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1NC - ASPEC

A) Interpretation the affirmative should specify the branch of government that implements their plan B) Solvency Deficit The agent that implements that plan heavily affects policy Epstein and OHalloran 99 (David, Fellow Dept PoliSci/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional
Analysis @ Columbia and Sharyn, Fellow Dept PoliSci/School of International and Public Affairs/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999, [pg. 7]) It is clear from these examples that where policy is made in Congress or through delegation to the executive has

a significant impact on policy outcomes. The central puzzle to be explained, then, is why does Congress delegate broad authority to the executive in some policy areas but not in others? Does this delegation reflect the particularities of an issue area, such as who are its benefactors, who are adversely affected, and what are its complexities? Does it
reflect deeper structural factors,
such as legislative organization, committee composition, or congressional-executive conflict (divided government)? Is executive branch decision making different form the internal workings of Congress, and how does this affect the decision to delegate? Can congress perfectly control delegated authority through administrative procedures, oversight, and administrative law? Does it want

to? In the end, what are the implications of delegating discretionary Can the virtues of separate powers intended by the Founders be maintained alongside significant delegation to the executive.

Power in the federal government is divided in 3 branches Rotunda 01 (18 Const. Commentary 319, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE POLITCAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, AND
MORRISON, lexis)

The Framers of our Constitution anticipated that a self-interested "federal majority" would consistently seek to impose more federal control

created a federal structure designed to protect freedom by dispersing and limiting federal power. They instituted federalism [*321] chiefly to protect individuals, that is, the people, not
over the people and the states. n10 Hence, they the "states qua states." n11

The Framers

sought to protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers.

power between the state and federal governments, and they

They divided further divided power within the federal government by

splitting it among the three branches of government, and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting it between two Houses of Congress. n12

C) Standards 1. Kills CP ground. Lack of specification destroys agent CP ground which is core negative ground. Also key to in depth education about the opportunity costs of agency implementation. This is critical civic education and is a key internal link to all their educational claims 2. Crushes solvency debatesno in-depth solvency debates about the who, what, when, and hows of the plan. Some of these agencies are better able to solve an aff than others. 3. Lack of specification is severanceallows them to say not usallows them to jack our link ground to agency DAs that is core topic ground and makes the plan a

moving target. This jacks education and fairness and makes debate boringleaves us with statism args. D) Voter for the reasons listed above

1NC Mansfield Amendment CP


Text: The United States federal government should repeal the Mansfield Amendment and then do the plan A. The implementation of the plan in the status quo would gut solvency because workers would phase out during implementation of the plan. Brent Goldfarb [University of Maryland] 2006. The Effect of Government Contracting on Academic Research: An Empirical Analysis
of Reputation in Research Procurement. November 28, 2006 These results have numerous implications. First and foremost, the results point to a potential shortcoming of the grant mechanism, from the perspective of the sponsor. If, all else being equal, it is desirable for the sponsor to have highly reputable academics work on projects with utilitarian goals, there is no evidence that the longevity of matches between sponsors and researchers depends upon research productivity as measured by publications or citations to those publications. One interpretation is that NASAs

program is selecting on the type of research that ts the program, but that they are relatively uninterested in academic output. The results demonstrate that NASAs program does not retain the attention of high-output researchers over time. In the past, the Department of Defense attached small amounts of unrestricted funds to academic grants specically with the intent of supporting the researchers own work (Stokes 1997a, p. 131). Congress prohibited this mechanism with the passage of the Manseld Amendment in 1971. This suggests that government agencies would be better equipped to solicit academics effort if they were free to design their procurement mechanisms. The policy response of the department of defense in the 1960s suggests that it is at least preferable to provide the sponsor the tools to select the most qualied candidate for a particular project, as opposed to disqualifying top academics ex-ante. Indeed, this is precisely the strategy of corporate sponsors of
academic research. Setting aside the numerous restrictions common in industry grants concerning the dissemination of research results, corporate sponsors often provide additional incentives to academics which are designed to elicit effort towards specic goals. For example in biotechnology, academics often have equity stakes in, and/or or sit on the scientic board of advisors of rms which support their research (Kenney 1986, Audretsch and Stephan 1996). These mechanisms can provide powerful incentives to alter the nature of academic research (Kenney 1986, p. 117). Such arrangements have often been met with alarm by the university community because they threaten academic norms as well as a notion of purity of academic research. However, they also possess the virtue of causing a small subset of highly talented individuals to devote their time to research with social value, as evidenced by the market. The effectiveness of such mechanisms has led leading universities to establish elaborate conict of interest policies to prevent academics from receiving research grants from companies in which they have nancial stakes.

B. The affirmative cant solve the root cause of innovative failure. The Mansfield must be repealed to solve the long trend of innovative stagnation. Laitinen 70 (Herbert Laitinen. Reverberations from the Mansfield Amendment. Journal of Analytical Chemistry. Page 689. 1970.) Late in 1969, the Congress of the United States passed an authorization bill for expenditures of the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 1970. An amendment by Sen. Mansfield, which passed with virtually no advance public notice, has since caused apprehension, confusion, and secondary effects of magnitude that still eludes estimation. The amendment, called Section 203, states none of the funds authorized by this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless such project or study has direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function. Ever since The Office of Naval Research pioneered the present system
of basic research support through research grants, the Department of Defense has invested a small fraction of its resources to gain the direct and indirect benefits of a strong outside research

Corporate and private research laboratories as well as universities and even other government laboratories have competed for research support through the proposal-grant mechanism from various civilian as well as military agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health and the Federal Water Pollution Control Agency, to require a closer and more obvious relationship between research and mission. In University circles, the Mansfield amendment is bound to play into the hands of campus radicals who will not acknowledge the possibility that basic research relevant to a
program. military invasion can also be beneficial to the peaceful pursuits of society. If it were simply a matter of transfer of funds to the one research agency that is not mission-orientated, the National

Science Foundation, no serious harm would be done. Unfortunately, the NSF is not receiving additional support. On the contrary, it has been directed, through the daddario bill, to expand its function to support applied as well as basic research. Thus, an already serious squeeze on pure research seems destined to intensify. Now to complete the circle, the emergence on the job market of a pool of post doctorates that can no longer be supported on research grants, plus the new group of graduating Ph.Ds to compete for a dwindling number of research positions in industry, government, and academic departments is being cited as evidence that we have an abundance of Ph.Ds and that decreased graduate support is therefore justified. Clearly this is a short-sighted policy. What is needed a strong and continuing commitment to basic research in support of all mission-oriented technology, both in relation to research training at pre- and postdoctoral levels and in relation to research output. Anything less will waste the talents of a substantial group of skilled research workers and will compromise our technological futures.

1NC Shell India Relations Disad


A. UniquenessUS is cooperating with India on space exploration in the SQUO ODonnell, Researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 11 [Frank, holds an MSc (Distinction) in Strategic
Studies from the University of Aberdeen and an MA (Honors) in International Relations and Middle East Studies from the University of St last accessed 6/23/11, Andrews, May 13, India's Space Ascent Gains New Boost, Geopolitical Monitor, http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/indias-space-ascent-gains-new-boost-4363] TD Speaking before the Indian Parliament in November 2010, US President Barack Obama outlined his policy of "forging

deeper cooperation with 21st century centers of influence - and that must necessarily include India." Noting space collaboration as an area ripe for expanded collaboration, the joint statement by Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced their determination to "transform bilateral export control regulations and policies to realize the full potential of the strategic partnership between the two countries." To fulfill this
nine institutions critical to Indian space and defense technology development were removed from the US Department of Commerce "Entity List " in January. This list restricts commerce in space, nuclear, chemical and biological technology with certain organizations. The Commerce Department also reallocated India to an export control category exclusive to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) "adherent" states. These revisions esase the path for
objective,

The granting of "MTCR adherent status" particularly signifies a growing US perception that India takes seriously concerns regarding global proliferation and sensitive technology transfers. These actions provide new opportunities for American agencies and firms to assist India in the evolution of its space program, including supporting Indian goals of mastering advanced rockets,
exporters to obtain licenses for transfer of space technology to India, although individual licenses may still be denied.

deploying an expanded satellite fleet, and building international commercial launch capacity.

B. LinkPlan crushes US-Indian relations only cooperation, like that of the SQUO, can solve Faulconer and Rendleman 10 [J. Walter, the new business area executive for civilian space at The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel, James D., Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Colorado Springs, Colorado, 2010, Improving International Space Cooperation, StrategicSpaceSolutions, last accessed 7/8/11, http://strategicspacesolutions.com/Public-papers/Intl-Space-Coop%206-510.pdf] TD Diplomatic prestige. Cooperation provides opportunities for a nation to demonstrate its international leadership and technical prowess. For example, India has used its recent launches to host payloads from a number of international partners. South Korea is leveraging Russian launch technology to attempt space launches of satellites all in support of its dream to become a top ten space fairing nation. Table 2 illustrates when each member of the "space launch club" joined. Russia and China launch satellites for much of the global space-faring community. Ultimately, support for cooperation and collaboration increases when

the perceived utility and diplomatic prestige derived from cooperation increases. In general, the more
countries participate, the higher will be the utility. Nevertheless, not all countries are equal, and their individual utility value depends on world politics. For example, the utility of having Russia join the [International Space Station (ISS)] program increased
significantly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, when relations with a new Russia were at the forefront of United States foreign policy. To

the extent that a symbol of cooperation with a given nation is valuable, utility will be delivered. As such, Indian participation in joint space exploration would send a strong signal to the world of good U.S.-Indian relations. This would simultaneously increase Indian prestige by demonstrating their
technological prowess.
Similarly, Chinese participation in joint space exploration would signal growing cooperation between the two nations...These diplomatic incentives may come at a cost for the cooperating nations; for example, China would likely have to make concessions in the form of more stringent technology export controls and/or better observance of human rights standards. If space exploration is

successfully used as a diplomatic tool to exert such soft power, its utility increases in proportion to the
26 A demonstration of the utility of diplomatic prestige gained from space cooperative endeavors can be seen in the ApolloSoyuz space link-up (1975) and Space Shuttle Mir docking (1995) missions, though not for reasons contained in the public pronouncements by the participants Their true and complex diplomatic utility was not made apparent for many years. As described by James Oberg: It was the very heights of the Cold War, (Apollo astronaut) Stafford recalled, with thousands of nuclear weapons aimed at each country. Then from outer space a streak of sanity appeared: Yet both superpowers had great accomplishments in space, so we decided to work together. Only with the Soviet program at a standstill did Moscow agree to fly a joint orbital mission. Its fallback position was that if it couldnt be Number One in space, it could at least pose as the equal partner of the new Number One, the United States. It was better than letting on how far behind its space program had fallen. 27 Political sustainability. International

degree that it is successful in implementing a policymakers agenda.

cooperation has the peculiar, wonderful, and sometimes wasteful capacity to increase the political will to sustain and fund space programs and associated budgets. As noted, cooperation provides a space fairing state the basis to

draw on additional resources when its own are not adequate to achieve desired space goals and visions. Cooperation also enables a program to weather attempts to be reined in even when faced with contentious and devastating costgrowth or budget realities (which most space programs invariably face). Thus,
within the United States, a program often wins a bit of sanctuary from cancellation threats or significant budget reductions to the extent that Congress and the administration feel compelled to not break, stretch, or withdraw from international agreements. Political good will is generated by funding these programs. To find an example of the power of
this good will, one only need look to the politics surrounding NASAs manned programs. Money has been allocated to the program even when the perceived justification for its expansive program has collapsed. Now the new internationalist U.S. President doesnt care much for the NASA manned mission, and has even less understanding of its science mission. In any event critics concede that the President sees value in the votes its engineering and contractor community represents, key especially in vote rich states such as Florida which serve as a nexus for manned U.S. launches. Similarly, some reason the political and diplomatic integration of Russia into the ISS program may well have saved the ISS and Space Shuttle programs from cancellation. 28 Once cooperation has commenced, canceling a program becomes

inconsistent with political sustainability as long as the utility cost associated with the loss of diplomatic
benefits and the negative effects on reputation of terminating an international agreement is larger in magnitude than the utility cost that must be paid to maintain the system The corollary to this is that there

is a high cost to be paid by any nation that chooses to unilaterally withdraw from an existing cooperative endeavor. This cost comes in the form of damage to the departing nations reputation or credibility. In general, any unilateral action sends a signal that the actor is an unpredictable and therefore an unreliable and possibly disrespectful partner. This tends to sabotage the possibility of future cooperation. As such, there is a long-term benefit to maintaining cooperation, even when the immediate
cost may seem to call for terminating it. 29 If significant cooperation has never occurred, its commencement is thought to be a defining event, delivering specific political rewards and diplomatic utility. This is why the recent pronouncements on space cooperation made by President Obama and Chinese officials during his November 2009 visits are being watched with special interest. The same attention is being paid to the overtures made with the Indian government and its space community.

Relations key to check any Indo-Pak conflict Dugger 02 [Celia W., June 10, Wider Military Ties With India Offer U.S. Diplomatic Leverage, New York Times, last accessed 7/8/11,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/world/wider-military-ties-with-india-offer-us-diplomatic-leverage.html] TD

Military cooperation between India and the United States has remarkably quickened since Sept. 11, with a burst of navy,
air force and army joint exercises, the revival of American military sales to India and a blur of high-level visits by generals and admirals. The

fledgling relationship between American and Indian military leaders will be important to Mr. Rumsfeld in talks intended to put to rest fears of war between India and Pakistan. ''We can hope this translates into some influence
and trust, though I don't want to overstate it,'' a senior American defense official said in an interview on Thursday. ''I don't want to predict this guarantees success.'' The American diplomatic efforts yielded their first real gains on Saturday when

India welcomed a pledge by Pakistan's military ruler to stop permanently the infiltration of militants into Kashmir. India indicated that it would soon take steps to reduce tensions, but a million
troops are still fully mobilized along the border -- a situation likely to persist for months -- and the process of resolving the crisis has just begun.

India has linked the killing of civilians in Kashmir to a Pakistan-backed insurgency there and has presented its confrontation with Pakistan as part of the global campaign against terrorism. India itself made an unstinting offer of support to
the United States after Sept. 11, and Washington responded by ending the sanctions placed on India after its 1998 nuclear tests. With that, the estrangement that prevailed between the world's two largest democracies during the cold war, when India drew close to the Soviet Union and the United States allied with Pakistan, has eased. India, for decades a champion of nonalignment, seeks warmer ties with the United States in

hopes of gaining access to sophisticated military technology and help in dealing with Pakistan. From the start of President Bush's term, some influential officials in his administration saw India as a potential counterweight to that other Asian behemoth, China, whose growing power was seen as a potential strategic threat.

The war will go nuclear in 12 days-crisis escalation means we control questions of timeframe, best quantitative models concur. Commander Kevin M. Brew, JAGC-US Navy, 2005, Naval Law Review, 52 Naval L. Rev. 177, p. 200-2
What will cause nuclear war in South Asia? The answer is, most probably, Kashmir. As discussed above India and Pakistan are "mortal enemies" and have fought three wars--four if we count the Kargil Conflict of 1999--since

their partition and independence in 1947. Part of the crisis is Hindu nationalism versus Muslim fundamentalism. But the seeds of the current conflict were planted at the time of the 1947 partition when reconciliation after partition was prevented by the ". . . two great post-partition traumas. For India, it was the humiliating defeat by China in 1962; for Pakistan, the vivisection of their country [loss of East Pakistan] by Indian forces in 1971." 70 The events are branded into the collective national psyche: Each trauma led directly to the consideration

of nuclear weapons and the further militarization of the respective countries. In India's case, the lesson of 1962
was that only military power counts and that Nehru's faith in diplomacy that was not backed up by firepower was disastrously naive. The linkage between the trauma of 1971 and the nuclear option is even tighter in Pakistan--and for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto a nuclear weapon had the added attraction of enabling him to reduce the power of the army. Ironically, Pakistan has wound up with both a nuclear program and a politically powerful army. 71 But the crisis would no doubt relate to Kashmir 72 --and even if started as a conflict with conventional

weapons/military forces, recourse to "tactical [*201] use" of nuclear weapons would occur within two weeks. 73 This paper cannot do justice to the complexities and emotions intertwined in the India-Pakistan conflict nor the Kashmir
problem. A recent study summarizes the Kashmir issue: Kashmir is both a cause and the consequence of the India-Pakistan conundrum. It is primarily a dispute about justice and people, although its strategic and territorial dimensions are complicated enough. As in many other intractable paired-minority conflicts, it is hard to tell where domestic politics ends and foreign policy begins. There are two Kashmirs. Besides the physical territory, another Kashmir is found in the minds of politicians, strategists, soldiers, and ideologues. This is a place where

national and sub-national identities are ranged against each other. The conflict in this Kashmir is as much a clash between identities, imagination, and history, as it is a conflict over territory, resources, and people. . . . Pakistanis have long argued that the Kashmir problem stems from India's denial of justice to the Kashmiri people (by not allowing them to join Pakistan), and by not accepting Pakistan's own legitimacy. . . . For the Pakistanis, Kashmir remains the "unfinished business" of the 1947 partition. Pakistan, the self-professed homeland for an oppressed and
threatened Muslim minority in the subcontinent, finds it difficult to leave a Muslim majority region to a Hindu-majority state. Indians, however, argue that Pakistan, a state defined and driven by religion, is given to irredentist aspirations in Kashmir because it is unwilling to accept the fact of a secular India. India, nominally a secular state, finds it difficult to turn over a Muslim majority region to a

Muslim neighbor just because it is Muslim. . . . In contrast, India's secularism, strengthened by the presence of a Muslimmajority state of Kashmir within India, proves that religion alone does not make a nation. India maintains that Kashmir cannot be resolved until Pakistanis alter their views on [*202] secularism. Of course, this would also mean a change in the identity of Pakistan, a contentious subject in both states. 74 A 1998 article identified the usual scenario for new clash: . . . a new India-Pakistan clash begins with the two

nations at a crisis point over Kashmir. India, worried that Pakistan could move tanks and armoured personnel carriers east from the border city of Lahore and cut off the Indian-held part of Kashmir, pre-emptively attacks to secure its corridor to that disputed region, pushing deep into Pakistani territory. The Pakistanis, driven backward and fearful of losing their nuclear arsenal, launch a nuclear strike against the Indian force. . . . Usually . . . the escalation to nuclear weapons happens within the first 12 days of the war game. 75

1NC Weaponization Disad


UniquenessObama arms control--- International co-op Broad and Chang 10, William J. Broad and Kenneth Chang, June 29 2010 (Writers for the New York Times), Obama
Reverses Bushs Space Policy, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/science/space/29orbit.html?pagewanted=print The Obama administration on Monday unveiled a space policy that renounces the unilateral

stance of the emphasizes international cooperation, including the possibility of an arms control treaty that would limit the development of space weapons. In recent years, both China and the United States have destroyed satellites in orbit, raising fears about the start of a costly arms race that might ultimately hurt Bush administration and
instead the United States because it dominates the military use of space. China smashed a satellite in January 2007, and the United States did so in February 2008. The new space policy explicitly says that Washington will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies. The Bush

administration, in the space policy it released in August 2006, said it rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space, a phrase that was interpreted as giving a green light to the development and use of antisatellite weapons. The policy also stated
that Washington would oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access or use of space, a phrase that effectively ruled out arms control. In secret, the Bush administration engaged in research that critics said could produce a powerful ground-based laser, among other potential weapons meant to shatter enemy satellites in orbit. By contrast, the Obama

policy underlines the need for international cooperation. It is the shared interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust, the new policy says in its opening lines. Space operations should be conducted in ways that emphasize openness and transparency.

Space technologies are dual use lead to military deployment of space weapons Brown, Trevor. Soft Power and Space Weaponization. Air and Space Power Journal 23:66-72 Spring 2009
Also available online at: http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html Brown is a new author interested in political, economic, and military strategy for the medium of space. But the United States does not necessarily have to choose between civilian and military space programs since much of

the technology developed for space is dual use. The space industry provides a tremendous opportunity for militaries that desire more affordable access and space assets that can significantly augment terrestrial forces. As Alfred Thayer Mahan pointed out, Building up a great merchant shipping lays the broad base for the military shipping.36 The US military can maximize its resources, not only financially but also politically, by packaging as much military space activity as possible into commercial space activity. One example involves satellite communications. The arrangement the Pentagon has with Iridium Satellite LLC gives the military unlimited access to its network and allows users to place both secure and nonsecure calls or send and receive text messages almost anywhere in the world.37 Another example involves space imagery. Even though the government must maintain sophisticated imaging capabilities for special situations, it could easily meet the vast majority of its routine requirements at lower cost by obtaining commercially available imagery.38 The Air Force could also use space transportation, another emerging industry, to maximize
its resources. Private ventures now under way are reducing the costs of space access considerably. It is possible that one enterprise could become an alternative to Russian Soyuz spacecraft for NASAs missions to the International Space Station.39 Such enterprises could prove attractive, cost-effective options for delivering the Air Forces less-sensitive payloads to Earth orbit. Space tourism, a growing industry, could enable the Air Force to procure affordable capabilities to routinely operate 60 to 90 miles above Earth.40 Advances that entrepreneurs are making in suborbital

space flight could eventually evolve to a point where the Air Force would find it far easier, politically as well as financially, to acquire platforms capable of delivering munitions from space.

Weaponization causes a shift to bio-terrorism Hitchens, 02 Theresa Hitchens 4/18/02, (Vice President of the Center for Defense Information) , "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet
or Russian Roulette?", http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm,)

Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security

in the long run that would outweigh the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities

raising the proverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space warfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.) Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercial firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Cornet, vice president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.30 Many experts also argue there would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemming from the need to counter other asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants in the race itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors

will look to terrorism using chemical or biological agents as one alternative.

Extinction. John Steinbruner, Senior Fellow at Brookings, 97


[Biological Weapons: A Plague upon All Houses, Foreign Policy, Winter 1997-1998, p. 85-96, JSTOR] Ultimately the world's military, medical, and business establishments will have to work together to an unprecedented degree if the international community is to succeed in containing the threat of biological weapons. Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference:

Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do
not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even

before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback Biological Weapons is that they would not
act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But

for a few pathogens ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use-the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from
one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential
for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

Russian Miscalc CP---1NC


CP Text: The United States federal government should resolve its issues with Russia surrounding the Joint Data Exchange Center in order to increase transparency between the United States and Russia. A) Solves miscalculation- repairing Russias early warning systems decreases chance of accident Podvig 06 (Pavel, affiliate and former research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Reducing
the Risk of an Accidental Launch, http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/14_2-3_%20Podvig.pdf) OP

Another important set of proposals that emerged from the discussion of dealerting includes a series of measures that are supposed to help Russia to repair its early-warning system. The measures that have been suggested include
direct assistance to Russia to help it launch satellites or complete construction of early-warning radars, establishing U.S.Russian early-warning data exchange center, or augmenting the existing early-warning networks with additional sensors. The assumptions behind these proposals are that the deterioration of the Russian early-warning network after the breakup of the Soviet Union has left it without adequate warning capability and that this lack of early warning increases probability of an accident. The idea of cooperation in strengthening early-warning capabilities, whether in the form of providing Russia with assistance in completing its system or of establishing data-exchange mechanisms, has been supported by advocates of de-alerting and its opponents alike. This is one of the few proposals that came close to being implementedin 1998 the United States and Russia agreed to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow for the purposes of information exchange. 7 Although this agreement has not been implemented in practice,

some authors have suggested using the framework it created for expanding U.S.Russian cooperation in early-warning information exchange. 8

B) JDEC would establish cooperative relations between US and Russia Collina 10 (Tom Z., over 20 years of Washington DC experience in arms control and global security issues, Executive Director of the Institute for
Science and International Security, Director of Global Security at the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Senior Research Analyst at the Federation of American Scientists, Russia, U.S. Working on Joint Launch Notification, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_07/JointLaunch) OP

Efforts to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) date back to September 1998, when President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin first agreed to it. At that time, the United States was concerned that the poor condition of Russias early-warning system could lead to
mistaken launches and crisis scenarios. Even so, 12

years later the JDEC remains unrealized, delayed first by various tax and liability issues and then by Russian concerns about Bush administration plans for strategic missile defenses. The aim of the JDEC is to enable the United States and Russia to share in real time their early-warning data on ballistic missile launches worldwide. The JDEC would supplement Russias early-warning data with data from U.S. sensors and satellites and could potentially play a role in establishing cooperative U.S.-Russian approaches on missile defense.

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