Press reports have also indicated that China's military is researching micro- and nanosatellites to attack foreign satellites,

but evidence of actual progress is http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=367 http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp? CAT2=353&CAT1=16&CAT0=2&COM=367&MOD=0&SMD=0&SSMD=0&STA=&ID=0&PAR=0 &PRINT=1 > Home > DOCUMENTS > Committee Reports > 2003 Annual Session > 156 STCMT 03 E WEAPONS IN SPACE AND GLOBAL SECURITY 156 STCMT 03 E - WEAPONS IN SPACE AND GLOBAL SECURITY Rapporteur : Lothar IBRGGER (Germany - Allemagne) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Page) I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. MILITARY USES OF SPACE A. UNITED STATES 2 B. RUSSIA 4 C. EUROPE 5 D. CHINA 6 E. OTHER COUNTRIES 6 III. IV. A. B. C. V. VI. VII. 2

POSSIBLE THREATS TO SPACE-BASED ASSETS NEW US MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMMES MISSILE DEFENCE AND SPACE 8 WEAPONS IN SPACE 10 ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS 11 8

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL CRITICAL VIEWS OF US MISSILE DEFENCEKKKK CONCLUSIONS 16 14

12

I.

INTRODUCTION(

1. A new security debate on the future status of activities in outer space is emerging. In particular, the international community is slowly becoming aware of the importance of security in this delicate area and it will soon have to face important choices with regard to the military uses of outer space. The claims by the United States and a few other countries, regarding a perceived vulnerability of space assets to possible attacks, has attracted the attention of both security analysts and military experts. The formulation by the United States of plans to defend its space assets from such threats, if necessary by deploying weapons in outer space, have not generated widespread public attention, but could have a serious impact on international security. This report will try to address these topics through, first, a general overview of military uses of space; second, an outline of the new US space military programmes; and third, an analysis of the implications of these programmes for international security and arms control. In conclusion, your Rapporteur will offer a few policy recommendations. 2. There are four general areas of space activity: civil, commercial, defence, and intelligence. Often, the distinctions between these sectors can be quite blurry, as was particularly true during the Cold War space race of the 1950's and 1960's. Since then, strong programmes in civilian space exploration and research have continued, primarily in the United States and, to a lesser degree, Russia. Even more widespread has been the commercial space industry, which attracts capital from governments and companies from around the world. 3. In the civil space sector, the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently the biggest spender in space, accounting for 80% of all space research funding in the world. NASA's strategic mission seeks to advance scientific knowledge and understanding of space, to advance human exploration, use, and development of space, and to research and develop advanced aeronautics and space technologies. Civil space activities by other countries are primarily associated with the International Space Station (ISS). While NASA remains the leading player here as well, other key participants include the European Space Agency (ESA), Russia, Japan, Canada, and Brazil. The nature of the ISS as an international programme allows the benefits from resulting scientific research, experimentation and commercial processes to be widely shared among nations. The recent tragedy surrounding the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew, and the subsequent grounding of NASA's shuttle fleet, has injected a degree of uncertainty into the field of civil space research. While President Bush and NASA have pledged a continued US commitment to space exploration, future directions of the shuttle programme and, with it, the ISS are currently undecided. 4. More diverse is the commercial space sector, which encompasses the commercialisation of space products and services by both public and private companies, and which has emerged as a nearly US$100 billion industry. Nonetheless, the scope of commercial space activities is quite limited as compared to that of governmental activities, which includes the defence and intelligence sectors. By far the most dominant commercial area is space telecommunications. Next is space transportation, essentially the launching of satellites, which is heavily dependent on the telecommunications market. A third area, remote sensing, makes up a far smaller percentage. Other commercial uses of space involve location, navigation, and timing satellite services as well as weather satellite services. These areas, along with most space transportation and remote sensing projects, are predominantly developed under mixed commercial-government activities, often in the form of public-private partnership (PPP) frameworks.

5. The commercial telecommunications satellite industry provides a range of services to millions of users, private and public, around the world. These include telephone, electronic data, television, radio, broadband and Internet services to both fixed and mobile users. The fastest growing telecommunications application for satellites is the provision of broadband services. These are largecapacity, content-oriented communications that move at very fast speeds. Also growing is the use of satellite Internet service, either directly or in conjunction with the terrestrial Internet network. In general, only the space telecommunications sector can be considered purely a commercial industry, but developments in "dual-use" technologies may soon change this, as the military in the United States and Europe are increasingly using commercial space telecommunications systems. 6. Other commercial satellite applications include remote sensing, which provides various types of imagery of the earth's surface at various resolutions to many industries. These include agriculture, civil and urban planning, environmental and pollution monitoring, geological exploration (including oil, gas, and mineral deposits), forestry, insurance and terrestrial mapping. Due to potential military or intelligence use of remote sensing imagery, the industry cannot exist free from government regulation. Companies in the United States, France, Japan, India, Israel, Russia, and China possess the most substantial remote sensing capabilities, and governments often purchase commercial images. 7. Location, navigation and timing satellites make up another branch of the commercial satellite industry. Here, the primary system is the US government owned and operated Global Positioning System (GPS). Originally designed for military purposes, the US Department of Defense now allows for free public access worldwide with full accuracy potential. Users employ GPS receivers that are either handheld or installed on aircraft, ground vehicles, or ships. The system provides the most accurate publicly available positioning and timing system on the market. The European Union also has plans to develop its own system known as Galileo, which rose out of concern over having to rely commercially on GPS, a system it does not control. Recent disputes among member-states concerning their share in the project have, however, hampered progress on Galileo. 8. Like GPS, weather satellites are government owned and operated as a public service. Most of the commercial weather satellite service-related businesses process raw data and provide this information to customers such as the agriculture industry, the retail industry, and the news and entertainment industry. Most of the world's space-faring nations co-operate in providing and distributing weather data to other nations. 98. Overall, the United States and Europe are the two primary players in the commercial space industry. However, while about half of commercial space revenues are generated in the United States, the commercial space market is of much greater relative importance in Europe than in the United States. This stems from the significant disparity in government space expenditures across the Atlantic. The United States outspends Europe four to one in civil space activities and nearly twenty to one in military space technologies. II. MILITARY USES OF SPACE

a.UNITED STATES

10. The United States is the uncontested world leader in military space operations. No other country can equal US space programmes in the military field. According to the SIPRI Yearbook, the United States at the end of 2001 had about 110 operational military-related satellites, representing well over two-thirds of all military satellites in orbit. In the field of military space the United States largely outspends the rest of the world: in 1999, according to the French Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), it accounted for 94.8% of global military space budgets. This gives an incredible advantage to all US-led military operations, which can rely on an extremely advanced system of combined communications, navigation, intelligence and surveillance. As US expert John Pike has written: "While other countries may deploy tanks, ships and aircraft that are not individually inferior to their US counterparts, no other country can tie all these various platforms together, using military space systems, into a single, integrated precision-warfare system of systems." This has been clearly demonstrated by the war in Iraq, during which US and British forces relied heavily on GPS navigation, high-resolution imagery, signals intelligence and near-real-time missile warning via communications satellites. 11. In the area of military communications, the United States can count on several geostationary earth orbit (around 36,000 kilometres from the Earth) satellite networks. They are operating on several different bands: a.Ultra-high Frequency (UHF): these provide low-cost communications on a relatively low bandwidth and include the Fleet Satellite Communication system, used by the US armed forces and Department of Defense (DOD); the DOD UHF Follow-On communications satellites, which are reaching the end of their lifetime and will be replaced by the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). b.Super-high Frequency (SHF): supporting high-bandwidth and transportable networks, these satellite systems provide mainly secure voice and high data rates to US national security communications with the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and its upgrade DSCS Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). As of 2005, the new Wideband Gapfiller Satellite (WGS) will replace the old DSCS and provide high-data-rate military satellite communications. An Advanced Wideband System is also in project. c.Extra-high Frequency (EHF): these provide anti-jam, low probability of intercept or detection communications for mobile terminals on vehicles, ships, submarines and aircraft. They are mainly supported by the Milstar advanced communications satellites, designed in the 1980s. Significantly restructured after the end of the Cold War, the Milstar satellite system will be reinforced by the Advanced EHF, planned to be launched in 2006. The Global Broadcasting Service (GBS) programme will implement a high-capacity broadcast system to provide transmission of classified and unclassified data and imagery to US forces. 12. The US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) operates other satellite communications systems providing covert intelligence data: the Satellite Data Systems (SDS) and NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) satellites. NRO is also developing a Future Communications Architecture, a network of satellites and communications systems that will provide intelligence imagery and signals.

13. In the area of navigation, the US armed forces can count on the well-known Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS), which can provide position, speed and precise-time data for aircraft, ships and ground forces (see par. 7.). The Navstar GPS is based on a network of 24 operational spacecraft that orbit the earth in 12 hours. There are often more than 24 operational satellites as new ones are launched to replace older satellites. The satellite orbits repeat almost the same ground track (as the earth turns beneath them) once each day. The orbit altitude is such that the satellites repeat the same track and configuration over any point approximately every 24 hours (4 minutes earlier each day). In both Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the military operations in Iraq, the effectiveness of reconnaissance, weapon delivery and rapid deployment of US forces were significantly enhanced by GPS assistance. 14. The United States also relies on satellites to improve its intelligence operations. With regard to signals intelligence (SIGINT), the United States operates four constellations of satellites in geostationary, highly elliptical (which can keep a particular region in view for a long time) and low earth orbits (below 1,700 km above the Earth). Signals intelligence satellites are designed to detect transmissions from broadcast communications systems (COMINT), as well as other electronic systems. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is devoted to the analysis of non-communications electronic transmissions, and includes telemetry from missile tests (TELINT), or radar transmitters (RADINT). The interception of such transmissions can provide information on the type and location of even low power transmitters, such as hand-held radios. The NRO is introducing an Integrated Overhead SIGINT Architecture (IOSA) that will improve SIGINT performance and avoid costs by consolidating systems, utilising medium-lift launch vehicles wherever possible, and using new satellite and data processing technologies. 15. The United States is also the world leader in imagery intelligence (IMINT) satellites. Imagery intelligence satellites use film and electronic cameras to produce high resolution images of objects on the ground at ranges of up to one thousand kilometres. Orbiting at altitudes of several hundred kilometres, such satellites can easily identify and distinguish different types of means of transport and equipment with resolutions higher than ten centimetres. The NRO is developing the next-generation IMINT satellites under its Future Imagery Architecture (FIA). These satellites promise to deliver many times the data at a much-reduced interval between pictures. 16. In the area of surveillance satellites, the White Cloud Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) performs wide area ocean surveillance, primarily for the US Navy. This system is used to determine the location of radio and radar transmissions, using triangulation. The identity of naval units can be deduced by analysis of the operating frequencies and transmission patterns of the emitters.

17. The United States also maintains a system of early-warning satellites combined with fixed and mobile ground processing stations, and a ground communications network, the Defense Support Program (DSP). Developed during the Cold War, its mission is to provide strategic and tactical earlywarning of ballistic missile attacks. These satellites use infrared sensors to detect the heat of fuel exhaust associated with missile launches. The US DOD is now developing two separate but related programmes to replace DSP and to support US missile defence plans: (1) SBIRS-High, managed by the US Air Force, which will consist of four satellites in geostationary orbit and of sensors on two other satellites in highly elliptical orbits; and (2) Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), formerly SBIRS-Low, managed by the Missile Defense Agency, which will consist of many satellites in low earth orbit, which would perform missile tracking, target discrimination, and other missile defence tasks. The first SBIRS-High geostationary satellite launch is planned for October 2006, while the two satellites in highly elliptical orbit were scheduled for delivery in the summer of 2003. The first two STSS satellites are to be launched in 2007, but the first next-generation STSS satellite is scheduled for launch in 2011. According to the Pentagon, at least 18 satellites would need to be deployed to provide coverage of key regions of concern, while worldwide coverage could require up to 30 satellites. 18. Finally, the United States had different active and projected anti-satellite (ASAT) systems during the Cold War, all of which were withdrawn from service or cancelled. According to some sources, the US Army Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) based in White Sands, New Mexico, has limited ASAT capability against some satellites in low earth orbit. In 1997, this laser was tested against a US satellite designed to detect the attack. The results of the test are classified. B. RUSSIA

19. The number of Russian satellites in orbit has considerably diminished in comparison to the Soviet period. In 2001, out of 93 operational satellites, the Russian military programme officially could count on 43 military spacecraft and about 20 dual-use satellites. Some independent sources, however, are disputing Russian official figures. Russian authorities have had difficulties maintaining the high annual rate of satellite launches of the Soviet programme, whose spacecraft had relatively short operating lifetimes. As a consequence, the Russian programme is generally obsolete, as most of its spacecraft (between 70 and 80%, depending on the sources) have exceeded their design lifetimes. 20. The Soviet Union had three systems of low altitude communication satellites, only one of which, the Strela-3, is believed to remain in service. In addition, Moscow operates six Molniya-1 spacecraft in highly elliptical and highly inclined orbits covering the northern hemisphere and used primarily by the government and the military. Another system, the Molniya-3, is used by both commercial television transmission and military communications. The Russian military can also rely on at least six Raduga geostationary orbit satellites. 21. The GLONASS satellites network provides Russia with a navigation system similar to the US Navstar GPS. Due to financial difficulties, however, the GLONASS system has been through some developmental problems and, as of the end of 2001, could only rely on ten satellites. Moscow is also operating a low earth orbit network of modest capabilities, the Tsikada, which is used for both military (designated as Cosmos) and civilian purposes.

22. The Soviet Union established three electronic intelligence (ELINT) networks, but only one of these is believed to still be operational, the Tselina-2. It is a low earth orbit system designed to detect land-based as well as sea-based electronic signals. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the principal mode of operations is for each satellite to record the type of signal received and to determine the direction of the transmitter from the satellite's position. Analysts on the ground can then combine the data received from the satellites to pinpoint the location of the receiver and to determine the type of emitter. No more than six of these satellites remained operational by the end of 2001. With regard to imagery intelligence (IMINT), at the end of 2001 Russia could only count on one digital IMINT satellite of the several spacecraft launched toward the end the Soviet period and in the early 1990s. Launched in 1997, the Arkon-1 satellite provides digital imagery of one- and two-metre resolution. 23. Russia operates one ballistic missile early-warning network, the Oko, consisting of satellites in highly elliptical orbits (Molniya); and a geostationary satellite similar to the US DSP, the Cosmos 2369. Moscow can also count on an ocean-surveillance system, the Electronic Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (EORSAT). With regard to anti-satellite systems, Moscow developed one in the 1980s, but it is believed to have been deactivated at the end of the Cold War. C. EUROPE

24. The strategic and tactical communications of NATO maritime and land forces are supported by the three satellites of the NATO IV SATCOM System. Access to these satellites is co-ordinated by the NATO Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Operating and Support Agency located at SHAPE in Mons. NATO is also planning to launch a Satellite Broadcast Service (SBS) as a counterpart to the US Global Broadcast Service. 25. A number of European countries operate satellite systems providing UHF, SHF and EHF military communications. Some of them are purely military systems, such as France's Syracuse III and Italy's Sicral, while others are dual-use systems supporting civil and government/military operations, such as UK's Skynet 4 and Spain's Hispasat. In addition, France, Italy and Spain operate Helios 1, a military observation satellite system, whose one-metre resolution images are also supplied to the European Union. An improved Helios 2 system, scheduled for launch in early 2004, will provide enhanced resolution and day/night capability. France, Germany and Italy are also planning to launch different imagery intelligence systems between 2003 and 2008. d. CHINA 26. Besides the NATO countries and Russia, China has the most advanced and complete military space programme. According to the French CNES, China "could be the world number two in space by 2020". It was the third country, in 1975, to launch an imagery intelligence satellite. However, after the return to earth of its last IMINT satellite in 1996, Beijing has not yet launched another. Experts believe that it is purchasing commercial imagery from Russia for its intelligence needs. According to US intelligence sources, China can also rely on a military communication satellite, the FH-1 system, which "will allow theater commanders to communicate with and share data with all forces under joint command". In 2000, Beijing also launched its first two-satellite navigational system.

27. Some believe that China is active in research on anti-satellite and other satellite technologies, but the true state of its programmes is unclear. According to the US Defense Department annual report to Congress on China's military power, released in July 2003, Beijing already possesses technology to jam satellite signals and is developing high-energy lasers and satellite tracking radar useful for antisatellite weapons. Press reports have also indicated that China's military is researching micro- and nano-satellites to attack foreign satellites, but evidence of actual progress is scarce. E. OTHER COUNTRIES

28. Among other countries, Australia can count on a military communications UHF spacecraft. India, focusing on using space for support of national economic and social development, has launched high-resolution commercial imagery satellites and is currently developing its IMINT system. Israel has launched several IMINT spacecraft under the Ofeq programme. Israel's Ministry of Defence is also overseeing development and production of four satellite programmes scheduled for completion by 2008: Ofeq-6 and Ofeq-7 imaging satellites; a synthetic aperture radar technology demonstrator called TechSAR; and a militarised version of the Amos 2 commercial communications satellite, planned for launch in December 2003. Japan's Superbird commercial communications satellites are also used by the armed forces. Finally, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey are all planning to launch their own intelligence satellites. III. POSSIBLE THREATS TO SPACE-BASED ASSETS

29. Space assets present a series of vulnerabilities, which can develop into potential threats, depending on the type of satellite and its orbit. The most vulnerable, because of their position close to earth, are Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites, which are usually below 1,700 kilometres above the Earth. Such satellites could be accessible to a ground-based anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) that could be deployed on even an intermediate range ballistic missile. Further up, we find satellites placed in a Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), such as the GPS network, at around 21,000 km. GPS satellites present inherent vulnerabilities such as the fact that they utilise low power signals and are used for civilian purposes. Furthermore, their orbits are stable and predictable, their general characteristics are well known and their signals can therefore be disrupted fairly easily. Finally, there are satellites in what is known as Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). This orbit is much more difficult to reach, but some countries have the necessary infrastructure to launch vehicles to this orbit, and have actually done so for different reasons, and could in theory deploy ASATs. 30. The availability of tracking data by amateur satellite observers from all over the world, who post their findings on the Internet, facilitates the tracking and identifying of satellites in low orbit. The increased sophistication of technologies such as radar, optical telescopes and passive radio frequency receivers makes it easier to track satellites in LEO. 31. According to an annex to the January 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (see below, par. 35), US space assets are threatened by six types of possible offensive operations: a.Attack to the ground segment of any space-based asset. This ground station attack is currently the simplest way to attack satellites; it could be carried out by a terrorist act that would physically disrupt the facilities or by using computer network intrusion.

b.Hacking and jamming computerised downlinks between satellites and their ground stations. This option is the cheapest one to disrupt space-based assets since it does not involve putting anything into orbit. Many countries are known to have developed military electronic jamming systems, which are far less costly than a space launch. c.Detonation of a nuclear weapon in low earth orbit, which would destroy any nearby satellite through its electromagnetic pulse (EMP). This event would also degrade many other satellites that would eventually pass through the area of highly charged electrons that would remain. Any country with even intermediate range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons could carry out this kind of attack. d.Micro-satellites (of less than 100 kg) and nano-satellites (of less than ten kg) that use lightweight composite materials and high-speed computer chips. These kinds of satellites could be used as secondary payloads of a primary space vehicle to covertly encounter space assets and disrupt or destroy them. e.Anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) that can be either ground-based or air-launched. These weapons range from low altitude direct-ascent interceptors to long-duration orbital interceptors. They could be launched into trajectories or orbits nearly the same as those of the target asset. Long-duration orbital interceptors can be placed in orbit for months or years and can be subdivided into: o Farsats - placed in orbit some distance from their targets and manageable to engage upon request o Nearsats - same as above but placed close to their targets o Space mines - placed in orbits that intersect that of their target and detonated during a close encounter o Fragmentation or pellet rings - a vast amount of small, non-manoeuvrable objects dispersed in space in a ring so that any satellite moving through the ring would be damaged or destroyed hSpace-to-space missiles - rocket-propelled ASAT interceptors that are launched from an orbiting vehicle to destroy an asset f.Miscellaneous anti-satellite systems, including ASAT, using laser, radio frequency and particle beam technology. Nevertheless, these are still a long way from being developed and would in any case be extremely costly and difficult to develop. 32. All of the above should indeed be considered as vulnerabilities that can, as the related technologies become more and more available, translate into threats to space systems. Attacks on ground segments and disruption of computerised downlinks appear to be the easiest and least expensive options for anyone, state or terrorist, interested in disrupting satellite communications or other spacebased networks. During the recent war in Iraq, according to US military sources, enemy forces attempted to jam the signal from GPS satellites on the battlefield. US forces were able to counter these attempts and destroy the jamming equipment with GPS-guided munitions.

33. Other threats seem much less likely. For example, although a number countries (apart from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, India, Israel, Pakistan, and possibly Iran and North Korea) have the capacity to launch a nuclear weapon into space and damage or destroy space assets, that does not necessarily translate into an actual threat. Apart from being prohibited by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, any such action against, for instance, US space assets would trigger a response which may include a nuclear attack. There is no reason to believe that any government would be willing to risk that. Technological barriers and high costs still prevent many hostile state or non-state actors from acquiring sophisticated anti-satellite capabilities or in-orbit weapons. Even many US government sources recognise that the development of such anti-satellite capabilities is probably decades away. In addition, the potential capabilities of other countries do not necessarily translate into hostile intent. A potential adversary, a US expert indicated, "must have not only the technological ability to develop weapons and the means to develop and use them, but also the political will and intent to use them in a hostile manner". IV. A. NEW US MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMMES MISSILE DEFENCE AND SPACE

34. In the late 1990s, aware of the increasing importance of space to the US economy and military operations, policymakers and military planners began to look at space as a possible area of confrontation. In 1997, the US Space Command published its report "Vision for 2020" as part of the future operational concepts of the US armed forces. Arguing that "an increased dependence upon space capabilities may lead to increased vulnerabilities", the report stated that space had become "the fourth medium of warfare - along with land, sea and air". The United States therefore has a "critical need to control the space medium to ensure US dominance on future battlefields". In conclusion, the report suggested that the United States should develop "robust capabilities to ensure space superiority". 35. This renewed interest in space by the Pentagon coincides with the drive for missile defences, which may need some space components. While the US Congress approved in 1996 the Defend America Act and in 1999 the National Missile Defense Act, the Rumsfeld Commission published in July 1998 a much-discussed report on missile proliferation. This report strongly recommended the development by the United States of robust missile defences and underlined the importance for these systems of space-based assets. Two years later, the US Congress established the Commission to Access United States National Security Space Management and Organization (or the Space Commission) headed by Donald Rumsfeld. The Space Commission issued a final report in January 2001 underlining the strategic importance of an "offensive" approach with respect to space. The United States, argues the report, must ensure continuing superiority in space capabilities and "the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to and, if necessary, defend against attacks on US interests". 36. The US armed forces, argued the second Rumsfeld Report, would need to transform their capabilities in the areas of: o assured access to space and in-orbit operations; o space situational awareness; o earth surveillance from space; o global command, control and communications in space; o defence in space; o power projection in, from and through space.

37. As Donald Rumsfeld became Defense Secretary in the newly elected Bush administration, the DOD started to implement some of the report's recommendations. In May 2001, the Defense Secretary declared, "There is no question that the use of land and sea and air and space are all things that need to be considered if one is looking at the best way to provide the kind of security from ballistic missiles that is desirable for the United States and for our friends and Allies." In July 2001, General Michael Ryan, the US Air Force chief of staff, endorsed the deployment of space-based weapons to protect US assets in space. He also predicted that by 2020 the United States will be able to shoot down other countries' orbiting spacecraft. 38. In October 2002, the US Space Command was merged with the US Strategic Command into an organisation that now controls all U.S. nuclear and space forces. "The missions of SpaceCom and StratCom have evolved to the point where merging the two into a single entity will eliminate redundancies in the command structure and streamline the decision-making process", Donald Rumsfeld said at the time. One of the largest components of the new StratCom - with 40,000 airmen and civilians - is Air Force Space Command, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Space Command's Strategic Master Plan calls for the United States, by 2025, to be able to strike any target in the world from space within minutes, to protect US systems in space from hostile forces, and to deny space access to potential enemies. 39. From the outset of its mandate, the Bush administration has made it very clear that it would pursue a robust ballistic missile defence programme, which would include parallel architectures with air-, land-, sea- and space-based components. One of the first steps to be taken to make possible the development and testing of the full range of missile defence capabilities has been the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. In the first year of its mandate, the Bush administration faced opposition to such a plan from Democrats in Congress, NATO allies, and Russia. The tragic events of 9/11, however, mollified internal and allied opposition as many started to believe that the resources of terrorists and rogue states should not be underestimated. The administration forged ahead, fine-tuning missile defence plans to include an umbrella of protection for "allies and friends". 40. The new security environment, and the "new relationship" between Russia and the United States established by Presidents Bush and Putin, opened the way to the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, announced in December 2001 and made effective as of July 2002. Moscow expressed concern about this development, but did not make an issue of it and signalled its willingness to collaborate on missile defence issues. 41. On 16 December 2002, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 23 outlining the "National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense", of which a White House fact-sheet was released to the public in May 2003. The Federation of American Scientists was able to obtain a copy of the original directive, in which the President states: "Some states, such as North Korea, are aggressively pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as a means of coercing the United States and our allies. To deter such threats, we must devalue missiles as tools of extortion and aggression, undermining the confidence of our adversaries that threatening a missile attack would succeed in blackmailing us. In this way, although missile defenses are not a replacement for an offensive response capability, they are an added and critical dimension of contemporary deterrence. Missile defenses will also help to assure allies and friends, and to dissuade countries from pursuing ballistic missiles in the first instance by undermining their military utility."

42.With NSPD 23, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to proceed with fielding "a set of initial missile defense capabilities beginning in 2004". The capabilities "planned for operational use in 2004 and 2005 will include ground-based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, additional Patriot (PAC3) units, and sensors based on land, at sea, and in space". In addition, Washington would seek permission from two NATO allies, the United Kingdom and Denmark, to upgrade early-warning radars respectively in Fylingdales and Thule, Greenland. Furthermore, "these capabilities may be improved through additional measures, such as": o Deployment of additional ground- and sea-based interceptors and PAC-3 units; o Initial deployment of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Airborne Laser (AL) systems; o Development of a family of boost phase and midcourse hit-to-kill interceptors, based on sea-, air-, and ground-based platforms; o Enhanced radars and other sensor capabilities; and o Development and testing of space-based defences, which a press release from the Defense Department on 17 December 2002 specified as being "space-based kinetic energy (hit-to-kill) interceptors and advanced target tracking satellites". 43. On 18 September 2003, the US Congress approved the Fiscal Year 2004 defence budget providing a total of US$368.2 billion in new discretionary spending authority for the Department of Defense (which does not include the cost of the operations in Iraq). The budget includes US$9.1 billion for ballistic missile defence, an increase of US$1.4 billion over 2003. Funding for other programmes, relevant to missile defence, was also approved: US$617 million for SBIRS High, US$339 million for Advanced Wideband Satellite laser communications, and US$174 million for Space-Based Radar. B. WEAPONS IN SPACE

44. The space-based kinetic energy interceptors programme is a revival of the space-based kinetic kill vehicle and "Brilliant Pebbles" projects of the Reagan and first Bush administrations. Kinetic energy weapons are aimed at destroying incoming targets with non-nuclear, direct hit-to-kill intercepts of strategic and tactical ballistic missiles in (endoatmospheric) and out (exoatmospheric) of the atmosphere. This specific plan involves the development of a constellation of space-based kinetic interceptors, or kill vehicles, capable of hitting a ballistic missile in its boost phase, as it climbs to the sky in the first few minutes of flight. A kill vehicle would be placed in low earth orbit as a satellite and, when a hostile missile launch is detected, use its propulsion and sensors to accelerate out of its orbit, target the missile, and destroy it by direct impact. 45. The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) intends to produce experiments and systems in the area of kinetic energy concepts in order to "deliver demonstrations in the 2003-2006 timeframe". MDA is aware, however, that "kinetic boost phase intercept is a challenge because the threat missile must be detected and confirmed within a few seconds of launch". The Agency is considering an initial sea-based boost activity to develop a high-speed, high-acceleration booster coupled with a boost kill-vehicle. This activity will offer the basis for a space-based experiment using a space-based kinetic energy kill vehicle. MDA would have to select a contractor for development and test of a terrestrial-based Kinetic Energy Boost-Phase Intercept (KE BPI), and then start work for a space-based KE BPI test bed. The plan for the Space-Based Interceptor Testbed is being defined, but it seems that after initially aiming for a capability starting in 2004 the programme has recently been put back. The Fiscal Year 2003 budget included US$30 million in new funding to explore the design of space-based kill vehicles.

46. Several experts have argued that, with the appropriate technical modifications, kill vehicles designed for missile defence could be used to attack satellites. By adjusting its design, the type of sensors and the amount of fuel it carries, as well as the length of time it is designed to operate, a kill vehicle could be given the capability to be an effective high-altitude anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. 47. Another system intended to support boost phase missile defences is the Space-Based Laser (SBL). This system's main element would be a satellite armed with a hydrogen-fluoride chemical laser capable of destroying missiles during their boost phase. Despite the advantages of operating a laser in the vacuum of space, some of the operational challenges for an SBL are daunting. According to a study by the US National Defense University (NDU), these include lift-to-orbit and space assembly, stable and reliable operation in space, and maintenance and re-supply of fuels. Moreover, an effective system should rely on a constellation of at least 12 satellites, considerably elevating costs. It is perhaps for these reasons that the SBL programme has recently been scaled back. In September 2002, the Pentagon closed the office dedicated to developing the SBL and moved all related research into a new MDA directorate called Laser Technologies. The first test of the programme, scheduled for 2012, and plans to build an SBL test facility have also been cancelled. Despite Congressional cuts to the programme, MDA continues to keep the programme alive, allocating US$50 million for it in 2004. C. ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

48. The United States retains some interest in ASAT systems. Apart from the MIRACL programme (see par. 17), the US Army began in 1989 a programme to develop a direct ascent kinetic energy ASAT (KE-ASAT). The main component is a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) that would be launched by rocket booster to strike and put a hostile satellite out of service. In a 1997 briefing, the US Army indicated that as "modern warfare relies heavily on timely access to information and instant communications, [K] overhead intelligence is crucial to the successful conduct of military operations". Indeed, the briefing added, "proliferation of high-quality satellite imagery and communications will enable our enemies to inflict heavy losses to US forces in future conflicts", therefore the KE-ASAT "would be a disincentive for potential adversaries to spend their resources on military satellites". Boeing is the prime contractor responsible for development and demonstration testing of the KE-ASAT kill vehicle and weapons control subsystem. While the KKV, based on existing hardware, has already been designed, developed, integrated, and ground-tested successfully, no test in space has been conducted so far. 49. According to Global Security, a Washington-based think-tank, in February 2000, "the Army informed Boeing that it was the intention of the government to restructure and redirect the efforts on the KE-ASAT program, including a halt on the fabrication, assembly, and test of the kill vehicles at a logical stopping point". However, by mid-March 2000 the February directive had been rescinded, with no decision by the government to restructure or redirect the KE-ASAT programme. As of mid-2001 three prototypes had been built, and all three remained in storage at a Boeing facility in Anaheim, California. In addition, various press sources reported that the programme might be transferred from the army to the navy. Although the military does not appear to be a strong supporter of the KE-ASAT, a few officials in the Bush administration, as well as some members of Congress, continue to voice support and seek funds for this programme.

50. Other elements of the Bush administration's missile defence programme are believed to have potential anti-satellite capabilities. The five interceptors of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) planned to be deployed in Alaska by late 2004 will consist of three-stage rocket boosters carrying a kill vehicle into space. According to US scientists from the MIT Security Studies Program, these interceptors, although intended to track and target ballistic missiles above the atmosphere, could be effective as ASAT against many satellites in low earth orbit. Also the Sea-Based Midcourse Defense (SMD), which uses an interceptor similar to those of the GMD, would be able to attack satellites in low earth orbit. 51. Finally, the Air-Borne Laser project, a powerful chemical laser installed on a modified Boeing 747 and intended to be part of the boost phase missile defence segment, would also potentially have ASAT capabilities. Although the ABL still has to overcome some technical difficulties, if its laser is to be able to attack long range missiles it must also be capable of attacking satellites. All ABL major components have been developed and tested by MDA, and a shoot down attempt of a boosting missile over the Pacific Ocean is likely to take place in 2005. V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

52. The US plans to deploy weapons in space and to develop ASAT weapons outlined in the previous paragraphs give NATO allies, in your Rapporteur's view, some reasons to be concerned. It is in fact likely that such programmes could actually undermine, rather than enhance, security in space as well as globally. The most dangerous possible consequence is the starting of a military space race. Other consequences include technical damage to space assets by orbital debris, and possible negative consequences for commercial space programmes or industries, such as telecommunications. 53. The United States maintains that it is committed to ensuring that exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes remain open to all nations. According to the State Department Office of Strategic and Theater Defenses, for the United States and other nations (including Russia, China, France and other NATO countries) peaceful purposes include activities that support and serve national security goals. Nevertheless, any weapons deployed by the United States in space or threatening space assets are likely to trigger a political and military response by its closest competitors, Russia and China. For a long time both countries have expressed their concern about US "weaponisation" of space in the context of the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), encouraging discussion and maintaining on the CD agenda an item called "prevention of an arms race in outer space" (PAROS). According to Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, "it is almost inconceivable that either Russia or China would allow the United States to become the sole nation with space-based weapons".

54. History seems to confirm that any strategic advantage based on technological superiority has often proven short-lived, as past examples such as nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, long-range missiles, and spy satellites demonstrate. An arms race in space is not implausible, as former US Air Force expert Bruce DeBlois has written: "Once a nation embarks down the road to gain a huge asymmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others is to close that gap. An arms race tends to develop an inertia of its own." A possible Chinese response to US deployment of weapons in space could in turn encourage India, its regional rival, to do the same. Both countries, as we have seen, have substantial military space programmes. Moves by India are likely to push Pakistan to seek space capabilities. The beginning of such an arms race could even convince US European allies to step up their military space programmes. 55. Some space-based weapons are more likely to prompt other states to respond to US plans. Experts at the US National Defense University (NDU) have pointed out, for instance, that fielding a space-based laser "is to put a weapon system in space that other countries (particularly Russia and China) would consider as escalating the US strategic capability". Although the SBL project would be part of the defences against ballistic missiles, the experts from NDU stress that "by definition, a spacebased defensive weapon is always armed, always overhead, and in constant flight over other countries", thus putting airborne as well as ground targets at risk. 56. Space-based weapons, moreover, would have the same inherent vulnerabilities of any other space assets. Travelling in fixed orbital paths, for instance, would make them very easy targets, even for possible asymmetrical attacks by countries with fewer technical and economic resources than Russia and China. This in turn would drive the need for the United States to produce and deploy better weapons and guarantee increasing force protection. The vulnerability of orbiting weapons would also increase the likelihood of their first use, very similar to nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. 57. A more practical concern related to the deployment of weapons in space is that of space debris. More than 9,000 objects over ten centimetres in size are already orbiting in outer space, often at very high speed, and can seriously damage or destroy satellites. Increased activity in space would certainly augment space debris and heighten this danger, especially in the case of testing (let alone use) of weapons in space. 58. All of the above arguments obviously can generate serious concerns for the international space industry. With so many human activities increasingly depending on commercial satellites, the presence of weapons in space could have considerable economic consequences. Commercial satellites have very limited protection, because in most cases it is considered too expensive. Actual risks of military confrontation in outer space would therefore increase costs, including insurance costs, for the space industry.

59. Taking into consideration the concerns expressed by the US administration, are there ways to protect space assets and reduce their vulnerability? Many experts suggest that one option could be the development of "non-offensive" space defences. Satellites may be hardened to withstand even the effects of nuclear weapons, either by selecting radiation-resistant components or by protecting them with appropriate metal shields. Satellites may also be able to manoeuvre in order to complicate hostile surveillance and targeting or to evade enemy fire. Other non-offensive defences may include decoys simulating both radar and optical signatures of the satellite; air- and ground-based substitutes for spacebased reconnaissance and communications; and protection of ground segments of space systems with physical security, personnel security and information assurance means (such as firewalls, encryption). Any of these techniques and strategies, according to most experts, would not exceed 10% of the total cost of a space system. 60. The US Air Force Space Command is already studying solutions to rapidly replace damaged or malfunctioning satellites that are part of essential military or commercial systems. These would include quick-response space systems, capable of launching satellites within hours or days of notification, as well as supersonic fighters carrying a booster to high altitude and then firing it into space. Some of these solutions, although still some years away from being fully deployable, could represent a viable (and less expensive) alternative to a weaponisation of space. Of course, the proponents of the weaponisation of space in the United States would still maintain that space-based weapons are essential to US missile defence programmes. 61. US European allies and many US opposition leaders have signalled their preference for international treaties or other legal instruments to regulate space activities and ensure long-term security in outer space. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST) lays out the principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. The first principle governing the treaty states that "the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of mankind". In particular, it prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies. The prohibition, however, does not include the transit of nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles through space or the stationing of conventional weapons in space or the use of anti-satellite weapons. The OST has now 102 state parties, including the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Israel and Pakistan. The provisions of the OST were extended to the moon by a specific treaty signed in 1979. The 1991 START I confirmed the prohibition of the production, testing and deployment of "systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit". 62. It has been argued by two former senior US arms control negotiators, George Bunn, who was General Counsel to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Outer Space Treaty negotiations, and John B. Rhinelander, who was deputy legal adviser at the Department of State during the ABM Treaty negotiations, that the 1967 OST may already ban strike weapons of any sort in low earth orbit. The treaty, they argue, contains one overall rule: space shall be preserved for peaceful purposes for all countries. It also contains provisions requiring any state considering activities that "would cause potentially harmful interference" with other states' activities to undertake appropriate consultations. This would allow, contend Bunn and Rhinelander, the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution formally endorsing an interpretation according to which the OST could cover earth-orbiting weapons designed to strike satellites or missiles. However, such an interpretation is not generally accepted in the arms control and non-proliferation community.

63. For this reason some countries have continued their efforts in the context of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) to discuss a new treaty. As noted above, Russia and China have recently intensified their efforts to table negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space. In June 2002, the two countries, together with other CD members, presented a draft treaty to prohibit the deployment of weapons in outer space. As Rebecca Johnson, Director of the British think-tank Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, has recently written, "the Chinese-Russian initiative is partly political tactic, and partly a genuine attempt to stimulate discussion about what a space security treaty might look like". The United States, however, adamantly opposes any discussion of a new outer space treaty, for which Washington sees "no need". Political differences within the CD have been aggravated by the Bush administration's general disdain for multilateral agreements and the nonproliferation regime. The impasse in the CD has not prevented the UN General Assembly from approving a resolution in November 2002 inviting the CD to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a "multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space". Such a resolution, as others before it, is destined to fail. VI. CRITICAL VIEWS OF US MISSILE DEFENCE

64. Many analysts and scientists in the United States as well as in Europe have raised substantial political and technical concerns with regard to the current US missile defence programmes. In a recent book devoted to this subject, Anthony H. Cordesman, a leading scholar from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, summarised the principal objections to the deployment of such a system: o Long-range missiles would be neither the only nor the optimum means of delivery for an emerging missile state attacking the United States with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. O The planned testing programme for the MD system is inadequate to assess the operational effectiveness of the system. o The deployment of the MD system could seriously impair efforts to control the proliferation of longrange ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and thus ultimately increase the threat to the United States from these weapons. o Deterrence will continue to be the ultimate line of defence against attacks on the United States by missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. o Poor weather, such as intensive rain storms, could blind or massively degrade the tracking capabilities of the system's X-band radars. 65. In addition, a comprehensive report by the Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program analysed the "numerous tactics that an attacker could use to counter the planned missile defence system". Three of these potential countermeasures are examined in detail: (1) submunitions with biological or chemical weapons; (2) nuclear weapons with anti-simulation balloon decoys; and (3) nuclear weapons with cooled shrouds. In the first case, an attacker could divide a biological or chemical agent among a number of small warheads, making the targets too numerous for any missile defence system to intercept or even detect. In the second case, the attacker could place a nuclear warhead in a light-weight balloon made of aluminised Mylar and release it along with many similar but empty balloon decoys. The defence would therefore need to shoot at all the balloons to prevent the warhead from getting through. Thirdly, the attacker could cover a nuclear warhead with a shroud cooled to a low temperature by liquid nitrogen, thus reducing the infrared radiation emitted by the warhead and making it very difficult to detect.

66. A recent study by a special 12-member group under the American Physical Society, the largest US association of physicists, raised serious doubts about the likely effectiveness of boost phase missile defences. In a 476-page report released in July 2003, the scientists indicated that boost phase missile defence is virtually impossible in all but a few limited circumstances. Although it stops short of offering any policy recommendations, the report concludes that "when all factors are considered none of the boost phase defense concepts studied would be viable for the foreseeable future to defend the nation against even first-generation solid-propellant Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)". Developing a reliable boost phase missile defence, the report warns, "would be a major undertaking likely to require a decade or more to complete". These are some of the study's technical conclusions: o Defence of the entire United States against relatively slow liquid-propellant ICBMs "may be technically feasible" using land-, sea-, or air-based interceptors, but "the interceptor rockets would have to be substantially faster (and therefore necessarily larger) than those usually proposed". o Defence against faster solid-propellant missiles "is unlikely to be practical". Even solid-propellant ICBMs based on 40-year-old technology would have short enough boost phase burn times to "call into question the fundamental feasibility of any boost phase intercept". The report recalls that US intelligence indicates that both North Korea and Iran could deploy solid-propellant ICBMs within the next decade. "Boost phase defenses not able to defend against solid-propellant ICBMs", the report states, "risk being obsolete when deployed". o Space-based interceptor rockets could work, but the interceptors would have to be fairly large to attain the speed needed to be effective. The technology for such a system could only become available in 15 years, and "defending against a single ICBM would require a thousand or more interceptorsKDeploying such a system would require at least a five to ten fold increase over current US space-launch rates". o The airborne laser now under development "would be ineffective against solid-propellant ICBMs". o Although a successful intercept could prevent a warhead from reaching its designated target, the warhead would continue on a ballistic trajectory. As a result, "live nuclear, chemical, or biological munitions [could] fall on populated areas short of the targetKTiming intercepts accurately enough to avoid this problem would be difficult". o In a hit-to-kill defence system, the time remaining after an interceptor is fired is so short (less than 170 seconds against a liquid-fuel ICBM and only 120 seconds against a solid-propellant rocket) "that the defense could fire only once". 67. On 23 September 2003, a report by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of the US Congress, warned that the cost of US missile defence programmes is likely to escalate, and the system's effectiveness could be impaired, because the Pentagon has decided to field a ballistic missile defence system by October 2004. The report, requested by US Senator Daniel K. Akaka, identifies ten critical Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) technologies and assesses the readiness level of each. According to the report, the Missile Defense Agency developed and tested only two of these ten technologies. In conclusion, the GAO indicates that "making a decision to begin system integration of a capability before the maturity of all critical technologies have been demonstrated increases the program's cost, schedule and performance risks". Because of the stepped-up schedule proposed by the administration, "there is a greater likelihood that critical technologies will not work as intended in planned flight tests".

68. In view of such serious, detailed and authoritative critiques from US sources, your Rapporteur is extremely concerned about developments which could open the way to the weaponisation of space. Your Rapporteur is convinced that a strategy of global preventive policies against missile proliferation and other threats to space assets based upon international co-operation would be more effective and less costly to taxpayers than deploying weapons in space. Diplomacy, confidence building measures, multilateral non-proliferation treaties, and a strict missile technology export control regime remain crucial to avoid an arms race in a new field. VII. CONCLUSIONS

69. Your Rapporteur firmly believes that all attempts to dominate space militarily could have destabilising consequences for global security. The stationing of strike weapons such as kinetic kill vehicles and lasers in outer space, as well as the deployment of anti-satellite weapons, both space- and ground-based, could generate an arms race and increase threats to important commercial and military assets in space. It is therefore important that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly draw the attention of member parliaments to this important and urgent matter. 70. Your Rapporteur is also convinced of the urgent need for a multilateral legally binding treaty to ban the deployment of space weapons (including ASAT). A comprehensive regime would require a multilateral treaty including: (a) a ban on the testing, deployment and use of all kinds of weapons in space; (b) a ban on the testing, deployment and use of ground-based ASAT weapons; and (c) a code of conduct for the peaceful uses of space. 71. Some experts have argued that other strategies might be followed to seek the attention of Allied governments and possibly change the course of US military space policy. A successful approach, as indicated to this Sub-Committee by analyst James Clay Moltz during a briefing at the Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies in July 2002, would involve building a large US and international "coalition that would highlight the threats posed by space weapons and make it clear, both to President Bush and the US voting public, that US plans are simply ill-conceived, self-defeating, and ultimately unacceptable". Building an international consensus on this issue is only the first - and probably the easiest - part of this strategy. The work of NATO parliamentarians could be instrumental in bringing this issue to the forefront of our countries' security agenda. 72. Convincing more parliamentarians to oppose the weaponisation of space, however, would require the separation of the space issue from missile defence require, , , , , ments. Some NATO governments and members of parliament have different views about the impact of the weaponisation of space, but, according to Moltz "a line could be drawn against space-based systems and opposition could be voiced against ASAT weapons if it is clearly articulated how the testing and multilateral proliferation of these systems will threaten long term US interests in space". Any initiative against space weapons should also make clear that it would not oppose a priori all forms of missile defence. A debate on the costs of space weapons would also be beneficial, as there are not, at present, any analyses of the long-term costs and trade-offs. Space defence costs should be compared with those of other, more peaceful, technologies to protect space assets.

73. Ideas have also been suggested as to how to overcome scepticism toward arms control treaties. For instance, it could be useful to adopt an "Ottawa process" strategy (referring to the successful negotiation of the Antipersonnel Mines Convention), as has been suggested by Rebecca Johnson, which would try to assemble a group of NGOs and concerned governments working outside intergovernmental channels. Such an initiative should emphasize not only the arms control aspects of space weapons, but also the dangers for the industry and in particular the serious problem of space debris. As indicated by many studies, the current missile defence tests are already producing hundreds of particles of metallic debris, but according to Moltz "the threat of longer-lasting debris will gradually increase as the altitude of interception increases". Any successful initiative in this sense must include key US players, such as the space industry, and all commercial space users. A public debate would also be extremely important to increase the awareness of the international public about the dangers of space weapons. 74. If a multilateral treaty negotiated in the context of the United Nations appears unrealistic, other international policy alternatives could be pursued. These may include unilateral declarations, bilateral agreements or multinational conventions against the weaponisation of space. An indirect approach could also be represented in a UN Security Council resolution banning any interference with peaceful space systems. _____________________ ( The Rapporteur would like to thank Jason Biros and Javier Fuentes Leja for their assistance in preparing this Report.

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