Respect, Relativism and Cultures of Honor Justin Synnestvedt

Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart but thou shalt love thy brother. Lv 19:17,18 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might. Dt 6:5 Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself. Sayings of Confucius 12:2 Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets. Mt 7:12

Honor killing is often in the news, and receives widespread coverage. For example, on Jan 30, 2012, a story ran in the Guardian, N.Y. Times, CNN and Fox News, of a 29-year-old Afghani militia man who, with the help of his mother, beat and then strangled his 22-year-old wife, for bearing a third daughter several months earlier.1 It is difficult to classify such cases of violence, because they entail various issues: attitudes towards women; the existence of violent militias in war-torn regions; the fact that constitutionally guaranteed rights are often ineffective against cultural habits; the effects of religious belief on social customs, and vice versa; and, of course, the role of media in supporting stereotypes, demonizing outsiders, and satisfying the publics thirst for titillation. But I wish in this essay to concentrate on the more general idea of a culture of honor. Two books I read recently focused my attention on this subject: Moral Relativism2, by Neil Levy, and Outliers, by Malcolm Gladwell.3 Levy cites many examples of the severe limitations of women in some Muslim cultures which prohibit their education, or paid employment; which demand their veiling, and clitoral excision; and which kill them for any unchastity, even in cases of rape. All these repressions may be practiced in the name of honor. Levy reports the following example: Sirhan, a 35-year-old murderer, is cheerful and relaxed and happy to tell his story. Hes especially proud to describe the efficiency with which he shot his young sister Suzanne in the head four times last March. She came to the house at 8:15 he relates, and by 8:20 she was dead. Three days before, the 16-year-old girl had reported to police that she had been raped. She committed a mistake, even if it was against her will, says Sirhan. Anyway, its better to have one person die than to have the whole family die from shame.4 Levy explains the matter-of-fact attitude towards this killing, and many like it, by noting that honour is a central concept in the cultures of the Middle East, as indeed it is in many others. He puts it in the context of the importance of being well thought of by ones group or society, which is especially important where tribal affiliation is the standard of group belonging. He quotes the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, regarding the Arabs of Algeria.

The point of honour is the basis of the ethic appropriate to an individual who always sees himself through the eyes of others, who has need of others in order to exist, because his self-image is inseparable from the image of himself that he receives back from others5 To be honoured and honourable, Levy goes on, is to occupy a worthy position in the social world, whereas to be shamed is to suffer what anthropologists call social death. I will come back to this thought later. One of the highly prized virtues in the Middle East is selfcontrol, Levy says. It is believed that women lack self-control; moreover, their great sexuality is a threat to mens self-control. So it is up to men to control women, especially with regard to their sexual behavior. Uncontrolled women can bring shame to the whole community. Look at Eve, the supporters of this view might say. Given all this, Levy explains, it is not surprising that in such cultures, strict prohibitions and limitations are placed on women - and if necessary they condone killing those who violate the rules. The killing is, therefore, not morally wrong; it is morally required.6 Levys book is about moral relativism. Moral relativism says, in brief, there is no universal standard - no fixed principle - that transcends differences of time and place, by which any moral question can in principle be answered. It doesnt exist, and it cannot exist. Every moral question must be answered from the particular cultural perspective from which it is answered. The same question, e.g. Is marriage with multiple spouses morally wrong? may be answered affirmatively in one culture, and negatively in another. Both answers are correct, from the relativistic position. Contradicting relativism, absolutism says there is a universal standard - a fixed and transcendent principle - by which any moral question can in principle be answered, without regard to where or when or by whom the question is asked. Indeed, this is the case whether or not that standard or principle is known by those asking the question. I would add that it is the search for this standard or principle, and the effort to apply it to ones life, which allows for moral growth, in persons and in societies. There seems to be a paradox in saying that a universal standard exists, whether or not it is known. How can one know that it exists, if one does not know what it is? The answer is, she cannot. It is a matter of belief, of the same sort as the belief that the Godhead exists, in Biblical thinking; or Brahman or Nirvana or Ultimate Reality exists, in Buddhist and Hindu thinking; or Good exists, in Platos thinking. I prefer this latter term. But this belief is not blind, like the belief in Santa Clause. It can be the result of, or consistent with, rational efforts to make sense of the world that ordinary humans experience, and in which they seek happiness. For me, belief in the Good is consistent with all the great works of science, art, wisdom literature and philosophy I have ever learned about. And to the same degree that the Good is abandoned, life becomes more violent, ugly, trivial, and pointless. In many years of teaching, I have found that one misunderstanding more than any other confuses conversations about relativism. It is the difficulty of distinguishing between the circumstances of an action, and the moral viewpoint about that action. This confusion is

compounded by an unfortunate abuse of the term absolutism. Absolutism as a philosophical position is not equivalent to irrational dogmatism. Every action is taken in a particular set of circumstances - a context- which must be taken into account to judge the moral quality of that action. A relativist and a non-relativist - an absolutist - should agree on this. Unfortunately, absolutists such as church authorities and their followers are apt to make dogmatic statements about actions, without regard for the context of these actions: for example Lying is wrong, Stealing is wrong, Abortion is wrong regardless of circumstances. This sort of dogmatic absolutism is irrational and offensive, and gives undeserved support to the relativist viewpoint. The true absolutist doesnt make lists of prohibited actions. She only says (believes) that every morally problematic action should be judged from one fixed, universal perspective or principle. The same guiding principle will apply to all moral questions, whatever the particular context, and (more importantly) in whatever culture they are raised. Of course this means the absolutist must find, or attempt to find an objective standard that will serve well, and many philosophers have tried to offer their suggestions about what that standard might be. It will not be the uncritical acceptance of any cultures habitual (i.e. subjective) moral attitude, be it religious or apart from religion. Although in common speech, moral relativism and ethical relativism are interchangeable terms, I find it useful to note that moral comes from Latin, and ethical comes from Greek. Rome was large, imperial and pragmatic; Greece was small, exclusive and idealistic. Since Rome and Roman law emphasized community life and social values, I associate morality with right behavior and religious conformity. Greece and Greek thought emphasized personal character and rational argument in the individual quest for perfection. Ethics, then, is the name given to the philosophical examination of questions about goodness and virtue. While speaking in favor of absolutism as a philosophical perspective about ethics, I want to emphasize the importance of modesty, tolerance and open-mindedness: modesty about ones belief in, and effort to find the Good; tolerance towards other, even seemingly foolish viewpoints; and open-mindedness to consider ideas that may not fit comfortably with ones own. These characteristics are not typical among those who speak dogmatically, without making room for reasoning, about the absolute wrongness of actions they oppose and forbid. That people around the globe disagree in their moral judgments does not by itself prove that objectively correct judgments cannot be made, or that there is no trustworthy objective standard for judgment. I can make an analogy from the world of science. Observable nature is lawful; few educated people would deny this. It is not questioned that natural laws exist, but what those laws are is often in question. Such is the nature of science. Even enormously fruitful and well confirmed conceptualizations of law, such as the law of gravity, come into doubt as science progresses. Furthermore, people may even be in disagreement about the facts which such laws hope to explain: e.g. global warming, fossil remains of proto humans, and planets outside our solar system. Since claims about facts can be disputed - often with great political and social turmoil - so can the theories be disputed which are offered to explain them. But that there are

facts is not (normally) disputed; nor is it (normally) disputed that there exist laws which determine or govern these facts. I say normally here because today, in the last, say, fifty years of social science, linguistics and philosophy, it has become common among academics to question whether truth can be known in any area, or even whether there is such a thing as truth. To a large degree, this skepticism rests on the modern idea of linguistic relativism. This view starts with the belief that all our ideas depend on (are functions of) the language we use. But languages are human constructs that differ from society to society; so the way people experience and think about the world depends on a particular language. There is no universal language. Even science and mathematics are just two of many possible languages. It follows therefore that all so-called knowledge is relative. In addition to this rather philosophical, linguistic kind of relativism, there is an older more global viewpoint which supports it from a cultural perspective. It is a characteristic of modern thinking in the past two centuries to emphasize subjectivity, i.e. to believe in the uniqueness of individuals and the autonomy of the self. This has developed under various social and literary banners, in various forms such as romanticism, individualism, existentialism and much of psychology. Obviously I cannot go in any depth into the several topics I mention in these few pages. I wish only to stir readers into deeper consideration, and reconsideration, of some ideas that have perhaps gone out of style, but which need not be considered a closed book. I think Levy used the shocking example cited above to underscore a point. As an educated Australian, he is quite aware that Sirhans violent murder of his sister will be abhorrent to anyone raised with western democratic values. Nevertheless, as a result of his examination of the arguments about cultural relativism pro and con, Levy feels compelled to accept this honor culture as morally valid in which the killing occurred. This is not to say that Levy believes all the particular behaviors which members of such a society claim to justify are valid. Such a cultures willingness to condone killing women no doubt results in part from that cultures common beliefs about feminine nature and sexuality. Such beliefs are often mistaken, and are subject to being changed by anyone willing to discuss the matter reasonably. By way of illustration, Levy quotes passages from a book published in London - Role of Muslim Women in Society - by a Muslim named Afzular Rahman. The arguments Rahman gives in favor of limiting women include outrageously unfounded and prejudicial claims about feminine nature. He is a man of some importance, writing for an English audience in England.7 I recommend anyone to read the passages Levy has quoted, and read also about Rahman and his fatwahs.8 But despite the falsity of Rahmans claims, Levy says that the cultural choice, which many societies have made, to put honor as the basis of morality is a valid one. He hastens to add that is one of a limited number of legitimate choices that different cultures have made - where one of various competing values has been raised to the status of a guiding principle. Honor seems to be a common characteristic, perhaps even a natural development of tribal life, in environments where the free expression of individual liberty is a threat to survival. By contrast,

western democratic societies can safely afford to accommodate a much greater degree of personal autonomy; and even they vary in the degree of autonomy that is tolerated. Levy summarizes the many arguments for and against relativism, and counter-arguments for these arguments, in an even-handed way, and he concludes that moral relativism is a reasonable position to take - not only that it is defensible logically, but also that it is consistent with our beliefs about human nature and biology, and that it jibes with the way people around the world think about what any morality must entail. Furthermore, he analyzes whether, as is often claimed, relativism is more likely than its opposite (absolutism) to excuse cultures which cause great suffering to some of their members harm. He shows that it is not. Levy also discusses whether relativism or absolutism will best support western peoples desire to be liberal, tolerant, or even respectful of others. The arguments dont favor one perspective over the other. In short, he fails to find convincing reasons to reject relativism. Finally, Levy believes that relativism is strengthened by the growing realization that moralities do in fact differ from culture to culture; that the adherents of each system are convinced that they are right; and that generally, despite the differences, each seems to function effectively. Nevertheless, Levy tries to show that the differences separating such cultures are not radical or limitless; rational people everywhere will typically agree on constraints to certain behaviors. In short, most moralities actually lie within a rather narrow range, and as Levy says, they will have to look a great deal like our own.9 As a result of his thorough summary, Levy comes to a compromise conclusion, namely that pluralism - the legitimacy of more than one morality - is a more reasonable view than insisting on only one true morality. His view is confirmed, finally, by two ideas which he takes as given, but which I think should be called into question. First, he holds that in the modern world, our ethics has lost its cosmic supports by which he means the Bible, or Quran or some other transcendent law.10 Secondly, because of this change in attitude about moral authority, and because the world today is so interconnected and competitive, our views had better be well founded empirically. I think these assumptions need further thought. It may be true generally that todays ethics has lost its cosmic supports (although it hasnt done so in my case). But even if modern thinkers typically reject or ignore biblical or spiritualist or metaphysical or eastern world views, it does not mean that such views are quaint or naf or useless. For one example Rene Girard, who is one of the luminaries of the Academie Francaise, encourages his fellow academics to undertake a much deeper and unprejudiced examination of Jewish and Christian scriptures, in light of modern critical and anthropological scholarship.11 For another example, Iris Murdoch, a moral philosopher at Oxford (St. Annes college) who died in 1989, has given convincing and moving modern arguments developing Platonic ideas of the Good.12 As for founding our moral ideas empirically, as Levy says, it is not clear what that means. Certainly we need to see how people do behave and how they think in various cultures. And we certainly must be aware of what biological, psychological and environmental factors are at play in their moral attitudes. But trying to base morality on nature necessarily makes the idea of moral goodness essentially meaningless. Let me explain. 5

A small child finds good whatever she favors - i.e. whatever brings her immediate sense gratification. As she grows, however, she will learn that she must restrain or postpone or even forego gratifying certain desires which the parents oppose because not doing so will lead to punishment. Older children learn to prioritize their desires; they cannot eat their cake and still have it. And still later, young adults learn to calculate the expected results of their behavior, taking into account what their friendships and the larger community require of them. Adults become aware of laws and conform to social norms. So much is obvious, and is entirely natural. The point is, if every behavior of an individual is the result of doing what is believe will maximize pleasure, and the norms of a society are the result of collective agreement to do whatever promises to makes social life pleasant, then there is nothing right or good that is beyond this natural effort to satisfy desires. In effect, all behavior is self-motivated, by this viewpoint. And that is indeed the viewpoint of most social scientists. Almost all the classical thinkers about ethics, however, have proposed and shown in one way or a another, that a person cannot be called moral unless and until she can chose freely between her own private interests and some higher good which she recognizes, and to which she can give allegiance. As I said, much of psychology says this is impossible, but it is not. Even our highest acts of apparent noble self-sacrifice are done, it is said, for selfish reasons, e.g. desire for recognition, feelings of self-worth, fear of shame, etc. But this is wrong, and the scientist stacks the deck in his favor by insisting that all proofs be in the realm of the observable and measurable. Morality is neither observable nor measurable, in that sense. Morality is possible, all the same. We can learn to recognize goods that transcend our selfishness - and we can train ourselves to be guided by those goods. I realize that my viewpoint cannot be proven scientifically, but neither can it be disproven. That fact itself proves the reality of moral choice, in my opinion. Is there a highest good? I believe so. I think it is love, but I wont argue the point here.13 I am not going to repeat all the arguments about moral relativism here. The relativist viewpoint is very old; one finds it expressed in Greece twenty five centuries ago. Herodotus, and Pindar agree that Custom is King. The exact same thought was affirmed by Ruth Benedict, who suggested in 1934 that the two phrases: It is morally good and It is habitual are synonymous.14 Herodotus was an historian, Pindar was a poet, and Benedict was a sociologist. None of them was a philosopher, for whatever that is worth. In recent generations, the relativistic perspective seems to have grown and become more complicated, with the advancement of anthropology and other social sciences. These have led to more and more awareness of cultural differences around the globe, and less and less willingness to make generalizations about other (i.e. non-western) cultures and peoples. For good reason, todays social scientists are especially careful to avoid making arrogant judgments of the sort that were apparent in the earlier generation of European social scientists who studied non-western societies. On the other hand, perhaps the current caution about making hateful generalization keeps todays academics from being willing to go out on a limb in the search for the big picture of their fields of study - even to look for universals. That is Girards view, which I find refreshing and promising. As he puts it, I think that anthropology should enjoy the same freedom to follow potentially productive intuitions as the natural sciences have 6

always enjoyed. Anthropologists should disregard the puritanical nihilism of our time and feel uninhibited about global interpretations15 Although I disagree with Levys unsupported assumptions, I agree with his critique and dismissal of unlimited relativism. But Levy favors a limited relativism, which he calls pluralism. In doing so, he notes that there is no reason not to conclude that pluralism is a kind of relativism. Indeed it might be the most plausible kind of relativism.16 I believe his pluralistic compromise begs the question, however. In my view, the key question is whether or not there is one universal moral standard. If Levy answers no (as he does), it doesnt matter if there are a few, many or endless numbers of relative moralities. Despite Levys thoughtful analysis, I believe relativism is a mistake, or a set of mistakes. I would happily give my critique if someone would enjoy getting into the argument. But in this paper I will simply assume certain ideas about morality which can be called non-relativistic - or even absolutist, although I know that term has many negative connotations. To conclude his overview, Levy says that he can see no reason to call a society wrong in which honor plays a primary role, even though it cannot be reasonably extended to justify killing those who go against that value. Obviously some cultures greatly emphasize personal rights over group rights. Western democracies typically do this, and the United States takes it to extremes. And equally obviously, other cultures, including all those around the Mediterranean, as well as some tribal groups in Oceania, Southeast Asia, South America and Africa, and to a different degree, Confucian countries, put greater emphasis on the family, tribe or community than do those in the West. I will return to this notion shortly. In his book, Malcolm Gladwell discusses honor killing in a different context from Levys, and from different examples. Gladwells purpose is not to provide support for moral relativism, but to show the depth and duration of certain cultural attitudes, rooted in certain geographic regions - borderlands - which can be translated from one land to another (in the case he examines, from the British Isles to the United States). As an illustration, Gladwell concentrates on a family feud that went on in Harlan, Kentucky, for some years prior to 1900. The families he chose were the Howards and Turners. He might as easily have discussed other feuding families of the region. For instance, Hatfield and McCoy, Hill and Evans, Strong and Amy, Martin and Tolliver, French and Everitt, Baker and Howard (which lasted from 1806 into the 1930s!) were all in Kentucky. Other states in the region had notorious feuds as well. William Turner and Samuel Howard were two original settlers in Harlan, among eight families who founded it in 1819. They became prominent citizens, and vied for respect. The feud started, it is said, after a storm blew down a fence and a neighbors cow wandered onto the Turner property. One of the Turner children - Devil Jim- shot the cow, and the neighbor left town in haste. The belligerent Turners intimidated other local residents, and ratcheted up the nasty feelings. When two grandsons of the Turner and Howard patriarchs - Little Bob Turner and Wix Howard - met in a poker game, each accused the other of cheating, and they fought. The following day, the Turner boy was killed with a shotgun blast to the chest. Turner men went to the Howard general store, and spoke roughly to Mrs. Howard, who took offense. Her son 7

Wilse exchanged gun fire with Will Turner, another grandson. Will later attacked the Howard home with a friend. Shortly after, the two families met in the street, and Will was shot fatally. At that point, members of the Howard family approached Mrs. Turner and asked for a truce. She refused. It was reported that when Will Turner staggered home, dying from a gunshot, his mother said Stop that! as he was yelling from pain. Die like a man, like your brother did! And so he did. But the feud continued for some years, frustrating various efforts of law enforcement to bring justice and order. Gladwell summarizes the history of this region where feuds have been so common. The original settlers arrived in America late in the 18th C. They were celts (or Scots-Irish), who came originally from the lowlands of Scotland, and parts of northern England, but many came by way of Ulster, in northern Ireland, where they had settled temporarily as plantation workers. These border lands were rough and harsh areas with little formal law, and little farm land to cultivate. Raising goats or sheep was typical. As sociologists point out, herdsmen are independent, and off by themselves. They must guard their animals and livelihood in ways that farmers need not do. Their social life is in the family, or the extended clan. Family allegiances are total, and outsiders are untrustworthy. These people felt compelled to present themselves as strong, brave and unwilling to accept any wrong or effrontery. Theirs was a culture of hard discipline, quick retribution, and honor. We find similar values in Shakespeares Capulets and Montagues, and in the gangs of inner cities around the world. Gladwell stresses that cultural qualities last for centuries, unless there is good reason and conscious effort to change them. He refers to various recent experiments in some American university psychology departments which show that even today, students from southern parts of the United States react differently to perceived insults from those raised in northern communities. Having lived in North Carolina and traveled widely in that state and nearby states, I find these generalization to be confirmed. Researching the history of feuds in the area Gladwell discusses, I looked at Google maps of the terrain; it was an enlightening experience. Only a few days ago, I came across another confirmation of Gladwells observations. I noticed on a web page (dated 11 Feb 12) an Associated Press news item from Mountain City, Johnson County. AP reported that Marvin Potter is charged with murdering a young couple who unfriended his daughter on Facebook i.e. they deleted her from their social network page on the internet. According to Mike Reese, sheriff of Johnson Country, the couple had reported to police that Janelle was harassing them. Potter, 60, has been charged with two counts of first-degree murder in last weeks slayings of Billy Payne Jr. and his girlfriend, Billie Jean Hayworth. The couple was shot to death in their Mountain City home in the far northeast corner of the state. Their 8-month-old baby was found unharmed in Hayworths arms. Its a senseless thing, the sheriff said. Authorities have been involved [in] other cases where Potters daughter, Jenelle Potter, believed she had been slighted by someone. Marvin Potters friend, Jamie Curd, has also been charged in the killings. Curd, 38, had romantic feelings for Jenelle Potter, 30, the sheriff said.

I looked up Mountain City, in Johnson County. It is in the far northeastern tip of Tennessee, where Tennessee, Virginia and North Carolina come together. It is a borderland in the harsh and isolating forested Appalachian region where those feuding families lived about whom Gladwell wrote. I noticed the typical anglo family and given names. Just as in the case of Mrs. Howard and Mrs. Turner, Janelle Potter was a woman who perpetuated family vengeance rather than reconciliation. Janelle held onto feelings of resentment, reacting aggressively to any perceived hint of being slighted. And her father felt justified in avenging the latest insult. The sheriff said it was senseless, but I think Gladwell would point out, and Levy would confirm, that the whole pitiful episode reflects a deep and abiding belief in the honor culture. The sheriff is concerned for what is legal. The actors, however, are concerned for what is right. But their notion of honor is not, in my view, equivalent to what is moral, as Levy might have suggested. Let me clarify this thought by way of concluding this essay. Does every society have morals? Im not sure. Certainly every society has what have been called folkways, mores, norms and sanctions of various sorts, and these certainly differ from group to group. They are seen in the way people act and how they speak. Many societies share some common religious views, at least publicly, although these may be diverse in larger cultures, and in some cases, secularism seems to be the norm. But even in the smallest, most archaic or tribal of communities, where there is a dominance of religion, can that society be called moral? Does it make sense to apply the word moral to a group, be it large and diverse, or small and close-knit? I think not. It is true, as social scientists point out, that in most groups, large and small - family, tribe, religion, community, nation - members typically think in terms of we (members) and they (outsiders), and this is equivalent to good and bad. But for me, the idea of morality is properly applied to individuals, and I believe further that many people are neither moral nor immoral, but remain undeveloped in that regard. Consider any community that is small and homogeneous enough for its members to have common views about what it means to be a good person. They typically conform closely to the habits and values they are taught, because not to do so will bring swift punishment. As was said above by Levy, to be honoured and honorable is to occupy a worthy position in the social world, whereas to be shamed is to suffer what anthropologists call social death. Social death would mean ostracism and lack of support, which could amount to a death sentence. If a members behavior is thought to endanger or dishonor a family within a clan, or endanger the clan itself, that person is very likely to be expelled or even killed. But does this mean that honor is a valid principle for morality? Clearly it does not. It is desirable, and typically is desired, to be honored, especially if the consequences of dishonor are grave, as is often the case. But what is desired is in no sense moral because it is desired. Nor is it moral to do what one must to do in order to avoid suffering. Avoiding pain is neither moral, nor immoral. But morality typically - perhaps always - does entail a persons conflict over whether, on the one hand, to follow her natural desire to gain pleasure or avoid pain, or on the one hand, to follow what she knows is of more importance than these - i.e. to follow a moral principle.

There have been many societies in the world where honor was of high value. These were typically warrior societies (in ancient India, Greece and China, in medieval Europe, the Middle East, and Japan for examples). The warrior class - the nobles - set the standards of value, and these included emphatically courage, duty, allegiance, honesty, respect and the like. An honorable person was one who did the right thing. He didnt do it, however, to be honored; he was honored because he did it, and maintained the noble traditions. One who is merely brave, for instance, is not necessarily honorable. Bravery may be fear of appearing badly to ones fellows; the brave person may be foolhardy, and immature - not at all noble. Furthermore, an honorable person (or noble) is not quick to be violent, in the effort to impress people, or keep his place in the community; he or she knows that it is sometimes more honorable to reject violence. His or her emotional life is governed by awareness of what is right, rather than by fear of being rejected by others. This kind of honor is true honor. By contrast, people who conform to the so-called cultures of honor we have been examining - partaking of family and tribal feuds, demeaning women, rejecting strangers, quick to take offense, to harbor resentment, and to avenge themselves, and expelling or if possible killing those who dont comply - these dont merit the name of moral persons, and certainly their societies could not be so named. It may be interesting to note, but I dont believe it is morally relevant, whether such communities are nominally Roman Catholics in Sicily, Sunni Muslims in Afghanistan, Southern Baptists in Kentucky, or Ultra-orthodox Jews in New York. If their members are motivated by what Girard and others call mimetic desire as it seems they typically are, their behavior does not rise to the level of morality by any standard, whether the critical observer is inside or outside the community, and whether she calls herself an absolutist, a pluralist or a relativist. Chicago, Illinois February 201
Nematullah Sarfraz, CNN news story, Jan 31, 2012. Neil Levy, Moral Relativism (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002). 3 Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers (New York: Little, Brown & Co, 2009). 4 Levy, Moral Relativism p. 180, cited from The Price of Honor( New York: Time, 18 Jan 1999). 5 Levy, Moral Relativism, p. 176, cited from Pierre Bourdieu, The Sense of Honour, in Algeria 1960, transl R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Pr, 1979) p.113. 6 Levy, Moral Relativism, p. 179. 7 Afzular Rahman, Role of Muslim Women in Society (London: Seerah Foundation, 1986). 8 An answer to Rahman is Sami M. El-Soudani In the Beginning: Hijacking the Religion of God (London: ExLibris Corp, 2010) - an e-book. 9 Levy, Moral relativism, p. 193. 10 Levy, Moral relativism, p. 191. 11 See, for example, The Girard Reader (New York: Crossroad Publishing/ Herder, 1991). 12 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). 13 See Emanuel Swedenborg, Divine Love and Wisdom, first published in Latin, Amsterdam, 1763; first English translation in U.S.A., 1851. 14 Ruth Benedict, from The Journal of General Psychology, 1934, cited in Gould and Mulvaney, eds. Classical Philosophical Questions, 11th e. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Publ, 2004) p. 308. 15 E.g. in Violent Origins, R.G. Hamilton-Kelly (ed) (Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1987), p. 111. 16 Levy, Moral relativism, p. 204 (my emphasis).
2 1

10