Project anagement The Delhi Metro Project Effective Project Management in the Indian Public Sector Eueryone who

has truvehd by the Delhi Metro wants onc in his or her city. Tod.ay, there is a national resurgence in public interest in urban public transport.r -Dn Mannoh@n Singh, Prime Minister of India, in 2006. The successful implernentation of the Delhi Metro project would. not haue been possible without tirnely availability of fund.s and thc necessary political support. An equally important role has bem played by the DMRC's corporate culture, which emphasizes that tq,rgets are nloat sq.roaonct and our dignity is in performing our duty well.2 -E Sreed.haran, Managing Directon Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.' in 2005. ith a 6.5 km section of Line 3 becoming operational in April 2006, Phase I ofthe Delhi Metro3 project was nearing completion. Of the total length of 65.16 km of the first phase, 62 km had "PM Lays Foundation Stone for Bangalore Metro", wwrnpib.nic.in, June 24, 2006. "Interview with E Sreedharao, Managing Director, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd," $i,*,.indiainfoline.com, December 19, 2005. A metrc system is usually an urban electric mass transit railway system independ ent of other traffic and with high frequency. A metro system includes elevated, at-grade, and underground sections. @ 2006 The Icfai Center for Manag ment Research (ICMR). All Rights Res rved. For acc essing and procuring the case study, log on to www.ecch.cranfreld.ac.uk or www.icmrindia.org

been completed and opened for service. This phase was set to cost Rs. 98 bn. As of early 2006, around 450,000 passengers were traveling by the Delhi Metro everyday. The Delhi Metro was meant to solve Delhi's traffrc problems, which had becone almost unmanageable. The Iirst steps to build a metm system in the city were taken in the early 1990s. In 1995, the Government of India (GoI) and the Government of the National Capital Teritory of Delhi (GNCTD) formed the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) under the Companies Act to construct the Delhi Metro. Conceived as a social sector project, a significant portion of the project cost was funded through a soft loan provided by the Japanese government through Japan Bank International Corporation (JBIC).' The rest was contributed by GoI and GNCTD through equity. E Sreedharan (Sreedharan) was appointed Managing Director (MD) ofthe DMRC and Project Manager for Phase Thc first steps to build I of the project in November 1997. Work on Line 1 of Phase I started in October 1998. DMRC formed consortiums to @ ,netro wstern in advise it on the project and to provide it with the latpst Delhi uere tahen in technolory. It also saw to it that the foreign companies thz early 1990s to worked with the Indian companies to ensure that the latter solae Delhi's traffie assimilated their expertise and technological know-how. problcrns, which had' The DMRC faced any number of technical and systenic become alrnost challenges during the construction of the metro. However, thanks to thorough planning, an effective project design, unnl,an@geable and a "we-mean business" culture, it was able to overcome all these hurdles. The organizational culture was based on punctuality, honesty, and a strict adherence to deadlines. The DMRC successfully rnanaged the various stakeholders in the project like the general public, government bodies, etc , and also ensured t'hat the project was environmentally safe. With Phase I of the Delhi Metro project nearing completion, the GoI decided to extend the metro network and work on Phase fI of the Delhi

Metro project vtas set to commence in September 20O6' In the pmcess of implementing the project, the DMRC had gained a lot of technological expertise, which would be used by other cities in India and abroad to build metro systems similar to the Delhi Metro. Backgrolrnd Note Metro systems were generally considered as a transport option when the population of a city crossed the 1 million mark (Refer Drhibit I to know more about metro transit systerns)' Delhi crossed that milestone as early JBrc r* f"t"d"d in 1961 by the Japanese govemmeEt as the Overseas Economic ' Cooperation Fund (OECF). It served as the imPlementiog agency for loan aid given to eotities in developilg countries OECF generally gave low-interest (arou nd i.!qo), long-Letm funds (about 20 years with five-year grace period) In 1999, OECF was merged with Export-Import Bank of Japan (JE)iIM) to form the JBIC'

Exhibit I The first meko system in the world was the London Underground which became opera tional in 1863. Later, metro systems were established in Paris and Berlin. ln 1904, the Ne w york Citv Subway was commissioned. Extending to 1,355 km, this went on to become the large st metro system in the world. ln the 206 Century, metro systems became common with new on es coming up in maior cities of the world. Some Metro Systems around the World Country City Name of System Year Opened Length (Kms) England tondon London Underground 1863 408 France Paris Paris Metro 1900 221.6 U5A New York New York City Subway 1904 1355 Spain Madrid Madrid Metro 1 919 226.7 lapan Tokyo Tokyo Metro 19)7 183.3 Japan Osaka Osala Muniopal Subway I q3f 113.5 Russia i 935 274.3 Russia St. Pete6burg St. Petersburg Metro r955 109.5 5. Korea Seoul Seoul Metro 1963 287 Mexico Me^ico City Mexico City Metro '1969 177 HonS KonS Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway 1979 91 lndia Kolkata Kolkata Metro 1984 t6.45 Igvpt Cairo Cairo Metro 1947 43.5 Australia Sydney Metro Light Rail 1997 7.2 Thailand Bangkok Bangkok Metro 2004 21 Source: www.w il ipedi a.ory as in the 1940s. The 1950s saw a doubling of the city's population; with that, the vehicular traffrc also soared. By the early 1990s, Delhi had more registered vehicles than Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai put together It had become one of the most polluted cities in the world, with automobiles contributing to more than two-thirds of the total atmospher.ic pollution. There was an urgent need felt at this point to irnprove both the quality and availability of mass transport services in Delhi. The frrst ever traffic study of Delhi (titled the "Origin -Destination Survey of Traffic of Greater Delhi") was carried out by the Central Road Research Institute (CRRI) in 1957. As many as 35 more studies on Delhi's transport problems were conducted subsequently by various entities (Refer Exhibit II for some of these studies). Almost all these studies recommended the Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) as a means to solve Delhi's traJfic problems. In 1989, the GNCTD, with support from the GoI, commissioned a feasibility study for developing an MRTS for Delhi. The study was undertaken by Rail India Technical & Economic Services Ltd. (RITES)5 and completed in 1991. RITES recommended a three-component transit system comprising rail corridors (surface/elevated), metro corridors RITES, established in 1974, is the multi-disciplinary consultancy wing of the In dian Railways. RITES has serwed as a consultant to top organizations and governments in 55 countries. It largely operates in the fields of transpod, infrastructure, and

related technologies.

txhibit ll : Studies on Delhi's Traffic Problems S-No. Sludy Organization 1 Transportation Study Central Road Research lnstitute, '1969 New Delhi 2 Town and Country Planning Ministry of Urban Affairs '1973 Oreanization Study and Employment 3 Metropolitan Transponation Team Ministry of Urban. Development 1974 4 Metropolitan Transpon Project Ministry of Railway 1975 5 Study Croup Planning Commission 1942 6 lndian Railway Study Croup lndian Railways r986 7 Ministry of Urban Deve'opment 1987 8 Planning of Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi Central Road Research lnstitute, New Delhi 1989 9 Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi RITES 1990 S ou rce : www. del h in et rctai L can (underground), and a dedicated busway, totaling 198 5 km. This mix of elevated and underground sections was proposed in order to bring down the overall project cost.6 RITES further recommended sequential construction of the total network because of the high costs associated with the project. The complete network was to have 16 lines. Sections with higher projected passenger traJfic densities were to be constructed first In 1995, RITES submitted a Detailed Project Report (DPR) for Phase I of the Delhi Metro project. The Delhi Metro Project In order to implement the Delhi N{etro project. the GoI and the GNCTD set up a 50:50 joint venture companl'called the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC). The company $'as incorporated under the Companies Act in May 1995. The DMRC was to complete Phase I of the project within 10 years, i.e., by the end of 2005. After the recommendations of various other civic organizations had been incorporated, the proposal for Phase I of the Delhi Metro project was approved b1'the GoI in September 1996. Phase I was to connect Delhi's business, education, and shopping districts. It was to cover about 340 hectares of Iand (of which about 58o/a was government land, 397a was private agricultural land, and 3% was private ur6an land) and involved the design and construction of three lines (with a total length of 56 km), 50 stations (of which 10 were underground), and three maintenance depots (Refer Figure I and Table I for the plan for Phase I). 6 As of 2002,.the cost of building the underground section was estimated to be Rs. 2.?0 bn per kilometer, while the cost of building an elevated section was Rs. 1 bn per kilometer Underground sections requircd stdcter environmental contr cl

and fire safety systems. The operational cost ol maintaining underground section s was also higher

Figure l: Phase I of the Delhi Metro Project Table l: Phase I of the Delhi Metro Line Lengh of Line Roste Line 1 22 kfil Shahdara to Rithala Line 2 llRm Vishwa Vidyalaya to Central Secretatiat Line 3 23 km Barakhamba to Dwaraka sd re: w dclta imettuail.om Funding the Project Globally, most urban MRTS projects were financially unviable because the fares could not be fixed solely on a commercial basis. If the fares were fixed too high, the passenger numbers would remain low, thereby defeating the very purpose of setting up the system. Therefore, the concerned governments generally bore the capital costs of an MRTS system. In the case of the Delhi Metro project too, the GoI and the GNCTD bore the capital costs. The total cost of the first phase of the project was initially estimated at Rs. 60 bn, at April 1996 prices. Later in 2002, with the cost of the project rising by approximately 10Vo per year, the estimate was revised to Rs. 89.27 bn. Initially, for Phase I of the metro to become viable, it was estimated that it would have to transport 2.2 million passengers per day. This was later revised to 1.5 million passengers per day. The economic IRR? (Internal ? Internal Rate of Return or IRR is defined as the rate of return that would mahe the present value of future cash flows plus the flInal market value of an investment equal to the cunent value of the investment. It is used by firms to make decisio ns regarding long-term investments (Source: www.investorwords.com).

Rate of'Return) of the project worked out to be about 2l.44o8 while the frnancial IRR was less than 37o. In view of the high cost of the project and the low frnancial IRR, some ministers in the GoI even zuggested that the pmject be dropped. However, the GoI decided to go ahead with it, keeping in minal that it was essentially a "social sector" project, expected to benefit the regional economy in more ways than one. The frnancial plan for Phase I was approved by the GNCTD and the GoI in 1996. Of the project cost, 28Eo was to be financed by equity, subscribed to equally by the GoI and the GNTCD. The two also agreed to give interest-free subordinate loans to cover the cost of land acquisition, which was exPected to be about \Vo of the total project cost. Funding for the m4ior share or about 647o ofthe project cost was to be provided by the Overseas F,conomic Cooperation Fund (OECF-which later became JBIC) through a timeslicetl soft loan.e JBIC disbursed the loan in tranches with each tranche treated as a separate loan, with its own moratorium and repayment period. The repayment period for each tranche was set at 30 years, which includecl a l0-year grace period (Refer Table II for the loan hanches given by JBIC). Property developmentro at the highly lucrative sites around the metro stations was to generate funds to cover the remaining 3% of the project cost. The debt-equity ratio was fixed at 2:1. The GoI and t'he GNCTD also clecided to bear the exchange rate risks equally. The DMRC planned to repay the OECF loan through surpluses from revenues, property development around metro stations-and its corridors, and levies/taxes on the residents of Delhi. Further, the project was exenpted from custom and excise duties. Tl:e Project Team With the funding for the project being frnalized, the next step was to as project mnnager constitute a project tearn. Sreedharan was appoint d and managing director of the DMRC in November 1997. A technocrat, he Phr* l.f the Dethi Metro was expected to generate substsntial benefits to the " economy by way of saving time for commutere, enabling reliable and safe journeys , reducin! atmospheri" poilrrtiott, curtailing the nubber of accidents, reducing f uel rlducing vehicle operating cost8, increasing the average speed of "or,"rr-!tion, road vehiclee, and improving the quality of life-all of which, in turn, wete exp

ected to msle Delhi a more attractive city for inv@tmeDt' s Time-eliced loans are given in parts (tranches or slicee). Each part had its o wn interest rate, moratorium, and repayment p riod' D The DMRC planned to generate around Rs. 6 bn by developing resl estate project s in and arouud the metro stations. This included 8n IT park, a mega shopping mall curn multipler, restaurantg, ATM counters, beveraSp counters, web stores, cherni st's shops, and coffee parlors.

had had a long stint in the Indian Railways OR) and had retired in 1990. During his service with IR, he had earned a reputation for completing major projectsll on time and within the budget. By the end of 1998, DMRC was able to recruit only 100 people; around 707o of the senior sta{f at the DMRC was on deputation from IR. The long delay in recruitment prompted critics of the project to comment that it was ar indication that the project itself would take more time and money than planned. Sreedharan was given complete freedom to pick and choose the project team. He selected a motivated team of professionals whom he regarded as fundamental tn the success of the project. "Each member of the team was interviewed personally by me. I went through their track record particularly with regard to their integrity,"r2 said Sreedharan. Most of the staff was between 18 and 30 years. Unlike other public sector organizations in India, the DMRC opted for a lean structure. It had just two departments-project organization, and operation and maintenance. The Delhi Metro was only the second metro project in India (the Kolkata Metrols being the first). Since the technolory to build metro systems was highly specialized, experts in the areas of civil engineering, electrical engineering, communications engineering, etc., were needed. However, the DMRC faced The key operating and. the problem of skill shortage as the country had neither institutes which taught metro technolory nor experienced tnaintenance personnel of personnel. Therefore, after recruiting suitable candidates, DMRC receiued. training the DMRC sent them abroad for training. The key at Eong Kong's Moss operating and maintenance personnel received training Tlansit Railuay at Hong Kong's Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC). They, in turn, trained the rest of the staff. Later Corporotion (MTRC) the DMRC opened its own "Metro Training School" at Shastri Park, New Delhi. Sreedharan too visited subway systems around the world for ideas on building the Delhi Metro. In an interview describing the diffrculties he faced in getting suitable people, Sreedharan said, "When we started there was a handicap as almost everyone was new to metro projects. Then we educated all the persounel and officers and absorbed experience from general consultants to upgrade our skills and now these very personnel have become one of the greatest assets to the nation."la l In 1963, Sreedharan was in charge of the repair of the Pamban bridge joining Raureshwaram, an island off the coaat of Tarnil Nadu, with the mainland. He was able to complete the project in 46 days whelr the project duration was set at 18 0 days. In 1997, he was put in charge of the Konkan Railways project, which involv ed building a railway system along the west coast of Indis, covering 760 km. The

project, which was a mqjor engine ring feat with 150 bridges and 93 tunnels, was completed in record time and within the budget. u "First Section of the Delhi Metro to Open this Year", www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002. The Kolkata Metro in the eastern city of Kolkata (earlier known as Calcutta) in India was inaugurated in 1984. It is 16.45 km long add has 17 stations. "Taking Metro to New Heights", www.hinduonnet.com, April 04, 2005.

The'corporation aimed to project an image of efficiency, courtesy, and a "we-mean-business" attitude; the employees were also required to be polite and discharge their duties to perfection. "What is important is that I have created an organization which has got a unique work culture and organizational values. The t am consists of bardworking, dedicated, and professionally competent people,"l5 said Sreedharan. The DMRC corporate culture was based on integrity. It was clear to the management at the DMRC that if the metm was to be built within the budget and on time, they would have to put in place effective contractawarding arrd procurernent processes in order to prevent cormption-the bane of most public sector projects in India. For this, the contract'awarding process was made ttansparent and simple. The procurement processes were made "fair and just" by removing almost all traces of subjectivity from tender evaluation. Planning the Project In India, major infrastructure projects are often stalled because of a lack of funds, political interference, lack of fhc DMRC aimed' to professionalism and accountability, property disputes, corruption, etc. Therefore, even before the commencement projeet an irnage of of the project, the DMRC attempted to put in place effective ffieienca courtes! ' a'nd a systems to ensure the smooth progress of the project. w e-ntean-bu si n;esI at titud'e Funding was not an issue in the case ofthe Delhi Metro with a team of project because it was settled even before the project hardworking, d.edieated, commenced, In order to steer clear ofpolitical interference, and professionally the DMRC sought autonomy on all major matters and cornpetent people the GoI promised to give it this autonomy. "Financial powers were vested in the Managing Director' AIso, the Managing Director was the last authority on tenders,"r6 said Anuj Dayal (Dayal), Chief Public Relations Olfrcer, DMRC. Next, the project manager put in place a system where every individual would be accountable for his/her role in the project. Each employee had to prepare a Detailed Project Report (DPR) with particulars regarding the work assigned and work completed each day and this was to be submitted to the respective supervisors. In case of deviations, the employee had to give reasons for the deviations and see that they were rectilied. Every Monday, the heads of departments had to meet to review progress, set new

targets, or revise targets, Great stress was laid on adherence to schedules and reverse clocks were to be used to indicate the number of days left before important deadlines. This kind of approach was unusual in public sector projects in India. Even though the project commenced three years later than originally planned, Sreedharan and his team decided to stick to the original deadline for the cornpletion of the Iirst phase, i.e., December 2005. "When the "Taking Metro to New Heights", www.hinduonnet.com, April 04, 2005. " 6 "On the Fast Track", www.tribuneindia.com, January 02' 2005.

government approved the project, it was envisaged that the metro would be completed in 10 years. Work should have started in 1995, but we didn't have an organization in place until 1997 so we were only able to begin work in April 1998. Nevertheless, we said, we would complete the first phase within seven years to meet the original target. This will be quite an achievement to build a metro from scratch within seven years,"t7 said Sreedharan, Like other major infrastructure projects in India, the Delhi Metro project too faced its share of property disputes. To ensure that these disputes did not hinder the progress of the project, the GoI enacted the Delhi Metro Railway (Operation & Maintenance) Act, 2002F or the Delhi Metro Act in 2002. The Act, which spelt out the rules for the local authorities, superseded the local municipal laws of Delhi. Also, lower courts were barred from issuing stay orders. This, to a large ertent, prevented property ownerg affected by the project from getting stay orders from courts to halt work on the project. In other cases, the DMRC engaged a team of lawyers to make sure that the courts did not grant such stay orders. In order to control costs, the total expenditure of.the Delhi Metro was split into three broad heads-manpower, To ensure th.at property enerry, and materials including maintenance. Each of disputes did not hind.er the these accounted for approximately one-third ofthe p roject cost. progress of the Delhi Metro project, the GoI To control manpower costs, DMRC enployed only 45 persons per kilometer of track-a number that was close enacted. the Delhi Metro to the international norm. Kolkata Metro, in contrast, Railway (Operation & had employed three times as many people. The Maintenance ) Act, 2002 organization was designed to be lean but effective. To keep down enerry costs, DMRC entered into a special agreement with the Delhi Transco Ltd-le to source powele for the project at a very low rate. DMRC used Primavera Project Planner 3.0'r for project planning and monitoring. The resource planning module ofthe software alerted users if there was an excess or shortage of resources and the cost planning module provided a complete cost break-up for the project. "First Section of the Delhi Metro to Open this Year", www.highbeam.con, January 03,2002. Prior to 2002, tlle Delhi Metro project caDrc under tlre Metro Railways (Constru ction and Worls) Act, 1978. The 1978 Act was elacted t facilitate the construction oft he

Calcutta (Kolkata) Metro. Since this Act covered only the construction stage of Metro Railways, the need for an exclusive Act for the Delhi Metro, covering oper ation and maintenance, was felt. Therefore, the Delhi Metro Act was enacted by the GoI in 2002. Delhi Transco Ltd. is the state-run transEtission utility for Delhi. The Delhi Metro project soulced its power from dilferent sources in order to ens ure continuous supply of power They are-Badarpur Thernral Power Station. Northern Region Electricity Board and NTPC Thermal Pos'er Station. The DMRC paid the Delhi Tlansco Rs. 4.80 per unit. Primavera Project Planner 3.0 software was developed by Primavera of the US, and supplied to the DMRC by KGL Systems which was a technical and marketing partner of Primavera in India.

The software allowed the DMRC to keep track of project activities, the quantum ofwork completed at different levels, the time lost or gained, etc. It also pmvided information of all critical and upcoming activities, making it possible to keep track of and reschedule activities wherever necessarJr. This was vital considering the loss incurred if one day of work was lost would amount to about Rs. 5 mn. In order to ensure quality in construction, the DMRC appointed a special quality assurance team independent of the field executives. Safety was a major concern. All personnel working at the construction site were required to wear helmets and other appropriate safety gear. The DMRC adopted a global bidding program for consultanry and contracts that required at least one Indian partner. This was done to facilitate technologr absorption by Indian firms and to ensr:re that the technolory was localized and reengineered. "One of the preconditions for any multinational company to bid for a Delhi Metro project is it should have an Indian partner,"22 said Dayal. The DMRC secured the best technology available To foailitate teehnology globally, for the Delhi Metro (See Exhibit III for features obnrptian by Ind.ian firms of the Delhi Metro). "We are proud to say that Delhi Metm and, to ensure thet the has the best and latest technolos. in the world, sourced from various countries. In fact, it would be appropriate technalog5t u)as locoli zed, to say that we are using tomorrow's technologr today,"a and reengineered, the said Sreedharan. Several multinational engineering DMRC adapted. o globol corporations from Australia, France, Germany, Japan, bidding progrom for Korea, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden worked on the project (See Exhibit IV for the names of the various companies cartaulta,nct, and contra cts involved in the project). A five.mernber consortium, called the General Consultants Group, was constituted in 1998 to prbvide overall consultancy for the project. This group included the Japanese frrms Pacifrc Consultants International (PCD, Japan Railway Technical Services, and Tonichi Engineering Consultants Inc., US-based Parson Brinkerhoff International Inc-, and RITES. The group was lead by PCI. Initially, there was disagreement between the IB and Sreedharan over the gauge to be adopted for the metro. Sreedharan was in favor of standard gauge,2a generally used in metro systems the world over, while the IR favored the broad gauge,25 the gauge used over most ofthe railway network

in India. Finally, the GoI intervened and asked the DMRC to adopt the broad gauge for the Delhi Metro. This confusion delayed the project by a few months. The work on utility diversion was undertaken much before the work on a particular section commenced. The DMRC followed a systematic :,, "Riding High in Delhi", usembassy.state.gov, July-August 2003. ! "Interview with E Sreedharan", www.indiainfolide.com, December 19, 2005. a The tracks in standard gauge are set 1435 Bm or 4 ft 8 1/2 inches apart. 5 The tracks in broad gauge are set 1680 mm or 5 ft 6 inches apart.

Exhibit lll: Outstanding Features of the Delhi Metro The Delhi Metro was considered an advanced MRTS, lt followed all the appropriate lndian and lnternational construction codes. Each metro train could seat 240 passen8ers with space for another 1,240 passenge rs to stand. Of the required 280 coaches, 60 were manufactured offshore in Korea and the other 2 20 coaches were to be manufaclured by progressive indigenization by BEML. The coaches were 3.2 m wide and made of lighh{eight stainless steel. The coach jnteriors were air-condilione d and fire resistant, Every coach was fitted with anti{ollision devices conformint to inter national standards. Centralized Automatic Train Control (CATC) comprising Automatic T.ain Operation (ATO), Automatic Train Protection {ATP), and Automatic Train Signalling (ATS) systems w as installed on the Delhi Metro. The ATO was mostly used on the underground section. The ATP sys tem applied automatjc brakes on lrains and brought them to a dead halt when train drivers we nt too fasi or 8ot too close to anothertrain. This system made the Delhi Metrc very safe even when more than 256 trains trave,ed on any lineTicketing in the Delhi Metro was fully automatic. Contactless stored value smart cards served the plrpose of tickets for metm passengeG. The entire fare collection system was mon itored through a central computer in the ope tional control center of ihe DMRC. Communications equipment on the Delhi Metro consisted of a transmission system w ith fiberglass cables, a train radio system enabling communication between the metro trains and the operations controlcenter, an internal telephone system, a public-address system forthe individual stationt and the power supplies for the various communications equipment. A fully automatic computerized syttem i.e., SCADA system isupervisory Control an d Data Acquisition System) was used for controlling the power supply. The system could detect faults and rectify them within seconds. The power for runningtrains as wellas for all t he stations ofthe 11 km underground section r:ame lhrough a feed from the New Delhi CIS sub-statio n-

The station air<onditioninS and ventilation system in tunnels were designed to m eet the rigorous climatic condjtions of Delhi (temperature is maintained around 29qC). lls reve6i ble ventilation fans were designed to keep passengers cool while the automatic fire doors ensure d their safety. Also, all coaches were provided wilh emergency batteries that provided lighting and ventilation in case of power failurc. There were escalators and accessible elevators at all stations, with tactile tiles to guide the visually impaired from outside the stationg to the trains. Al l entrances of the metro gtations were controlled through automatic flap gates through which 45 to 60 passengers colld enter per minute. The security systems on Delhi Melro were comparable to the best transport system s in the world. All stations were fitted with CCTV cameras and suryeillance systems. The trains system also had "in+uilt safeguards' against any tenorist attack. Even though X-ray machines wer e installed at some stations, manual f.isking qf passengerc was also done as it was considered more'effedive". All metro stations also had their own police force called the Metro Police. Since Delhj is an earthquake prone area, the elevated and underground sections o f the Metro were constructed to withstand extreme seismic stress. Allstations we fitted with seismic senso6 to wam of imPendins earthquakes. C,inpiled hotr' vaious s)r<Es process wherein the concerned consortium surveyed the area for the utilities (water pipes, sewer, power cables, etc.) to be diverted and submitted a wdtten repori to the DMRC. The DMRC in turn forwarded it to the concerned utility bodies, which completed the work within a prescribed period. The DMRC decided to adopt construction technologies that would help it make up for lost time. These included trench-less digging and the use of pre-fabricated/precast concrete26 blocks and ballastless tracks." The use Precast concrete was generally prepared by casting concrete in reusable molds in a controlled environment. Later, it would be transported to the constmction sife a nd set into place. It generally was of higher quality and cheaper than tmditional c oncrete. Ballast, consisting of gravel and cinders, usually form the track bed on which r ailway sleepers are laid. In ballastless tracks, tracks are placed on concrete without sleepeN or ballast being used. Ballastless tracks are mainly used on high speed lines an d in tunnels.

Exhibit lV: Companies lnvolved in the Project ceneral consultants Croup Rolling Stock Alternating Current (AC) propulsion system, jnstallation and control system for rolling stock Centralized Automatic Train Control Fare Collection System Communications Equipment SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) System Maintenance Activiiies 4 km stretch {Vishwa Vidyalaya to Kashmere Cale) 7 kms (Kashmere Cate to Central Secretariat) Pacific Consultants lnternational (PCl), JapanRailway Technical Services, and To nichi Engineering Consultants lnc. (all three belong to lapan), Parson Brinkerhoff lnternational lnc. (USA and RITES (lndia). Mitsubishi Corp. iJapan) and KORoS (renamed ROTEM) (Korea) and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. Mitsubishi Electric Corp. 0apan). Al$om Transport Ltd. (lndia), Alstom 5A {France), Alcatel SA (PortuSal), and Sumitomo Corp. 0apan). Thales-etransactions CCA, SA {France) Siemens Ltd. (Cermany). Alcatel (France). Cobra SA and Eliop SA, (both of Spain) and IRCON lnternataonal Ltd. (lndia). Kumagai Cumi (Japan), skanska {Sweden), Itochu (,apan), and Hindustan Conslruction Company (lndia). Dyckerhoff Widmann AC (Cermany), L&T (lndia), Samsung Corp. (Korea), Shimizu Corp. 0apan), and IRCON lntemational Ltd. Cotnpiled hom vatious sout s

of ballastless tracks also minimized maintenance costs, reduced vibration, and provided greater riding safety and comfort for passengers. Project Implementation Construction work on the project commenced on October 1, 1998. The entire project was divided into three lines. Further, these lines were divided into sections (Refer Table III for details of Phase I of the Delhi Metro project). Line 1 (Shahdara to Rithala) The work on Phase I commenced with the Shahdara-Tis Hazari section of Line 1, covering a distance of about eight kilometers. The work involved utility divers'tons, barricading, and actual civil constrrrction. A major part of this section was on elevated tracks. All tracks in the elevated corridor were laid on concrete (ballastless). The tracks were supported on single piers. The elevated viaducts had a height of 10 m and were built generally in the middle of the roads. The tracks were fenced with 10 ft high concrete slabs with barbed circular wire on top to prevent trespassing. The section where the metro crossed over the river Yamuna was constructed first because the densitv

Table lll: Details of Phase I Particulars Sections Character Length, Stations Opened on Line 1 (Shahdara to Shahdara to Tis Hazari Elevated and 7.92 km, at-grade. 6 stations 25/1212002 Rithala) Tis Hazari to lnder Lok 4.74 km, 4 stations O4/10/2OO3 tnder Lok to Rithala 9.40 km, B stations 01104/2004 Total 22.06 krm, 1B dations Line 2 (Vashwa Vishwa Vidyalaya Vidyalaya to to Kashmere Cate Underground 4 km,4 stations 20112/2004 Central Secretariat) Kashmere Cate to 7 km,6 stations 0310712005 Central secretariat Tolal 11 kms, 10 stalions Line 3 (Barakhamba Barakhamba to to Dwaraka) Dwaraka Elevated and At Crade with a rhort 22.79 kms, 22 stations 31/1212005 With extensions to Line 3. Dwaraka- Subcity Dwaraka underground section 6.5 kms, 6 stations 01/0412006 Baaakhamba to where it joins 2.Bl kms, Expected to lndraprastha Line 2. 3 stations tle completed in September 2A)6. Total 32.1 kms,31 stations Total lentlh of Phase I 65.15 kms, 59 stations Sou rce: www.del h i rnel.rctai l.con

of traffic was projected to be the highest on this route. Building across the river Yamuna was completed by using a special technique called "incremental launching"'3. The use of this method caused minimum disturbance to traffic. This was also expected to provide a smoother journey for commuters because of lack ofjoints. Line 1 also included a short section which was built at-grade. Line 1 became completely operational with the inauguration of the Inder Lok to Rithala section in April 2004. Line 2 (Vishwa Vidyalaya to Central Secretariat) Line 2 of Phase I covered 11 km and was cornpletely underground. Of this, a 4 km stretch (Vishwa Vidyalaya to Kashmere Gate) was constructed by Kumagai Gumi of Japan, Skanska of Sweden, Itochu of Japan, and Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) of India using the "cut and cover"2e method. The work for the remaining 7 km (Kashmere Gate to Central Secretariat) began in April 2001 and was handled by M/s International Metro Civil Contractors (IMCC),3o a joint venture of 6 In incremental launching, segments of the bridge were precast and then were launched in place with the hetp of special low-friction sliding beadngs with lat eral guidesa This is a simple method ol excavation for building tunnels-In this process, a trench is dug and is later roofed over, with strong supporting beams to prevent roof collapse. s IMCC comprised Dyckerhoff Widmann AG (DYWIDAG) (Germany), Larsen and Toubro (India), Samsung Corporation (Korea), Shimizu Corporation (Japan), and Ircon International (India).

five companies. Of this section, 4 km involved underground tunneling which was done using fully-automated, high performance boring machines. The remaining 3 km were constructed using the 'cut and cover' method. This section of Line 2 was completed eight months ahead of schedule. The tunneling started in August 2002 and was completed by September 2004. Different tlpes of machines were used for tunneling, depending on the soil conditions. For a distance of 4 km between Kashmere Gate and Patel Chowk, Rock Tunnel Boring Machines (TBM) and Earth Pressure Balance Machines3' (EPBM), purchased from Bangkok Metro,32 were used for tunneling. To further speed up the process of tunneling, the DMRC used the New Austrian Tunneling Method33 (NATM). This method provided temporary support to the rock by means of shotoetesa and rock bolts till permanent concrete was used (Refer Exhibit V for more about the tunneling process). The twin tunnels for up and down movement of trains were made using high quality reinforced concrete. The finished internal diameter of these tunnels was 5.7 meters. cir!.t t t{ar Co!![ugfll D.lt llhr a5-D{rt FltG. chr.t i.t Coqll ughr OaaSl t rr Bt , Ot{ r.!a3a EPBX Son &tt I l3l,.tds<t, I r{Ar* &r. C ,.OGI b gOiLlO X.r... > 3aa Lo.r. 2 5a.{ X.t r! 26622 LLr. d 9ta.8(' l..t tr r( 3Ag X.{.r. '. *-*-aenime*r6ra{-cor" The completion of tunneling was a major milestone for the Delhi Metro project in view of the tricky ground conditions and the requirement to ensure complete safety of the buildings in the vicinity. Most of the buildings in that area had shallow foundations. The DMRC therefore undertook a "condition survey" of each building and strengthened the foundations of ftt". nlnlf i" . typ" of Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM). It is generally used when bodng below the water table. The cutter head is pressurized with either fluid or air to balance the water pressure. EPBM op rators generally had to undergo intensive training including passing through decompression chambers like deep sea divers' Bangkok Metro was constructed by the Mass Rapid Transit Authority (MRTA) of Thailand and operated by Bangkok Metro Public Company Limited (BMCL) under a 2s-year concession. NATM used the geological stress of the rock mass in the tunnel to stabilize the

tunnel. An optimal cross-section IDas computed using geotechnical measurements' Shotcrete was used, immediatety after excavation, to create a natural load-beari ng ring in the tunnel which also minimized rock deformation. Shotcrete (sprayed concrete) generally used compressed air to shoot concrete ont o surfaces. It was generally used in vertical str-uctures, rock surfaces or for ro ck suppoft during tunneling activities

the weak buildings. This was all the more important as the tunneling activity was carried out in areas with very old buildings, some even dating back to the l?d Century Mughal Empire. "The new underground section was the most diltrcult and formidable stretch of Phase-I of the metro. We had to preserve the architectural heritage of old Delhi and the character of Lutyen's Delhi,"36 said Sreedharan. The metro underground tunnel was expected to have a life of 120 years. The frrst 4 km section of Line 2 between Viswa Vidyalaya and Kashmere Gate became operational in December 2004. The line's linal ? km section opened in July 2005. Line 2 was completed within the budget and nine months ahead of the contracted schedule. Line 3 (Barakhamba to Dwaraka Sub-city) The work on Line 3 started in February 2003. In April 2004, the GoI and the DMRC decided to extend Line 3. This led to the addition of about 9 km and nine metro stations to Line 3. With the extension, the total length of Phase I increased to 65.16 km (13.01 km Metro corridor and The elevated track 52.15 km Rail Corridor). The scheduled completion date nte@suring 23 km ot the of this phase was also revised from end 2005 to March Boja Gard.en crossing 2006. The revised cost of Phase I of the Delhi Metro was becanne the longest metro estimated to be Rs. 105.71 bn, which excluded the cost of the Dwarka sub-city extension (Rs. 3.20 bn) which section in the world. to be was to be funded by the Delhi Development Authority put in to seruiee ot one go (DDA). Over the course of the Delhi Metro project, the Indian partners-especially RITES-in the consortiums acquired several capabilities. This gave the DMRC and RITES the confidence to manage the construction of Line 3 on their own even though the stretch passed through somei of the most congested areas of Delhi. Moreover, some changes were incorporated in Line 3 to cut down on costs as well as on time to make the facility more user-friendly. For example, Line 3 used U-shaped girders36 in constructing most of the elevated sections. These were believed to be cost-effective, aesthetic, and sound absorbent. Also, cement waa replaced with steel at many places in order to save time. The Baralhamba-Dwarka Metro section was inaugurated on December 31, 2005. This section was elevated or at-grade with a short underground section in central New Delhi that intersected with Line 2 at Connaught Place. At that place, the track was at a depth of 16 rneters. It gradually rose to a height of 10.5 meters. It was constructed at a 37o gradient, which meant that the track rose by 3 meters for every 100 meters traveled horizontally. This section was completed in 30 months. The elevated track

reached a maximum height of 17.5 meters at Raja Garden crossing, where "New Underground Section of Delhi Metrc Idaugurated", www.outlookindia.com, July 02, 2005. A girder is a support bearn used in construction. Tracks were laid on girders ac ross elevated sections, especially bridges.

it crossed over an existing flyover. It also became, at 23 km, the longest metro section in the world to be put to service at one go. In April 2006, the extension line from Dwarka to Dwarka sub-city was inaugurated. As more land was available in this section, the metro tracks were supported not on a single large pier but on two smaller circular piers placed side by side with a small foundation. This also meant that no buildings had to be demolished or people displaced as in the construction of the other lines. All the work on Line 3 was completed by April 2006, except for the Barakhamba to Indraprastha section, which was expected to be completed by September 2006. Managing the Stakeholders in the Project Effective project management involved not only completing tlre pmject on schedule and within the budget, but also managing the project's stakeholders. The stakeholders included the governments, the contractors, Effectioe project the funding agencies, and the general public. n,anagernent inuolaed nnt only eornpleting the Despite assurances that the DMRC would enjoy autonomy, it faced political pressure not only in its ptoject on sehedule and recruitment processes, promotions, and contract u:ithin the bud.get, ;but also awarding but also in land acquisition. However, the nxan@ging the project's DMRC resisted this pressure. "...we never changed any staheholders decision simply because somebody wants it. If it was required technically or frorn a professional angle, yes, we do it. Not because anybody wants it,"37 said Sreedharan. The DMRC also ensured that it paid the contractors, whom it called "associates,' on time. It was able to complete most of the project within the budget mostly by liniting comrption. "The contractors are grateful not to have to give bribes to get a project,"33 said Sreedharan' Because of the cordial relationship that the DMRC was able to establish with the contractors, they worked harder to help the DMRC in its project activities. In fact, the project was frnished ahead of schedule on certain sections because of the suggestions given by the contracto$ on utility diversion altd surface road tra{frc management. Considering that the Delhi Metro was constructed mostly with Japanese funds, DMRC put in special efforts to maintain good relations with JBIC offrcials.'It made it a point to invite JBIC officials to the inauguration events of various metro sections. The DMRC also tried to ensure that the project did not cause much inconvenience to the general public. It faced and overcame challenges of

relocating a large number of utilities like water pipes, sewerage lines, telephone and electric cables, to facilitate the construction work. It ensured t "Politicians Know I Cannot be Maneuvered", www.rediff com, March 10, 2006 "Elattuvalapil Sreedharan, Getting New Delhi on Track", www.time.com, 2003.

that all these utilities were diverted in advance, so that there was no intermption of services during the construction of the metro in a paxticulax area. It organized community interaction programs to inform and seek solutions from the public. "We have a community meeting to exprlain what we will do, what problems are likely to arise for them, and to seek their help. We have publicized a telephone help line number so that anyone with a problem or question can contact us,"3e s 'd Sreedharan. The DMRC also faced the diffrcult task of relocating the peoplee evicted from properties acquired for the project. It built temporary accommodations for the people who were to be relocated. With the Delhi Metro Act coming into force, the DMRC faced very few legal problems in acquiring properties. About 400 caries were frled against the DMRC on this issue, out of which only 100 were pending as of 2006. Of these, most were for augmenting the assessed value of the property, and the compensation to be paid. "One of our main achievements has been our ability to acquire land and nove people without any major problems, whereas this is normally a very sensitive issue in India,"4l said Sreedharan. In order to lessen the difficulties for rnotorists and pedestrians, alternate tralfic plans for the roads affected by the construction work were prepared well in advance, with the assistance of the Indian Institute of Technologr, Delhi. When the construction began, barricades were put up x'ith assistance from Delhi Traflic Police. Moreover, new roads were built or the existing roads widened to accommodate traflic before work actually started. The DMRC also tried to ensure that the construction of the Delhi Metro did not damage the environment. It pursued enyironmental and safety objectives during the construction and operation of the Metro by seeking and receiving the appropriate ISO certifrcations. In 2003, the ISO 140014' Environmental Management certification was achieved on two sections during the construetion phase itself. In addition, in 2004, Delhi Metro obtained the OHSAS 180014 certifrcation for its environment, occupational health, and safety management system. "First Section of the Delhi Metro to Open this Year", www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002. The people who had to be evicted were generally the ones who owned properties or houses along the intended metro tracks. The project involved the removal of 30 slums, and 4,000 structures, which included several small businesses. "First Section of the Delhi Metro to Open this Year", www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002. ISO 14001 environment management standards help organizations minimize the adverse effects of their operation processes on the environment. These standards are flexible and can be applied to any organization producing any product or ser vice

at any place in the world. The Ne\a'York Metro is the only other metro to obtain this certification. The OHSAS 18001 certification is a part of BSI's (a leading business service provider) Health & Safety Electronic Book. The certification was created through the efforts of a number of the world's leading national standards bodies, certif rcation bodies, and specialist consultancy groups. It is compatible with both the ISO 90 01 and ISO 14001 management systems standards.

The DMRC ensured that the construction sites were entirely covered, with no soil or tlirt being allowed to spread outside. Trucks carried away debris antl clugout soil during the night. The construction site was also totally concealed from public view and all vehicles going out of the site were washed at the entrance. During the construction stage, special efforts were made to minimize construction noise and pollution. The DMRC used silent generators at work sites arrd also used light shields to reduce glare from work lights at night. The DMRC took measures to dispose of waste water from the construction sites in an enYironmentally-friendly manner' It initiated a program to plant new saplings along the route of the metro, to replace the i"""" ttt"t hatl been cut down during the project. It also included the provision of rain-water harvesting'! facilities as part of its station construction contract, as a measure to conserve water' Project Evaluation The successful completion of the project effectively silenced the critics who had been skeptical about the ability of an Indian public sector organization to complete any project, let alone one as complex and costly as the Delhi During th.e Metro, on time and within the budget. The DMRC stuck construction sta'ge' to its completion targets throughout the project and even speci@l efforts were Iinished some sections ahead of schedule. The extension tnode to minimize work (on a 2.8 krns stretch) on Phase I was progressing smoothly and was expected to be completed by September construction noise 2006. and. pollution DMRC was expected to save Rs' 6-7 bn on the project' "The project completion cost is Rs. 10,570 cr (Rs' 105'70 bn). We have not spent that much. Now the project is practically over. My own assessment is we will definitely save about it*. ooo o to Rs. ?00 cr (Rs. 6 bn to Rs. ? bn) on the project cost,"6 said Sreedharan. This was in contrast to the cost escalation seen in most public sector projects in Intlia. The DMRC was successful in keeping the cost of the project at US$32-53 mn per kilometer. In comparison' the Bangkok Metro Lad incurred costs of US$56-80 mn per kilometer' Outlook The Delhi Metro was expected to play a major role in relieving the transport

problems faced by the city's residents. Moreover, with the GoI planning extensions to the Metro, it appeared that the benefits of an effrcient ffithe metro stations was to be di'erted through the drain pipes to settlement/filtration tanks where the water was cleaned, before being allowed to flow into borewells below the stations' 6 "Dethi Metro has Become the Symbol of India's Progress", wwwrediffcom, March 13, 2006.

Exhibit Vlll: Operational Aspects of the Delhi Metro Project Phase I A study of the operational aspects of different metrc network of the world Save the DMRC inputs to run the Delhi metro. Within the short period that it had been function inS, the Delhi Metro set new operational efficienry standards. lt became one of the few railway systems in the world to rccord a punctuality level of over 99",6 in train operations. The t rains operated at intervals of three to five minutes beh^r'een 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. ln 2003, the DMRC signed an agreement with the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) , Delhi's bus operator, for the introduction of about 200 shuttle buses to move pe ople to and from railway stations. ln the early days of the Delhi Metro, there was a near stamp de to get onto the tr ains. People iostled with each other, refused to stand in queue, did not return the tokens, t ore up the seats, spat inside the coaches and even pulled the emergency chains without reason. The DMRC educated passengers on appropriate behavior in trains as well as imposed Penalti es to rectify their behavior. It also conducted programs to teach passengers how to enter and exit the coaches properly. The DMRC laid a lot of emphasis on commercial propeny development in the meko st ation complexes to earn higher nonaperating revenues. As of 2006. almost 20% of the an nual revenues of the DMRC came from these sources. Moreover, the DMRC had a system to rationalize its fare structure so that the Delhi Metro earned more per passenger without affecting passeng$ numbers. The maximum expenditure, about 23Yo, was incurred on salary. wages, and other employee costs. Prrticnlars 2004"0s 2003-04 (Rs. in mn) (R5. in mn) Revenue (income from operations, consuhancy and 720 rentals from propenies) Expenditure (be{ore depreciation and intercst on loans) s20 Loss after adding depreciation, interest and other costs 760 320 Canpiled twn vaious soutcE and remodeled it to suit the requirements of the broad gauge track. Even after delivery the rolling stock had to go to Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) in Bangalore for fitment before it was ready for operations in Delhi, thus delaying the deployment of rakes. "We cannot increase the frequency further than that due to the shortage of trains (rake),"a? said Satish Kumar (Kumar), Director (Rolling Stock and Electricals), DMRC. Similarly, the process of indigenization of the coaches was also not yet

complete. Another challenge that the DMRC faced was the severe dearth of parking facilities at its metro stations. Many of its parking lots were full and in some areas, the municipal authority that owned the land around the metro stations did not allot it sufficient space for parking facilities. To deal with this problem, the DMRC initially considered building multiIevel parking facilities near its stations. However, the idea was dropped owing to its prohibitively high cost. Instead, the DMRC sought to introduce more shuttle buses to and from the stations, to solve the parking problem (Refer Exhibit VIII for more information on operational aspects of DMRC). The DMRC earned revenues of Rs. 1.50 bn in the financial year ended March 2006, in comparison to the Rs. 720 mn it had earned the previous year It planned to repay the Japanese loan from 2007. Moreover, it expected to earn additional income by providing consultancy services to organizations and cities, both in India and overseas. Sreedharan said 4 "Crowded Days Alead for Delhi Metro", wwwhindu.com, Julv 18, 2006.

"DMRC has also been approached by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, S1'ria, and Iran for setting up metro systems in their countries."as {t Namratha V Praead, Former Research Associate, The lcfai Center for Manage Eft nesearch (ICMR) So,ahin Gouind' Fatulty Associate, The lcfai Center for Management Research (ICMB) SS George, Director, The Icfai Center for Management Research (ICMR). References 1. Chand.an Mitra, Delhi is Finally a Metro, wuw.dail5pioneer.com, JuIy 10, 2006. 2. Mawjit Saha, Metro RaiI will be o Chcap Modc of Ttansportation, www.proiectsnlonitor.com, July 06, 2006. 3. Rajat Guho, Govt to Give Metros a Free Run, Under Common Code, www.economictimes.indiatimes.com, June 23, 2006. 4. Gaurqv Viuek Bhatnagar, Crowdcd' Days Ahead for Delhi Metro' www.thehindu.com, June 18, 2006. 5. Sudipta Sengupta, Delhi Metro Reprta Loases for 2nd Year in a Raw, www-merinewscorry May 26, 20066. Vqnd.qna Gombar, Ie the Delhi Metro a Costly Mistake? www.rediff.com, furil 03, 2006. 7. Missinn 202O: Delhi Metro Mnust Coaer 40O km' www.thehind.ubusinessline.com, March 23, 2006. 8. Archana Masih, Politicions Know I Cannot be Maneuaered, wuw.red,iff.com, March 10, 2006g. Delhi Metrc Chief Srcedharon in US Top 25 Newstnakers List' www-ibef.org, January 12, 2006. 10. How KLG Systel i8 Keeping Tlaak of Delhi Metro Corporation' Mukta Magazine, www.klgsystelcom, 2006' 11. Shekh&r Gupta, For the Record: Tolking with E Sreedharan, www.ind,ianexpress.com, November 18, 2003. 12. DMRC All Set to Complete First Section of Phase III' www-thehind.u.com Ocnber 06, 2005. 13. Urban T?ansit: The Challznges, www.d'eccanherald.com, June 27, 2005. a "Taking Metro to New Heights", www.hinduonnet.com, April 04' 2005. Case Folio 83 March 2007

14. Amelia Gentleman, Delhi Delighted with Its New Metro, www.iht.com, March 12, 2005. 15. Bamesh Ramachandran, On the Fast Tlach, www.tribuneind.ia.com, January 02, 2005. 16. Delhi Metro Rail...2,iOO Less Buaes on Roads! www.indiainfoline.com, January 03, 2003. 17. RC Acharya, Nl Set for Delhi Metro Flag-off, w w w. thehindubusine s sline. com, December 2 3, 2002. 18. Delhi Metro o Sytnbol of Indo-Jopanexe friend.ship, www.cities,expressindia,com, December 25, 2002. 19. Ajita Shashidhar, Delhi Metro b n tise Funds through Realty Development, u)wu.blonnet,com, November 04, 2002. 2 0. ww w. d.el himetrot(til.con 21. www.urbantransit.net 22. www.irfca.org 23. www.blonnet.com 24. www.wikipedia.com 25. www.pbworld..com Reference # 14M-2007-03:06-02 Form lV 1. P{aceotpublicatjon i Hyderaba.l 2. Penodicjtyofibpublicalign : Monil& 3. RintelsNam : ENMunhy Naiionali9 : Indian (a) Whetha a citizen oflndia? : Yes Addre$ : # 52 . Nagarjuna Hils, hnjasutta. Hyd rabad -500 082. 4 Publisha'sNarne : ENMunhy Naiionality r lnd'an {a) Whether a ciiten oflndia? : Ya Mdr6s i # 52 , Nagarjuna HiIs. hnjasutta. Hydenbad -500 082. 5 EditolsName : ENMurthy Naiionaliiy : lndian Yes (a) tvheiha a citiren oflndia? : Addre$ : # 52, Nasarjuna Hi[s, hnjasutta. Hyderabad -500 082. 6

Name and address s of indi./iduals who own the newspap r and holding more than one p erc nt of ihe toiat capital -The lnstitute ot Chart r d Financtal Analysls ol lndla, The lcfai Univ Gity, # s2, Nasadlma Hllls, Pantagutfr, Hyd rabad -5O0 082. I, E N Munhy. heretnj dsclare fiat the padiddaG gi\ n above are true to the best o i my knov,ledse and b Ief. Date sd/March, 2007 Signature of Publlsher