Int J Philos Relig DOI 10.

1007/s11153-011-9331-4 ARTICLE

The lutheran inuence on Kants depraved will

Dennis Vanden Auweele

Received: 7 July 2011 / Accepted: 8 December 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract Contemporary Kant-scholarship has a tendency to allign Kants understanding of depravity closer to Erasmus than Luther in their famous debate on the freedom of the will (15201527). While, at face value, some paragraphs do warrant such a claim, I will argue that Kants understanding of the radical evil will draws closer to Luther than Erasmus in a number of elements. These elements are (1) the intervention of the Wille for progress towards the good, (2) a positive choice for evil, (3) the inscrutability of moral progress, (4) the rejection of prudence as a means for salvation and (5) the rejection of moral sentimentalism. I believe that Kant-scholarship mistakenly pegs Kants rational Enlightenment optimism for an existential optimism while Kants view of fallen nature draws closer to Lutheran than Erasmusian depravity. A tacit Lutheran inuence pervades Kants moral philosophy which could explain the inuence Kants has had on some more pessimistic 19th century philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. Keywords Free will-debate Luther/Erasmus Depravity Radical evil Salvation Immanuel Kant
How can an evil tree bear good fruit? Immanuel Kant

German philosophy in the 1819th century seems dominated by philosophers who, although usually renouncing direct inuence from this, stem from a Protestant rather than a Catholic line of inheritance: Leibniz, Kant, Wolff and Fichtealthough brought up for charges of atheismwere are Lutherans, and even Nietzsche, the great enemy of institutional religion, had nothing but Protestant ministers as direct male family

D. Vanden Auweele (B ) Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Lesagestraat 43, 1820 Steenokkerzeel, Belgium e-mail: Dennis.Vandenauweele@hiw.kuleuven.be

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members. Their Lutheran pessimism with regard to the impossibility of autonomously venturing towards salvation or the good often mixed with rationalist Enlightenment optimism. Ever since the Gordon Michalsons seminal work on Kants1 concept of radical evil as fallen freedom, Kant-interpretation has been having a tendency to more or less univocally relate Kants notion of will closer to a Catholic than a Protestant understanding of the Fall by mistakenly pegging his rational optimism for an innate seed of goodness in the natural human will2 . While for Luther and Erasmus religious soteriology and morality surely mix, for Kant, the distinction seems tantamount to his system of autonomous ethics. I hope to show that there are a number of religious inuences in Kants moral system, and that some of these are typically Lutheran. Therefore, I should like to raise a few notes of caution against univocally aligning Kants understanding of the radical evil, depraved will closer to a Catholic than a Protestant understanding of the Fall. Specifically, I will comment upon Michalsons claim that Kants position is similar to that of Erasmus in his celebrated debate with Luther over the freedom of the will (1990, p. 75) by tracing some of the typically Lutheran treads in Kants notion of the power of choice (Willkr)3 . Textual fragments seem to, at face value, align Kant closer to Erasmus than Luther. He writes that while some supernatural cooperation is also needed for [the human being] becoming good or better (6:44), still a germ of goodness is left in its entire purity, a germ that cannot be extirpated (6:45). However, this restoration is not the acquisition of a lost incentive for the good () [but] the recovery of the purity of the law (6:46). Two themes will guide my exposition: rst, how to understand depravity in a Lutheran, Catholic and Kantian sense and, second, how Luthers concept of God and grace show structural and performative similarities with Kants higher faculty of desire (Wille) and feeling of respect (Achtung). Erasmus diatribe In 1524, Erasmus wrote his Diatribe or Sermon concerning Free Will as a response to Luthers Assertio omnium articulorum D. Mart. Luth. Per bullam Leonis X Damnatorum (1520) to which Luther responded with his On the Bondage of the Will (1525)4 , ultimately leading to Erasmus Hyperaspistes (15261527). Although
1 All references stem from the Cambridge Edition of Kants work. They will be followed by the number of the volume and page number of the Akademie Ausgabe, as is customary. 2 See: Winter (1972, p. xi), Michalson (1990, p. 75) and Staten (2005, p. 17). 3 Kant was actually raised in Pietism, not Lutheranism or Calvinism. Pietism is a theological movement

within Lutheranism which is usually, in the constructivist understanding (cf. Wallmann (1990), taken to be initiated by Philipp Jakob Spener (16351705) and continued by August Hermann Francke (16631727). Several scholars (cf. Lindberg (2005) point towards the earlier inuence of Johann Arndt (15551621), Johannes Tauler (13001361) and Thomas Kempis (13801471) on the movement. Within Pietism, two sub-movements emerged: Moravianism and Halle Pietism, of which the latter inuenced Kant the most. The most significant point of divergence between Pietism and Lutheranism is the formers emphasis on the monastic ideal of Imitatio Christi. For the purposes of this paper, I feel I can gloss over the differences between Pietism and Lutheranism.
4 The English translation of the free-will dispute is taken from Winter (Ed., 1972). I will abbreviate this

work in the text as EL as well as add the number of the page.

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Erasmus was very critical of church authority, see especially his Praise of Folly (1511), and initially sympathetic to the Reformation5 , he was rather hesitant with regard to Luthers analysis of the bondage of the will. Erasmus denes freedom of the will as the power of the human will whereby man can apply to or turn away from that which leads unto eternal salvation (EL 20). Man is free to turn away from salvation or towards God: in man, there is a desire both for the depraved Flesh as well as for God. Erasmus equates fallenness with freedom: we have become free to turn away from God which, by itself, makes us evil or depraved. Erasmus subscribes to the classical scholastic three-fold distinction of the human being in body (esh), spirit and soul. According to this distinction, only the body is corrupted through the Fall. Erasmus understands the rejection of Godnot as a positive commitment to evilas form of giving in to the depraved esh. Because of the Fall, human beings have a natural tendency to venture astray and are prone to immersing in sensuality: The will capable of turning here and there is generally called a free will, despite its more ready assent to evil than to good, because of our remaining inclination to sin (EL 65). This attraction to sensuality has an upside, however, since it forms the ground for the human agents potency for merit: the human agent is able to freely opt for God and work towards her regeneration from evil. Whenever she is evil, she is overtaken by her sensuous nature and needs to be re-awakened to her moral destiny. Accordingly, Erasmus asserts that the human agent is principally able to autonomously fulll some of the basic requirements that will work towards her salvation as her other capacities (i.e. spirit and soul) are untainted by the Fall: corruption has not destroyed the human agents potency for the good, only weakened it; the natural light has been dimmed, not extinguished. The Fall is, in Erasmus understanding, never radical or absolute as a germ of goodness always remains. A particularly emphatic illustration of this surrounds the Catholic interpretation of Gods incarnation in the esh: God enters the immanent world as a eshed being, therefore there is something about (eshed) being that is fundamentally good. The much-debated dual nature of Jesus does, in Erasmus understanding, not univocally focus on either humanity or divinity as both are the constituent parts of Jesus being. Therefore, we should not radically turn away from the devices offered to man, such as prudence and charitable work, in order to be saved because they were blessed in Jesus. Erasmus calls prayer and, more importantly, wisdom the weapons of a Christian as he was thoroughly convinced that rational truth could not contradict revelatory truth (the unity of truth). Being itself, if approached properly, is infused with an aura of
5 After Luther nailed his 95 theses to the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg on October 31, 1517, Erasmus wrote a number of letters to Thomas More and John Colet detailing his, to a large extent, approval of Luthers discomforts with the Church. A popular saying goes that Erasmus work laid the egg that Luther hatched. Erasmus refused, however, to univocally pick sides with the Reformation, or the Catholic Church, and was therefore accused of cowardice from either side. Although Erasmus repeatedly claimed that taking sides would be to the detriment of his position as a non-partisan scholar, one could easily take Erasmus refusal to adhere to all the tenets of the Reformation as a sign, reminiscent of his Humanism, of his deep-rooted reservations concerning Luthers emphasis on the bondage of the will and the nullity of charitable works and prayer to work towards the good. He did believe that the Catholic Church needed to be reformed and returned to a more original and pure interpretation of Scripturealthough ercely rejecting any form of schismby criticizing the hairsplitting of theology. He feared that Protestantism would simply replace the old theology with a new one. Cf. Gonzalez (1975, pp. 1922).

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goodness that no amount of corruption can ever extinguish: If we are on the road to piety, we should continue to improve eagerly and forget what lies behind us; if we have become involved in sin, we should make every effort to extricate ourselves, to accept the remedy of penance and solicit the mercy of the lord (EL 9). Accordingly, there are some worldly things that can assist man in meriting the Kingdom of Heaven. The Church, for example, can work as a mediator between God and man in order to put man on the right path to salvation. In Erasmus opinion, however, the Church has strayed from her proper end and should be scrutinized and reformed: we need a religion that returns ad fontes and not a new hairsplitting of theology. To what extent can the human will and its worldly aids sufce to work towards salvation without supernatural assistance? Erasmus remains relatively unclear on this issue6 , which could be attributed to the fact that he has not yet formed a definite opinion on any of the numerous traditional views regarding the freedom of the will (EL 7). He does seem to suggest, however, that, for the most part, salvation should be attributed to the grace of God. This does not entail, however, that human agency has a negligible role to play in meriting this supernatural assistance. In fact, through the workings of the will cultivating its talent for goodness through prayer and charitable works, it will be more likely to be saved by God. This soteriological understanding of moralitydrawing dangerously close to Pelegianismis mostly an inner attitude of the mind for Erasmus, who strongly opposes hypocritical, and merely external, obedience to the law: vices masquerading as virtues are the greatest enemy to morality and Christianity. Hence, augmented by Gods grace, human agency is able to overcome its own depravity and venture towards personal salvation: Man is able to accomplish all things, if Gods grace aids him (EL 78). In good Christian humility, Erasmus calls grace the principal cause and the will only the secondary cause of salvation because the free will itself comes from divine grace (EL 86). The human agent has some good within her that can assist to merit salvation, and she should therefore work towards this end with all of her, even though limited, powers. Despite the condence Erasmus, who enjoyed the sobriquet Prince of the Humanists, has in human capacities as well as his de-radicalization of original sin, his sense of Humanism in general remains self-consciously Christian by emphasizing the requirement of a virtue of faith7 .
6 During the entirety of his life, Erasmus has stayed unclear on many issues. When he was asked by Frederick the Great to testify to Luthers personality and piety, Erasmus answered with a glowing and brief epigram. Luther commented to this that Erasmus is an eel. Only Christ can grab him. While many take up Erasmus indecisiveness as a sign of cowardice or sloth, one could easily picture Erasmus as unwilling to take sides as the options offered to him all seemed equally undesirable. He was convinced, however, that there should be a Church in the future which should grow from the established one without violent schism. He famously stated: I will put up with this Church until I nd a better one. 7 Cf. Skinner (1978, p. 91). Although most scholars are, on a whole, sympathetic to mine and Skinners

analysis of Renaissance Humanism, some point out that this account fails to take in the larger social and intellectual context of Humanism in its interaction with scholasticism (Rummel 1995). Others tend to oppose this homogenization of Humanism as it seemingly fails to note the strong Augustinian line of argumentation, e.g. Erasmus and Lorenzo Valla (Herdt 2008; Kraye 1988). Anthony Levi seems to formally oppose Skinners assessment of Renaissance Humanism by claiming that it was mostly instigated by a rebellion against a view of man as perfectible by norms of belief and behavior extrinsic and irrelevant to his rational needs and moral aspirations (1974, p. 8).

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Luthers response Luther claims that Erasmus is not a proper Christian as the Christianity which he describes is without Christ, without the Spirit, and chillier than ice (EL 105). Luther interprets the Fall as a radical happening that cannot be reversed by any human endeavor since the human agent is inexcusably fallen and the good is beyond her reach. Luther believed that previous, especially Scholastic, theology has downplayed the severity of the sinfulness of man (see especially his Attack on Latomus (1521)), something which he found continued in Erasmus elicitation of the freedom of the will. This total human depravity will later on be taken up as the rst of the ve points of Calvinism. Prior to On the Bondage of the Will, Luther asserted, in the Heidelberg Disputation (1518), that there is a Theology of Glory8 and a Theology of the Cross9 : the former attempts to comprehend God in His manifestation while the latter only speaks of God in a more narrow sense of manifestation, namely in His immediate revelation. In Luthers view, a Theology of the Glory was impossible because of human depravity and weakness. God is not to be found in any works which Luther understands in a twofold sense: the workings of, on the one hand, God such as immanent creation (rationalism) and, on the other hand, man such as moral agency (moralism). God is found neither in human kindness nor the beauty of creation. Rational theology boasts of being wise, while it really is, according to Luther, folly10 , and even exalted reason is under the sway of the devil11 . Luther does not refuse all natural knowledge of God, however, as he allows, in his Theologia Cruxis for the rational and natural certainty that God exists, that He is good, that He is all-powerful and that He is all-knowing. This left hand-knowledge of God can become supplemented by right hand-knowledge of God, which is Scripture. The error of both Paganism and Peleganism consists in putting too much stock in the left-handed knowledge of God, therefore downplaying the more essential right-handed knowledge. The Fall has, according to Luther, not only tainted the human agents natural aptitude for goodness, it has removed all natural or rational possibility for knowing12 and adhering to the good. In Luthers understanding, the problem created by the Fall entails not that we are tempted by the Flesh, but that we are nothing but Flesh. Should we lack all revelation and grace, we would be unable to fulll any of the requirements to become good. The only remaining grain of goodness that is left in the human agent is her passive ability for faith which Luther, at times, calls the Holy Spirit in us.
8 Luther takes this term from Exodus 33:1820. Moses implores God to show his glory to which God answers that he will only naturally disclose his existence, kindness, power and sight but not his face: You cannot see my face, for no one may see me and live. 9 This term most likely stems from I Corinthians 1:25 in which Paul discusses the weakness of God. 10 Luther refers a lot to Pauls letters. This one is taken from Romans 1:22: Although they claimed to be

wise, they became fools.

11 This is Luthers 24th thesis. He does not take such a harsh stance on all forms of rationality, however, as he sings the praise of rationality in the service of humanity. He praises scientic progress and especially the printing press. He did believe that reason lacks all possibility to think or capture God as she is the whore or prostitute of the devil. 12 See Sudduth (2009, 111127) and Moroney (2000) for a more elaborate treatment of these so-called

noetic effects of sin.

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Charitable works and sacramental service are only good insofar as they are accompanied by a spirit of grace and complete surrender to God. Jesus incarnation in the Flesh did not serve, as Erasmus takes it, to infuse being with divine goodness, but rather reinforced the distance between God and man by emphasizing Jesus eminent grandeur and transcendence. While, in a manner of speech, asking what would Jesus do is the ultimate and only guide, according to Erasmus, to progress towards the good13 , this question only emphasizes, for Luther, the insurmountable difference between divine omnipotence and human bondage. Luther recycles a lot of elements from classical theology, but, in both his Sermons and comments to Pauls letters, we see an ever returning emphasis on Jesus divinity over His humanity. Luther often quotes John 14:9 in which Jesus identies himself univocally with God therefore mitigating His supposed humanity. Luther pushes his point by, most likely intentionally, misinterpreting Erasmus avowal to the ultimate necessity of grace. Should we remove Gods grace from the equation, Luther claims about Erasmus, the will is not free at all, but is the permanent bond-slave and servant of evil, since it cannot turn itself unto good (EL 112). While Luther states that the human agent must be graced prior to her becoming good, Erasmus has emphasized that she can be set on the pathway to the good and can partially become good through her charitable works and prayer for there is a gracing preceding action and merit. For Erasmus, the human will is left a grain of goodness and can, through this, venture beyond the Fall. For Luther, however, the human will is not redolent of divine goodness and even venturing upon the pathway to salvation is beyond its strength. Ultimately, Luther will venture towards the most extreme of positions and state that we must deny free will altogether and ascribe everything to God (EL 133). The decisive difference between Erasmus and Luther can be captured in the latters denial of the possibility to autonomously venture towards the good. Since, for Luther, everything is up to God, we must reject the possibility of any kind of mediationsuch as Church, prayer or charitybetween immanent world and transcendent beyond. Moreover, the human agent can never know whether she is about to merit salvation or not, as all immanent signs of a character pleasing to God are contested. While Luther most definitely did not reject the possibility of salvation through grace, the human agent can do nothing to merit it. Both Luther and Erasmus claimed that some form of moral regeneration is needed and the original goodness of beingwhich preceded the Fallmust be restored; Erasmus believed, contrary to Luther, that some of this was within the reach of human autonomy. To sum up: Erasmus believed that the Fall only weakened and not extinguished the human beings knowledge and aptitude for the good. Luther, however, claimed that without revelation the human agent has no knowledge of his own sinfulness or the good and man is fundamentally unable to progress towards the good without the prior gracing of God. Moving beyond the Fall is a forteriori impossible without the gracing of God that no human agent can ever merit. Luther denies both natural knowledge of the good (cognitive Fall) and natural adherence to the good (conative Fall).
13 Jennifer Herdt eloquently states that the main goal of Erasmus moral discourse was to commit people to the imitatio and aemulatio of Jesus Christ (2008, pp. 116 ff.). She gracefully captures Erasmus disagreement with Luther on this point (173 ff.).

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Kants fallen will Kants morality is renowned for its emphasis on duty and the utter rejection to align morality, in any way, with the human agents natural desires and ambitions. I will investigate Kants suggestion that morality should be conceived as a duty and link this to his discussion of the radical propensity to evil (Hang zum Bse) in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (hereafter, Religion). Understanding Kants concepts of depravity and restoration will be tantamount to the notes of caution I draw up in the next section against aligning Kant too univocally with Erasmus. I will pinpoint how this gives food for thought for a concept of grace and the soteriological powers of the rational will (Wille). Kant sets out in Groundwork I and II to articulate the content of the supreme principle of morality and carries this on into Groundwork III by investigating whether this principle is at all operative: The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality (4:392). The supreme principle will be autonomy understood as both the negativeor descriptivefreedom from immediate determination by any interest and the positiveor normativefreedom to determine oneself through reason alone (4:447). Autonomy, positively speaking, elicits the moral duty to format our maxim in accordance with rationality. This entails that we must act as if we are a universal legislator in a merely possible Kingdom of Ends (4:431; 4:439). In this Kingdom we, on the one hand, treat the humanity within ourselves and others never merely as a means, but always also as an end and (4:428), on the other hand, make sure that the maxim upon we act is logically and volitionallyuniversally applicable (4:402). A significant amount of scholarship has been pursued, over recent decades, on the subject of what exactly the status is of Kants assertions in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter, second Critique) as opposed to his later works, such as the Religion, the Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter, Metaphysics) and the Anthropology from a Pragmatical Point of View (hereafter, Anthropology). Early commentators, among which most noteworthy Hegel, Fichte and the early Schelling, focused almost exclusively on Kants early works ultimately calling Kants system of morals an empty formalism. More recently, Kant-scholars seem to unanimously agree that the earlier works need to be supplemented with the insights of the later, thereby offering some much-needed nuance14 . In this spirit, one can only understand Kants emphasis on duty should one take into account his discussion of the propensity to evil in the Religion and his bleak outlook on humanity in the Anthropology. In the Anthropology, Kant paints a picture of humanity that, despite its endowment with reason, is hardly inclined to act accordingly. While human beings are irrevocably confronted with morality as a fact of reason (Faktum der Vernunft), they are almost not at all inclined to act in accordance with morality. Although some beings are more likely to act rationallysuch as men over women and whites over othershumanity as a whole is ill-disposed towards morality. The only thing that could lift mankind beyond this state of depravity is its potency to be perturbed by his constant propensity
14 Cf. Wood (1999, pp. 113). Similar arguments were, before Wood, made by Aune (1979, xxi) and

Patton (1964, pp. xxi).

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to be irrational (7:332333). In the Religion, Kant conceptualizes the human agents ill disposition towards reason under the heading of the propensity to evil. Kant distinguishes a propensity (Hange) from a predisposition (Anlage): the latter is called a predisposition to the good which is original and the constituent parts required for [the nature of a being] as well as the forms of their combination that make for such a being that should be perceived as belonging to this being with necessity (6:28). In total, there are three predispositions to the good, namely to animality (mechanical self-love), to humanity (comparative self-love) and to personality (respect for the law). All three are originally good and yet prone to abuse. A propensity is, in contrast, called the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general (6:29). Kant claries in footnote that a propensity differs from a predisposition in virtue of it being acquired over time: human agents are not inborn with a disposition to drink alcohol, but, whenever they experience enjoyment herein, a propensity might arise that arouses an inclination towards drinking alcohol. A propensity is contingent for mankind, while a predisposition is a universal a priori necessary constituent of human nature. A propensity must therefore have a historical and volitional basiswhich Kant calls a transcendental extra-temporal choicethat actualizes this propensity although it can be taken to bein potencyslumbering in human nature prior to it. The propensity of evil is an act in a twofold sense: temporal and extra-temporal (6:31). Kant now claims that mankind has an acquired disposition towards evil of which there are three levels: frailty of the human heart, impurity of motives and depravity of human nature (6:2930). Allow me to highlight three characteristics of this propensity to evil. First, this propensity is rooted in the moral faculty of choice (6:31): the moral faculty of choice has acquired a propensity to rank the disposition to humanity over the disposition to personality, and the disposition to animality over both former. Evil is the subjective incentive to subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others or to [reverse] the ethical order (6:30). Second, this propensity to evil is an a priori part of human nature as all human agents have acquired a universal taste for evil over the good. One should not univocally attribute this taste for evil to either the senses or reason as the former contains too little, since they do not allow a positive choice for evil (as there is no freedom), and the latter contains too much as the will itself (Wille) does not legislate evil (6:35). The latter is usually called Kants rejection of devilishness15 . Third, this propensity to evil is called radical (Radikal Bse) because of two characteristics: on the one hand, it corrupts the ground of all maxims and, on the other hand, it cannot be extirpated through human forces (6:37). The second follows from the rst: as evil taints all choices man, we will always be positively inclined to evil and cannot hope to overcome it by ourselves. Still, Kant asserts that it must be rationally possible to overcome this evil (6:37). One should note that the logical necessity for a possible victory over evil does not entail that an actual victory is possible. Kant explicitly denies the possibility of a nal victory over evil when he rejects theological chiliasm (6:34).

15 For a good discussion, see Anderson-Gold (1984).

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To reiterate, the propensity to evil is an acquired universal characteristic16 of man that induces him to give priority to sensuous over rational interests. This propensity to evil cannot be conquered, but must be battled at every turn. A human agent is good only if her intentions (Motive) to be moral are pure even though the actual incentive (Triebfeder) will never be pure. As such, it stands to reason that the highest good a human being can attain is a good will that intends to act in accordance with duty because of duty and not a holy will that acts in accordance with duty because this is its nature. This explains Kants emphasis on duty: we have the moral duty to combat an evil we are principally unable to conquer. How is a human agent actually motivated to act morally? This question returns time and again in Kants published oeuvre and he seems to be unable to make up his mind in this respect. In his Lectures on Ethics, he calls this the philosophers stone (Ineld, 1963, pp. 4445). He phrases the question in his published works as how is a categorical imperative possible (4:453) or, how pure reason can be practical (4:459) or, how freedom is possible (4:459) or, whether pure reason of itself alone sufces to determine the will (5:15). Ultimately, the question reads: if morality can never be taken to align itself with that which a human agent naturally aspires to, and all enjoyment motivating morality should be rejected, why would we want to be moral17 ?
16 This peculiar togetherness of a historical with an a priori basis for evil has caused philosophical polemic with regard to which one is the most basic. In my analysis, I take the possibility for a propensity to evil to be universal while its actualization is historical or contingent. Henry Allison has focused on the imputability of evil in connection with his incorporation-thesis of Kantian freedom. He emphasizes the a priori individual character of evil that makes each individual agent responsible for his evil nature and the evil he might commit (Allison 1990; see also: Axinn 1994). Allen Wood (1999) emphasizes the social dimension of radical evil by tracing it back to Kants discussion of unsociable sociability in Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmpolitan Point of View. In this essay, Kant claims that there is a certain antagonism in human history which he terms the unsociable sociability (ungesellige Geselligkeit) of man: [the] propensity to enter into society which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society (8:20). On the one hand, the human agent is propelled to unite in a cosmopolitan society (vergesellschaften) by renouncing her claims as an individual (moving up to personality), but on the other hand she experiences a powerful propensity to individualize (vereinzelnen) and pursue her individual desires and ambitions. I believe that a nessed combination of both aspects would be the best approach to capture Kants understanding of radical evil. On the one hand, Kant emphasizes that each individual is responsible for her evil nature by a transcendental choice. Therefore, the propensity to evil cannot be reduced to a quality of the species as this might excuse the individual agent from the evil she might commit. On the other hand, the propensity to evil is a genuine characteristic of the human species whenever it engages in cultural activities: as soon as man is free from bestial necessitation, she nds herself at a crossroads forced to choose between good and evil knowing all too well that she should opt for the moral law but still remains tempted to evil. This propensity is universal to the human species and should be understood as an achievement of man. How are we to combine the social and the individual dimension of radical evil? Pablo Muchnik phrases this issue as follows: Their positions [Wood and Allison] can be symptomatic of an unfortunate dilemma Kant poses to the interpreter: either to emphasize the widespread social/empirical dimensions of evil at the expense of its noumenal origin (Wood), or to stress its noumenal origin at the expense of its social/empirical dimension (Allison) (Muchnik 2009, p. 56). How can something common to a species also be imputable to an individual being if imputability entails freedom? Kant seems to gloss over the problematic aspect of this issue as he never formally discusses it. Richard Bernstein notes: Many of the tensions and problems in Kants conception of radical evil can be traced back to his attempt to reconcile the claim that human beings are, by their very nature, evil with the claim that, despite this propensity to evil, human beings () can become morally good (2002, p. 20). 17 The question of moral motivation is highly debate in Kant-studies these days. The eld is split by,

what McCarthy (1993, p. 423) calls, intellectualists and affectivists. While the intellectualists hold that

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What interest do we have in acting morally18 ? There seem to be three stages in Kants argument with regard to the possibility for autonomy: the Groundwork, the second Critique and the Religion. In the Groundwork, Kant devotes the third part to the question whether freedom is at all possible. While this must be assumed, we cannot know how since the noumenal realm is barred from inquiry through the regulative use of transcendental idealism: The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is the same as the impossibility of discovering and making comprehensible an interest which the human being can take in moral laws, and yet he really does take an interest in them, the foundation of which in us we call moral feeling (4:460). Kant does not deny that man takes an interest in morality which he denes as that which by which reason becomes practical, i.e., becomes a cause determining the will (4:460), he does, however, not allow any inquiry in how this operates. In the second Critique, Kant will lift the veil surrounding the noumenal realm somewhat by stating that the confrontation with the moral law effectuates a twofold effect on the human agent. It arouses, on the one hand, a negative and pathological feeling of displeasure as it detriments self-love and strikes down self-conceit (5:73) and, on the other hand, a positive noumenal feeling of eminence and grandeur moving man to respect the moral law (5:74). The eminent grandeur of morality motivates the conative adherence to morality. In the Religion, Kant hints that the eminence of morality might not be enough, for most people, to motivate themselves to act morally. They might need the subjective supplementing of religion as delivering some good ctions, such as grace, in order to cultivate the interest in morality19 . How does the above give to think on grace? Kant attempts to circumvent two classical approaches to explain moral motivation: divine command-theory (Crusius) and moral sentimentalism (Hutcheson, Hume).

Footnote 17 continued being confronted with the moral law elicits a motive for adhering to it, the affectivists claim that rational insights are, in themselves, inert and need to be supplemented with something else. The affectivist position is defended by, among others, Richard McCarthy (1993; 2009), Larry Herrera (2000) and Karl Ameriks (2006); the intellectualist position is defended by, among others, Andrew Reath (1989), Henry Allison (1990) and Onora ONeill (1975). Christine Korsgaard (1996, chapter two) traces this dispute back to a discussion between rationalist ethics (Wolff et al.) and moral sentimentalism (Hume, Hutcheson, et al.). Personally, I nd a nuanced version of affectivism most convincing.
18 Kant has, at times, been pegged as a psychological hedonist; such a person only allows the incorporation of an end into his maxim if this end is thought of as bringing pleasure. This position is virtually undefendedfor a single exception (Kerstein 2001)over the last few decades. A more viable alternative is motivational hedonism (Ameriks 2006, McCarthy 2009): an agent can only incorporate an end into his maxim if and only if the human agent has an interest in this end. An interest can be given through the faculty of desire comprising of two parts: the lower and the higher. The lower faculty of desire spawns interest in material interests that come under the general principle of self-love or ones own happiness (5:22). The higher faculty of desire, if there is such a thing, spawns interest in morality. While I nd this approach very valuable, it does fail to capture the qualitative difference between moral (normative) and non-moral (non-normative) interest. It tends to reduce the choice for morality to a struggle between the force of an interest while, for Kant, morality is superior to sensuality because of its nature and not its performative strength. 19 As this issue does not belong to the core of this paper, I will not touch it. I have dealt with the connection

between religion and evil in Kants philosophy in my XXX (Peer review anonymous).

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The former explains moral duties as deriving normative appeal from God in the sense of motivating human agents to act in accordance with morality because God commands so. The latter claims that human agents have a natural moral feeling that attracts them to being virtuous: we are virtuous because this elicits a feeling ofhigher and more stablepleasure. Although Kant irted with both of them at some time20 , he ultimately rejected them because the spurious principles on which they base morality are all heteronomous (4:441). Morality should be based on autonomy: the legislation and execution of moral duties depends on the rational self-legislation of the will. In contrast with Luther and Erasmus, Kant has no room in his theory of morals for any robustly religious concept of grace. Kant discusses grace, in the Religion, as that which serves to supplement the deciency of all his moral capacity (6:174). Since the human agents maxim-making is ultimately corrupted by evil, she will never be good but can only aspire to the good. As this insight might paralyze moral agency, we may think, from the viewpoint of the moral religion, on grace: as long as our intentions are pure, God will grace and carry us the rest of the way. This way of thinking on grace was already prepared in the second Critique although Kant relegated this insight to a footnote (5:124). Grace is but a good ction and completely dependent on our own merit21 . Only the human agents own devices seem, at this point, suited to work towards her salvation, i.e. her victory over the propensity to evil. One must, however, qualify what exactly lies within the powers of the human agent and what does not. Kant declares that there is a negative and a positive sense in which the human agent has a free will. The power of choice (Willkr) is descriptively free, i.e. it is free from immediate determination by any interest. While animals are determined through the strength of their interest in a certain end, a human agent can reect on these interests. Kant denes negative freedom, in the Groundwork, as that property of such a causality[a power of choice]that it can be efcient independently of alien causes determining it (4:446). Accordingly, one must assume that rationality is, at rst, an alien cause that does not immediately determine the power of choice. Rationality as a motive for acting is offered by the will, the higher faculty of desire (Wille), which is autonomous in a more positive sense: it legislates in accordance with universal and a priori laws. In order to
20 In two of his pre-critical essays, namely Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (17631764) and Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (1764), Kant offers some praising to Hutcheson and seems to, to some level, align his own approach to morality to moral sentimentalism. For the critical Kants disagreement with Hutcheson, cf. Henrich (2009). In the second Critique, Kant seems to align himself with a divine command-theory as he proposes the existence of God as a necessary postulate of practical reason. He claims that we ought to view all duties as divine commands (5:129). While he does qualify this statement, it remains, to some extent, unclear what his critical disagreement is with divine command-theory. In the Metaphysics, Kant will nally clarify that we should act as if (instar) all duties come from God and not as if we have duties towards (erga) God (6:487). 21 Most scholars contend that Kant attempts to reduce religion to morality by rejecting anything that might repress morality. The apotheosis of this is found in Kants discussion with J. Michaelis in a footnote to the Religion. Michaelis argues that we should not have a morality holier than the Bible (6:110) to which Kant responded that we should always interpret the Bible in accordance with morality. Stephen Palmquist (1992; 2000), however, defends that Kant does not at all reduce religion to morality, but rather raises morality to the level of religion for it to be able to fulll its objectives. For a good discussion of both sides, cf. Firestone and Jacobs (2008).

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be morally good, the power of choice needs to incorporate the legislation of the higher faculty of desire into its maxim as the supreme ground of determination. The power of choice is, however, inclined to prioritize sensuous inclinations over rational laws as it is radically evil. Therefore, a human agent can only be motivated to act morally through the normative appeal of the higher faculty of desire. The power of choice is unable to incorporate the universal law into its maxim without the positive feeling of respect elicited by the higher faculty of desire by the moral law. In this section, I have argued that Kants system of morals is based on duty because of the radical propensity to evil. We are only good if we incorporate the moral law into our maxim with as sole motivation respect for the moral law. The rationale of our interest in the moral law is given through the higher faculty of desire that spawns interest in acting in accordance with universal and a priori laws through confrontation with the eminence of morality. As such, the power of choice can only be saved from its state of depravity through the higher faculty of desire. This should have given us the tools to show that there are some similarities between Kant and Luther. Closer to Luther than Erasmus In this section, I will argue that Kants conception of the power of choice draws, in some of its elements, closer to Luther than Erasmus, mostly because, for Kant, the power of choice has no natural means to work towards its own salvation. Salvation is offered through the powers of the higher faculty of desire legislating in accordance with universal a priori lawsor reasonwhich could rightfully be termed Kants form of revelation. In my argument, Kants higher faculty of desire (Wille) takes up the function of Luthers God and respect (Achtung) replaces grace22 . First, I will present Michalsons argumentation for aligning Kants concept of the will with Erasmus. Consequently, I will draw up some notes of caution on his univocal alignment of Kant with Erasmus. Kant is interested, especially in the Religion, in understanding moral regeneration. After he argues that mankind is radically evil, he is puzzled about the possibility to move beyond this state of depravity. How can an evil tree bear good fruit? (6:45)23 How can we expect to construct something completely straight from such crooked wood? (6:100). Kant asserts that moral regeneration must be possible since reason demands it and cannot demand anything irrational. Michalson acknowledges Kants dilemma: We thus seem stuck between debility and demandbetween a corruption brought upon us by ourselves, and an obligation nonetheless to heal ourselves through a free but unspeciable act (1990, p. 73). Since moral regeneration must be possible, Michalson claims, there must be left a grain of goodness in our being. Michalson
22 Ever since Josef Bohatecs (1966) seminal work on the theological sources of Kants philosophy, scholarship has moved away from an original schismatic understanding (e.g. Ludwig Borowskis early work on Kant) of Kants dialogue with Lutheranism/Pietism towards a more nessed dialogue. Recently, however, Manfred Kuehn (2001, chapters one and two) has eloquently defended a significant break between Kants Pietistic upbringing and his critical philosophy. I hope to show that the specic content of some of Kants philosophical concepts shows significant kinship with some typically Lutheran assumptions. 23 Kant mimics Luke 6:43: No good tree bears bad fruit, nor does a bad tree bear good fruit.

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connects this grain of goodness to Kants assertion that we are not devils: we do not legislate evil for the sake of evil24 and, therefore, we must be capable of [moral regeneration] (6:41). This is Michalsons basic mistake as he conates devilishness and depravity: Kant does not equate legislating evil for the sake of evil with depravity. Depravity is, rather, the ineradicable tendency to give priority to sensuous over rational interests. In Michalsons view, Kant takes the human agent to be able make some sort of initiative or constructive step in the salvation process and original sin does not eliminate our capacity to turn towards God and open ourselves (1990, p. 75). Michalson claims that radical evil has not corrupted the Wille and the human agent can naturally opt for the good. I believe that Michalson misses some aspects of Kants philosophy in depicting Kant closer to Erasmus than Luther. Although I do not deny that, for Kant, freedom in the positive sensemust rationally be possible, it must remain elusive. There are some elements, I admit, that draw Kant close to Erasmus such as his elicitation that the fall has not extinguished the natural light of reason to know the good. Luther espoused a more radical notion of the fallen human being that is unable even to know the good. There are a number of angles, however, that align Kant closer to Luther than Erasmus that seem to have slipped Michalsons notice. I will approach this issue from ve different angles: from the radicality of evil, from the choice for evil, from the inscrutability of freedom, from Kants rejection of prudence, and from the un-Kantian consequences of Michalsons argument. Basically, Michalson fails to fully conceptualize the difference between the power of choice and the rational will and, therefore, cannot fully conceive how the rational will fullls a quasi-religious and soteriological function. Moreover, Michalson argues that, since Kant rejected devilishness, the power of choice must be able to naturally progress towards the good. The rejection of devilishness does not, however, entail the rejection of radical depravity to which Kant fully describes. Only the Wille is untainted by depravity, much like, to Luther, only the passive ability faith is the last grain of goodness in the human being. The human agents depravity will forever mark him with a vital impossibility to autonomously move towards the good. Kantbut also Luther and Erasmusclaims that attaining the good must be rationally possible as the human agent can recuperate from the Fall. Kant does not allow, however, for the human agent to naturally move towards the good. This might be somewhat odd since Kants morality is based on autonomy. The autonomy of the Wille is, however, not what we might naturally understand as autonomy. We usually understand under autonomy something like the possibility to choose between two options sometimes including that one option is morally superior to the other: our power of choice can opt between two options without being in any way predetermined to either of these choices (negative freedom). This disinterested freedom seems to be to some extent lacking in Kants moral philosophy as we are tainted with radical evil which gives an inclination to opt for evil over the
24 Michalson repeatedly refers to Sharon Anderson-Golds essay Kants Rejection of Devilishness: The Limits of Human Volition (1984) to substantiate his own view that Kant rejects devilishness. He himself does not offer any substantial argumentation to corroborate this claim except for some textual fragments. In these fragments, however, Kant rejects legislating evil for the sake of evil and not the impossibility of rising from the swamp of depravity. Michalson seems to conate the terms devilishness and depravity.

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good. By ourselves, we have no way to opt for the good over evil. We need the higher faculty of desire fullling the function of Luthers God to move us towards the good. Without the soteriological powers of the Wille, it would be impossible for the human agent to venture towards the good. The Wille needs to grace us with respect for the moral law in order for us to move towards salvation. Kant is often renowned for being one of the rst to offer a concept of radical evil that, although ultimately rationalized, exceeded the naivety of others, such as Leibniz, who dealt with evil. Kant asserted that man does not lose his freedom when acting in an evil fashion but rather makes poor use of this freedom. While Luther did not discuss at great length the human agents choice for evil, as he denied the necessary natural freedom of the will to opt for either good or evil, Erasmus did claim that any evil a human agent commits must be perceived as a privatio boni. Kant would most certainly not agree with Erasmus that we are tempted by the esh whenever we act in an evil fashion; he claims, on the contrary, that we are positively choosing to commit ourselves to overturning the moral world order. For Kant, we positively choose to act in an evil fashion although we are very much aware that we should act otherwise25 ; for Erasmus, we act in an evil fashion because our spirit is weak and cannot refuse the call of the esh. Ultimately, our nature would, for Erasmus, opt by itself for the good if not for the distractions of the esh. For Kant, the propensity of evil is rooted in the power of choice itself therefore including the need for a supernamely the Willeto opt for the good. One could argue that the human being if devoid of sensuous interest would not have a propensity to evil as sensuous interest forms the ratio behind the reversal of the moral order. This point is, in my view, nonsensical as Kant takes the three different predispositions (animality, humanity and personality) as necessary constituents of human nature; a human being without sensuous interests would therefore be a contradictio in terminis. In Kants view, autonomy (or, the good) will always remain inscrutable. Kant repeatedly states that we are never allowed a glimpse into the depths of our own heart so we do not know whether we are actually progressing towards the good26 . Similarly, Luther stated that salvation is ultimately unpredictable and no human practices can guarantee progress towards the good as God is the ultimate unpredictable moral judge. Gods grace is granted inscrutably, unconditionally, and not in accordance with any merit we
25 Kants notion of the radical positive choice for evil has been, and still is, prone to misunderstanding. Frans de Wachter (2003) summarizes it well: First, radical evil is not equated, within Kantian philosophy, with being overwhelmed by the sensuous drives. Second, radical evil can only be overcome by a different positive drive. Third, radical evil is an action (commissio) that should also be seen as negligence (omissio): we are doing something while we should have done something else. Martin Matustik (2008, p. 90) has been careless in pegging Kants notion of evil as privative; such a reading has unintentionally been enforced through a certain reading of Henry Allisons reciprocity-thesis of freedom (1990) which he later on explicitly rejects (1996). 26 In the Metaphysics: The depths of the human heart are unfathomable. Who knows himself well enough to say, when he feels the incentive to fulll his duty, whether it proceeds entirely from the representation of the law or whether there are not many other sensible impulses contributing to it that look to ones advantage (or to avoiding what is detrimental) and that, in other circumstances, could just as well serve vice? (6:447). In the Religion: Assurance of [making moral progress] cannot of course be attained by the human being naturally, neither via immediate consciousness nor via the evidence of the life he has hitherto led, for the depths of his own heart (the subjective rst ground of his maxims) are to him inscrutable (6:51).

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might have. While Kant claims that being good is ultimately the manner in which we become worthy of happiness (4:393; 4:450; 5:124), being happy does not guarantee us that we are in fact progressing towards the good. Erasmus claimed that a seed of goodness remains in the human being allowing for autonomous progression towards salvation; moreover, he acknowledges that there are some specic ways in which such progress can become apparent. Luther denied any and all mediation between God and the human agent: she must fully rely on a super or transcendent entity to be saved. In the same way must the human agent, for Kant, rst rely on her super or higher faculty of desire for her to progress towards the good. Kant rejects prudence (4:394 and 5:2122) as a tool to work towards attaining the good. Although Kant does not deny that prudential goods might be conducive to attaining a good will, they lack value in themselves and can only become good if combined with a good will: pleasure, standing, honor, esteem, etc. do not offer a stairway to Heaven. Luther has furiously lashed out against the business of indulgences that freed man from sins by performing some earthly works of atonement. To be fair, Erasmus was also opposed to indulgences, although on different grounds. He believed they were hypocritically given to a so-called repentant in order to free her from a sin that she would happily re-commit. Luther, however, believed that no amount of earthly labor or prudential practices could ever move the human agent towards regeneration; only God decides who is worthy of it. Earthly labor only has moral value if combined with the virtue of faith which can only be imbued in a human agent through revelation. Similarly, Kant has asserted that only through respect (Achtung) for the moral law can our actions have any moral resonance. Finally, Michalsons claim that a seed of goodness remains naturally in the human agent leads to the absurd consequence that there is a natural and innate feeling for morality in the human agent. This position is called moral sentimentalism with which Kant irted for a while but ultimately fully rejected from the Groundwork on. Kant states, in the second Critique, that there is no antecendent feeling in the subject that would be attuned to morality: that is impossible, since all feeling is sensible whereas the incentive of the moral disposition must be free from any sensible condition (5:75). Accordingly, the human agents natural being is in no way host to a feeling for morality that precedes being faced with the moral law through the higher faculty of desire. Goodness must be, in Kantian philosophy, superimposed, and not built from the ground up: the feeling of respect is forced upon the negatively free power of choice and is, in no way, derived from it. As Kant puts it in the Religion: The restoration of the original predisposition to good in us is not therefore the acquisition of a lost incentive for the good () If a human being is corrupt in the very ground of his maxims, how can he possibly bring about this revolution by his own forces and become a good human being on his own? Yet duty commands that he be good, and duty commands nothing but what he can do (6:467). The human agent is able to become good through a revolution and not an expansion: a change of heart rather than a strengthening of natural moral resolve (6:47). The legislation of the Wille offers the tools for this change of heart. Although it is ultimately the human agents own workings that make him good, the higher faculty of the desire delivers the tools for this ethical revolution.

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Conclusion I have argued that Kants understanding of the fallen or evil will is closer to, in a significant number of elements, Luther than Erasmus. Allow me to reiterate before examining the importance of my own claim. Kant claims that the human power of choice is corrupted by a propensity to evil which cannot be extirpated by the human agent, and to progress morally is only possible through respect for the moral law elicited through the higher faculty of desire. This draws Kant closer to Luther than Erasmus in their respective understandings of the fallen will on ve accounts. First, the human agent can only progress towards holiness through being confronted with a super, namely respect for the moral law. Second, radical evil is rooted in human freedom as it is fundamentally corrupted (in Luthers term: completely esh) and not in the distractions of the esh. Third, the progress towards the good remains inscrutable to the human agent. Fourth, there is no mediation between the human agents will and the good safe through rationality (or, to Luther, revelation). Finally, accepting a prior feeling for morality reduces Kants morality to moral sentimentalism which he explicitly rejects. Kants rational optimism for the possibility of salvation through the powers of the Wille has been wrongfully pegged as some form of natural potency to attain the good. I have argued that Kant is in fact closer to Luthers pessimistic account of the human agents own devices in attaining salvation. This has been offered in contrast with Michalson who, in my view, surprisingly misses Kants underlying pessimism. In a later work by his hand, Michalson (1999) has argued that underlying Kants philosophy there is a principle of immanence that paved the way for 19th century atheist thinkers such as Schopenhauer, Feuerbach and Nietzsche. From the viewpoint of the principle of immanence, Kant is aligned with (Romantic) atheism rather than liberal theology (Schleiermach, Tillich) or positivism (Compte). I concur with Michalsons (1999) argumentation: Kant can more properly be read as the intellectual father of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche than Compte or Schleiermacher. I hope by clearing out any lingering misunderstandings on Kants concept of the fallen will to strengthen this point. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche both claimed that being is no good and that it is better not to be. Both of them seem to reject any natural way out of this mess and salvation could only be offered through silencing the will (Schopenhauer) or re-creating the world and loving the fate we are dealt (Nietzsche): both were skeptical, however, of the ultimate possibility of this highest good. As the super seems to be missing for Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, they are left to their own devices which are ultimately insufcient. Kant may be taken to pave the way for this through his radicalization of the depravity of the will and the insufciency of the natural powers of man to break from this state of evil. I intend to argue for this point elsewhere.
Acknowledgments I would like to extent my gratitude to William Desmond, Simon Truwant, Martin Moors, Andr Cloots and Paul Moyaert for their many helpful suggestions and comments on earlier versions of this essay.

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