Reyes v. Chiong Date Promulgated: July 1, 2003 Ponente: Justice Panganiban Nature of Case: Sworn Complaint filed by Atty.

Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyer's oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Facts: 1) Petitioner is the counsel of Zonggi-Xu who invested P300,000 in a fishball factory to be set up by Chia Hsien Pan. 2) The factory did not come into being; Xu asked for his money back but Pan refused to give it. 3) Xu filed a petition for estafa against Pan. Respondent, Pans counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest. He also filed a civil action with the RTC of Zamboanga City against petitioner, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga. 4) When confronted by petitioner, respondent explained that it was Pan who decided to institute the civil action. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil case, if petitioner would move for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a settlement. 5) IBP adopted the recommendations of Commissioner San Juan who held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and petitioner. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue(s): Did respondent violate his lawyer's oath and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility? Disposition: Atty. Chiong suspended for 2 years Held/Ratio: Canon 8: A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. 1) If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga's resolution, they should have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga's decision to file an information for estafa. 2) The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case. 3) Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.
CAMACHO v PANGULAYAN PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES: courtesy, fairness, candor, avoid harassing tactics Canon 8 FACTS: - Atty. Manuel Camacho filed complaint against the lawyers of Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, which included Atty. Luis Pangulayan and other respondents who comprised the law office.

Camacho (complainant) was the counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC) in a civil case o The students were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE. The Student Disciplinary Tribunal recommended the expulsion of the students after it found them guilty of using indecent language in some articles in the paper, and of unauthorized use of the student publication funds Camacho alleged that the respondents, who were then the counsel for AMACC (defendant) obtained, without Camachos knowledge, compromise agreements or Re-Admission Agreements with four of the expelled students in the aforementioned civil case o The re-admission agreements in effect required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have against AMACC, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against AMACC Respondent Atty. Pangulayan said that o The other co-respondents did not take part in the negotiation and execution of the readmission statements o The re-admission agreements had nothing to do with the dismissal of the civil case and were executed only for the settlement of an administrative cases involving the expelled students While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and re-admission agreements addressed to the AMACC president were separately executed by some of the expelled students Following the execution of the letters of apology and re-admission statements, Atty. Balmores (one of the lawyers in Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices) filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending a Manifestation on behalf of the defendant AMACC (hi I think a manifestation means: a manifestation of their having availed of their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or basically the plaintiffs drop the charges against the defendants after a compromise agreement) Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines then passed a resolution which suspended Pangulayan for 6 months for being negligent in his duty, and for the dismissal of the case against the other co-respondents because they did not take part in the negotiations of the case

HELD: - Pangulayan was aware that Camacho was the counsel of the plaintiff students, but he still proceeded to negotiate with the students and their parents without communicating the matter to their lawyer - This failure of respondent whether by design or because of oversight is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague - Also, the allegation that the re-admission agreements were only to settle the administrative aspect of the controversy is contradicted by the Manifestation, which clearly stated that the students agreed to terminate all civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings which they may have against AMACC - The Court found that 6 months was too harsh. They suspended Pangulayan for 3 months and the decision was entered in his personal record. The case against the other respondents (other lawyers of Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices) was dismissed.

SABERON v LARONG LANGUAGE: abusive, offensive, improper; Canons of Professional Ethics

FACTS: - Complainant Jose Saberon charged Atty. Fernando Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) - Saberon filed before the BSP a petition against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation (bank) and Alfredo Bonpin. The petition alleged that the bank and Bonpin refused to return checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by Saberons wife, despite full payment of the loan. - Respondent Larong, counsel for the bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses, stating among others: That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by the plaintiff (Saberon) - Saberon then filed present complaint, finding the statements to be malicious and bereft of any factual or legal basis

Saberon contended that he filed the petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his right to seek redress, and that Larong was fully aware that the loan obtained by Saberons wife had already been paid Larong said that there was nothing abusive in the way he used the word blackmail to characterize the suit of Saberon IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa said in his Recommendation that the word blackmail connotes something sinister, and unless the person accused is criminally charged with extortion, it would be offensive to characterize that persons act as blackmail. Funa said that a counsel is expected to present factual arguments and to anchor his case on legal merits o Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objective of his client and shall not present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage o Funa also said that Larong violated professional conduct by using words unnecessary and irrelevant to the case IBP Board of Governors in their Resolution disapproved the recommendation and dismissed the case for lack of merit Saberon appealed, saying that the Resolution was illegal and void for violating the mandatory requirement stating that a resolution should be reduced to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and reasons on which it is based Saberon further submitted that the penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment, because the Larongs offense showed moral turpitude Larong stated that the complaint against him was a harassment suit because it was in his capacity as counsel to file an Answer in response to complainant o He also said that the purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of fact, backed up with a narration of the suits filed by complainant against his clients, and that the allegation made in the Answer should be considered absolutely privileged o He also pleaded that at the time the allegedly offensive language was used, he was only two years into the profession with no intention of dishonoring it o He also asked for Saberons and the Courts clemency Saberon countered that Larongs comment revealed the latters intention to deliberately state a falsehood, and refused to accede to Larongs entreaty for clemency (TARAY MO KOYA) o

HELD: - Court found Larong guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT (not grave misconduct ha!) The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates (summarized): o Rule 8.01: A lawyer shall not use language which is abusive or offensive o Rule 11.03: A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts - While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language - Respecting Larongs argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged (the narration of the suits filed by complainant and his wife against Larongs clients), lawyers should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy in making such remarks or comments. Petitions and motions are absolutely privileged, but only for so long as they are relevant to the subject of inquiry - The ascription of blackmail in the Answer filed by Larong is not legitimately related or pertinent to the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP o Also, Saberon and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases against the bank and Bonpin - With respect to the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors: there was no compliance with the procedural requirement that the IBP Board of Governors decision shall clearly state the findings of facts or law on which the same is based

With respect to Saberons plea that respondent should be disbarred: disbarment and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, and should be imposed with great caution o While Larong is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit his disbarment Saberons petition PARTLY GRANTED: Larong found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language, fined P2,000, with a stern WARNING!

Laput v Remotigue Sept. 29, 1962 Labrador, J. Facts: Petitioner was lawyer of client Vda. de Barrera in May 1952. By January 1955, P had prepared 2 pleadings to close proceedings on an estate case. Client refused to countersign and asked P not to file them anymore. P found out that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed a written appearance as new counsel for Vda. de Barrera. On Deb. 1955, respondent Atty. Francisco Remotigue entered his appearance. Respondents are charged with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against another lawyer. Complainant states that the appearance of respondents are unethical and improper because they had the desire to replace P as attorney, and took advantage of the clients goodwill and intrigued against the preparation of the final inventory and accounting and prodded client not to consent to Ps decision to close the proceedings. Also that Rs made P seem like a dishonest lawyer no longer trusted by his client, because Rs made the client sign revocations of power of attorney and sent them out to corporations. Case was referred to the Solicitor General. Sol-Gen recommended complete exoneration of the Rs. Holding: Sol-Gen was correct. Yay. Petitioners free from guilt. Case dismissed. Reasoning: 1) Before Atty. Pangalinghug entered his appearance, the client had already filed a pleading discharging the petitioner. Even if Atty. Laput did not get a copy of the pleading, it was the fault of the client and not the respondent. 2) Client just did not trust Laput anymore because she found out that some dividend checks which should have been sent to her was sent to petitioner, so she felt cheated. 3) There is no irregularity in their appearance as counsel. Atty. Patalinghugs services were properly contracted. 4) Petitioner voluntarily withdrew as counsel on Feb. 1955 after Patalinghug entered his appearance. This amounted to acquiescence to respondents appearance as counsel. This estops petitioner from complaining now. 5) Remotigue also not guilty of unprofessional conduct because his appearance was only on Feb. 1955, after client had already dispensed with petitioners services on Jan. 11, 1955 6) With regard to the revocation of power of attorney, they do not seem to be prompted by malice, but made merely to safeguard the interest of the client. Laput v Remotigue Sept. 29, 1962 Labrador, J. Follow-up Administrative Case

Facts: Complainant, by virtue of a duly recorded Attorneys lien, has certificates of title and other records and papers of his client (Vda. de Barrera). Respondent Remotigue filed with the court motions to direct the complainant to surrender certain certificates of title, another motion asking the court to issue duplicate copies of the certificates of the title to respondent, and he and the client sold without notice to petitioner the lots covered thereby. Case is filed charging respondent Remotigue with malice, bad faith, and misrepresentation when he filed motions in court without notice to complainant, thereby committing unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty. Solicitor-General found that as early as Jan. 1955, when Barrera discharged Laput as counsel, he had already been asked to surrender all papers and documents relevant to the cases he handled. He was not served a copy of this pleading, but he must have known this since he went over the records of the proceedings, yet Laput did not comply. In spite of the pleadings, complainant kept to himself the certificates of title. Respondent had not acted with malice or bad faith. Respondents complete exoneration approved.
Aguirre v. Rana June 10, 2003 Carpio Facts: Respondent Edwin L. Rana passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On May 21, 2001, one day before the scheduled oath-taking of the successful bar examinees, the complainant filed a petition for denial of admission to the bar against the respondent. Despite this, the Court allowed the respondent to take the lawyers oath but instructed him against signing in the Roll of Attorneys until the case has been resolved. The charge against respondent was unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. According to the complainant, the respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate during the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MEBC). The complaint alleged that the respondent filed a pleading before the MEBC where he represented himself as counsel for George Bunan, a vice-mayorly candidate. The complaint further alleged that respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body since he is a secretary of the Sanguniaang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate; and that he acted as counsel for George Bunan without the latter engaging him for his services. Respondent claimed that his assistance to George Bunan was performed because the latter asked for his specific assistance and that it was not with him as a lawyer but merely as a person who knows the law. He also denied representing himself as an attorney. With regard to his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, the respondent stated that he had already resigned from the position. Respondent countered that the complaint is politically motivated since the complainant is the daughter of the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Issue: Did the respondent engage in unauthorized practice of law and should therefore be denied admission to the Philippine Bar? Ruling: Respondent Edwin L. Rana is denied admission to the Philippine Bar. Reasoning:

Respondent took the lawyers oath on May 22, 2001. However, the records show that he appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to the said date. The evidence also shows that he signed as counsel for George Bunan of the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precints for the Office of Vice Mayor. On May 14, 2001, Mayorly candidate Erly Hao also retained respondent as counsel. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MEBC and filed various pleadings without authority to do so. Respondent called himself counsel, knowing fully well that he was not a member of the bar.

While it is true that respondent had already taken the lawyers oath, it is the signing of the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Passing the bar is not the only requirement to become an attorney-at-law. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company November 29, 1971 Reyes, J.B.L. Facts: The petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo where the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ordered the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Entila and Tenazas. Afterwards, Cipriano Cid and Associates, counself of record for the winning complainants filed a notice of attorneys lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. Atty. Atanacio Pacis filed a similar claim. Entila and Tenazas manifested that they do not object to an award of attorneys fees amounting to 25% of the total backwages. Afterwards, Quintin Muning filed a petition for the award of services rendered equivalent to 20% of the total backwages. This petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid stating that Muning was not a lawyer. CIR awarded 25% of the backwages as attorneys fees with 10% to Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates, 10% to Quintin Muning and 5% to Atty. Atanacio Pacis%. The award to Muning, who is not a lawyer, is sought to be voided in this case. Issue: Can Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer, share in the division of attorneys fees? Ruling: The orders under review are set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorneys fees for Muning. Reasoning:

The principle in Amalgamated Laborers Association et al v. Court of Industrial Relations is applicable

in that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case. Sec 5 (b) of R.A. 875 states that while parties before the Court of Hearing Examiner are not required to be represented by legal counsel, it is no justification that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees. Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar. Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for compensation of attorneys agreement as to fees imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorneys fees. Since respondent Muning is not an attorney, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with the winning complainants and therefore cannot recover attorneys fees. The rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive: -Statutes have been enacted prohibiting people not licensed or admitted to the bar from practicing law. -The great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court. -The reasons are that ethics of the legal profession should not be violated in that the law will not assist a person to reap the benefits of an act done in violation of the law - and acting as an attorney without authority constitutes contempt of court.

Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations

Date of promulgation: April 30, 1985 Ponente: Justice Makasiar Topic in the syllabus: 7.3.2. FEES Divide fees for legal service with persons not licensed to practice law R-9-02; Canon 34, Code of Professional Ethics FACTS: Urgent motion to cite Atty. Benjamin PINEDA, union administrator Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank (Cubao Branch) in contempt for their alleged failure to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on September 1, 1983 and the September 13, 1983 resolution directing Pineda and Capuno to comply with the restraining order and ordering Manila Bank to transfer funds allocated for the workers to the NLRC

Issuance of the temporary mandatory restraining order stemmed from Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuelas orders before the NLRC, allowing the sale of the property awarded to satisfy or answer for the claims of the union members in 4 cases and authorized the distribution of the proceeds of the purchase

BACKGROUND: 4 cases regarding claims for overtime of 500+ bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit o o August 20, 1958: complaint filed with CIR December 23, 1974: 2 parties reached an Agreement HALILI BUS AND CONDUCTORS UNION (including its officers and members-claimants) shall withdraw and dismiss with prejudice its case before the CIR ESTATE OF FORTUNATO HALILI shall deliver: Deed of Transfer of a parcel of land in Barrio San Bartolome, Caloocan City (area = 33,952 sq. m.) + Negotiable Check for Php25,000.00 in the name of Domingo CABADING (union president) Deed of Transfer + Negotiable Check = full and final satisfaction of UNIONs claims; HALILI is ABSOLUTELY, COMPLETELY and FINALLY absolved and released from any and all liability UNION is a duly registered labor organization duly authorized on December 22, 1974 by its members to sign the Agreement

o o o o o o o

January 6, 1975: HALILI transferred land to UNION in trust for its members-claimants February 14, 1975: land was registered in the name of the UNION August 9, 1982: UNION, though Atty. PINEDA, filed urgent motion with Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting authority to sell and dispose of the property September 23, 1982: motion granted Manila Memorial Park Cemetery (prospective buyer) expressed misgivings on authority of UNION to sell and dispose of property (P.D. 1529, sec. 66) December 1, 1982: PINEDA filed motion with Supreme Court requesting for authority to sell the property SC merely noted the motion in a December 8 resolution PINEDA, without authority from SC but relying on the earlier authority given by MOLE, filed another urgent motion, praying that UNION be authorized to sell the lot to the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery and to make arrangements with it such that payment will be advanced for the real estate taxes inclusive of penalties, attorneys lien which is equivalent to 35% of the total purchase price, and home developers fee of Php69,000.00 February 9, 1983: Labor Arbiter granted motion June 7, 1983: sale was finally consummated When Atty. Jose ESPINAS (alleged original counsel for UNION) learned of the sale from past Union president Lopez, he requested, first from Labor Arbiter Valenzuela and later NLRC Director Reyes to provide records of the case. At first he was told the records were missing, but these were eventually found, at which point he and UNION filed motions urgently praying that: PINEDA deposit with NLRC Php712,992.00 paid to him allegedly representing 35% attorneys fees on the sale of the lot now registered in the name of the UNION

o o

CABADING (union president) or his reps deposit with the NLRC the 6% alleged union expenses paid to them Manila Bank Cubao Branch prevent further withdrawals of amount deposited in the name of PINEDA and/or the UNION and turn over any remaining deposits to NLRC Should PINEDA and the UNION officers have already withdrawn the deposits or parts thereof, they should be required to post a bond in the equivalent amounts of 35% (attorneys fees), 6% (union expenses) and 5% (brokers fee) of the total proceeds of the sale, solidarily

EXTRA BACKGROUND FACTS (surfaced later, but occurred earlier) o August 21, 1958: UNION president Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the UNION had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever amount would be awarded the UNION When Atty. PINEDA appeared for the Union in these cases, he used the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates, giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer He joined Espinas firm in 1965, left for a bit, but rejoined in 1968 he did not reveal to his partners that he had a retainers contract entered into on January 1, 1967 which allegedly took effect in 1966 ONLY UNION officers knew about it!!! Retainers contract appears ANOMALOUS, ILLEGAL and UNETHICAL Executed only between PINEDA and OFFICERS NOT a contract with general membership Contingent fee of 30% for those still working for Halili and 45% for those who were no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group, who were entitled to more benefit besides, when the contract was executed, Halili had already stopped operations in Metro Manila, so PINEDA knew ALL the workers would be out of work and the 45% would apply to ALL Contract retroactively was executed when ESPINAS was still handling Halilis appeal in the Supreme Court PINEDA did not substitute himself in the place of Espinas or the law firm When Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorneys lien with Labor Arbiter Valenzuela, he did NOT attach his retainers contract Retainers contract wasnt even notarized!

o o

HELD: PINEDA is found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT, for which he is sentenced to IMPRISONMENT in the Manila City Jail until orders of SC dated September 1 and September 13, 1983 are complied with. PINEDA is also directed to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be DISBARRED under Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Copies of this Resolution and the October 18, 1983 resolution furnished to MINISTRY OF LABOR and TANODBAYAN for appropriate action.

RATIO (only included the issue relevant to the topic in the syllabus) The Php101,856.00 which PINEDA donated to the UNION (amounting to 5% of the total 35% attorneys fees taken from the proceeds) appears IMPROPER since it amounts to a rebate/commission. This amount was subsequently treated as Union miscellaneous operating expenses without the consent of the general membership.

Amalgamated Laborers Association vs. CIR: We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility. The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness. Fraudulent and deceitful pattern in Pinedas actions: sometimes, instead of signing his motions for and in behalf of J.C. Espinas & Associates, he signed as B.C. Pineda, lone counsel for petitioner

Cobb-Perez v. Lantin July 29, 1968 Castro, J

TOPIC: COURT OBLIGATIONS
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court CANON 22 (Canons of Professional Ethics). Candor and fairness The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, of the language of a decision or a textbook; or with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed, or in argument to assert as a fact that which has not been proved, or in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses, in drawing affidavits and other documents, and in the presentation of causes. A lawyer should not offer evidence which he knows the court should reject, in order to get the same before the jury by arguments for its admissibility, nor should he address to the judge arguments upon any points not properly calling for determination by him. Neither should he introduce into an argument, addressed to the court, remarks or statements intended to influence the bystanders.

Ultra Summary: The counsel of the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions calculated to delay (6 times = more than 8 years after the finality of the judgment) the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory.

Facts:

Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision against the observation of the court that the series of actions that were filed by the petitioners and their counsel were merely means to prevent the execution of a simple money judgment. Treble costs were charged against counsel by the court since they had an active participation in attacking the execution in a piecemeal fashion by seeking the issuance of preliminary injunctions. Instances (di ko alam kung ano yung other 2 huhuhu. Possibly di sinabi sa case or yung 2 times na nag-no show sila in #2 and #4)
1) After the decision was rendered, Mercedes Cobb-Perez (wife) intruded and asked

for an ex parte writ of preliminary injuction from CFI Rizal knowing that the case was decided in CFI Manila. Naturally, the ex parte writ was lifted because the court did not have jurisdiction.

2) Even a month before the ex parte writ of injunction was lifted, wife filed a motion to lift the writ of execution, alleging that the property was conjugal and the nature of the debt is personal. Wife failed to present any evidence and she and her counsel failed to attend the hearing. 3) Wife and Damaso Perez (Husband) filed for the issuance of another injunction from Branch 22 of CFI Manila (not the same branch which controverted the writ of execution. This was denied by Judge on the ground that the court had no power to interfere with the injuction or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.
4) On the same day that the injunction was denied, Husband resorted to another

remedy by filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the order which denied his wifes motion. Naturally, this did not prosper because it was filed by his wife. For more, this was merely an offer to replace the levied property (stocks) with cash dividends. Promise was never fulfilled by husband or counsel. Issue: WON the counsel of the petitioners should be charged with the treble costs. Judgment: Atty. Crispin Baizas and A.N Bolinao shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs. Reasoning: It is apparent that the remedies were designed the foil the execution of the money judgment since even before one remedy was exhausted, they interposed another one. Although their defense is that the counsel is merely assertive, there is a difference between assertiveness (which should be encouraged) and an insistence despite the patent futility of the clients position. It is the duty of the counsel to advise his client on the merit or lack thereof of his case. If the cause is defenseless, it is his duty to advise the client to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. Young v. Batuegas Date Promulgated: May 9, 2003 Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago Nature of Case: (Resolution) Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer's oath. Facts: 1) December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed for bail, alleging that the "accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority..." 2) Petitioner learned from NBI that accused (Arana) surrendered only on December 14, 2000 3) Respondent Susa calendared the petition for bail despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects: a. lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant b. violation of the three-day notice rule c. failure to attach the Certificate of Detention

2) Respondents argued that they brought their client to the NBI to voluntarily surrender on Dec. 13 but due to heavy traffic, they reached the NBI at 2am the next day. 3) As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice.* 4) Respondent Susa explained that it was Ms. Pena who received the respondents motion (for bail) and was instructed by the presiding judge to receive it subject to the certificate of detention. 5) IBP Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala recommended that respondents be suspended from the practice of law for 6 months. Issue(s): Are respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood? Disposition: GUILTY. Suspended from practice of law for 6 months. Held/Ratio: 1) A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." 2) Respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. 3) In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation. 4) Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. January 30, 1971 Castro, J. Facts: The companies (respondents) and the unions in the companies (petitioners) entered into a collective bargaining agreement. During the negotiations, there was a dead-lock on the issue of union-shop. Conciliation conferences were held in the Department of Labor to no avail because the companies did not make any counter-proposals, but instead, insisted that the unions first drop their demand for union security. Further negotiations took place but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. The Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered as unfair labor practices of the companies. While the unions were on strike, the companies sent two letters (exhibits A & B) individually to the employees on strike. Exhibit A (p.253) basically provided benefits to employees such as

meals, comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, overtime pay, etc. Exhibit B, on the other hand, included threats, stating that their positions might not remain open for long. The management tried to break through the Unions picket lines a fight was started by Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and in the fight that ensued, both parties suffered injuries. Prior to the fight, the Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer. After the fight, the companies filed criminal charges against the picketers in the City Fiscals Office of Manila, alleging that non-strikers were injured and using the photographs taken during the fight as evidence. Eventually, the strike was called off because of the companies ultimatum, giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced. Employees went back to the companies but some werent readmitted despite complying with the conditions set by the company (enumerated below). The CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies. The Companies filed an answer denying the allegations and prayed for the dismissal of the case. After trial on the merits, Judge Arsenio Martinez rendered a decision dismissing the unions complaint for lack of merit. Issues & Reasoning 1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practices by sending the letters individually to the strikers. [YES] The act of sending the letters individually to employees is not considered to be a legitimate exercise of the companies freedom of speech. They were sent to the striking employees individually through registered special delivery mail without being coursed through the unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining the act of bargaining individually despite the collective bargaining agreement is considered an unfair labor practice. Exhibit A contained promises of benefits and Exhibit B contained threats. The free speech protection under the constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal. The company was guilty of union-busting and strike breaking. It is clear that the letters were intended to destroy unionism within the employees.

2. WON the companies discriminated in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike. [YES] The companies imposed 3 conditions for readmission of the strikers: 1) employee must be interested in continuing to work; 2) there must be no criminal charges against him; 3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958. All employees went back to work, therefore the only issue is if the employees all complied with the 2nd condition. Despite the fact that they were able to secure clearances, 34 officials and union members were still refused to be readmitted on the ground that they committed acts inimical to the companies. For more, the companies admitted non-strikers who had criminal charges despite the fact that they werent able to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination. 3. WON the companies dismissed officials and members of unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and opportunity to present their side. [YES] Despite the fact that they were able to secure clearances, some of the employees werent admitted and were instead dismissed. There was no sufficient basis for such dismissal

(letters stated that they merely committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike). Also, there was overwhelming evidence to negate the allegation that a member (Tabasondra the VP of the union) had abandoned his job. 4. WON the court should order the reinstatement of officials and members of unions. [YES] The union members were discriminatorily dismissed and the court should order their reinstatement with back pay. 5. WON Judges misquotation was an attempt to mislead. (THE ONLY ONE RELEVANT TO OUR LESSON) [NO] Petitioners asked the Court to cite Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations in contempt on the ground that what the judge quoted (in p. 277 and 278 in the case) do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of the Courts decision (basically, the judge cut and paste sections of a portion of the decision and put them into separate paragraphs and changed some words). The Court said that this does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent judge. The Court is inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt to mislead. The respondents counsels, who reproduced it, are likewise not at fault since they merely relied on the quotation by the judge. Be that as it may, the Court has the firm view that in citing the Courts decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of the courts, judges, and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. The reason for this is that from this Tribunals rulings do all other courts, lawyers, and litigants take their bearings. If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose the proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers, and the public who may thereby be misled. In other words, verbatim reproduction of quotations is imperative. Happily for the judge and the respondents counsel, there was no substantial change in the thrust of the Courts particular ruling which they cited. They are, however, admonished to be more careful in citing jurisprudence in the future.

Judgment: Dismissed respondents will be reinstated to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages. IN RE SOTTO RESPECT COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS: maintain respect and insist similar conduct by others C-11 FACTS: - Respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto was required by the Court in the present proceeding to show cause as to we he shouldnt not be punished for contempt of court - Sotto had previously issued a written statement in connection with the decision of the Court In Re Angel Parazo in the Manila Times and other newspapers. The following are excerpts of his statement: o High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members

I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil is to change the members of the Supreme Court I announce that one of the first measures which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Sotto was granted 10 days more besides the 5 days originally given to him to file his answer, but still filed his answer after the expiration of this period. The case was set for hearing on January 4, but was postponed to January 10, 1949. Sotto, however, did not appear, so the case was submitted for decision In his answer, Sotto did not deny having published the threat and intimidation as well as the charges against the Supreme Court. 1) Contended that under section 13, article VIII of the Constitution, which states the Supreme Courts power to promulgate rules regarding pleading, practice, and procedure, that the Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the SC can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and a law has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive 2) Alleged that he made his statement in the press in the exercise of the freedom of speech, and with utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the honorable members of the high Tribunal o

RULING: Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt by virtue of the publication and was required to appear and show cause to the Court why he should not be disbarred HELD: - 1) Well settled doctrine in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution is patterned after theirs: That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction independently of any special expression of statute (simply, that this power exists but is not explicitly stated in the law) - Court then cited In Re Kelly: o Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor o Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit or tending to influence the decision of the controversy is contempt of court and is punishable - Had respondent limited himself to a statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, his criticism might be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court. However, Sotto did not merely criticize the decision of the Parazo case, which was then still pending. o He intended to intimidate the members of the Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, reorganizing the Supreme Court by reducing its members from 11 to 7, in order to change the members of the Court who decided the Parazo case, and influence the final decision of the Court o He attacked honesty and integrity of the Court and degraded the administration of justice, as seen in his statement: In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years [by the SC]; the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. - If the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of the Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands. Moreover, Atty. Vicente Sotto is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 2) Respondents assertion in his answer that he made his statement in good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of the high

Tribunal may mitigate but not exempt him from liability, but it is belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding o Sotto alleged that Justice Gregorio Perfecto was the principal promoter of the proceeding for contempt, conveying the idea that the Court acted through the instigation of Justice Perfecto License or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of free press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct In summary: in all his statements, the respondent misrepresented to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. In truth, he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of the said case through intimidation and false accusations against the Supreme Court

CONCURRING (J. Perfecto, as in that guy Sotto was blaming for all of this gulo. This case is so long because of this opinion. His feelings were very hurt eh): - Sottos answer was filed late, but the Court overlooked this delay. It legally could have been rejected - The record of this case indicates that the practice of falsehoods seems to be habitual in respondent; proceeded to enumerating Sottos past criminal cases and misbehavior - Respondents allegation that he made the press statement not as a private citizen but as a senator, and should have ample liberty to discuss public affairs lacked merit. Senators are not amenable to the law - Respondent could not have acted in good faith as he alleged, as seen in his slanderous statements like the Supreme Court having committed many blunders and injustices deliberately) - Respondents statement was an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice by bullying the members of the SC with the menace of reorganization and removal - Posing as a false martyr for freedom of the press SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, et. al. VS. Hon. CLORIBEL et. Al. In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attys. Vicewnte Sotto, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano Regala and Associates, Erlito Uy, Juanito Caling; and Morton Meads Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. After the decision of the court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the ff. Lawyers made statements against the court: 1. Atty. Vicente Santiago guilty of contempt of court Third motion for reconsideration - he pictures petitioners as vulturous executives. He speaks of the Court as a civilized, democratic tribunal but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

Motion to inhibit - He categorizes the decision of July 31, 1968 as false, erroneous and illegal. He accuses two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of the case: Associate Justice Castro bec his brother is the vp of the favoured party and Concepcion whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created board of investments. He said that the two justices were not free from the appearance of impropriety and also aroused suspicion that their relationship affected their judgment.

- Paragraph 6 (contained language that was disrespectful) *see page 8 of case for complete text - Although this was voluntarily deleted, the fact is it has been made. - Par 6 describes many of our judicial authorities who believe that they are chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Paragraph 7 Repeated mention of unjudicial prejudice against respondent MacArthur and spoke of unjudicial favoritsm for petitioners Paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners xxxx should also inhibit themselves.

He convinced Caling to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations and the background of the case. Caling said that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. 2. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt Accuses petitioners of having made false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading.

3. Atty. Regala exonerated 4. Atty. Uy exempt from contempt 5. Atty. Caling guilty of contempt. He should have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character 6. Morton meads guilty of contempt. He had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration.

In re: Almacen February 18, 1970 Castro, J. Facts: Before the court is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title filed in protest against what Almacen alleges, among others, a great injustice against his client by the Supreme Court. The present petition stemmed from a civil case entitled Yaptinchay v. Calero, in which case, Atty. Almacen was counsel for the respondent.

-The trial court rendered a decision against Almacens client which prompted him to move for reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion but did not notify the latter of the time nor place of the hearing. Hence, the motion was denied. -Upon appeal, the CA relied on Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. Inc. V. Batu Construction & Co., in dismissing the appeal stating that the motion for reconsideration did not contain neither the time nor place of the hearing and thus is a useless piece of paper. A second motion for reconsideration on the CA decision was also denied. -Atty. Almacen then appealed to the SC by certiorari. The supreme court denied the appeal through a minute resolution. It was at this point that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing the aforementioned Petition - a pleading which is interspersed with contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks against the Supreme Court and its individual members. -Almacen indicts the Supreme Court as a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to our please for justice, who ignore without reasons their applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." -His client has allegedly become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." -Justice, as administered by the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." -He ends his petition with a prayer that a resolution be issued ordering the Clerk of Court to receive his certificate of title in trust with reservation that at any time and in any event that we regain our faith and confidence he may retrieve his title to resume his practice of the noblest profession. -Almacen reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of his petition. The Court then resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. The Court allowed him to submit a written explanation and thereafter, be heard in oral argument. Almacens written argument as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers no apology. Almacen merely repeats his allegations and even embellished them with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Issue: Did Atty. Almacen employ scandalous, offensive and menacing language against the Supreme Court and its members and should therefore be subject to disciplinary action? Ruling: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen is hereby suspended from the practice of law until further orders. Reasoning: On minute resolution denials: Although the court has been asked to do away with issuing minute resolutions, and instead to state the facts and the law and to spell out the reasons when denying petitions, foregoing such a practice would render the Court unable to effectively carry out its burden under the Constitution. Such mode of disposal has helped the court alleviate its heavy docket. Then Sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court state that a review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. Upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court; There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

On expressing disappointment and criticism on judicial action: Judicial officers are not above reproach; like all other public officers, they must answer for their answers before the chancery of public opinion. Lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down. Criticism of the courts has been an important part of the traditional work of the bar and no class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in scrutinizing the capacity, impartiality and integrity of the members of the judiciary because they have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment.

However, all such criticism must not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. On whether Atty. Almacen can properly be subject to disciplinary sanctions: There is no relief afforded to Atty. Almacen by the circumstances that his actuations were made only after the judgment in his clients appeal attained finality. He could still be found in contempt, for what is sought to be protected is the Court itself and its dignity. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes in Atty. Almacens petition, answer and oral argumentation far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals

Date of promulgation: October 1, 1998 Ponente: Justice Regalado TOPIC IN THE SYLLABUS: Code of Professional Responsibility RULE 12.03: A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. FACTS: June 20, 1980: o M/V (motor vessel) Pavlodar, flying under the flagship of the USSR (now Russia) and owned by the Far Eastern Shipping Company, arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia. o The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. o The Philippine Port Authority (PPA) tasked Captain Roberto Abellana to supervise the berthing of the vessel. o The Manila Pilots Association (MPA) assigned Senen Gavino to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth 4. o Gavino boarded the vessel and stationed himself in the bridge. The vessels master, Victor Kavankov, was beside him. Kavankov briefed him about the vessel and its cargo. The vessel lifted anchor and headed towards the port. o Half a mile away from the pier (landmark, in case sir asks: big church by North Tondo Harbor), Gavino ordered the engine stopped. 2,000 ft. away from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. However, the anchor did NOT take hold as expected. The vessel didnt stop nor slow down. o A commotion ensued between Kavankov and his crew members. But when Gavino asked what it was about, Kavankov assured him there was nothing to it. o Gavino ordered the engines half-astern (according to Google, this means revolutions as indicated in ship's orders). o Abellana, who was on the pier, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. o Anchor still did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the full-astern code. But before the anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier, causing damage to both the pier and the vessel.

Manila RTC: PPA sued Far Eastern, Gavino and MPA. Far Eastern, Gavino and MPA ordered to jointly and severally pay PPA P1,053,000 representing actual damages and the costs of the suit. Court of Appeals: No employer-employee relationship existing between MPA AND Gavino. MPA solidarily liable (with Far Eastern and Gavino) to PPA, but MPA entitled to reimbursement from Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to 75% of its prescribed reserve fund.

Supreme Court: Far Eastern assigned several errors to the Court of Appeals.

NOTE: The issues and ratio arent really relevant to the topic in the syllabus but Im including them anyway. Skip ahead to the last part if you want to get to the Legally Professional part! ISSUES, HELD and RATIO 1. WON Gavino and MPA should be held solely responsible for the resulting damages sustained by the pier a. NO! Both Gavino and Kavankov were negligent (based on their respective testimony) b. MPA is solidarily liable for the negligence of its member pilots, without prejudice to subsequent reimbursement from the pilot at fault 2. WON the master (Kavankov) exercised the required diligence demanded from by him by the circumstances at the time the incident happened a. NO! Like Gavino, he was negligent. 3. WON the amount of damages sustained by PPA (awarded by RTC, affirmed by CA) is exorbitant and unreasonable a. NO! Amount of damages is reasonable represents the proportional cost of repair and rehabilitation of the damaged section of the pier. 4. WON Far Eastern should be awarded any amount of counterclaim a. NO! Far Easterns imputation of PPAs failure to provide a safe and reliable berthing place is obtuse mere afterthought (tardily raised), no allegation or evidence on record that Berth No. 4 was unsafe and unrealiable 5. WON Far Easterns claim against Gavino and MPA should be granted in the event that Far Eastern is held liable WHY ARE WE DISCUSSING THIS IN LEGPROF AND NOT OBLICON? Prefatorily, on matters of compliance with procedural requirements, it must be mentioned that the conduct of the respective counsel for [Far Eastern] and PPA leaves much to be desired, to the displeasure and disappointment of this Court. Counsel for Far Eastern: law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, through its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria o What did they do wrong? FORUM SHOPPING MPAs petition in G.R. 130150 was posted by registered mail on August 29, 1997. It would be fair to conclude that when Far Eastern filed its petition in G.R. No. 130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already have received a copy of the former and would then have knowledge of the pendency of the other petition. It was therefore incumbent upon Far Eastern to inform the Court of that fact through its certification against forum shopping. o Far Eastern cant pretend it didnt know about the other petition because on April 25, 1998, it itself filed the motion for consolidation of the 2 cases! Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically Atty. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of heedless disregard of its undertakings under the Rules shall be dealt with more severely. Counsel for PPA: Office of the Solicitor General, composed of Assistant SG Roman G. Del Rosario, Solicitor Luis F. Simon, and Assistant Solicitor General Pio C. Guerrero o What did they do wrong? inordinately and almost unreasonably long period of time to file comment, thus unduly delaying the resolution of these cases First case (G.R. No. 130068) It took several changes in OSG leadership before the comment on behalf of PPA was filed It took 8 motions for extension of time, totaling 210 days, a warning that no further extension shall be granted, and personal service on the SG himself of the resolution requiring the filing of such comment before OSG finally delivered the comment on July 10, 1998 (original deadline: November 12, 1997)

Far Eastern wasnt even furnished a copy of said comment!!! (Required by Section 5, Rule 42: The comment of respondent shall be filedA copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner.) Instead, a copy was inadvertently furnished to MPA, which wasnt even a party to that case! Second case (G.R. No. 130150) It took 6 extensions, a total of 180 days, before comment was filed. While MPA (petitioner in this case) was properly furnished with a copy of its comment, it would have been more desirable and expedient to have furnished its co-respondent Far Eastern with a copy thereof, if only as a matter of professional courtesy. This undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the tax-paying public and can only be categorized as CENSURABLE EFFICIENCY on the part of the government law office. This is most certainly professionally unbecoming of the OSG. What else did they do wrong? They didnt consolidate the 2 cases! Consolidation would have made their job easier theyd only have to prepare 1 comment, which they might have actually been able to submit on time. We find here a lackadaisical attitude and complacency on the part of the OSG in the handling of its cases and an almost reflexive propensity to move for countless extensions, AS IF TO TEST THE PATIENCE OF THE COURT, before favoring it with timely submission of required pleadings. The canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility apply with equal force on lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks As government counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service It is incumbent upon OSG, as part of the government bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its duties with the highest degree of professionalism, intelligence and skill and to extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to the public (source: Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) Assistant SG Del Rosario and Solicitor Simon are ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of unduly delaying proceedings due to delayed filing of required pleadings shall be dealt with more stringently. SG is DIRECTED to look into the circumstances of this case and to adopt provident measures to avoid a repetition of this incident and which would ensure compliance with orders of this Court regarding the timely filing of requisite pleadings, in the interest of just, speedy and orderly administration of justice. Copies of the decision will be spread upon the personal records of the lawyers in the Office of the Bar Confidant

Programme Inc. v. Province of Bataan 26 June 2006 Corona, J. FACTS: Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. (BASECO) was the owner of Piazza Hotel in Mariveles, Bataan. On May 14, 1986, granted petitioner Programme Inc. a contract of lease of Piazza Hotel. o Monthly rental: P6,500 o 3 year contract from January 1, 1986 to January 1, 1989, subject to renewal by mutual agreement of parties Upon expiration of the contract, petitioner was allowed to continue operating the hotel on monthly extensions of the lease contract. In April 1989, the PCGG issued a sequestration order against BASECO. Among the properties sequestered was the lot on which the Piazza Hotel stood.

On July 19, 1989, the Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes. The respondent Province of Bataan was the highest bidder. Programme Inc. filed a complaint for preliminary injunction and for collection of a sum of money against BASECO. Respondent Province of Bataan filed a motion to intervene, as the new owner of the property. Said motion was granted. Province of Bataan filed a complaintin-intervention praying that petition Programme Inc. be ordered to vacate the Piazza Hotel for lack of legal interest. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. CA affirmed TC decision.

ISSUE: 1. Is respondent Province of Bataan the legitimate owner of Piazza Hotel? RULING: PETITION DENIED 1. Yes Evidence clearly established Bataans ownership o Title of land on which Piazza Hotel stands is in the name of the respondent o Tax declaration was in the name of the respondent as owner of Piazza Hotel Petitioner was merely a lessee; hence could not be the owner of a building merely leased to it. o Petitioner admitted BASECOs ownership then of the property in the lease contract o In its own complaint for preliminary injunction and sum of money, petitioner acknowledged that it was not the owner of the property when it stated that [BASECO] lease[d] to [petitioner] the building Piazza Hotel x x x for monthly rentals of P6,500. At best, what was confirmed was that the petitioner managed and operated the hotel. There was no evidence that petitioner spent for the construction or renovation of the property. Petitioner cannot be considered a possessor in good faith because this applies only to a case where one builds/sows/plants on land which he believes himself to have a claim of title, not to lands wherein ones only interest is that of a tenant under a rental contract. Both the trial and appellate courts already declared that the land and the improvements thereon belonged to the respondent. The Court finds no reason to overturn this factual conclusion. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Since the petition was clearly without legal and factual basis, counsel should not have even filed the appeal. It is obvious that the intention was merely to delay the disposition of the case. Dispositive: Costs against petitioner. Same costs against Atty. Benito Cuesta I, petitioners counsel, for filing this flimsy appeal, payable within ten (10) days from finality of this decision.

MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., (COMPLAINANT) AL(RESPONDENTS)

VS.

WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION

ET

GR NO. L-27662 OCTOBER 29,1968 FERNANDO, J. 1. Abitria an employee of Manila Pest Control (MPC) filed a complaint against Workmens compensation commission(WCC). MPC filed an MR against the decision by WCC but was denied since there was already a decision against petitioner awarding Abitria P6,000 as his disability compensation benefit. It was also denied because there was no plea in the MR to set aside said decision and it was rendered moot and academic. 2. MPC filed another MR arguing that they werent aware that a decision has already been made regarding the complaint filed by Abitria.

3. But this MR was denied and a the plea for execution made in behalf of Abitria was granted, the sheriff levied the properties of MPC. 4. Because of this, MPC is arguing that there was an infringement of procedural due process and the acts of WCC was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 5. WCC filed an answer and it was revealed that petitioner was the just evading the performance of an obligation o Abitria was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the atmosphere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. He began to experience symptoms of pulmonary tuberculosis. WCC granted the petition of Abitria and held that the illness was brought about by his work. Guzman (of WCC) tried to deliver the decision to Manila Pest Control. He went to the office of Atty. Corpuz but Corpuz refused to receive the decision arguing that he no longer had anything to do with the case and he also said that the decision should be delivered to Atty. Camacho. Camacho wasnt there so Guzman just left the decision with the clerk.

o o

ISSUES 1. WON there was an infringement of due process against MPC. NO.

RULING Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied. REASONING 1. MPC was arguing that there was an infringement of due process when the decision was executed even when they didnt receive a copy of the said decision but it was found out that their own counsel refused the decision in order to delay the fulfillment of the obligation of MPC to pay Abitria the compensation demanded. This cannot be. The court held that due process concept cannot be the very vehicle to visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant injustice and fairness.