JANA McGraw Hill Presentation MHP

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http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/64040/00009026641100139...
EX-99 2 p11-1523exhb.htm EXHIBIT B - POWERPOINT PRESENTATION
Presentation to McGraw-Hill
August 22, 2011
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Disclaimer
THESE MATERIALS ARE FOR GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. THEY DO NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THESE MATERIALS, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ADVICE ON THE MERITS OF ANY INVESTMENT DECISION. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN REPRESENT THE OPINIONS OF EACH OF JANA PARTNERS LLC AND ONTARIO TEACHERS PENSION PLAN (EACH, A SHAREHOLDER), WHICH OPINIONS MAY CHANGE AT ANY TIME AND ARE BASED ON PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE MCGRAW-HILL COMPANIES, INC. (THE ISSUER). OPINIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE CURRENT OPINIONS AS OF THE DATE APPEARING IN THIS MATERIAL ONLY. EACH OF THE SHAREHOLDERS DISCLAIMS ANY OBLIGATION TO UPDATE THE DATA, INFORMATION OR OPINIONS CONTAINED HEREIN. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND DATA USED HEREIN HAVE BEEN DERIVED OR OBTAINED FROM FILINGS MADE WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) BY THE ISSUER OR OTHER COMPANIES THAT EACH OF THE SHAREHOLDERS CONSIDERS COMPARABLE,AND FROM OTHER THIRD PARTY REPORTS. EXCEPT FOR THE HISTORICAL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, THE MATTERS ADDRESSED IN THESE MATERIALS ARE FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS THAT INVOLVE CERTAIN RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ACTUAL RESULTS COULD DIFFER MATERIALLY FROM THOSE CONTAINED IN THE FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS. NEITHER OF THE SHAREHOLDERS ASSUMES ANY OBLIGATION TO UPDATE THE FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION. NEITHER OF THE SHAREHOLDERS HAS SOUGHT OR OBTAINED CONSENT FROM ANY THIRD PARTY TO THE USE HEREIN OF PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED INFORMATION. ANY SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS INDICATING THE SUPPORT OF SUCH THIRD PARTY FOR THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN. ALTHOUGH DATA AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM SOURCES BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE, NEITHER OF THE SHAREHOLDERS GUARANTEES THEIR ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS OR FAIRNESS. EACH OF THE SHAREHOLDERS HAS RELIED UPON AND ASSUMED, WITHOUT INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION, THE ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS OF ALL DATA AND INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM PUBLIC SOURCES. NO WARRANTY IS MADE THAT ANY DATA OR INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, WHETHER DERIVED OR OBTAINED FROM FILINGS MADE WITH THE SEC OR FROM ANY THIRD PARTY, IS ACCURATE. NEITHER OF THE SHAREHOLDERS SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE OR HAVE ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY MISINFORMATION CONTAINED IN ANY SEC FILING OR THIRD PARTY REPORT. THERE IS NO ASSURANCE OR GUARANTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE PRICES AT WHICH ANY SECURITIES OF THE ISSUER WILL TRADE, AND SUCH SECURITIES MAY NOT TRADE AT PRICES THAT MAY BE IMPLIED HEREIN. THE ESTIMATES, PROJECTIONS, PRO FORMA INFORMATION AND POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSALS SET FORTH HEREIN ARE BASED ON ASSUMPTIONS THAT EACH OF THE SHAREHOLDERS BELIEVES TO BE REASONABLE, BUT THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE OR GUARANTEE THAT ACTUAL RESULTS OR PERFORMANCE OF THE ISSUER WILL NOT DIFFER, AND SUCH DIFFERENCES MAY BE MATERIAL. EACH OF THE SHAREHOLDERS CURRENTLY HOLDS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF SHARES OF COMMON STOCK OF THE ISSUER. EACH OF THE SHAREHOLDERS MAY FROM TIME TO TIME SELL ALL OR A PORTION OF THEIR SHARES IN OPEN MARKET TRANSACTIONS OR OTHERWISE (INCLUDING VIA SHORT SALES), BUY ADDITIONAL SHARES (IN OPEN MARKET OR PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED TRANSACTIONS OR OTHERWISE), OR TRADE IN OPTIONS, PUTS, CALLS OR OTHER DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO SUCH SHARES. EACH OF THE SHAREHOLDERS ALSO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE ANY ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO EACH OF THEIR INVESTMENTS IN THE ISSUER AS THEY MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COMMUNICATING WITH MANAGEMENT OF THE ISSUER, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ISSUER, AND OTHER INVESTORS.NEITHER THESE MATERIALS NOR ANYTHING CONTAINED HEREIN IS INTENDED TO BE, NOR SHOULD IT BE CONSTRUED OR USED AS, INVESTMENT, TAX, LEGAL OR FINANCIAL ADVICE, AN OPINION OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF ANY SECURITY OR INVESTMENT, OR AN OFFER, OR THE SOLICITATION OF ANY OFFER, TO BUY OR SELL ANY SECURITY OR INVESTMENT. 2
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Overview
McGraw-Hill has consistently underperformed its potential and traded at a sizable discount to its intrinsic
value, primarily due to the operational challenges, capital inefficiencies and structural complexity caused by its conglomerate structure While the announcements of a portfolio review and the intention to take significant actions in 2011 are encouraging, the muted market reaction immediately following the announcements reflects concerns that McGraw-Hill will not go far enough in addressing its issues The recent regulatory and political scrutiny around the S&P Ratings business highlights the drawbacks of housing wholly unrelated businesses together and the risks of further delay in addressing this issue McGraw-Hill must move past long overdue reviews and finally execute on transforming its corporate structure to improve operating performance and realize the true value potential of its assets Specifically, McGraw-Hill should promptly: -Separate McGraw-Hill Education -Separate Information & Media -Separate the S&P Index business -Collapse its corporate overhead and right size its segment cost structures to achieve peer margins -Accelerate its share buyback ahead of pursuing these value creating steps to maximize resulting shareholder value -Bolster S&P Ratings with a well-known independent oversight figure to help manage increasingly complex global regulatory landscape and improve dialogue with investors, regulators and the public
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Failure To Maximize Value Comes Primarily From Three Sources

Operational underperformance MH Education and Information & Media are competitively disadvantaged in the current portfolio Structure leads to management inefficiency, excess overhead and sub-peer segment margins Equity alignment challenged given diluted impact of divisional performance on stock performance Inefficient capital allocation Different growth, regulatory and ROIC profiles create conflicting capital allocation priorities Conglomerate structure limits strategic value-enhancing M&A S&P Ratings limits capitalization options for other segments due to perceived conflicts in assuming
meaningful leverage Structural complexity
Minimal commercial logic to structure; does not create unique value and complicates equity story MH Education is a drag on operating metrics and valuation of the rest of the businesses Information & Media is an exciting growth story lost in McGraw-Hill among larger businesses MH Financial is itself a set of unrelated assets that is misunderstood in the broader McGraw-Hill
story; in particular the S&P Index business is lost within MH Financial Public focus on S&P Ratings segment overshadows other segments
McGraw-Hills value creation plan should address the key structural elements of its underperformance and undervaluation.
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McGraw-Hill Portfolio Review & Assessment: Share Performance
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McGraw-Hill Boasts A Portfolio Of Independently Attractive Assets

S&P Ratings Strong market position with barriers to entry, real pricing power and secular growth from
development of international capital markets MH Financial
Growing and high margin S&P Index business combined with unrelated subscription-based
critical content with attractive growth and margin improvement opportunities MH Education
Iconic industry brand in consolidated industry with strong content base and sales
relationships but facing headwinds; K-12 business faces state / local funding challenges while business increasingly requires comprehensive digital learning platform and assessment capabilities; Higher Ed business faces accelerating need for digital capabilities Information & Media
Critical industry information in a number of sectors, with energy / materials accounting for
majority of profitability; well positioned to benefit from penetration and pricing growth; strategic asset with opportunities to participate in industry consolidation
Each business has unique strengths and challenges. The question is: what is McGraw-Hills logic for keeping any of these businesses together?
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! That The Market Consistently Undervalues

McGraw-Hills 3 year average valuation of 12.6x earnings is at a ~25% discount to the 15.9x weighted average of its peer group and trails all of its peers other than Gannett.
Peer Wtd. Avg
15.9x Forward P/E Valuations at 6/13/2011 FDS = 28.7x IHS = 25.0x MSCI = 21.1x MCO = 17.7x TRI = 17.0x PSON = 15.0x MHP =14.2x DNB = 12.7x
GCI = 6.1x
Note: Period ends at 6/13/2011, the day before McGraw-Hill announced its portfolio review, intention to sell broadcasting and review of G&A. Data per CapIQ. Peer group based on Piper Jaffray peer analysis for sum of parts valuation. Weighted average represents average of peers according to McGraw-Hill annual segment EBIT composition (pre-corporate allocation). Peer analysis only possible beginning in 2008, as that is the earliest period for which McGraw-Hill has provided separate segment disclosure for MH Financial. Moodys used as peer for S&P Ratings; Pearson used as peer for MH Education; average of Dun & Bradstreet, FactSet, MSCI and Thomson Reuters used as peer for MH Financial; IHS used as peer for non-broadcasting Information & Media; Gannett used as peer for broadcasting business within Information & Media.
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McGraw-Hill Has Trailed Peer Returns Over The Long Term

McGraw-Hill underperformed its peers in total shareholder return during the three year period preceding the recently announced portfolio review.
(1)
McGraw Hills three

year total return of 2% was 29% less than the weighted average of its peers over the period
(1)
Pearson total return for period excludes impact of changes in value attributable to its stake in Interactive Data Corporation, which was sold in 2010. Including changes to Pearson total return attributable to changes in the value of its stake in Interactive Data Corporation results in a minimal (2%) change in Pearsons total return over the period.
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! And Its Diversification Provided No Benefit In The Market Downturn

McGraw-Hills diversification did not insulate shareholders during the financial crisis. McGraw-Hills total return was 18% worse than the weighted average of its peers. Total Return: S&P 500 Peak - Trough (10/09/07-3/09/09)
During the S&P 500s
decline, McGraw-Hill performed in line with Moodys and considerably worse than all other peers except Gannett While McGraw-Hill matched Moodys on the way down, it underperformed over the past decade, with McGrawHills 50% return falling 124% below Moodys 174% return over that period(1)
Note: Represents total shareholder returns. Weighted average represents average of peers according to McGraw-Hill segment EBIT composition for 2008 (pre-corporate allocation). Moodys used as peer for S&P Ratings; Pearson used as peer for MH Education; average of Dun & Bradstreet, FactSet and Thomson Reuters used as peer for MH Financial; IHS used as peer for non-broadcasting Information & Media; Gannett used as peer for broadcasting business within Information & Media. Peer group based on Piper Jaffray peer analysis for sum of parts valuation. Assumes all dividends reinvested. Data per Bloomberg.
(1)
Represents total return for period from 6/13/2001-6/13/2011. Assumes all dividends reinvested. Data per CapIQ
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McGraw-Hill Portfolio Review & Assessment: In-Depth Segment Review
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Portfolio Review Focus
In conducting the portfolio review, a key question should be: if you were to start from scratch today, would you construct McGraw-Hill in its current form?
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McGraw-Hills Diverse Portfolio: Snapshot Segment Comparison

S&P Ratings
Key Business Lines Ratings General Business, Government MSD / HSD (price + secular volumes) Interest Rate & Financing Environment / Global New Debt Issuance Volume Low / Mid 40% and Growing ~2% Revenue 71% High
MH Financial
Indices, CapIQ, Credit & Equity Research Financial Services Businesses HSD / LDD (price + volume + cross-sales + new product) Financial Services Seats / Adoptions of New Indices & AUM Growth Mid / High 20% and Growing ~1% Revenue 18% Low
MH Education
K-12 and Higher Ed Learning and Support Materials, Testing K-12: State / Local Ed Higher Ed: Students Flat / LSD (state funding / enrollments) State & Local Ed Funding / Post-HS Enrollment Growth Low Teens and Flat / Declining ~8%-10% Revenue 9% Medium (federal / state / local ed)
Info. & Media

Platts, JD Power, Aviation / Construction Week, Broadcasting Diversified Businesses MSD / HSD (price + volume + M&A) Energy Price Volatility / Auto, Aviation and Construction Growth High Teens and Growing ~1% Revenue 12% Low
Key Markets
Growth Profile
Key Revenue Drivers EBIT Margins(1) Capital Intensity ROIC(2) Degree of Regulation
McGraw-Hills segments exhibit distinct financial and qualitative characteristics with different end market, growth, margin, capital intensity, ROIC and regulatory profiles.
(1) (2)
Segment margins shown excluding corporate allocations. 2010 ROIC as calculated on page 13.
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MH Education:Disadvantaged Within McGraw-Hills Portfolio

MH Education compares unfavorably with other businesses in McGraw-Hills portfolio, as measured by
growth profile, operating margins, capital intensity and ROIC As a result, MH Education competes with substantially higher returning businesses for capital, resources and management attention; this leaves MH Education competitively disadvantaged MH Education requires ~3-4x more capital than any other segment, and the segment will need additional ongoing capital support to catch up with competition in development of digital capabilities However, every dollar deployed to MH Education is a relatively less attractive investment because the segment struggles to achieve its cost of capital and other segments offer higher returns Furthermore, these characteristics make it challenging to justify acquisitions in MH Education
MH Education needs substantial capital support and institutional prioritization, yet it is among McGraw-Hills lowest returning investment opportunities.
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Also Disadvantaged Against More Focused Competition

MH Education has underperformed principal peer Pearson (PSON) on an operational basis, a reflection
of MH Educations position within the McGraw-Hill conglomerate structure (only ~23% of total EBIT) PSON has spent 10 years managing its portfolio to focus on education / learning as its core competency
As part of its portfolio reshuffling, PSON has sold over $5bn of assets - including high-quality and
growing but still non-core businesses - and used the proceeds to acquire over $4bn of assets that enhanced its core strategy, with a particular focus on complementary education businesses As a result, education now accounts for ~80% of PSONs total EBIT vs. ~35% 10 years ago
With clear focus, PSON has made the investments and acquisitions needed to become the leader in the
attractive areas of the education market and to grow its emerging markets education business
Education is a core competency / most attractive business for the competition; this leaves MH Education inherently disadvantaged.
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As A Result, MH Education Appears To Be Losing Share

Despite its strong history and legacy market position, in recent years operating performance has
weakened and MH Education has significantly underperformed
MH Education has lost share in its higher education business, as management acknowledged during its
2010 results call, though strong market conditions have still provided an avenue for growth
Based on AAP data, MH Educations K-12 business has experienced share loss outside of new adoptions These losses are a major ongoing concern, as they appear to reflect McGraw-Hills competitive
disadvantage in the faster growing and more attractive areas of K-12 education spending
McGraw-Hill has largely

maintained share in new adoptions, but appears to have lost relative market share in the more attractive non-adoption market
MH Education would be better positioned to compete standalone with greater attention and incentives to reverse share loss and direct the business for success.
Note: US K-12 New Adoptions represents MHP share of new adoptions in adoption states, and Other US K-12 Ed Spend represents MHP share of open territory sales, residual sales in adoption states and supplemental sales. Market data per AAP as disclosed in Stifel Nicolaus 2011 Outlook for El-hi Publishing report dated January 19, 2011. While AAP data does not represent the entire US K-12 education market, it does represent the key components of the market (largest and most direct competitors) with data contributed from the most significant market participants. McGraw-Hill adoptions share per Q4 earnings calls.
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MH Educations Weak Structural Position

We think that MHP could evaluate a potential sale/spin of the Education segment (22% of MHP profits). We view the Education properties as relatively low growth (LSD) and low margin (essentially 10-15% since 1995) which put it at odds with much of S&P Ratings, M-H Financial, and Platts. Education has also struggled in recent years amid tough times for local/state budgets, and lagged competitor Pearson. - J.P. Morgan, August 1, 2011(1) Consider the following - 1) the financial profile of Education (more capital intensive, lower returns, cyclical ~ K-12) is less attractive vs. McGraw-Hill Financial Services, in our opinion; 2) McGraw-Hill Education has been losing share in both el-hi and college for the last several years which we think is at least partially due to under-investment in these businesses (at least on a relative basis) - School revenue is nearly -30% off its '05 peak, the company's legacy testing biz (norm-referenced testing) has been hurt by NCLB, and the higher education digital strategy has generally trailed competitors - Stifel Nicolaus, August 2, 2011(2) The weak link in the MHP earnings outlook near-term is the educational publishing unit, reflecting heavy spending on digital initiatives and a difficult K-12 funding environment. While we see longterm payoff from the digital migration (as evidenced by the higher margins achieved in the more technologically advanced college business), we expect spending to constrain margins in 2011 and 2012 - Piper Jaffray, May 19, 2011(3)
MH Educations performance is a drag on other McGraw-Hill businesses.

(1)
Activists Coming; Michael A. Meltz; J.P. Morgan; August 1, 2011. (2) The McGraw-Hill Companies; Drew E. Crum and David Pang; Stifel Nicolaus; August 2, 2011. (3) Management Visit Reinforces our Positive View; Peter P. Appert and George K. Tong; Piper Jaffray; May 19, 2011.
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Information & Media:Obscured Value And Disadvantaged In M&A

From an investors perspective, the Information & Media business is lost within the broader McGraw-Hill
conglomerate structure and is too small to move the needle Information & Media represents only ~10% of EBIT and is overshadowed by three other segments
Management has recognized that Platts is an underappreciated gem(1) within the company From an operational perspective, Information & Media does not receive the growth support,
organizational focus / prioritization or equity incentives needed to maximize performance
In the media space there is a strong track record of orphan assets like Info. & Media materially
improving performance once equipped with the appropriate attention, resources and incentives
Information & Media is well positioned to participate in information services industry consolidation As a buyer: While McGraw-Hill has recently supported two Info. & Media acquisitions (Bentek and
Steel Business Briefing Group), a standalone Info. & Media business could be considerably more acquisitive, in line with information services peers, to drive growth, margins and value creation As a seller: Information & Media would be a highly valued acquisition candidate for larger pureplay info services companies or diversified media companies looking for info services exposure
A standalone Information & Media business could better optimize operational performance, garner investor attention and participate in consolidation.
(1)
CEO Harold McGraw III comment during Q2 2011 earnings call discussion of McGraw-Hills portfolio review.
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IHS Example Demonstrates Value Creation Potential

Standalone competitor IHS focus and execution has resulted in strong performance and a high valuation IHS enjoyed strong
revenue growth through the market downturn, generating organic constantcurrency revenue growth in every year IHS has also been a from 2008-2010 leader in industry consolidation, having acquired over 30 companies since 2007 The market has rewarded IHS strategy and performance with a rich valuation
Information & Medias assets provide the foundation of a business that - with improved focus and appropriate access to capital - should be capable of similarly strong operational performance and warrant a premium valuation.
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MH Financial:Overshadowed by S&P Ratings And Overly Complex

Despite separate disclosure, MH Financial remains overshadowed by the larger S&P Ratings segment Regulation: S&P Ratings is subjected to considerable regulatory oversight M&A / Growth: MH Financial is a diverse collection of businesses with variable growth and
profitability characteristics, ample opportunity to participate in value creating M&A and considerable growth runway, while S&P Ratings is a mature business Capital Structure: S&P Ratings limits overall company leverage due to perceived conflicts of interest
Margins / ROIC: Both have very strong margin and ROIC profiles in absolute terms, but S&P
Ratings has considerably better margins and ROIC on a relative basis
Management has conceded that McGraw-Hill Financial is a completely different business than S&P(1) MH Financials diversity and lack of transparency hinders management performance and valuation S&P Index business is well positioned to realize value as a standalone business and would be an
attractive asset for strategic acquirors; however, today its value is unrecognized given poor disclosure and unrelated assets within MH Financial Ratings Direct is a more natural fit with the S&P Ratings business
Capital IQ performance masked by disclosure (e.g. number of customers not a helpful performance
metric / indicator)
MH Financials lack of clear fit with S&P Ratings and its own complex asset mix obfuscate its value and in particular conceal the value of the S&P Index business.
(1)
Per commentary of CEO Harold McGraw III on Q2 2011 MHP earnings call Q&A.
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MH Financial & S&P Ratings Underperform Pure Play Peers

While there are some differences in business model and mix, both S&P Ratings and MH Financial
operate at margins well below best-in-class pure play competitors Following the separation of MH Education, Information & Media and the S&P Index business, the remaining S&P Ratings / MH Financial business will be positioned to improve its performance and bridge its margin gap with peers Senior management focused on one discrete business rather than four
Eliminate corporate costs Better alignment of management incentives with business performance
Comparable EBIT Margins: S&P Ratings and MH Financial vs. Peers
Note: All periods represent fiscal years. Excludes non-recurring items for S&P Ratings, MH Financial and all peers. For S&P Ratings and MH Financial, adjusted EBIT margins include allocation of adjusted corporate overhead (based on % EBIT contribution). For S&P Ratings and Moodys MIS, margins exclude intercompany royalty revenue and EBIT; intercompany royalty revenues assumed to have no associated costs. MSCI 2010 margins impacted by acquisition of lower margin business during fiscal year.
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S&P Ratings Issues:Overshadows McGraw-Hills Other Businesses

Public scrutiny of the S&P Ratings business serves as an overhang on McGraw-Hills valuation
We remain long-term bullish on MHP (and MCO) but acknowledge that it will be difficult for the shares to outperform near-term given increasing regulatory scrutiny, which has intensified meaningfully since S&Ps downgrade of the US - Piper Jaffray, August 18, 2011(1)
Analysts and investors have accounted for public focus and regulatory scrutiny by applying a
discount to the valuation of all McGraw-Hills businesses, not just to the S&P Ratings business Negative headlines following S&Ps downgrade of the US sovereign rating reignited regulatory fears. Here we believe incremental regulation beyond measures in Dodd-Frank seems unlikely. Also, our price target includes a modest 10% discount [to McGraw-Hills total sum of the parts enterprise value] for these risks - Goldman Sachs, August 18, 2011(2)(3)
The result is that S&P Ratings (~50% of total EBIT) infects the valuation of the other businesses
rather than protecting them through diversification (as management has historically contended)
McGraw-Hill can address this overhang through separation of MH Education, the S&P Index
business and Information & Media ! S&P Ratings meanwhile should add a well-known independent oversight figure to help manage the increasingly complex global regulatory landscape and external dialogue
Separating other businesses would release them from unjustified S&P Ratings overhang, and allow for greater focus from top management at S&P Ratings.
(1) (2) (3)
Regulatory Worries Create Near-Term Headwind; Peter P. Appert and George K. Tong; Piper Jaffray; August 18, 2011. Reiterate Buy on self-help headlines; we see 30% upside; Sloan Bohlen and Conor Fennerty; The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; August 18, 2011. Goldman Sachs applies the same 10% valuation reserve to the value of Moodys (GS report on Moodys dated April 28, 2011: Moodys Corporation: Outsized 1Q is compelling but we are hesitant to chase; still Neutral), for whom the vast majority of EBIT is directly related to ratings vs. ~50% at MHP.
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No Real Synergies To Justify Drawbacks Of Conglomerate Structure

MH Education and Information & Media realize no meaningful commercial or cost benefits from each
other or the other McGraw-Hill segments
S&P Ratings and MH Financial maintain a relationship for indices and credit research S&P credit research reports should be housed within S&P Ratings (vs. MH Financial today) A separation of the S&P Index business should be achieved through a branding agreement for
the S&P name, in line with comparable index transactions
S&P Ratings S&P Ratings MH Financial Commercial Relationship for S&P Index and Cross Selling Ratings Direct; Limited Corporate Overhead Commercial Relationship for S&P Index and Cross Selling Ratings Direct; Limited Corporate Overhead Limited Corporate Overhead Limited Corporate Overhead MH Education Limited Corporate Overhead Information & Media Limited Corporate Overhead
MH Financial
Limited Corporate Overhead
MH Education
Limited Corporate Overhead Limited Corporate Overhead
Information & Media
McGraw-Hills business segments lack clear commercial or cost synergies. In particular, MH Education and Info. & Media enjoy no benefits from the structure.
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McGraw-Hill Portfolio Review & Assessment: Value Potential
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Corporate Structure Impedes Recognition Of True Value

McGraw-Hill is an overly complex equity story for analysts and investors For its size, McGraw-Hill is followed by a relatively small number of Wall Street analysts Diverse primary coverage universes of analysts highlight the difficult equity story A sum of parts valuation is the best means to recognize the value of McGraw-Hills distinct assets All of McGraw-Hills analysts believe the companys assets are worth more separately than together ~25% average analyst sum of parts discount highlights substantial discount to fair value The companys valuation suffers from a conglomerate discount vs. pure play segment peer
multiples ! MHP can unlock additional value for shareholders through corporate actions including potential segment /divestiture or spin-offs(1) Peer Competitor Coverage
Firm (Analyst) Piper (Appert) JP Morgan (Meltz) Goldman (Bohlen) Stifel (Crum) Lazard (Bird) Benchmark (Atorino) Evercore (Arthur) S&P X X X X X X X X X MH Fin X X MH Ed X I&M X X Sum of Parts / Upside (Date) $52 / 22% (7/29) $55 / 33% (8/1) $50 / 25% (8/18) NA $55 / 33% (8/1) NA $45-58 / 16% (8/2) Other Coverage Areas For-Profit Education Radio, Publishing REITs, info services Large Cap Diversified Media Ad Agencies, Newspapers Newspapers, Broadcasting Outdoor, Newspapers, Broadcast
A clearer story would unlock value by improving analyst and investor focus and free McGraw-Hills businesses to explore value-creation opportunities.
Note: X indicates segments whose comparables / competitors the analysts covers as part of their primary coverage universe. Sum of parts upside percentage based on share price on date of research report.
(1)
Reiterate Buy on self-help headlines; we see 30% upside; Sloan Bohlen and Conor Fennerty; The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; August 18, 2011.
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Portfolio Review Can Result In Substantial Value Creation

An immediate separation of McGraw-Hills businesses would unlock substantial shareholder value by
eliminating the current conglomerate discount, accelerating corporate and segment cost rationalization which would lead to margin improvement, and facilitating appropriate capitalization Unlocking McGraw-Hills long-term
$65 $61 $58 $51
conglomerate discount(2) would result in ~$11 of value Eliminating McGraw-Hills corporate cost structure would contribute ~$6 of value Execution of McGraw-Hills authorized buyback would create $3.50 of immediate value Bridging the remaining margin gap with McGraw-Hills peers (gap after collapsing the corporate structure) would create an additional ~$4 of value
(1) (2) (3)
(4)
(5)
Separation would unlock substantial value and could create even greater value through M&A activity for each segment.
Represents closing price on 6/13/2011, the day before McGraw-Hill announced its portfolio review, intention to sell broadcasting and review of G&A. Based on McGraw-Hills long-term discount to the weighted average P/E multiple of its peers (as shown on page 7) and average conglomerate discount per analyst research (as shown on page 24). Represents elimination of McGraw-Hills $164.4mm of 2010 adjusted corporate costs valued at a 17.8x forward P/E multiple. Valuation multiple represents MHPs 6/13/2011 multiple adjusted for elimination of the companys conglomerate discount; this is in line with the 17.9x weighted average multiple of MHPs peers on 6/13/2011 (see page 7). Assumes MHPs corporate tax rate. (4) Assumes repurchase at 6/13/2011 closing price. Assumes funding through new leverage of 2x EBITDA at MH Education, MH Financial and Information & Media segments, with no incremental leverage on S&P Ratings (implies pro forma net leverage of ~1x EBITDA on all MHP). Assumes 4.5% after tax cost of debt. (5) Represents value from bridging remaining margin gap with peers after elimination of $164.4mm of adjusted corporate costs. Peer margin comparison detail shown on pages 14, 18 and 20. Assumes multiple and tax rate consistent with footnote 3.
(1) (2) (3)
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Conclusion
McGraw-Hills conglomerate structure acts as a significant constraint on each of its businesses,
hampering operational performance, strategic flexibility in allocating capital and share price valuation
McGraw-Hill has much more meaningful and beneficial opportunities to improve operating performance
and clarify the underlying value of its assets than the actions undertaken to date (such as seeking to sell broadcasting, which accounts for only ~2% of total EBIT) A wide ranging, transformative and comprehensive resolution of the corporate structure and cost structure is essential for McGraw-Hill to improve operating performance and shareholder return
Separating MH Education, Information & Media and the S&P Index business would position these
businesses to improve performance and participate in consolidation, thus unlocking value
Collapsing McGraw-Hills corporate cost structure and eliminating duplicative overhead costs
would enhance this value creation
Accelerated share buybacks would multiply the value creation impact of these changes Bolstering S&P Ratings with an independent oversight figure would help the business navigate an
increasingly complex global regulatory environment and heightened public focus
JANA and OTPP each look forward to providing an independent shareholder perspective to McGrawHills management and Board of Directors as they conduct the current portfolio review
The real question is why would McGraw-Hill not promptly take these steps to improve operating performance and unlock shareholder value?
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EX-99 2 p11-1523exhb.htm EXHIBIT B - POWERPOINT PRESENTATION

Failure To Maximize Value Comes Primarily From Three Sources

McGraw-Hill Portfolio Review & Assessment: Share Performance

McGraw-Hill Boasts A Portfolio Of Independently Attractive Assets

! That The Market Consistently Undervalues

Peer Wtd. Avg

McGraw-Hill Has Trailed Peer Returns Over The Long Term

McGraw Hills three

! And Its Diversification Provided No Benefit In The Market Downturn

McGraw-Hill Portfolio Review & Assessment: In-Depth Segment Review

Portfolio Review Focus

McGraw-Hills Diverse Portfolio: Snapshot Segment Comparison

Info. & Media

MH Education:Disadvantaged Within McGraw-Hills Portfolio

Also Disadvantaged Against More Focused Competition

As A Result, MH Education Appears To Be Losing Share

McGraw-Hill has largely

MH Educations Weak Structural Position

MH Educations performance is a drag on other McGraw-Hill businesses.

Information & Media:Obscured Value And Disadvantaged In M&A

IHS Example Demonstrates Value Creation Potential

MH Financial:Overshadowed by S&P Ratings And Overly Complex

MH Financial & S&P Ratings Underperform Pure Play Peers

Comparable EBIT Margins: S&P Ratings and MH Financial vs. Peers

S&P Ratings Issues:Overshadows McGraw-Hills Other Businesses

(1) (2) (3)

No Real Synergies To Justify Drawbacks Of Conglomerate Structure

Limited Corporate Overhead

Limited Corporate Overhead

Limited Corporate Overhead Limited Corporate Overhead

Information & Media

Limited Corporate Overhead

Limited Corporate Overhead

McGraw-Hill Portfolio Review & Assessment: Value Potential

Corporate Structure Impedes Recognition Of True Value

Portfolio Review Can Result In Substantial Value Creation

(1) (2) (3)

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