/

//J

-;:-_ - 7--,4,/

DOTIFAAICT-87110
FAA Technical Atlantic Center Airport

City International

N.J. 08405

Summary Report--FullScale Transport Controlled Impact Demonstration Program

_NASA-TR-89642) FULL-SCALE TRANSPOR_ CONTROLLED IMPACt DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM Final Summary Report _N&SA) 82 p AvaiL: NTIS HC AOS/MF A01 CS&L '3|C G3/03

N88-

100 21

Unclas 010_537

September Final Report

1987

This document is available to the U.S. public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

US.Deportment Federal

of Transportation Administration

Aviation

NOTICE This document is disseminat:ed under the sponsorship the DepartmenC of TransporCat:ion in the interest of information exchanse. The United States Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof. of

The United States C_overnmenC does not: endorse produces or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturer's names appear herein solely because they are considered essent:ial Co the object of this report.

TABL2" Pae vii

h>IECIITIVE

S1)DiARY

] ._IT RODUClTI

ON

15Li:k '/:- otmd r ! U't')< P&N MANACENEb;T

'rechnica]
){P, P, <q _ 501,1 f! I1 [-

t,, ,,r..,'.-,

]"IA.'.i.,\(;}ii_il'h'gT 4

J'n r t: J c [ p,'nu t,': ]' f:{ )(; i',AN t I >11' !, i(HE E TAT ] O N Ai r('ra _t rntegratJcm, aT,J Checko_ tt!

"](_ tvt !,b;pe Cround }-] J ght I>};ACT

r ime l_ t s / ,qy ,_t c-r.,_ Operat Ope_:a 5.on_ t :i on s

(, ]

SCENARIO

]%

Impact [ l,q)a c t !,'>, iNENT f)}-k (S)

Sceng)ri Scol_a zio

c,

(}']nrmed) (Actual) t'E}_ F()R,_{A} , ( E

/SYSTEMS

.',.1;t:ii:_.qt_n (?rashwor Cah[o F1_',;1._t ?'ll>d_t }laz:lrdoll,'; ])ata

L Kerc_:_erlu tb_ne.q._:,./St-t'uct_-._ Safety; :_.nd .Materin]s

(AT,IF) ] /Res't taint

",r _,

l'{re Data

!e>:f)v_:f,*enc,< Cockpit Vo[c'e Pacl::_e.< S.y,_tem Coptra] S_stem System L <') 6 Po('orJc.r:-' Lc, c:,tc_-,: TYr,._:r,[)-(:,,: <,) ) < !.',ecnrder!Flecr.rtu_i,:

Tncident

Acqu]s]t_on/])he)tograpl_{c Piloted VehJc].e/F]J_bt

]{emote]y

F]J.}j]It S;)[et}f/F]J_ht i:(.:(;]NEERING IHOFt.(,P,,',} ^ >I.].C/V ' q-' ' '

Termin,qtJc_71 !DE(3 CO_'ERACiI<

I Ce

.... , ,,H

F].?F

RESCUE

S ]

[,(',,;.;'i-T._4PACT

(AC{:iI)},2,I

q'')

fN'Y),IS'CTtIA'I

]()F,/I_NA12%q

I ._"

!2.I;,R(IENCY

!,:VACi_IAT]

O}', ])ATA

(?h;I:RVAq'] (]<t_

tRI_OEIDIN_ pAGE BLANK NOT FILIV'_

iiJ

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

(Continued)

REFERENCES APPENDICES A -B -C D --Participants CID Documents System Flight Index Jet-A/AM]< Plans Report List and Bui]dup Schedules Plan

Degrader Typical CID

E -F --

Pilot/Crew

Distribution

iv

LIST Figure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 CID/Boeing 720 Site Site

OF IM,USTRATIONS Page
O i

Impact/Slideout Actual Wing Visual Main Impact Openers Target Control

g In

Alignment Room

Fence

In

Spectrum CID Impact Impact

Analysis Flight Sequence

Facility Profiles

12 15 18 21

9 10 ll 12 !3 14 15 16 17 18 19

CID AMK

B]ending System Installation

Engine/Degrader Engine/Degrader Degrader Interior Dummy Control

23
_O

Pane]

24 26 27

Configuration

Installation Structural Galley Response

Aircraft Forward Aft

_O

Installation

30

Galley

7nstal]atJon Compartments Fire Blocking Layers Epoxy Epoxy Windows Windnws (with frame)

JJ

Overhead Seats

31 ?4 36 37 38 Recorder Package Locator 40 41

with

21 22 23 24 05

Burn-Through Burn-Through Tritium Digital Light Flight

Resistant Resistant Device Data

(individual)

U.S. Navy Flight Transmitter

Incident

Recorder/Electronic

LIST Figure 26 Close-Up of Transmitter Simulated DAS Main Incident

OF

ILLUSTRATIONS

(Continued) Page

Recorder/Electronic

Locator

41

27 28 29 3O 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 48 41

Hazardous Pallet Subsystem Subsystem

Cargo

42 44 44 45

Recorder Checkout

Camera/Photo RPV Ground

Floodlight Cockpit

Installation

45 47

Flight U.S. NASA U.S. Remote Remote CFR

Control Navy P.3

Uplink/Downl_nk "Cast-A-Glance" Helicopter

Rack

Installat_on

4a 49 _0

Aircraft

Photographic Army

Photographic

Helicopter Tracker Setup 57 5_

L.

Cine-Setant Camera Station

53 Accident Damage Investigation 55 57

Post-Impact CID Fire

LIST

OF

TABLES

Table 1 Original Project Schedule Project History Schedule -Installation and Flight

Page 6

and

Schedule

vi

EXECUTIVE

S_MARY

Planning in July

for 1980. The

the

Full-Scale aircraft full dress on March

Transport experiments rehearsal 7, 1984.

Controlled and took systems place

Impact

Demonstration began 1984, and

(CID) in

bega_

The

integration February 29,

December the CID

1983. aircraft

first first

flew

In the

all

there

were piloted at made

14

manned CID

test

flights took

prior off -on

to its

CID. final 120

On

December and the

I,

]984,

remotely

aircraft AFB,

flight days of

impact target date

demonstration committment

Edwards to

California in 1980.

within

Congress

This flown

was

the

first

time by

that remote and AMK

four-engine it

jet was on to fuel A.

aircraft also the

(Boeing first time

720) that

had an

been

successfully was flown flight operated CID data on did

control, successfully was used

aircraft In previous

solely tests, on not

antimistJng one engine,

kerosene while

fuel the

(AMK).

other

engines The

had

conventional perform as

Jet planned, and

complex

however, crashworthiness data the was their a

the

results

provided

much Tbe cabin

valuable fire The

the

antJmisting in CID

fuel provided

experi_ents. to extensive Aeronautics accident. find$_gs Materials fire

safety Federal

experiments Aviation (NASA) the two

little and CID on

due National

damage. Space

Administration concluded agencies to on the Science that

(FAA) the

and On of

Administration April joint of the 2, CID 1985,

survlvab]e pre]Imlnary and

reported Transportation, and

the

undertaking Committee

Aviatio,,

Subcommittee

House

Technology.

Overall highest control

observation professional vehicle and The

and

impression by the

of

the

CID CID

operation team. test Tbe

was

that

it team,

was

at

the

level

entire

ground

remote room (support

lab/cockpit Air NASA, in Force FAA, this

team, support DOD, effort.

aeronautical (i.e., industrly, ground,

range, tower, team

control CFR, etc.) be

operations), flawlessly. their

performed for

etc.,

must

complimented

performance

vii

INTRODUCTION The Full-Scale Transport Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID) Programwas a joint Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)research effort conducted on December], 1984, at the NASA-Ames/Drydenlight Research Facility (NASA-A/DFRF),EdwardsAir Force Base, F Ca]ifornla. This Summary Report is a deliverable product supporting the program Mamagement Plan. It delineates a summaryof the total CID experiments, instr_Jmentstion/data acquisition, telemetry, remotely pi]oted vehicle/flight control system (RPV/FCS), systems integration, flight operations, impact demonstration, post-lmpact investigation, and "quick-look"/prelimlnary data results. Detailed technics] reports are scheduled to be prepared by the FAAand NASA.
BACKGROUND.

In jet

1980,

tile

FAA

planned to

to

conduct

controlled the

impact

of of

a the

typical

modern

day

transport (AMK) that a

aircraft fuel test

demonstrate While magnitude the logical efforts basis that

effectiveness the support AMK

antlmlstlng it became

kerosene obvious experiments initiatives. cabin fire

concept. of would this be

planning could for

experiment, various actions other or

research research and

which It safety

regulatory

long-term

appeared research

crashworthiness/structursl/restraint benefit from such a _mpact

could

demonstration.

Therefore, experimentation Center CID AMK,

the

FAA and

invited flight provided

NASA

to

participate of this

in test.

and

support The

the

crashworthiness Research and the vehicle/ flight and test test by

operations the

NASA-Langley Instrumentation supported piloted and

(NASA-LaRC) data

structural (DAS). safety

crashwortblness The NASA-A/DFRF remote]y

program

acqlsitlon and and system data

systems cabin f_re acquisition

crashworthiness,

experiment

integration,

instrumentation, flight analysis. control the

integration; and

(RPV/FCS) impact

design

development; and data

ground

operations;

subsequent

demonstration;

reduction

The

Full-Scale of

Transport FAA for of this and AMK,

CID NASA

Program exhaustive

was

developed laboratory,

and

primarily

based and fire is to

on

culmination tests

simulation, and cabin

development safety. provide action. The the

conducted

crashworthy

design and the for

features, other test

consummation evidence,

demonstration and

efforts of

specifications,

criteria

consideration

ru]emaking

The range

aircraft design features

(figure which and

I)

was

typical

4-englne service in are

jet the

(Boeing mld-1960's, to

720)

intermediate but and its physics]

entered

airline B-707,

design airframe

construction (i.e.,

practices DC-8,

common A-300

U.S. etc.).

foreign

manufacturers

B-757,

The and were under

CID data

aircraft acqisition

contained systems and Current

the to new and

necessary support generation

systems, the AMK, flight

components, crashworthiness, data and cockpit packages and

instrumentation, and voice were _irborne) fire safety recorders located were

experiments. installed. the

Passive area B720 for to

benign test.

hazardous The

materials (ground

galley in the

this provide

RPV/FCS controlled

integrated

remote

air-to-surface

impact.

DRIb-'INALpA,b'_IS OF pOOR QUALITY

,/

FIGURE

I.

CID/BOEING

720

Engineering ground) flight Basically, tbat the The

high-speed provided the

motion necessary

picture, internal was

video, and provided

and external in

still data of

cameras

(airborne

and A control. than and

documentatJcn. loss cf remote other

safety the

termination B-720 to was

system unchanged the

case

from systems

its and

original equipments

configuration of the

necessary RPV FAA's system.

integrate

experiments

aircraft a need

safety for a

program, large can

as

proposed crash transport hazard;

to test

Congress which

in would crash

mid-1980, demonstrate survivability crash impact an@

_dentified validate through: protection.

transport improve fire

technology (i) reduced

that

aircraft and (2)

post-crash

improved

PROGRAM,

EXPERIMENTS/OBJECTIVES

TECHNICAL. Recent safety o advances provide in for: Kerosene fuel upon Fuel release impact (AMK)--verify and/or and that AMK the AMK can preclude f_rebal] ignition growth impact technologies and their applications for post-crash

Antimisting of an airborne

suppress

ignited i, an

characteristic fuel/propulsion

demonstrate

operational

system.

Structure (fuselage, wing, floor)--examine structural failure mechanismsand correlate analytical predictions; provide baseline etal crash data to support FAAand NASA composite crash dynamics research; and define dynamic floor pulse for seat/restraint system studies.
O

Seat/Restraint formance evaluate of

System--assess existing, improved, of new

regulatory and new

criteria; lightweight fittings.

evaluate seat

perconcepts; and

performance

seat

attachment

Stowage improved

Compartments/Galleys--evaluate retention means.

effectiveness

of

existing/

Analytical to transport Fire

Modeling--valldation aircraft Safety--observe windows, and and verify seat low-level

of

FAA

"KRASH" crash layers,

and

NASA

"DYCAST" impact

models

predicted blocking emergency

test

loads.

Cabin

burn-through performance.

resistant

lights

Flight evaluate usefulness Flight

Data

and

Cockpit of

Voice new

Recorders >_R/CVR

(FDR/CVR)--demonstrate/ and demonstrate

performance for Incident accident

systems, analysis. Locator

investigation

Recorder/Electronlc performance system. of

Transmitter U.S.

(FIR/ELT)-Navy/Naval Air

demonstrate/evaluate Test Center (NATC)

the

ejectable

Hazardous an impact

Materials environment.

Package--demonstrate

performance

of

packages

in

Post-Impact current investigation

(Accident) National procednres.

Investigation Safety

Analysls--assess Board (NTSB)

adequacy forms and

of

Transportation

Nemotely the

Piloted

Vehlcle/Flight aircraft through and

Control the

System

(RPV/FCS)--gulde activate to a the precise

"unmanned"

flight

profile, the aircraft

onboard impact MANAC EMENT.

experiments/systems, target area.

control

The

following

were

the

primary

managememt

tasks:

Provide

program

development,

coordination,

and

implementation.

Provide

program

and

technical

support.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT A Test Management ouncil (TMC)was established to overview CID and to assure C implementation of the participating FAAand NASA organizations commitmentsand responsibilities. Council representatives were from the FAATechnical Center, NASA-LangleyResearch Center, and NASA-Ames/Drydenlight Research Facl]Ity F management. The TMC was the ProgramManager's route to each participating agency's top managementor problem solving and general project/program f reporting. The Program Manager provided overall
implementation coordination with all

program development, coordination,

participating organizations.

and

PARTICIPANTS.

Participants program those CID

included and

numerous

government

and

industry A

organizations provides heavily a to general the

with

various of the

functions organizations

responsibilities. individuals who

Appendix contributed

listing of

and

success

program,

PROGRAM

I_LEMENTATION

The and

Management and installations

Plan

(reference plans well NASA-A/DFRF Project 4) were the

i), as underway

by

its by

January The issue

1984 and

release, distribution

represented date. 2) as

the CID was

experiments functioning augmented Management applied to by

systems

implemented. the "Basic

experlment/systems Plan" (reference 3). as and an A

deliveries

under the

Operations Plan"

"CID

Operations was

(reference as early

"Configuration wrench checkout, 5) Other

Plan" the

(reference B-720,

implemented

inlt_al

experiments/systems etc. and B) is The

installation "Ground Operations of the of the the

integration, Plan" (reference

maintenance, provided supporting CID documents the

repair/replace, final Index organization will be (appendix

operations in listing a

ground working

activities. subject sections. documents.

documents

identified

appropriate

The whose a

NASA-LaRC reporting

was was

given This etc.,

the

overall in

CID

program

schedule information

tracking (reference

responslbi]ity 6) format on

provided document schedule segments

a management contained for of all the CID

monthly flow

basis.

comprehensive aircraft, program systems,

integrated/flow-charted experiments, tests

(logic

networks)

(ground/flight),

activities.

Initial

experiment

deliveries were end A of February successful and were first

to

NASA-A/DFRF in late

by

mid-December 1983 Test

1983 and (CST) on March with in

with baslca]ly in midon conducted 7, 1984. the July final 1984. to

Installation/integration completed February February Subsequent three A by 1984. 29, the

started 1984. ground manned for impact

December ground Systems

were started was

RPV/FCS

checkout

Combined flight April, was

1984, flights

conducted and June

planned the plan was and was

May,

1984,

flights, test manned

including buildup flight minimized that the

demonstration, which was

occurring a systematic This unmanned

late

flight

initiated CID mission for

development

assure

safety risks, CID

success. system final

systematic and performance, This and meant mission.

development "confidence"

established ready

re]iabillty

the

not only confidence must be built up on the basic aircraft but also the AMK degrader/engine systems, instrumentation/data acquisition/camera systems, FDR/CVR, nd the RPV/FCS a concept. The test aircraft, ground, and flight
TEST AIRCRAFT.

experiments/systems installation, integration/checkout, operations are generally discussed in the following sections.

The

test

aircraft which new jet hours of entered by

was

typical

four-engine in $4.2 During takeoffs and was the

jet

(Boeing

720) This use in

intermediate aircraft trslning it logged was the more it had

range

design purchased agency's 20,000

airline FAA in

service ]960 for

mid-1960's. for FAA

the

million its and judged

operations and its made

inspectors. over 54,000 career,

career,

thon come

landings. to be the

Basically, best

to the end for CID.

useful

candidate

aircr_,ft

The

physical

design

features (i.e., Airframe fuel and

and

construction 707,

were McDonnell cabin

common Douglas

to

U.S. DC-8,

and

foreign 757, se_t/

airframe Airbus restraint systems

manufacturers A-300, etc.).

Boeing

Boeing decK, avionic

structure, propulsion of the

interiors, flight

flight control and

systems, were

systems, aircraft

representative

industry

cross-section.

The

general

specifications

for

the

Boeing

720 136.7

are: Feet Feet Pounds Pounds Pounds Gallons Normal CID Configuration Flight the Research of to cabling were not systems ]983,

Length Wing Empty Maximum Gross Fuel Flight Passengers Span Weight Landing Taxeoff Capacity Crew Weight Weight

130.9 106,000 175,000 203,000 12,]89

(3)
(124) (113)

The

aircraft in

was June

turned 1981 to

over

and

delivered for and strain the

to CID

NASA-Ames/Dryden program. During

Facility initial access

prepare floor,

summer in order

interior areas for In i.e.,

materials, accelerometers, some areas,

side side

panel an panels ceiling,

removals and

began

gages,

instrumentation/power materials

installation. replaced; were

selected

cargo with flight Base the

compartment, planned

fuselage experiment control remote

etc.

Seat/restralnt seat-restralnt

replaced The Air

standard/modified and avionics systems

systems. Edwards

deck,

flight

were

modified

for

Force

operations,

piloted

vehicle,

and

instrumentation.

The

fuel

and

propulsion and were Thermal

system operations. removed

were

modified

to

support and

the

A_

degrader

system.

instrumentation, turbocompressors degrader eliminated. installed system. in

Air-conditioning from the engine to for

pressurization installation leading generator of edges package the were was AMK

allow the wing flame

anti-iclng ignition

systems

An A_ positive the tail cone.

source/dual

EXPERIMENTS/SYSTEMS All modifications Center, could and to

INSTALLATION, the B-720 were

INTEGRATION, under the Center with the and

AND

CHECKOUT. of NASA-A/DFRF. their assigned FAA

jurisdiction (NASA-LaRC), appropriate Support

Techncial contractors crew Various (reference indJviduals the required chief

NASA-Langley work on the

Research aircraft Maintenance contractors and were

and/or

NASA-A/DFRF approvals. drawings

Chief, and the

_ircraft industry installation of

Division englneerJng

FAA, 7)

NASA, for

developed

integration identJfied,

buildup. and they

Responsible in turn for

lead

and

points

contact revisions

maintained

documentation control

and

necessary

coordination

configuration Installation, with the CID in

(reference and

4). checkout were generally planned system of accomplished schedule report (table in I) 6) events Once weeks accordance and and was each progress, as the

integration, team the "Top approved NASA-LaRC Man at CID

original prepared

project monthly Dsily

detailed NASA-A/DFRF

(reference and pa_t

Schedule." the Dryden meeting and

schedule Managers conducted week work

activities to review lists.

reported/reviewed week, a total

Project was new

morning

meeting.

team/crew etc.,

problems,

solutions,

the

item

TABLE

1.

ORIGINAL

PROJECT

SCHEDULE

--

INSTALLATION

AND

FLIGHT

SCHEDULE

FY84 0 Hardware implementation and installation Ground Manned Flight checkout flight readiness and tests combined systems tests reviews flight [-_
[_

FY85 M J J A S 0 N D

N D

F
!

M A

f-

Unmanned Site analysis Site cleanup Reporting

As in the early schedule December (AD) was

impact

indicates, 1983. had been in

experiments Basic aircraft in

and

systems

installatlon/integratlon with FAA/manufacturer

began aircraft

compliance early ]983.

directives cabling and December

initiated October 1983 camera an

Sensor/Instrumentation/power data acquisition beglnni_g and system in schedule (DAS) midoverview.

started motion Table

with actual

initial project

high-speed 1983.

picture 2 provides

systems

installation history

Delivery based on

and bench

installation testing by buildup in the of

of the

the

four

AMK flight

fuel

degrader

systems Corrective the on-site systems to

were

delayed were

first for RPV were

degrader. and

actions

accomplished design checkout combined and

contractor continued.

all

degraders and in

installation installation in the and

(ground generally

airborne) a state

were systems

progress tests

and (CST).

participate

TABLE2.

PROJECT

HISTORY

AND

SCHEDULE

FY84

FY85

Hardware implementation and installation Ground Manned Flight checkout and tests combined systems

flight tests reviews flight

readiness

Unmanned Site analysis Site cleanup Reporting

impact

The

initial

CST and

was the

conducted AMK

on

February system

29, was

1984.

The

DAS but

performed

limited The

checkouts, RPV on system March 7,

degrader/pod of its

installed control in

nonoperational. The for first

performed 1984.

many

upllnk/downlink satisfactorily

functions.

aircraft/engine

systems

performed

preparation

flight

On The

April plan

4, was

1984, to with one After

the step an

initial each

degrader/engine through run. a

systems systems Once that

operations checkout checkout and conduct

were prior was to

attempted.

degrader and with of

integration then integrate

engine degrader a series

ground a

completed, engine the and 1984. as to run

companion systems

engine only

normal attempts, corrected,

procedures. operation the first was

degrader

checkout problems on a

shutdown.

Numerous run was

anomalies successfully (appendix

occurred, conducted C) provides

degrader/engine buildup system

Aprl]

II, insight

Flight

AMK/degrader

plan

general

degrader/engine GROUND OPERATIONS.

checkout.

The

ground

operations but within also elements the impact 3 site days

(reference the operational

5)

activities control in rested area with

not and for

only support CID

included (as

the

impact over

site all

development ground activity for down Ground the to

required) a post-lmpact

support CID

participating control operations of impact.

pre-impact, the was (GOM/CC)

impact, operations. Ames/Dryden then

operational

Responsibility Project to impact. Manager the CID

within Operations

Coordination Commander

transltloned at CID

Manager/Convoy

finally

Impact adjacent (PAIRA). layer wide.

Site. to The of I-i/2

The the

CID

test Air site

area Force (figures hard

was 2

located and 3) a

on was

Rogers Active covered

Dry

Lake a

Jmmedlately Range 4feet to Area 6-1nch by 300 deep feet

Edwards inch

Base rock

Precision for

Impact with of 1,200

impact

diameter

distance

_I(;I!RE

2.

TMPACT/SI,IDI_OU?

SITE

FIGURE

3.

ACTUAL

IMPACT

SITE

Ground installed range

photographic/video either (10 at the side feet of high)

coverage the impact

fixed and as

position slideout

and area.

tracker

platforms

were

Thirty-four

photographic aids were on each

poles

serving They before

photographic located planned at

identification lO0-foot point.

installed side

impact 200

site. feet

were the

intervals

beginning

about

impact

Twelve I0 feet each feet

low tall

impact with the

resistance, five lights point,

breakaway per six pole, on of each

landing were side

approach located of the every

)ight 100 75

structures, feet feet wlth beginning across

each 300 from

after other.

impact are 42

runway,

They every to

constructed These realistic

lightweight tower's ignition and

fiberglass their source. 60

tubes 300-watt

breakaway approach

couplings lamps serve

inches. a

light fuel

provide

Eight planned lower the

wing

openers

(figure

4)

were by to

located tile leadlng rotate Each (blade a black

between edge and

50 of cut

and the

I00 wing

feet will the

past cause

the the of

impact half of

point. the wing the by

Contact opener fuel 7 and center feet was

upwards wing part) fence in

into

]o_er

portion 400 p_lot

wing, and

rupturing is 8 feet

tanks. long aiming,

opener by 2 of

weighs feet 5)

approximately wide. with For an openers. RPV

pounds visual

target

a]ignment orange

(figure

international

installed

front

tl,e wJ,g

Operational operations, impact, area. and The

Control. personnel, up Air for part of through Force all the

The and

GOM/CC

was

responsible during T+]5 the days (AFFTC) of or that in

for fins] the

the CID

cortro] prior

of

_]] to impact, control was which the were vicinity at

equipment

3 days

approximately Flight Test

operational Co_m_ander resources called into

Center

On-Scene (DOD) may be

responsible either of The hours days. searched through radio the a

the CID an

AFFTC/Department operations emergency Control I week prior

Defense which

CID/720 Site day

during

operation. Area to was impact sealed envelope signal. under up NASA/IiSAF through access, prior into the security approxi_ately and to helicopter engine start area was by control T+I5 94

Impact per USAF

Operational beginning

Security and a

Police safe and

were "all

posted, clear"

off Entry

the impact

lakebed/sterile

termination special badging.

area

control

communications

Aircraft, tions requried after pre-

experiments, and access

and

systems

operations

teams

supported

the coverage prior

lakebed teams impact

opera-

post-lmpact. to service, the

Engineering load, film and and set video

photographic/video up the equipment

to

and

impact

to

recover

tape.

Official designated area.

technical observer

observers, areas off

VIP's, the

guests, and

and

media

personnel the

were

assigned envelope

lakebed

outside

termination

Crash Standard crew the prior

fire

rescue locations USAF water

personnel on and An teams the FAA in the foam

and

firefightlng outside investigation to check the safing

apparatus the vehicles were

were

preposltioned envelope area. a with

at normal with gases

designated

lakebed

termination specialist

firefJghtJng

provided was toxic after

complement. firefighting to allowing

accident order

transported or unsafe

aircraft team

for onboard

aircraft/systems

flre

extinguishment.

FI{;URE

4.

UIN(;

......

{:

FIGURE

5.

VISUAL

TARGET

ALIGNMENT

FENCE

I0

The aircraft/experiment safing team; tape, film, and experiments recovery team; TV/photographlc documentation team; documentation research team; and the postimpact investigation team were amongthe additional personnel requiring pre- and post-lmpact access to the operational ares.
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.

All

flight

operations Plan

were

conducted 2) and and Spectrum the

in

accordance Project operations Facility

wlth

the

Dryden Plan supported 6 and

Basic (reference by 7). the 3). NASA

Operations All One ground Main

(reference

CID

Operations were (figures

(aircraft/systems) Control Room and

airborne Analysis

Appendices and and the its

and

D for

provide a

typical

flight checkout

test of

buildup the

plans

that

were

developPd

implemented the RPV/FCS.

systematic initial and of an the

a_rcraft, 7, 1984) was crew had

experlments/systems, basically to not assess been a the flown test of

The

Flight opportunity aircraft, Initial

001

(March for the

aircraft/systems and systems to 1981 delivery

flight flights

flying since

qualities

as

the

aircraft

Dryden.

follow-on

were:

Flight Flight Flight

002 003 004

March May May

15, 3, 9,

1984 1984 1984

After (only) Program series degrader

number ground Manager of CID and

of and induced

attempts flight Dryden reviews, systems of

on checks

May for

17-19, Flight Manager item

1984,

to

complete 005 and

the 006,

degrader a number

system of CID a the

Numbers were shut down

installation

technical

deficiencies

observed; the

therefore, operation. 13 items that the flight work etc. and task.

the After for

and team engine 5 weeks

Project a work

list

of and

approximately it to was estimated

was

developed, be

approximately 23, begin for It 1984, the the work

work made

would to

required the systems systems, as

accomplish from as control, delayed NASA other

On

May to

decision on the

was data that

remove

aircraft well remote would FAA be and was run

status

and

englne/degrader acquisition Flights date of 005 July and

identified

instrumentation, was then the obvious planned in

and 28, a new

006 ]984.

therefore

impact

CID status

management On July 10,

participated ]984, Flight Problems After a

reviews,

schedule (CST) and was a and as

developed. with of old minimum anomalies Boeing

successful 005 was

combined conducted on

systems July 13,

test 1984,

anomal_e_. occurred. aircraft.

number the follows:

did Flight

occur 005,

with

experiments, the flights

systems, were

720

generally

Flight Flight Flight Flight Flight Flight Flight Flight Flight

006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014

August August August September October October November Novemboer November

7, 17, 28, 18, I, 25, 5, 15, 26,

1984 1984 1984 ].984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 Final CID Flight (Unmanned) Preparations (Manned) Dress Rehearsal

Flight

0 15

December

1,

1984

II

| FIGURE 6. MAIN CONTROL ROOM

FIGURE

7.

SPECTRI_

ANALYSIS

FACILITY

12

,; A _.l'rg _,

To

summarize

the

CID

flights,

there

were

14

"manned"

flights

flown:

-----

Total Total 9 69 RPV CID

flight RPV time

time: was and

31.4 52.2 13

hours percent of total

takeoffs

RPV

landings to altitudes between 150 and 200 feet

profiles/approaches

One

"unmanned" -Total

flight RPV time

was was

flown: 8 minutes: 54 seconds.

The

final

CID

unmanned (actual) Operating Day of

f]ignt and

(015) RPV/FCS (DOF)

will

be

discussed Flight and

in

more 015

detail Mission

in Rules

the

impact were

scenario 8), for used

summaries. 9), operations.

(reference

Ri,]es

(reference

Flight

Cards

(reference

]0)

Flight

I_ACT

SCENARIO

In for

the

1980-198]

time

frame, to the

the FAA used

FAA

B-720

(N-23) Center.

transport As

was

made

available the

testing was

purposes to be

Technical for:

orlgina]ly

conceived,

aircraft

primarily

o Demonstrating postcrash experiment instrumented instrumented fire with

the

effectiveness The decision

of

AMK was

in made

typical to

impact

survivable the AMK an m series of

environment. additional (to

piggybac_ which

crashworthiness validate analytlcal systems

experimemts model

included and

structure cabin and

predictions)

seat/restralnt

installations.

However, established o o o o o o

recognizing by the

that FAA

experimental for

incompatibility Standards

may and

exist, CID team

priorities members.

were

Office

Aviation

A_dK Structural Validation Seats/Restraint Seat Blocking FDR/CVR's (Fuselage, of Analytical Systems Layers/Burn-Through Resistant Windows Wing Measurements) Model (KRASH)

As

part a

of joint

the

effort

to

define the

an FAA was

acceptable Technical contracted of in crash a

impact Center, to this do

scenario NASA-LaRC, an indepth was that to

to

all and

experlmenthe major of define basis

tors,

effort

between manufacturers accidents. occupant crash

transport transport mechanisms a range of

aircraft aircraft affecting survivable

investigation define and form may failure to a

The conditions

purpose or

study crash

survivability

environment,

scenarios technology.

for

developing

improved

crashwortbiness

design

The which files

accident occurred of the

data

base

consisted the years

of of

review

of

933 The

worldwide sources of

transport the data aircraft only 99; which, from foreign: statistics.

accidents were the

during FAA, etc. Civil

1959-1979. Board on total (CAB),

Aeronautics data focused to the transport phase,

NTSB,

transport

manufacturers, applying accidents delineated to by

The

survivable data base,

accidents was (domestic: and occupant

after 76)

established 175

criteria survivable

reduced

933

accidents modes,

operational

failure

13

The following criteria was established for statistics to be considered in this data base: (a) Airframe survivable volume was maintained during impact and prior to severe fire; (b) at least one occupant did not die from trauma; (c) potential for egress was present; and (d) accident demonstrated structural or system performance. The scenario was derived from a detailed review of the survivable accidents data, analytical mode] predlct_ons, and full-scale fuselage section drop testing, plus stated experimentor requirements.
Antimistln$ Kerosene Compatible CID Air-to-surface --Maximum 20-100 tank --155 gallons rupture exposure to 100 after knots tank rupture above 100 knots (Abe) A_ flJe] of impact knots per and fuel; engiDe i.e., systems

performance

demonstration at wing tank fuel rupture release obstructions per e_ch single point

second

4-5 second Decelerate

Verifiable slide-out Under mounted Crashworthiness

positive gravel,

ignition franglb]e Simulated site

sources; landing IEnition

i.e., lights,

engine etc.

separation, i.e., aircraft:

consideration: and/or impact

sources;

Representative Emulates aborted Maintain Sink rate a final takeoff fuselage at

of

an

impact

survivable missed

accident approach, and/(,_

approach/landing,

integrity = 17 feet to per second (f/s)

impact pulse

Vertical

impact

prior

impact

obstructions

Seat/Restraint

S_ste_

Evaluate sest/fittlng Vertical LongitudlnaI we could

performance concepts rate at sink

of

existing, = 17

improved, f/s g's) accept

and

new

lightweight

impact

acceleration set at imspact

( 9-10 (at floor)

4-6

$'s,

or

what

Structural/Bendin$

BrldBe Calibration analytical of fuselage/wlng structures for comparison to

models

IMPACT

SCENARIO

(PLANNED).

The of less feet,

final

"unmanned"

CID

was

to

fly

the

flight

profile The final the

(figure flight lakebed,

8) time

after was climb

a to to

series last 2,300

engine/systems/experiments than and 9 minutes. the the The dry

ground aircraft lakebed and sink to the

checks. will takeoff

from a

circle At speed,

intercept remote and

slmulated on the the

instrument ground descent. sets

landing up an

system approach

beam.

intercept,

pilot begins

altitude

rate,

14

OR_C,'T.-_'AL PA_E

1_

OF POOR QtrkLn_

[.--_ _3

I"-t

15

The

aircraft the

will prepared

descend impact

along area

a in

glide a

slope

at

controlled with the

sink

rate.

It

will

strike and will

nose-up

attitude

wheels

retracted

wing flaps strike a fuel

set at 30 degrees. Almost series of wing openers for to be released into the

immediately the purpose and

after impact, the wings of rupturing the fuel tanks creating potential fire

allowing situation. The of

airstream

aircraft frangible

then

will

continue light is

along

a prepared to to

grave] those rest

surface at

striking commercial feet

six

sets

approach The aircraft area. after

towers expected

similar to come

installed 1,000 to

airports. i_itial In

1,200

from

the

impact

November

1984, recommended the

numerous a relaxation of

flights, of

the

Flight

Readiness an@ impact safety

Review accuracies success. and

(FRR) in Tbe mission order CID

Committee to team improve

impact the in

requirements RPV pilot's of flight

probability the mission

enhancing

reviewed and

requirements the following

light

success,

implemented

scenario: (At Impact)

Impact

Scenario

Current Requirements Sink Rate 17+0 -2 f/s Implementation 17+3 -2 f/s Con_en ts

Difficult with ground effects

+5

+5 Can control

Longitudinal

Velocity

150-0

kts

150-5

kts

Pitch

+1+0

+io+I

Difficult with ground effects

longitudinal

Accuracy

+75

feet

+75 -]25

ft ft

(long) (short)

Difficult with effects improves probability ground but

Lateral Roll

Accuracy

+15 0+1

fet

!15 0+i o

feet

No No

problem problem

_leading

+I

+_i

No

problem

The

above

reduces mental objectives

the and and

accuracy physical goals.

pressures flexibility,

from

the and

RPV

pilot, not

allows compromise

him CZD

additional mission

should

16

IMPACT

SCENARIO

(ACTUAL).

The

remote

takeoff typical intercept following pushover.) 54 seconds.

and

climbout as normal,

from compared aud rotation.

the to final

lakebed previous approach (Impact

appeared remote

to

have

proceeded Climb-out

in

a to

relatively racetrack 25 seconds

manner was

takeoffs. occurred

intercept occurred release

5 minutes: seconds was 8

takeoff Total

2 minutes:24 to _mpact

following minutes:

flight

time

from

brake

The

initial

final At across about

descent 500

appeared feet above centerline

to

be

acceptable level left the

with (AGL), to

typical the aircraft At the from as he

higb

pilot began

workload. drifting point, At the to at a this

ground from

the

impact was pilot

right. center]ine

260-foot left to

AGI, rig|_t. to align

the

aircraft the with offset

moving workload

rapidly

across

point,

increased

dramatically The resulting oscillations angle was

attempted of turns, were were aligned

aircraft lateral

the

runway

centerline. resulted of in the the right. ground attitude Impact Following followed root. by The

series

similar continuiI1g

maneuver,

roll bank vehicle

which

impact.

Peak-to-peak 15 degrees.

amplitude At to impact, the the

excursions approximately

approximately the First engine short rate of runway, contact with of the 18.5 left

with

however, (figure about planned feet engine of per a

offset 9) 2.0 with

was

by

the about was

left 13 ]49

outboard left knots

or about (TAS)

Number 410 w_th tbe and then the feet a

nose-up (X).

yawed velocity left the

impact second.

sink

outboard bottom was

engine forward about

contact, antenna

inboard fuselage of

impacted the wing

the

forward

aircraft

50

feet

to

r_ght

centerline.

The (_=

aircraft 120-122 or

continued knots) Number 3 with

its the

slide-out wing This engine of

yawing

about

40

to was right

the made

]eft. by

First the right of

contact

opening cutter at the the

obstructions entered seventh the

inboard nacelle compressor.

engine. into the

hand the

side low was

the

continuing

stage

of

pressure stopped in ignition severed caused fuel inlet are_ the the

Postcrash one-third on oil the the oil, inboard

analysis of or a

engine

showed

rotation of a second cutter case severing in the impact

approximately occurred fuel front and on and of lubricating

revolution. side as and of the

One-tenth the engine. AMK.

later, also also the

left as well fluid,

The gear The

supply engine lines aircraft into 3 the wing and

lines to of

accessory

releasing

hydraulic

degraded

torque the

itself

counterclockwise (which is mounted cutter

discharge the CID

degrader

strut broke to entered

doghouse loose the and

engine the

installations). 3 main fuel wing innermost center the beam

The tank.

then

rotated of the

upward Number of the tank,

Number two

Simultaneous devices tore

destruction wing leading "hip" gear tires or wheel on

engine, Number at

additional The

opening opener the

the the

inboard edge "cheek" well the of

3 engine. the approximate through keel

through right

of

inactive to the main

hand

proceeded aircraft

fuselage and the

landing main gear

tearing left hand

out the set.

two

forward

The

innermost

cutter through of this

entered the lower was

the skin

wing and in

leading the the

edge

passing 3 main fuel

through tank

and inboard

slashing _d

diagonally rib. Part

Number aft

cutter

found

lower

cargo

compartment.

17

ORIGI_t?,_ OF PO(_

_ _w'-' Q U'_'AJj_'':'_'-

z b-] c

[.-, .<

18

Tbe

flame

which over the

initiated fuselage increasing of the ignited heat fuel the

at as

Number the until

engine

continued its to oil,

to

burn

with

the with initial

fire the yaw fire

flowing angle was This, through

aircraft the fuel from line

continued came

slide-out rest. and The

constantly the result to

aircraft

degraded released inlet wing did line

lubricating the destructing degrader the wing aircraft fuel

hydraulic was long fed as was boost off

fluid. fuel the still pump wing fed in tank the and was

added the

engine, (for to the the as

ruptured Once cross-feed tank. during

to

the

unseparated). through left boost the

separate, in on the the

fire

fuel All

from

override operating

"cheek" pump

engines

were

this

the

CID.

The came

total to

time rest The At to was

from 11

initial seconds. time the by of

contact The the

of fire,

the as its

Number the

I engine came

until to

the rest, state was lines

aircraft dimlnJshed was not and 9 visually aircraft

aircraft

greatly. seconds. damaged markings The

total the time

fire

at

fuselage-involving the fuselage exterior

fire the

diminished, flame. All

any

degree plainly summary

paint

instrumentation

were

visible. is presented the actual for comparison of the "planned" specified

following parameters

impact

versus

measurements:

Impact

Scenario

(At

Impact) Actual CID Measurements

Pre-CID Requirements Sink Rate 17+3 -2 fps

RPV

Downlink

AFFTC

18.45

f/s

17.3

f/s*

Longitudinal Pitch

Velocity

150+5

kts

149

kts

(TAS)

151.5

kts

(TAS)*

+io+7

+2.0o***

Longitudinal

Accuracy

+75 -125

feet long short

#i left

engine wing

impact 410' 281' short short from (X)

fuselage

Lateral

Accuracy

15

feet

+34

ft

right

wreckage distribution figure

(fuselage)

Roll

0+i o +1 o

13

Heading * Phototneodolite

13

left***

-4+I.

* FPS-16 ** *** Ground

Radar Measurement photography

High-speed

19

EXPERIMENT(S)/SYSTEMS

PERFORMANCE

Results areas, analysis notes on

of these is

the

experiments preliminary

are

described findings/results

in

the as

following detailed detailed

sections. data

In

most and and/or

are

reduction reports

continuing. completed

Key

areas

will and

prepare findings.

technical

those

analyses

ANTIMISTTNG

KEROSENE

(AMK).

The

CID

_MK

experiment of the (2)

had

two

primary kerosene

objectives: fuel concept

(1)

demonstrate in preventing of _MK in

the large an post-

effectiveness crash fireballs,

antimlsting verify the

operational

compatibility

aircraft

fuel/propulsion In was November briefed 27, to

system. 1984, the FRR The on the and final AMK blending to tank the gallons was the (figure Technical was I0) and fueling with procedure NASA-A/DFRF on the November aircraft fuel

subseqently wing 1984,

Briefing accomplished

senior 28, was

management. Early

aircraft 29,

flushing AMK

1984.

November

blending/fueling loaded into do_ and

of the through

initiated. As the

Approximately blending/fueling of the in up to

11,325 process Jet-A/AMK the and fuel

were in

aircraft fueling

tanks. completion,

progress taken Samples in the in

snmples

were

being

tbose

samples on _ l, tanks

analyzed/characterized prescribed 1984. met As or Fuel schedule analysis the in the

laboratory. early the

were

taken of

including showed that

morning all the

Decmeber fuel

results FAA AMK

AMK

aircraft

exceeded

specification section,

requirements. "Impact the in Secnario--Actual," was the as a yawed to wing of t|,e instead t|_e ].eft of when at cutting the and it

described the the site the

previous site This and wing. A_fK

hitting struck impact severing pressurized

impact ground. hitting right degraded

symmetrical, yaw A resulted

aircraft one of

steel engine result in

openers to severing engine the

destroying large oil, the openers aircraft.

the fire and wing

rigl_t occurred

inboard

prior

fuel,

hydraulic fal]ed,

lines pouring the fewer

and

strut

compnrtments. combustor burning area. fuel to

Simultaneously, Other enter wing the

fuel right

onto

ruptured enabTing

penetrated

fuselage

The

preliminary in right

conclusion which at the vaporized a large major and the

is

that

the

yawed

impact (the

of

the

aircraft Number the 3 fuel 3

cre_ted engine) was action engine

a was co,_d and at

situation placed develop. pylon the to fuel immediately

ignition fuel burned release

source point. any at before angle

destroyed As a reslzlt,

signlfJcant impact air, fuel caused creating a

antimis_i_g tbe a Number

Moreover, form s

left against

yaw

shield

the

onrushing the

stagnation time

region than

release/ignition at the ignition

point source. that used in

al]owing

longer

residence

expected The impact

demonstrated additive example of an an of

there this

are test

conditions is as not

in

which to by on fuel

the

jet

fuel a postcrash is the pylon Vhi]e whic_ the

aDtimisting fire. One

sufficient

prevent CID,

such and

conditions, _he rupture near fuel been

illustrated of the fuel point have Ji_es of

the the

destruction produced antimlsting of the fire

engine

e_gine

intense

ignition of

source the source

release. forward

characteristic had the ignition

would

prevented aft, in the

propagation it provided

further

nevertheless Edwards

limited,

although

still

significant,

protection

scenario.

20

OF

POOR

_,T _.....

u.l

21

Exterior diminished shows the that fire.

and

internal 9

film seconds.

documentation Examination relatively of fire of the

indicates of the

that film

the footage

resulting and the the

fire fuselage duration of the the of

within the The

fuselage reduced of the from This made

sustained intensity fuel. the The burning fuel by

little is later which have

damage damaged

during to the the the

fire

attributed

antimisting

characteristic aircraft aircraft door and/or resulted

which fuel to of

interior fuselage a the forward fuse]n_e

entered entered

during cargo

slideout. openings Researchers result cutters through from was the

appeared passage

through through later

wing the Burning

cutters fire which fuel

structure. did by not wing

discovered a failure of

that AMK. for the

damaged the fuselage

the

n_rcr_ft ruptured

inside fire which

responsible floor.

long-term

entered

the

cabin

by

buring

The

FAA

is

to in

investigate controlled

this

conclusion and review that

by field of

duplicating tests. accident to CID It

the is as

CJD also

impact attempting the to

conditions determine of "impact

laboratory through accidents

statistically, survivable"

past

reports, it

percentage happened.

correspond

actually

Engine/degrader Up to the DOF, fo]!ows:

system the

(figure

Ii) (figures

operation 12 and

was 13)

as

planned

with

no

anoma]_e[_. wa_ _s

degrader

operational

experience

Jet-A Jet-A

Ground Flight

Run/Tests Tests

14.3 12.7 27.0

hours hours hours hours hours hours

A>_ AMK DOF

Ground Flight Run

Run/Tests Tests

7.1 4.0 ll.1

Times

A}_ C]D

(;round Flight

Run

0.7 _0.2 0.9

hours hours hours

(40 (_

minutes) mlnutes:54 seco,ds)

The idle.

degraders Degrader N 2. N 2.

were

each

started was degrader 1,191 a

first nominal speed systems

and

then RPM _

the and

companion englne(s) and

engine idle

brought at _ at fuel 66 74

up to to

to 67 77

operation At All impact, at

21K was

percent percent consumed

21K

RPM

engipe

speed Total

degrader/engine

performed

f]nw]e_s]y.

estimated

gallons.

CRASUWORTHINE_

.q

S/STRUCI"dRAL/RESTRAINT

Crashworthiness and seat/restraint or

refers

to

the to

ability protect A review or

of the of

tbe

aircraft

fuselage, and crew has in

floor a

structure,

systems accident.

passengers past

typical that

landing

takeoff

accidents

shown

occupants have received termed survivable. A airframe, seat/restraint forces

serious "survivable" system, experienced

fatal injuries in accidents accident is defined as one cabin the environmcnt occupants are remain within

that have been in which the reasonably the ]_mits intact, of human

and by

and the impact tolerance.

22

ORIGINAL OF POOR

PAGE 'QUALITY

FIGURE

ii.

ENGINE/DEGRADER

SYSTEM

INSTALLATION

FIGURE

12.

ENGINE/DEDRADER

23

.<

o Z o

,..,4
r..4

I,-I

OP_G_AL PA,E OF IE)OR QIYA'LI'rY

24

The

CID

was

expected of

to

yield

data

that

will

help to

researchers various crash points areas that and

obtain loads. in with the an

better

understanding Accelerometers wing, of seats. during onboard center speed fuselage, in These impact

aircraft strain and would

structure gages were

response installed

and

at

175

aircraft equal number loads

floor, the sensors and

galley/stowage systems be used to

compartment and obtain from transmitted Additional the dummies

sensors

seat/restraint

occupied

those

accelerations those sensors to was

transmitted taped ground by by

slldeout. equipment at that

Information and also

were the

recording for cameras recording

directly data cabin

control 11 high-

location. located in

collected cockpit.

strategically

the

aircraft

and

The

interior Jet a (figure

of

the

aircraft for of 75 the

was

configured

(figure and of and

14)

much special

llke test

typical equipment.

passenger there dummies which pelvic were

except total 15). I] did

instrumentation almost 13 all were instrumented

other were

seats,

which

occupied attendent.

by adult

human-like dummies

There

anthropomorphic I flight in

represented locations.

passengers, include remainder dummy. Many

I pilot, were of

Instrumentation

accelerometers

installed noninstrumented the seats and

the

head, dummies floor

thorax, with

a_d one

The child multiple

adult adjoining

noninstrumented also contained

structure

accelerometer

installation.

Structural

(Fuselage,

Wins,

Floor)

The dictions impact addresses established the

structural of the on the structural the of

experiment fuselage damage basis this and impact of model floor a

consisted subsequently of metal validated to a matrix

of

matching etc., establishing

the with The will

analytical the criteria be obtained postcriteria

prewhich will from and system be

deformatlon/failures, structures. model of

variable

and

application conditions can be

aircraft

configurations seat/restratlnt

crash designs

in which identified.

pulses

and

optimum

As

described to is ground

in

the

"Analytical wss introduced model) of and posttest fire which of

Modeling" which the CID

section, will impact. due with to

an Most the

unsymmetrical remodeling important, unexpected to correlate results.

yaw/roll (change however, wing actual

condition symmetrical the loss

necessitate

evidence destroyed

opener

damage impact

the

ability

deformatlon/damage

predicted

With

results

obtained

from structural

the

revised information

unsymmetrical (also will the be

model supporting developed. technical

and drop FAA

available test and data), NASA

postcrash

a correlation reports results.

of will

information provide

future and

detailed

analysis

Seat/Restraint

System

Experiments

The track part

seat/restraint attachment of the all of the the seat cases, same

system devices leg the basic

experiments and and seats so

did

include

improved

seatas In standard benefits of

energy-absorbing were

devices located could included next

installed structure. to a

structure modified design Other

seatbelt/seat-pan

almost seat of rear

researchers

assess an

the

modifications. seats and a

experiments

evaluation system.

facing

newly-deslgned

child

restraint

25

(/)

k_

26

DF. POOR QUAUTY

z G .< -< Z

27

The 13 T_,e load

CID

multiple and containing

type 14 13

restraint instrumented and The minimum 2g up) The would FAA and peak in the

system and

experiments seat 60 included of of to

consisted designs 168 the 9g

of dummies.

standard

modified (seat

crew/passenger dummies) CID

(FAA/NASA/

French)

noninstrumented

instrumentation cell data seats 4.5g down,

accelerometer/ occupied 1.5g

channels. (meeting and seats. devices to 6g meet up and

performance loads compared modifications

standard side, of the

static be seat improved dynamic 35/50

forward,

the

performance (featuring energywere 10g

modified stroking and lOg

absorbing designed side, change

seat-track loads feet per of

fittings) 18g forward, velocity second

tested

down,

range. examination structural being i0 revealed that while involved including by the fire. ]5 two in two standard/modified standard fuselage designs seats had seats minor damage. French

Post-impact show no

deformation directly seats,

deformation The remaining were

the NASA

cutter and one

design,

destroyed

Based involved appeared

upon in to

observed the be less

test than

film wing either

and

except

for

the tbe

two CJD

seats impact seat being

directly loads design ana-

fuselage

opener the

damage,

standard/modified data Is currently

strengths. lyzed to

Instrumented complete data a this (figure of

seat/dummy performance 16) time. revealed (Data

assessment. the is following impact being pulses--g for

Preliminary forces as

function and

currently

analyzed

completness The floor

accuracy.)

values:

In

the

"cockpit"

were: ]4 2.6 4.9 for for for 0._ 0.14 0.14 seconds seconds seconds

Vertlcsl Longitudinal Lateral

In

the

forward

cabin: 6.0 ].6 2.4 for for for 0.14 0.20 0.18 seconds seconds seconds

Vertical Longitudinal l, atera]

Over

the

wing

box: 5.5 3.5 2.0 for for for 0.14 0.14 0.11 seconds seconds seconds

Vertical Longitudinal Lateral

In

the

back

part

of

the

cabin: 3.0 5.0 2.0 for for for 0.I0 0.14 0.09 seconds seconds seconds

Vertical Longitudinal Lateral

28

ORIGINAI,
!i i i i ili ili ii !

PAGE

iS

OF. DOORQUALITY
/ ...... i _iliii:iiii_iiiiii_ii_i_/

L_

E
'il

o
0

i,ii!_i'ii _

L_ rJ3

z c3 D.-,

i:::d r..b _d ._
r y_

_o

L5

29

Stowase/Galleys

Compartments

Researchers planned to evaluate the affect of crash loads on galleys and stowage areas because investigation of past accidents has shown that passengers have been injured or have had difficulty evacuating an aircraft due to improperly or inadequately restrained galley equipment and/or passenger carry-on items. Standard restraint systems were tested in both the galleys (figures 17 and 18) and overhead compartments (figure 19), and the results will be applied The CID as necessary stowage and in the development compartment of new design criteria. of two

galley

experiments

consisted

galley modules (filled to volume capacity) located in the forward starboard side of the aircraft and two overhead stowage compartments (filled to capacity weight) mounted aft the galley modules. While the galleys were not instrumented, accelerometers were installed at nearby structural support areas. The overhead occupant compartment supports were instrumented with three load cells and a traix acce]erometer installed on one of two 75-pound test weights.

FIGURE

17.

FORWARD

GALLEY

INSTALI,AT]ON ORIGINAL PAGE QU IS

30

OF. POOR

&LITY

ORIGINAl; OF POOR

PA_ QUALITY

iN

FIGURE

18.

AFT

GALLEY

INSTALLATION

FIGURE

] 9.

OVERHEAD

COMPARTMENTS

31

As door

observed opened

on

film, both

during the

the galley

initial modules showed the

ground stayed that other.

impact, intact, fire The had

one

overhead

compartment their one internal

while

including destroyed galley minor

contents. compartment fire soot). damage

Post-impact and while partially the

examination destroyed galley,

overhead partial (mainly

forward showed

showed damage

aft

including

contents,

Based appemred

upon to must

the be be

observed less further than

film the

and

posttest

examination, of both

the the of

C]D galleys

impact and

loads overhead compartment

design The

strengths inadvertent

compartment doors

restraint

means. assessed.

opening

the

overhead

Analytical Data

Modeling during the demonstration called "KRASH" in and will and be used t_ validate KRASH, to and f_r determine DYCAST t_en to

collected modeling

computer

programs

"DYCAST."

example, has characteristics their simulate _ill be

been

used extensively of small aircraft capabilities. impact the from to FAA actual w1_ich

evaluating helicopter Researchers

the design structures used These KRASH

crashworthiness the controlled with base

demonstration. results a generic of the mode] aircraft element of CID prescribed descent, roll/yaw peak ramge ruptL]re

simulations

compared a data

demonstratJen, will be developed for

providing possible Both used of a the to

application lump predict of 17 mass the feet

future KRASH impact.

transport and finite At the

designs. NASA aircraft 3-I/2-to angles, and and DYCAST models were impact pitch,

structural per and in minor the the second with the

behavior (f/s) zero ]dg

during 4-de_ree the

condition

severe/survivable

alr-to-ground

conditions ]50 knots

ground vertical 9g range, impact in

speed, loads with involved to

models loads in

predicted the ]'he 6 to

horizontal] floor

fuselage additional

deformation. whieb the of a ana-

actual

yaw/roll obtained on induced the by

conditions from basis the

resulted lytical symmetrical high It is yaw

a change Both

predicted were lateral

values

models. impact and roll

models

developed loads

without angles.) the the analytical model condition data of is an

unexpected

believed

that

additional peak vertical models. will with being

lateral and

]oa(Ts

may

not

have

sig-

nificantly predicted an actual CID

affected by the

]ong_tu(lina] to support which lateral data mode]

responses this conloads. be evaluated above position, aiders the

However, be developed the additional These KRAS_

unsymmetrical impact CID

(KRASH)

Instrumented against objectives. CABIN FIRE SAFE]_" the

analyzed.

will to

results

unsymmetrical

satisfy

EXPERIMPINTS.

The

use

of

A_

in might

the

demonstration engulf like several and within

was the seats

expected test and

to

preclude

or

rLinimize the or

the fuselage, retarding

fireball and ignite researchers the spread

that

otherwise materials

aircraft, wall aimed should at

penetrate preventing occur.

interior did of

panelings.

However,

incorporate into

experiments the cabin,

flames

fire

32

Seat

Blocking

Layers

Fire-blocking approximately laboratory blocking and FAA

layers 50

(figure of already effective

20) the

were

selectively seats. that the

installed Extensive these spread them on fireof

on

percent

passenger have shown

experiments layers is taking are

in

retarding to

flames, airlines.

regulatory

action

require

all

Seat encase

cushion the

fire-blocking urethane or foam

layers cushions. the

are

fire-resistaut the foam evaluation in from

fabrics blocking-layer burning. have

which

Baslcally, urethane and

material Extensive value of

inhibits full-scale seat

prevents (C-133)

testing

proven the onset

the of _d

cushion

fire-bolocking cabin

layers fires, and

delaying

flashover ramp One

during

post-crash

preventing

inf]ight

fires when a seat is the type of effective blocking fabric. rows) seats so that of Norfab individual (rows) a a to were was seats

initial layer on the

target of is Norfab 32 CID (11 rows)

the ignition source. , an aluminized of a total The standard be than ef a of fireseats

blended 68 (2B

used on

test

aircraft. with could other probabl]Ity

blocked (rows) in was the

positioned comparison fire. employed No of

alternately fire damage

visual cabin was be

performed h_gbfire

event movie

instrumentation because the

speed

cameras

considered

mJnlma].

The the the cal

intense cabin wing

cabin area from in a of

fire the burned fire

gutted center

most wing

of

the

passenger to the

seats. trailing visual and

However, edge of

station that

was

condition damage.

permitted

physi-

comparisons

It and

was in

noted fabric, most

that cases,

on

the the

standard foam the outer

seats, fabric to

fire from and seat

had the foam level.

burned headrest from In

away the all

tile

outer

melted

completely

area, cases, the

melted

back-rest the

areas--extending seats fabric was were was in

downward in burned place in it

fire-blocked outer material surface hand and and

superior away, and new

condition. the Norfab In

Although aluminized some cases, the

finished blocking aluminized areas was the were firm walls

unburned. condition.

the

appeared squeezed,

When the was

headrest foam on to

was

noted fire the to

that damage both

underlying also

resilient. ceiling seats seats.

Greater areas as of

observed and adjacent to

cabin those

above

the nonblocked fire-blocked

compared

areas

adjacent

Tbe the

fire-blocked results to fire

seats in

performed component

in

manner

consistent testing

with by providing

obtained

and

large-scale

resistance

growth.

new on

flammability November layers 26, over

standard 1984, a

for which

seat

cushions the this

was

enacted

by of date.

the fire-

FAA

requires period from

installation effective

blocking

3-year

33

OI_IGINAL _

PA,GE QUALITY

IS

FIGURE

20.

SEATS

WITH

FIRE

BLOCKING

LAYERS

34

Burn-Through The tant The second epoxy advanced by to

Resistant experiment windows window NASA fires was

Inner the 21

Window selective and

Panes use of burn-through resis-

(figures contains and of be at is

22). inner EX 112; pane the which improved was window

an

improved to as

developed resistance that would

referred type

this

provides with Jcal

additions] post-crash Center, of the

burn-through external fires. air-

normally testing

experienced the FAA the and fuel of Tech,

Full-scale frame section

using

C-133

permitted window external seconds

comparison the EX fires. i]2

conventionally window in side-byprovided

stretched side

acrylic to 60 to of were with starting direction. the 26

advanced The time advanced before

exposure

window burnthrough

approximately compared A total

additional window. resistant

conventional

burn-through installed standard at the This on

improved They 13 and

inner were on

pane

(EX

112)

windows installed aircraft forward

the

aircraft. pane most windows, window the

alternately each side in of the

inner rear

progressing panels was a

the _t

positioned The purposes alternate in

forward-most installat_on event that

approximately for visual external fuel

mid-wing. comparative fire

selected

the

post-crash

occurred.

The 'the that area

damage aircraft fire

sustained and

by

the tbe

aircraft cargo

resulted compartments. the the floor, windows

in

fuel

fire

under

inside was wing

Evidence except were possibly of the

suggests for convensn

penetration of the

through where all

forward type. window

tional In the the

string inner window of each these wing.

on panes

the and

right two on the were

side of in the

of

the

aircraft, inner a of aft

tbree panes the

of were trail-

improved The All of the in be

standard side just

intact. count. ing Due edge to

string windows

left

contained

siml]ar

series

intensity each by series

and

duration melted comparing

of out

the or

fire,

all

of

the No

other judgment

windows could The fact through result between

were

distorted. inner

made

visually of the

the

remaining fire, and

panes. the up not

characteristics that the the in fire

uncontrolled the damage differences cabin to the in windows.

particularly by burning did

penetrated and the of and

primarl]y test

floor,

article

any

evidence

burn-through

resistance

conventional

advanced

Low-Level Low-level installed next impact. to

Emersency emergency on the a number

Lishtin$ lighting of These seats were devices which to be (tritium) were located for were on selectively the seat arms during

aisle.

observed

performance

35

OI_GINAI_ OE l_:)O_-:

PAGE QUALITY

TS

FIGURE

2l.

BURN-T_IR:_[:(;tt

;:.I:S1STANT

I:()P):Y

W[NDOI_S

(:_'ITR:

FRAM:E)

35

DI_G/NAL,,OF PO0_

PAG_ I_ _TT,_LrT Y

.<

o -a Z

X o

r.3

C',,I

;.r..1

37

O_ClNAL OF H)Oa

PAGE IS -QUALITY

Floor proximity lighting can provide escape-route guidance to passengers and crew members in a smoke-filled cabin environment that would obscure ceiling-mounted lighting. FAA extensive fire testing and environment lighting. evacuation have proven studies with human the effectiveness subjects of floor in a theatrical proximity

Twenty-five Tritium lights (figure 23) were installed on the aircraft. total of 8 aisle seats were selected throughout the cabin, and a light was installed on the top of the armrest, the side, and the rear. An additional light was installed on a ninth armrest. Two different types of two-part adhesives were used in mounting the lights to the armrests.

FIGURE

23.

TRITIUM

LIGHT

DEVICE

Only three tritium lights remained bonded to two seats (two on one seat and one on another). No additional lights were found on the floor or in the floor debris. Fire consumed the missing lights in an environment beyond the point of occupant survivability. All lights should be mechanically fastened to maximize their time of usefulness. A standard for floor proximity lighting was enacted by the FAA on November 26, 1984, which requires compliance by the U.S. fleet within 2 years from this effective date. FLIGHT DATA AND COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS.

The CID also provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the usefulness of current and advanced technology flight data recorders (FDR's), cockpit voice recorders (CVR's), and special sensors since tb _ information obtained from these systems could then be compared with the data acquired from the various other onboard

38

experiments our

and

flight of

data the

recording and

systems. usefulness

The of with

results FDR's regard analysis all a air

could and to CVR's

then in

increase postcrash impact

understanding accident

adequacy

aircraft

investigations, and both tool.

particularly aircraft of newer

occupant on impact.

survivability Presently, accident heading, attitude, permits CVR's FAA

determination requires

performance recorders FDR's normal on record

types The

carrier of

aircraft data and such roll that

as as

an

investigation pressure and

variety pitch on a

altitude,

airspeed, and lateral

acceleration,

longitudinal to

acceleration--all the flight cockpit path and and

time

base

investigators record crew 30-minute recorders signal advanced

reconstruct and

impact

conditions. sounds on a

The

conversations tape. to be used

other

external

continuous Flight original foil roll, data

in

the

CID

demonstration records by

included limited

the

aircraft's on a

analog and

unit

(Sunstrand), systems

which supplied

information

digital

various

manufacturers.

Three

state-of-the-art Sundstrand), were sensors FDR was

digital one Lear

flight Siegler 24)

data

recorders

(DFDR's) memory area unit performance data The

(Fairchild, FDR, with to set the and a one CVR

Lockheed, (Fairchild) Flight special The was LSI being Data

(LSI) in the on

solld-state aft cabin

installed Unit to record to not provide

(figure (FDAU), unique data,

along

special and DFDR's. but

Acquisition

signal having

conditioning aircraft a prerecorded

(Teledyne), stored, B-720 medium

signals

demonstrated was and refurbished the FDR

primarily by was

for

survivability. and in a the new foil

existing

fol] was

recorder installed,

Suudstrand reinstalled

recording

aircraft.

All

FDR

systems the foil

and

sensors

were and

installed the CVR,

and although

operated subjected did The have LSI

as

planned. to extreme

The fire

three

DFDR's, generated recording by both checked was found

recorder, and molten survive, the to determine the

heat mediums NTSB by and LSI to

aluminum and the

impingement, tapes of data unit set were to manufactures.

their FDR fire was

respective and if analyzed and subsequently any,

subsequently imternal and

processed damage,

respective

extent

have

prerecorded

intact

useable.

Overall, found to

the be

experiment definitely signals,

was too

a low,

success.

Sampling for

rates the which with

for pitch,

certain roll,

signals and wltb be must DFDR's

were

particularly the programmed

acceleration applicable Impact their humanly three FLIGHT and design,

although Aviation data permits is data

rates obtain

were

in

accordance

Federal post-impact which

Regulations difficult loss load

(FAR's) to during factors.

obviously present under happened

revised. because high, of but all

recording This

relatively in this

survivable, DFDR's INCIDENT during

deceleration impact.

case

to

RECORDER/ELECTRONIC

LOCATOR

TRANSMITTER.

Also Locator mounted impact.

tested

was

uniquely (ELT) 25 and land

deployable provided 26) away in the by

Flight the

Incident Air

Recorder Test Center and fired thus

(FIR)/Electronic (NATC). in the It air its was on

Transmitter (figures It was

Naval

vertical the aircraft

stabilizer wreckage,

to

from

assuring

survivability.

39

< o_

o cJ r_ <

,
g'3

..4
_

0
I_I_IGINAL OR
U

PAGE

l_I

POOR

O'_ _ I.ITy

Og'Z'7 <"N'AU PA,G_

FIGURE

25, U.S. NAVY TRANSMITTER FLIGHT INCIDENT RECORDER/ELECTRONIC LOCATOR

FIGURE

26.

CI,OSE-UP OF TRANSMITTER

INCIDENT

RECORDERELECTRONIC

LOCATOR

41

The

Nave/Canadian that was

Forces installed The with operation

joint to FIR

experiment test sensors. the

contained

a prototype

solid-state in a

FIR/ELT crash

ejection/separation preprogrammed ELT (radio to to data beacon) be a

characteristics and and was not actively marker visual

environment.

contained

interconnected strobe The (_!S)

aircraft and when

survivability the B-720

were

investigated. stop. dorsal switch The side of The fin. (one unit The of was unit two) left found did which yaw not did

FIR/ELT

ejected 15 (at (under feet

decelerated stabilizer nose

approximately eject not earlier break

from

the clue switch

vertical to the triggered

impact) fuselage

frangible ejection). the right Jn the

aircraft's the fin vertical mountJT,

during

slideout tended aircraft

and

AMK

flame

pressure

on

stabilizer until the

to hold the FTR/EI,T came to rest.

airfoil

dorsal

tray

FIR radio after

data

did

survJve (both

(no 121.5

bit mHz

drop-out) and 243.0 due The were VMS

and mHz) to

w_i,_;in

an

operable for (fuel, some ensuing less

condition, than foam, of time 10

the seconds etc.) after

FIT

becon

transmitted fluids for by the

ejection. out a

The curcuit plastic

unit

failed

impact operated

CFR

shorting ejection. HAZARDOUS

board. covers

period fire.

The

blackened

MATERIAL

PACKAGES.

Dow which

Chemical had been was lower load

and

Lawrence with galley No

Packing a scent

(figure jelled

27) water

provided

pint

and

quart

packaF, (the

es

filled an iPert cargo data.

material--nor_r,nning p_ck,_ges were located in acce]erometers was provided.

je]1_np, the to

m,_terial forward acquire

acry.]ic near

copo]ymer). floor

These positioned

_n

order

specia]

instrumentation

FI(;URE

27.

S]MIiLAT]D

HAZARDOUS

CARGO

42

QUALITY"

The with lower

experiment multiple forward

represented metal galley containers

series of

of

15

hazardous jelled

material water)

packages placed

(filled within the

nonhazardous

compartment.

During was fire. and

the

period from fire them

in the men

which lower axed of

the galley into the

firemen

entered due

the to

aircraft the lower the

galley cargo burning

area,

smoke

coming The threw

compartment compartment, right-hand

compartment packages,

the

retrieved exit.

outside

forward

During affected appeared impact

the by to loads

posttest the have

examination, axe

none and/or during

of from the

the

packages dropped

that

were

intact the

and

not

firemen's been low.

being aircraft

outside impact,

aircraft transmitted

damaged

ground

the

appeard

Upon galley

completion area, will the be

of

the

analysis dynamic

of

the

instrumentation transmitted to

data the

obtained

from mster_a]

the

actual

loads

hazardous

packages

identified.

DATA

ACQUISITION/PHOTOGRAPHIC

SYSTEM.

The

floor

plan

of

the of 10

CID DAS

aircraft pallets 29), and

is (two four

as

presented located pallets lights

in

figure and

]4. aft) 31).

Instrumentation per figure chec_olJt 28,

hardware recorded system

consisted subsystem (figure 30),

sets

for

(figure

power associated

(cameras/lights), (figure

cameras

NASA-LaRC CID two six used was

developed

the

complete behavior each each

instrumentation/data experiments. of a collecting had of 30 180 The

acquisition DAS, and as

system

for

the

crashwortbiness/crash independent The these data DAS systems and the directly of for systems, signal in

developed, data unit. which from each then and

included from There 176 were DAS ]80 were

capable DAS for two for

processing per of data

sensors.

conditioning

units total system

channels channels The tape

balance to

monitoring. 14-channel via four

transferred

onboard

recorders, systems

simultaneously at the ground

transmitted air-to-surface receiver control station.

telemetry

recorded

The I0

overall cameras

performance At impact, functioned

of 97

the percent

DAS The

and of

onboard

photographic systems all onboard into in the

systems were were

was active, enclosed and in all

excellent.

the

transducers/sensors

properly. which prevented film

DAS/photographic fire damage unique fire and to

thermal

insulation The systems, PILOTED

recorded the reaction of the

information. seat/dummy REMOTELY

onboard and

provided of CONTROL

insight smoke

propagation

aircraft

interior.

VEHICLE/FLIGHT

SYSTEM.

The

remote a

flight remote

control aircraft with selected the

and

guidance

system impact experiments

was

developed (representing and supporting

for

CID

in

order

to

conduct crash

alr-to-surface designated for its role

a near

real-world The

situation) was

systems. of and its its

NASA-A/DFRF experience physical

in

the

CID

program

because (RPRV)

in flying facilities.

remotely

piloted

research

vehicles

associated

The

RPRV

technique testing manner.

was

developed

by

NASA-A/DFRF and advanced a pilot

in

the

early

1970's in a a

as far

a means less

of

flight hazardous

experimental This

aircraft technique

technologies sitting in

allows

ground

cockpit

43

_':tq,'F

28.

DAS

?,lAIN

PALI_,ET

RECORDER

SUBSYSTEM

FIt;F,

Rk

29.

RECORDER

SUBSYSTEM

44

CHECKOUT

SUBSYSTEM

System Calibration controt

Quidk Calibration Out of

look tolerance

records channels

FIGURE
N,KK4 1.-_._1222

30.

CHECKOUT

SUBSYSTEM

_:

FIGURE

31.

CAMERA/PHOTO

FLOODLIGHT

INSTALLATION

45

(figure commands 33), and

32) to fly an airplane are sent electronically flight information is

using from returned

telemetry and radar. the ground cockpit in the same manner.

to

Flight control the aircraft

(figure

The

RVP

technique the from was for landing cockpit and pilot point the such

differs to fly to

from precise

conventional test

remotely

piloted of

aircraft merely

because the

it

permits aircraft The B-720

maneuvers

instead

guiding

point. remotely as piloted research vehicle elevators, and path are others Commands control fed ever flown. Flight flaps, sent the fed to from through the the

largest functions

commands rudder, ground ailerons, the onboard

engine nose via

throttles, steering,

ailerons, were for are

gear, to the rudders

brakes, aircraft which system.

wheel an direct other

uplink

system. flight

elevators,

provide The

autopilot system. such flight airspeed

functions

directly

appropriate Flight fuel

information flow, and and

as

engine

pressure information to the

ratio, such ground

exhaust as cockpit

gas heading, using

temperature, attitude, a dog, link

RPM,

navigational was returned

altitude, system. A series

of

operating as follows: bra_e or

rules

for

the

final

"unmanned"

CID

approach

to

impact

were

implemented From

i.

release systems the

down support

to

400 lead

feet can

on call

final a

approach,

any and

e_perRPV pilot

mentor Initlates

"go-around" During and in determines or

go-around management

per

normal reviews

procedures. problem is

go-around, (base8 to land.

program/project on This problem) decision if

another directed

impact to RPV

attempt pilot

order E).

abort

(appendix

2.

Between can From and call 150

400 a

feet

down

to based

150 on turn

feet his on

on

final

approach, accuracy

_ assessment. DAS

RPV

pilot

go-around to and impact. TERMINATION

impact photo camera

feet

impact, the JPL

batteries, system.

recorders pilot must

cameras, to

lakebed

RPV

continue FLIGNT SAFETY/FLIGHT

SYSTEM.

In the

the

event

that or

the in

ground-based event was of to an be

RPV

cockpit

had flight to

lost control return CID

the

ability system

to

control the an The

aircraft,

the system

onboard activated

failure, to

flight

termination ground

the

aircraft lakebed a to barren fly at

uncontrolled CID

impact area CID of an

within was void

the of

designated humans Tbe and

sterile basically

area. lakebed

profile/sterile the at the designated a

was

within aircraft under

boundaries. and pilot rate

program descent in the

plan into ground

was the

the

unmanned area

specified

speed RPV

of

prepared

impact

control

located

cockpit

NASA-A/DFRF.

In

the

event to

of

an

onboard the to

failure a

or

that

the and

ground-based independent aircraft's into

pilot ground

lost

the radio to be

ability link was

control be used

aircraft, terminate to idle ground.

separate flight.

command were right-hand

to

the and

The

throttles a to steep be

automatically spiraling

retarded descent to

the Engines

aircraft i, 3,

turned and

the

4 were

shutdown

46

_GINAI_ OF POOR

PA_ Q_ALITY

IS

(2) r.3

C"3

r...3

i:iiii

47

FICURE

33.

t:I,]GHT

CONTROl,

UPLJNK/DOWNLINK

RACK

INSTALLATION

48

ORIGINAL D_ POOR

PAGE IS _'_ _, rTv

ORIG/NAL OF POOR

PAGE QUALITY

IS

immediately be lowered

with and system

engine the

2 shutting

down

25 to The

seconds go to

later. leading

Landing edge up.

gear (There was

was was not

to no

stabilizer the

commanded aircraft.)

destruct

onboard

flight

termination

system

activated

as

the

RPV

system

and

aircraft

performed

as

planned.

ENGINEERING

PUOTOGRAPHIC/VIDEO

COVERAGFi

The the

CID

program

developed experiments,

total

motion/stil]

fJ]m

and

video

documentation and the through of tbe through

of

aircraft

insta]lation/integratJon, Ground total stop. total stop. flight Airborne flight cameras profile cameras profile

flight documented and and impact impact

operations, all of

controlled appropriate slideout appropriate slideout

impact portions deceleration portions deceleration

demonstration. of to of to the a the a

scenario all scenario

documented

Airborne The

Photographic black the RPV and

and

Video and

Coverage color and film crew was top in video control cameras cockpit mounted of his the to nose Jn cameras the were primarily cockpit. A

airborne to of II in

white

assigned total located response. aircraft in the the Jet

pilot

guidance

ground

high-speed the A passenger

engineering bin film and

were

strategically dummy nose of impact the also by

acquire in the

high-speed was one

camera in the the pilot (JPL). still

as

mounted

vertical of the

stabl]Jzer, wind (Army screen and through

cockpit Propulsion airborne to 34) 35

overlooking Laboratory film and aircraft

view

Two

helicopters prior to

NASA)

provided slideout (figure (figures

coverage A the CID Navy

impact

eventual positioned and 36)

rest. above total

P-3

"CAST-A-CLANCE" and and two

aircraft helicopters coverage.

itself to acquire

CID

aircraft film

profile

video

FIGURE

34.

U.S.

NA\rY

P.3

Wl

CAST-A-GLANCE

11

AIRCRAFT

49

FIGURE

35.

NASA

PHOTOGRAPHIC

HELICOPTER

FIGURE

36.

U.S.

ARMY

PHOTOGRAPHIC

HELICOPTER

ORIOINAE PLC-e _s
50 '0_ POOR QUA],ITY

Ground A up ground

Photographic

and

Video

Coverase coverage system by JPL. (figures 37 and 38) remote 100) systems to rest. was set file, were

photographic/video the impact site

around

perimeter and to

Comprehensive camera ( _

video, in place

infrared, and

specialty, prior time

documentary impact with v_deo through

operated were

deceleration and ground

These

systems

correlated and CRASH FIRE

airborne systems.

instrumentation/photographic

RESCUE

The in

principal an aircraft The

objective accident most the

of by

the

crash

fire a of

rescue fire-free on

(CFR)

service

is

to

save for

lives

establishing factors

evacuation effective and the

route rescue are response

occupants. training

important

bearing the

the time.

received,

effectiveness

equipment,

The USAF

equipment vehicles,

responding and an F-6

to

the

CID

site The

comprised B-720 aircraft of 10,539 of fire

a mix is

of

P-2,

P-4, by

P-10, C

P-13

foamer. of one C

served foam

]nde_

airports (AFFF), critical firefighting percent

requiring two fire foam area

a minimum trucks, for and Index

2,100 rapid square seconds airports

gallons is feet and

water square

for

production The practica] proper (90 Employing be

intervention

vehicle surface in

(RIV). feet. can 90

techniques, by foam)

]0,539 in 60

controlled

covered

extinguished

seconds.

Description approximately notification intervention minutes is

of of

Events. 90 seconds. the CFE

Tbe to

response Response move out at the

time time (alarm)

of is

the the to

CFR total

to

CID

impact t_me

was from fire t_me of 2 the

elapsed

the site.

first A

effective response NFPA.

(agent the

discharge)

accident of both

recommended

objective

the

7CAO

and

The be

major 6,500

pool square discharge. the

fire feet.

(figure This A narrow was wing,

39) fire but

on was

the

]eft

side

of with

the foam

fuselege in 45 and the of of

was seconds under

estimated after the of from the fire right

to the

controlled fire foam on its

initial side of

intense by the two fire

burning trucks the left original

along from side load

fuselage The rapid left

attacked of which

front the AMK,

aircraft. protected involvement.

control

fuselage

the

contained

After crews variable cabin were a

obtaining entered pattern were

control the two spray

of main

the cabin

fire

on

the with

left

side

of hose

the

fuselage, equipped and

the

rescue w_th in the

doors At this to which

portable the

lines

nozzles. nonsurvivable

time, occupants.

temperature These the this

smoke

considered by the not a

envlronmenta] compartment was the below cabin

conditions through the nor cabin from

sustained in it was

pool

of

AMK

had

entered Since the

baggage fire in

rupture

fuselage readily

during accessible

slldeout. to

floor, outside Accident Center virtually

firefighters

the

fuselage. and that full-scale well fire tests interior and conducted fuselage at the fires FAA have Technical been

experience have shown

established by the rescue of

unextinguishable very extinguish The large

firefighting agents external 507 and

services. were fires, pounds of to consumed and Ha]on extinguish _n "cool" 1211 was some an

Consequently, effort the to

quantities fires,

extinguishing small

interior USAF

control

fuselage. with "hidden"

A/S32P-13 skin fires.

vehicle pen@trator

containing nozzle

equipped of the

the aircraft interior

employed

51

FICURE37.

REMOTE CINE-SEXTANT TRACKE]_ SETUP

F]GURI

38.

CAMERA

STATION

52

C_!," _-,:-,},:

QUALI_'y

_2

t'_

53

The

quantities 1,300 of

of gallons agents

firefighting of AFFF;

agents and mdltiple 2,000

dispensed pounds

comprised of Halon

34,000 1211.

gallons This

of

water; quantity

enormous of fire

required

resupply

efforts

during

the

course

extinguishment. Conclusions

i. ICAO and

The NFPA

response (2

time

of

CFR

(90

seconds)

was

below

that

recommended

by

the

minutes).

2. which was

Control below

of that

the

major

pool by

fire FAA,

(6,500 ICAO,

square and

feet)

required

45

seconds

recommended

NFPA.

3. large

The

firefightJng over that

vehicles required in

with FAR

agents Part

responding for

to Index

the C

C]D

were

ip

excess

134.49

airports.

of

4. The the burnout

burning AMK which entered of the cabin interior.

in

the

cargo

hold

was

the

principal

cause

5. effectively hold.

The

single the

skin

penetrator required to

nozzle extinguish

was

not the

adequate large AMK

to fire

dispense in the cargo

agents

6. diagnosed

CFR soon

crew

report

stated

that

the

hidden

source

of

the

fire

was

not

enough.

7. coordination improved

Based

upon between

photographic the

coverage, crews CFR

it

was

evident command

that personnel

better would haw.

fireflghting of the

and

the

effectiveness

mission.

POST-IMPACT At the conclusion and in the of tlle CID,

(ACCIDENT) FAA An conducted

INVESTIGATION/ANALYSIS a "formal" full-scale team composed propulsion, The industry. directives in and their report team accident of human (figure

investigation specialist factors, 40) each was day

analysis. areas and members were to of

accident

investigation

aircraft fire FAA, be

performance, rescue NASA, as handled DOD, required (IIC)

structures, this and by on effort. NTSB

operations, formed to the with groups FAA

crash from

private the

Investigative

formed

Investigator-In-Charge

progress

respective

groups.

The

purpose

of forms,

this

experiment

was

to

assess

the

adequacy

of

the

current and

accident reporting and

reporting requirements. cockpit from

investigative The analyses and flight in refining research and procedures completed being will

procedures, also

documentation, a readout information The of

analyses, the with results flight that

include of this

data

voice

recorders, onboard

comparison data monitoring

obtained be made

various for

systems.

wl]l and

available The 720 all CID CID,

use

accident and the

investigation investigative The

techr, iques team on-site met 2

procedures. after the was, group Bfor

documentation and plans

days

formulated. within by 5 days group

investigation and

practical reports

purposes, were

after

initiation

factual

prepared

chairmen.

54

OmC_AL P_E m OF POOR QUALiTy

e.)

I o

-,,T

L_

55

The

experiment, in that

_nitially it was

proposed enthusiastically with recognized

and

pursued received expertise

by

the and in

FAA was

personnel, conducted by

was

success

professional type wing effort. openers to

personnel Because damage and to

required fire proved

disciplines damage to (figure be more

for 41) of

this and

of

the

unforeseen the the

catastrophic investigation

the was report

aircraft, met of by

challenge A detai]ed

which

investigators. factual reports is to be available.

integrated

the

group

EMERGENCY

EVACUATION

DATA

Investigation the lower A areas

has of

revealed the

that

the that

internal is, the by smoke. was

fire cargo II

originated compartments during

from

fuel below

fires the

in cobie of

fuselage; film buildup

floor. the of the

review

of

onboard rapid smoke

coverage of crack

cameras Tbe average

the

slideout forward from

aircraft until

revealed complete the

for 5 20

cameras seconds cargo was the

circumferential

structure

approximately and approximately that

seconds

slideout for the

complete aft section

obscuration, It has been aft

of

aircraft.

determined car So areas,

sidewall this

liners likely

were not in place for the reason for such fast smoke

forward and obscuratJon.

and

At 113

this

time, may of

the have

best

estimate from the

is

that CID area the

23

to

25

percent The of the

of total

full

compleme_t a limited brea_

of

people

escaped from evacuees

the

aircraft. forward aft of

includes

quantity a greater

evacuees of

cabin from

c_rcumferential

and

number

area

the

break.

Evacuation

from

the

cabin

is

based

on

the

following

major

considerations:

--

The and

only

usable

exit

was blocked

the by

].eft

forward

door fire).

(front

right

galley

door

overwing

exits

external

--

Approximately obscuratio_

seconds on

of onboard

time

from cameras).

slideout

to

complete

smoke

(based

--

In

spite and

of

dense

smoke, would

crew move

members toward

would door

instinctively used for

locate

forward

door,

passengers

aircraft

entry.

--

Assuming exit, than open to the

each the 5

evacuee total time to slide). cabin

requires to smoke

slightly (15 obscuration

more

than 5

i second was 200 seconds

to percent

go

through greater to

evacuate

seconds) (assume

seconds

required

door/deploy from the aft

Evacuation

is

based

on

the

following

major

considerations:

--

The

only

usable fire).

exit

was

the

right

rear

door

(left

rear

door

blocked

by

external

--

Approximately obscuration

20 (based

seconds on

of onboard

the

time

from

slideout

to

complete

smoke

cameras).

--

Assuming an than flight exit, the

each the 20

evacuee total seconds to time to

requires to smoke

slightly (33

more

than

1 second was 8 65

to

go

through greater for

evacuate

seconds) (assume deploy

percent

obscuration door 56 and

seconds

required

attendant

reach/open

slide).

ORIGINAE

PA_E

IS

5.

,..-t

57

How

many

additional speculative. to

people

could

have no smoke as

survived

and

escaped was

through installed

dense on

smoke the became

is

highly

Unfortunately, made

instrumentation density, to when or toxic the cabin

aircraft Therefore, untenable.

measure temperature, no estimate can be

gas fire

concentration. environment

OBSERVATIONS

Flight November 1984. A/DFRF

Plan 26, On

G--Flight 1984.

014 Flight 28,

(pilot 015 the

proficiency) technical NASA-A/DFRF findings and review,

was

successfully was conducted

conducted on November to Flight

on 27, NASA-

briefing FRR

November

1984, their

committee

presented on was the

the

senior

management

recommendations the decision

014 to "go

anomaly. with CID"

Based on senior as scheduled.

management's

rendered

The etc.,

AMK

flushing 30, 17. ]984, Day

and

fueling The the

operation, crew (DOF) briefing Flight to a alrcraft/systems

aircraft and Plan photo

pref]ights, briefing were 015 at of and

reconf_guration, were moved started 7:25 at to conducted to at a.m. ]akebed 3:30 s.m. were Winds o,

were

initiated. and of crew than 9:14 appeared

November runway with the

operations H--Flight call-to-stations a CID planned. temperature profile,

Flight and 3

ground at less

proceeded knots north The normal

reported

with

42F do_,

takeoff _mpact

(approximately (9:22:]1)

a.m.). to be

takeoff, and as

As

previously

indicated, teams was of began completed the impact

the

documentation

research/post-impact on As the CID

(accident) plus work 2 was days. Their

investigation investigation the security moved on-site.

their

investigation/analysls 5 days of work. and

within site was

their carcass

comp]eted, contractor

minimized,

sa]vage

REFERENCES

I. Program,

Management

Plan:

Full-Scale dated

Transport January 1984.

Controlled

Impact

Demonstration

DOT/FAA/CT-82/151,

dated

2. Basic November

Operations 1983.

Plan

Dryden

Flight

Vehicles,

Dryden

Handbook

8640,

dated

3. Controlled February 6,

Impact 1984.

Demonstration

(CID)

Project

Operations

Plan,

CID

84-86

4. 1983.

CID

Systems

Configuration

Management

Plan,

CID

83-01,

dated

October

12,

5.

Ground

Operations

Plan,

CID

84-23,

dated

October

29,

]984.

6. Center,

Management prepared

Information monthly (initial

Control report:

System

Report, 13,

NASA-Langley 1983).

Research

December

7. 1984.

CID

Drawing

Number

Reference

Document,

CID

84-36,

dated

October

30,

58

8. 9. I0.
MAJOR

CID Mission Rules, CID 84-28, dated November1984. CID Operating Rules, CID 84-33, dated November1984. CID Flight Cards, CID 84-35, dated November29, 1984.

CID/REPORTS.

i. Summary

Antimisting Report,

Fuel

Research

and dated

Development April 1986.

for

Commercial

Aircraft--Final

DOT/FAA/CT-86-7,

2. System February

Antimisting Investigation, 1987.

Fuel

(AMK)

Flight Electric

Degrader Co. Final

Development Report,

and

Aircraft

Fuel dated

Genera]

DOT/FAA/86-6,

3. Impact

Crashworthiness Demonstration

Experiment Program, Final

Summary Report

Full-Scale DOT/FAA/CT-85-20,

Transport dated

Controlled June 1986.

4. Controlled

Galley Impact

and

Overhead

Compartment Report

Experiment DOT/FAA/CT-85-33,

Results--Full-Scale dated December

Tral_sport ]985.

Demonstration,

5. Publication

Full-Scale 2395,

Transport dated April

Controlled 1985.

Impact

Demonstration,

NASA

Conference

6.

Impact

Data NASA

from

Transport Paper

Aircraft 2589, dated

During

Controlled 1986.

Impact

Demonstration,

Technical

September

7. Propulsion

Full-Scale Labor_tory

Transport Final

Controlled Report,

Impact

Demonstrstlon dated

Program April 1986.

Jet

DOT/FAA/CT-85-35,

8.

Full-Scale

Transport and

Controlled Report of

Impact

Demonstrntion-Aircraft Final Report

Accident DOT/FAA/ASF-

Investigation 86-001, dated

Experiment July 1986.

Investigation,

59

APPENDIX A

PARTICIPANTS

The the also

FAA

Technical conduct responsible

Center of the

(Atlantic CID and of safety,

City was the

Airport, serving as

New the

Jersey) CID

was

responsible Manager. kerosene,

for It

overall was

Pregram

for cabin

many

experiments; etc., onboard

i.e., the

antimisting test aircraft.

crashworthlness,

fire

NASA's

Langley

Research experiments of the

Center on

(Hampton, the

Virginia) Its

had major

crashworthiness/struccontribution (DAS) for was the the entire

tural/restraint development CID.

aircraft.

instrumentation/data

acquisition

systems

NASA's sibility flight

Ames/Dryden for control and all the

Flight design

Research and

Facility

(Edwards, of the handled the

California) piloted integration

had

the

respon-

implementation system. that It flew also

remotely the

vehicle's of all ft the did

and

guidance

experiments conduct FAA-Ames having ground, FAA

system and Center

hardware flight

on

airplane.

Additionally,

ground

operations. Field, AMK California) system was a test team member checkout,

Research the and

(Moffett for the

responsibility flight tests. (Washington, participated conducted

degrader

integretJon,

headquarters and and

D.C.) in the a

test

team

members

represented (FRR) team

headquarters i_ the C]D

management activities, NASA

FJight

Readiness (accident) team

Review

post-impact D.C.) test CID

investigation represented

experiment. headquarters

headquarters and the

(Washington, FRR team in

members

management

the

activities.

NASA-Ames member and

Research supporting

Center

(Moffett

Field,

California) support.

participated

as

FRR

team

flight

following

aircraft

Each

Government the

agency competitive of agreement and

utilized contracting were in

industry

support

to Formal the The

the

greatest

extent agreements Department

practical and of

through memorandums Defense and

process. force between governments.

Interagency FAA, CID NASA, team

(DOD),

international as

included

Government

industry

participants

fol]ows:

U.S.

Military o U.S.

Services Air Force

Air

Force

Flight

Test

Center

(Edwards crash

Air fire

Force

Base,

California)-air traffic

Range, control United

tracking, (ATC), States

communications, security, Air Force Force and etc. 1369th Base, remote

rescue,

Audio

Visual

Squadron

(DO!)

(Vandenberg coverage:

Air Manned

California)--Ground tracking

photographic/video

A-I

o U.S. Army -Air Force Flight Test Center (Edwards Air Force Base, California)-Photographic/video coverage helicopters

o U.S. Navy -Naval Air Test Center (Patuxent River, Maryland)--Flight Incident Recorder/Electronlc Locator Transmitter (FIR/ELT) experiment. Industry support provided by: Leigll Instruments LTD (Canada)--FIR/ELT dev_loper, test, support --USN/NavJISurface WeaponsCenter (Dalgren, VA)--Remote tracking/ radio controlled camera tracker system USN/P-3Orion Squadron (Pt. MuguTest Center, California)-P-3 Orion "Cast-A-Glance" airborne photographic/video coverage and

o National Transportation Safety Board (Washlngtor, D.C.)--Flight data and cockpit voice recorders (_)R/CVR) tape readout and analysis, and p_stimpact investigation team member o Department of Transportation -(DOT)/_AA

Civil AeroMedical Institute ([CAMI] OklahomaCity, Oklahoma)-Seat/restraint systems tests and analysis

Foreign o

Governments United Kingdom

--

Royal and

Aircraft analysis

Establishment--Antimlsting

kerosene

experiment

support

France -Airbus Industrie (Toulouse)/Freneh system, and Dynamic structural Science, anthropomorphic analysis. Incorporated system, system dummy, Embassy dummy, Industry (Phoenix, (Washington, data D.C.)-system by:

Seatrestraint experiment,

acquis_tlon provided

support Arizona)--

Seat/restralnt acquisition testssupport

instrumentation, integration,

and and

data

development,

I_dustry/Additiona] o Imperial additive tests and

Support Chemical (AVGARD analysis ) Industries of America (Wilmington, samp]ing and Delaware)--AMK characterization,

developer/supplier, support

A-2

General Electric (Evandale, Ohio)--AMK degrader program manager, design, developer, installation, and test support -- Garrett Pneumatic SystemsDivision (Phoenix, Arizona)--Degrader system manufacturer, integration, and test/support General Electric instrumentation, genera]_ aircraft (Edwards, California)--Engine/AMK fuel degrader integration, checkout, fuel analysis laboratory, and maintenance support simulation, tests,

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Pasadena, California)--A_ sampling, characterization, and analysis support

JPI, Photographic Section, Ground/Airborne (Pasadena, California)-Responsible for ground/airborne photographic/video system design, development, integration, test, and support. o Lockheed Aircraft analysis (Burbank, California)--"KRASH" mode] development and

o Boeing Commercial Airplane Company(Seattle, Washi_gton)--"DY_:AST"mode] development and analysis; Boeing 720 technical support o Boeing Technical Services (Seattle, support Washington)--Boeing 720 technical

o Republic Management ystems (Trevose, Pennsylvania)--Management of S seat/restraint system development and tests experiment (FAA) -- SI_U_A, Incorporated (Tempe, Arizona)--Seat/restraint system development, supplier, tests, and support; SOMTA seat model analysis o Kentron (Hampton, Virginia)--Instrumentation/data support o acquisition system

System Development Corporation (Hampton, Virginia)--Impact computer analysis program/support

dynamics

Lockheed Aircraft Services (Ontario, California)--Flight data and cockpit voice recorder(s) systems design, integration, checkout, and test support; and supplier of an FDR,data reduction and analysis -Teledyne Controls (West Los Angeles, California)--Manufacturer/ supplier for flight data acquisition unit Fairchild Aviation Recorders/Fairchild Weston Systems, Incorporated ( )--Supplier (On load to CID) state-of-the-art _)R and CVR; data readout and analysis --Sunstrand Data Control (Redmond,Washington)--Suppller CID) state-of-the-art FDR; data readout and analysis Lear Siegler, Incorporated ( )--Supplier CID) state-of-the-art solid state memorydevice (on loan to (on load to

A-3

DowChemical Company (Midland, Michigan)--Supplier hazardous materials packaging experiment(s) --

and integrator

for

Lawrence Packaging (Newark, NewJersey)--Suppller (E. Hartford,

of experiments propulsion

Pratt and _itney Aircraft system technical support

Connecticut)--B-720

Bendix (Long Beach, CalJfornia)--Autopilot/flight techrical support

control system

Jim Matthiesen (RedwoodCity, California)--Boelng 720 consultant, pilot, flight engineer, ground school and simulator instructor, Bon vi-vant, etc. Frank Sanders Aircraft (Chino, Callfornia)--Tailcone design, development and installation Cal Ysnde]l Industries (Fontana, California)--Aircraft frame generators salvsge contractor

A-4

APPENDIX CID CID-86 -01 -02 -03 -04 -05 -06 -07 -08 -09 -10 -1] -12 -13 -14 -15 CID-84 -01 -02 -03 -04 -05 -06 -07 -08 -09 -10 -Ii -12 -13 -]4 -]5 -16 -17 -]8 -19 -20 -21 -22 -23 -24 -25 -26 -27 -28 -29 CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID RISK ASSESSMENT OE CURRENT PROGRAM TEST CID CID CID SYSTEMS CONFIGURATION BASELINE DEFINITION SYSTEM DESIGN APPROACH MANAGEMENT A_ RISK DOCUMENTS

B INDEX

PLAN ASSESSMENT AND STATUS REVIEW

CID REMOTE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM FINAL DESIGN AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: UPLINK AIRBORNE AIRBORNE AIRBORNE AIRBORNE AIRBORNE AIRBORNE AIRBORNE AIRBORNE AIRBORNE AIRBORNE CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: DESCRIPTION: DESCRIPTION: DESCRIPTION: DESCRIPTION: DESCRIPTION: DESCRIPTION: DESCRIPTION: DESCRIPTION: DESCRJPTION:

POWER DISTRIBUTION LANDING GEAR THROTTLES NOSE GEAR STEERING FLAP S BRAKES AUTOPILOT INTERFACE TELEVISION SYSTEM FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM INTERFACE WITH EXPERI_IENTS

APPROACH PLAN FOR JANUARY 10, 1984

SYSTEM VALIDATION/INTEGRATJON GROUND EEFECTS ANALYSIS B-720/CID FLIGHT CONTROL AND

GUIDANCE

SYSTEM DOCUMENT

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES REQUIREMENTS PROJECT OPERATIONS PLAN 720/CID SIMULATION SYSTEM VALIDATJON/INTEGRATION PB20D AUTOPILOT _INTENANCE COMBINED SYSTEM MISSION RUI,ES FACT SHEET FLIGHT ] FLIGHT FLIGHT IA CARDS TEST PLAN TEST _M]AL FOR

PLAN

FOR 28,

FEBRUARY 1984

14,

1984

FEBRUARY

CARDS LABORATORY PREFI,IGNT

REMOTE CONTROLLED VEHICLE FLIGHT 003 FLIGHT CARDS FLIGHT 004 FLIGHT CARDS DAS COMBINED SYSTEM TEST FLIGHT 005 FLIGHT CARDS DAS FUNCTIONAL TEST PLAN FLIGHT 006 FLIGHT CARDS COMBINED SYSTEM TEST FOR FLIGHT 007 FLIGHT CARDS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS FI, IGHT 008 FLIGHT CARDS FLIGHT 009 FLIGHT CARDS FLIGHT 010 FLIGHT CARDS MISSION RULES: UN!_NNED PROCEDURE LOG

PLAN

JULY TEST

]0,

1984 AND ANALYSIS

PLAN

FLIGHT

-30 -31 -32 -33 -34 -35 -36 -37 -38 -39 -40 -35N

CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID CID C,]D

MISSION MISSION OPERATING OPERATING COMBINED FLIGHT DRAWING FLIGHT FLIGHT GUIDANCE FLIGHT FI,]GHT

FLIGHT FLIGHT RULES RULES SYSTEMS 011

PLAN CARDS (GROUND) (AIRBORNE) TEST CARDS DOCUMENT REFERENCE CARDS CARDS VERIFICATION/VALIDATION TEST RESULTS FDR OCTOBER 22, 1984

FLIGHT

NUMBER 012 0]3

FLIGHT FLIGHT

AND 014 015

CONTROL FLIGHT FLIGHT

CARDS CARDS (UNMANNED)

8-2

APPENDIX C DEGRADER SYSTEM JET-A/AMK BUILD-UPPLAN (PRELIMINARY) The first test buildup plan assures that the following sequence of degrader runs is followed. Tbis wl]l lead to a fully qualified degrader to perform the CID misslon. In order: I. 2. 3. 4. 5. Start and run in level flight on Jet-A Run through speed accels and dece]s on Jet-A LANDWIT_ DEGRADER RUNNING ONJET-A Takeoff with degrader running on Jet-A Repeat I througb _ on A_ guidelines will be met at all times:

Furthermore, the following

During qualification testing, the number of degraders running during the landings and takeoffs wl]l be sequentially increased from I to 4. During qualification test (] through 5 above), only one engine will A_ during all landings and takeoffs. To implement this qua]iflcation, FLIGHT Plan
I

be running on

the following
ENGINE Nb_IBER

flight

plan is established:

TE/JET-A

TF/JET-A

TO/JET-A

TE/JET-A

L/JET-A
D L/JET-A TO/JET-A TO/AMK

_/J_rK
TOIJET-A LIA_X TO/_MK LIJFT-A

@
@ LIJFT-A

L/JET-A

TOIJET-A LIJET-A

TOIAMK L/JET-A

TOI3ET-A LIJET-A

TOIJET-A LIJET-A

TO/JET-A L/AMK

G*

TOIAMK

TOl_krK

TOIAMK

TOIAMK

TE L TO @ G*

TEST

= LAND = TAKEOFF = NO DEGRADER OPERATION FOR to tank a TO CID tank, to SATISFY ON THIS AMK REQUIREMENT FLIGHT will but always can stay in that Jet-A tank to engine B ABOVE

= ENGINES Once flights

QUALIFIED AMK added - AMK

NOTE: Manned

engine

cross-feed

C-I

APPENDIX D TYPICALFLIGHTPLANS ANDSCHEDULES For each flight plan, there are a series of events which are required prior to f]ight. Flight Plans C and D below are typical for the Jet-A only flight and the first AbIKflight. Additions were identified such as Flight Readiness Review (FRR) Committees (Ad Hoc NASA-Amesnd FRRboard NASA-A/DFRF) a Review/Meetings, FAA/NASA flight go-ahead, etc. Briefly described below are typical times of that flight. o
FLIGHT PLAN C--FLIGHTS 005

preflight
AND 006

plan act_vitles

nnd ,_ajor test

June

28-30,

1984

Degrader Degr,lder

Systems Syste,

Chocks slEny, ine

(only) R,,ns

July

2-3, TBD

]984

Technical

Briefing

(YASA-A/DFRF of F]ight mission P]an C;

management--overview i.e., go/no-go Procedures Test HOLIDAY (CST) major flight criteria, review

ta.qks, etc. for

rul_,r,,
System,,:

Co_l.',ined

July

4, TEB

1984

Pre-CST

meeting

July

6,

1984

CST--ALL control aircraft/ dress

systems cockpit,

up;

_.e.,

yround room, an_

remote

control -Flight

experiments of

step-by-step Plan C

rehearsal ight Engines

July

7,

1984

Pre-f]

July

9, TBD

1984

Pre-flight

Aircraft

(includJnF

fuel]

Crew plan

brief-final review

procedures

and

f]J_ht

July Major Test

I0 Items

&

12,

1984

FliF_hts

005

and

006

I.

Takeoff-degrader

on

Jet-A,

Engine

Number

2. 3.

Fuel Ground

degrader effects

tests tests

Jet-A,

Engines

1,

2,

and

4.

Airspeed

calibrations

D- 1

Langley

experiments

checks

(DAS/camera

system)

6.

CID

profiles

remote

piloted

vehicle

(RPV)

control

7.

Land

degrader

on

Jet-A

engine

number

8.

Flight o

termination PLAN D -

shutdown FLIGHT 007

FLIGHT

Post-flight

Plan

C anomaly malntenance/repair-failures, aircraft, d_screpanies,

Systems/experiment systems, ere. or experiment

squawks,

AMK

blender

set-up

and

checkout

Blend

AMK

fuel,

sample,

characterize

Flight Technical

Readiness Briefing

Review

(prior

to

first

AMK

flight)

_MK/degrader

systems

checks

Flight CST

configuration

degrader/engine

ground

runs

Pre-fllght

engines

Pre-flight Crew Brief

aircraft

(including

fuel)

August

3,

1984

Flight

007

Major i.

Test Takeoff

Items degrader on - AMK Engine Number 3; Jet-A Engine Number 2

2.

Fuel

degraders

tests

- AMK

Engines

2 and

3;

Jet-A

Engines

I and

3.

CID

profiles

RPV

control

4.

Approach

to

Runway

25

5.

Land Engines

Runway

22 4

- Airborne

Control

- Degraders

on

- #d_K

Engine

Number

2;

Jet-A

I and

6.

Takeoff

Runway

22

RPV

control

degraders

off

7.

Land

Runway

22

- RPV

control

degraders

off

8.

Remote

Pilot

(PP)

ground

operations;

i.e.,

_ose

wheel

steering

and

brakes

D._2

9.

Remote o

engine PLAN

shutdown E

FLIGHT

Post-flight

Plan

Systems/experlment

anomaly

maintenance/repair

Blend

AMK

fuel, brief

sample,

characterize

Technical

AMK/degrader

systems

checks

Flight CST

configuration

degrader/engine

ground

runs

Pre-flight

engines

Pre-flight Crew brief

aircraft

(_ncluding

fuel)

August

13,

1984

Flight

Major I.

Test Takeoff

Items remote pilot degrader off Runway 22

2.

Land

remote

pilot

degraders

off

Runway

22

3.

Takeoff Jet-A

airborne ], 3,

control and 4

degraders

on

AMK

Engine

Number

2;

Engines degrader

4.

Fuel

tests

- AM](

Engines

1 and

2;

Jet-A

Engine

5.

CID

profiles

RP

control

6.

Approach

to

Runway

25

7. 8.

Land

Runway

25 for

RP

degraders operation

off on

- RPV lakebed

control

Configure

9.

Takeoff

remote

pilot

i0.

CID

profile

RP

control

11.

Land

degraders

on

AM](

Engire

Number

I;

Jet-A

Engines

2,

3,

and

1)-3

FLIGHT

PLAN

F Post-flight Plan E anomaly sample, maintenance/repair

Systems/experiment Blend AMK fuel, brief systems

characterize

Technical AMK/degrader Flight CST Pre-flight Pre-flight Crew August Major i. 2. 3. 27, Test Takeoff Land 1984 Items - remote pilot Flight brief

checks degrader/engine ground runs

configuration

engines aircraft (including fuel)

- degraders off

off

- Runway 22 - AMK

22

- remote

pilot

- degraders

- Runway on

Take off - airborne control Jet-A Engines 2, 3, and 4 Fuel CID degrader profl]es tests RP - AMK

- degraders

Engine

Number

];

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. I0.

Engines

1 and

4; Jet-A

Engines

2 and

control 25 off on - RPV lakebed off - Runway 16 control

Approach Land

to Runway 25 for

Runway

- degraders RP operation pilot control

Configure Takeoff CID

- remote RP

- degraders

profile

]I. Land airborne Jet-A Engines

control - degraders I, 2, and 3

on

- AMK

Engine

Number

4;

D-4

FLIGHT

PLAN

FINAL

"MANNED"

FLIGHT

Post-fllght

Plan

Systems/experiment systems, etc. or experiment

anomaly

maintenance/repair fsi]ures,

aircraft, discrepancies,

squawks,

A_

b]ender

set-up

and

checkout

Blend

_MK

fue],

sample,

characterize

Flight Technical

Readiness briefing

Review

(prior

to

f_nal

AMK

flight)

AM_/degrader

system

checks

FLight CST

configuration

degrader/engine

ground

runs

Pre-flJ

ght

engines

Pre-flight Crew brief

aircraft

(including

rue])

This FRR their

sequence Committees findings and At

of

events Hoc

wi]] Ames

follow and his A/DFRF

tile Flight Board) the CID

Plan will to G, for Dr.

sequence

of

events. and Manager

The provide (Marty NASA

(Ad and

meet, Dr. Bill

deliberate, A/DFRF Site would G and Ballhaus,

recommendations prior the state to

to Flight of

program,

Knutson), NASA-Ames. and FAA genera]ly

subsequently sometime of their

recommendations Plan

Director, apprise H, and

Bs]lhaus Plans

management solicit

readiness

F]ight

concurrence.

September

i,

1984

FLIGHT

- WINDOW

OPENS

Major i. 2.

Flisht Takeoff CID -

Items remote -

- manned pilot control degraders off Runway 17

profile

RP

3. 4.

Land

remote for PLAN

pilot CID H

degraders

off

Runway

22

Configure o FLIGHT

mission CID

The

original dress

Flight rehearsal

Plans of

and

objectives mission

were (FLight

to Plan for

accomplish GO; if

complete with

manned minimum mission.

the the

CID crew,

successful flight/CID

anomalies,

remove

reconfigure

"unmanned"

D-5

As each flight plan currently progresses, the magnitude of the logistics of an hour or two turn-around from G to H with an all-up status of all ground facilities, and aircraft, systems, and experiment, being required, it is not clearly obvious that this objective can be satisfied. A comprehensive review of all the final pieces of the CID is in progress, and may not be in place until Flight Plan F. FLIGHTH CID Mission - Unmanned i. 2. Tskeoff - remote pilot Perform CID - AMK/degraderson - Runway17

1)-6

APPENDIX

CID

PILOT/CREW

REPORT

The the

following remote

report control

is vehicle

provided

by

the

CID

RPV

pilot,

flight

test

engineer,

and

laboratory

supervisor:

Introduction. the first and flight runway sterile final airplane was then a objectives 17 and

This only

was flight were

the to to

fifteenth be flown fly

flight without the

of a B-720 feet

the

CID

Test crew from

Program onboard. ]akebed while onto the

l,ut was Tile

safety aircraft above

remotely

climb It was

to

approximately on then the to be flo_

2,300

the

ground the to and

positioning area. approach to

the

airplane where a the to

racetrack descent

pattern around would to which the the be

inside racetrack started

designated the allow

northerly ground into The just

impact

prior

gravel

s]Jdeout the

area. wings

It and

expected fuel

slide

cutters was

wo,]d im

rt,pture the

create

spillage.

flight

completed

manner

descr_led.

Preflight, starts (flight starts onboard the takeoff the the and were

En$ine done

Start, by the and to go

and onboard Buzz

Final crew

Checks. of Tom

The

cockpit

sett, p (pilot),

and VJc and

entwine Holton engJnP The tc_ (,f and

McMurtry The any airplane in assure the

engineer), appeared cre_nembers takeoff. the area. P-3 NASA photo One since

Sa_D, er

(technician). and w_thout the delay to had

checks

efficiently to was There a

significant at that King to for getting

problems. pr_c,r fo_ was out

started security The Control two

evacuate minor

5 minutes clearance everyone Air safety the

planned

personnel photo were Room

sterile Navy then

helicopters, airborne gave the and

chase, mission,

airplane

ready

support takeoff.

clearance

Takeoff and EPR. minor move and the

and

Initial

Climb. gradually were

Following increased bo]ted together power the 2.5

a to

countdown, takeoff for this

the power flight The

brakes of

were

released 2.66 a to

throttles throttles

approximately and that trim airplane the trim caused started

The

variation slightly therefore,

between nose but it a down small caused

engine from aft no

settings. degree of the

elevatc_r as the

setting stick

accelerated,

movement problem.

slowed

movement,

The

acceleration Runway sensitive part less of contrast 17

appeared t_sing some than on

to the

be

normal pedal

and

the

airplane system.

was

steered The

down was the

Lakebed quite first had picture.

rudder

steering deviations in

steering during

and the

minor The some

directional color TV previous

resulted the nose of an provided

roll.

installed flights

the

a_rplane

but

adequate

At

speed

of

80

knots,

the

nose was

when used

steering to provide

was

disengaged, directlona]

and control. VI, VR the

thereafter, It V2 was

aerodynamic quite were and the 151

rudder and 10 At and VR,

control completely fast

effective set about takeoff. rate knots, was

satisfactory. to allow was more moved away gently was

The speed

calculated margin during between to

speeds rotation V2. but of

knots the

the and V 2

stick slower.

aft

noticeably the

Liftoff

very

close

speed

airplane

climbed

nicely.

E-I

Using the attitude gyro and the TV picture, the pitch attitude for climb could be held relatively constant. After assuring that a positive rate of climb was continuing and that the hydraulic pressure was normal, the landing gear was selected up. The flaps stayed at 30 degrees throughout the flight. Upon reaching 200 feet above ground level (AGL), a left turn to 120 degrees heading was started and the engine power reduced to approximately 2.35 EPR. The airplane climbed to 4,600 meansea level (MSL) (2,300 feet AGL). A small right aileron trim bias had to be set in to maintain a constant ]leading. This resulted in about one or two degrees of indicated right bank angle. The error was thought to be a result of gyro precession during the takeoff. Tbis bank angle error, even though small, was distracting as it had been on previous flights.
Racetrack airplane altitude the aileron Pattern. was to Using tile raw data on and the steering desired system straight again to bar needles, leg the on a the constant the at track and downwind, heacling. established 4,600 be trim closely bias feet had southbound MSI. held. to be The E_ile downwind allowed away hold

approximately

guidance flying

adjusted

Base right into bar bank,

Le$. to the was

As command turn, held

the a the

base right

leg

was

approached, However, drift to until center. and hold the

the once outside the This no

vertical the airplane track the

steering had if the

bar been

moved rolled

turn. would order of

airplane In left

steering turning was the

centered. had to I/2 on be inch

desired was real

track steering to

while bar

angle

increased

vertical

approximately experienced

similar

conditions

previous

flights

caused

problems.

Final lead-ln was

Approach. line and on the

Turning the ground

onto

the

final be seen clear the

approach, on as the on TV some was

the

target

area but the When to the

and

the

could not

screen, flights. nose

contrast the

low

picture

was

as

"terminal the desired

guidance" glldeslope. was area had raw adjusted fence. to be

became As to Instead flown back

active, the

airplane was

down

intercept pitch panel of drifted minor glideslope held the the

glldeslope the TV the and

intercepted, X on the It steering down The the was bar

attitude target low that and the

place of up

boreslght the the glldeslope. pitch up be and down

orange also had the

holding to

glldeslope,

the

airplane

determined

g]ides]ope

indicator Several

indication allowed speed an very

errors. approximate close to

oscillations to while coming

through autothrottle final.

calibration 146 knots

made.

While slightly When center altitude

making right

the of 200 a

glldeslope the feet center

and

pitch and

adjustments, a correction was there Review

the to still seemed many (FRR) was on

airplane the left

drifted was right enough senior members a and about factor the at made. of

llne, the

passing and to

altitude, was back. and in

airplane but

slightly to times Board be by

go-around correct personnel

considered, The Flight the a concern

expressed

engineering the in The lack the ground of

Readiness control the remotely

redundancy to rules required

overall make the

system reaching

certainly first 150 feet,

decision

continue activated

and

touchdown after controlled

the

attempt.

continuation

flight test engineer that altitude.

instrumentation

E-2

APPENDIX F DISTRIBUTION LIST

Civil Aviation Authority Aviation House 129 Kingsway London WC2B 6NN England Embassy of Australia (I) Civil Air Attache 1601 Mass. Ave. NW Washington, DC 20036

(5)

DOT-FAA AEU-500 (4) American Embassy APO New York, NY 09667

University of California (I) Service Dept. Institute of Transportation Standard Lib 412 McLaughlin Hall Berkely, CA 94720 British Embassy (I) Civil Air Attache ATS 3100 Mass Ave. NW Washington, DC 20008 Director DuCentre Exp DE LA (I) Navigation Aerineene 941 Orly, France ACT-61A AAL-400 M-493.2 Bldg. IOA

Scientific & Tech. Info FAC (I) ATTN: NASA Rep. P. O. Box 8757 BWI Airport Baltimore, MD 21240 Northwestern University Trisnet Repository Transportation Center Evanston, IL 60201 ANE-40 AS0-52C4 APM-13 Nigro AEA-61 ADL-32 AES-3 ANM-60 North (2) (2) (2) (3) (I) (1) (2) APM- I APA-300 AGL-60 (I) Library

(2) (2) (5)

ASW-53B AAC-m4D ACE-66 ADL-I

(2) (2) (2) (I) (1) (1)

(i) (I) (2)

ALG-300 ACT-5

F-1

(I) Faa, Chief, Civil Aviation Assistance Group Madrid, Spain c/o American Embassy APONewYork, NY09285-0001 Dick Tobiason (I) ATA of America 1709 New York Avenue, Washington, DC 20006

AI Astorga (I) Federal Aviation Administration (CAAG) American Embassy, Box 38 APO New York, NY 09285-0001 Burton Chesterfield, DOT Transportation 6500 South McArthur Oklahoma City, OK DMA-603 (I) Safety Inst. Blvd. 73125

NW

FAA Anchorage ACO (I) 701C Street, Box 14 Anchorage, Alaska 99513 FAA Atlanta ACO (I) 1075 Inner Loop Road College Park, Georgia

FAA Fort Worth ACO (I) P. O. Box 1689 Fort Worth, TX 76101 Faa Long Beach ACO (I) 4344 Donald Douglas Drive Long Beach, CA 90808 FAA Los Angeles P. O. Box 92007 Worldway Postal Hawthorne, CA ACO Center 90009 (I)

30337

FAA Boston ACO (I) 12 New England Executive Burlington, Mass. 01803

Park

FAA Brussels ACO (I) c/o American Embassy, APO New York, NY 09667 FAA Chicago ACO (I) 2300 E. Devon, Room 232 Des Plains, Illinois 60008 FAA Denver (I) 10455 E. 25th Ave., Aurora, CO 98168 Frank Taylor (I) 3542 Church Road EIlicott City, MD

FAA New York ACO (I) 181 S. Frankline Ave., Room 202 Valley Stream, NY 11581 FAA Seattle ACO (I) 17900 Pacific Highway Soutll C-68966 Seattle, Washington 98168

Suite

307 FAA Wichita ACO (I) Mid Continent Airport Room 100 FAA Bldg. 1891 Airport Road Wichita, KA 67209

21043

Mr. Gale Branden (FAA) 5928 Queenston Street Springfield, VA 22152

(I)

Richard E. Livingston, Jr. Director, Aerotech Operations the IAPA Group 1805 Crystal Drive Suite 1112 South Arlington, VA 22202 National Transportation 800 Independence, Ave., Washington, D.C. 20594

(I) for

Dr. Hans A. Krakauer (I) Deptury Chairman, International Airline Pilots Assoc. Group Apartado 97 8200 Albufeira, Portuga! Geoffrey Lipman (I) Executive Director, President Conseil International Foundation of Airline Passenger Assocs. Case Postale 463, 1215 Geneve 15 Aeroport, Suisse, Geneva

du

Safety S.W.

Board

F-2

NASA-Ames/Dryden Flight Research P. O. Box 273 Edwards, CA 94035-0025 Ted Ayers, M/S D-O (I) Russ Barber, M/S OP (5) Ken Hodge, M/S OP (I) Tom McMurtry (I) Marty Knutson, M/S DO (I) US Navy Naval Air Test Center Patuxent River, MD 20670 Dan Walters, SY70D (I) Jim Matthiesen, 414 W. Oakwood Redwood City, Consultant Blvd. Ca 94061

Center

FAA E&D Office Ames Research Center P. O. Box 25 Moffett Field, CA 94035 Tom Walsh, ADL-5 (I) Barry Scott, ADL-5 (5) FAA E&D Field Office Langley Research Center Hampton, VA 23665 Harry Verstynen, ADL-5

(i)

(I)

FAA Northwest Mountain Region 17900 Pacific Highway South C-68966 Seattle, WA 98168 Bud Parker, ANM-IO0 (I) FAA Aircraft Certification Office 4344 Donald Douglas Drive Lon 9 Beach, CA 90808 Tony Bonanno, ANM-131L (I) Cal YandelI CA (I) Drive NJ Industries (I)

John D. Gregoire (5) Jet Propulsion Laboratory California Institute of 4800 Oak Grove Drive Pasadena, CA 91109 Frank Sanders (I) 7000 Merrill Avenue Chino, Ca 91719 Jim Woodall (I) 2443 Watt Road Ramona, CA 92065 Mr. HolIis H. McKeag (I) Dow Chemical Co. Bldg. 2020 Midland, Michigan 48640 Mr. George Coffinberry General Electric I Neumann Way Cincinnati, Ohio 45215

Technology

Fontana,

Leo Garodz 517 Whitman Turnersville,

08012

Mr. Graham Leroy Lockheed Aircraft Ontario, CA

(I) Services

(i)

Mr. Cecil Morgan (I) General Electric Edwards Test Center Edwards, CA 93523 Mr. Edmond BolIay (I) French Embassy 2164 Florida Ave., NW Washington, DC 20008

Mr. Jim L. McAbee (I) Imperial Chemical Industries Specialty Chemicals Division Wi|mington, DE 19897 Dr. Larry Wolfe (I) College of Technology University of Houston Houston, TX 77004

of

America

'_%U.S, GOVERNMENT

PRINTING

OFFICE:

1987-704-075/60144

F-3

ASF-I AST-I APM-I AVS-I

- Office - Office - Program - Associate

of of

Aviation Science

Safety & Advanced

(I) Technology Service (I) (I) Standards (I)

Engineer

& Maintenance for (I) Division

Administrator of Airworthiness Engineering

Aviation

AWS-I - Office AWS-IO0 - Aircraft

(I) LIST ACT-I/-2 FAA-HDQS N. Blake, ADL-2A (I) D. Schroeder, APM-740 (I) D. Kirsch, AWS-120 (I) F. Delgandio, ASF-IO0 (5) T. McSweeny, AWS-IO0 (I) D. Nelson, AWS-120 (I) T. Horeff, AWS-IO0 (I) D. Salvano, AWS-120 (I) S. Soltis, ANM-IO2N (I)

CID DISTRIBUTION FAA TECHNICAL CENTER B. Singer, A-CT-300 (I) J. Reed, ACT-340 (50) N. Miller, ACT-301 (I) B. Wesfield, ACT-320 (I) B. Fenton, ACT-320 (5) C. Caiafa, ACT-330 (I) D. Johnson, ACT-330 (5) J. Traybar, ACT-330 (I) Gus Sarkos, ACT-350 (I) Po Versage, ACT-350 (5) T. O'Brien, ACT-310 (I) P. Jones, ACT-310 (I) NASA-Langley Research Center Hampton, VA 23665 Charles Blankenship, M/S 118 Mike Card, M/S 244 (I) Bob Hayduk, M/S 495 (5) Emilio Alfaro, M/S 495 (I) Ed Fasanella, M/S 495 (I)

(I)

NASA-HDQS Sam Venneri, Code R (I) Dr. Ray CoIIoday, (I) NASA-Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA 94035 Tom Snyder, M/S 200-3 (I)

F-4

OI_IGINAL

PAG_

l_

DOTI FAA/CT-87110
4. Title ond Subt_,le _, Rmport r)aOe

SUMMARYREPO2T--FULL-SCALE TRANSPORT CONTROLLED IMPACT DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

___S.EB.__
*_. Pl_rfr_r_irig Or_nizolion Co_

At,T-300 ._. _r_._,,,_ _ede,_a! Avial!.on Admin_strat, Aeronautics and Space Administration io_rjaT_ .... '.

FAA Techr_LcaL Center, At!antic C_ty Airport, NASA-Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA NASA-Ames/Dryden _!_,qht Research Fac_Li_ty, Edwards, CA 93523 l].S. Departmeqt of Transportation Federal Av_at'_:on Administration Associate Adm'rLnistrator for Aviation Washington, DC 20590
_oDlemeng_"y I_ete_

NJ 0840: 23665

DOTIFAA/OT-._7/:O

Standards

_. _._o,_,_..=_,cod_

16,

Ab_0ract

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducted a full-scale air-to-surface impact-survivable "impact demonstration" with a remotely piloted transport aircraft on December !, !_84, at Edwards Air Force Base, California The test article consisted of experiments, special equipments, and supporting systems, such as antimisting kerosene (AMK), crashworthiness structuraI/restraint, analytical modeling, cabin fire safety, flight data recorders, post-impact investigation, instrumentation/data acquisition systems, remotely piloted vehicle/fiight control systems, range and flight safety provisions, etc. This report describes the aircraft, experiments, systems, activit_es, and events which !ead up to the Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID). An overview of the final "mnmanned" remote contro! flight and sequence of _mpact events a_e de!ine_ted_ Preliminary post CID observations are presented

]7.

Key

Words

Control led Impact Demonstration Antimisting Kerosene (AMK) Crashworthiness Cabin Fire Safety Analytical Modeling Data Acquisition Remotely Piloted Vehicle
|_. Security C|olli|, (| 6i! r_ort}

Document is available through the National Service, Springfield,

to the U.S. Public Technical Informat_un Virginia 22161

:_),

Seeul*ity

Cle.sit.

(,_f ohi

pa_e)

Unclassified Fo,m DOT F 1700.7 m-72)

R_odvc0|_

Unclassified
_f cerealted p=g_ outho_|zed

21.

No.

otP_gem

_2.

Pric*