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Catalina Mesesan Transgressive violence in Besssarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria Introduction The Romanian protagonist role in the mass

murder of Jews, Roma and other groups such as the Russian-speaking, supposedly Bolshevik partisans in Besssarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria under the administration of the Romanian Governments Commissariat (CBBT) has been analyzed in various ways. The apologetics of the Antonescu regime consider it a German affair with involvement of Iron Guard sympathizers in a context of weak central command over the conquered territories. The post-1989 scholarship while placing the responsibility with the Romanian state differs in its interpretation of the intent, chain-of-command, bureaucratic responsibility, planning and implementation of the campaigns of extermination. This latter debate is relevant not only in the context of the larger center-periphery debate on the Holocaust. The analysis of violence in these three Eastern territories is interesting for a series of reasons, ranging from the validity of the theory of dehumanization as a condition for large scale violence to the debate on the violent potential of modern states versus pre-modern societies. Research question Planned or unplanned, center-coordinated or impulsive local initiatives, what cannot be understated is the level of brutality that occurred in the territories under the Romanian occupation, committed by Romanians, Germans and Ukrainians, from civilian collaborators to civilian bureaucrats and security personnel. And precisely this brutality is a major variable in the debate regarding the connection between modernity and genocide. For this purpose, Besssarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria represent a unique combination: two states at different stages of nation-building and industrial development are involved simultaneously in extermination campaigns. Do their methods differ? If so, in what aspects and what is the theoretical relevance of these manifestation of violence? Is the brutality of the Romanian army a result of limited logistical capacities? Hypotheses The paper argues that there are many similarities between the Einsatzgruppen D and the Romanian army in the violence perpetrated against the civilian population. It also puts forward that, despite the practical differences in the implementation both can be interpreted as manifestations of transgressive violence and, more specifically, as intersubjective dimensions of violence: through the methods used, the victims were not necessarily dehumanized but in all the sense of power of the perpetrator was enhanced in these inter-human interactions. Consequently, excessive cruelty can be the power to dehumanize the victims, and, more often, is just an expression of power over other humans when the socially imposed limits are relaxed (transgressive violence), thus allowing the individuals to upgrade their social positioning in these violent ecstatic communities (the Einsatzgruppen, the army, gendarmerie and the Special Batallion) through the control of the victims (intersubjectivity). However, the aim of the research question is not to reduce the complexity of actors behavior to a primacy of violence as a manifestation of powerseeking attitudes among the perpetrators but to draw attention to the violence in itself,

and more specifically, the direct contact with the victim, as a valid variable in the study of mass killings. Theory In one of his articles, Levene criticizes what he calls the western epistemological insistence on binary opposites: the rational versus the irrational, the modern versus the antimodern1. He further argues that the concepts of modern and antimodern might be two inadequate categories of historical enquiry and that few historians have distanced from such a framework, with notable exceptions such as Saul Friedlander, to countenance2. Considering that Nazi officers involved in the killings of Jews alongside Romanian troops have submitted letters of complaint on the inadequacy of the methods employed by the Romanians3, this point becomes highly relevant. Did the Romanians display irrational, anti-modern behavior in not burying their victims while their Nazi counterparts were a modern killing machine that took pains in following procedure? Interpreting the events that occurred in Besssarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria in a modernity framework (of opposites) would seem to suggest that, indeed, the Romanians were primitive, brutal and disorganized in leaving their victims unburied, oiling the wheels of the transport wagons with the blood of the victims, routine rape and other such acts4. However, the situation becomes more complicated if one inquires into the modern aspects of the Romanian state at that time (intensely involved in a process of nationbuilding as shown by Irina Livezeanu5) such as the centralization of its security apparatus6 and into the methods employed by the Einsatzgruppen D on the ground such as the violence inflicted by the kommandos as to restore order during the mass killings, according to Otto Ohlendorfs testimony7.In the East, the Nazi army was involved in bribing, public beatings (the reserve policemen, Becker)8, on-the-spot-massacres9 and clearing off ghettos in an improvised manner (for example, the Marcinkance ghetto)10. Plus, according to Ohlendorf, the gas van was not used until the spring of 1942 by the
1

Mark Levene. Review Article Illumination and Opacity in Recent Holocaust Scholarship, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 37(2), 2002, p. 279. 2 Mark Levene. Review Article Illumination and Opacity in Recent Holocaust Scholarship, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 37(2), 2002, p. 279. 3 Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, p. 97. 4 For a list of the atrocities see Matatias Carp. Holocaust in Rumania, 1940-1944, Primor Publishing: Budapest, 1994, pp. 217-324. 5 Irina Livezeanu. Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, 2000. 6 Jean Ancel. Solutionarea problemei evreiesti in Basarabia si Bucovina, iunie-august 1941, Available at http://www.idee.ro/holocaust/pdf/solutionarea.pdf , retrieved on 28 December 2011, p. 11. 7 Otto Ohlendorfs profile. Holocaust Research Project, Available at http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/einsatz/ohlendorf.html, retrieved on 25 December 2011. 8 Christopher R. Browning, Nazi policy, Jewish workers, German killers, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.108. 9 Jean Ancel, The German-Romanian Relationship and the Final Solution, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 19, Number 2, Fall 2005, p. .258. 10 Christopher R. Browning, Nazi policy, Jewish workers, German killers, Cambridge University Press, 200, p.157.

Einsatzgruppen D and only for women and children.11Indeed, the Nazis would filled the graves to efface the signs of execution, and then labor units of the population levelled them12 but in both cases the killing methods involved the contact with the victim, although it would be interesting to study the effects these methods had on the various groups of perpetrators (Romanian gendarmes and military personnel, local collaborators, the Einsatzgruppen D and the Nazi army), considering that the Romanian counterparts, had significant less exposure to ideological training (except maybe the Special Batallion of the SSI). However, a focus on the non-rational aspects of mass killing behavior rather than on modernity theory has many practical limitations due to the difficulty in data collection (fundamentally based on the perceptions of the victims and by-standers), in quantification and to the risk of brushing off complex institutional and systemic factors in favor of a sum of individual motivations (the perpetrators). Despite the difficulties, this focus would provide insights on issues such as the dehumanization of the victim and the perpetrator. Also, according to Levene, the debate ensued after the publication of Goldhagens book on the 101 Police Batallion showed not only the academic reluctance to admit that everyday violence was a part of the experience of genocide 13 but also it helped to give more credibility to victims accounts on the issue. Moreover, it would broaden the comparative studies that can be undertaken regarding the illegal armed groups engaged in violence against the civilian populations through the framework of transgressive violence. This framework of transgression is attempting to bridge the dichotomy between modernity and anti-modernity. Closely connected to it in is the intersubjectivity of perpetrators and victims. In short, transgression, according to Dan Stone, is shared by all genocides and massacres and involves the creation of ecstatic communities based on a radical form of exclusion that occurs under sociologically and anthropologically explicable circumstances. This exclusion [] drives the feeling that, however distasteful the murder is, the perpetrating community needs its victims dead in order to purify the state or return to a putative prelapsarian condition14. The definition is quite encompassing and some observations regarding its relationship with intersubjectivity are in order as not to render the concept of transgressive violence operationally useless. Intersubjectivity claims that during massive acts of violence, the individual perpetrators do not always dehumanize the victims (and if they do, it is an unstable, temporary process) and rather significant violent acts stem out of psychological changes inside the perpetrators from adaptation and power dynamics and that precisely the human, or intersubjective, qualities of the violent interaction provided the violence
11

Otto Ohlendorfs profile. Holocaust Research Project, Available at http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/einsatz/ohlendorf.html, retrieved on 25 December 2011. 12 Ibidem. 13 Dan Stone. Modernity and violence: Theoretical reflections on the Einsatzgruppen, Journal of Genocide Research, 1:3, 199, p. 375. 14 Dan Stone. Genocide as Transgression, European Journal of Social Theory 7(1), 2004, p. 50.

with much of its meaning.15 From a social psychology paradigm, moral reluctance and amoral willingness are not mutually exclusive and they create a more complex landscape of perpetrator profiles while they keep some key explanatory elements as a common denominator: adaptation to power dynamics in the perpetrator group, certain geographical distance from their normal social mores and a complex interplay between objectification and subjection16. For the purpose of this paper, these key elements are crucial and offer the operationalization needed for the concept of transgressive violence in the case of Romanian and Nazi behavior in Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transnistria. The first two elements are relatively straightforward: the security personnel (army, gendarmerie, SS etc) are not acting in their normal context and, as in any social groups, complex power dynamics are born, although these ones are heavily influenced by the availability and character of the incentives that can be taken from the environment through violent means (for example women, bribes, better housing or promotions). The last, the interplay between objectification and subjection is to be found in the analysis of the interactions victim-perpetrator and in the killing methods and its interpretation is more problematic. The definition of transgressive violence marks two important aspects for the research question. First, is the freeing from conventional morality of particular groups, such as the SS or the Romanian gendarmes and the ecstatic behavior resulting from it. Second, it does not mention the dehumanization as a particular requirement for the perpetration of murder. The first aspect is important because it builds on the observation that the murders themselves, including the ones committed by the Nazis apparatus, were not carried out in a clean, factory-like manner, and that Nazi ideology preceded the "rationalized" structures which implemented it17. This reality hardly transpires from the sanitized activity reports of the Einsatzgruppen18 but it does, from the irregularity of reports being sent in and the loose reporting procedures on the ground often visible in the justification of the killings. In a different analytical framework, Browning, when discussing the radicalization in Brest, puts forward a continuous process of center-periphery feedback, in which general guidelines were sent to authorities on the ground and the most effective results of their creative interpretation in killing methods was later institutionalized as policies and methods to be implemented elsewhere19. This creative adaptation is present in the Romanian structures, too. For example, the Romanian Special Intelligence Service (SSI) set up a unit similar to the German Einsatzgruppen 20, the Special Echelon of the SSI, but; although on paper it was similar to the German Richtlinien in methods
15

Johannes Lang. Questioning Dehumanization: Intersubjective Dimensions of Violence in the Nazi Concentration and Death Camps, Holocaust Genocide Studies (2010) 24 (2), p. 226. 16 Johannes Lang. Questioning Dehumanization: Intersubjective Dimensions of Violence in the Nazi Concentration and Death Camps, Holocaust Genocide Studies (2010) 24 (2), p. 235. 17 Dan Stone. Modernity and violence: Theoretical reflections on the Einsatzgruppen, Journal of Genocide Research, 1:3, 199, p. 367. 18 Ronald Headland. Messages of murder: a study of the reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service, 1941-1943, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Press, 1992. 19 Christopher R. Browning, Nazi policy, Jewish workers, German killers, Cambridge University Press, 200, p.126. 20 Jean Ancel. The German-Romanian Relationship and the Final Solution, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 19, Number 2, Fall 2005, p. 256.

(shootings of Jews on the spot in villages, massive arrests, ghettoization in urban areas and other) it differed in the geographical coverage. As in the case of the structure and organization of the Romanian regime in Transnistria, heavily influenced by the Nazi ideology and practically by the Nazi advisors on the ground21 the practical measures differed substantially from the theory, the Romanians being involved, as their Nazi counterparts, in a continuous creative adaptation with, indeed, less logistical capacities but equally engaged in the interplay objectification-subjection. The operationalization of transgressive violence Intersubjectivity in genocidal behavior, as previously mentioned, is closely connected to three key variables: adaptation to power dynamics in the perpetrator group, certain geographical distance from their normal social mores and a complex interplay between objectification and subjection22.All of these can be followed in the specific context of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transistria with both military groups. What follows are just few examples from the vast landscape of actions undertaken. A. Adaptation to power dynamics Radu Florian, in his analysis of the Jassy massacre points towards a relatively high degree of coordination of the security apparatus (the 14th Infantry Brigade, the Ministry of Interior and the Police, the Second Division and SSI headquarters) both internally and externally, with units of the Gestapo present in the area. 23 Indeed, in Jassy, the conditions to implement the genocidal actions were more conducive to an orderly operation than on the front. There, the situation was more complex and fragmented. For example, Transnistria was divided into 13 districts, all headed by prefects (colonels in the army or in the gendarmerie), each divided into subdistricts (headed by pretors) and in which by 1943, approx. 8,445 Romanian functionaries worked as to organize what was considered a huge production farm in the service of Romania24. Under these guidelines (Take as many as possible from Transnistria, but without recording on paper 25 and Antonescu exercising a high degree of control over the army, the main genocidal perpetrator in Transistria26), significant regulations (such as the design of the demographic map of the region through the thorough work of the Central Institute of Statistics in Bucharest and the exchange in currency) were implemented and much confusion was permitted to exist in this extraction model. The pretors and their heads of gendarmerie had significant
21

Jean Ancel. The German-Romanian Relationship and the Final Solution, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 19, Number 2, Fall 2005, p. .258. 22 Johannes Lang. Questioning Dehumanization: Intersubjective Dimensions of Violence in the Nazi Concentration and Death Camps, Holocaust Genocide Studies (2010) 24 (2), p. 235. 23 Radu Florian. The Jassy Massacre of June 29-30, 1941: An Early Act of Genocide Against the Jews, in ed. Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, pp. 75-76. 24 Jean Ancel. The Romanian Campaigns of Mass Murder in Transnistria, 1941-1942, in ed. Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, p. 88. 25 Jean Ancel. The Romanian Campaigns of Mass Murder in Transnistria, 1941-1942, in ed. Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, p. 90. 26 Jean Ancel. The Romanian Campaigns of Mass Murder in Transnistria, 1941-1942, in ed. Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, p. 92.

governance leverage, although very few abated from the violence-inflicting norm of the Romanian authorities, much like their Nazi counterparts in Nazi-occupied regions. One important factor in the adaptation to power dynamics is the intelligence-gathering process that allows, due to its configuration a further stratification of the local population (collaborators, passive and enemies), of the authorities themselves (who has access to information on war booting was valuable, despite his rank) and the rationalization of subjection-objectification through the relative intelligence value the individual can bring. Like their Nazi counterparts, Romanians made use of the local militias and collaborators. The Romanian gendarmes, first dispatched alongside the army were involved in cleansing the ground, maintain law and order, organize the deportations and establish an intelligence gathering network in Transnistria, whose main agents were local Romanians, Russians and Ukrainians.27 More generally, regarding social positioning inside the perpetrators networks of prestige, the Army displays the more significant similarities with the Einsatzgruppen hierarchical model due to the control exercised by Antonescu. The local gendarmes, on the other hands, responded to various heads and were in a unique position in the exercise of violence in Transnistria, displaying more similarities with the Nazi reserve police sent in other occupied territories. One line of investigation would be the adaptation strategies of the gendarmes related to the exploitation of resources and their patterns of violence: whom were the ones they would try to impress through the use of violence and for what type of favors? Was there a radicalization as the one encountered by Browning in the reserve police in Upper Silesia? B. Distance According to Dan Stone, the notion of spatiality is important: the stretching out of the norms and values of German society allowed people to accept the occurrence of genocide, as long as the actual killing took place in a region outside the law such as occupied eastern Europe28 (and this label includes the three territories) and he continues by saying that in the case of the Romanian state this behavior was even more marked since the Jews in the Old Kingdom were not deported to Transistria while the Jews in the conquered territories were. However, although that is true for the Jewish population, the situation is markedly different for the Roma population: the ones living inside pre-war Romanian borders were subjected to a census on 25th of May 194229, orders were given to the local to round up the Roma fitting into certain categories (although great freedom of interpretation was allowed30), and then they were transported to Transnistria. While there is a debate on the categorization employed to deport the Roma population (racial and/or social), the deportation in itself to that region supports the idea that Transnistria was
27

Jean Ancel. The Romanian Campaigns of Mass Murder in Transnistria, 1941-1942, in ed. Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, p. 94-95. 28 Dan Stone. Genocide as Transgression, European Journal of Social Theory 7(1), 2004, p. 57 29 Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, 2004. 30 Shannon Woodcock, Romanian Romani Resistance to Genocide in the Matrix of the Tigan Other, p. 35.

regarded as a dumping ground for some of the unwanted of the regime. The otherness aspect of Transnistria, a comparatively small piece of land between Bug and Dniester, not a part of Romanian territory before the war and neither with a significant Romanian population like Bessarabia and Bukovina of the region (territories to be cleansed of the non-Romanian elements), is significant when talking about the extremes in transgressive violence reached by the gendarmes and the army there. Bessarabia and Bukovina were also other territories but, this time, much in the same line as Western Poland was in Nazi policy and propaganda; historically considered a part of the Romanian nucleus. When analyzing the Jassy massacre of June 1941, a planned mass killing within the territory of Romania, one important detail stands out: although the preparations for the massacre started right after the outbreak of hostilities31 the motives given by one of the heads of the Romanian Special Information Services (SIS) were about the defeats on the front and the Bolshevik threat supposedly existing in the city32. Thus, publicly (it is highly debated if some sectors of the security forces outside of the direct perpetrators actually internalized the motive33), the perpetrators enforced the spatiality, so important in the transgression of violence framework: Jassy, then a border town, although in Romania, was supposedly contaminated by foreign elements through its closeness to the front. C. Methods: objectification and subjection An observation regarding trasngressive violence is particularly relevant for the third variable: it is excess as to reinforce the law, as the former has meaning only in connection to restraint, according to Bataille34. Transgression should not be seen as synonymous with rage, but as a generalized, even rationally organized social phenomenon. 35More generally, it exists as to reinforce (be it by mere contraposition or by some teleological reasoning, in some cases) a particular conception of the social. More specifically, in the case of the three territories, it might have reinforced a minimum denominator between various organizations actively taking part in the mass killings (Einsatzgruppen, army, civilian administrations, local populations): social order made possible without Jews, Gypsy and Bolshevik spies in a generalized social phenomena that incorprated some aspects of social organization. For example, when discussing the link between the mass murder of the Gypsy and of the Jewish populations, Levene points towards a genocidal commonality36 despite the differences in coherence and geographical coverage because, at least, of the existence of a chronology of killing for both groups. In all of the cases in the discussion, the chronology and intent existed from the part of both states. In the case of Romania, the plans regarding the Jewish question started trickling down the hierarchical ladder after the ministerial meetings of 17-18 June 194137 but were a part of an autochthonous, internally-led Romanization policy enacted with the proclamation of
31

Radu Florian. The Jassy Massacre of June 29-30, 1941: An Early Act of Genocide Against the Jews, in ed. Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, p. 71. 32 Ibidem. 33 Radu Florian. The Jassy Massacre of June 29-30, 1941: An Early Act of Genocide Against the Jews, in ed. Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, pp. 75-81. 34 Dan Stone. Genocide as Transgression, European Journal of Social Theory 7(1), 2004, p. 58. 35 Dan Stone. Genocide as Transgression, European Journal of Social Theory 7(1), 2004, p. 58. 36 Mark Levene. Review Article Illumination and Opacity in Recent Holocaust Scholarship, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 37(2), 2002, p. 289.

the national-legionary state in September 194138. Nazi Germany was, by that time, already years into various plans of dealing with the Jewish question. Also, the Romanian plans would suffer various changes, much like it happened in Germany (first, the massive deportation of all Jews from Romania to Russia after the Nazi invasion of USSR, announced by Mihai Antonescu on 6 September 194139, when that failed, in the summer of 1942 a new plan, to deport the Jews to the Nazi death camps was approved but soon changed-October 1942 because of pragmatic considerations regarding the possibility of losing the war and a return to the initial emigration plans). And, operationally, starting from June 1941 to spring 1942, mass campaigns of killings took place in Jassy, Bessarabia and Bukovina and, also, the deportations to Transistria of the Jews that survived the killings. In this context, the Romanian and German authorities, while sharing the same general objective of removing (through physical destruction or deportation) the Jews, Gypsies and communist collaborators did not always act coordinated and jurisdictional and policy conflicts emerged often, especially in the issue of the Jews of Transnistria. According to Jean Ancel, What is often termed the wild approach to the Final Solutionthe Richtlinien Hitler shared with Antonescucan be characterized as follows: to start with, kill as many Jews as possible; round up the survivors; then work them to death between one selektsia and the next. This is what the Germans did on Ukrainian territory, and this is what the Romanians did in Transnistria from 1941 to the end of 1942. But the Germans generally prevented the Romanians from pushing any of their Jews into the territory of the Germans own wild approach.40 And this refusal and inability of the Einsatzgruppen D to accept the Jews from Transnistria created many practical problems of Jews being sent back and forth on the two banks of the river Nug, or summarily shot or drowned. Approx. 264,900 Jewish citizens of Romania41 (excluding Northern Translivania and Transinstrian Jews) and aprox. 11,000 Roma42were humiliated and killed in an extraordinarily vast catalogue of methods that were far from being impersonal: beating Jews to death for making eye contact, drowning, cutting into pieces alive, starvation, suffocation and rapes are but a few. The latter, the rape stands out because it challenges a particular distancing between the victim and the perpetrators of a modern, impersonal model of mass violence: Rape is a common side-effect of mass murder. The phenomenon sits uncomfortably within a conceptual framework of dehumanized violence; a complex interplay between objectification and subjection seems to be involved43
37

Jean Ancel. Solutionarea problemei evreiesti in Basarabia si Bucovina, iunie-august 1941, Available at http://www.idee.ro/holocaust/pdf/solutionarea.pdf , retrieved on 28 December 2011, p. 1. 38 Lya Benjamin, anti-Semitism as Reflected in the Records of the Council ofMinisters, 1940-1944 in Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, p. 5. 39 Idem, p. 11, p. 31.. 40 Jean Ancel. The German-Romanian Relationship and the Final Solution, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 19, Number 2, Fall 2005, p. 261. 41 Matatias Carp. Holocaust in Rumania, 1940-1944, Primor Publishing: Budapest, 1994, p. 30. 42 See the Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, 2004. 43 Johannes Lang. Questioning Dehumanization: Intersubjective Dimensions of Violence in the Nazi Concentration and Death Camps, Holocaust Genocide Studies (2010) 24 (2), p. 235.

The Romanian authorities would frequently commit it44 and the Nazis would engage themselves in such behavior not only in the camps and ghettos but also in the military campaigns.45 It would be interesting to explore the networks of informal favors that functioned between the perpetrators (such as access to young girls and children) in order to explore the re-objectification that occurred on such transfers. Conclusion The paper does no justice to the story of the victims in its scope, choice of analytical framework and, especially, in the generalizations produced. Its aim was exploratory: a discussion of the value of the concepts of transgressive violence and the objectificationsubjection dynamics in comparing the behavior of genocidal actors in looking for a common denominator despite significant implementation and organizational differences. However, each of the three operational categories needs to be supported by much more examples with a firm comparative basis. Also, in-depth comparative investigations in the same small-scale need to be undertaken for such claims to be answered. Despite this, the topic of direct contact victim-perpetrators is very interesting in the study of mass killings and organized crime.

Bibliography

44

For example in, Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997, p.116. and Matatias Carp. Holocaust in Rumania, 1940-1944, Primor Publishing: Budapest, 1994. 45 Sara H. Horowitz. Women in Holocaust Literature in Ed. Dalia Ofer & Lenore J. Weitzman. Women in the Holocaust, Yale University Press, 1999

Jean Ancel. Solutionarea problemei evreiesti in Basarabia si Bucovina, iunie-august 1941, Available at http://www.idee.ro/holocaust/pdf/solutionarea.pdf , retrieved on 28 December 2011 The German-Romanian Relationship and the Final Solution, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 19, Number 2, Fall 2005 Ed. Randolph L. Braham. The destruction of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the Antonescu Era, Colombia Univ Press: New York, 1997. Christopher R. Browning, Nazi policy, Jewish workers, German killers, Cambridge University Press, 2000, Matatias Carp. Holocaust in Rumania, 1940-1944, Primor Publishing: Budapest, 1994. Sara H. Horowitz. Women in Holocaust Literature in Ed. Dalia Ofer & Lenore J. Weitzman. Women in the Holocaust, Yale University Press, 1999 Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, 2004.
Johannes Lang. Questioning Dehumanization: Intersubjective Dimensions of Violence in the Nazi Concentration and Death Camps, Holocaust Genocide Studies (2010) 24 (2), 2010, p. 225-246.

Mark Levene. Review Article Illumination and Opacity in Recent Holocaust Scholarship, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 37(2), 2002. Irina Livezeanu. Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, 2000. Otto Ohlendorfs profile. Holocaust Research Project, Available http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/einsatz/ohlendorf.html, retrieved on December 2011. at 25

Dan Stone. Genocide as Transgression, European Journal of Social Theory 7(1), 2004
Modernity and violence: Theoretical reflections on the Einsatzgruppen, Journal of Genocide Research, 1:3, 1999.

Ronald Headland. Messages of murder: a study of the reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service, 1941-1943, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Press, 1992. Shannon Woodcock, Romanian Romani Resistance to Genocide in the Matrix of the Tigan Other.

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