J AN 1 s t - D e c 3 1 s t 2 0 0 8

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.
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A N S O Q U A R T E R LY D ATA R E P O R T Q.4 2008

S U M M A RY & S T R AT E G I C A S S E S S M E N T

Throughout the year NGOs were involved in more than 170 security incidents (up 20% from 2007) within which 31 people were killed, 78 abducted and a further 27 seriously wounded. A growing percentage of incidents were caused by Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) and a growing percentage resulted in death or injury. In short, attacks on NGOs became more frequent and more deadly. The primary explanation for this is the notably expanded conflict, up >50% from 2007, which caught more NGOs in its wake as it spread. With a few exceptions, NGOs were generally attacked for being perceived as intrinsic to the military and political objectives of the International Military Forces (IMF) and related foreign Governments. The ability of NGOs to address this perception, by demonstrating neutrality, has been severely constrained by both the dangers of establishing reliable contact with an inconsistent and hostile Armed Opposition and the prohibition of such contact (explicit or implied) by Government, foreign donors and military forces who generally perceive it as an act of collaboration with their enemy. The uncomfortable reality is that throughout 2008 NGOs have been caught between two obstinate parties neither of whom respect their right to work with the other in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and this has directly contributed to the perception of NGOs as partial and the resulting attacks and fatalities. It is a very unfortunate situation which looks set to escalate in 2009 as AOG continue their rural campaign, still suspicious of NGOs intents, and IMF intensify offensive combat operations in accordance with the new USFOR-A mandate. The recent IMF articulation of an Iraq style Clear, Hold, Build strategy for Afghanistan bears the potential to further politicize the delivery of aid, by integrating it as the third element of the combat plan, and is likely to generate pressure for NGOs to associate even more closely with one side. The manner in which NGOs respond to this pressure will be pivotal in determining their safety throughout the year. Most courses of action carry further risks but wholesale avoidance of association would seem the least worst option. Looking ahead, and absent some broad collective action from NGOs to demand respect, from all parties, for their right to impartial action, the most likely scenario is that NGO will continue to be at risk of attack in rural conflict areas and so forced in to ever shrinking enclaves of humanitarian space. In the short term this may save NGO lives by withdrawing staff from the danger zones, but it will do nothing to address the root cause of insecurity (lack of impartiality) while further deteriorating the ability of NGO to mange perceptions of themselves in the field and leaving vulnerable Afghan communities underserved. NGO should anticipate a 2009 fraught with painful and complex decisions. Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul, January 2009

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1. THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT & CRIMINALITY ON NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO)

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1.1 GENERAL NGO TRENDS

ANSO reported total NGO security incidents 20062008
27 23 23

22

14 11 11

15 11 12 10 10 10 8 8 6 13 10 13 13 12

16 12 9 7 12 10 8 13 11 8 5

11

5 3 2

FEB

FEB

MAR

MAR

FEB

MAR

JAN

JAN

JAN

JUL

JUL

SEP

SEP

JUL

APR

APR

MAY

MAY

APR

MAY

OCT

OCT

SEP

OCT

JUN

JUN

JUN

DEC

DEC

NOV

NOV

2006

2007

2008

Incidents involving NGO escalated dramatically this year as conflict spread across the country. They included a wide range of attack types from simple threats and intimidations through to armed robberies, kidnappings and fatal ambushes. They occurred in 33 of Afghanistans 34 provinces demonstrating a wide threat area and impacted National and International NGOs comparatively. Incidents were caused by various actors however the volume assessed to be caused by criminal groups fell from 61% of the total for 2007 to just 35% for 2008 while there was a corresponding increase in the share allocated to AOG from 39% in 2007 to a full 65% this year. This supports the assessments that the increase is being driven by expanding conflict, rather than deteriorating social conditions and related criminality, and Assessed Cause of NGO Security that NGO mitigation measures have seen some Incidents, 2008 only success in off-setting vulnerability to crime. The ongoing phenomenon of criminal involvement in AOG operations also accounts for more incidents being allocated to AOG. In many areas it has become analytically irrelevant to distinguish between the two. Although not directly matching AOG attack trends (compare chart above with 2.1) it is reasonable to assume an escalation of AOG/NGO contact moving in to 2009 and an associated likelihood of death and injury as a result.

ACG 35% AOG 65%

NOV

AUG

AUG

AUG

DEC

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1 . 2 A O G AT TA C K S A G A I N S T N G O
NGO contact with AOG was notably higher throughout 2008 and dramatically so for the four summer months when conflict usually peaks. Organizations with a substantial rural footprint, which often coincides with those implementing the National Solidarity Program and other Government priority projects, were most exposed.

AOG attacks on NGO: 2007 Vs 2008

2007 2008
12 66 3 8 67 33 3 20 17 10 7 4 17

66

2 While verbal and written threats continued to 1 1 dominate the incident profile the real growth was seen in serious, life threatJAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ening incidents with armed attacks up from 12 in 2007 to 21 in 2008, use of IED up from 3 to 9 and abduction up from 14 cases to 22 this year.

44

In a handful of cases AOG appeared to be addressing a specific grievance (actual or perceived) with some aspect of the NGOs operations but more commonly serious attacks were launched without any effort at, or interest in, understanding the agencies activities or intents. AOG often justified these as targeting supporters of the international military or Government without ever offering evidence. Given the difficulties of advocating towards AOG noted at the outset it seems likely that NGO will remain at serious risk of AOG attack going in to 2009. The default strategy of suspension/relocation will mitigate this risk in the short term but will not address the long term need to develop a strategy for communicating NGO intents to those that would do harm.

Categorization of AOG attacks on NGO, 2008

Beatings Searches Threats Abduction Missile/Mortar Arson IED/Explosives Armed Attacks
0 Armed Attacks Series1 21 5 IED/Explosives 9 Arson 7 10 15 Missile/Mortar 4 20 Abduction 22 25 Threats 34 30 Searches 3 35 Beatings 3

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1 . 3 N AT U R E O F C R I M E S ( A C G ) A G A I N S T N G O
Trends in criminal activity against NGO are almost opposite to the AOG trends and have shown a dramatic downturn throughout 2008. As expected, armed robbery remains the #1 crime accounting for 68% of the total although the actual volume has dropped from more than 50 cases last year to just 39 this.

Criminal attacks on NGO: 2007 Vs 2008

2007 2008
9 9 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 7 7 6 5 6 11 10 9 9

Approximately 42% of robberies occur JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC on the road, 40% at home/office and the remaining 18% fail or are aborted. In most cases there is little evidence that the target is known to be an NGO. This is especially applicable to those robberies which occur on remote roads where NGO are caught simply because they have the only vehicles on the road. There is a growing concern regarding the ability of ACG to recognize NGO workers as potentially valuable abduction targets and many road robbers have made extensive searches of people and vehicles. Identity sterilization remains the most effective means of addressing this. Armed attacks (basically what would be classified as Assault or Attempted Murder elsewhere) is thankfully down from 19% in 2007 to just 2% this year and has been caused by personal circumstances in all cases.

Categorization of criminal attacks against NGO, 2008

Armed Attacks Armed Robbery
2% 2% 19% 9%

Abduction

Threats

Beatings

68%

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1.4 NGO ABDUCTIONS

Although the annual figures are moderately down (78/2008 vs. 88/2007) it is important to note the fact that NGO were much better trained and prepared for kidnap in 2008. This would imply that training & policy are not having an impact on exposure or are just not being applied adequately. Staff demographics will also factor here. Kidnap has remained predominantly Afghan likely due to availability of targets as Afghans travel more frequently than Internationals. AOGs account for more than 90% of abductions and deaths in captivity, up from less than 70% in 2007, to indicate a growing involvement of combatants in this activity. Interestingly, with the exception of Kabul, not one of the 18 criminally associated abductions occurred in a province where there had been an AOG NGO abduction possibly reinforcing the ACG/ AOG collusion assessment. Abduction occurred in 14 provinces to show a wide threat area with AOG abduction predictably concentrated in South & East and criminal concentrated in Centre, North and West. More than 65% of abductions occurred while the victim was in transit and mostly between the hours of 8 and 12 AM. The death of an American woman and Japanese man in captivity were tragic but exceptional and do not indicate a major move towards execution of captives. 95% are released unharmed.

NGO staff abducted, 2008

71

7
National Staff International Staff

6
Total Killed In Captivity (K.I.C)

NGO abductions by province, 2008

Zabul Parwan Kunduz Khost Kapisa Herat Helmand Balkh Wardak Paktya Paktika Nuristan Nimroz Nangahar Logar Kunar Kandahar Kabul Ghazni Farayab Farah Daykondi 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

ACG

AOG

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1 . 5 N G O F ATA L I T I E S
Perpatrator of NGO staff death, 2008
ACG 7% IMF 10%

NGO Staff Killed, 20062008

National International Total
31 24 24 11 15 6 25

AOG 83%

4 Gross annual figures (right) do not show 0 much more than a moderate growth in deaths amongst international staff. Na2006 2007 2008 tional staff deaths have grown steeply from 2007 but are comparable to 2006 and even closer to 2005 (28) so present no clear trend other than the fact that Afghan nationals remain more exposed than their international counterparts. Factors such as demographics and organizational policies are not known but weigh heavily in these numbers.

The data disaggregated by cause however (above left) provides further evidence of the escalating seriousness of AOG attacks on NGO with AOG now responsible for more than 80% of NGO deaths up from 53% in 2007. IMF have entered this chart for the first time, killing three NGO staff in an air strike. A trend which is likely to grow in 2009 with more IMF offensive operations. Closer analysis (presented below for the first time) reveals that NGO workers are most vulnerable on the road with the majority of deaths occurring during ambushes or abductions. Targeted killings and deaths during office/home invasions remain rare. The number of deaths in roadside ambushes (12) exposes a particular vulnerability to this sort of attack and suggests that the use of vehicle or body armor might be a reasonable mitigating strategy but probably not more so than a simple suspension of road travel in known AOG areas.

Circumstances of NGO Death, 2008

Targeted Murder In IMF Airstrike During/After Abduction Office/Compound Invasion Roadside IED Strike Roadside Ambush (Small Arms Fire) 3 4 3 3 6

There have been few observable patterns in NGO deaths other than that all international deaths occurred between 8-11AM and that most were female. The former is likely due to the predictable accessibility of NGO workers during the morning commute while the latter is likely coincidental. In 2007 most fatalities
12 were male with no indica-

tion that this was deliberate targeting of males.

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1 . 6 L O C AT I O N O F N G O AT TA C K S / I N C I D E N T S
Similarly to 2007 attacks on NGO occurred in 33 of Afghanistan 34 provinces (only Panjshir is excluded) indicating the wide and systemic nature of NGO vulnerability. The regional distribution of attacks (right) has remained quite stable (2007 Central was 26%, West 18%, North 21% etc) but the whole pie has grown larger (c.20%) with Central and Northern Regions seeing the largest increase in actual incident rates. Kabul and Kunduz have seen the greatest annual growth rates (Kabul 36/2007 to 48/2008 and Kunduz 1/2007 to 14/2008). For Kabul this reflects the concentration of NGO facilities and staff in the capitol, as well as the inevitable inkblot deterioration of the province caused by large numbers of AOG in Logar & Wardak. The movement of AOG forces in to these two provinces, and its impact on the outlying districts of Kabul, has been one of the defining aspects of 2008 and will be fundamental to the manner in which conflict will unfold in 2009. Kunduz presents a similar picture reflecting both the concentration of NGO (as preferred capitol of the North East) and the growth of formal AOG forces in the area. The Northern regions still have a lead in the more serious incidents (5 killed in Kunduz alone) mostly likely as a result of NGO density, lower security posture and weaker extension of security forces.
Regional Distribution of NGO Incidents, 2008

NORTH 26%

CENTRAL 28%

WEST 14%

SOUTH 15%

EAST 17%

NGO Incidents by Provincial Cluster, 2008

24 9 11 6 9 21 5 17 6 20 7 36

Kunduz/Takhar/Badakshan Balkh/Samangan Faryab/Jawzjan/SariPul Parwan/Baghlan/Panjshir Nuristan/Laghman/Kapisa Nangahar/Kunar/Khost Uruzgan/Daykondi/Bamiyan Helmand/Kandahar/Zabul Farah/Nimroz Heart/Badghis/Ghor Ghazni/Paktya/Paktika Kabul/Logar/Wardak

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2. CONFLICT TRENDS & ANALYSIS

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2 . 1 A O G I N I T I AT E D AT TA C K S

AOG Initiated Attacks 20062008

(Includes only AOG Close Range, Indirect Fire and Suicide Attacks. Does NOT include any criminal event or activity)
700 600 500 463 400 300 200 160 100 0
OCT OCT NOV NOV OCT APR APR APR MAR MAR MAR MAY MAY MAY NOV AUG AUG AUG JUN JUN JUN FEB FEB FEB JUL JUL SEP SEP JUL JAN JAN DEC DEC JAN SEP DEC

569

602

634 508 511

487 420

405 335 279 213 173 81 111 121 235 261 206 159 145 129 160 255 329 344

376

344 353 332 276 189 218

372 300

2006

2007

2008

In December 2007 ANSO Q.4 report noted that we are at the beginning of a war, not the end of one. This proved prescient as we went on to record eight straight months of conflict escalation peaking in the worst four months of summer fighting since ANSO (and others) records began. It is now commonly accepted that AOG are in the ascendency and have improved their capabilities and reach to exert effective influence over close to 45% of the country. Also notable in the data is the speed and consistency with which the escalation unfolded (compare the erratic Jan-Jul 2006 to the same for 2008). This would indicate that weapons, ammunition and personnel are readily available and that reliable re-supply lines have been established. This is further evidenced by the annual winter lull which has so far failed to drop even as far as the peak of conflict last year. Such continuity in tempo indicates a well resourced operation with fighters staying in place during the period in which they normally de-camp.

AOG attack composition, 20062008

2006 2007 2008 3198

1899 1267 966 113 151 121 SUICIDE IDF 1255

2030

Further disaggregation of data in to types of attack (left) again indicates that conventional close range (small arms & RPG) and indirect fire attacks (missiles & mortars) have formed the backbone of the AOG strategy. Most commonly these have been ground attacks on IMF/ANSF fixed positions or convoys. There have been fewer suicide attacks finding their target this year but this is due to improvements in ANP/ANA ability to prevent them rather than any let up in deployment which remains about even.

CR

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2.2 CONFLICT AREAS

Conflict expanded geographically as well as in terms of overall number of attacks. ANSO data indicates that AOG attacks occurred in 33 of 34 provinces, indicating a wide operational area, with notable AOG activity (on average >20 attacks per month) emerging in seven new provinces throughout the course of 2008.
Number of Provinces Experiencing AOG Attacks, 2007 Vs 2008
2007 2008

22 20

9 4 0 5 2 4

It is important to note however that 010 Monthly 1120 Monthly 2130 Monthly Over 30 Monthly Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks classifying provinces in this manner presents a more positive picture than may be the case as often when an area really deteriorates incident reports dry up as sources move out. Many of the provinces reporting <10 incidents per month are known to be much worse. Expectedly the Southern area accounted for 42% of all AOG attacks (up from 36% for 2007) while the Eastern region saw some drop off with 31% of attacks (down from 38% of 2007) The Central, North, West and North East regions maintained an annually proportional share despite increases in actual incident numbers. THE FOUR PROVINCES WITH OVER 30 ATTACKS PER MONTH
Kandahar Province, AOG attacks 2007 Vs 2008
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

Kunar Province, AOG attacks 2007 Vs 2008

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

2007

2008

2007

2008

Helmand Province, AOG attacks 2007 Vs 2008

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 JAN

Ghazni Province, AOG attacks 2007 Vs 2008

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

2007

2008

2007

2008

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2 . 3 C I V I L I A N C A S U A LT I E S
Gross Civilian Casualties, 20062008
2026 1176 2366

Civilians Casualties by Cause, 20062008

AOG IMF
1290 996

2006

2007 2008

Civilian casualties continue to climb with ANSO recording an estimate of 2,366 non-combatant civilians killed throughout 2008 up from 1,176 in 2006.

557

541

459

161 2006 2007 2008

This figure includes Afghan civilians only (men, women and children) and does not include ANP, ANA or AOG figures. The data shows a moderate decrease in the number killed by IMF (also down as a percentage of the whole) and an ongoing escalation of civilian deaths caused by AOG. Majority of deaths are caused in AOG ground offensives (SAF, RPG, IED etc) and targeted killings of civilians suspected of being IMF informants/associates. Murder for criminal causes remains a significant threat as does being killed for driving too close to an IMF convoy (escalation of force) or being caught in the area of an AOG suicide attack.

Most Common Causes of Civilian Death, 2008

AOG Ground Attack Criminal Murder IMF Operation Suicide Attacks IMF Escalation of Force 0 45 200 400 600 800 1000 411 373 600 917

# of civilians killed

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REPORT END
For further information director@afgnso.org

ANSO, January 2009