Smullyan: Chapter 5

1. Definitions:
S is consistent S is -inconsistent iff iff no sentence is both provable and refutable in S. , for some formula F, x(Fx) is provable, but, for every -, Fn is refutable. n [-inconsistency implies consistency but not vice versa.] S is axiomatizable iff the set of Gdel numbers of the provable sentences is 1 (i.e. unbounded existential quantifiers but only bounded universal quantifiers). everything provable in S1 is provable in S. there is a formula in S that enumerates A. -1. If nA, m(F(n ,m) is provable in S). -2. If nA, m(F(n ,m) is refutable in S). A={n: F(n ) is provable in S} Something analogous holds for n-tuples. A={n: F(n ) is true} Something analogous holds for n-tuples. all true 0-sentences are provable in S. it is either true and provable in S or false and refutable in S

S1 is a subsystem of S A set A is enumerable in S F(v1, v2) enumerates A in S

iff iff iff

F(v1) represents A in S F(v1) expresses A S is 0-complete A 0-sentences is correctly decidable in S

iff iff iff iff

2. Overall Goal
This time we consider systems with all the formulas of PA and which include first-order logic but with different arithmetic axioms. We want to prove. Theorem G: If PA is -consistent, then it is incomplete

In chapter IV, we proved that PA is axiomatizable. Given this result, theorem G follows from the following two theorems.

Theorem A:

If S is any axiomatizable, -consistent system in which all true 0sentences are provable, then S is incomplete.

Theorem B:

All true 0-sentences are provable in PA.

3. Proof of Theorem A
3.1. Step 1: We get A from A

Assume we can prove A. Theorem A: If S is any axiomatizable, -consistent system in which all 1-sets are enumerable, then S incomplete. It is easy to get A from A if we can get the following Lemma: Lemma 2: If all true 0-sentences are provable in S, then all 1-sets are enumerable in S.

We will prove a generalized version of Lemma 2, viz. a version that applies to 1-relations as well as 1-sets. Proof of Lemma 2: Let R(x1 xn) be an arbitrary 1-relation. There is a 0-relation S such that: R(x1 xn) iff y(S(x1 xn, y)) For the use of a single unbounded existential quantifier at the beginning of a sentence is what distinguishes 1-relations from 0-relations. Let F(v1vn, vn+1) express S(x1 xn, y). Then F(v1vn, vn+1) enumerates R(x1 xn). For, assume that all true 0-sentences are provable in S: 1. If R(k k ) holds, then there is a k such that S(k k , k) holds. If so, F(k - , k
1 n 1 n 1 n

-) is a true -sentence and, hence, provable in S (by assumption). k 0 2. If R(k1 kn) does not hold, for every k S(k1 kn, k) does not hold. Hence, for every k F(k - , -) is false. So, ~F(k - , -) is a true -sentence and, hence, k k k k
1 n 1 n 0

provable in S (by assumption). I.e., for every k, F(k 1 -n, -) is refutable in S. k k By the definition of enumerability, and 1. and 2., R(x1 xn) is enumerable in S. And since R was arbitrary, all 1-relations and sets are enumerable in S. Now we know that we can get A from A. But how do we get A?

3.2.

Step 2: We get A from Theorem 3

Assume we can prove Theorem 3: Theorem 3: Suppose A(v1, v2) enumerates P* in S. Let a be the Gdel number of the formula v2 ~A(v1, v2) and let G be the sentence v2~A(a , v2). Then: 1. If S is consistent, then G is not provable in S. 2. If S is -consistent, then G is also not refutable in S. From Theorem 3 we can get A. Proof of A: Suppose: S is an axiomatizable, -consistent system in which all 1-sets are enumerable. Since S is axiomatizable, P is 1 (by def. axiomatizable). If P is 1, then P* is 1 (we proved this in the chapter IV). By the supposition, P* is enumerable. By Theorem 3, G is neither provable nor refutable in a -consistent system. So, S is incomplete. Therefore, A (by conditional proof). But how do we get Theorem 3? 3.3. Step 3: How do we get Theorem 3?

First we prove the -Consistency Lemma, which we will need later on. -Consistency Lemma: If S is -consistent, then every set enumerable in S is representable in S. More specifically, suppose S is -consistent and F(v1, v2) is a formula that enumerates A in S. Then, he formula v2 F(v1, v2) represents A in S.

Proof of the -Consistency Lemma: Assume: S is -consistent and F(v1, v2) is a formula that enumerates A in S. -1. Suppose nA. Then for some m, the sentence F(n ,m) is provable in S. Hence the sentence v2 F(n , v2) is provable in S. 2. Conversely, suppose v2 F(n , v2) is provable in S. If n is not in A, then all the - 0 - 1 - 2 -sentences F(n , -), F(n , -), F(n , -), F(n ,m) would be refutable in S, which would mean that S is -inconsistent (since v2 F(n , v2) is provable in S). So

if S is -consistent, then n must be in A. By (1) and (2), the formula v2 F(v1, v2) represents A in S.

Next we have to prove Lemma 1: Lemma 1: For any formula H(v1) with Gdel number h: 1. H(h ) is provable in S iff hP* 2. H(h ) is refutable in S Proof of Lemma 1: For any formula H(v1) and any number n, the sentence H(n )H[n ] (unabbreviated: H(n)v1 (v1=n H(v1))) is not only arithmetically true, but is a theorem of first-order logic with identity. Hence it is actually provable in S (since all axioms of Groups I and II are axioms of S). Therefore, H(n ) is provable in S iff H[n ] is provable in S, and H(n ) is refutable in S iff H[n ] is refutable in S. In particular, if h is the Gdel number of H(v1), then H(h ) is provable in S iff H[h ] is provable in S iff hP*. Similarly, H(h ) is refutable in S iff hR*. (For the Gdel number of H[h ] is d(n) and, per definitionem, nA* iff d(n)A.) Next, we have to prove Theorem 1: Theorem 1: Suppose S is simply consistent and H(v1) is a formula whose negation represents the set P* in S. Then the sentence H(h ) is neither provable nor refutable in S, where h is the Gdel number of the formula H(v1). Proof of Theorem 1: Assume: S is consistent and H(v1) is a formula whose negation represents the set P* in S. Since the negation of H(v1) represents P*, for any number n, the sentence H(n ) is (because ~H(n ) is provable iff nP* - that is what it means that ~H(v) represents P* - and to prove that is to refute H(n )). refutable in S iff nP* In particular, H(h ) is refutable in S iff hP*. But it is also the case that: H(h ) is provable in S iff hP* (by Lemma 1). Therefore, H(h ) is provable in S iff H(h ) is refutable in S. This means that H(h ) is either both provable and refutable in S or neither. By the assumption of consistency, H(h ) is not both provable and refutable in S; hence, it is neither. Therefore, Theorem 1, by conditional proof. Note: From Theorem 1, 1, Cor., and the -Consistency Lemma we get: Theorem 2: If either P* or R* is enumerable in S and S is -consistent, then S is incomplete. iff hR*

We can now prove Theorem 3 Proof of Theorem 3: Assume: A(v1, v2) enumerates P* in S; a is the Gdel number of the formula v2 ~A(v1, v2); and G is the sentence v2~A(a , v2). Assume: S is -consistent. By the -Consistency Lemma, v2 F(v1, v2) represents P* in S. v2 F(v1, v2) is an abbreviation for ~v2 ~F(v1, v2). So, v2 ~F(v1, v2) represents the negation of P*. Therefore, by Theorem 1, v2~A(a , v2) is undecidable in S. So, v2~A(a , v2) is not refutable in S. By conditional proof: If S is -consistent, G is not refutable in S. Assume: S is consistent. For reductio, suppose the sentence v2~A(a , v2) is provable in S. Then a is in P* (by Lemma 1, taking v2~A(v1, v2) for H(v1)). Since A(v1, v2) enumerates the set P* in S, there must be a number m such that - the sentence A(a , m) is provable in S.

Hence the sentence v2A(a , v2) is provable in S, but this sentence is ~v2~A(a , v2), which is the negation of v2~A(a , v2) i.e., it is the negation of G. So if G is provable in S, so is its negation, which means that S is then inconsistent. By reductio, G is not provable in S. By conditional proof, if S is consistent, then G is not provable in S. Putting the two conditionals together we get Theorem 3.

4. Exercises
Exercise 1: Since H(v1) represents P*, H(k ) is provable in S iff kP*. However, H(k ) is refutable in S iff ~H(k ) is provable. And ~H(k ) is provable iff E [k ] is provable iff kP* (by Lemma 1).
k

Therefore, H(k ) is provable in S iff it is refutable in S. Since S is consistent, it must be neither. Exercise 2:

~ P* is the set of numbers n such that En[n ] is not provable in S. In order to be representable in ~ S, there has to be a formula F such that: P* = {n: F(n ) is provable in S}. However, F(v1)
5

has a Gdel number; call it f. Ef[ f ] is either provable in S or it is not. If it is, then F( f ) is

~ ~ provable; and, hence, f is in P*. But if f is in P*, then Ef[-] is not provable in S f ~ contradicting our assumption. So it seems that Ef[-] is not provable in S. If so, then f is in P* f
(by the definition of P*).

Hence, F(-) is provable; and so Ef[-] is provable in S f f

contradicting our assumption. Therefore, P* cannot be represented in S. Exercise 3:

~ P* is the set of numbers n such that En[n ] is not provable in S. Suppose for reductio that S is
complete. Then P* is the complement of P*. Hence, whatever formula represents P* in S the negation of the formula represents P*. Let the formula that represents P* be H(v1). Since, S is consistent, Theorem 1 tells us that H(h ) is neither provable nor refutable in S. So, S is incomplete. However, if S is complete, then so is S (given that S and S do not differ in their formulas). So S must be incomplete. Exercise 4: 1. Since H(v1) expresses P*, hP* iff H(h ) iff H[h ]. hP* iff the Gdel number of En[h ] is in P. This is the case iff H[h ] is provable iff H(h ) is provable. However, H(h ) is not provable (see proof 2 of the corollary p. 60). So GN(En[h ]) is not in P. Therefore, h is not in P*. Hence, H(h ) is false. 2. False. Same argument with P changed to R and provable to refutable. Exercise 5: Assume hypothesis. Take an arbitrary 1-set, {x: R(x)}. This set is representable in S iff there is a formula F such that {x: R(x)}={n: F(n ) is provable in S}. As for every 1-set, there is a 0-formula, S(v1, v2), such that x(R(x) iff y(S(x, y))). Because of this biconditional y(S(x, y)) expresses the set {x: R(x)}. Every true sentence formed from S(v1, v2) by replacing the variables with singular terms can be proven in S (by hypothesis). And since S includes first order logic, from every true instance we can prove the existential generalization y(S(x, y)). So, given -consistency, all true instances of y(S(x, y)) are provable in S. Therefore, the set y(S(x, y)) expresses is the set is represents. Thus, y(S(x, y)) represents {x: R(x)}. Since this set was arbitrary, the same holds for every 1-set. Exercise 6: All the true instances of F(v1, v2) are provable in S. Since, S includes first-order logic, we can prove every true existential generalization of the form v2 F(a, v2) from these instances. Given -consistency, these existential generalizations are all the true sentences of the from v2 F(a, v2) there are. So, all members of {x: v2 F(x, v2) is true} are also members of { x: v2 F(x, v2) is provable in S}. 6

Suppose for reductio that there are provable but false instances of v2 F(x, v2). Take such an instance v2 F(a, v2), then every sentence of the form F(a, b) is false. But every false sentence of this form is refutable in S (by supposition). So all sentences of the form F(a, b) are refutable but v2 F(a, v2) is provable. I.e., S is -inconsistent contradicting our assumption. So there is no provable but false instances of v2 F(x, v2). {x: v2 F(x, v2) is true}={ x: v2 F(x, v2) is provable in S}, i.e. v2 F(x, v2) expresses and represents in S the same set.

5. Proof of Theorem B
Theorem B: All true 0-sentences are provable in PA.

Strategy: We will prove something stronger, which is useful in later chapters. Namely: Theorem B+: The systems (R0) ,(R) ,(Q0), (Q ) and PA are all 0-complete.

Since everything provable in a subsystem is provable in the extended system, B+ follows from the following two claims: Proposition 3: The system (R0) is 0-complete.

and (given that (Q) is PA without the induction scheme, (Q0) is (Q) without N9, and (R0) is (R) without 5) Conjunction of Propositions 4, 5, plus some obvious facts: (R0) is a subsystem of (R) ,(Q0), (Q ) and PA. 5.1. Proof of Proposition 3

First we need to prove that certain conditions are sufficient for 0-completeness. Proposition 1: The following two conditions are jointly sufficient for S to be 0-complete. C1: Every atomic 0-sentence is correctly decidable in S. C2: For any 0-formula F(w) with w as the only free variable and for every number n, if the sentences F(D), , F(n) are all provable in S, then so is the sentence (wn )F(w). Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose C1 and C2 both hold. We show by induction on degrees of sentences that all 0sentences are correctly decidable in S (which, of course, implies that all true 0-sentences are provable in S.) 1. By C1 , all 0-sentences of degree 0 are correctly decidable in S. 2. It is obvious by propositional logic that for any sentences X and Y , if X and Y are both correctly decidable in S, then ~X and XY are correctly decidable in S. 7

3.

Any other non-atomic 0-sentence T, must be of the form (wn )F(w) where F(w) is a 0-formula of lower degree than T and contains w as the only free variable. By the induction hypothesis, the all sentences of lower degree than T are correctly decidable. We must show that (wn )F(w) is also correctly decidable in S. Suppose the sentence is true. Then each of the sentences F(0 ), F(1 ) F(n ) is true. Hence each of them is provable in S (by induction hypothesis) since they are of lower degree than (wn )F(w). Then by condition C2, the sentence (wn )F(w) is provable in S. Suppose the sentence is false. Then for at least one mn, the sentence F(m) is false and, hence, refutable in S (again by induction hypothesis). Since mn is a true 0-sentence, it is provable in S (by C1). Since mn and ~F(m) are both provable, mnF(m) is refutable in S. But (wn )F(w) (mnF(m)) is provable (it is logically valid), and so (wn )F(w) is refutable in S.

From Proposition 1 we can prove Proposition 2: Proposition 2: The following three conditions are jointly sufficient for S to be 0-complete. D1: All true atomic 0-sentences are provable in S. - D2: For any distinct numbers m and n , the sentence n m is provable in S. D3: For any variable w and any number n, the formula wn (w = - w=n ) 0 is provable in S. More specifically, conditions D1, D2 and D3 jointly imply condition C1 of Proposition 1, and D3 implies condition C2. Proof: ?? (ran out of time) From Proposition 2 we can prove Proposition 3. Proof: ?? (ran out of time) 5.2. Proof of Proposition 4

If we can prove that (R0) is a subsystem of (Q0), then it follows immediately that it is a subsystem of PA (everything else we need for B+ follows too). So we just need to prove: Proposition 4: (R0) is a subsystem of (Q0).

Proof: ?? (ran out of time)