Vladimir Gligorov A Kantian Idea of Sovereignty Introduction The Kantian motivation to study international relations is to answer the question,

Is elimination of wars possible? The answer is that it is possible in the same way that all social relations can be pacified, i.e., through the introduction of the rule of law. International rule of law should be based on the protection of individual rights as much as the domestic rule of law. Indeed, the two cosmopolitan and constitutional laws should define the content of the sovereignty of states, which is defined within the idea of negative freedom: sovereign states have duties towards their own citizens, other states, and their citizens as those emanate from the constitutional and cosmopolitan laws. This I take to be a Kantian idea of sovereignty. It needs to be argued for on three different grounds all of which are also Kantian in inspiration. One is theoretical: is it conceivable? The other is pragmatic: how can it work? The third is empirical: do we see it emerging? I will take up these three questions in that order. Some conclusions end this short paper. A Hobbesian Argument In The Contest of Faculties Kant says: (I)n so far as human beings can themselves accomplish anything or anything can be expected of them, it can only be through their negative wisdom in furthering their own ends. In the latter event, they will find themselves compelled to ensure that war, the greatest obstacle to morality and the invariable enemy of progress, first becomes gradually more humane, then more infrequent, and finally disappears completely as a mode of aggression. They will thereby enter into a constitution based on genuine principle of right, which is by its nature capable of constant progress and improvement without forfeiting its strength.1 Kant consistently uses this Hobbesian argument from anarchy to arrive at the solution that entails the existence of perpetual peace. As in Hobbes, the solution is a contractarian one. There are then two questions to answer. First, how Hobbesian is Kant? Second, how Kantian
1

Reiss (1970), p. 189. In other places Kant argues that wars will get worse over time approximating the state of war of all states against all states before it becomes clear to citizens of all states, including those that are big and powerful, that peace is to be preferred. Both processes gradual disappearance of wars and the adoption of the rule of law to avoid an overall world conflict are consistent with the Hobbesian argument for pacification through the rule of law.

is Hobbes? The interesting answer to the first question is the one that emerges through the answer to the second question.2 Probably the extreme interpretation of Hobbes theory of sovereignty, which is however very often accepted, usually with some qualifications, is that developed in the work of Carl Schmitt.3 Essentially, in this interpretation, Hobbes argued that internal security has to be purchased at the expense of the perpetuation of external anarchy. Thus, the need to face the external enemies determines the absolute power of the sovereign over the citizens of the state. In a sense, politics is the continuation of war by other means.4 In the context of the discussion of the concept of sovereignty, the external, international, sovereignty determines the internal, constitutional, sovereignty. This interpretation can be sustained as Hobbesian only if it is accepted that Hobbes contradicted himself. Because he certainly argues that citizens are not obliged to obey the sovereign if that implies that they may have to sacrifice their lives or put them at risk, for instance in wars. This goes against the very reason that compels people to enter into a social contract that establishes the sovereign power: the motivation for the establishment of civil society is the elimination, in principle and institutionally, of the risk of violent death. It, the sovereign power, is justified as long as it supplies security in return. If it does not, it does not have to be obeyed. Leo Strauss draws the following conclusion from this inconsistency. The only solution to this difficulty which preserves the spirit of Hobbess political philosophy is the outlawry of war or the establishment of a world state.5 This latter conclusion follows perhaps in the sense that Hobbes did not believe in the division and separation of powers: for him, sovereignty had to be one and could not be shared - a federation does not seem to be an option for him and, thus, a world federation seems inconceivable within the Hobbesian political philosophy.6 But, it is questionable whether this concept of sovereignty belongs to the spirit or to the letter of Hobbes political philosophy, i.e., to his argument or to his explicit
2

The standard interpretation of the history of international relations theory contrasts Hobbes realism with Kants idealism (see, for instance, Beitz, 1999). Kants Hobbesianism is, however, underlined by Tuck (2001). Williams (2003) is ambivalent on this point. Malcolm (2003) shows that Hobbes was not a realist he is taken to be, though his interesting essay is not altogether clear and does not discuss the relationship with Kant, though he seems to be arguing that Hobbes was quite Kantian in his reliance on international law. 3 Underlying, for instance, his The Concept of the Political and Political Theology and indeed all his writings. For a criticism relevant for this paper see Strauss review of The Concept of the Political. 4 This is one way to understand the significance that Schmitt puts on the contrast of friends with enemies for political science. 5 Strauss (1953), p. 198. In his criticism of Schmitt, Strauss points to the main difficulty that interpreters of Hobbes who take him to be the originator of the theory of power politics face: Hobbes either thinks that politics starts where the state of nature ends or he does not. If he does, then Kantian conclusion of the necessity of the international rule of law is unavoidable. Schmitt, of course, thought that without the constant presence of the state of nature, there is no politics either in theory or in practice. Malcolm (in 2003) argues that natural right in Hobbes applies universally and thus leads to the existence and acceptance of international law. This is another way to argue, I think, that Hobbesian argument does not lead to the conclusion that power politics is the natural state of affairs in international politics.

claims. Kant, it can be maintained, showed that Hobbes way of arguing, though not his wording, does not entail the conclusion that sovereignty is either one and indivisible or altogether non-existent. This, however, will lead to the change in the definition of sovereignty. Here, again, Carl Schmitt could be helpful. He thought that sovereignty belonged to the state of nature. It is defined as the right to make the incontestable decision in exceptional situations: for instance, in the state of war. The sovereign is the one who can send out people to kill and be killed. This clearly belongs to the state of nature, not to the state of civil society. Thus, the concept of sovereignty is that of a right that those in power have in the state of nature. Kant looks at sovereignty as the obligation or a duty that a state takes on itself as a subject of international law. These duties are both external and internal. Externally, the state gives up the right to wage war, while internally it accepts the duty to respect individual rights, in other words to be constrained by a constitution. Carl Schmitt thought that the constitution cannot constrain the sovereign, because its power is required precisely in those instances when the constitution is either inapplicable or breaks down. In a sense, the sovereign is in the same position in which every individual is in the state of nature. Hobbes, however, deduces natural rights of people in the state of nature, which are in fact all those duties that they are ready to take up in order to live in the civil society. They are ready to sign a compact that makes it possible for them to enjoy the security of the civil society. The reason that they want to do that is that they prefer peace to war. This preference is based on the interest in self-preservation, but is also moral, which is what Kant also says. Kant thinks that wars are the most immoral things imaginable. Though he disagrees with Hobbes on the foundation of morality, they are in agreement that there is no morality in the state of war, which does not mean that there are no moral rights but only that there is no way to enforce them. War is immoral because it breaks all moral rules and, Kant thought, cannot be made into a moral activity by the adoption of the laws of waging wars. It follows from that, I think, that there are no just wars and that the whole idea of justice in wars is a misguided one. It could be argued, then, that Kant was a Hobbesian, because Hobbes was in fact Kantian. In other words, Kantian cosmopolitan conclusions were implied in the Hobbesian concept of sovereignty. Once the state of nature is rejected not only among friends but in every respect, the same mechanism that displaces the sovereignty of the individual with the sovereignty of the state displaces the latter with the rule of international law. Both are
6

Early criticism of Hobbes rejection of the separation of powers can be already found in Leibniz (1988), 118120.

conceivable only if individualism is accepted. Hobbes, in clear break from Aristotle and most classics, thinks of human beings as being unsocial. Kant starts with the same premise and reaches the same conclusion: people join societies in order to live in peace, theirs is an unsocial sociability. The optimal size of that society from the individualistic point of view is clearly the cosmopolis. This is so precisely because of the individualist assumption, or of the specific unsocial sociability that characterises human beings. To stop short of the cosmopolitan conclusion would mean to abandon the way of arguing from the state of nature that Hobbes introduced.7 Hobbes insistence on the unsocial character of human beings has been interpreted as being based on his specific anthropology and psychology. But, that is not really necessary. It is enough to assume individualism.8 Individualism is necessary to assume if a contractual theory of morality and politics is to be defended. This is because the costs of social relations cannot but fall on individuals, thus they have to be parties to the contract. Thus, if it is not to be assumed that man is by nature a social animal, i.e., if social relations are contractual, then individualism is unavoidable. This is independent of specific anthropological or psychological assumptions about human beings that one may want to make or accept. All the differences between Hobbes and Kant in these respects are thus irrelevant for the way they see the basis on which civil society is constructed: the basis is always individualism, which in contrast to the Aristotelian or other communitarian theories in political philosophy and ethics can be called unsocial sociability. It is simply the allusive way of expressing the fact that the assumption of individualism is being made. That has next to nothing to do with the particular view of human nature that one is prepared to take or accept. Federalist Argument
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Again, Strauss is certainly right to point out, as Constant did in the well-known lecture on modern and ancient freedoms, that individualism underlies the whole modern political philosophy. He is also certainly right in arguing that all the problems that modern political philosophy faces have also to be traced back to individualism. That does not mean, however, that there are solutions to be found in the ancient political philosophy or in any other alternative approach to politics. He seems to have thought, as did Schmitt, that political philosophy faces always the same set of problems that it tries to understand and explain rather than to solve once and for all. Of course, he differed from Schmitt in the definition of these problems: Schmitt thought that those were associated with the difference between friends and enemies while Strauss saw them, as did practically all political philosophers, liberal or others, in the western tradition, in the tension between the individual and the public. In that sense, Schmitt was not only contemplating the exception, he was, as a political philosopher, truly exceptional, perhaps together with Marx or perhaps some Marxists. Because, though for different reasons, they believed that politics is an instrument of war and not the other way around. 8 This is standard in the game theoretical and social choice based interpretations of Hobbes political philosophy. This is also the starting point of Rawls in his A Theory of Justice and of most political philosophy that his work revived. Thus, the often discussed differences between Hobbes and Kant on the role of rationality and of moral incentives (and ethics in general), is not really relevant for their respective political philosophies and their comparisons. The key assumption is that of individualism, everything else can be debated separately and on its own merits.

The precise political organisation of the cosmopolis is of course a different matter. In Theory and Practice Kant says: On the one hand, universal violence and the distress it produces must eventually make a people decide to submit to the coercion which reason itself prescribes (i.e., the coercion of public law), and to enter into a civil constitution. And on the other hand, the distress produced by the constant wars in which the states try to subjugate or engulf each other must finally lead them, even against their will, to enter into a cosmopolitan constitution. Or if such a state of universal peace is in turn even more dangerous to freedom, for it may lead to the most fearful despotism (as has indeed occurred more than once with states that have grown too large), distress must force men to form a state which is not a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single ruler, but a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right.9 The solution consistent with the Hobbesian argument is that of a cosmopolitan republic. However, it, the cosmopolitan state, could turn out to be despotic. This is an empirical possibility, it is not a necessity. Clearly, Kant thinks that a republican world state is possible. But a despotic world state is also possible.10 The republican constitution could be subverted and it could then be hard to see how the world republic could be restored. To forestall such a possibility, he suggests another solution: a world federation. In the case of the world republic, only one centre of power would be sovereign and that only internally, as there are no other states and thus there is no external sovereignty. In the case of the world federation, sovereignty is preserved, but it is decentralised and defined within the international law. There is a debate about how deep or thick this world federation could be. It is often pointed out or argued that Kant had in mind only a very loose or limited confederation of states. This does not seem likely for two reasons. On the one hand, the main aim of legalisation of international relations is to get rid of power politics, because the final aim is to get rid of the use of violent means and especially to remove the possibility of wars once and for all. This is a historical end, but not the end of history. It is also not the end of politics, as Schmitt thought. It is a fulfilment of an end, one that politics aims at. There are any number of other aims that remain. The elimination of power politics is also thought to be Kantian, but not Hobessian. This is again not correct. Hobbes argued that there can be no supreme power, no one person or a coalition of persons
9

Reiss (1970), p. 90. At least, Kant writes that way. However, the Hobbesian concept of sovereignty could perhaps imply that. As the sovereign is above law, that could perhaps lead to despotic consequences if there were only one state in the world. The reasons could be those that indeed can be observed to be supporting despotism in large and populous states.
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that is stronger than any other person or a coalition of persons. Indeed, in the Hobbesian world, everybody is weak in the state of nature. That goes for individuals, but also for groups of people, i.e., for states. In addition, there is no balance of weakness and thus there is no balance of power. Thus, power politics can only lead to a war of every state against every other state, to international anarchy.11 This is essentially the point that Kant makes, and I think he draws it from the consistent interpretation of Hobbes concept of power, which is essentially that of the symmetry of weakness rather than of balance of power. On the other hand, this federation has to be based on law, and the nature of law, any law if it is to be law, is that it has individuals as subjects. This is because of the formal and the substantive character of law. Formally, because it is a rule and thus has to apply to those that can follow the rule and those are ultimately the individuals. Substantively, because all the costs are individual, and thus all the duties have to be individualised. Thus, if law has to have any relation to the idea of justice, it has to distribute duties justly and that implies that it has to individualise liability. The elimination of power politics and the need to individualise duties lead to a rather deep integration of member states of the world federation. Kant himself discuses only certain aspects of this integration. But the structure of the argument is such that it suggests an integration that essentially means that the world republic would have one legal system, though it would be sustained and implemented in a decentralised way, i.e, by a federation or a confederation. Kant does not give other reasons for preferring world federation over a world republic. He leaves an impression that the former is a second best solution. That may not be the case, however. There are reasons to prefer federations over centralised states and those carry over to the international commonwealth. Some of the reasons can actually be deduced from what Kant says about the territoriality of states, the spread of markets and the limitation of public debt. Before going into these issues, it is perhaps useful to look into the frequently mentioned fact that Kant does accept that people differ in culture and in other ethnic or national characteristics. He also treats states as self-sufficient and self-contained. How are

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There is, it seems to me, a general misunderstanding of Hobbes idea of power. Strauss argued that the idea of power is the key to understanding Hobbes and modern political philosophy. It is, however, striking that Hobbes in fact starts with the state of nature in which everybody is weak and nobody powerful: there is no balance of power in the state of nature. And as far as states are permanently in the state of nature, international relations cannot be based on the balance of power. In other words, there is no equilibrium solution to power politics.

these aspects of his theory to be reconciled with his cosmopolitanism? Here a contrast with Rawls theory of international relations may be useful.12 Though Rawls echoes almost all Kants statements, he does not accept either world federalism or cosmopolitanism. Rather, he starts with the assumption that societies are closed and self-sufficient with no international relations whatsoever. Then they enter into an international compact with the aim to coexist peacefully. Among them there are some burdened societies that need aid and outside of this community remain outlaw states that present the residual security risk.13 Now, on the face of it, this theory does not differ fundamentally from Kants. However, it does not rely on the Hobbesian argument and is not individualistic in the Kantian sense.14 Hobbes sees the state as primarily a security arrangement. Other values and goods are not necessarily to be supplied by the state. Kant in essence adopts the same approach. Rawls, however, sees the society and the state as the suppliers of mutual benefits and of their just distribution. Political obligation springs from these facts. International law lets peoples, societies and states live in peace. There are no Hobbesian reasons that drive the creation of societies and of states, at least not in his later work which is the relevant one when it comes to international issues and affairs. For Rawls, the key problem is the inevitable political pluralism both domestically and internationally. It is really the ideological conflict rather then the conflict between the individual and the public that is the key political problem for Rawls. There is no doubt that ideological, i.e., religious conflicts are important and that those have been neglected by almost all political philosophy until the early nineteenth century. Still, one way to see these conflicts resolved, both domestically and internationally, is to adopt an individualistic point of view rather than a communitarian one. Kant indeed takes into account cultural differences and the reality of cultural pluralism.15 He also takes a state to be self-sufficient. However, he still argues that all states will adopt a republican constitution and that these republics will enter into a world federation based on international law. Clearly, he dissociates culture from politics. His acceptance of the
12

Especially relevant are Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples. His A Theory of Justice is also relevant but mainly because of his shift from a Hobbesian and Kantian kind of an argument to be found there to a more communitarian one that is to be found in his more recent work. Especially when it comes to international law and relations, Rawls adopts liberal nationalist point of view rather than the individualistic and rational approach to be found in Kant. 13 He also adds the fifth type of states: benevolent absolutisms. He says very little about those, however. 14 Also, Rawls theory is almost exclusively normative. It is especially hard to understand his contention that his is a realistic utopia as it is both too realistic to be utopian and too normative to be meaningfully realistic if that entails some role for the empirical facts. 15 In that he seems to have been of the same opinion as Herder.

existence of certain social homogeneity and of self-sufficiency cannot be understood as providing external sociological and economic reasons for the determination of the extensionality of a concrete state. It is not to be taken to have any additional significance for the solution of the basic political problems, especially not those that are connected with security. This can be seen from the way that Kant treats the above mentioned issues of territoriality, markets, and public debt. Rawls argues that the specific people own the territory they occupy and can thus regulate movements of people and the working of the labour market. Rawls justification invokes a questionable analogy of states with private firms.16 In essence, he basically argues that citizens are shareholders and the government the management of a certain state on a certain territory because, otherwise, the value of the territory and thus of citizenship would tend to deteriorate. Thus, a state is, in this respect, one large firm. Kant thought that the public ownership was only formal, while every piece of property was distributed to individual persons. The responsibility was thus decentralised too. So, the territoriality of the state was to be seen purely in terms of security and legal jurisdiction, it had nothing to do with the value of the land or of the citizenship. Also, territory was not to be seen as being coextensive with the distribution of cultures. Thus, state had no role in maintaining the culture and certainly could not claim that it was responsible for its development in order to maximise the value of the citizenship it offered or secured. Kant also thought that trade replaces war and makes it obsolete. That was the belief of other liberals, e.g., of Constant. Though he did not treat the role of financial and labour markets, it is to be assumed that in the circumstances in which he was writing, the type of nationalistic protectionism that emerged later on would have most probably been rejected by him.17 In any case, his endorsement of trade could be extended to include freedom to invest and move. Thus, it can be argued that Kant indeed, anticipated the four freedoms endorsed by the European Union; those of ideas, goods, capital and labour. Kant famously argued that states should be prohibited from accumulating public debt. He thought that the ability to run fiscal deficits, especially those externally financed, enabled states or induced them to go to war. Thus, he argued for the prohibition of public debt. It could be argued that Kant was advocating the constitutional provision of balanced budgets for

16 17

In The Law of Peoples. A Kantian argument for a market state, I think, could be made. For a recent treatment of the changing nature of states with the discussion of the contemporary market state, see Bobbitts Shield of Achilles.

any state, republican or any other. He clearly did not want to allow states to be able to bail themselves out of recessions or out of accumulated debts by going to war. Thus, the world federation would be run by a common legal system, would consist of free republican states, which would be based on private property, would entertain free markets and would forbid the states to accumulate public debt. The latter requirement would probably imply the use of common currency. Thus, the sovereignty of a state would be limited to the implementation of the international and constitutional law. Argument from Globalisation Kant argued that providence reveals the historical necessity of perpetual peace. Rawls, as already mentioned, speaks about realistic utopia. Clearly, perpetual peace cannot be found in the past, so it has to be anticipated in the future. But it has to be discernible in the present. Kants argument is detailed and well known, so it will not be summarised here. The key issue is not so much the justification or the content of the international and cosmopolitan law. There are essentially two questions of interest: first, whether states will ever develop an interest to abandon power politics and adopt international law and, second, even if they adopted it, why should they implement it? The first issue, of the replacement of the law of power by the power of law, has become rather hotly debated recently. Probably the most notorious is the argument to be found in the recent book by Robert Kagan.18 There he argues, as does Thrasymachus in Platos Republic and the knave in Hobbes Leviathan, that power is justice (that might makes right) and only the weak have an interest in the law that constrains the powerful. Kant essentially argues, similarly, to Hobbes, that wars will get more frequent and more bloody and will thus become too costly for the powerful as well as for the weak. Thus, Kant argues that certain symmetry of power or rather weakness will lead states to gradually adopt the rule of law and give up the reliance on power politics. Kant also notices that the world has become interdependent and that everybody has an interest in the implementation of international law. Thus, he links the emergence of the international legal order to the process of globalisation, as would be called today. In the same way in which local markets get regulated and practically for the same reasons, it will be in the interest of everybody to regulate global markets. Thus, it is the interest in the benefits that the functioning of the elements of the civil society on a global scale brings that will support the gradual development of the international legal order and of the cosmopolis. Clearly, this
18

Of Paradise and Power.

interest strengthens with the increase of the costs of conflicts, which grow together with the growth of benefits that global markets bring. That rule of law in the global market should be as beneficial as in the national markets seems too obvious to require any additional argumentation. There is just the issue of the particular way that the required international action should take. Kant thought international contract is the preferred alternative. In that context he upheld the concept of national sovereignty: states need to be sovereign to be able to take over the obligations under the international law: they should be sovereign in order to create international obligations and implement them. These ideas could be supplemented with those that are to be found in the work of liberal federalists, for instance in Hayek.19 Two arguments could be mentioned. World federation is superior to a unitary world state because it enables, first, competition of legal practices and, second, it gives people the possibility to vote with their feet. This is analogous to the freedom of entry and exit into a market that facilitates the efficient allocation of resources. It is often argued, in this context, that Kant restricts obligations towards foreigners to those of hospitality. Rawls, thus, looks quite unfavourably on migration. This interpretation, however, is both incomplete and probably false. It is incomplete because Kants states can be hospitable in different ways and Kant does not deny that. For instance, it may mean that foreigners can expect that the host country will pay their medical bills or care about their welfare in whatever way that country thinks is hospitable. How wide or restricted these obligations are is not prescribed by Kant. It is also false to conclude that Kant thought that foreigners can only be guests, they cannot migrate. These are clearly two different things. Migration is up to the market and laws that regulate them. I do not see Kant arguing that labour markets should be closed down at state borders. The correct interpretation is probably that Kant obliged states to be hospitable to the guests from other states and let everything else to the markets and the civil society. At least, I think that is a Kantian argument that can be found in, for instance, Hayek. Thus, cosmopolis would be decentralised and would consist of free individuals and sovereign states. Sovereign in the sense that they would be responsible for the legal order and for the implementation of the international law. Conclusions Kantian idea of sovereignty is that of the political centre of responsibility under the international law. In addition, it is internally constrained by the republican constitution. It is a
19

In his Individualism and Economic Order.

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device to prevent the occurrence of wars, an instrument of pacifistic politics. It will emerge because people will learn from the horrors of the ever more terrible wars and because of the globalisation of individual interests. Its stability has to be additionally assured by the privatisation of property, freedom of trade and the restriction on the accumulation of public debt. In the final analysis, this cosmopolis should have only one goal: freedom of the individual. It could be argued, though it indeed is not in this paper, that the European Union could be such a cosmopolis in the making.20

20

Carl Schmitt famously argued that: The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political. If state is understood as a legal entity and politics is understood as a certain political regime, then political settlement is a precondition of the rule of law. Schmitt did not believe in the converse statement that rule of law can sustain a political settlement. The latter assertion can perhaps be attributed to Hans Kelsen. These two statements encompass the political history of Europe. The connection of the political settlement with the rule of law was clearly seen by Kant. However, the two centuries that followed after he wrote on international law accepted the first, Schmittian part of this theory, while the second, Kelsenian part, had to wait until the end of the last century to get its chance. European Union is premised on a security arrangement, but its sustainability depends on the European rule of law taking hold (see Weiler, 2001).

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References Beitz, Ch., Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton University Press, 1999 (revised edition). Bobbitt, Ph., The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002. Hayek, F., The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism in Individualism and Economic Order. The University of Chicago Press, 1948. Hobbes, Th., Leviathan. Kagan, R., Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. Leibniz, G. W., Political Writings. Edited by Patrick Riley. Cambridge University Press, 1988 (second edition). Malcolm, N., Hobbes's Theory of International Relations in Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford University Press, 2003. Rawls, J., Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press, second edition, 1996. Rawls, J., The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press, 1999. Reiss, H., Kants Political Writings. Cambridge University Press, 1970. Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political. University of Chicago Press, 1996. Schmitt, C., Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985. Strauss, L., Natural Right and History. The University of Chicago Press, 1953. Strauss, L., Notes on Carl Schmitt: The Concept of the Political in Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. University of Chicago Press, 1996. Tuck, R., The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford University Press, 2001. Weiler, J. H. H., Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europes Sonderweg in Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the US and the EU. Oxford University Press, 2001 Williams, H., Kant's Critique of Hobbes: Sovereignty and Cosmopolitanism. University of Wales Press, 2003.

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