Machiavelli's Paradox: Trapping or Teaching the Prince Author(s): John Langton and Mary G.

Deitz Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec., 1987), pp. 1277-1288 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962589 . Accessed: 03/01/2012 20:12
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MACHIAVELLI'S PARADOX: TRAPPINGOR TEACHINGTHE PRINCE

In The Discourses Machiavelli extolled the virtues of republican government, yet in The Prince he advised the ruler on how to perpetuate autocratic rule. What accounts for this paradox? Mary Dietz argues that Machiavelli sought to deceive the prince, trapping him into actions that would destroy his rule. John Langton contends, in contrast, that Machiavelli was seeking to teach the prince how to govern so that the autocratic state could evolve into a republic.

In his most substantial work, The Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, Machiavelli defends the ideals of republicangovernment by arguingon historicalgroundsthat the most stable, solid, and humane states have been founded on social equality, politicalliberty, rule of law, popularelections, and mixedconstitutionsembodying a system of checks and balances. Yet in his best known book, The Prince, Machiavelli lays out an elaborate, "Machiavellian" program for acquiring and retainingautocraticpower and thus seems to encourage a form of practical politics that vitiates the realizationof his political values. Students of political theory have proposed quite a few diversesolutions to this paradox. The prevailing view, it seems clear, is that Machiavelliis actually seeking in The Prince to teach an absolute ruler how to use his power to reform a corruptand feeblestate and therebyto lay the foundation for the emergence of a viable republic.In otherwords, according to the dominant interpretation,Machiavelli regardsthe absolutismhe encourages in The Prince as the necessary precondition for the establishmentof the kind of republicanism he endorses in The

Discourses.

Mary Dietz (1986)rejectsthis and other availableattemptsto reconcilethe politics

of The Prince and the values of The Dis-

courses as unpersuasive. Instead, she advancesthe contentionthat ThePrinceis actuallya "politicalact,""anact of deception," a piece of "duplicitous advice," designedto restorea republicin Florence by tricking a "gullibleand vainglorious prince," Lorenzo de Medici, into implementing policies that would "jeopardize his power and bring his demise"(p. 781). This is a novel and provocative thesis, but after analysis and reflectionit strikes me as implausible and misleading. It is predicatedon a selective, misguidedreading of the relevanttexts and an inadequate construal of both Machiavelli's fundamental values and his theoretical intentions. In exposing these flaws in Dietz's argument, I want to suggest that a particular"nationalistic" version of the dominant view of the relationship between The
Prince and The Discourses offers a much

more tenable interpretationthan the one she devises. Dietz (p. 782) essentially views The Princeas a well-disguisedtrap. The "text itself provides areas of 'solid ground,' or
firm advice a new prince . . . can rely

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American Political Science Review Vol. 81

upon to gain and maintain power." But hidden amid this solid counsel are " 'ditchesand pitfalls'in the form of subversive directives,"concealed by "promises of power, glory and popular support."My impression,in contrast,is that The Princeis too long, too historical,too involved, indeed altogethertoo judicious for this to be the case. Putting it another way, why is the solid ground around the putativepitfallsso well prepared-and so extensive? Machiavelli examines many topics in The Prince, particularlyin the area of foreignaffairs,which have no directbearing on the problemof maintainingpower within a state. And he does so in a rigorous, bureaucratic "issues-and-options" style. Why did he not simply relate the solid counsel in a more straightforward, uncomplicatedway? Indeed, if his goal was to bring Lorenzo down, why did Machiavelli not just write a short, snappy, meretricious memorandum on how to govern Florence instead of a densely packed handbook on realpolitik (which, by the way, a gullible and vainglorious prince would probably not peruse)?The answer, I think it is clear, is that Machiavelli'spurpose was instruction, not deception. Of course, it can be retortedhere that the most effective trap always looks like somethingelse, and this explainsall the well-tended"firmground" aroundthe pitfalls in The Prince. But are there really consciously preparedpitfalls in the text? Or, to put the question in a more manageableform, Does The Prince contain any advice not consonant with what Machiavelli teaches in The
Discourses?

civilian militia or mass-based native in army. Letus examineeach prescription if turnto determine it has a sinisterintent.

City Residingin a Conquered (Florence)

As Dietz points out, according to Machiavelli, if a new prince wants to effectivelygovern a republiche has seized or conquered, he should either "destroy it" or "residein it" (pp. 782-83). In The Discourses Machiavelli (1950, 183-84),1 repeats the advice about destroyingconqueredcities or provincesin orderto rule them securely, but he explains here that the destructionof a society in this context means the reorganizationof its governof ment, the redistribution its population, of and the restructuring its stratification system. In other words, Machiavelli is apparentlyquite sincerewhen he advises Lorenzothat he has an option: to solidify his rule in Florencehe can destroythe city or reside in it. What if Lorenzo had chosen the formeroption, which Machiavelli himself (1950, 184) describesas "the best means of holding a principality"? Why present an option here, thus giving Lorenzoa chanceto follow a path leading away from the pitfall?Indeed,would any other allegedpitfallsbeen of Machiavelli's effective, if Lorenzo had elected to Florence? "destroy" But what about the less radical option of residencewithin the city as a "meansof Is securingpossession"? this a trap?Dietz construes the suggestion to be a ploy to induce Lorenzo to abandon his country villa and take up residence in the city, where he could be more easily found and people destroyedby a vengefulFlorentine still deeply imbuedwith republicansentiments (p. 783). Now, this argumentturns on the assumption that the mass of Florentineshad not forgotten "the name of liberty"-that they were, in fact, ardent republicans,just waiting for the

Dietz contends that Machiavelli puts four main suggestionsin The Prince that he hopes will induce Lorenzo to dig his own political grave: (1) that he should residein the city of Florenceitself; (2) that he should strive to gain the favor of the people; (3) that he should not build any fortresses;and (4) that he should createa
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Machiavelli'sParadox
opportunity to break the shackles of princelyrule. Indeed,Dietz'swhole thesis rests on the assumptionthat "the Florentines had become accustomedto a republic," that "in Florence,the idea of liberty was deeply rooted in political tradition" (p. 784). Yet, she herselfquotes (p. 785) a passage from Machiavelli's History of Florencewhere he states that "libertywas unknown" the city. Moreover,Machiain velli contends in The Discourses that republicanvalues, traditions,and institutions were never strongly developed in Florence.The city had its "originin servitude,"and then
when afterwardsthe opportunityoccurredfor her to gainherlibertyin a measure,she beganby makinga constitutionthat was a mixtureof her old and bad institutions with new ones, and consequentlycould not be good. And thus she has gone on for the two hundredyears of which we have any reliableaccount,withoutever havinga governmentthat could really be called a republic.
.

velli did not think the old republic was worth restoring:its constitutionwas not good and its citizens,elites as well as common people, generallylacked civic virtue in the sense that their propensitywas to put their private interestsbefore the general good. He wanted the city reorganized, reformed, revitalized, and this, he emphasizes, requires the labor of an absolute ruler (1950, 110-11, 138-39, 166-67d, 170-71). But even that was not sufficient,becausefromMachiavelli's perspective, no Italian city-state, no matter what form of government it possessed, was really a viable geopoliticalentity in a world dominatedby largeabsolutistkingdoms. The only viable entity was the entire country of Italy, united under a strong (ultimately republican) government. As Machiavelli observed at one point in The Discourses,
A countrycan neverbe unitedand happy,except when it obeys wholly one government,whether a republicor a monarchy,as is the case in France and Spain;and the sole causewhy Italyis not in the samecondition,andis not governedby either one republicor one sovereign,is the Church.... The Church, then, not having been powerful enoughto be able to masterall Italy, nor having permitted otherpowerto do so, has beenthe any cause why Italy has never been able to unite underone head, but has always remainedunder a numberof princesand lords, which occasion her so many dissensionsand so muchweakness that she becamea prey not only to the powerful barbarians,but of whoever chose to assail her. (1950, 151-52)

. And although Florence repeatedly gave

ampleauthority,by publicandfreesuffrage,to a few of hercitizensto reformthe government, yet theseneverorganized for thegeneralgood, but it alwayswith a view of benefiting theirown party, which, insteadof establishingorderin the city, only tended to increase the disorders. (1950, 239-40)

The specificimplicationof this passage is that Machiavelli clearly does not see Florence a hotbed of republicanism as and certainlydid not write The Prince under the illusion that most Florentineswere chafingto regaintheirlost liberty.Indeed, all the evidenceof TheDiscoursesleads to the conclusion that Machiavelliregarded his countrymenas largely "corrupt" and "effeminate"(1950, 284-85, 369, 491). They were not a dangerous, rebellious mass in his estimationand the actual history of Florence afterthe fall of the republic in 1512 fully confirmsthis view. The broader implication of Machiavelli's assessmentof his native city is that it explodesDietz's claim that the purpose of The Prince was to "restore"the previous Florentinerepublic (pp. 781, 794; see also Machiavelli1950, 111). Machia1279

GainingPopularSupport
As Dietz relates, there is probably no more frequentlyrepeatedpiece of advice in The Prince than that "theruler should always strive to gain the favor of the people" (p. 783). Machiavelli not only reiterates this advice again and again but offers apparentlyprudentsuggestionsfor implementingit (1950, 64-67, 85). How can practical advice about gaining popular supportbe a trap? Dietz's conjectureis that Machiavelli's real view of the matteris just the opposite

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of what he preachesin ThePrince:in contrast to what he writes there, he actually believes that a dictator in Florencecould best secure his position by gaining the support of the nobles, while distrusting and, if necessary, repressingthe libertyliving people. In other words, by telling Lorenzothrough The Prince to be hostile to the nobility and to cultivate the favor of the people, Machiavelliwas, in Dietz's view, attempting to trick the Florentine dictator into alienating his natural allies and trusting his natural foes. Dietz supports this conjecture in large measure through a strained interpretation of a memorandumwritten by Machiavelli to Pope Leo X, entitled "On Reformingthe State of Florence." Yet in The Discourses Machiavelli (1950, 162) says that he regards"asunfortunatethose princes" who try to control a mass of hostile subjects with "extraordinary measures," such as "cruelty." This only erodes their authority. The "bestremedy"for popularhostility is not repressionbut "to try to secure the good will of the people." And this can be achievedby, on the one hand, massacring the nobles and, on the other hand, allowing the people "tolive in security,"that is, to conduct governmentaccording to the rule of law (1950, 162-63). Whom is Machiavelli trying to deceive here? Although he employs a different argument, he repeats essentially the same advice in The Prince (1950, 35-36). Are both books, then, duplicitous? I think not. However Machiavelliantheir teachings may be, both works are sincere efforts to educateand to exhort. detects a clever trap (pp. 787-88). She thinksthis chapteris intendedto convince Lorenzo not to build a fortress, because Machiavelli really believes a central citadel would make the dictator less vulnerable to a republicaninsurrection.But is this, in fact, really Machiavelli'strue belief? Dietz herself acknowledges in a footnote that in The DiscoursesMachiavelli unequivocally denounces the practice of erecting fortresses (p. 797). She does not, however, discusshis threemain groundsfor this advice. First,Machiavelli because claims, fortressesare "injurious" they induce the foolish presumptionon a prince's part that he can systematically abuse his subjects and yet control them with force. In the long run this generates tremendoushostility, and no citadel can permanently protect a ruler from an aroused populace. Second, fortressesare "useless" againstthe artilleryof a modem army (1950, 362-68). Finally, and most crucially, fortresses have a debilitating effect on the military capacity of a society: they foster the conviction that a large, well-trainedarmy is unnecessary; whereas, as Machiavelli observes (1950, 369), fortresses cannot preserve states without good armies and they are unnecessaryfor states with them. In light of this analysis, I cannot see how Dietz manages to convince herself that Machiavelli's advice on fortressesis a trap. But perhapshe is being duplicitous in The Discoursesas well when he avers, "A good and wise prince . . . will never build fortresses, so that they may place their relianceupon the good will of their subjects,and not upon the strengthof the citadels"(1950, 364).

Fortresses Building
In chapter 20 of The Prince, Machiavelli profferssome very equivocal advice about the practice of building fortresses. Indeed,the advice is so wishy-washy that it is difficultto imaginethat it would persuade anyone to do anything. Yet Dietz
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a Creating CitizenMilitia
A new ruler, indeed any wise ruler, Machiavelli strenuously argues in The Prince, should always have his subjects armed and trained for combat, and he should never rely on mercenaryor auxili-

Machiavelli'sParadox
when every one saw that he was the sole master of his own forces." Perhapseven more damaging to Dietz's argument, in chapter 21 of The Prince, a mere three subjects may . . . easily make himself a pages after the point where Machiavelli mark for overthrowby creatingthe very claimsthat "historyis full of examples" of instrumentof his own destruction,name- new sovereigns arming their subjects, he ly, a civilian militia" (p. 786). Now discusses the case of his contemporary, obviously, armingand traininga substan- "Ferdinand, King of Aragon, the present tial body of citizensmay "facilitate plots, King of Spain."As Machiavelliobserves incite insurrection, and inspire rebels." (1950,81-82), "Ferdinand may almost ... But what leads Dietz to maintainthat this be termed a new prince because from a is what Machiavelliactuallyhoped would weak king he has become for fame and follow from his advice?She seemsto offer glory the firstking in Christendom,and if two arguments.On the one hand, she inti- you regardhis actions you will find them mates that Machiavellihad a high estima- all very great and some of them extration for the republicancommitmentsand ordinary.... He was able with the money revolutionary potentialof his countrymen from the Churchand the people to main(pp. 786-87); but this, as I have tried to tain his armies, and by that long war demonstrate,does not appear to be the [with the Moors] to lay the foundations case. On the other hand, she implies that for his military power, which afterwards Machiavelliknew that few successfuldic- made him famous."For Machiavelli,this tators or princeshad actually armedtheir is a particularly instructive example, subjects,and that, in fact, Lorenzo'sown because Ferdinanddid for Spain exactly grandfather, Lorenzo the Magnificent, what Machiavelli exhorts some "rehad actually disarmed the citizens of deemer"to do for Italy in the famous last Florencein order to securehis dictatorial chapterof The Prince. position. Nothing more graphically reAlthough it now seems almost superveals Dietz's carelessreading of the rele- fluous to say it, TheDiscoursesis actually vant texts and her misconstrual of full of examples of absolute rulers who Machiavelli'svalues than this argument. created popularly based armies-Tullus, Accordingto Dietz, "whenMachiavelli Pelopidas, Epaminondas, the "current discusses such virtuous new princes as King of England" (1950, 175-76). In Francesco Sforza... or CesareBorgia... encouraging Lorenzo to establish a he makes no mention of their having civilian militia, Machiavelli was hardly armed their subjects, doubtless because attemptingto deceiveand ruinthe Florenthey did not. His bold claim that 'history tine dictator; instead he was articulating is full of such examples'[of new princes one of his deepest convictions, namely, who armed their subjects]is followed by that "princes and republics of modem no examplesat all" (p. 786). But in point times as have no national troops for of fact, Machiavellicites many examples, defense or attack ought well to be includingthe case of Cesare Borgia him- ashamed of it; for . . . if there are no self! As he explicitlypoints out (1950, 51), soldiers where there are men, it is not Borgia found his mercenarytroops "un- owing to any natural or local defect, but certainto handle, unfaithfuland danger- solely to the fault of the prince" (1950, ous." He therefore"suppressed them and 175). relied on his own men.... [Thereafter,] Dietz tries to make her argumentabout his reputation . . . constantly increased, the duplicitouscharacterof Machiavelli's and he was never so highly esteemed as advice by focusing exclusively on ques1281

ary troops (1950, 44-46, 48, 51-52, 77-78). For Dietz, this piece of advice is perhaps Machiavelli's most treacherous pitfall: "The new prince who arms his

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tions of domestic politics and internal power. But both The Princeand The Discourses addressas well the other dimension of realpolitik, internationalaffairs. And on this subjectif thereis one message whichMachiavelliwants to drivehome, it is the utterfolly of beingwithout a strong, indigenous army in a world filled with violent and voracious states. Again and again in The Discourses, Machiavelli describes Florence as "feeble," and she floundersin this execrablecondition precisely because, having few troops of her own, she reliesheavily on cowardly mercenaries (1950, 212-14, 285, 317, 369, 385, 491). When Lorenzothe Magnificent disarmedthe Florentinepeople, he committed, from Machiavelli'sperspective,a heinous political crime. Creating and maintaininga civilian militia poses risks to a prince's regime, but being without such a force guarantees his country's degradation,subjugation,and inevitable obliteration. view and if tions. If this was Machiavelli's he shared it with friends and associates, then it is no wonder that he was not given position in the (ultimately a governmental weak and short-lived)Florentinerepublic that emerged in 1527 after 15 years of Medici rule. The problem was not so much that Machiavellihad sought a position with Lorenzo but that he had become, in terms of his partisancommitments, an Italian nationalist rather than merely a Florentinerepublican. In Machiavelli's estimation, the first step in the process of creatinga national state in Italy had to be the emergenceof some autocraticleaderwho possessedthe knowledge-and the motivation-to accomplish in Italy what Ferdinand had achieved in Spain. But this is only one aspect of what Machiavelli wants. In The Discourses (1950, 116-17, 129-30, 166), he discloses his conviction that the Roman republic stands as the historical model of what a state should be. What Machiavelli ultimately hopes to foster through his writings is the rebirthin RenaissanceItaly of the Roman republicin some modernized form. Viewed from this perspective, The Prince and The Discourses are easily reconciled.After a ruler had carriedout the "moral"and practical program outlined in The Prince-that is, after he had secured control over a particular citystate, developed a strong, popularly forces based army, driven "barbarian" from Italy, and extendedhis control over the country-he could turn to The Discourses,perhapsnear the end of his reign and under Machiavelli's own personal guidance, to learn how to give his new political creation the republican institutions and culture which would make it stable, long-lived and humane, thus ensuring its greatnessand the prince's(and ultimateglory (see MachiaMachiavelli's) velli 1950, 145). WhetherMachiavelliactually believed that Lorenzo de Medici was up to this

Political Values, Theoretical Intentions

Dietz's thesis rests substantiallyon the assumptionthat Machiavelli'sonly deep and values are "republicanism liberty"(p. 794). But Machiavelli was also a passionate nationalist. Indeed, if the last chapterof The Prince is a sincerecry for risorgimentoand not, as Dietz suggests, one more piece of "bait"to trap a vaingloriousLorenzode Medici (p. 796), then it seems clear that the national unification, security, and glory of Italy were among Machiavelli's most cherished values. The destruction of Lorenzo and the restorationof a small, feeble, corrupt, and badly organized Florentinerepublic could do nothing for the achievementof these nationalisticaspirations.The establishment of a viable Italian state could, however, set the stage for the reintroduction and evolution of republicaninstitu1282

Machiavelli'sParadox
stupendoustask, thereis no questionthat he hoped he might be and that he would hire Machiavelli as chief consultant for the project. It is not too farfetched to say that Machiavelli wanted to do for Lorenzowhat Count Cavourdid for King Victor EmmanuelII in the late 1850s. In sum, Machiavelli was not trying to deceive and ruin Lorenzo;he was trying to educatehim about the opportunityfor, the demands of, and the glory to be gained from, the unificationand political regenerationof Italy. This, of course, is not a novel thesis, but it has the merit of being much more plausiblethan the argument concoctedby Dietz. In criticizingthe kind of reconciliation of The Prince and The Discourses proposed here, Dietz suggests that Machiavelli was too politicallyastuteto entertain the naive belief that the "heroicpolitics" of a full-fledged, Machiavellian ruler would "somehow 'give away' to mass politics, that the death of the prince [would] lead to the rise of the republic" (p. 780). But a moment's reflection on what we know about the broad trajectory of European political evolution will show that this view, far from being naive, is incredibly prescient.Absolutismservedas the preconditionfor the establishmentof the modem nation-state, which in turn permittedthe riseof masspolitics. Indeed, this is what eventuallyhappenedin Italy. Alas for Machiavelli, he was 350 years ahead of his time.
LANGTON JOHN

of my interpretation The Princeas an act of political deception whose advice is intended to trap and destroy Lorenzode the Medici,JohnLangtonresurrects staple view of the nineteenth century. The Prince, he states, is a cry for national and Machiavellihimself-determination, self is an Italiannationalist,ratherthanan ardentrepublican.His familiarinterpretation rests upon two general claims: first, that The Prince is a sincereand straightforward"handbookon realpolitik," written in a "rigorous,bureaucratic,'issuesand-options' style," and second, that Machiavelliintendedthe "heroicpolitics" of the (nationalist) princewould give way (under Machiavelli's guidance) to the republicanpolitics of the Discourses. Since I addressedthe second argument at some length in my article and since nothingnew has been addedto it by Langton, I will not reiterate criticismof the my "from-heroic-to-mass-politics" here. view Sufficeit to say that I still find unconvincing the notion that Machiavellibelieved that a Medici prince, once secure, would selflessly endow his regime with republican ordini, thereby hastening his own political demise. Langton's first claim, however-that The Prince contains honest nationalistadvice-challenges my interpretation more directly. Let me turn to our particular disagreements over Machiavelli's "advice," after resituating the generalproblemhistorically.

Florentine Republicanism

At the center of my interpretationof The Princeas an act of politicaldeception stand two key arguments: a historical Perhaps, as Garret Mattingly once one, that Florentinerepublicanism was a remarked, the puzzle of Machiavelli's living reality when Machiavelliwrote his Prince "has taken up more time and treatise, and a biographical one, that energy than it deserves" (Plumb 1961, Machiavelli remained a republican not 190). Nevertheless,Machiavelliremainsa just from 1498 to 1512 but throughouthis theorist ripe for controversy, and The life. The latter argument gives him the Prince continues to fascinate and invite impetus to plot against the Medici autoIn competinginterpretations. responseto crat; the former gives him reason to
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Westminster College

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believe that the political environment would be hospitable to an overthrow if only the conditions to hasten such an event were in place. Langtoncasts doubt on both of these arguments contending by that after 1512 Florence was hardly a "hotbed of republicanism"and perhaps not accurately viewed as a city deeply rooted in republicantraditionsat all. Furthermore, Machiavelli himself "did not think that the old republic was worth restoring";instead, he thought Florence would be better served by an absolute rulerwho would "reorganize, reform,and revitalize" in orderto unify Italy. Thus, it on two counts-for the city and for Machiavelli himself-republicanism becomes a dead letter, and "nationalism" rises in its stead. These are indeedbold claims. As Langton notes, by questioningthe republican tradition in Florence and Machiavelli's political preferences, he challenges the very context upon which my interpretation depends. But is he correct? As we know from the discoveriesof a generationof scholars, from Hans Baron and J. R. Hale, to Quentin Skinnerand J. G. A. Pocock, Florentinethinkersin the fifteenth century developed a political the theorycelebrating republicanideals of liberty, civic equality, and an armsbearingcitizenry(Baron1961; Hale 1977; Pocock 1975; Skinner1978). At the very least then, Florenceseems to have been a "hotbed"of republicanideas. Moreover, thanks to the labors of recent historians, we know that Florencewas also a city of strong civic republican practices-of "substantial lasting"oppositionto the and Medici stretching back to their first regime in 1434, and of constitutionalist traditions espousing equality before the law, elections by lot, and freedom of speech(Brucker 1969; Hale 1977; Najemy 1982; Rubinstein1968; Schevill 1936). Langton comments upon none of this previous scholarship (not even to reject it). What he does declare is that "the
1284

actual history of Florenceafter the fall of the republic fully confirms" that the Florentines were disinclinedto attemptto regain their liberty. But to what "actual history"does he refer?The newly restored republic of 1527 may indeed have been "weakand short lived," but it was neverthelessborn of a popularrebellionagainst the Medici lords, fully in keeping with a traditionof republicanfervor and citizen opposition between 1434 and 1458 and again in 1466, 1478, and 1494, the year of Piero de Medici's overthrow. Hale, Rubinstein, and Schevill ably trace the story of popular unrest in the city after the returnof Lorenzo.And if the Florentine propensityto revolt requiresany further confirmation,we also have Machiavelli's own words. In advisingPope LeoX on "reforming" Florence, Machiavelli emphasizesthe volatility of the city after 1512, warning that
the whole general mass of Citizens.
. .

are never

satisfied-and whoeverbelievesotherwiseis not wise-unless you restore, or promiseto restore to them theirAuthority.... The general mass of FlorentineCitizens will never be satisfiedexcept the (Council)Chamber
be reopened.... Therefore it is the better pro-

ceeding that You open it with secure methods and means, and that You take away from whoever was your enemy, the opportunityto reopen it againstyour will and with the destruction and ruin of your friends. (quoted in Pansini 1969, 635)

The picture Machiavelli paints for Pope Leo reveals a citizenry that cannot cast aside the memory of its ancientliberty. It does not portray, as Langtonwould have it, a populaceimmuneto the promiseof a republic and incapable of reclaimingits republican traditions. What Langton asserts, then, simply flies in the face of historical,textual, and political evidence. Langton also emphasizes, and with reason, the critical attitude Machiavelli adopted toward his native city as well as his frequentattacksupon its factionalism, its political corruption,and its failure to achieve a stable governmentakin to the

Machiavelli'sParadox
one he so admiredin ancient Republican Rome and envied in Venice. Certainlyno one, least of all Machiavelli,ever claimed that Florencewas the pristine image of republicanism; city was at best charthe acterized by constant fluctuations between autocraticand republicanrule. But do Machiavelli'srealist appraisalsmean, as Langtonclaims, that he had no interest in restoringthe republicand insteadwelcomed the arrival of a state-building prince?I find no evidence of it. In the firstplace, Machiavelli's criticism may be taken at face value-as evidence of his refusal to bow to idealisticvisions and his awarenessof what the Florentines were up againstwith regardto theirpolitical survival. Without question, as he acknowledgesin his History of Florence and in referenceto the Pazzi conspiracy, there were times in which "libertywas unknown"in Florence.The periodof 1478 -when the Mediceanreactionagainstthe republican revival of 1466 was in full swing-was certainly one such period. Likewise,Machiavelliwas, without question, worried about the inabilityy of those cities "born in servitude"to effect successful republican regimes. But nowhere-including in the passage Langton takes as evidenceof Machiavelli's disdain for republicanismin Florence-does he would be betteroff govsay that Florence ernedby an absoluteprincewith nationalist aspirations. As Hale has observed, neither Machiavelli nor his contemporaries were asking themselves, "Should Florence governedby a republican be constitution or by an absolute prince?" Rather, Machiavelli'sconcern was with the question, 'What qualitiesshould our republicshow the outsideworld, and how can our sick state have its vital tone restored?" (Hale 1961, 181). Thus, Machiavellidoes not think, pace Langton, that once destroyed,a republicis best not recoveredbut ratherthat once destroyed (or overthrown),a republicfacesits greattest difficultyand politics its most impor1285

tant challenge-the restoration of its liberty and civic virtis. As he writesof Romein the Discourses, "in a great republic there are constantly evils occurringrequiringremedieswhich must be efficacious in proportion to the importanceof the occasion"(1950, 538). Much the same could be said of Florence, a far less gloriousrepublicto be sure, but a republic nonetheless and in need of "efficacious remedies" to restore it to health. This is the issue that Machiavelli, as political theorist, political actor, and Florentine patriot, faces head on with historical creativity in the Discourses, with detailed advice about the restoration of republicanordiniin "Reforming State the of Florence," and with craft and cunning in The Prince.

Pitfalls in The Prince

The force of Langton'scriticism turns upon a general thesis about Machiavelli and Florentinerepublicanismthat lacks biographical,historical, and textual support. I will returnto this in closing. But now, what of his specific countersto the "pitfalls"I uncover in The Prince, especially regardingthe Medici residence,the civilian militia, and the building of fortresses?I am afraidthat none of Langton's counters succeed, much less do they require abandoning an interpretationof Machiavelli's pieces of advice as trapsfor the Medici prince. On the issue of residence,Machiavelli advises Lorenzoeither to destroy the city or reside in it. The first choice, far from leading away from the "pitfall,"actually draws the prince toward it. The destruction of Florence,as Machiavelliknows, is an outrageoussuggestionand a practical impossibility.It rendersthe truly dangerous second choice-residing in the cityas the only attractive alternative. Thus, Machiavelliwould give Lorenzothe illusion of choice even as he narrows the

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prince'srangeof possibilities.This is how Machiavelliusually conceivesof the complex world of choices and deceptions; consider also Ligurio'sploys in Mandragola, where he often plays an outrageous choice off against one that seems reasonable to old Nicia but one which will actually compromisehim. As to the dangerof residingin the city, we might recall that the history of republican upheavals in Florencewas in part one of the people'stakingand retakingthe Palazzo Medici, which was vulnerableto mass action in a way the Medici villas in the Tuscan hills were not. Perhaps Machiavelli fondly remembered the ouster of Piero in 1494, when a vengeful Florentine populace drove the family from the palazzo, dragged Donatello's Judithfrom the family gardens,and set it up beforethe palaceof the Signoriawith a new inscription warningwould-be tyrants and praisingcivic liberty. Such an event -of practicalpoliticalas well as symbolic importance-could not have occurred had the Medici prince been fortified beyond the city walls. As Machiavelli understood, to oust a prince a people must have not only the spiritbut also the opportunityto get at him. The matterof Machiavelli's advice concerning "whom to arm" is even more important. I argue that in advising Lorenzo in chapter 20 to "keep his subjects armed" and make "partisans"of them, Machiavellisets still another trap. He lays the groundworkfor a new Florentine civilian militia that could contribute mightily to the destructionof the Medici regime. To convince Lorenzo that new princes regularly arm their subjects, Machiavelli appeals to history but he offers no historical (uncharacteristically) examplesat all to illustratethe aptnessof his advice. Thus, he presentsthe warrant of history to Lorenzo,but the warrantis in fact a sham, for the advisorknows that the practice he describes as routine for
new princes is rare.
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Langton,however, claimsthat Machiavelli offers at least two examples (in chaps. 5 and 21) of new princes who armedtheirsubjects.In CesareBorgiaand Ferdinand Spain, Machiavelliallegedly of provides models whom Lorenzo can use for the course of action outlined in chapter 20. Leavingaside the obvious question -if Borgiaand Ferdinand were such good examples, why did Machiavellinot mention them in Chapter 20?-let us turn instead to a more vital question: are Borgia and Ferdinand,in fact, examples of new princes who "always had their subjects armed?"On this score, I would suggest that it is Langtonwho advances the "careless reading." His misreading hingeson what should be the obvious differencebetween a "civilianmilitia"of the kind Machiavelli recommends Lorenzo, to and a "privatearmy"or "nationaltroops" which he credits Borgia and Ferdinand, respectively, with establishing. To put this otherwise, Machiavellisurely appreciates that in the Romagna (the greatest source of mercenaries) Borgiarelies upon "his own men" and that in Spain Ferdinand taxed the people to build up his military might. As a result, neither was beholdento foreignsoldiers.But nowhere does Machiavelliequatetheiractionswith the creationof an arms-bearing citizenry. And it is the latter that he counsels Lorenzoto create in chapter20, when in essence he advises the rearmingof a formerly republican city. Thus, the examples of Borgia and Ferdinandare neither apt nor relevant in this context. In fact, the example of Borgia could be counterproductive,so Machiavellidoes not mention him, just as he does not mention il Magnifico, Lorenzo's grandfather, who, disarmed the Florentines and was the most successfulof all the Medici lords. These examples are important. Nevertheless, I think that by seizingupon them, Langton ultimately dodges the most important question of all. Regardlessof fit whetherBorgiaor Ferdinand the bill, is

Machiavelli'sParadox
Machiavelli's advice on armingone's subjects helpful counsel for a Medici in

Florence?Langton himself concedes that "creating and maintaining a civilian militia poses risks to a prince'sregime." Preciselysol But in admittingas much he simply begs the crucialquestion;he does not resolve it, nor does he persuasively challenge the contextual and historical evidence I present in order to reveal Machiavelli'sdeception. To counter my interpretation of Machiavelli'sadvice on fortresses, Langton turnsto the Discourses,and notes that there,too, Machiavelliis chary of fortress building and urges that the prince rely insteadupon the good will of his subjects. He seems to imply that on matterswhere there is no contradiction between The Prince and Machiavelli's other writings (especiallythe Discourses)there must be no deceptionat work in The Prince. I see no reason to accept such an interpretation, unless one assumes(as I do not) that everything Machiavelli expresses elsewhere can be read as the "truths"that expose the "lies"of The Prince. If, however, this is Langton'spresumption, he needs to be more consistentin his application of it, and acknowledgenot only those passagesthat seem to point to a sameness in Machiavelli'sadvice, but also account for those passageswhere strikingcontradictionsappear.He makesno attempt,for example, to explain the advice against fortress building in The Prince in terms of Machiavelli's letter to Guicciardini, where Machiavelliequates the successful Medicean conquest of Florenceprecisely with the building of a fortezza. Nor-to take another example of importance in my essay but unacknowledgedby Langton-does he confrontthe counselagainst liberalityin ThePrincewith Machiavelli's treatmentof it in the History of Florence as a valuableMediceantactic to maintain power. Nor does Langtontry to explain how Machiavelli'sdictate to Lorenzo to "buildupon the people" and be wary of
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the nobility squares with his straightforward comment to Pope Leo that a prince in Florence"despoiledof Nobility cannot sustain the burden of the Principality,"and thus must create a "middle group" between himself and the general public (Pansini 1969, 620). By simply asserting that the latter is a "strained interpretation,"Langton again sidesteps the intriguingand difficultissues. He certainly offers no explanationfor them. Pitfalls aside, Langton'sinterpretation fails finally to confront the methodological premisebehind my readingof The Prince-that genuinelyhistoricalstudy is the indispensableprecondition for interpreting political texts of the past. Other than a few (unsubstantiated)assertions about Florentinerepublicanism,Langton offers no historical reading of Machiavelli's treatise and uses descriptions the author could not in principle have accepted as his. So, for example, we are given the nineteenth-century languageof "nationalist aspirations" the twentiethor century conception of a "viable geopolitical entity." Furthermore,Langton would have us accept an ahistorical description of The Prince and the Discoursesas works of politicalliterature.As noted, he describesthe former as written in a "bureaucratic 'issues-and-options' style,"and rhetorically asks why, if my he interpretationis correct, did Machiavelli not simply write a "short, snappy, meretricious memorandum?"But these are anachronisms. The bureaucraticmemorandum and the "white paper"were not literary options in the fifteenth century, and within the existing genre of the Mirror of Princes tracts The Prince is remarkablyshort and snappy. In his conclusion, Langtonshifts from an ahistorical to a suprahistoricalinterpretation of Machiavelli'sintentions. He praisesthe Florentinerepublicanfor having the prescience to anticipate nothing less than "the political evolution" of Europedown throughthe nineteenthcen-

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tury. Among its lesser faults, this credits Machiavelliwith a vision of politicalcreation as a linearprogress,a view he did not hold nor could have held. To the contrary, his own clearlyexpressedvision of the cyclical movement of glory, decay, and regeneration, or anacyclosis, has more to do with the revolution of order and disorder than with the evolution of "mass" from "absolutist" politics (D'Amico 1984, 132). Even more troubling, however, is Langton'sevident willingness to subscribeto an overly simplified view of Europeanhistory-only to reconstitute Machiavelli's contribution both to it and to political thought more generallyas a grand moment in the telos of the modem nation-state. Writing history backwards,Langtonwould have us understand Machiavelli as "350 years ahead of his time"! Commentatorsmay well take issuewith this or that interpretation of The Prince, includingthe "politics of deception" find there.ButI would like I to suggest that we can make headway in our controversies over the meaning of Machiavelli's little treatise only if we return it to the period in which it was written and examine Machiavelli'sintentions within his own time, not aheadof it.
MARYG. DIETz

References
Baron, Hans. 1961. Machiavelli: The Republican Citizen and the Author of The Prince. English Historical Review 299:217-53. Brucker, Gene. 1969. Renaissance Florence. Berkeley: University of California Press. D'Amico, Jack. 1984. Order from Disorder: Machiavelli on "Cyclicity." Canadian Journal of Italian Studies 7:132-47. Dietz, Mary G. 1986. Trapping the Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception. American Political Science Review 80:777-99. Hale, John Rigby. 1961. Machiavelli and the Renaissance. London: English University Press. Hale, John Rigby. 1977. Florence and the Medici. London: Thames & Hudson. Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1950. The Prince and the Discourses. Trans. Luigi Ricci and Christian Detmold. New York: Modern Library. Najemy, John. 1982. Machiavelli and the Medici: The Lessons of Florentine History. Renaissance Quarterly 35:551-76. Pansini, Anthony. 1969. Niccolo Machiavelli and the United States of America. Greenvale, NY: Greenvale. Plumb, John H. 1961. The Italian Renaissance. New York: American Heritage. Pocock, John G. A. 1975. The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rubinstein, Nicolai. 1968. Constitutionalism and Medici Ascendency. In Florentine Studies. ed. author. London: Farber & Farber. Schevill, Ferdinand. 1936. History of Florence from the Founding of the City through the Renaissance. New York: Ungar. Skinner, Quentin. 1978. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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