Philosophical Review

Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths Author(s): E. M. Curley Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (Oct., 1984), pp. 569-597 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184828 . Accessed: 25/02/2012 11:55
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The Philosophical Review,XCIII, No. 4 (October 1984)

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS E. M. Curley

n April 1630 Descartes wrote,in a state of some excitement,to the faithfulMersenne, to announce a metaphysicaldoctrine which caused then, and has caused ever since, much puzzlement among his readers:
(1) The mathematicaltruths,which you call eternal, have been establishedby God and depend on him entirely, just as all other creatures do ... he has established these laws in nature as a king establishes laws in his kingdom.'

SubsequentlyDescartes explains that the eternal truths-what we would call necessarytruths-depend on God's will,thatsince God's will was free,he could have created a world in which these truths did not hold,just as he could have not created any world at all.2 So, forexample, God was freeto create a world in whichthe lines from the center of a circle to its circumferencewere not all equal. We cannot comprehend this possibility, but that is because our intellects are finite, whereas God's power is infinite and incomprehensible. Clearly this is a bizarre doctrine. But how bizarre is it? What exactlyis Descartes committedto by this doctrine? Why does he hold it?What is the best thatcan be said in defense of it?Those are the questions I hope to answer in thispaper. But before I proceed to say whatI thinkDescartes is committed by thisdoctrine,let me to say what I thinkhe is not committedto.

'Letter of 15 April 1630, in Descartes, Oeuvresphilosophiques, Vol. I, edited by F. Alquie, (Paris: Garnier, 1963-1973), pp. 259-260. Cited hereafteras Alquie. 2Letterto Mersenne, 27 May 1630, Alquie I, 268.

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E. M. CURLEY

I of There is an interpretation Descartes, oftenfound in the literdeveloped recentlyby Harry Frankfurt,3 ature, and interestingly according to which Descartes's doctrine commitshim to the thesis that there are no necessary truths,no truthswhose negation is impossible,that,froma logical point of view, anythingis possible. of This thesismightbe expressed in the symbolism modal logic by puts it by (p)Mp, thatis, for any p, p is logicallypossible. Frankfurt as saying that the eternal truthsare "inherently contingentas" or necessarythan" any other propositions(p. 42). "no more ultimately I take it that the force of the qualifyingexpressions which I have the emphasized is to allow that, although we, of course, perceive eternal truthsas necessary,that is just a factabout us, it does not nature of what we perceive: show anythingabout the intrinsic we ... (2) The propositions findto be necessary need notbe truths in . of at all. The inconceivabilitytheir falsity.. is notinherent them. to of It is properly be understood to onlyas relative thecharacter our "Creation," 45). p. minds(Frankfurt, of The inability our minds to conceive of the falsity the eternal of of truthsis "merelya contingentcharacteristic our minds" (p. 44). God mighteasilyhave created us otherwise.And if he had created us otherwise, would not have deceived us in any absolute sense, he themselveswhich makes because there's nothingin contradictions them impossible. Descartes,of course, never says thisin so manywords. Otherwise Frankfurt'sinterpretationwould not be an interpretation,but of merelya restatement the doctrine.So whatdidDescartes say that to has led interpreters ascribe this doctrine to him?
3"Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths," The Philosophical ReviewVol. 86, no. 1, (1977), pp. 36-57. Cited hereafteras Frankfurt, and Suarez, (Rome: Being in Descartes "Creation." Cf. Cronin, T., Objective Press, 1966), p. 37; Wells, NJ., "Descartes and the Gregorian University 35 Scholastics BrieflyRevisited,"New Scholasticism (1961), p. 182. I had blanchede originallybeen inclined to read J.-L. Marion's Sur la theologie (Paris: PUF, 1981) as operating under the same assumption,but Descartes M. Marion tells me, in conversationabout a draftof this paper, that he on agrees withme against Frankfurt this point. 570

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

First,in some passages in whichDescartes expounds his creation doctrine he does abstain from saying,in his own person, that the eternal truths are really eternal. So in the letter to Mersenne quoted above (1), he speaks of "the truthsof mathematics, which you call eternal ... "4 Someone mightwell take that to implythat Descartes himself thinks that the truthsof mathematicsare not reallyeternal or necessary More serious are passages like the following, whichcomes froma letterto Mesland (2 May 1644): of howit was a matter freeof (3) As forthedifficulty conceiving dom and indifference God to makeit notbe truethatthethree for that anglesof a triangle wereequal to tworight angles,or generally, it contradictories cannot exist together, can easily one remove bycon... haveanylimits (Alquie that sidering thepowerof theGod cannot III, 74). What is particularlystrikingabout this passage is that Descartes allows thatthe denials of mathematicaltruthsdo involve a contrais dictionand yetmaintainsthattheircontradictoriness only a reason forregardingthemas false,not forregardingthemas impossible. Take any contradiction you like. God could have made it true. Hence, it could have been true. Hence, it is possible, even if false. Hence, anythingis possible, there are no necessarytruths. II Whatever we may think of the intrinsicmeritsof the doctrine we thatthere are no necessarytruths, should recognize that there are compellingsystematic reasons whyDescartes should not hold it. The most obvious, of course, is that Descartes thinksGod has the propertyof existingnecessarily(Alquie II, 593). Surely thisentails thatthere is at least one necessarytruth,viz., that God exists.But some interpreters(though not Frankfurt)exempt eternal truths
4Alquie I, 259. There is a similarpassage in a letterto Mersenne of 17 May 1638, Alquie II, 62. 5As Gueroult did in his Spinoza,vol. I (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne),p. 80, n. 238. Marion (op. cit., pp. 161-178) also emphasizes this language, but apparentlydoes not draw Gueroult's conclusion. 571

E. M. CURLEY

about God fromthe scope of the creationdoctrine.So let us pass to other examples. Consider the ontological argument.As Descartes expounds this, it requires the assumptionthatI conceive of countlessthingswhich have true, immutable and eternal natures, even though theymay never have existed or have been thoughtof (AT VII, 64). These eternal natures do not depend on my mind; my thoughtdoes not impose any necessityon things,rather the necessityof the things themselvesdeterminesme to thinkof them in the way that I do.6 does This hardlysounds like a man who would write,as Frankfurt on his behalf, "the necessitieshuman reason discovers. . . are just necessitiesof its own contingentnature" ("Creation," p. 45). Moreover,not only do we perceive thatthe truthsof mathematics are necessary,sometimes,at least, we perceive clearlyand distinctly thattheyare necessary(e.g., at AT VII, 65). If theyaren't in factnecessary,thenitlooks as thoughDescartes willhave to give up his criterionof truth.Not everything perceive clearlyand diswe tinctly true. At the time of writinghis articleon the creation of is the eternal truths,Frankfurtreplied to an objection of this kind that it presupposed a realist conception of truth which he had independent grounds for denying to Descartes. At that stage he solution to the evidentlystill thought that the most satisfactory problem of the Cartesian circle required us to ascribe a coherence theory truthto Descartes ("Creation," p. 52). Subsequently,howof ever, Frankfurt has apparently recanted, acknowledging that "wheneverDescartes gives an explicitaccount of truthhe explains it unequivocally as correspondence with reality."7So invoking a coherence theoryof truthwillnot give us a plausible wayout of the that difficulty we clearlyand distinctly perceive certaintruthsto be necessary.
6AT VII, 67. In a paper read at the APA meetingsin Boston, December to 1980, "Descartes on God's Ability Do the LogicallyImpossible,"Richard La Croix emphasized an analogous passage in the Sixth Replies (AT VII, 436). and InCritical 7"Descartes on the Consistencyof Reason," in Descartes: Essays,edited by M. Hooker (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Univerterpretive sityPress, 1978), p. 37. He cites no texts,but presumably has in mind passages like thatin the letterto Mersenne of 16 October 1639 (Alquie II, 144). See also the discussion in my Descartes Against the Skeptics, Press, 1978), pp. 108-112. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 572

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

reason for hesitatingto Perhaps the most interesting systematic ascribe to Descartes the thesisthat there are no necessarytruthsis that the recognitionof necessarytruthsseems to be central to his philosophyof science. In Le monde Descartes classes the fundamental laws of physicstogetherwith the principlesof mathematicsas necessaryor eternal truths: to I (4) In addition thethreelawsI haveexplained, do notwishto from supposeany others, those exceptthosewhichfollow infallibly on to eternal truths whichthe mathematicians accustomed base are theirmostcertainand evidentdemonstrations, thosetruths, say, I according which to God himself taught that has disposedall has us he in and measure, and whoseknowledge so things number, weight is naturalto our souls thatwe cannotbutjudge themto be infallible nor whenwe conceive themdistinctly, doubtthatifGod had created several worlds, they wouldbe as truein all of them they in this as are one (AT XI, 47). Here Descartes assimilatesprinciplesof physics-principles of inertia and of the conservationof motion-to mathematicaltruths. To thatextenthe may remind us of Quine. But in Descartes's case the assimilationis made in order to claim necessity both for mathematical and physicallaws. Even more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that Descartes here anticipatesan idea usuallycreditedto Leibniz, thatnecessarytruths are those which are true in all possible worlds. The same idea is on when Descartes sumemphasized again in the Discourse Method, marizes what he had done in Le monde: and without (5) I showedwhatwerethelawsof nature, basingmy on thantheinfinite of arguments anyother principle perfections God, I triedto demonstrate thoseof whichone could have any doubt all and to showthat, there evenifGod had created several could worlds, notbe anyin which they wouldfailto be observed (AT VI, 43). It's importantfor the methodologyof Cartesian physicsthat the laws of nature should be true in all possible worlds; onlyiftheyare, can physicsbe a priorito the extent thatDescartes thinksit is. Not thatDescartes thinksphysicsis whollyan a prioriscience. He does recognizea role forexperimentthere,as manyrecentstudieshave 573

E. M. CURLEY

emphasized.8 The functionof experiment,however, is not to determinewhat the laws of nature are, but to determinehow,given those laws of nature, the effectsare produced, to determine the initialconditions,typically unobservable mechanisms,fromwhich the phenomena can be deduced.9 If Descartes thoughtthere were no necessarytruths, would be difficult see whyhe should not it to extend his empiricismeven to the laws of nature.10 III We have, then,at least three systematic reasons whyit would be awkwardfor Descartes to affirm, what the standard interpretation of his creationdoctrinerequires,thatthereare no necessarytruths. The standard interpretation hard to reconcilewith(i) Descartes's is commitment true and immutablenatures in the ontological arto gument,(ii) his acknowledgmentthatwe clearlyand distinctly perceive certaintruths be necessary,and (iii) his (limited)use of an a to
in 8See, forexample, Daniel Garber's "Science and Certainty Descartes," in Hooker, op. cit., and the literaturecited there. 9The whole issue is undoubtedlymore complicatedthan I suggesthere, but two passages which support this reading would be in the Discourse, vi (AT VI, 64-65) and PrinciplesIV, 199-206. Alquie's annotation of the formerpassage is particularlyrelevant to our present theme. Descartes writes: "First I tried to find in general the principles,or firstcauses of everything thatis, or that be,in the world . . ." (myemphasis). Alquie (I, can 636, n. 1) observes thatthisformula "indicatessufficiently the a priori that deduction whichwillbe carried out on the basis of principleswill resultin the reconstruction a possible world rather than in the explanatorydeof scriptionof the real world. Nevertheless,it will sufficeso long as it is a matterof generalities(heavens, stars,etc.). It will no longer sufficewhen one wishes to descend to more particular things,thatis, to explain whythis possible body, ratherthan some other, exists." I would prefer to say that the deduction shows whatanypossible world is like. That is whyit suffices. 101 agree with Kripke that we ought to keep the logico-metaphysical or issue of necessity contingency separate fromtheepistemologicalissue of a prioricity a posterioricity. or There may be contingenta prioritruthsand necessarya posteriori truths.Cf. Namingand Necessity, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1980 passim). All my argument requires, I think,is that it should be natural to assume that only the necessary is knowable a priori.So there is some plausibility the historicalthesisthat in the empiricismof modern natural science had its origin in the JudaeoChristianconception of nature as the product of divine will.Cf. the essays of O'Connor, Fosterand Oakley in Part I of Creation: Impactofan Idea, The edited by D. O'Connor and F. Oakley, (New York: Scribners,1969). 574

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

priori method in physics.In the next sectionI shall argue thatthere are textual grounds for questioning the standard interpretation even in those passages in which Descartes is expounding his creation doctrine.But beforewe come to those passages, let me amplifya remark made above in passing. Descartes, I maintain, anticipated an idea usually credited to Leibniz, thatnecessarytruthsare those whichare true in all possible worlds.You mightobject thatin the passages cited in supportof thatclaim Descartes does not explicitly use the notion of a possible world,the notionhe uses is thatof a worldGod mighthave created. He identifiesnecessary truthswith those which would have been true in any world God created. And that'scertainly true. Nevertheless, grounds forcrediting the Descartes withthis idea are as good as those for creditingLeibniz withit. The same question has been raised about Leibniz. So far as I have been able to discover,there is no passage in which Leibniz identifiesnecessarytruthswiththose true in all possible explicitly worlds. The best support for attributing thatview to him"I comes fromthe followingpassage: are can (6) Essential [propositions] thosewhich be demonstrated by a resolution theterms, of or which necessary, virtually are so identical, that or their is These have opposite impossible virtually contradictory. eternal Not obtain longas theworld truth. onlywillthey so lasts, they wouldalso have obtainedif God had createdthe Worldin another
way.12

In one respect,Descartes is closer to mostmodern conceptions'3 in thathe speaks of other worlds,ratherthan other waysof creating the World. In another, he is more remote,in that he conceives of his alternativeworlds as ones which do not exclude one another
" Cited by Benson Mates, in "Leibniz on Possible Worlds," in Frankfurt's Leibniz, collection critical a of essays, (Garden City,N.Y.: Anchor, 1972), p. 337. The attribution Leibniz of the idea thatnecessarytruthis truth to in all possible worldsis questioned by WilliamLycan in "The Trouble with Possible Worlds," in The Possibleand theActual,ed. by M. Loux, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 274, n. 1. 120puscules fragments et ingdits Leibniz,edited by L. Couturat (Paris: de Alcan, 1903), p. 18. '3The qualificationis necessitatedby Kripke's cautions about the term possible world' in Namingand Necessity, 48n, pp. 15 ff. p. 575

E. M. CURLEY

("If God had created several worlds . . . "-my emphasis). But both in Descartes and in Leibniz the connectionbetweennecessarytruth and truth in all possible worlds is expressed in terms of divine creation,of a world God mighthave created, or a way God might have created the world.

IV
Apart from the systematic difficulties the standard interpretation of the creation doctrine involves, there are suggestionsof a different interpretation, one which acknowledges the existence of necessarytruths,even in those passages in which Descartes is expounding or defending the doctrine. Consider that firstpuzzling letterto Mersenne. In it Descartes endeavors to prepare Mersenne fordealing withobjectionsby constructing following the imaginary dialogue: if thesetruths, (7) They willtellyou that, God had established he couldchangethem, a kingdoes his laws;to which one mustreply as themas eternaland yes,if his willcan change.-But I understand God.-But hiswillis immutable.-AndI judge thesameconcerning free.-Yes, buthis poweris incomprehensible (AlquieI, 260-261). The point here is to reassure the imaginary opponent that the truthsin question are genuinelynecessary,in spite of having been created by a free act of God's will. As Beyssade explains, far of the extend(8) The incomprehensibility divinepower, from to where perwe ingcontingency thedomainof mathematical truths, on to ceiveonlynecessity, invoked, thecontrary, safeguard is necessiIt ty,where we can only imaginecontingency. is true that our can only represent the work of a free will as conimagination

a will and of which free, nevertheless is and immutable, creative truths does notprove[that therecan be no suchthing].'4 truly necessary,
14La philosophic de by premiere Descartes, J.-M. Beyssade (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), p. 112. Cited withoutany appearance of disapproval by Marion, op. cit., p. 278n.

to tingent.... But the Cartesian remindsus thatour inability imagine

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DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

And Descartes's imaginarydialogue in the first letterto Mersenne is not the only such passage. Consider the not-so-imaginary opponent Gassendi, who objected, against the ontological argument, that it seemed hard to maintainthatthereis an eternal and immutablenature other than God. Descartes's replydoes not deny that the true and immutable naturesare reallyeternal. "You would be right,"he says,thatis, it would be a hard thingto maintainthatthereare true and immutable natures. or (9) If it were a questionof an existing thing, even if I had does established so thatitsveryimmutability something immutable notdependon God. Butjust as thepoetsfeign that destinies the have indeed been established Jupiter, thataftertheyhave been by but he boundtoobserve so that established, is himself them, I don'tthink in truth essencesof things the and thosemathematical truths which of can be knownconcerning are them, independent God; ratherI think that, becauseGod so willed becausehe disposed it, them they so, are immutable eternal. and thatseemshard or softto you Whether matters little. is enoughforme thatitis true(AT VII, 380; Alquie It
II, 827).15

The eternal truthsare trulyeternal, even though theyhave been created. If we suppose thatthisis Descartes's position,we trade one paradox foranother.The standard interpretation requiresus to ascribe to Descartes the paradox that there are no necessarytruths.The but I alternative am pursuingis thatthereare necessarytruths, that some or all of themare created. Out of the frying pan into the fire, you may say. And in the end, perhaps, I agree. But apart fromthe historicalinterestwe may have in determining just what mistake Descartes made, I think there is some philosophical interestin seeingjust whatthereis about thisdoctrinethatmakes it a mistake.
'5One disquieting note about this passage. Here Descartes accepts the comparison between God's relation to the eternal truths and Jupiter's relationto the destinies,whereas in the letterto Mersenne of 15 April 1630 (Alquie I, 259-260) he rejected that comparison as demeaning to God. The solution to that puzzle seems to be that in the letterto Mersenne he did not thinkof the destinies as being in any way dependent on Jupiter, whereas in the 5th Replies he does.

577

E. M. CURLEY A natural objection is this. Creation, if it is anything,is an act, hence an event, hence somethingessentiallyrelated to time. For any event,it must make sense to ask "At what time did thatevent occur?" It may be difficultto answer that question, but it must on alwaysmake sense to ask it. The eternal truths, the other hand, are essentiallynot related to time. For any eternal truth,it does not make sense to ask "At what time did that eternal truthcome intoexistenceor come to be true?"If it'sreallyeternal,the question is improper; there can be no time at which it came to be true. whatDescartes willsay to this.He willrejectthe It's clear, I think, assumptionthatif the eternal truthswere created, there mustbe a timeat whichtheywere created. He does use temporallanguage in various places in connectionwithhis creationdoctrine.In the passage quoted above (9), he is willingto compare God toJupiter,who was bound to observe his decrees after had made them. And in he the Conversation Burman,when Burman asks: with of of fromthis[thedoctrine the creation the (10) Does it follow to a thatGod could have commanded creature hate eternaltruths] to made thisa good thing do?'6 him,and thereby Descartes replies: what he do do but (11) God couldnotnow this: we simply notknow could have done. In anycase, whyshouldhe nothave been able to (my to givethiscommand one of hiscreatures? emphasis). These are only the most strikinginstances of Descartes's use of temporal language in expounding his doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths.It's quite characteristicfor him to talk about whatGod couldhavedone, ratherthan what God can do, as if there was a time at which God hadn't yet establishedthe eternal truths. Still,Descartes can't mean thistemporal language to be taken at face value. For whereas he apparentlydoes thinkof the creationof the world as a datable event, occurringapproximately5000 years
withBurman, translated by John Cottingham Conversation 16Descartes's (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 22.

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DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

ago,'7 he evidently does not so conceive the creationof the eternal truths.What God did, to create the eternal truths, was to will and understand them from all eternity.'8There is no time at which theycame to be, no time prior to whichtheywere not true. This is at least one difference betweenGod's actionsand men's. Anotheris that the act by which God understands,wills and brings about all thingsoccurs at all times as one "perfectly simple" act.'9 So the concept of an action,when applied to God, does not have the same implicationsit does when applied to man. Whetherthisdoctrineis consistentor not, I make no attemptto decide. There would seem to be a problem in reconcilingthe following three propositions: (i) God created the world in time. (ii) God created the eternal truthsfrometernity. (iii) God created all thingsby one perfectly simple act. But perhaps I do not adequately understand the divine simplicity. Perhaps no finitemind is supposed to understand it. In any case, rather than focus on the disanalogies between God's actions and men's, I preferto exploit an analogy between them. I take my cue from Beyssade (8), who observes that Descartes's doctrine is invoked "to safeguard necessitywhere we can only
17 To Burman's objection that eternity all at once and once for all, is Descartes replies: "That is impossible to conceive of. It is all at once and once for all, insofar as nothing is ever added to or taken away from the nature of God. But it is not all at once or once for all in the sense that it existsall at once. For since we can divide itup now,afterthe creationof the world,whyshould it not have been possible to do the same beforecreation, since duration remains constant? Thus eternity has now co-existed with created thingsfor,say,5000 years,and has occupied timealong withthem; so it could have done just the same before creation if we had had some standard to measure by" (op. cit.,pp. 6-7; cf. the Sixth Replies, AT VII, 432). '8Letter of 27 May 1630 (Alquie I, 268) and cf. the Conversation with Burman,pp. 15-16. 19Cf.PrinciplesI, 23, and the comment on it in the Conversation with Burman,pp. 31-32.

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E. M. CURLEY

imaginecontingency," thatis, in the domain of the will.One wayof expressing the connection between volitionand contingencyis to say that it is, in general, true of any agent, a, that if a willsthatp, then it is at least logicallypossible that a not will thatp.20 Using a symbolismwhich I hope will be perspicuous,2' we mightexpress thisas follows:

(i) (a)(p)(Wap ->MWap)

(i) seems to express a general logical truthabout acts of will. If we express God's omnipotence by saying that a proposition is true if and only if God wills it to be true,

(ii) (p) (p <>Wgp)

then it seems possible to derive from these assumptions a thesis involvingiterated modalities which might plausibly be taken to express Descartes's creation thesis in atemporal language. Let Pl, be any necessarytruth,so that (iii) LpI In virtueof (ii), we have (iv) Lp1 -- WgLpj In virtueof (i), we have
(v) WgLp1 -- MWgLp1

Detaching the consequents of (iv) and (v), we get

201 am much indebted in this paragraph to Wayne Wasserman, whose the commentson an earlier versionof thispaper prompted me to simplify argumentat thispoint. The crucial principle(i) is invokedbyJames Ross in Philosophical Theology second edition, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), p. xx. 211 use 'a' as an individual variable, 'p' as a propositional variable, 'W... 'as a two-placepredicate to be read'... willsthat ', 'M' and 'L' to and necessity, and '->' to represymbolizelogical possibility respectively, sent entailment.

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DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

(vi) MWgLpI that is, it's possible that God doesn't will PI to be necessary. But sincePi is necessaryonly if God willsit to be necessary(by (iv)), (vi) entails (vii) MLp1 Since Pi was a randomly selected necessary truth,the deduction from(iii) to (vii) allows us to generalize to (viii) (p) (Lp
->

MLp)

(The principle invoked here is that p -- q, then Mq -- Mp.) or equivalently, (ix) (p) (MMp) So the suggestionis thatwe should understandDescartes's doctrine of the creation of the eternal truthsas involving,not a denial that but a denial thatthose whichare necesthereare necessarytruths, as saryare necessarilynecessary.To thinkof these truths created is neitherto thinkthattheyare not necessary,nor to thinkthatthere was a timewhen theywere not necessary,but to thinkthatit is not necessarythattheybe necessary.Iterated modalitiesin the timeless presentexpress Descartes's thoughtbetterthan his own temporal language does.22
22As we shall see later, I think that (p)MMp is not thebestformula for expressingDescartes's creationdoctrine.I adopt it here only provisionally, to avoid for the time being the explanations a more exact formula will withthe argumentof this require. Lee Horwitzhas pointed out a difficulty paragraph. Descartes holds thatcreationis continuousand thatthe distincof tionbetweencreation and conservationis only a distinction reason (AT VII, 49). If I continue to exist fromone time to another, I do so because God, by one and the same action,willsmycontinued existence.In the case of the eternal truths,God's continuous volitionof theirtruthis supposed of is to be an immutableact. God's immutability whatexplains the necessity these truths.But if God's continuous volitionof these truthsis immutable, then,once he has willed them,he cannot not willthem,in violationof (i). I 581

E. M. CURLEY

This suggestionabout how to interpret Descartes's creationdoctrinewas first made, I think,by Geach.23 Geach does not support the suggestiontextually, but it's worthnoting that there is a quite explicittextualbasis for supposing Descartes to have been making a claim about iterated modalities. A passage that we considered earlier (3), from Descartes's letter to Mesland of 2 May 1644, continues: that and (12) Then also byconsidering our mindis finite created of sucha nature thatitcan conceive possible things as the thatGod has willedto be truly possible, not of such a naturethatit can also but conceive possible as thosewhichGod could have made possible, but nevertheless willedto make impossible. [That God's powerhas no limits] us that tells God cannot havebeendetermined bring about to it thatitwas truethatcontraries cannotexisttogether that, and hence, he couldhavedone thecontrary though ... God has willedthatcertaintruths werenecessary, is notto saythathe has willedthem that For necessarily. to will thattheywere necessary and to willthem or to are necessarily, tobe necessitated willthem, completely different (Alquie III, 74). Here we have Descartes invokinga scope distinction between (1) WgLp and (2) LWgp in a way thathas a clear bearing on a scholasticargumentwe shall consider (see pp. 585-588). It should be evidentthatin this shortly passage Descartes wants to allow that there are some propositions which are in fact impossible,but which mighthave been possible,
take this to be a difficulty Descartes's philosophy, rather than in my in interpretation it,a difficulty of perhaps first seen by Spinoza (cf. the Ethics I P33S2). 231n an articleentitled "Omnipotence," firstpublished in Philosophy 48 (1973), pp. 7-20, and subsequently reprinted in Providenceand Evil (Cambridge,Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Geach's suggestion is discussed by Alvin Plantinga in Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), pp. 103-114, but rejected as "contrary to the fundamentalthrust"of Descartes's system. 582

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

not and that others are in fact necessary,but might,nevertheless, have been necessary. There is nothing epistemic about these "mights."We are not saying: "These thingsseem necessary,but, for all we know, theymightnot be necessary."We are saying: "These thingsare necessary,but there is nothingnecessaryabout that."
V

Why did Descartes hold this doctrine? Clearly he thought that God's omnipotence required it. But this simple, obvious answer does not take us veryfar. Why should he have thoughtthat God's omnipotence required God to be the creator of eternal truths? Descartes writesas if his doctrinewere the only alternativeto postulatingsomethingeternal that is independent of God:
are or (13) As for the eternal truths,I say again thatthey true possible but are by becauseGod knows them be trueorpossible, notthatthey known to God to be trueas ifthey weretrueindependentlyHim.... One must not of nevertheless truths those would betrue, still say,then,thatifGoddidnotexist,

of fortheexistence God is thefirst mosteternal all thetruths of and all But which be,and theonlyone from can which theothers proceed. in whatmakesit easy to be mistaken thisis thatmostmen do not and being,who is the consider God as an infinite incomprehensible depend.24 onlyauthoron whomall things But whyshould Descartes suppose that if God does not create the eternaltruths, theyare true independentlyof Him? The Thomistic view,afterall, conceived the eternal truthsas neithercreated nor independent of God: no would be eternal.But were eternal, truth (14) If no intellect in truth eternity it alone. has is becausethe divineintellect eternal, from thatanything otherthanGod is eternal; Nor does itfollow this in is becausetruth thedivineintellect God himself (Summa Theologiae Ia 16, 7). Why does Descartes reject this Thomistic solution? Frankfurtaddresses this problem and suggests that Descartes
24To Mersenne,6 May 1630, Alquie I, 264-265. Italicized phrases are in Latin in the original,whereas the rest of the letteris in French. 583

E. M. CURLEY

It thoughtthe Thomistic doctrine compromised God's simplicity. made the eternal truthsdepend on God, all right,but on God's between intellect, on his will.To say thisis to implya distinction not God's intellectand his will. And certainlyDescartes does thinkit essentialto identify God's intellectand will,and does connect this identification with his creation doctrine. In the passage quoted above (13), I omittedthe followingsentence: the of words, they (15) If menunderstood properly meaning their that of couldneversaywithout precedes blasphemy thetruth a thing and are theknowledge God has ofit,forin God willing knowing one,

he he knows in such a way thatfrom very that wills the fact something, thereby is it,and on thataccountonlysucha thing true.25

But it should be noted that here the identityof God's will and intellectis invoked against an opponent who maintains that the truth a thingprecedes God's knowledgeof it. This can hardlybe of Thomas. One difficulty with Frankfurt'saccount is that it speaks not of Thomism, but of Scholasticism, and treats"Scholasticphilosophers such as Suarez and Aquinas" ("Creation," p. 39) as if therewere no important differences between them. But thereare. If we examine Suarez's criticism the Thomists,we willfindthatitis Suarez who of best fitsthe profile of Descartes's opponent.26 Descartes neglects
25Alquie I, 264. Again, the italicizedphrases are in Latin in the original. cites a passage from the Sixth Replies (AT VII, 431-432), but Frankfurt for thatpassage is less satisfactory his purposes than (15), since it appears to make God's intellectsubordinate to his will. Cf. Alquie's annotation, Alquie II, 872, n. 2, and Marion, 282-289. 261n whatfollowsI am much indebted to Cronin,op. cit.The interpretation of Suarez is a delicate business and Cronin's reading may not be correct. In "Suarez on the Eternal Truths," The Modern Schoolman58 (1981), pp. 73-104, 159-174, Norman Wells emphasizes the difference between Suarez's various Thomistic opponents and the danger of taking of as some of Suarez's statements representative his own finalposition.For a the purpose of identifying likely opponent for Descartes, however, I representsa natural if believe it will be sufficient Cronin's interpretation misreadingof Suarez. No doubt the historicalsituationis far more complex than either Cronin or I represent it as being. The best available work account is now, no doubt, the massive and erudite,but verydifficult of Marion cited in fn. 3.

584

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

Thomas's alternativetheory,I suggest, because he tacitlyaccepts the validityof Suarez's criticism Thomas. of

In the Metaphysical Disputations,27 one of the problems Suarez

takesup is whatwe mightcall the problem of the existential import of necessarytruths.Suarez takes it for granted that there can be eternal (necessary) truths-for example, "All men are animals"about beings whose existence is contingent.But the orthodox doctrine in medieval quantificationtheorywas that universal generalizationsentail the existenceof membersof theirsubject class. On the other hand, it is orthodox doctrine in anybody's modal logic that a truthentailed by a necessarytruthis itselfnecessary. How can "All men are animals" be necessarywhile "There are men" is contingent? This is not Suarez's way of settingup the problem. His way of puttingit is as follows:if the essence of a thingperishes when the thing ceases to exist, then those propositions in which essential predicates are predicated of a thing are neither necessary nor of perpetual truth. This conclusion is unacceptable, since it would entail that all truths about creatures would be contingent,and hence, since all science is of necessarytruths, thattherecould be no scienceconcerningcreatures.Suarez notes that "some modern theof ologians" have been willingto grantthatpropositionsputatively perpetual truthmightcome, and cease, to be true as thingscome, to and cease, to exist,but findsthe opinion contrary the wisdom of the philosophers and of the Church fathers. Suarez then considersand rejectsa Thomisticsolution: thateternal truthsabout creatures might be true, regardless of the existence of the creatures, "not in themselves,but in the divine intellect." This, he says, won't do. For contingent truths have a as perpetual truthin the divine intellect much as necessaryones do. And-what is more important for our purposes-the eternal truths... (16) . . . are not truebecausetheyare known God, rather by they no otherwise reasoncouldbe given are are known becausethey true,
2 vols. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965). The metaphysicae, 27Disputationes passages I shall be concerned with are in Disputation XXXI, Section xii, 38-47, pp. 294-298.

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E. M. CURLEY

whyGod necessarily knows thatthey true,foriftheir are truth proceededfrom God himself, wouldhappenbymeansof God'swill, that so it wouldnotproceednecessarily voluntarily.. (p. 295) but Part of the interestof this for the Cartesian scholar is that it provides us with an identifiableindividual who (apparently) asserts whatDescartes denied in the letterto Mersenne quoted above (13). But so far there is nothing in Suarez which says that the eternal truthsare true independentlyof God. As the passage continues, however,it certainly implies this. For example, in relationto these truths, the divine intellectis (17) . . . speculative, operative; thespeculative not but intellect supof poses,and does not make,the truth itsobject;so propositions of thiskind.. . have perpetual not truth onlyas theyare in thedivine intellect, also according themselves prescinding but to and from the divineintellect (Ibid.). Suarez's own theory(?? 44, 47) is that propositionslike "Man is an animal" can be construed in two differentways: (i) the copula linkingthe termsmay signify actual and real conjunctionof the an terms existing in the thing itself,in which case the truthof the propositiondepends on "the efficient cause on whichthe existence of the termsdepends"; ifthe termsdon't 'exist'(i.e., aren't instantithe ated), the propositionwillbe false; (ii) alternatively, copula may signifyonly that the predicate is 'of the nature of the subject', whether the terms exist or not; in this sense, the proposition is equivalent to a strictconditional, "if somethingis a man, it is an animal" (= "it cannot be the case that man comes into existence unless an animal does"); but the truthof thisconditional does not of depend on the instantiation its terms,or as Suarez says,on the existenceof an efficient cause whichcould produce instancesof the terms: (18) If,per impossibile, therewereno suchcause,thatproposition for be animalhas a capacity sensation"] wouldnevertheless ["every true(Ibid., 297). p. In adopting this solution, Suarez is, in effect, restrictingthe orthodox medieval doctrine of existentialimport. But he is also, 586

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

himselfto the proposition Descartes is so apparently,committing evenifGoddidnot truths wouldbetrue the anxious to deny: that eternal exist (cf. (13) above). Of course, the fact that Suarez says what Descartes denies does not show that Descartes had Suarez in mind as an opponent. But Suarez's work was in common use in Jesuitschools like the one at whichDescartes was educated (Cronin, op. cit.,pp. 32-33). In spite of of his ritualprotestations ignorance of the workof his predecessors, Descartes can cite Suarez when it serves his purpose (Alquie II, 677). I thinkit'sreasonable to suppose thatDescartes mightwell have cited Suarez (but not Thomas) in this context,had he been pressed to identifya philosopher who held the kind of doctrine against which his own creation theorywas aimed. But whydoes Descartes neglect the Thomistic alternative?Earlier I suggestedthatDescartes may have taken forgrantedSuarez's critique of St. Thomas. Let me try to make that more explicit. Suarez thinkswe must explain whythere is a necessaryconnection terms,explain whatis the foundationof those betweennonexistent He necessaryconditionalswhose termsare not instantiated. thinks it will not be sufficient say that the connection exists in God's to arises fromthatexemplar, idea of the species and thatthe necessity because one of the thingswe want to know is whythe divine exemplar representsthe connectionas a necessaryone. His own answer and proceeds "fromthe object itself," seems to be thatthe necessity not fromthe exemplar, though he admits that there is some difficultyin seeing how thiscan be, since in itselfthatobject is nothing. I suppose that Descartes mayhave felt(as I believe Suarez did feel) that,since truthinvolves a correspondence between thoughtand for reality,Suarez was raising a genuine difficulty St. Thomas. If truthis correspondence, and if there really are necessary truths, there must somehow be necessitiesin re. Since Suarez's alternative position did seem,at least, to posit somethingeternal other than God, it is understandable that Descarteswould resistthat. But he may have feltthatthe dialecticleft him a thirdalternative.Suarez had reasoned as follows: (a) if the eternal truths were true because they were known by God, we would not be able to give any reason why God would necessarily know them to be true; (b) if theirtruthproceeded fromGod himself,that would be by his will, and so they would proceed volun587

E. M. CURLEY

tarily, not necessarily;hence, (c) the eternal truthsmust be known by God because they are true independentlyof his knowledge to them. I suggest that Descartes had this argument in mind and rejected step (b). To say that the eternal truthsproceed from the willof God does not entail thattheyare not necessary.God can will thatthese truthshold necessarilywithoutbeing necessitatedto will that(cf. (12) above). So his creationof them is a genuine act of will (not necessitated),and yet it does provide a foundation of their necessity, because his will is immutable (cf. (7) above). If we see Descartes's theoryas arising out of reflectionon the controversy between Suarez and Thomas, then we can understand whyDescartes sometimesidentifies eternal truths withthose which give us no knowledge of anythingthat exists28and why he is so attracted the comparison he makes betweenGod's relationto the to eternaltruthsand a king'srelationto the laws of his kingdom(e.g., in (1) above). It is not merelythat the eternal truthsand the laws are both the products of will, but also that,because their validity depends onlyon theirbeing willedbya person of sufficient authority,their validityis independent of their instantiation. Just as the king's prohibitionon poaching does not, to be law, require the existenceof poachers, so God's decree thatall men mustbe animals does not, to be a truth,require the existence of men.29 VI What is the best thatcan be said in favorof Descartes's doctrine? Much depends on interpretation.If you accept the standard interpretation, according to which Descartes holds that there are no necessary truths, then perhaps the best line to follow is that the adopted by MargaretWilson,who sees Descartes as anticipating insight thatall truths, even those of logic,are in principlerevisable,
I, of 28Cf. The Principles Philosophy 10 and 48, and the comment on the with latterpassage in the Conversation Burman,p. 34. See also Curley,De(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, scartes AgainsttheSkeptics 1978), p. 34. 29Cf. the SixthReplies, where Descartes writesthatGod can be called an efficient cause of the eternal truths,"in the same way thatthe King is the existingthing, efficient cause of the law, even if the law is not a physically but only,as they say, a moral being." 588

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

and hence that none are ineluctablynecessary.30Wilson acknowledges, of course, thatthereare anti-Cartesian, well as Cartesian, as elementsin the positionof philosopherslike Quine and Putnam (p. 235, n. 31), but I don't believe thatshe givessufficient weightto the anti-Cartesian elements.Not onlydoes Descartes not "linkhis position to any observationof 'conceptual revolutions',"he also seems to thinkthathisconceptual revolutionwillbe the last one. That, I'd say, is one more reason for hesitatingto interpretDescartes as denyingthat any truthsare really necessary. There is textualsupport for the standard interpretation. Otherwise,it wouldn'thave come to be the standard interpretation. But I hope enough has been said to persuade the dispassionate reader thatDescartes had good reasons for not sayingwhat he sometimes seems to be saying.I suspect he was somewhatconfused about the modal status he wanted to accord to the truthshe called eternal. The distinction between (p)Mp and (p)MMp is subtle enough that we can raise this suspicion withoutimpugning Descartes's philosophical ability.In any case, the question whichinterests is this: me what'sthe best thatcan be said in favorof Descartes's doctrineifhe is, in fact, committed to a modal thesis involving iterated modalities, and not to (p)Mp. For now I shall continue to use, provisionally,(p)MMp to formulate the thesis involving iterated modalities. In the next section I shall consider a more accurate formula. At one stage, I thoughtthe following.There are, afterall, systems of logic which express the modal intuitionsDescartes seems, at times,to have, thatis, systems modal logic in which(p)MMp is of logicallytrue. These systems,the Lewis systemsS6-S8, are consistent, theyhave semanticinterpretations, theyhave decision procedures. They may be incorrectsystems modal logic in thatthey of don't statetrue principlesof logical necessity but and possibility, at least they're coherent, and that's something. Many people have found Descartes's creation doctrine incoherent. But thisis the kind of defense Geach anticipatedwhen he introduced the iteratedmodalityinterpretation into the literature.The passage is too delightfulnot to be quoted fully:
301n her recent book, Descartes(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 125-126.

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by unsoundphilosophies havebeen defended (19) In recent years, logicians: some of the moredubiousrecent whatI maycall shyster of be developments modallogiccould certainly used to defendDein every'possibly werea theorem, which p' scartes. system which A in is but has thing possible, indeed neverbeen takenseriously; modal possibly or p', systems which in 'possibly logicians havetaken seriously that for p', again 'itis notnecessary necessarily wouldbe a theorem of arbitrary interpretation 'p'. Whatis more,some modernmodal indeed;some take worlds very seriously logicians notoriously possible of of them thatwhatyouand I vulgarly evengo to thelength saying the call theactualworldis simply worldwe happento livein. People both possibly and p' whotakeboth seriously, theaxiom'possibly things any theontology possible of worlds, wouldsay:You mention imposa worldin which thatisn'timpossible but and sibility, there's possible is wouldwish awayoutthanDescartes possible. And this evenfurther that to go; forhe wouldcertainly wishto saythat'It is possible not a God should not exist'is even possibly true. So a fortiori shyster But logician could fadgeup a case forDescartes. to mymindall that disreputable discithisshowsis thatmodallogicis currently rather a modalnotions inadmissible-ontheconare pline;not thatI think I thatcurrent professional trary, think theyare indispensable-but is standards thediscipline lowand technical in are ingenuity mistaken forrigour.3' logician. But Now I am not a logician. A fortiori,I am not a shyster the defense of Descartes which I proposed just now does seem to me a fairtargetforGeach's sarcasm. One mightnot want to accept everything Geach says (e.g., the apparentlyblanketcondemnation of possible world semantics).Still,it does seem thatthe defense of Descartes at this point attaches too much significanceto purely like S6 are, at some level of formalresults.I now thinkthatsystems interpretation,incoherent. There is something distinctlyfishy about the devices used in the decision procedure for S6 to secure the result that (p)MMp is logicallytrue.32 The decision procedures for the standard systems(T, S4, and 31Op.cit.,p. 11.

withthe admirablyclear exposi321n what follows,I assume familiarity tion of decision procedures for modal logic in G. E. Hughes and M. J. to Cresswell,An Introduction Modal Logic (London: Methuen, 1972), see Chapters 5 and 15. For the remainder of this Section I omit particularly but it should be underover propositions, explicituniversalquantification stood to apply. 590

DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

S5) give formal expression to somethingwhich is at least likethe Cartesian-Leibniziannotion thatnecessity truthin everypossible is world, possibility truthin some possible world. As far as T and S4 are concerned, it is only somethinglike it,since we mustqualifythe Cartesian-Leibniziannotion by saying that necessity(possibility) is truthin every (some) accessible possible world. In S5 this qualification becomes vacuous, since the accessibility relation is reflexive, transitive and symmetrical, everypossible world is accessibleto and every other. Hence Hughes and Cresswell conclude that S5 expresses the Leibnizian conceptionof necessity more "directly" than do T and S4 (p. 76). In S6 the contactwiththese basic intuitionsis consideralymore remote. The diagram testinga formula must include at least one 'non-normal'world, a world in which the valuation rules for nonmodal formulaeare the same as in normal worlds,but Mot is always assigned the value 1 (and Lo, the value 0). Everynon-normalworld must be accessible to at least one normal world, and everynormal world is accessibleto itself.But no world (includingitself)is accessible to a non-normalworld. To see how this works,contrastthe way MM(p&-p) is evaluated in T withthe way it is evaluated in S6. In T, there is a consistent the assignmentof values which falsifies formulawithouteven considering alternativepossible worlds: wI MM(p&-p) 0 0 1001

The formula is not a logical truthin T (or S4, or S5). But in S6 there must be a non-normalworld, w2, accessible to wI, in which M(p&-p) is assigned the value 1, though there can be no world accessible to w2 in which (p&-p) is assigned the value 1: wI MM(p&-p) 0 0 1001

w2 M(p&-p)
1 0

But M(p&-p) mustalso be assigned the value 0 in w2,sinceMM(p&p) is assigned the value 0 in w1. So a consistent falsifying assignment
591

E. M. CURLEY of values is not possible. The formula is logicallytrue in S6 (and related systemslike S7 or S8). Above I said that there was somethingfishyabout the way this resultis obtained. Actually,I thinkthereare at least two thingsthat are fishyabout it. First,the admission of non-normalworlds,with their own special rules for the evaluation of modal formulae, means that the 'modal operators' are not being interpretedunivocallyin formulaewhichinvolveiteratedmodalities.Second, since the valuations of modal formulae in non-normalworlds are quite independentof the values of theirarguments,in those or any other possible world,thereis no reason at all to regard these rules forthe valuation of modaloperators. a systemlike S6, not much is leftof In the Cartesian-Leibnizianintuitionthat possibility truthin some is possible world. So if (p)MMp were the best formulafor expressing Descartes'screationdoctrine,he would be not much betteroffthan if he held the appalling (p)Mp. VII The timehas now come to discuss an issue I have alluded to, but, for the sake of simplicity, have avoided discussing.Does Descartes intendto stateanythesisabout the modal statusof all propositions? I thinknot,but (as noted earlier (p. 571)) opinion among Cartesian scholars has been divided. Some, like Frankfurt, have argued that Descartes does intend a universal thesisabout the modal statusof does not shrinkfrom all propositions,viz., (p)Mp. And Frankfurt embracing the most hair-raisingconsequences of this doctrine. Speaking of Descartes's proofsthatGod existsand is not a deceiver, Frankfurt writes, ... These proofsnecessarily leave open the questionof whether or their are conclusions true"speaking absolutely" in God'seyes.That that that is, theyleave open theunintelligible possibility God knows He does notexist.This is perhapstheultimate paradoxthatmyinentails terpretation (Frankfurt, "Creation," 53). p. Other interpreters, Gueroult,have thoughtthatthere mustbe like thatwould at least some absolute impossibilities. Any stateof affairs limitGod's omnipotence or his being is absolutelyimpossible. So 592

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propositionslike "God exists,""God is able to do what we conceive to be possible," "God is not a deceiver," and others,belong to a created 'higherorder' of eternaltruths than do those eternaltruths by God's will.33Gueroult is influenced partlyby a principle that Anglo-Saxon philosophers sometimes call the principle of nonwere possible,the possible could no vacuous contrast.If everything longerbe opposed to the impossible,and therewould no longer be as any sense in characterizing anything possible. But it is important to Descartes that there should be some point in saying,for example, that materialthingsare possible. In thisdispute it seems to me thatGueroult is more nearlyright than Frankfurt, though the dispute is muddied by the fact that of neitherpartyconsiders seriouslythe possibility expressing Descartes's creation thesis in terms of a formula involvingiterated modalities.And it mightbe thoughtthatonce we do consider that possibility, no longer have any reason to limitthe scope of the we thesis. If what Descartes is committedto is (p)MMp, rather than (p)Mp, then the need to make exceptionsmaynot seem so pressing. We can allow that "God exists" is necessary, so long as we remember that it is only contingentlynecessary. The iterated consemodalityinterpretation avoids the horrendous systematic quences of the simple modalityinterpretation. But thatwould be too hastya conclusion.34Even if we interpret Descartes's doctrineas best expressed by a formulainvolvingiterated modalities,thereis reason to make at least some exceptions,to hold thatat least some eternal truthsare necessarilynecessary,not merely contingently necessary. After all, what's supposed to explain the necessityof those eternal truthsGod did create is his does not immutability above, text (7)). If God's immutability (cf. then it'shard to see how belong to a 'higherorder' of eternaltruth, it can serve to explain the necessityof created eternal truths.Iterdes vol. II (Paris: Aubier, selon l'ordre raisons, 33Gueroult,M., Descartes

341 note that Geach resisted this conclusion when he first put forward the iteratedmodalityinterpretation (see 19, above). Geach offersno reasons for his resistance (unless saying that somethingis certain counts as givinga reason for it). In what followsI endeavor to support his intuition withargument.

1953),pp. 26-29.

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Gueroult's talk of a ated modalitiesofferus a way of interpreting and De'higher order' of necessity,possibilityand impossibility, scartes'scontentionthat eternal all thetruths of of and (20) theexistence God is thefirst most which can be, and the only one from which all the others
proceed...
.35

That necessarytruthsabout God should occupy a special position may also be suggested by reflectionon the fact that, insofar as Descartes has the concept of a possible world, he thinksof it as a world God mighthave created. I contend that Descartes's doctrine is best expressed by the following pair of theses: (T1) (x) ((Ex & -LEx) (T2) (x) (LEx
->
-*

(p) (Lpx

->

-LLpx))

((p) (L ypx

LL px))

Here 'E . . . ' represents the one-place predicate . . . exists." So existingbeings (T1) says that necessarytruthsabout contingently claims that necessarytruths are only contingently necessary. (T2) about necessarilyexistingbeings are necessarilynecessary. in Note that I say that Descartes's doctrine is best expressed these terms.I do not maintainthathe was clear enough about the subtle distinctions involved not to give frequentencouragementto alternative readings. The textsjust are not all that unambiguous. To take one example, Gueroult had cited, in favor of limitingthe doctrine,a passage in the letterto Mesland of 2 May 1644 in which Descartes admits that which so evident are thatwe cannot (21) There are contradictions without before minds our entirely impossible, judgingthem putthem indehave made creatures thatGod might liketheone you suggest: of (Alquie III, 74-75). pendent himself would be Gueroult inferred that our judgment of impossibility on the other hand, points out that Descartes correct. Frankfurt,
35To Mersenne, 6 May 1630, my emphasis.
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DESCARTES ON THE CREATION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS

does not actuallysay the judgment would be correct,but that he does go on immediatelyto say that (22) If we wouldknowtheimmensity His power, shouldnot of we put thesethoughts beforeour minds. We are advised not to consider such propositions, Frankfurt thinks,so as to avoid being compelled to judge falselythat it was impossible for God to make creatures independent of him. On Frankfurt'sreading of the texts, Descartes is committed to the exceptionlessthesis,(p)Mp. I find Frankfurt's of interpretation (21)-(22) inconsistent with the doctrine of judgment in the Fourth Meditation,according to which(on myinterpretation) any propositionswe are literally compelled to assent to must be true in an absolute sense. Otherwise God would be a deceiver. But the interpretation (21)-(22) canof not be settled without pursuing larger issues of how Descartes's defense of reason is to be construed,for example, withoutdiscussing whether Descartes is as skeptical about the possibility our of attainingknowledge of absolute truthas Frankfurt makes him out to be. Since I have discussed those issues elsewhere,36I will not pursue them here, contenting myselfwith noting that an alternative reading of (21)-(22) is possible. I take it that Descartes would regard this proposition "It is not possible that God should make a creature independent of himself' as true, but dangerous, since it is liable to mislead us into judging (falsely) that "God's power is finite." There are a number of relevanttextswhichpoint in a numberof different directions. I abstain from surveyingthem and concentrateon what I thinkis the fundamentalquestion, raised by Marand ad hoc of Degaret Wilson:37 "Would it have been arbitrary scartesto exclude essentialtruthsabout God fromthe scope of his
36Descartes AgainsttheSkeptics, 108-118. pp. 37See Wilson'sDescartes, 124. Wilson provides a briefand fairsurvey p. of the relevant texts,marred only by an apparent acceptance of Frankfurt'sreading of the letterto Mesland. For a thoroughand subtle analysis of the letter to Mesland, culminating essentially in a vindication of Gueroult's position,see J.-M. Beyssade, "Creation des veriteseternelleset doute metaphysique,"Studia cartesiana (1981), pp. 86-105. 2 595

E. M. CURLEY

creationdoctrine?"I suggestthatit would not have been, and that the rationale for the creation doctrineofferedin Section V of this the whole paper explains why. According to my interpretation, problem arises fromworrying about the truth-conditions necesof sary truthsdealing with thingswhich may or may not exist,with essences which,according to Genesis, at one time were not actual. In the case of God, the question does not arise. God's essence is eternallyactual. So there is no need to provide a foundation for essential truthsabout God in his immutable will. Eternal truths about God, in Descartes's view,would constitute legitimate a exception to the creation thesis. If thisis the correctinterpretation Descartes'sdoctrine,whatis of the best that can be said in favor of it? We cannot, at this stage, appeal to the existenceof well-understoodlogical systems incorporatingthe modal intuitionsDescartes appears to have. So far as I can discover, no extant systemcontains theses (T1) and (T2). I to gather that these theses could be added withoutinconsistency a like T. Afterall, the point of developing a minimal minimalsystem of systemis preciselyto allow for the possibility variant systems containingtheses like(T1) and (T2). But so far as I am aware, no in one has triedto workout the detailsof such a system the waythat they have worked out the details of systemscontaining (p)MMp. The measures thatturned out to be necessaryto provide a semanticsforsystems like S6 do not seem a veryauspicious omen for the in futureof such systems those we have been contemplating this as section. But as a nonlogician,I can only leave it to the logicians to find out. If we assume, for the sake of argument,thatthe task of providing a sensible semanticsfor systemsincorporating(T1) and (T2) is not insuperable,therewillstillbe other problems.For example, the key difference between necessarily necessary truths and contingently necessary truthsis supposed to be that the formerare about his creatures.How truths about God and the latterare truths are we to classifypropositions involvingboth God and his creatures? For example, I assume that Descartes will hold it to be a necessarytruththat (a) God is more powerfulthan Adam.38 If we
38This example is suggested by Mesland's (see text(21)). But Mesland's example will not make the point, since God's creation of anythingis sup596

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regard (a) as a truthabout God, then (T2) will proclaim it to be a necessarilynecessary truth. But if we regard it as a truthabout Adam, (T1) will proclaim it to be a contingently necessarytruth. This does not seem to be a verysatisfactory result. I conclude that,while Descartes's doctrinemay not be as bizarre it as it sounds when expounded by certainof his interpreters, faces severe difficulties even on the most charitableof interpretations.39 University Illinoisat Chicago of

posed to be a contingentevent. I am indebted to David Stump for forcing on me a clarification the argument of this section. of 39The first versionof thispaper was read at the Chapel Hill Colloquium in October 1979. Subsequent versionswere read at the University Iowa, of of the Great Expectations Colloquium, The University Nebraska, and the Universityof Pennsylvania. I am indebted to various members of the to audiences on those occasions, but particularly MargaretWilson and Jim Ross. 597