some contracts cannot be described in a complete and enforceable contract. Therefore, a complete contract would need the following requirements.
a) Firstly, the parties must have the foresight to see all relevant contingencies which
would creep up and how they will adapt to the problems which arise, they must be unambiguous, also which factors were considered and which are actually beforehand.
b) Secondly, the parties entering into the contract must be able to determine and agree to
an efficient course of action for each possible contingency.
c) Thirdly, The parties entering into the contract must abide by the terms, this has two
elements namely C1) First the parties must agree that the contract cannot be modified later which would rob the initial contract of its credibility, C2) Each party individually must be able in its own accord to judge if the contract terms are being met and if they are being violated by the other enforce the contract terms on the other. The chapter further explains the problems of actual contracting which are limited (Not all contingencies are fully accounted for) by the problems of: Limited Foresight, Imprecise Language, Costs of calculating solutions and the costs of writing down a plan collectively called as the BOUNDED RATIONALITY of people during actual transactions among people. Therefore in such cases when there are contracts with what probably we can assume are loose ends or rather incomplete contracts arising because of the problems of bounded rationality we can expect that when parties try to adapt in case of contingencies and incomplete contracts they may give rise to opportunistic behaviour amongst the parties including reneging, this nagging fear of opportunism may at times deter parties from relying on one another as much as they should for efficiency, such incomplete contracts may further lead to problems of imperfect commitment and hence reluctance to enter into a contract.
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In certain cases, even if the contingency can be seen and planned, and contractual commitments enforced, one of the bar gainers may have relevant private information before the contract is signed, this private information interferes with the possibility of reaching a value maximizing agreement, E.g. it is lead to believe that sellers have relevant information about the product that they are selling in a second hand market because they believe that the product utility is now minimal and are interested in disposing it off to the sceptical second hand buyers, this leads to inefficiency, the Source of Inefficiency is called ADVERSE SELECTION.(Sellers are adverse to the interests of the buyers). In reality real contracts are seldom perfect, leaving room for self-interested behaviour that will thwart the realization of effective plans. In reality all possible outcomes of a contract cannot be described in detail, the idea of foreseeing and unambiguously describing every contingency that might possibly be relevant to the agreement is not possible in the complex environment. In reality real people are subject to Unforeseen Circumstances as the outcomes could not be looked into with adequate foresight during the planning phase, Costly Calculations and Contracting sometimes the management looks at the positive side of an outcome and often neglects the other possible outcomes as the opportunity cost of calculating this second outcome would hamper more productive work, it is only when the plan is put into execution and the second outcome which is actually against the managements interest comes into prominence gives rise to the identification of loopholes in the original contract. Imprecise Language can hamper the outcomes and efficiency of most contracts, furthermore simply adding more clauses and subdivisions in the contract too can make disputes more likely. Contractual Responses to Bounded Rationality : Can be looked into with an angle that people design their contracts recognizing that they cannot possibly be perfectly adapted to all possible future outcomes; one such solution is to write rather inflexible contracts with blanket provisions that are to apply very broadly. A broad blanket provision minimises the cost of describing eventualities and leaves little room for ex post uncertainty about what behaviour is required. Such spot transactional contracts are called SPOT MARKET CONTRACTS. They include A) Relational Contracts in which the parties do not agree to the detailed plan of action but on a larger goal and objectives, on general provisions that are broadly applicable and the plan of action as to what should be done when contingency arises.
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And the power distribution amongst the parties involved in the contract.
B) Implicit
contracts which do not have any document as the mutual expectations are shared between the parties and are commonly used with this they can be powerful means to economise on bounded rationality and contracting costs, therefore shared values, ways of thinking and belief as to how things must be done are key aspects of shared contracts. A natural drawback of implicit contract is that by their very nature they cannot be tried in a court of law as there is no formal contract. Effects of Contractual Incompleteness: Contracts are meant to protect people by aligning incentives, when contracts are incomplete, the alignment can be imperfect, therefore the concern with the possibility of being disadvantaged by self-interested behaviour that an incomplete contract does not adequately control or may prevent an agreement from being reached in the first place. It may also inefficiently limit the extent of cooperation being achieved.
A) Commitment and Reneging: Achieving commitment can be very valuable because it

can affect others expectations and at the same time lead to the modification of their own behaviour, this is illustrated by an example that when apple launched a special range of Macintosh Computers they installed a standalone plant producing the apple range of computers. This lead to the behaviour modification of a) Employees: they knew they had to succeed b) Competitors: they felt there would be little point to drive apple out of the market when they had dedicated themselves to a cause and c) Customers: when they saw this much publicised move by apple they knew that they could count on its support and hence would have preferred an apple mac over any other PC.
B) Commitment Problem No 1: Reneging, is especially problematic with incomplete

contracts because what should be done is often left incomplete some self-interested actions may be adopted by one party who takes advantage of the loopholes, the other party in contract with it may complain but may not have the power to label it a cheat as the first party may say that it is carrying out this action as per the agreed terms which in totality is incomplete. Thus reneging not only impedes efficiency but also affects performance.
C) Commitment Problem No 2: Ex Post Renegotiation is a rather subtle problem

because in some cases it will be rather beneficial for both parties to renegotiate
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the ex post because what was efficient when the contract was first entered into may not be the same now after actions have been taken and further information revealed, if parties understand this at the time of crafting the original contract document they will later face these incentives, they may not be able to draft the contract in an efficient manner. Viz stock options to motivate employees to raise the stock price of a company (vis a vis current market price) is exercised by most companies as an incentive to improve and motivate employee performance. Suppose after issue of this statement the stock price falls drastically, the employees would be demotivated, and thus the contract terms if remediated would be better for the employer and the employees to increase efficiency at work. A complication of Ex Post renegotiation includes, is that in some contexts it will turn out ex post that breaching the original contract terms will lead to more personal gain for one of the parties, and it insists on inefficient functioning of the initial contract, viz a chain and a manufacturer enter into a contract of producing a few goods, but later the manufacturer finds more lucrative opportunities and breaches the initial contract with the manufacturer by paying damages when the chain may insist on delivery after it had entered into a contract. Investments and Specific Assets: An Investment is an expenditure of money or other resources that create a potential flow of benefits and services, the potential flow is itself called an asset. Tangible assets like houses, machinery are the most commonly identifiable assets also; investments in education create a valuable asset: Human Capital which also leads to cash flows and benefits. But Specific Assets are those, which are most valuable in a specific setting or relationship. A parallel can be drawn with the term Cospecialized Assets3, which is used when two or more assets have maximum value when used in conjunction and lose much of their value if used in isolation. Viz A rail road which plys between a coal mine and an electric utility, also these two assets (railroad, coalmine) lose value if isolated and gain a lot of value when used in conjunction, also there is a problem of a selfish motive develops between any one of the owners of either assets as the other will fall vulnerable to meet the demands which are post contractual in nature, a classical term for this is called the HOLD UP PROBLEM (Which is an example of post contractual opportunisms) in this the general business problem is that each party worries about being forced to accept disadvantageous terms later,
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Cospecialized Assets are a subset of Specific Assets.
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after it has sunk an investment, or is precarious about its investment being devalued at the actions of others. A party which is forced to accept this worsening terms after it has incurred sunk costs is called a Held Up company. This leads to conclude that it is the specificity of assets together with imperfect contracting that leads to the hold-up problem, which is not a common occurrence it applied in the standard market context where this is perfect contacting in an ambit if a large number of buyers and sellers, but rather the opportunistic behaviour that develops in the players who have invested in large specific assets and either make or are rendered vulnerable to the other dependent member who is in contract with it. Clearly if the contracts were made complete, with the contract preventing either of the partners from indulging in a post opportunistic behaviour: the hold-up problem would be eliminated, but with an example a concept is highlighted. Suppose that there is a contract between a mine and an electric utility to supply coal, these two facing the expected contentious problem of HOLD UP: why? Because it may later arise if either of the partners falls prey to its selfish desires and breaches the contract, to prevent this post opportunistic behaviour a long term contract is entered into by the mine and the utility, but for this the price of coal should be set, now the question arises at what price? Hence the contract the coal mine owner may face rising labour and other costs which he does not expect, for this should an escalator clause be included which adjusts the price of the coal when some mining index cost rises, or should the price of coal be tied to the spot market price of coal in that particular area ? that is why when faced with such scenarios we have a strategic solution, in an empirical study carried out by the noted MIT Economist Paul Joskov, most Coal Mines and Power utilities were owned by the same company (Vertical Integration4) or had entered into contracts with each other which were of a long term in nature and had escalator clauses. A mathematical example of the hold-up problem is the famous prisoners dilemma problem5, also this opines that the threat of breach of contract and the hold-up problem, concern that post contractual opportunism may occur, depresses and discourages a firm from investing, therefore it is quintessential that firms must commit not to attempt and grab more than their share of returns.
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When a company expands its business into areas that are at different points of the same production path. The problem has not been explained in this term paper but will be explained during the Viva.
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Achieving Commitment: the term paper in its beginning has already illustrated the relational and implicit contracts as a response to contractual incompleteness, where these contracts serve to set expectations and establish decision processes to deal with inevitable and unforeseen circumstances while avoiding the trouble to jot inundated details. And in the case of cospecialized assets it is best for the same firm to own both, or the other solution is one which is called COMMITMENT. And in a world of costly and incomplete contracting trust is utmost important in realizing transactions which are important and which may be profitable, thus in reneging or breaching a contract the firm loses its reputation, thus losing the chance to conduct transactions later on. Thus the tenacity to maintain a reputation by a firm removes the incentive for behaviours which are opportunistic and post contractually harmful to the transactional partners of the firm. Private Information and Precontractual Opportunism: The parties committing to get involved in a contract before entering into the contract must reach an agreement, this involves some sort of bargaining, which in itself is a complex process, central to economic life, and has distinct features as bargaining strength, credibility, guile, patience and strategic insight. Also when costs and benefits of a certain plan are known to that party alone, it leads to what we term as Informational Asymmetries. Informational Asymmetries can prevent many a agreement from being reached. Under such conditions even if an agreement is reached, it is not going to be an efficient one, especially when the parties have no option but to participate. At times, informational asymmetries lead to problems in true valuation, which can only be curbed when both the parties confess to the true value of the transaction that they are engaging in thus to ensure that trade takes place and both the buyer party and the seller party gain a bit of surplus from the trade which they otherwise are not only forced not to carry out but also wont do if there is ambiguity in valuation (arising from slanderous misreprentation in the true value of the product being transitioned in the contract) each confess to. Albeit Efficiency can be achieved despite the inefficiencies when there are incentive constraints, important to bilateral bargaining and trade takes place when gains for both buyer and seller are large. The costs associated to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, time and effort imposes the phenomena of Bargaining Costs. Adverse Selection: Adverse selection is one of the major problems of pre contractual opportunism it arises because one of the parties has hold of information which may
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not be explicitly mentioned to the other during the agreement of the contract and the contract is being entered into because of one of the vested interest of one of the party with the Precontractual information. Such private information can also block the efficient functioning of any contract, Viz. when a pregnant lady takes benefit of an insurance policy she has pre contractual information and a selfish interest to maximize her gain in the transaction, she may not openly declare the same during the agreement of the contract and later on post contract she may claim for medical benefits and this puts the insurance company which had no privy about the state of the lady when the contract was entered into. Signalling and Screening But we have to be cognizant of the fact that private information, responsible for adverse selection can be extracted by investing time and effort which consume attention and are costly to the firm expending these efforts. But there is a caveat here, that there are limitations and the contract albeit with a lesser degree is still prey to informational asymmetries. In Signaling, privately informed parties take the lead in adopting behaviours that when properly interpreted reveals the information, viz workers may show that they are more productive by either more productivity or else by studying and earning college diplomas and the degree would be a signal for productivity. On the other hand Screening refers to the activities being undertaken by the party without private information in order to separate different types of the informed party along some dimension
Moral Hazards & Incentives

The problems that most decision makers in organizations face is that when those with critical information have interests different from those of the decision maker they may fail to report completely and accurately which are needed by the decision maker to make good decisions. This scenario also applied when buyers cannot easily monitor the quality of goods and services that they receive; there is a tendency for some suppliers to substitute poor quality goods or to exercise little effort, care or diligence in providing the services. This can be illustrated in the form of an example that when a mechanic cheats us when we go to him to service our car for an engine problem and since we are ignorant about the intricacies of the engine, we are susceptible to be cheated by the mechanic, he may replace an inferior part for an already existing part which would be otherwise functional, or even if genuine he may not care to do the job with utmost sincerity, so much so that we may run into a problem again and spend time and money which
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could have been otherwise invested into another productive activity, this scenario is a typical example of the MORAL HAZARD problem. The Moral Hazard problem is a form of post contractual opportunism that arises because actions have efficiency consequences that are not freely observable and so the person taking them may put his or her private interests at others expense. This term, Moral Hazard had been originally extracted from the insurance industry, when people had changed their behavior after entering into a contract with the insurance agency, the change in behavior had an incongruous effect on the Insurance Agency when more claims were being filed against the insurance agency. We have discussed the problem of not being able to write down complete contracts with an enforceable behavior that is to be adopted by both parties after the contract has been entered into, therefore enforceable contracts cannot be written down. Although the term Moral Hazard at first impression gives a negative outlook, not all changes in behavior that are accompanied are socially undesirable, because some social interests may not be represented in the transaction between the insurer and the insured, E.g. A Pregnant lady may go to the doctor for regular checkups this although may be of negative impact to the insurance company, it is consistent with societys goals, there will be healthier babies and mothers, also it may be interesting to note that the costs involved in going to the doctor by the woman may exceed the total benefits received. The Moral Hazard problem can be looked into with the help of the following example, a divisional executive may look into his short term gain of achieving perks and promotions and sacrifice crucial long term goals of the company and shareholders interests, a doctor may practice conservatively and may tell his patient to carry out all kinds of prognostic tests before administering any kind of medication on him. Albeit these examples do not have the propositions of a formal insurance, they have a crucial feature of insurance, the decision makers have the crucial feature of insurance, and the decision makers the Manager and the Doctor do not bear full impact of their decisions. Viz. the doctor who orders extra tests benefits in terms of the reduced likelihood of malpractice suits against him, but does not pay for the costs of the tests or suffer the discomfort that they cause. We can extend this example into the PRINCIPAL AGENT RELATIONSHIP where situations in which one individual (agent) acts on behalf another (principal) and is supposed to advance the principals goals. In this scenario, the moral hazard problem arises when the agent and the principal have different individual objectives and the principal cannot easily determine the agents reports and actions are being taken in pursuit of the principals goals or self-interested pursuit of the agent. In the above examples of the manager and the doctor can be stated in the principal and agent context that the agent in both cases are the doctor and the manager and the respective principal are the patient and company shareholders. 9|

We now explain Moral Hazard in organizations, prima facie Moral Hazard was identified in the insurance context and most of its spectacular manifestations are still found there, however for understanding organizations however we have to acknowledge that moral hazard is a common phenomenon and it affects a wide array of transactions and attempts to deal with moral hazard accounts for many of the institutional arrangement we see in the markets and the organization. Moral Hazard and Employee Shirking : An important instance of moral hazard arises in employee relationships, where employees may shirk their responsibilities, where an employee albeit doing his work at a congenial pace will try and portray an image of being overworked and also that he is going about his work at a decent pace when in reality he could have done the work faster and better, so to annul this problem, management in most organizations incentivize the worker into bringing about his best performance, these arrangements tie employee compensation to various measures of performance which are supposed to motivate effort, creativity, care, diligence, loyalty and so on. Examples to enhance output include commissions to sales people, performance pay to executives and son on. We can very well see that these are arrangements of Moral Hazard, why? Because the firm is not paying directly for what the employees are supplying but are using a proxy for it. What is actually being supplied are things such as employees intellectual and physical effort and what is paid for is the result of these efforts the amount and quality of time invested by the worker may be difficult to monitor, but the results of the efforts are more conspicuously observed, thus rather than paying for unobserved work, the firm incentivizes the worker in turn motivating him and bringing about a behavioral change and making him work in the desired way which enhances the value of the organization. Moral Hazard and Managerial Misbehavior : The dispersed holdings of stock amongst a multitude of small investors and the election of a board of directors to control the interests of the shareholders had created an effective separation of ownership and control, and an agent and principal relationship when no individual stock holder had any real incentive to monitor managers and had to believe that the Managers were running the firm keeping the stockholder interests in mind, but over time in certain organizations we find that the managers had supplicated their own selfish interests with an array of perks and exorbitantly lavish setups, more over in an array of critiques one of them also included an attempt to resist takeover plans because they were aware of the fact their jobs could be in danger if any takeovers take place (successful hostile takeover bids have generally seen the senior management of the firm being taken over, sacked) which otherwise would have been very beneficial to the shareholder value, clearly this is a case where there is a conflict of interest between the shareholder and the managers of the firm. One such feature of a takeover defense is the Poison 10 |

Pill, which involve the creation of special securities that give certain right to the holders in the event of a hostile takeover and if the raider owns up more than a specified fraction of the firm leads to the loss of the firm which is acquiring. Such poison pills clearly outline the Moral hazard, in which the Board acts against the interest of the shareholder. Moral Hazard in Financial Contracts: A common sort of moral hazard problem arises when different individuals have differing claims on the financial returns from an investment, and Moral Hazard examples are abound with other examples and account for the many accounts in the form of Financial Contracts. Between equity and debt holders equity holders would like their investments to work out and generate more value whereas debt holders would like to get their promised fixed payment Controlling Moral Hazards: The three main reasons to prevail for a moral hazard problem to arise are Firstly there must be potential divergence of interest amongst people, conflicts of interest may not always arise, but when resources are scares it will, so this aspect is contextual. Secondly, there must be some basis of gainful exchange or cooperation between individuals, some reason to agree or transact that may later on lead to divergent interests and the Third critical requirement is that there must be difficulties in determining whether the terms of agreement have been followed or not, and also in reinforcing contract terms by one party over another, this point can also arise when both parties know that the contract terms have been violated but cannot be individually gauged by a third party. These difficulties also arise because monitoring actions or verifying reported information is costly or impossible. The following three ways suggest ways to deal with moral hazard problems: Monitoring : Increase the resources devoted to monitoring and verification, the underlying idea is to prevent inappropriate behavior directly by catching it before it occurs, Viz in the doctors and patient problem which we have discussed earlier, before carrying out a test which the patient or insurance agency opines would be irrelevant, the patient can consult a second doctor. In other situations monitoring is intended to decrease the probability of getting away undetected with the socially inefficient and self-interested behavior, in this case the basis of dealing with the problem is by the nature of introducing rewards and penalties, Viz a penalty is that a punch card system may be introduced and if a worker punches a card late or comes late to work, a punishment in the form of reduced pay can be imposed, Monitoring may also appreciate the need for a desirable behavior by rewarding a person for an appropriate conduct. Monitoring by Competing Sources of Information, Although monitoring requires developing sources of information about the agents truthfulness and performance it is not incumbent upon it from a cost perspective, a prime possibility is to rely upon competing sources for information to develop the much needed 11 |

information, and each of the competing sources will point out their own merits and the D merits of the others another method is Monitoring by Markets where managers strive to give in their best effort in order to avoid a bad reputation in the market and an accompanying fear of unemployment, this fear may provide managerial incentives. The problem of Risk Bearing amongst Risk Averse people is that they will be needed to be convinced by the management to accept a higher pay, this in turn is costly to the organization, when it is forced to use the incentive method to convince people to accept the risks. Risk Costs and Incentive Benefits: Designing Efficient Incentive contracts involve balancing the cost of risk bearing against the benefits of improved incentives. Quintessentially the basic idea behind incentive contract is that of achieving goal congruence, an appropriately designed reward system causes self-interested behavior to approximate the behavior the designer wants. Alternatively we can think of a well-designed and planned incentive and performance scheme as removing the conflict of interest by effectively aligning the goals of the Principal or the organization or the designer with that of the agent, or Manager. Bonding: In certain industries it is common to require the posting of bonds to guarantee performance; a bond is a sum of money that is forfeited in the event of any inappropriate behavior by an individual under the bond. But in many cases a bond will have to be sufficiently large to provide an incentive when the chances of getting caught are small and the incentive to cheat is large, and most often individuals who need to be bonded may not possess the tenacity and resources to take up that bond. The Chapter further illustrates the Ownership Changes and the Organizational Redesign by eliminating the agent, and having principles acting on their own behalf, but a caveat accompanies this as seldom can we be our own doctors and it further annuls the gains of specialization. Furthermore in Market settings, changing ownership patterns to bring the affected transitions can eliminate the moral hazard problem as discussed in the summary of the Bounded Rationality problem when it is better for a firm to acquire another if both are a dependent on each other, and can possess some sort of divergent interests later (the Mine and Utility Problem) Influence Activities and Unified Ownership is describes as one of the other major categories in the problem of moral hazard is the one of influence activities, they arise when the employees (can be agents) also try to influence the employers decision (Can also be Principals) even if the decisions of the decision maker are not altered and he or she goes by the privy of his decision the time and effort by the ones other than the decision maker spent in influencing him can be of insignificant gain and leads to loss of productivity, Influence costs can be eliminated by the imposition of organizational rules and structures which are well defined and have a significant employee reporting directive. Influence Costs can be further eliminated when there is no decision 12 |

making or influencing power with those who consume their productive time in unproductive work when they try to influence the decision maker who stands rather unbiased and will take his own decision irrespective of the others trying to influence him. We see that in the organizational context that when two previously separate organizations are brought under a common central management with the power to intervene, the scope of influence increases with the members of one organization pleading for the resources of the other organization be transferred to them. Further the chapter concludes relating influence costs and Failed Mergers that major problem creep up as each organization has its own structure, policy, pay scales, organizational issues, thus in business conglomerates each division must function independently with the central leadership selectively intervening when there are clear gains of doing so this can also be brought about by creating separate boundaries and legal system between divisions.
End
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FB11001 - Bounded Rationality &moral Hazards

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Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Bounded Rationality & Private Information

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

A) Commitment and Reneging: Achieving commitment can be very valuable because it

B) Commitment Problem No 1: Reneging, is especially problematic with incomplete

C) Commitment Problem No 2: Ex Post Renegotiation is a rather subtle problem

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Cospecialized Assets are a subset of Specific Assets.

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Moral Hazards & Incentives

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

Akshay S Bhat (FPM-1) - XLRI Jamshedpur - FB11001- MANAC II (Term Paper)

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