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Le Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs de France


ts of all the Jews deported from France and history of each transport)

656 p.,


La Solution Finale de la Question Juive;

ssai sur ses principes dans Ie Reich et en France sous I'Occupation,

208 p.,


by Dr. Joseph BILLIG.

Die EndlOsung der Judenfrage in Frankreich,

Deutsche Dokumente (136), 244 p., by Serge KLARSFELD.


Works edited by Serge Klarsfeld in 1978 and intended for the Centers of Historical Research on the Holocaust:


of two

thousand documents





in France concerning the "Final Solution" in France (1940-1944).

Presented in chronological order with

detailed index and tables.

ection of several hundred documents from the Service for Jewish Affairs, the /1-112, of the Sichereitsdienst-SD (1937-1939).

Documentary files concerning the Nazi criminals (Kurst Lischka, Herbert Hagen, Ernst Heinrichshon) responsible for the deportation of the Jews from France. They have been indicted and will be tried in 1979 in Cologne.

The autobiography of Beate Klarsfeld, Wherever They May Be. Was published in 1975 by The Vanguard Press, New York (344 p.).



Documentation, by Beate Klarsfeld, was published in 1969

by Melzer Verlag, Darmstadt, with a foreword by Heinrich BOll.



The Launching of the "Final Solution" by Dr. Joseph BILLIG

The Existence of Gas Chambers The Number of Victims and the Korherr Report by Georges WELLERS

Edited by Serge KLARSFELD

Translated from the Original French




The BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION - New York 1978 The Public Committee for the Support of BeateKlarsfeld, Jerusalem Association pour Ie Jugement des Criminels Nazis qui ont opere en France, Paris


"'~~ LIBRARy OJt-
"'~~ LIBRARy OJt-

This book is dedicated to the memory of


(June 29, 1925-August 24, 1978) Founder and President-General Director of PRONUPTIA He was a good, generous and creative Man, who lost his mother, father and brother at Auschwitz. e helped us to publish "The Memorial of the Depol1ation of the Jews from France." He was killed in a tragic automobile accident, which also took the lives of his son, Marc, and his daughter in law, Colette.












l--' dJ

\ \)\J.\;~~

Copyright © 1978 by Klarsfeld All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any form. FIRST PRINTING







The Launching of the "Final Solution" by Dr. Joseph BILLIG

Part I: The Jewish Question until 1941.

1. The Incubation Period of Hitler's Anti-Jewish Action,







Jewish Emigration during the Incubation Period of the "Final Solution"

The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action Isolated from Mass Movements

The Jewish Question in the Gestapo and in the SD before the War

The Preparation of the "Final Solution": the SS Destined to Inspire the Gestapo

The Service for Jewish Affairs within the SD, the II-112, under the Sign of "Zionism" (1935-1938)

7. The SD and the Zionist Emigration


The Anticipation of the "Final Solution":

Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna

The Efforts of Hagen to Force Jewish Emigration in Various Countries




The Men of the II-112 Confronted with the Jews

The Passage to the "Final Solution" in the Reich



Reichssichereitshauptamt (September 1939)

Eichmann's Task from September 1939 to March 1941

12. The Integration of the Men of


the II-112 into


















Jur lne

--r Inat ~·olutlon".

1. The Order of the Fiihrer (Der Fiihrerbefehl) in General

2. Public Announcements of the "Final Solution" by the Fiihrer and Chancellor of the Reich

3. The Announcements of the "Final Solution" by Hitler before his Dining Companions at the Fiihrer's Head- quarters

4. The Orders of Hitler to Himmler

5. The "Final Solution" by a Jewish Colonial Reserve (Summer 1940-Spring 1941)

6. The Order of the Fiihrer for the "Final Solution" in the Occupied Soviet Regions (Spring 1941-Summer 1941) The Principle of the "Final Solution" by Exterminatory Deportation to the Occupied Regions ("East of the East") (Autumn 1941) Hitler's Approval of the Generalized "Final Solution" and the Conference of Wannsee (January 1942) The "Final Solution" by Gas Chambers in the Concen- trationary System (Summer 1942-0ctober 1944) The "Final Solution", "Page of Glory" Which Will Have Neither to be Written Nor to be Forgotten



The Existence of Gas Chambers by Georges WELLERS

The Gas Chambers at Auschwitz '"

l. A few Documents from Archives ~. Declarations of Members of the SS

I. Statements of Former Prisoners at Auschwitz

The Gas


of Gerstein Kurt Gerstein and His Report






, "Proofs" that the Gerstein Testimony is a "Forgery" .

~. Irrefutable Documents f. The Gerstein Report at Nuremberg ;. Stockholm Confirms























6. The Gerstein Testimony and the Insincerity of its Detractors


7. The Gas Chambers at Belzec



8. A Mysterious Visitor and His "Testimony" (?)



9. "Witness X" and the Legend of the Mad SS




The Number of Victims and the Korherr Report by Georges WELLERS


1. Convergence of Diverse Estimates



2. Rassinier's Figures ¥d His Methods



3. The Hungarian ·Chapter



4. The Korherr Report (December 31, 1942)



5. The Korherr Report Completed (March 31, 1943)



6. Genocide in the U.S.S.R., in the Baltic Countries and

in Bessarabia


































7. Results of the Census by Nationality of the Population

of the U.S.S.R




8. Number of Victims Recorded



9. Number of Dead and of Survivors






















Appendix A: The First Korherr Report (December 31, 1942), the German Text


Appendix B: The First Korherr Report (December 31, 1942), the English Translation


Appendix C: The Korherr Report Completed (March 31, 1943), the German Text


Appendix D: The Korherr Report Completed (March 31, 1943), the English Translation


Appendix E: Korherr: His Past and Present Activities, His Photograph in 1978










We have taken the initiative not only for the conception of this book,

Our objective is

its edition and publication, but also for its distribution.

to provide people of good faith with the precise facts which incontestably refute the lies of the Neo-Nazi propaganda relevant to the Holocaust. Those propagandists who seek to rehabilitate Nazism are perfectly aware that what marks it indelibly is the infamous genocide of the Jewish people. They take advantage of the credibility of the public and the more or less unconscious desire of the latter that this nightmarish mass murder had never take place. That is why the Neo-Nazis have during recent years launched an offensive which has had a certain success. Their principal themes are the following: that Hitler was not responsible for the "final solution", that the gas chambers as a mean of exterminating the Jews never existed, that the number of Jewish victims has been very considerably exaggerated. This propaganda is internationally co-ordinated, and the most virulent of these Neo-Nazi publications appear in the major languages. In the following pages, we shall give striking examples of this propaganda which seeks to weaken the cause of the Jews in general as well as that of Israel. At our own risk, we have been leading the combat throughout the world and on the spot to challenge the impunity of the Nazi criminals and the development of Neo-Nazism. We have also decided to make publicly known the unequivocal refutations of this propaganda and to bridge certain obvious gaps regarding the history of the Holocaust. In addition our publications are distributed free of charges to research centers on the Holo- caust and to sources of information every-where: major university and public libraries, the mass media. We may cite as an example our "Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs de France", in which we reproduced official Nazi data (last names, first names, places and dates of birth, nationalities) concerning the 80,000 Jews who were victims of the "final solution" in France, as well as the description of each convoy. This work has put an end to the propagande which claimed that the Jews in France have been spared. As for the collections of documents that we have published and our documentary files, their importance as aids to research is evident. They have also just permitted the indictment in Cologne of the former SS Chiefs, Kurst Lischka and Herbert Hagen, who before operating in France were in Berlin respectively Chief of the Anti-Jewish Service of the Gestapo and Chief of the Anti-Jewish Service of the SD. "The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania" is based on irrefutable German documents. Of particular interest is the report drawn up for Himmler by the Inspector of Statistics of the SS, Richard Korherr. The latted added up with great precision the Jewish losses (as of December 31, 1942 and as of March 31, 1943). An appendix contains the totality of the reports in German accompanied by an English translation. They are publicly printed for the first time in an unabridged version. Moreover, Y/e have succeeded in locating the infinitely valuable Korherr himself in 'Lower Saxony, where we were able to speak with him and take his photograph. The Neo-Nazis will therefore be unable to claim that Korherr


question were falsified or ~--- even - _ •• invented. 4UU UUU5"IaLlUU eUlU {nat tne documents in


The notes contain the original text of the quotations concerning the

The English translation can thus be easily compared to

the German by those who have any doubts.

We hope that our endeavours to provide documentation as well as our

launch an appeal to

direct action

our readers for help so that our foundation may continue to undertake similar projects which are just as necessary.

"final solution".


receive effective support, and we

Beate and Serge KLARSFELD.


at the Center


assification numbers consisting of capital letters followed by an Arabic numeral











)IIowed by an Arabic one are the numbers of documents conserved

f Contemporary Jewish

Documentation in

Paris; for

example (XXXVII-l 22).

re those

lr example (PS-446).

of documents










from the Archives x of the International Military Tribunal; FOREWORD The Neo-Nazi weekly, denying the Holocaust,


The Neo-Nazi weekly,

denying the Holocaust, circulates freely in the country where the genocide was

"National-Zeitung," circulation 110,000, propaganda organ

organized and perpetrated



Arg. 75,. p_, Auatr.·,sot, Berg. 2OFN' DIn.3,!I !Cr. 1 FlnnL 2,-Fmk. J GrIoch.20 Dr. I HoD. ,,shll./lrak200OI./lllL UOL I KaR,·,40SI Kuw.200nl.1 Ub.1.5P11 Port.15!M1./ SeudIlt.2,S RI/SDdatr.-,3CI R./TOr1t






IVar• .,1.'

Israel billel wieder zur Kasse



.,1.' Israel billel wieder zur Kasse Erpressung - mit 6-Millionen-Liige .- Israel once again demands money;

mit 6-Millionen-Liige


wieder zur Kasse Erpressung - mit 6-Millionen-Liige .- Israel once again demands money; blackmail with the

Israel once again demands money; blackmail with the lie of the 6 million

Klarsfeld-Ban,de contra Oberst Rudel Dilrfen -Juden sich alles erlauben?Is. 2





tt.-,SO I IBolg.20FnI Dan.3,51C •• 1 f!nlll.2,-ftftk,/Gr,-cn.20D •• /HoIL1,5hll/lm .200fiIo/lTa!.350L/J[OI\


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NeuerGaskammer-Schwindel aufgedeckt

New fraud on gas chambers discovered



t;. 71,- "-I AuW.·.so,/s.lg.2G FAIl DIII.:s,s !Cr. I FInnl.2,.FtU./GMch.20Dr./ HoI!. 1,ShlLltnUot




2,SRI/8IIda!r.-,3CIR./TGIt. a £/USA-AO./V


Die LUgen g!gen Hitler

Neue Erpressungen gegen Deutschland


The lies against Hitler


The lies against Hitler UNBEYn(LTIGTE VEAGANGENHEIT Der Schwindel des 20. Jahrhunderts Das Ende der

Der Schwindel des 20. Jahrhunderts

Das Ende der 6-Millionen-Liige

.Ind. Ole NATIONAL_ZEITUNG hal dem_

Von Prof. Dr, Arthur R. Bulz






welle. Wenn dn .GclehrIN'· test.lellt. dna











bb 19-19, die

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toll! gcmllll lfingol vo.hand.ner RegeJn IUr





Wie Meinung gemacht


In den USA. dcm 'Dtstichllchcn Vorrell••

g~~cn~::~,6~~~:~~~~'~~~ :~~Ir:;;~: :~~~"~·,a~~:;;u;~r:'"'~~CI,~r;ue~~Rne,~ ~~~;~~I~~I~rl~~d-&"C~~I~I"f~I~:~:












<=hem Grundo nu<=h Immor -

.Ich m!t clnor

~Ovie!~lelltrest: Der amerikanische ;~~~;:~~~f::~~y~~~~~;~;E£:::::: ~~~~~~~::~ll~;i1~f~~:~7!~~yn;t€~ ~~:~~:~~~~;t:~~J·ul~~~n_gt;~~~.~~r~ ~~~I~~~:U~~;Bd1~"';~:~:~I~ill'I~~;~

The hoax of the 20th century; the end of the lie of the 6 million

6 Millionen vergaste Juden als Schwindel entlarvt!


Neue Dokumentation aus Amerika IS. 5


"6 million Jews gassed" discovered a hoax


IPlIllB lfI8AZ 8. IPlfllB


•• lfJlPfJIJa.Tf

lfI8AZ 8. IPlfllB fPWBlfJlPltBlPlfI •• lfJlPfJIJa.Tf by A.R.BUTZ .111<1 {II h(>r~ lilerE> likt,


IPlfllB fPWBlfJlPltBlPlfI •• lfJlPfJIJa.Tf by A.R.BUTZ .111<1 {II h(>r~ lilerE> likt, art'


{II h(>r~







PLEASE help us spread THE TRUTH!

Order copies of THE HOAX ,OF THE 20th CENTlJRY at these prices:




Liberty Bell Publications

Reedy, W.Va. 25270



Preface de Manfred Roeder

LE MENSONGE D'AUSCHWITZ Preface de Manfred Roeder La pone du camp de concentration d'Auschwitz The lie

La pone du camp de concentration d'Auschwitz

The lie of Auschwitz

Did Six Million


by Richard Harwood

5 copies for

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Die Wahrheit iiber die Judenmorde

Wie lange noch Erpressung der Deutschen?


The truth on death of the Jews ' How much longer will the blackmail of Germans last?

Wer erfand den Schwindel von

6 Millionen vergasten Jude"? / s, 6


h;.75,.,_, Aull ••


S I 8.1,.20 F,., Dii1l.3,5 Ie., 1 Finn!.2,.flllk. I G, •• 1 Hall 1.5 hR I r

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20(1 All/lib. 1,5 Pi I 'orl. 15 £.c.1 SaucIi"., 2,S III SOdaf,• .,lO 1.1 Tan., 8 £IUSA -.90S/Vo •• -.14.£

So lust das Fernsehen

lie das deutsche Volk belrogen wird

der br.l~n Ilffenl-

Ilthk~1 an den Sendungen deT Rund·








f ld



ars e weI 't e re

d' t


Es bell.hl slch





las ",he pOIlt/5th' Gerlchl, mehrlach Programm. und Zwor mil haben Nach·





unk ~unllbhanglg~ und selnll Sendun-

.lldjeRedeseln kann. Es bl$lehl line qllllgbcrr. UnlerwDrllgkell gegenDber

Anschla"ge un an

Reuter, Miinchen ~~~:~;:e~~gll~eS:ln::'~~~:~k:::~:~~ Der franzQsische Rechtsanwalt Serge thelen slth wenig darum, Ole Wltk- Klarsfeld hat weitere "Vorfalle" nach

:~~~::II:~:I~:::~:nd~:~:~e:g:~~ dem Muster des Bom~ena12schlags auf

das Verlagshaus der In Munchen her- ausgegebenen rechtsextremen utJaro-


lnen, uml IS bntehl ebenso .Int oft rarsieId VOn Juden verubten Attentat

war Angaben der Polizei zufolge ein Sachschaden von 10000 bis 15000 Mark entstanden. Die ein Kilo schwere Bom-



:k~~~:ntllpaS!~:u:~e;D~;:n~s:~ ~lzeitungll angekii~digt

:haml!)u lInkslasllgkelt der Pro- timme, die .51th stlwohl In der Aus·


Ind~poliusche~Nogazlnenundln- I be. war am Samstalt im Archivr~um des

Sonderrechte fOr Bandenchef Klarsfeld

im Archivr~um des Sonderrechte fOr Bandenchef Klarsfeld Who invented the hoax of the 6 million gassed

Who invented the hoax of the 6 million gassed Jews? Special right for the head of the Klarsfeld gang The T. V. lies in this way; how the German people are slandered

lieWahrheit HberHitlersKls

tne truth on Hitler's concentration camps, by Prof. Dr. Butz


or s

ac now e gmen s

of these

most valuable studies. Those or Mr. Wellers appeared in "Le Monde Juif" (No. 86-1977 and 89-1978) and that of Dr. Billig in "La Solution Finale de la Question Juive", a work which our Foundation published in 1978.


should like to express our gratitude to

the two



Born in Saint-Petersbourg, Russia, in 1900, Joseph Billig received his Ph. D. from the University of Berlin in 1929, In 1939, Dr. Billig enlisted

in the French Army, was wounded in combat and from 1940 to 1945 was

a prisoner of war in Germany. In Nuremberg, he participated in the

work of the American prosecution, particularly in the case of A. Rosenberg.

Until 1976, he was historian at the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris.












works, the titles of which we translate here from the original French:

-Germany and Genocide (Nazi Plans and Realizations).

. -The General Commission for Jewish Affairs. Centre, Paris, 1955.


Ed. du Centre,

Paris, 1950.

Three volumes, Ed. du








Operations of the Hitlerian Reich.

Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1963.

-Hitlerism and the Concentrationary System. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1967. -Kiesinger or a Subtle Fascism, Extra-Dienst Verlag, West-Berlin, 1969.


Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1973. -The Institute for Studies of Jewish Affairs. Ed. du Centre, Paris,











-The Final Solution of









Born in Russia in 1905, Georges Wellers studied at the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Moscow. From 1932 to 1975, he carried on research in physiology in Paris, where he was named director of a research laboratory at the Faculty of Medicine. From 1968 to 1974, he was also an adviser to the Dean of the Faculty. Laureate of the Academy of Science and of the National Academy of Medicine, he is the author of more than 150 articles published by the scientific press in France and abroad. He is a member of various learned societies and is Honorary Research Lecturer at the National Center of Scientific Research. Mr. Wellers holds the decorations of Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, Chevalier of the National Order of Merit.


oy tne Gestapo and deported to Auschwitz. He was liberated from Buchenwald by the American Army on April 11, 1945.

Georges Weller is the author of numerous works relative to the Nazi

concentrationary system and the deportation of the Jews.


cite the following titles which we have translated for the English-

speaking reader:

From them we


~•• ~vVVUIU"1 .lL-, i::f'ti,


-From Draney to Auschwitz. Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1946.

-The Mass Arrests of December 12, 1941. No. 14-15.

-The French Population Confronted with the Persecution of the Jews.

"Le Monde Juif" , 1949,



Juif" ,

1949, No.


-The Raid of July 16 and 17,

1942, in

the Paris Area.

"Le Monde

Juif" , 1949, No.

21, 22,


-Collective Resistance in the





"Le Monde

Juif" , 1949, No.


-An Historical Account of the Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto.

Monde Juif" ,





Ed. de I'UNADIF, Paris, 1965

and 1978. -The Hunt for the Jews. "Historia", Paris 1972, No. 26. -The Yellow Star at the Time of Vichy. Ed. Fayard; Paris 1973.

-The Final Solution of the Jewish Question and the Neo-Nazi Mytho-

-The Nazi Concentrationary System.


"Le Monde Juif" , 1978, No. 86.





of Historical Facts. "Le Monde Juif" ,

1978, No. 89.

Georges Wellers is a member of the Executive Committee of the Center of Contemporary Jewish Documentation and the editor of the review, "Le Monde Juif". He was the only French witness at the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem.

of Quality Photo London, without



been possible.

whose generous assistance

We should also like



to thank Mr.



Phillip Portugal



the publication of this work would not

Serge Klarsfeld.



by Dr. Joseph BILLIG


Part I The Jewish Question


1. The Incubation Period of Hitler's Anti-Jewish Action


Hitler was as prudent in the launching of his anti-Jewish action as he was in demonstrating that the Third Reich was destined, by expansion, to become Great Germany. In February and March 1933, anti-Jewish exactions took place in several localities. (1) The terms "Judeo-Bolshevism" and "J udeo- plutocracy" also continued to form part of the Nazi vocabulary, which was henceforth endowed with the dignity of being a governmental one. This alarming news arrived abroad and set off protests in the interna- tional press. Hitler attributed these anti-Nazi reactions to Jewish emigration from the Reich and retorted immediately by officially order- ing, at the end of March, the boycott of Jewish businesses, doctors anG lawyers. (2) This boycott lasted but one day, the first of April. Grebbels noted on April third: "The propaganda of atrocities has diminished very considerably. That is why the Cabinet has decided to not resume the boycott for the moment." He added that this means of pres- sure would be maintained as a menace without actually being applied. Until November 1938, Hitler carefully endeavored to avoid all public demonstrations against the Jews. Until November 1938 (with the exception of Austria, annexed to the Reich), the exclusion of Jews from the professions was effected with caution and a certain hesitation. The first legislative act against the social position of the Jews of Germany was taken some days after the boycott. In the law of April 7, 1933, on the reform of the Civil Service, the prohibition of Jews in public office was implied. A law of April 25 introduced a quota for Jews in the schools and universities. The law of September 29, 1933, creat.ed the Chamber of Culture of the Reich, to which writers, journalists and artists were obliged to be10ng. This law excluded non-Aryans but allowed for exceptions. It was only in January 1939 that Grebbels insistantly ordered the "dejudaiZing of the Chambers." (3)







To these measures were added ini tiatives which were more or less local and occasionally private. Exclusions were decreed from various occupations having to do with public service (for example, that of doctor employed by the Social Security); certain employers laid off their Jewish employees, (4) sometimes under pressure from the Party. Jewish schoolchildren and students were prevented from sitting for cer- tain examinations. As for Jews in the economy, no general rules restrained their economic activity. But the anti-Jewish policy of the regime created worry and uncertainty among the Jewish people, an insecurity which sometime~ encouraged them to sell their belongings at

a loss.

Finally, the psychological climate of scornful hatred with regard to the Jew was marked by vexing prohibitions (6) decreed locally to close public places and prohibit use of public equipment "to Jews and dogs". The Nazi authorities played down this point in anticipation of the Olym- pic Games which were to be held in Berlin in the summer of 1936. But his attenuation was temporary (CDXXXVII-4S). Thus Hitler's regime humiliated the Jews, but (except for uncontro- lable incidents) without violence. As Hitler proclaimed on March 27, 1933, on calling for the boycott: "Not one hair of the Jews will be twisted." The Jewish population, transformed into a body foreign to the nation, could still live by collaborating with it: the Jews were not excluded from the economy and in addition even a man such as Greb- bets tolerated a few of them in cultural affairs. A number of the most distinguished professions remained open to them. The prohibition to practice medicine dates from July 1938 and that to practice law from September of the same year. The most striking blow cast against the German Jews between 1933 and 1938 was the promulgation of the two laws adopted in Nuremberg by the Reichstag meeting during the Congress of the Party in September 1935. It is a question of the legal and dishonoring alienation of the German Jew from his non-Jewish fellow citizens. The law on citizen- ship enacted on September IS, 1935, established the differenc.e be- tween the German citizen, endowed with civil rights, and the dependent of the Reich, who did not possess these rights. A second law of the same date forbade marriage and sexual relations between a Jew and a person of Germain or related blood. The law transformed the Jews into a group of outcasts in the midst of the German people since it was entitled "Defense of the German Blood and Honour." Before November 1938, the Jews (aside from those of Austria annex- ed to the Reich in March 1938) were not reduced by the regulations to

a miserable life of inactivity. Nevertheless, their condition of pariahs

little by little weakened the foundation of their existence and plunged them progressively into misery and disarray. We may cite the report presented in July 1938 by the Jewish communities of Vienna and of the Reich at the Conference of Evian. This conference was attended by reprensentatives of thirty-two states meeting to discuss the possibilities

Certain non-Jews took advantage of this. (S)


The Incubation Period

of organizing the emigration of Jews from the Third Reich. concluded that

The report

"One uas the right to hope that the problem of emigration, which has become a question of life or death for the German Jews, can be resolved. We hope tllat the Conference of Evian will achieve its worthy goal at a moment when a fourth of tIle Jewish population of Germany cannot assure its means of existence and is dependent on public charity, when thousands expect iastir'b unemployment, when tens of thousands of young people

wanting to work have l6st their jobs



It is thus that the Nazi authorities from 1933 to 1938 prepared the ground for Hitler to launch his solution to the Jewish question, at the time that the Third Reich was taking its first steps towards the creation of Great Germany. This solution could consist in nothing other tha;, the total elimination of the Jews from the German vital espace. Tht decisive step was to be taken in winter 1938 by the dispossession of tnr Jews: economic Aryanisation. Grering, as Chairman of the Four-Year Plan, presided over the spoliation.

detenoration of the quality of jewish

Towards the end of 1938, the

life was such that the Minister of the Economy announced on December 20, 1938, a decree (CXLV-SSO) especially conceived to combat ,un- employment among the Jews. It instituted their obligatory hiring fm

manual From work. January 1939 on, the situation was ripe for direct action in the


liquidation of their presence from the Reich. It is at that time that Grering was to be given the reponsibility for turning the Jewish question

of Hitler's solution

to the Jewish question,

in the sense

of the

over to the Gestapo. The first form of the solution was forced emigra- tion, already applied in Austria since spring 1938. It was convulsively inaugurated in the Reich in November 1938 by a brutal operation of internment rapidly organized with the promise of liberation to those who demonstrated their willingness to emigrate.

2. Jewish Emigration during the Incubdtion Period of the" Final Solution"

The Nazi authorities as of 1933 were interested in the development of the emigration of the Jews. They envisaged Palestine as the principal destination, and it was therefore Zionist emigration which was favou- rized. The principle was to keep the greater part of the emigrant's possessions: a fraction of them was destined to finance the emigration of Jews who were poor and the rest, while respecting the interests of the Reich's policy on foreign currencies, was destined to assure the Jews the means of settlement required of the immigrants by the countries receiving them. In August 1933, the Ministry of the Economy of the Reich concluded an agreement named Hahvara (which in Hebrew means "transfer") with Zionist organizations. According to this agreement,







the emigrant was to pay in marks the sum to be transferred; this was to cover a part of the price of German exports to Palestine (the other part was to be paid to the Germans in cash) whereas the emigrant upon arrival was to receive in Palestinian money the equivalent of the sum

he had paid in marks.

The Ministry

of Foreign Affairs



A procedure

which favourized the birth of a Jewish state, and yet in Palestine, to them seemed inacceptable. Rosenberg and his collaborators professed the same point of view hostile to Zionist emigration. But Hitler and with him Himmler and Heydrich, thus the Gestapo and the SD as well, insisted until the end of 1939 on the emigration to Palestine: the Zionist of emigration Jewish emigration. was by its very nature the strongest current in the movement

Ribbentrop himself were opposed to this agreement. (8)

It would manifestly be absurd to infer the existence of a sort of sym- pathy between the Nazis and Zionism. This curious attitude of the Hitlerian authorities may be compared to the attitude of Hitler himself with regard to the Soviet Union at the time of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact in September 1939. This agreement was favour- able to the immediate interests of the Soviet Union, a sworn enemy in

the eyes of the Third Reich; but Hitler concluded it even so.

He was

certain that

at a given moment

he would surprise

the enemy

by his

attack. The leaders of the Soviet Union were conscious of this as were the representatives of the Zionist organizations in what concerned their own case: they received at the same time immigrants and German exports, whereas the Reich emptied its territory of the Jews and gained currency for its exports to Palestine.

The Nazi authorities gave evidence of their primordial interest in the emigration of Jews to Palestine, but they neglected no. possibility of emigration to another destination, being always understood that the greater part of the Jewish patrimony remain to profit the Reich and that the regulations concerning. foreign currencies be respected. At the end of the Conference of Evian, an international commission presided over by the American Rublee was formed. It reached an agreement with the Ministry of Finance and that of the Economy of the Reich and was founded on the same principle as that of Hahvara and valid for diverse countries of immigration. Only 25 % of the Jewish fortune could be affected by the new agreement, the rest remained at the disposition of the Reich. (9) The Rublee agreement was concluded in January 1939 on behalf of the Germans, thanks to the efforts of Schacht, opposed by Ribbentrop, who wanted po collaboration of foreign states in resolving the Jewish question in Germany. However, foreign countries opened their borders but parcimoniously to the driven-out emigrants.

3. The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action Isolated from M ass Movements

The propaganda directed by Grebbels, Rosenberg and Streicher accli- matized the anti-Jewish spirit among the German masses. It was


The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action

necessary to obtain the consent or at least the toleration of the people

for what

hand, all participation of the masses, except at two particular moments (the boycott of 1933 and the "Kristallnacht" of November 1938) was forbidden. The anti-Jewish movement was to be strictly hermetic, thus centralized; but in spite of that it was to be known as one of the "great actions" of the regime. The Party, a mass movement, occasionally went beyond these principles. Severe instructions coming from the top were then addressed to the diverse Nazi authorities. In March 1934, the Nazi professional organization for commerce and artisanry mani- fested its intention to provoke a boycott of Jewish stores. Rudolf Hess sent it a severe warning (CXLV-519) condemning every anti-Jewish action undertaken without an order from the FUhrer, given the reper- cussions of such comportment abroad. In April 1935, Hess sent a circular to all members of the Party to warn them that all personal contact with a Jew and, on the other hand, all spontaneous anti-Jewish activity would be sanctioned by exclusion from the Party. In August of the same year, R. Ley, chief of organization of the Party, pronounced in a circular the same prohibition to the Party and its ramifications (the SA, the SS, etc.). At the same time, Himmler addressed the following order to the members of the SS:

the central authority would do to the Jews. On the other

"1) I strictly forbid any individual action on the part of any member whatsoever of the SS against the Jews; 2) The solution of the Jewish question is a matter in the competence of the Fuhrer as it has been until now for the solution of all questions, and not of no matter what individual; 3) Violations, even slight, will be penalized by exclusion from the SS." (10)

of the Interior, and R. Hess

addressed a strictly confidential order (CXLV-531) to the civil and police administrations and to the directors of Party districts forbidding all anti-Jewish demonstrations at the time of the assassination of Gustloff, chief of the Swiss Nazis, by a Jew. In a circular of April 21, 1936 (CDXXXVII-46), the Ministry of the Interior clearly emphasized to all regional administrations that in the Jewish question, which was developing by stages, there was no reason

to go ahead of the government, whose activity had not yet exceeded the regulation of citizenship and had not yet touched upon economic questions. This circular reveals that Hitler was still waiting for the moment when he would inaugurate the solution of the Jewish question. But neither during this waiting period nor during the future activity was the German citizen to be excited. It 'was sufficient that he be comprehen- sive about the rude measures that the FUhrer would take or approve against the Jews. This detachment as to Jewish affairs is underscored in a work which analyzes the reports edited by the SD on the internal situation of the Reich: (11)

"In the echo that Hitler and his conception of the world provoked among the German people, anti-Semitism scarcely played the central role which it no doubt held in the ideology of Hitler."

In February 1936, Frick, Minister








It seems to us that it would be inaccurate to suppose that this indif- ference covered a tacit opposition. The citizen participates in an event as something inevitable because the one in whom he has confidence energetically proclaims it necessary.

This state of mind characterizes, too, with slight differences, the per- sonalities profoundly engaged in the Hitlerian movement. Speer,


Third Reich, wrote in his memoirs:

of the War Economy, and one of the principal figures of the

"I have always been surprised by the slight trace which Hitler's anti-Semitic

The hatred which Hitler professed for the Jews

remarks have left on me


impression on me."

so natural

to me

at the time

that it did not





In another passage he wrote that he did not feel





hunt for




crats and Jehovah's Witnesses about whom I heard in my entourage."

that." He thought (12)







"not to get mixed up in

Such an attitude explains that those who executed the Hitlerian action against the Jews had not to feel marked by the horror of their task. They were attached with the other artisans of the Third Reich to a single and unique work, albeit strictly compartmentalized, a work which the Reich created. An Eichmann would certainly not have succeeded in the gigantic task of Speer. Speer would probably have been neither able nor willing to support the vision of horror with which Eichmann's

activity was impregnated.

commanded the ensemble and in whom they had confidence saw the necessity for the work of each of them. There was no passion for the

object of the mission, but only for its accomplishment. this in his memoirs:

But both of them knew that the person who

Speer expressed

"I have the impression that this desperate race that I was running with time, this look of a madman that I kept perpetually fixed on the figures of production and on efficiency curves, had smothered all consideration and

all human sentiments in me

I did not see in the faces of the internees (in the concentration camps) the reflection of the physionomy of the regime, whose existence I was striving


months." (13)

What bothers me much more is rather that













In contrast to the case of Speer, master of Hitler's war economy, the


inseparably from the direct and constant vision of this physionomy of the regime, given that it was in themselves that the expression of the atrocity of Hitlerism culminated.

of zeal was

in the case

of the chiefs. of the "final solution"


In the Gestapo and the SD

4. The Jewish Question in the Gestapo and the SD before the War

The Jewish question did not immediately occupy an important place

in the two police bureaus

the SD for what concerns the SS and in the Gestapo for what concerns the State.

Let us first sketch the situation in the Gestapo. Political police units were developed in all the German countries immediately after Hitler's

The two most important centers were those of Bavaria

and Prussia. In Bavaria the political police was presided over by Himmler and directed by Heydrich. Gcering presided over that of Prussia, which he baptized "Geheime Staatspolizei": Gestapo. Its direction was confided to Diels. As of April 1933 its judicial section was endowed with a service for matters concerning Jews, Free-Masons and anti-Nazi emigration. This service was directed by Hasselbacher.

Between 1933 and 1934, Himmler managed progressively to obtain the direction of the political police for all the regions of Germany. In April 1934, he first of all received froin Gcering, as his assistant, res- ponsibility for the Gestapo, the direction of which he entrusted to Heydrich. Under Heydrich, the service of Hasselbacher was transferr- ed from the judicial section to that of "Enemies", main section of the Gestapo, which had already distinguished itself under Diels by the hunt for Communists and other representatives of the left. But Hassel- bacher's activity in the Jewish question remained rather unimportant. However, Himmler and Heydrich rapidly transformed the Gestapo (Prussia) into a central authority which surveyed the political police of all the regions of Germany. We shall note that the Service for Jewish Questions in the Gestapo was attributed the index IIB4.

Although directed by the Reichsfiihrer-SS and by his close collabo- rator, Heydrich, the Gestapo was not confounded with the SD. When Heydrich moved into the Gestapo in Berlin, he brought with him pro-


such as Hasselbacher, who had worked for Diels. The men of the SS were integrated into the Gestapo, but it was the profession-al policemen who were to organize the work.

The section which contained Hasselbacher's office was at first directed by Flesch, who in addition personally handled Jewish matters (CDXXXVII-20). He was replaced in September 1937 for Jewish matters by Freytag. The latter remained in this post until June 1938, to be finally replaced by Kurt Lischka (CDXXXVII-23,2S). (14)

The SD, intelligence service of the SS, was created by Heydrich on Himmler's orders in 1931. It developed a very considerable activity before Hitler's rise to power (intelligence concerning political parties,

of Himmler and Heydrich,

that is


say in

rise to power.

policemen from Munich

all while keeping

on certain









within the Nazi Party itself. (15) It was, however, relatively inactive between 1933 and 1937. Its chief, Heydrich, concentrated his efforts on the Gestapo. The two principal sections of the SD were Section II, "Internal Affairs" (Inland), and Section III, "'Foreign." In Section II an "Adversaries" service was formed; it covered in particular "ideolo- gical adversaries," which included the service concerning Free-Masons (Ill). Within this service a SUb-section for Jewish affairs (figure II 112) was to be created. The first chief of II 112 was von Mildynstein, replaced (16) by Schroeder who kept the position until April 1937. Beydrich had just ordered a more dynamic activity of II 1, and Schroe- der was removed in favour of Wisliceny. But the real impetus was ;not to be given until the second half of 1937. Wisliceny was replaced in November 1937 by Herbert Hagen (CXXXVII-18) (17) whereas all of II 1 received for chief a young and brilliant professor, F.A. Six. The latter, in addition to his activities in the SD, was at the same time to be director of the' Foreign Policy Institute. He had already previously

worked with Hagen.

milated Jews," "Orthodox Jews "-a part which was to remain embryo-

nic-and "Zionism." The first subject was at the beginning treated by

Schroeder and

third was confided to Eichmann. Himmler destined the SD to become the intelligence service inspiring

the Gestapo, while at the same time remaining independent and retain-

ing its statute from the SS and not from the State.

SD a freedom of mind which the functionaries of the police lacked. Those of the SD lent themselves to a careful study of the problems they explored and reached objective points of view from which they drew

but also concerning

the diverse tendencies

which were being

The II 112 was divided into three parts: "Assi-

as of March 1937 by Dannecker (CDXXXVII-18); the

He required of the

what were to them well-founded conclusions. The independence of the SD did not always dispose the Gestapo to collaborate. But this colla- until boration 1937. was established on good terms in the Jewish question, at least


5. The Preparation of the "Final Solution": The SS Destined to Inspire the Gestapo

Hitler waited for more than five years before undertaking the liquida-

He did not,

however, leave the world ignorant of his intentions for so long a period.

It was known that the intended to proceed with this liquidation at a certain time and to entrust this governmental action to the non-govern- mental organization of the SS, the only one capable of executing this solution in a radical manner. In September 1935, he presented to the Reichstag meeting at Nuremberg the three laws of Hitlerism: that of the flag of the Third Reich (flag with the swastika), that of citizenship in blood the Reich, and honour. and finally that concerning the protection of the German

tion of the Jewish presence from the German vital space.


The Preparation of the Final Solution

The Congress during which Hitler proclaimed the three laws was called the Congress of Liberty to underscore that the Reich had re- assumed its military sovereignty (March 1935) by proclaiming obligatory ,military service. On the other hand, the naval agreement with England implied the expansion of its rearmament. As for the domestic situation, the opposition forces were practically mastered by 1935. Far from appeasing him, this situation incited Hitler at the Congress to parti- cularly emphasize his resolution to strike out harshly at the slightest sign of opposition. He declared ~uring the opening speech:

"This spirit of decision to stamp out certain aangers in all circumstances, and even those still in the bud, will not hesitate either, should the situation arise, to transfer functions which are not fitting to the State because they are foreign to its very essence to organizations better adapted to the execution of this task." (18)

Here Hitler denounced the weakness of the professional police, who were still too influenced by considerations of a careful respect of legality to act with full efficiency in a field such as that of the Jewish question. Nevertheless, when the time for the anti-Jewish action arrived, it was the Gestapo which detained the central responsibility. But Heydrich had by that time integrated members of the SD with his executives. As for the "organizations better adapted" evoked by Hitler to rigorously apply a policy of repression, he gave at this same congress a further detail, but a fundamental one, precisely on the subject of the anti-Jewish policy. We know that at this Congress of the Party he convoked the Reichstag at Nuremberg in order to submit the laws already mentioned. In the speech presenting them, Hitler let loose against the anti-Nazi influence of Jews abroad, but also against the agitation which, according to him, they maintained inside the Reich. He proclaimed:

"The third (law)

is the attempt

at a legislative


of a problem

which, in case of a new failure, must be entrusted to the National-Socialist

Party for the definitive solution. Behind the three laws stands the National Socialist Party and with it and behind it the Nation. I ask that you accept these laws." (19)

Hitler spoke in the opening discourse of adequate "organizations" which would act in place of the State. Now he spoke of the Party. But within the Party, among the organizations of repression, the SA was already emasculated. What was left was the SS with its SD. As for the Party as such, in 1938 it attempted to take in hand the economic Aryanization in Austria. At a meeting on October 14, 1938, concern- ing the Four-Year Plan, Grering denounced (PS-1301) the savage acts of members of the Party designated administrators of temporary enter- prises. He also rejected the thesis according to which Aryanization was a Party affair, it being exclusively an affair of the State. It was precisely during this period that the process of integration into the Gestapo of specialists of the Jewish question of the SD began in Austria, annexed to the Reich.







Heydrich in an article of 1936 (20) explained the task of the SO as indispensable to the Gestapo:

"The prerequisite to the struggle of the police against the adversaries is the "ideological struggle" against the principles of the adversary which can only be led by the National-Socialist movement. That is why the Police of the State must work in the closest liaison with the SD of the Reischs- fUhrer -SS, to which the direction of the NSDAP has entrusted, in its position as an organization of the SS as a whole, the intelligence work for the investigation and surveillance of the adversaries on the level of ideas."

Much later (May 1944), Himmler defined the role of men trained in the SO in the exterminatory deportations of Jews to the East. In a speech pronounced during a course on political ideology (21) he said:

"Measures taken within the Reich could not be taken by a police composed only of a civil servants. A corporation which would be bound only by the oath of a civil servant would not have the necessary strength. These measures could be adopted and applied only by an organization composed of National-Socialists moved by a fanatic conviction. The SS is one and affirms itself as apt and has taken the responsibility for this task."

These words of Himmler express retrospectively what Hitler indicated at the congress of the Party in 1935: the vocation of the SS to execute the solution of the Jewish question. In 1944, Himmler spoke of the "final solution" in its definitive sense; the direction of it could only be assumed by men trained in the spirit of the SO. If he considered that these men in particular were prepared to undertake such an action, it is not because he believed them to be especially brutal. On the contrary, in this instance it was rather their flexibility and their intellectual discipline that he judged to be a favour- able condition. Having once established an absolute goal, a flexible nature is necessary if one is to pursue it not blindly, but in adapting the action to fluctuating circumstances. The goal was the total elimination of the Jew from the German vital space. The intellectuals of the SO worked first on planning the emigration, then on the "territorial solu- tion" (attribution of a "reserve" to the Jews); and finally they agreed to the process of extermination. The years of study of the Jewish condi- tion in the world, years spent within the SO, made them proficient at this task. They knew the structures of Judaism and were able to set up a system of administrative collaboration with the Jewish organizations, which in most countries facilitated the deportations. We have quoted the words of Heydrich in an article dating from January 1936 concerning the role of the SO. During the same month and year, the principal Nazi daily, the "Voelkischer Beobachter," explained the SO to the general public:

"Given that the Secret Police of the State, taken up primarily by tasks of the executive branch, is unable to fulfill that task of observation of enemies


The Preparation of the Final Solution '

of the State to the extent required, it is the security service of the Reichs-

a comple-

ment to it will assist it as the intelligence service of the Nazi mouvement and will thus put a great part of the forces of the movement which it has

fUhrer-SS, named by the deputy of the FUhrer, whis as

mobilized at the disposition of the security of the Reich." (22)

We insist upon these 'official explanations of what constituted the SO because, considered by itself, its activities remained in the background of those of the Gestapo, which represented the terrifying face of the regime. However, the greater part of the men who accomplished the most complex and most horrifying task of the "final solution" within the Gestapo came from the SO. In June 1936, Himmler obtained the creation of a unified police for all of the Reich. As of that time his official title was: Reichsfiihrer-SS and Chief of the German Police attached to the Ministry of the Interior of the Reich. He thus disposed not only of the Gestapo but also of the civil police and the criminal police. But the criminal police and the Gestapo became a single office, that of the security police, where H. MUller was Chief of the Gestapo and Nebe that of the criminal police. Thus Heydrich presented himself henceforth as Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) on behalf of the State, and as Chief of the SO on behalf of the SS. The SO possessed within the Reich a whole network of regional and local services which were to gather intelligence on the activities of the opponents of Nazism. This information was then centralized in the

main bureau (Hauptamt) of the SO in Berlin. Until the second half of 1935, that is to say before the "Nuremberg Laws," the activity of the SO was insignificant, at least in what concern- ed the service for Jewish affairs. Nor was the Gestapo at the center of

the anti-Jewish policy of the first period. Neither the exclusion of the

Jews from the public sector as a whole, nor from cultural activities nor from certain professions necessitated by definition the intervention of the Gestapo. It did intervene, however, in case of violation of the regulations and was consulted by other authorities. The role of the

Gestapo began to become important for the Jews only in 1938. historian of the "final solution" in the Reich, wrote (23):


"Already in 1938, the greater part of the important procedures and many


jurisdiction of the Gestapo which was either working on the matter or kept

of the less important

ones concerning

the Jews

were equally within


As for

Jewish affairs in the SO, as early


the end of 1935,

that is

to say, following the legislation proclaimed at Nuremberg in September of the same year, Heydrich gave the order to develop the service of Jewish affairs of the SO, which was still embryonic. Let us recall that the service in question bore in the whole of the SO the index II-1l2.







6. The Service for Jewish Affairs within theSD, the /l-112, under the Sign of "Zionism." (1935-1938)


Jewish affairs. Eichmann, posted in the SS to the SD in 1934, was em- pioyed in the Free-Mason service, where he found the work fastidious. At his trial in Jerusalem he described how he accepted with joy his trans- fer to the sub-service" Judaism," which had just been created. (24)

We have indicated

above that

before 1935

the SD

did not

"One fine



the beginning

the SS-Untersturmflihrer von

He told me that he had organized a new sub-ser-

and asked me if I didn't feel like being

of 1935

Mildenstein came in

vice (Referat) "Judentum"

appointed to it. Happy to get rid of coins and seals, I answered: yes."

Eichmann was to take charge of Zionism whereas a certain Schroeder was then working on matters concerning the assimilated Jews. Eichmann added that von Mildenstein did not delay in giving him the book by A. Boehm, "Judaism," which he was later to sum up in a "Leitheft" (Notebook of Guidelines for Work). Eichmann indicated the subjects of stUdy (25):

"Structure of world Zionist organization, the goals of Zionism; the sources

which assisted it and its difficulties, and also the possibilities of supporting

political solution to the Jewish










means of" men of confidence" and informers, keeping aware of the activities of Jewish organizations both Zionist and wassimilating." Under examination, Eichmann gave the characteristics of the successive chiefs of the II-112 and accorded the place of honour to Hagen. It is interesting to compare these characteristics. We are already familiar with the structure of the II-112. Let us now consider it in its presentation by Eichmann. He very much appreciated von Mildenstein who rejected the vulgar anti-Jewish propaganda launched by Streicher and "sought unconditionally a political solution in such a way that I considered Mr. von Mildenstein my master." But Heydrich judged that von Mildenstein's anti-Jewish behaviour was too clement," (26) and the latter was replaced at the beginning of 1936 (27) by the very young Schroeder, his protege, whose name we have pre- viously cited. According to Eichmann, Schroeder, whom he despised for his lack of maturity and his arrogance, was to keep this post only

a few weeks. Nevertheless, the reports of the II-112 still bore his name

in April 1937.

In brief,

the first task

of the II-112


in studying


He was, however, only temporarily named chief of the

II-112 (CDXXXVII-16). He was replaced on the first of April, 1937 (CDXXXVII-18), by Wisliceny, who until that time had been the collaborator of one of the people responsible for the "Free-Mason" service. "Wisliceny was a


The Service for Jewish Affairs, the II-112

benevolent chief. His obesity predisposed him to tranquillity. He was well-read in history, one could converse admirably with him." After the departure of Schroeder, the post "Assimilated Jews" remained vacant. But the replacement was promptly appointed. It was Danne- cker, transferred from one of the regional offices of the SD in the pro- vinces where he also took care of Jewish affairs (CDXXXVII-18), In the meantime, the' work intensified:

That is what one calIed the daily

entries (Tageseinlauf). The reports of the sections (regional, local) of the

SD, the shipments of materials from the archives seized by the Gestapo and 'ffom which reports were to be addressed to it, reports of Nazi organi- zations and of the police services."

"Now things began slowly to move

Towards the end of 1936, (28) all of the section II-1 received a new

head which was to give it all its impetus. This was F.A. Six, employed until then as chief of the "Press" section, 1-3. It is Six who in Novem- ber 1937 was to replace Wisliceny by Hagen, the former being trans- ferred to Dantzig to direct the regional section of the SD, "Ideological Adversaries." Eichmann related that Hagen "tried to set up the affair

otherwise and to animate it

ny by Hagen, who was his protege and former collaborator in the

"Press" section. Eichmann testified:

Thus Six replaced the fiegmatic Wislice-


"Hagen was an intelIigent and broad-minded person. He disposed of a

fine general culture and was highly capable of rapidly assimilating matters of which he had previously no knowledge, of recognizing what was essen-

tial, of extracting it and immediately writing an article on it

thus that Dr. Six used him as the author of numerous articles in his monthly, published at the time by the Institute of Foreign Policy under his

" "At that time he had no idea of Jewish organizations, of


their aspirations, of their goals. The first thing he did on arriving was to

question me

and wanted to know everything with such precision that it was difficult for me to come out with everything I knew: more exactly, he pumped out my knowledge until there was nothing left, the organizations that I named.

I should add

that he was assisted in this by the tables that I have evoked previously,

And the astounding thing was that he retained alI that

He interrogated me, in fact, in such an exhaustive manner

And it is

those which were hung on the walls and which generally indicated at least the names."

Hagen had in Eichmann a serious and extremely zealous collaborator. Eichmann declared under examination:

"I must say that I procured the Jewish Encyclopedia and other works in

At that time I read enormously in this field and, its goes

without saying, all of the Jewish papers."

great quantity

He said that he studied the Jewish organizations first-hand and that having no executive power and therefore being unable to convoke Jewish personalities to interrogate them, he obtained these contacts by means of convocations delivered by the Gestapo.







Judging from the cited characteristic of Hagen, the latter developed his activities of chief on the basis of material assembled by Eichmann. Eichmann declared in Jerusalem:

And accord-

ing to the old saying, "New brooms sweep clean," one began here with a


the end of 1935, one had only dragged

new division of labor. In principle, it was a question of pulling the SD out of the insignificance of its activity and pulling it up to the level of the

(Hagen) submitted to his chief a

renewed activity under the authority of Hagen's superior, Dr. Six

"As I have already told you, Hagen arrived after WisIiceny.

Gestapo, in direct contact with it, Gestapo-executive authority, SD-intel- ligence authority. This intensification took place not only in the II-lI2

but in

the Sipo and the SD

and had to result from

an order of the chief of

the whole of II



In this passage, Eichmann answered questions concerning the report submitted by Hagen to Six in December 1937 (CDXXXVII-21) on the "reorganization of the section," thus from the time of Hagen's nomina- tion as head of the II-112. Hagen declared that the "real work on the adversary Judaism by the section II-112 began roughly near the end of 1935," but that the awk- ward tactic of the direction (of the II-112) prevented the establishment that the II-112 did not bring out its initiative in the Gestapo and that, of "all practical contact" with the Jews in Germany. Hagen deplored when the latter took an interest in Jewish organizations and proceeded

to the interrogation of a personality repreCS'entative of these organizations, "the questioning was conducted exclusively by officials of the Gestapo." Hagen added that one did not exercise any "political orientation of

according to the Gestapo's point of view," nor

the surveillance of" Jewish political officials." In contrast, we learn that the representatives of the II-112 henceforth entered into direct contact with the representatives of Jewish organizations convoked by the Gestapo and that one spoke not only of Judaism in Germany but in the world as a whole. "By means of regular convocations of officials direct- ing Jewish organizations, we are trying to direct the policy in the Jewish question in such a manner as to favourize and intensify the emigration especially of indigent Jews." At the same time, visits to the headquar- ters of Jewish organizations permitted the checking-up on them and the correction of certains "faults" such as the employment of foreign Jews. On the other hand, the II-112 established a liaison with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior" to obtain an immediate influence upon the practical execution of the emigration. The final objective is to centralize all of the Jewish question in Germany in the SD and the Gestapo. A report to the Chief (Heydrich) on this subject is being drawn up." (30) Eichmann under examination (31) emphasized the contradiction be- tween the firm resolution of the government to have the Jews emigrate and the difficulties raised on this subject by the German administration. The development of the Jewish affairs section of the SD, with the Ges- tapo as executive authority, had the task of overcoming the difficulties and taking charge of the solution of the Jewish question, which at that time amounted to emigration.

Jewish organizations


The Service for Jewish Affairs, the II-112

The central role that the II-112 was destined to play for the Gestapo was emphasized in the report quoted from Hagen which referred to a decree of execution (Funktionsbefehl) promulgated by the Reichsfiihrer on July 1, 1937. It stipulated that the SD was to be responsible "for all general and fundamental questions" which did not include executive measures and that it was to take its decisions "in strictest agreement with the section II B4," the section of Jewish affairs of the Gestapo. An examination of the trimestrial reports of the SD II-1l2 demons- trates the role played by this section in the activities of the II B4 of the Gestapo. The report edited in October 1937 (CDXXXVII-20) qualified as "sufficiently good" the collaboration with Flesch in whose section the II B4 was situated. It adds:

"Since September 15, 1937, Assessor Flesch has been transferred to the Gestapo of Berlin. A personal contact has been made with his successor, Assessor Freytag. Given that Assessor Freytag has not yet any familiarity with the field of Judaism, he (Flesch) has asked to help him to a large extent and especially to advise him also on executive measures." (32)


it is under-

scored that the II-1l2 interrogated the leaders of Jewish organizations,

and it is explained that:

In its semestrial report

of July 1938


"The necessity to engage itself personally in this sort of manceuvres or action stems from the fact that the civil servants in charge of external affairs of the Gestapo are not qualified, due to their lack of knowledge in this field, to find out from the Jews the information necessary to determine the general tendency." (33)







regional centers of the SD and the Gestapo. March 1, 1939 (CDXXXVII-25) declared:




The trimestrial report of

"The relations with the section corresponding to the Gestapo, the II B4 (Governmental Advisor Lischka and Governmental Advisor HUlf), are very good. Collaboration: All questions relevant to Judaism are discussed to- gether on the basis of the fundamental attitudes of the section II-1l2. All of the correspondance is countersigned by the main office of the SD and

by the Gestapo when it is addressed to a third party



The semestrial report of January 1938 (CDXXXVI-22), from which date the II-1l2 was directed by Hagen, brought out the good relations

with the Gestapo and added: "The initiative in the work belongs essen-


zations, the reports specify that not only were Jewish leaders convoked by the SD to be questioned by the Gestapo, but also that the SD commonly made unannounced visits to these organizations and at the

to the II-1l2." (35)

As for

the surveillance

of Jewish


same time searched their headquarters (CDXXXVII-22-23). These quotations demonstrate that the development of the SD and of


according to which the governmental authority of the Gestapo in hand-

the Gestapo exactly correspond

to the views

of Hitler








ling the Jewish question needed the inspiration of the non-governmental authority of the SS of which the SD was an emanation. In the trimes- trial report of March 1, 1939, Hagen, writing of the" Action of Novem- ber against Jewry (Judenschaft)" (a reference to the "Night of Crystal": reprisals for the attack committed by Grinzpan in Paris against the person of the German diplomat Von Rath), specified that "the prin- cipal bureau (of the SD) and all its main and regional branches partici- pated in part in the execution of the action and in part in the putting under safe cover of the material of Jewish archives and libraries." (36) At that time Eichmann was occupied in Vienna, and it was Hagen and Dannecker who had to cope with all this activity directed by Lischka. The last part of it saw the brutal internment of 30,000 Jews as a means of pressure to stimulate the wiIIingness of the Jews to emigrate from the Reich. A few weeks after having received the responsibility for the II-112, Hagen drew up the regulations for his section which were summed up in a note of December 21, 1937 (37). The accent was put on the necessity to study works devoted to Judaism, to make resumes of them and to discuss them. These regulations formed a supplement to those given by the II-I, that is to say by Six. They were thus due to Hagen personally. It is true that on this subject the reports note that due to lack of time, the cultural work never got off the ground. Let us re8all, however, that Eichmann affirmed that he had read enormously on the question. In addition, a thick report on French Judaism made by Oannecker at the time of his activity in Paris (XXVI-I) shows that he was very familiar with the structures of Jewish organizations in general. It is certain that the education which Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker acquired by assiduous study made them competent specialists of the Jewish question. The work which was being accomplished in the II-112 carried the obligation of letting at least a chosen public outside of the SO take advantage of it. Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker gave lectures on the Jewish question for the preparatory courses of the SO but also for classes organized by the Police, by the "People's Tribunals" and above all by the Party. This teaching activity was very intense from January to June 1938. During this period when, precisely, the solution to the Jewish question was suddenly brought up . before public opinion as having to be resolved without delay, the princi,?al activity was due above all to Hagen and Dannecker and very little to Eichmann, who was occupied in Vienna forcing the Austrian Jews to emigrate. One notes in the report of October 1936 to February 1937 (COXXXVII-16) four lectures; in that concerning July to December 1937 six lectures of which there were delivered by Hagen, (CDXXXVII-22), two by Eichmann, one by Dannecker. But from January to June 1938 twenty-nine lec- tures were given, including eighteen by Hagen, four by Dannecker and one by Eichmann. Afterwards, in the report covering July to December 1938 (CDXXXVII-23), one notes two lectures by Hagen, in August. In the report of January to June 1938, Hagen wrote:



The Service For Jewish Affair, the II-112

"Given that the involvement of the service 11-112 in the field of education

(Schuling) remains very intense, it appears necessary assistant to prepare the documentation." (38)

to name a scientific

But no follow-up was given. Let us note that in August 1938 Hagen prepared two lectures for the Foreign Policy School of the Party, but that the text was presented by Knochen in Hagen's absence. Knochen was the assistant of Six. It is evident that the collaboration between

the sections of the II-I was close.

It is instructive to point out that the SO's manner of bringing up and treating the Jewish problem was in clear and violent contrast to the vulgar and pornographic anti-Jewish propaganda of Streicher and his monthly, "Der StUrmer" ("the Assaillant"). The team which was educating and cultivating itself to later assume a central role in the "final solution" developed its capabilities by the imposition of a certain scientific discipline. This divergence between Heydrich and Streicher came to light in May 1938 concerning a foul anti-Jewish illustrated

which Streicher destined for young people: "Der Giftpilz" ("The Poi- sonouS Mushroom") (CDXXXVII-8, 9, 10). Streicher gave Heimer, the editor of the "stUrmer", the reponsibility of taking the necessary steps to obtain a favourable report on the publication from the SD. Hagen, Six and Heydrich decided that a favourable opinion on their behalf was inadmissible. But they consented to receive Heimer to show him the work that Eichmann was accomplishing within the Jewish community in Vienna. In a letter which Hagen wrote to Eichmann on June 28, 1938, he pointed out the ineptitudes of the editor of the


horrified indignation of Heimer confronted with the revival of Jewish










religiOUS sentiment.

"When I hear such a thing, I hold onto my head: but what do they have to do then! Perhaps the "Stlirmer" will contribute in bringing about the radical solution of shortening them by a head to prevent their having the joyful thought of recognizing themselves as Jews again." (39)

7. The SD and the Zionist Emigration

The Gestapo and the SD imagined that the best way to develop the

Zionist emigration.

According to the statistics furnished in March 1943 to Himmler, only



of the Jews

was to favourize


it was anticipated that the Zionist movement would be able to encou-

of the Gestapo.

rage the wave of emigration.

15 % of the 353,000 emigrants from the Reich went to Palestine.





this subject

a characteristic


This note dating from February 20, 1935 (CDXXXVII-5), informed all branches of the Gestapo that the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, was







to be forbidden to speak in pUblic. It was formulated in the following manner: "It is true that he is a Zionist. It has, however, been esta- blished that he prefers the leftist movements of Judaism." (39a) This care to maintain Zionist feeling among the Jews xas also shown by certain details. For example, a note of April 4, 1936, from Heydrich to all of the Gestapos (COXXXVII-3) announced that the use of Hebrew was forbidden in public assemblies, but that it was authorized in meetings the intention of which was the practice of that language to facilitate

emigration to Palestine.

Given this tendency, it is evident that the work of Eichmann, respon- sible for Jewish affairs, was the most important in the anti-Jewish section of the SO. With this in mind, he made in company of Hagen a study trip to Palestine in 1937. He read Yiddish fluently, which allow- ed him to study the Zionist press. He thus learned that a para-military organization ("The Hagana") had been formed to prepare the creation of the Jewish state. It was consequently necessary to make contact with this organization to learn in what spirit and what manner the Jews were acting to obtain the majority in Palestine by intensifying immigra- tion. Eichmann succeeded in establishing contact with one of the leaders of the "Hagana" who came to Berlin, entered into connivence with him and invited him to come visit the Jewish colonies in Palestine.,? Hagen on June 17, 1937 (COXXXVII-1), drew up a report signed by Six and intended for Heydrich. Let us note that at that time the II-112 stilI had Wisliceny for chief. But apparently the nonchalance of the person excluded him from dynamic actions. The report edited by Hagen stated that Eichmann was the obvious man to follow up the invitation, but that for greater security it was better that he be accom-


Hagen commented:

"The Jewish work of colonization must be studied thoroughly. It is im- portant to know these works in particular because after the proclamation of a Jewish state or a Palestine administered by the Jews, Germany would have a new adversary in foreign policy which could decisively influence the political line in the Near East. In addition to that, the establishment of

a State will accentuate the question of a statute for the Jews, as a minority

residing in Germany."


This argumentation, common among the Nazi doctrinarians, opposed them to Zionism. But this was not the case for Hagen. In fact, in this (representative same report he of proposed the Hagana): to offer the following compensation to Polkes

"to put pressure on the committee representing Jews in Germany so that it


would oblige Jewish emigrants



to Palestine




other country.

SUch a measure is clearly in the German interest and has

already been

to obtain



the Jewish



measures of the Gestapo.



Palestine will


The plans of Polkes




same time


The SO and the Zionist Emigration

Hagen thus weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the Zionist emigration and decided that the advantages were greater. The voyage took place between September 26 and October 2, 1937. Eichmann was accompanied by Hagen himself. At his trial he spoke of Hagen as his superior here. This is not quite true because Hagen took over the II-112 only in November 1937. He nevertheless occupied, directly next to Six, a position superior to that of Eichmann, albeit in a different service of the II-I. Although their position of emissaries of the SO was camouflaged, the English authorities prevented Hagen and Eichmann from entering Palestine from Egypt. The two envoys of the SO suc- ceeded even so in meeting Polkes in Egypt and in informing themselves of the situation there and in a Palestine. The report (COLXXX-8) dated 4 and 27 November, 1937 (Hagen already being chief of the II-112), was drawn up for the greater part by Hagen. Eichmann related only his discussions with Polkes in Cairo. As for relations between the Jews and the Arabs, Hagen judged that the Arabs had no racial hatred towards the Jews, but that they were against them only if their own interests were threatened by them. Counting on Zionism, Hagen did not however neglect anti-Judaism. In conclusion he proclaimed "the total incompetence of the Jews to direct the economy of their country" and declared

"the habit the Jews have of deceiving each other is evidently not the most

for the economic chaos of Palestine,

the absence of Aryans does not allow the Jews to trade with them

minor reason

even more so because

" (41a)

As for Eichmann, he declared himself opposed to Polkes's proposition!:) (without having admitted this to him) which risked making Palestine too powerful and were inspired by the Havara agreement to which, accord- ing to Eichmann, the SO was opposed. He agreed with the point of view of Wisliceny who in July 1937, in an "Orientation Notebook" which he wrote for the SS Office on Race and Implantation, argued against the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The reason advanced was that this state would serve as a cover for all the Jewish minorities in the countries that they would continue to exploit (point of view also defend- ed by A. Rosenberg). The Nazi support of Zionism was evidently a great paradox. The fact remains, however, that the SO acct;pted this paradox. It was ·sufficient that the propensity to massive emigration which was inherent to Zionism be able to immediately serve the liquida- tion of the Jewish presence from the Reich.

8. The Anticipation of the Final Solution:

Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna

Until March 1938 the solution to the Jewish question was, so to speak, in incubation in the Third Reich. The signal that brought it suddenly to the foreground was the annexation of Austria. Beginning imme-







to Austrian

The "solution" was not in evidence in all of the Reich until

November 1938. The operation in Austria was both carefully and feverishly prepared by the S.D. (42) An immense and technically perfected file was com- piled to cover all persons whose activities classified them as opponents of Nazism, obviously including the Jews. As of March 1938, the Hitlerian power lashed out against the Austrian Jews. Expropriation was immediately decreed and applied. The Jewish organizations as a whole were forbidden, and personalities representative of Jewish commu- nity life were arrested and interned. (43) In the semestrial report on the activity of the II-112 between Janua- ry 1 and June 30, 1938 (CDXXXVII-23), Hagen summed up the politi- cal action in Austria which was the essential part of the activity of the II-112 at the time:




the annexation,

the action




"Results of the investigations: the accomplishment of the entire operation against Jewish organizations in Austria, with the participation of civil

servants of the foreign section of the Gestapo: reconstitution of Jewish orga- nizations for the country of Austria; discovery of internal processes concerning the foundation of a Jewish State; financing of the Jewish emi-


view of the situation of the Reich regarding foreign currencies." (44) '7

form Austria to the extent that it is admissible from the point of

As for the direction of this action, the report states:

"The SS U'stuf Hagen was detached to Vienna from March 3 to April 11, 1938, to participate in the actions in Austria. SS U'stuf Eichmann was on March 16, 1938, designated for the same mission and was later entrusted with the direction of the II-112 of the Office there." (45)

At his trial Eichmann gave no account of the presence of Hagen in Vienna. He related that he arrived alone in Vienna and that, having no contact apart from the address of the Sipo-SD in that city, he under- took the reorganization of Jewish life, subordinating it to the imperative of emigration. He told of the liberation of Jewi<>h personalities, the choice he made of an administrator of the Jewish community and the intuition which led him to create a central office for Jewish emigration (Zentralstelle fUr judische Auswanderung). He was quick to unite in the same section representatives of all the government authorities on whom the delivery of emigration permits depended. This centralization did in fact remarkably accelerate the process of preparation for emigra- tion. According to the testimony of Wisliceny (LXXXVII-67), Heydrich engaged his authority for the creation of this office. We have noted, however, that Eichmann soent the first three weeks in Vienna with Hagen, entrusted with the same mission as the latter. In addition, the idea of a Zentralstelle may be derived from Hagen's report of December 7, 1937 (CDXXXVII-21), on the reorganization of the II-Il2 involving it in practical work and not just theoretical. It is


concerning the Jewish question to the SD and the Gestapo.


a question








The Zen-



Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna

tralstelle that Eichmann was to organize in Vienna was nothing other than the instrument of this centralization recommended by Hagen as

to head the II-112. It was, as Hagen

expressed it on December 7, 1937, the instrument of the "establishment of relations with the competent sections of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." But Eichmann perfected this principle by addressing himself to all the authoritie<; on whom the per- mission to emigrate depended: the Prefecture of Police, Ministries of the Economy and Finance, the Gestapo, etc. The representatives of all the authorities were gathered together in one bureau, and the preparation of all the documents necessary for emigration took place as on an assembly line. (46) According to this testimony of Eichmann, the Jewish personalities with whom he then worked in Vienna had also asked him to centralize the procedures; for, as he recognized himself, the diverse administrations sometimes created obstacles, which exaspe- rated the Jewish emigrants. In the impetus that the II-112 gave to the Jewi5h emigration from Austria, it continued to give preference to Zionist organizations. The semestrial report of Hagen for the period of July to December 1938 (CDXXXVII-25) informs us that after the closing up of all the Jewish organizations in Vienna, immediately following the annexation to the Reich, all of the Zionist organizations were Ie-opened (and religious organizations as well, except for those exercising educational activities). In contrast, the organizations of assimilated Jews remained prohibited. On May 3, 1938, Eichmann (47) wrote to Hagen:

soon as he was nominated

the "Zionist Review" publishes its first issue next Friday.

I had the manuscripts sent to me and am currently in the midst of the

bothersome work of censoring. It goes without saying that the paper will

I have required

that the cultural community and the Zionist union reach a figure of 20,000 indigent Jews emigrating between April 1, 1938 and May 1, 1938, which they have accepted as having to be executed."

be sent to you. It will in a way become "my" paper

"Dear Herbert

Eichmann in this letter summed up the situation as follows:

"Aryanization, Jews still in the economy to be treated according to the decree of Gauleiter Burkel. By far the most difficult chapter, that of getting "

the Jews to emigrate, is the task of the SD

The Zentralstelle was a dependancy of the "Sipo-SD of the Danube." Eichmann was named direc;tor of the Zentralstelle. But he still belonged to the SD II-Il2, of which he directed the Austrian branch. At the same time he exercised an executive function, for on the one hand he organized the administrative work in view of emigration; and on the other hand he led the Jews to emigrate by making their life in Austria intolerable. Subordinate to Stahlecker, chief of the Sipo-SD for the region of the "Danube", Eichmann was divided between the SD, to which he still belonged, and the Gestapo. It nevertheless remains that the SD II-Il2, in other words Hagen, finally arranged matters concern-







ing the emigration from Austria; and this is proven by Hagen's report

He went to Vienna to organize

with representatives of the Ministry of the Economy the attribution of

of October 31, 1938 (CDLXXX-18).


which was

to permit

the emigration

of the Jews

first from


and later



the Reich.



that he

strongly insisted that the Zentralstelle be the sole agent handling these

a Jewish

economic organization. The Zentralstelle turned over to the II-lI2 the documentary material confiscated from Jewish organizations. This material was immediately and carefully studied, as prove the reports of the "Kommando" formed for this purpose in the II-l12. The collaborators of the II-lI2 sought

among other things any traces of anti-Nazi activities on the part of the

functionaries of the Jewish organizations.

to this work put in his report of June 17, 1938 (CDXXXVII-26), that he had discovered in a letter of 1936 from a member of the "Union of

Austrian Jews" that the latter had been very active in the fight against

National-Socialism in Austria.


This was

to avoid

the creation


this purpose


One of the people assigned

The coI1aborator of the II-l12 added:

"The original of the letter and copies of it were immediately sent off to U'Stuf. Hagen to see if the Krisshaber case was already known. If it was,

"Austria" or


else an arrest was te be made."

investigation was to be conducted at once by the section


But the II-l12 was more and more involved in matters of,an executive nature. It acted in company with agents of the Gestapo. Thus Himmler gave an order which Heydrich apparently transferred to Six and Six to Hagen. Hagen stated in a note of November 2, 1938 (CDLXXX-22), that Eichmann had established contact with the Gau- leiter "Lower Danube," Globocnik (he who was later to direct the extermination of the Polish Jews), concerning the execution of Himmler's order to concentrate aU of the Austrian Jews in Vienna. It was under- stood that these Jews (approximately 10,000 people) would be invited by representatives of the SD, accompanied by members of the Gestapo, either to emigrate before December 15, 1938, the ZentralsteI1e furnish- ing them both papers and financial means, or to transfer before Octo- ber 31 their residence to Vienna, where housing would be provided.



9. The Efforts of Hagen to Force Jewish Emigration in Various Countries

Paranel to this activity of the II-l12 in the executive field, the intelli- gence activity also continued. The local and regional headquarters of the SD stiU had their confidence men and their informers and communi- cated information to the main office of the II-l12. But Hagen personal- ly took care of this work when it concerned confidence men and infor-



abroad. (49)

He wrote in his report of December 7, 1937


Jewish Emigration in Various Countries

"Outside of this work, we have begun to study world Judaism in a system- atic manner (partly by direct contacts) given that the decisions for the con- tinuation of the solution to the Jewish question in Germany imply an exact

knowledge of the leading Jewish organizations on a universal scale."


He insisted in his semestrial report for "June to December 1939 (CDXXXVII-25) on the.importance of intensifying work abroad; for the emigration of the Jews, which was taking place under constantly increas- ing pressure, displaced the field of action of the Jews to foreign countries. Among the few confidence men and informers ,of whom he disposed abroad, the central role was played by people in the Near East. In the report for January to June, 1938 (CDXXXVII-23), Hagen indicated one man in New York, another in Paris, one in Bucharest. But these names were crossed out. There remain in a stable manner three or four persons for the Near East and three persons through whom the II-l12 tried to organize clandestine transportation of Jewish emigrants or ways to transfer money for the emigrants. These were the essential subjects of Hagen's correspondence with his men of confidence or informers (CCXXXIV). It happened that the SD and the Gestapo together disposed of the same informer. Occasionally, Hagen's correspondants also provided political information aside from the Jewish question. Hagen welcomed it gladly but as less important complementary infor- mation and transmitted it to the appropriate sections of the SD. All of the activity of intelligence-gathering seems not to have amounted to much. The II-l12 learned a great deal about the structures of Judaism all over the world, but the documentation gives the impression that it sought its knowledge primarily in non-secret sources. The essential preoccupation of the II-1l2 was the intensification of Jewish emigration. On June 20, 1938, (51) Hagen informed Eichmann of the success of his talks with the Ministry of the Economy on the use of funds coming from contributions granted to the Reich by

Jewish organizations abroad to aid emigration. In a note of November 7, 1938, Hagen proposed to develop propa- ganda which would incite England to grant additional possibilities for this emigration. In the course of that year, Hagen emphasized several times in his notes to Six the necessity of obtaining from foreign countries greater possibilities for the Jewish emigration. The II-1l2 also involved itself in the organization of an illegal emigration. On February 6, 1939, Hagen wrote to one of his confidence men, director of an important travel agency, about the failure of the transport of Jews that the latter had organized to Paraguay. He communicated to him the rumours according to which the government of that country would accept the illegal immigration on the condition that it be remu- nerated at a certain rate per head. In May and June, 1939, the director of the travel agency corresponded intensely with the II-l12 (Hagen put him in contact with Eichmann and Dannecker) to execute the project of buying old Greek boats for clandestine transportation of Jews, the







payment for which was to consist in the delivery of arms. Hagen contacted the Ministry of the Economy on this subject (CDXXIV-8, p. 16). In July he noticed that the Greeks were avoiding the issue, probably following English intervention (May 19; June 2, 12, 17 and 29; July 5, 6, 8). This correspondance reveals that the Greek fleet often participated in the clandestine transport of Jews.

In the course of 1939, the emigration became increasingly difficult. Hagen noted on June 15, 1939 (52):

"Promote" emigration to the maximum possible. The emigrations are be-

Promote all plans for emigration no


matter where."















assembling a documentation for a report to Heydrich on a plan for the

installation of Jews in Madagascar. He presented it as having already

















in collaboration

the section




(II B4), and it revealed that

"the Jewish question cannot be resolved on the basis admitted until present

(financial difficulties, etc.) and that it is necessary to put a foreign policy

solution on the agenda

(Madagascar Plan)."

A reference to this non-dated note was made in another of March 24, 'i


one apparently in question. in Eichmann's presence, to recall among other projects the









10. The Men of the I/-112 Confronted with the Jews

In 1939 Six and Hagen, employing the pseudonym of "Dieter Schwartz," put out (testimony of Wisliceny, LXXXVIII-67) a brochure entitled "World Judaism," which appeared in the series of treatises published by the SS. Beginning with the thesis of the Jewish will to

dominate the world, they analyzed the system of Jewish political, social, financial, national and international organizations. They finished up with Zionism which they considered incapable of bringing about a real solution, given the number of Jews in the world and the small territory

"Dieter Schwartz" revealed in this context that the Jews

themselves desired a Jewish State only as the center of a Jewish govern- ment power which would protect them in the activities that dispersed they would continue to develop. "Dieter Schwartz" thus denounced Zionism. The brochure concluded, nevertheless, by emphasizing that the only thing that interested Germany was to remove the Jews from its territory at any price. Thus the authors did not exclude, without how- ever saying so explicitly (they did not bring up the question of anti- Jewish measures), that if Palestine could not contain the entire popula- tion of Jews in the world, it would suffice to absorb that of the Reich.

of Palestine.


The Men of the II-112 and the Jews

It is known that in the report on his trip with Eichmann to the Near East, Hagen represented the Jew in Palestine as a crook who, for lack of activity in a non-Jewish milieu to rob it, took advantage of the Jews with whom he was surrounded. Hagen formulated the classic anti- Jewish image of the Jew moved by a depraved desire for world power. In this brochure the condition of Jew is considered a racial characte- ristic, indelible: the Jew remains Jewish no matter what his religious beliefs nor his integration with another people. Hagen wrote on June 3.0, 1939, to a Czech editor to advise him on the anti-Jewish propaganda to be developed in his paper, "Znova:"

"Given that the law concerning Jews has not yet appeared in the Protec- torate-the reason for this is probably that the Germans do not agree with the religious conception advanced by your Government-you thus have the most favourable occasion to continue your propaganda activity of your racial conception in the Jewish question." (54)

And Hagen gave much advice to his correspondant.

In the anti-Jewish propaganda, Six, Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker condemned the hysterical outbursts of Streicher and his paper, "Der Stiirmer" (" The Assaillant "). They limited themselves to a cold and laconic refusal of the Jewish presence in their country. This refusal was to be thus even more efficacious in its results. Hagen was not obliged to enter into contact with those Jews for whose removal he was working. We have no direct information permitting us to imagine the attitude that he assumed if he happened to communicate personally with them. But we do know how, according to the SD II-112, a man of the SD was to approach the Jews. Hagen wrote in a note of February 9, 1938 (CDLXXXIX-9) on the activity of the SD in the region of Fulda-Werra, which counted a numerous Jewish population (according to Hagen, 23,000 Jews resided in Francfort), that the man assigned to the Jewish question in the SD of that region was unfit for the job. His chief wrote that" although demonstrating both willingness and zeal, he is not suited to fulfill his function given his age (twenty-two years old) and his lack of tcughness." (55) Hagen thereby agreed with the opinion of the chief of the branch of the SD. An account on Eichmann and the atmosphere of the emigration offices that he organized allows one to conceive the comportment of a person of the II-112 when confronted with Jews. B. Loesener, Chief of the Section on Racial Questions at the Ministry of the Interior, described Eichmann as he appeared to the Jews in the offices of the Zentralstelle and those of the Jewish community. (56)

"The corridors along which the emigrants had to pass were enormously overcrowded with Jewish persons who had to or wanted to leave. I had not the courage to speak to one of these people, for I felt that I was being watched by Eichmann, although he was polite and even very attentive to me; but one always sensed his glacial determination. In the corridors overflow- ing with people, frightened women seized their children as soon as they saw Eichmann, whereas he, without being troubled by this, advanced as if the







I follow-


of the synagogue, in the Leopoldstrasse, where he had previously spoken of me as reporting on racial questions to the Ministry of the Interior. Upon my arrival there, I saw a certain number of Jews seated on chairs on which they had obviously already been waiting for hours. When we arrived, they

immediately stood up; they were persons in charge of various questions in

Eichmann also took me into the office of the community

way were clear and pushed aside all that recalled human misery.


his tracks

the community of the synagogues of Vienna.

called them

their reports, and they at once, like trained animals, delivered what they had

In a curt manner, Eichmann

by their names, indicated to me just as briefly the subjects of

was to say. well-founded

On each face, one could read the expression of a mortal fear which


Neither the letters exchanged by Hagen ("Dear Herbert") and

Eichmann ("Dear Adolf") nor their relations as chief and subordinate


reveal the slightest disagreement concerning their way of acting.

Hagen. may suppose that Eichmann's comportment was virtually approved by

11. The Passage to the "Final Solution" in the Reich (1938-1939) .

The final solution had been launched in Austria as of spring 1938.,/ Geering, in charge of the Jewish question, declared at a meeting of the Four-Year Plan (PS-l301) on October 14, 1938, that it was time to exclude Jews from the economy. He meant by the same occasion that the incubation period of the Jewish question was over. The action precipitated in Austria was like an anticipation of what was to be done everywhere in the Reich. But Geering at this meeting severely criti-

cized the manner in which confiscations had been effected in Austria. The Gauleiter in charge of the operation considered that it should profit Austria!). members of the Party who had suffered before the annexation to the Reich. Because of this, Aryanization had taken place in scan- dalous disorder and with abuses. Geering underscored that in the

entire territory of the Reich,

strictly the

the dispossession

of the Jews


to be

affair of the State and not of the Party.

In April and in June 1938, the economic Aryanization in the Reich was already noticeable in decrees ordering the Jews to register their businesses and their fortunes. But on December 3, 1938, a decree proclaimed the Aryanization of possessions. This decisive step in the launching of the solution to the Jewish question was taken during the storm raised by the attack committed by the Polish Jew Grynzspan at the German Embassy in Paris. He killed, apparently by chance, the German diplomat Von Rath in a protest against the brutal expulsion of

Polish Jews from German territory. Geebbels seemingly encouraged by Hitler, incited troops of the SA and the Party to proceed with progroms

in the night .of November 9-10.

by nearly alI of the ranking Nazi dignitaries. The burning down of synagogues and the wrecking of stores were accompanied by looting.

This measure was severely disapproved


The Passage to the Final Solution

On November 10, 1938, Heydrich gave orders (PS-3S01) to the Sipo-SD to not prevent the pogroms as long as the directives against exactions were respected by the crowd. On the other hand, he ordered the arrest of the greatest possible number of Jews and their internment in concen- tration camps. In the report to Geering (PS-30S8) dated November 11, Heydrich gave him very incomplete information on the enormous amount of destruction' and looting and on the arrest of Jews to be interned. The next day Geering, on Hitler's orders, met with the most important leaders of nearly all branches of the Government (PS-1816) to decide upon preparatory measures for the solution of the Jewish question. He began as follows, speaking as the man responsible for the Four-Year Plan (note that the essential work in the preparation of the "final solution" was economic: the dispossession of the Jews, called economic Aryanization):

"Gentlemen, today's session is of prime importance. I have received a letter from Bormann, Chief of Staff of the Representative of the FUhrer, in which he writes to me on behalf of the FUhrer that the Jewish question must now be considered as a whole in order to be brought in one way or another to its solution. Yesterday the FUhrer once again reminded me by telephone to take all of the decisive measures in a centralized manner. Given that the problem is principally a vast economic problem, that is "

where one must apply the pressure


For hours Geering and the participants at this conference made an effort to uncover and define the necessary measures to assure that in the space of a few weeks, the Jews of the Reich would be separated from their possessions. Their fortune was to be blocked by the State

of this fortune; their

which was to grant them a pension of 3 112 %

businesses were to be sold or officially liquidated. Heydrich intervened nearly at the end of the conference to give another turn to the deliberations and one which went to the heart of the


"Whatever may be the elimination of the Jews from economic activity, the fundamental problem finally still remains that of the departure of the Jew from Germany." (57)

He set forth the manner in which the Sipo-SD proceeded in Austria by creating and using the Zentralstelle. He pointed out that in the same period of time, only 19,000 Jews had left the Old Reich, but 50,000 had left Austria. He explained that the Jewish emigration would not cost the Reich any foreign exchange and asked that Geering create an office for the totality of the Reich similar to that of the Zentralstelle in Vienna. Geering accepted this request. Heydrich sketched out the future: the emigration of all the Jewish population was to take eight to ten years during which a total segregation of the Jews was to be applied. Finally, Geering evoked an even more shady aspect of the question:







"If the German Reich were to find itself involved in the foreseeable future in an external conflict, it goes without saying that we, too, would think in Germany in the first place to settle our account with the Jews. Aside from that, the Fiihrer will finally undertake-beginning with the powers that have put the Jewish problem on the agenda-a foreign policy action to thus effectively attain the solution of the problem of Madagascar. That is what "

he exposed to me on November 9


Thus, on November 9, the news of the death of Von Rath having reached the Chancellery, Hitler evoked as an immediate objective the project of the Jewish reserve in Madagascar and, as a possibility in the future, a "settlement of accounts" with the Jews in case of war. In what concerns Madagascar, we know that in March 1939 Hagen had reminded Eichmann of the necessity of a report on this subject to Heydrich. But what marks with an· indelible stamp Grering's personal style of treating the Jews at this time when he was in charge of the Jewish question, is his exclamation to the famous conference of November 12, in respect to the enormity of the sum that the insurance companies would have to spend to cover damages caused by the progroms:

"I should have preferred that you slaughter two hundred Jews rather than annihilate such worth."

The feverish activity of expropriation, first in Austria and afterwards 'i in the totality of the Reich, was not in the competence of the II-112. The economic administration of the country, at the head of which was the Four-Year Plan, took care of it. The section of Eichmann in Austria and, since spring 1939, also in the Protectorate, took care of economic questions only in relation to the Jewish emigration. The expropriation of the Austrian, German and Czech Jews was a wide- sweeping action. It was also the preliminary action necessary to the solution of the Jewish question. But the solution itself, or the liquida- tion of the Jewish presence from the German vital space, was represented at this time by emigration. And it was prepared by the SD, by its studies and by the influence it held on Jewish organizations. It was the SD which trained Eichmann, still acting in Vienna as editor for the II-U2, although placed at the disposal of the Sipo-SD of Vienna. It was Hagen in Berlin who could consider himself at the head of the action which Eichmann had just launched in Vienna. Honouring a promise made to Heydrich at the meeting of November 12, 1938, Grering ordered the creation of the "Reichzentralstelle flir jiidische Auswanderung (The Central Office of the Reich for Jewish Emigration)." He added in his decree of January 24, 1939, on this subject (NG-2586A) that he subordinated this office to Heydrich as Chief of the Sipo, that i,s of the Gestapo and the Criminal Police. By the same occasion, the SD was in a way removed from the action. Eichmann's precedent showed the path to be followed: the men trained by the SD were put at the disposal of the Gestapo. Grering's decree contained an important clause which clearly stemmed from the doctrine of the SD cultivated by Hagen, Dannecker and Eichmann:


The Passage to the Final Solution

Take all measures for the preparation of an intensified Jewish emigra-

tion: among others, create an appropriate Jewish organization to assure the

uniform preparation of requests to emigrate




We know with what care the II-112 inspected and developed its contacts with Jewish institutions, work which Eichmann prolonged in Austria by reanimating the activity of the Jewish community in Vienna, which collaborated with the Zentralstelle to organize the emigration. In Germany, the institution of this nature was to be the "Reichsver- einigung der deutschen Juden" of which the creation was decided (on the basis of a decree of Grering) in July 1939. But the Reichsvereinigung was to be obliged to participate in administrative work, not for the emigration but for the deportation of the Jews. Alder, a knowledgeable historian of the deportation of the German Jews, and who himself lived during this period in the Reich, pronounced in his work on the depor- tation the following judgment:


remarkably in anticipation, at the development of the process of deportation

without snags." (59)

"The connection between the SO and the Reichsvereinigung

The same thing took place in most of the occupied territories. The Gestapo owed to the SD this fruitful doctrine of the utilization of Jewish organizations. But it was the Gestapo which applied the method elabo-

rated by the SD.



(Heydrich stipulated in his order (PS-3051) that it was necessary to arrest wealthy Jews in particular), was also an operation of the Gestapo to incite this mass to hasten its emigration. These internees were quickly liberated on condition that they prove their willingness to emi- grate. However, the SD collaborated in the action, as Hagen stated in his semestrial report for July-December 1938. It nevertheless remains








that the essential part of the operation no longer belonged to the SD.



in the semestrial





December 1938






March 1,




Grering's decree):


Auswanderung und

the time


der Reichsvereinigung der luden Deutschlands, the SO

at first led the tal ks. The situation changed only after the Reichszentrale


fUr jiidische Auswanderung was subordinated to the Security Police."








This by itself indicates that the essential work of the II-112, that with the Jewish organizations, had passed in 1939 into the hands of the II-B4 of the Gestapo (section directed by Lischka). A note of Hagen (CCXXXIV-18) of May 25, 1939, on the reception of two regional chiefs of the SD to whom Hagen, aided by Dannecker, explained the new situation, emphasized that because of "the giving of the direction of the Reichszentrale flir Jiidische Auswanderung to an official of the Gestapo", the SD had not to take the initiative for the creation of new centers for emigration and that all questions of assistance to the Jews were to be settled with the consent of the offices of the Gestapo.




He stressed

several times




that he had brought

Lischka up

to date.

Hagen added a general remark to his explanations:

the treatment of

judaism inside Germany by the SD, a plan is being drawn up to involve Judaism abroad in the work of the section II-112 to a greater extent than presently. For this reason, the two (visitors) were invited as of now to seek out all of the facts concerning Judaism in Poland." (61)


the intention

of dropping

as much

as possible

We may wonder if Hagen was getting ready in May 1939 to prepare

the materials for a future activity of the

if these new projects were in fact initiated.

Gestapo in Poland.

We ignore


The Integration of the Men of the l/-112 into the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (September 1939)

The breaking out

of the war





a radical


of the structure

of the SD

and of the Sipo.

The Sipo

and the SD were both capped by a single unit, the "Reichssicherheits- hauptamt (Principal Security Office of the Reich: RSHA)." The RSHA was split into six and later seven departments. The former Depart- ment II of the SD, where Six and Hagen were, became Department III, that for intelligence activities for the interior of the Reich. But there( was no longer an anti-Jewish section. On the other hand, Depart- ment III of the SD, which became Department VI of the RHSA and

took care of foreign intelligence under the direction of Jost and later of

Schellenberg, had an anti-Jewish section.

It was called "Judaism and

Anti-Semitism "and was directed by Hagen. Hagen's section was a sub-section of that entitled "Ideological Enemies Abroad," which was headed by Knochen. The latter had previously been the assistant of Six in the press section, where he had held the responsibility for the analysis of the press of emigrants from the Reich.

As for Six, under whose direction Knochen, Hagen, Wisliceny, Eichmann and Dannecker had until then worked, he received a special responsibi- lity in the RSHA: that of the direction of the scientific department, "Ideological Studies and Applications." The Gestapo delivered to it all of the material (archives, libraries) seized from "ideological enemies." The Gestapo itself (as of March 1, 1941) was to be Department IV of

the RSHA.

The section for Jewish affairs which under Lischka was the


B4 became the IV B4.

Subordinated to Eichmann, it had no longer


be guided by the SD, as in the time of the II-l12.

13. Eichmann's Task from September 1939 to March 1941

The task of the IV B4 was at once considerable. It was to assure that the harsh laws of exception conceived to totally uproot the Jewish population bring about total segregation. For that purpose it was to set up and control the Union of Jews in Germany. Because the


Eichmann's Task 1939-1941

possibilities of emigration had become infinitesimal, the IV B4 was reduced to working by itself while waiting for a solution to be found.

In the Austrian and Czech territories, the two ZentralsteIlen, that of

Vienna created by Eichmann and that of Prague (for the Protectorate:

Bohemia, Moravia) created in 1939 also by Eichmann, continued to function. During the early months of the war, Eichmann devoted himself to these two bureaux. They were dependent on the Sipo-SD of their region but in fact acted on their own initiative without interference from Lischka, Chief of the IV B4.

During these first months, the IV B4 in a way remained outside of the principal circuit of the anti-Jewish activity, which began to develop in a new direction. The conquest of the vast Polish territories and the fall

of Polish Judaism into the hands of the Hitlerian power opened up new

perspectives for the manipulation of the Jewish populations in general. The objective was to liquidate their presence from the German vital


The division of Poland into a part annexed to the Reich (Wartegau, Upper Silesia) and a region placed under the regime of the General Government coincided with the intention to evacuate the Jews from the first part and also from the Reich and the Protectorate into the General Government, a region of the latter to be used as a temporary reserve for Jews. That is what Heydrich on September 21, 1939, explained to the mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen) of the Sipo-SD in invaded Poland (PS-3363) at a time when the General Government was not yet proclaimed as such (62). Heydrich added that it was a question of the "final goal" kept secret and which would be attained after a rather long period by the "totality of the measures" (Gesamtmassnahmen). He stated that these measures themselves were to be soon announced.

A certain zone in the region of Lublin seems to have been planned for

the concentration of the Jews, who were first brought by stages into

the cities of the General Government.

One wonders what Heydrich was thinking as he evoked "the final

goal" about which he refused to say anything whatever. It was certain-

ly not a question of the very principle of the creation of a Jewish reserve

in the General Government. This project was not in fact hidden from public opinion nor was that of a Jewish reserve in Mada-

gascar. Thus a direct evocation of the Jewish reserve in the region of Lublin and a rather allusive evocation of a reserve in Madagascar are

to be found in a short treatise which the publishing house of the NSDAP

put out in 1941 (63):

"For a certain period of time, a region of settlement in the districts of

Lublin was considered a sort of reStorve for the Jews

unthinkable that the Jewish reserve near Lublin be a definitive solution. This solution can only be obtained on the basis of the recognition of the principle that the Jew has not to be part of the world and territories where white men are settled, but rather those of colour. It is therefore in the region of the latter that the future territory for Jewish settlement must be sought."

But it was also







But the author ends his treatise with <l p;ognost;c Yihich lc:'::',·C3 [2 C::lUDt in the air as to the very principle of a Jewish reserve:

"In the meantime, the war imposes its own problems on us and the victory will confront the German people with new tasks, still greater, most of which will be more important than the problem of a Jewish reserve. The last word has not yet been pronounced, but it will be at the appropriate time and by an authoritative source in order to definitively liberate the people and the Reich from the malediction of Europe: the Jew on the eastern border."

One has the impression that the author wanted to lead public opinion to believe that the German people would have neither time nor energy to lose in taking care of the settlement of the Jews and that Hitler would know how to pronounce the word which would assure their disappearance in the most radical of manners. Isn't this how we must interpret the unutterable "final goal" that Heydrich announced on Sep- tember 21, 1939? The following observation is in fact found in the report on the inspection trip that Seyss Inquart, deputy of Governor General Frank, made to the General Government in November 1940. It concerns the eventuality of a Jewish reserve in the region of Lublin:

"This region, with its swampy character, could quite possibly, according to the reflections of District Governor Schmidt, be used as a Jewish reserve, a

measure which would

probably greatly decimate




Relating to this it is to be noted that Heydrich, in his memorandum of September 21, 1939, to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen, insinuated that the mysterious final goal would be attrained by the living conditions that these measures would bring about for the Jews. The plan for a Jewish reserve in the General Government was given up as of 1940 (LXXXVIII-67). Between summer 1940, after the brilliant victory in the West, and autumn 1941, the ideas concerning "the final solution" to be given to the Jewish question were not fixed. It was hoped that the power repre- sented by the victorious Reich would oblige the other nations to grant the Reich space for a Jewish reserve. The plan for a Jewish reserve in Madagascar included Jews from Poland as well as from Western Europe. That did not prevent the continued concentration of Jews in the General Government until March 1941. Eichmann was able to tell of an order from Hitler to evacuate 300,000 of them, a figure which was far from being attained at the time. (65) As the deportations of Jews concern- ed mainly the Austrian territories and the Protectorate, Eichmann with his two Zentralstellen in these two countries was greatly involved in this operation. In addition to the Jews, Poles were massively deported from Poland annexed to the General Government. All of this movement of populations provoked the furor of the Governor General, H. Frank. To counter these reproaches against the chaotic action of the Sipo-SD, Heydrich created within the Gestapo (the RSHA IV) a section IV D4 to organize this action. He named Eichmann its chief. Dannecker was




Eichmann's Task 1939-1941

at Eichmann's side during an important conference which met on January 30, 1940: it concerned the transfer of populations in the regions i:J. question (66). Thus Eichmann and Dannecker were integrated with the RSHA-IV. In contrast, Hagen, as we have seen, remained in the SD, in the RSHA-VI (SD for foreign intelligence), where he directed the section "Judaism and Anti-Semitism." It is not clear how the functions of Eichmann as Chief of the IV D4 and Chief of the IV B4, were combined. He was named head of the latter in place of Kurt Lischka, who had been transferred in December 1939 (Postdam film 1174A2592 (603)) to Cologne to direct the Sipo-SD there.

in the spring of 1940


to his own



became Chief of the IV B4, the section for Jewish affairs, with Rolf Gunther as his assistant. As for the functions of Eichmann in the IV D4, they ended in March 1941 with the prohibition to transfer popu-

lations to the General Government. It is only after this date that the documents designate Eichmann's section as IV B4 and no longer IV D4. Eichmann related that upon taking possession of Lischka's former section, the IV B4, he found there

"in addition to the furniture, the civil servants who until then had served Lischka. They continued, as was normal, their work of secret police of the

State, an


they were very well-trained civil servants, who were perfectly familiar with

their regulations, in which we then had to plunge ourselves and study them." (67)

activity which was then foreign

to myself and to Gunther.

The situation is here in a way the reverse of that of the SD 11-112 in 1938 in relation to the II B4 of the Gestapo. At that time Hagen, Dannecker and Eichmann impregnated, so to speak, the anti-Jewish work of the Gestapo with their knowledge of the Jewish question acquir- ed in the SD. Now Eichmann and his assistant, Gunther, applied them- selves to combining their capabilities acquired in the SD with those demanded by the executive work of the police.






to be






Dannecker. Let us recall that Knochen and Hagen were in Depar- ment VI of the RSHA, the foreign intelligence section of the SD, where

Knochen directed the section "Ideological Adversaries" and Hagen had within this section the sub-section "Judaism and Anti-Semitism." As for Dannecker, we know that at the beginning of 1940 he was with Eichmann in the IV D4. In the second half of 1940, all three were to be designated for Jewish affairs in the Sipo-SD in occupied France. In the summer of 1940, Heydrich sent a small commando to Paris. It was to form the branch of the Sipo-SD in occupied France. The anti-Jewish movement in France apparently had a privileged position in the solution of the Jewish question as a whole. Luther, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote in a memo- randum of August 1942 (NG-2586): "The regulations in Paris served







as a model for the regulations in Holland and in Belgium." (68) The elite of the anti-Judaism unit of the SD was transferred to Paris. Knochen, specialist of the affairs of emigrants from the Third Reich, was to direct the Sipo-SD in occupied France; Hagen was to direct it in the Atlantic region of France;Dannecker, specialist of "assimilating" Judaism, was to be entrusted under Knochen with the anti-Jewish section of the Sipo-SD. Lischka, specialist of Jewish affairs in the' pre-war Gestapo, was to join this group. In the same way that Eichmann in the IV B4 depended on his spe- cialized subordinates under Lischka for the real police work, Knochen received an assistant for his work in France, the experienced Gestapo



The men who inaugurated the Hitlerian anti-Jewish action under the sign of the SS and the Gestapo were to continue it in France under the


solution" by extermination. Eichmann declared under questioning (69):



post in Paris

was a distinction

which had



But it was

then to be already


the sense of the "final


"The final solution of the Jewish question as such, that is to say, relative to that special mission received by Heydrich, for example, or to express it for once without circumlocutions, murder, was not a law of the Reich but

an Order of the FUhrer

of the law at that time, that "the words of the FUhrer" amounted to law

It was understood, according to the conception "

It is thus that the judicial basis of the "final solution" was presented in the Third Reich and in the countries fallen under its yoke. The action in France under the occupation is the example the richest in subtleties of the functioning of the "final solution" directed by the Order of the Fuhrer in question.

We shall now try to realize what constituted an Order of the Fuhrer in general and its functioning in the launching and the development of the extermination of the Jews.



Part II The Orders for the "Final Solution" of the Jewish Question

1. The Order of the Fuhrer (der Fuhrerbefehl) in General

A mISSIOn announced as an Order of the Fuhrer imposed on those to whom it was entrusted an unconditional fervour in its execution.

According to the testimony of Eichmann, it was as an "Order of the Fuhrer" that Heydrich presented to him the task of the extermination of the Jews, a task for which Heydrich gave him the responsibility. The Order of the Fuhrer gave the force of law to the measure ordered. Such was the foundation of the regime based on the "Fuhrer-

prinzip. " But

fied by a multitude of chiefs in a hierarchy engaging the personal responsibility of each one in the accomplishment of his task. They had to use their initiative not only with their subordinates but also with their superiors to develop as well as possible the action under the sign of the Order of the Fuhrer. In this hierarchy of responsibilities, the highest level was that of Orders of the Fuhrer, by definition in confor- mity with the doctrine and therefore right. Next came the level of governmental orders, which applied the supreme orders in terms of one of the spheres constituting the life of the people (Ministries, Party, SS) and often acted in contradictory interdependence. Beneath the governmental level was that of the administration, which arranged by its orders the execution of those of a higher level. But, given the Fuhrerprinzip, these less important acts were to be accomplished with the same conviction as the governmental acts, the whole being animat- ed by the conscience of the direct and total responsibility of each member of the people to the Fuhrer. It may be argued that the efficiency shown in the accomplishment of the evil acts of the Hitlerian regime was not due to blind obedience but rather to a very lucid zeal developed by subordinates who some- times gave a stimulus to their superiors in the execution of the order that the latter had received.

this principle set up a complex system which was rami-








In two fields, that of foreign policy and that of military affairs, Hitler after consultation and reflection decided for himself. It is less certain that he was as decisive in other fields, such as the maintenance of order and "purge" operations. High-ranking personalities of the Hitlerian regime have left accounts in their memoirs of the way in which measures referring to an Order of the Fuhrer were often taken.


active at Hitler's side, and who was finally named Chief of the General

Government (Polish territories not annexed to the Reich), wrote in his memoirs: (70)

Hans Frank,


from the time

of the creation

of the Party

"Himmler and Bormann transformed the remarks that the Fuhrer some- times dropped at table into "great secret missions" or else obtained on this occasion authorizations for their action. The history of the Third Reich is in its later period full of such procurations of the Fuhrer. How-

revoke (zuruck-


ever, he was himself, in these cases, generally too weak to





Diels, Chief of the Gestapo under Geering until April 1934, gave the same impression on the formation of decisions at Hitler's level: (71)

"All these initiators and executants acted as a medium by which the out- growths (Ausartungen) of the Hitlerian vitality were intensified to the maximum. In their milieu were born the grotesque ideas (skurille Ideen) which transformed themselves in his head into totalitarian final solutions Bormann with Himmler raised the inoffensive proposals (harmlose Aeusser- ungen) of Hitler, as in a CUlt, to the level of "Orders of the Fuhrer" endowed Wilh the strictest legal force. When the circle was closed, they soon exceeded the wishes and even the dreams of the demi-god."

O. Dietrich, Press Chief of the Government, President of the Chamber of the Press of the Reich, wrote: (72)

Sometimes, orders that

Hitler had given casually, during a discussion, had not been recognized as such by his interlocutor and so had not been executed; whence conflicts between different military offices and others. Rather often, people that he received for reasons that had nothing to do with politics, simply because it pleased him to see them, took advantage of the occasion to attain their

ends; Hitler then made them promises privately or approved what they proposed; after, they acted as if what Hitler had told them was an "Order of the Fuhrer" and that did not fail to produce great confusion, for there "

already existed an "Order of the Fuhrer" diametrically opposed

"Hitler almost never gave his orders in wntmg

An attentive observer like H. Picker, at the time a young jurist attach- ed from March to July 1942 by the Ministry of the Interior to the Head- quarters of the Fuhrer, noted for M. Bormann the remarks that Hitler made in the circle of his guests. Picker wrote in the foreword of the published version of these notes: (73)


The Order of the Fuhrer

"The goal which attracted me was to clearly show this veritable Hitler in his soundings of the future, in his hesitations before the uncertain and in his inhibitions before "the ultimate consequences a la Stalin"."

The taking of ordinary decisions at Hitler's level was described by

B. v. Schirach,

Fuhrer ·of the Young People

1940, Gauleiter of Vienna: (74)

of the Reich



"Soon Bormann assured that stenographers registered each of Hitler's words, even at table. Bormann piled up these notes in enormous armour-

ed closets, arranged according to subjects, names, dates

quests, complaints addressed to Hitler finally landed on Bormann's desk. Hitler saw but a small part of them. Bormann has himself brought from these armoured closets the comments of Hitler concerning the subject treated and afterwards edited the answers in the style and name of his master. Hitler during the year had often expressed the most contradictory opinions on the same subject: Bormann always chose the most extreme, the most brutal. And Hitler always covered for Bormann."

All letters, re-


This role of active intermediary that Martin Bormann played in the development of the political and public life of the Third Reich did not concern the special relations of Hitler with Himmler, Heydrich or Kaltenbrunner, successor of Heydrich. But the way in which M. Bor- mann established decisions in Hitler's name characterized the attitude of Hitler in general: Hitler taught and his collaborators deduced the extreme decisions to be taken, except in foreign policy and in the conduct of the war where Hitler acted personally. We may cite, too, F. Hossbach, liaison officer of the Wehrmacht with Hitler, who observed Hitler's influencable character when confronted with accomplished facts: (75)

"The'e is no doubt that following arbitrary initiatives, taken on their own account by sections of the Party, things often followed an orientation which, in the beginning, was not a agreement with Hitlers own intentions. In these cases, he was more the party led than leading; and, when they were over, he attributed to himself events which previously he had wanted other- wise or had not wanted at all. However, he seized with passion many accomplished facts with which he was confronted and assimilated them."

It is curious that it occurred to Hitler to personally and publicly make

On July

. i3, 1934, in an important speech, he commented on the murderous action of June 30 and the following days against the SA (Rahm) and against the politicians that he associated with the tendencies of the latter. At a given moment of his speech, he formulated the argument that the SA had advanced to incite people to revolt against the established Hitlerian regime: (76)

known before the Reichstag his reputation of being indecisive.

"The necessity of a separate intervention of the SA has been explained by the evocation of my inability to take decisions, which would be overcome only if faits accomplis occurred."








R. Olden, a militant anti-Nazi, explained in his work on Hitler, which appeared in 1936, the brutal decision against the SA. (77)

"There is but a single explanation possible of the reason for which the deci- sion was put off so long, to the point where it degenerated into a catas- trophe because Hitler, the FUhrer, is very far from being able to be counted

H;s weakness led him to make simultaneous and incom-

among the strong patible prom;ses to

Blomberg and to


One cannot call into question the force of Hitler's personality as Fuhrer of the Third Reich. He created by speech a spiritual force which stirred the masses and engendered in the conscience of his colla- borators conclusions which they drew as "Orders of the Fuhrer." To treat a subject, Hitler had to present it in its derivation from all of his political and ideological work which he exposed with this in mind. This is how his speeches were constructed. The accounts that we have cited indicate that face to face with a collaborator, Hitler explained to him the complex development of his thinking on a subject, leaving him the care to find a precise decision in it, to present it after to his Fuhrer and, ifr\ necessary, to convince him of the close agreement of this decision or even the action already accomplished as a result of it, with the intentions exposed by Hitler. Gilbert, the American psychologist on special mission to the Interna- tional Tribunal of Nuremberg for the purposes of psychological study of the defendants at the Main Trial, related the reaction of Grering to the hypothesis that he presented to the latter on the role of Hitler in the taking of decisions concerning the" final solution":

"I shall suggest the following tableau: H.itler, obsessed by anti-Semitism and incapable of tolerating opposition or advice advocating moderation, saying finally to Himmler: "Get rid of them-it little matters how-I don't want to hear about them anymore!" Grering reflected a moment, seeming to visualize the scene; then he declared that it was probably like that that it happened."

. The essential for Hitler was acquired i'n advance: the measures pro- voked by the development of his thinking were to be carried through by the spirit of extreme harshness with which he impregnated the Party that he created by gathering about him persons adequate for this spirit This spirit was guaranteed by the training the Party gave to its members. It was perhaps this dialectical manner of expressing his wiII by the explana- tion starting from principles or origins which acquired for Hitler the reputation that he evoked himself regarding the operation against Roehm. A significant parallel was drawn by Himmler between this last action and the "final solution." In fact, in his important speech of October 1943 at Posen to the high-ranking officials ot the SS, Himmler, before exposing in brutal terms the extermination of the Jews as the goal of the deportations (he said: "evacuation "), warned that he would speak of a matter of which the men of the SS should be aware as of a necessity, but with regard to which they were to observe the same discretion which was the rule in respect to the recollection of the Roehm affair.


Public Announcements by the Fuhrer

2. Public Announcements of the "Final Solution" by the Fuhrer and Chancellor of the Reich

January 30, 1939 was the last anniversary in peace-time of Hitler's rise to power. In his speech before the Reichstag on domestic and foreign policy, Hitler pronounced his famous "prophecy": (78)

"Today I want to be a prophet once again: if financial international Judaism in Europe and beyond Europe were to succeed once again in pushing the peoples into a world war, then the result of it would not be the Bolshevi- zation of the earth, th