Trex 01192

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Rig Assessment

Transocean
Maintenance Department Deepwater Horizon
Oct 17 to Ocr 31 ?005
Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment
Deepwater Horizon- DP Semi-Submersjble

.... .... l -----=-------- Nov 4, 2005 R. Da1ley --I

8 De<:.:pv..ater Honzon F;ig Conciition Scl"Jr<i!Card _ __ No 4. 2005 R. Daiiey
C and Recomner,dat!nn:" Nov 4 2005 MocJuSpec /West
0 (5.2) lmprcvement Opportunities Nov 4. 2005 1 MoauSpe::
E '(5.3) Maintenance Issue:. - Nov 4, 2005 ModuSpec' >Nest
'vl0dl1S'i'lec-Report of Sur.rey (us -fj61.1 .2}-- Oct 17. 2005 - ModuSpee
Oct31, 2005
F
;>.JcduSpec Supp. lemental Repo .. rt c.f (lJS1334 2j Oct 17, 2005- ModuSpec --I
__ West Er.gineerif!g _ __ Nov 30, 2005
_ ---- __ _ ____ Oct :,1, 2005 _ l
I TOI Sut>sea &. 13ullenns _Assa'.>Sroet>! Oct 21, 2005 .E_r_!?da<ic Alonso
J Cre:ne Re:J-:>rt- Post r;r<> _ Fee 2G(}5 _ _ _ _
Calerp l!ar Crar:e Engine Repcrt Fire Feb 26, 2C05 Cate pill<:sr
L Tl1c:rrnographic Repor.. 2002 UnitE:d -
Spectr5J9r<:phtcs
Report _. _ J.:l2':. 2004 s.w. Wire Rorc
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---- -------------------- ----------
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Rig No
6087

1
Date
Nov4, 2005 Deepwater Horizon Rig
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC
TRN-HCEC-00063579
TRN-HC E C-00063580

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00063581
A
..

Rig Assessment
1>
Transocean
I Oct 17 To Oct 31, 2005
l
Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment Summary Report
Deepwater Horizon- DP Semi-Submersible
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... -- ---- .. - . - --- - . - - - 1-- - -
.. -

2 Prelilnirrc;ry Draft Nov 22. 2005 R Dailey J . Tr10mson

Revision Description Date Author Reviewed
This document contains confidential information proprietary to Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, lr"lc. and may
not be transferred, reproduced. conveyed or divulged to any other company or person without express wri tten
permission .
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Dale 1 !
Nov 22, 2005 I Deepwater Horizon Rig Assess.m __ e_n_t _._l ____ 1 __ . _ _,__1_8_,
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Rig Assessment
Transocean Maintenance Department Deepwater Horizon
Oct 17 To Oct 31 , 2005

Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment Summary
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTJON ............. ,. ......................................... _ ......................... - ............................................................... 4
1. 1 RlG DATA ......... .......................................................................................................... ....................................... 4
1.2 ASSESSMENT SCOPE OF WORK ........... .. .. .. ............................................... ........ ................................................. 6
1.3 APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND GUIDELNES .................................................................. .. ........ ........ .. ............... 5
1.4 OBJECTIVES ...... ... .... ... .. . ............................................. . ........... ................. . ............. ....... ............. ..... ...... ............. 5
1.5 i\SSESS"'-1E'<TPROCESS ........................................................ ................................. : ..... ........ ............ ............. ...... 5
2. EXECUTIVE SU:viMARY ............................................................................................................................. ........ 7
2.1 RIGCONDITIONSUM'MARY ...... ..... .... ....... ......... ......... ......................... ................................. ........... .. .......... .. ... 7
2.2 MAINTENANcE SYsTEM REvrFw ..................... ...................................................... ................ ................... ........ s
2.3 .i'AAJOR ASSET AND .. .... .................... .. .................. ... ..... .... ....... u .............. 8
2. 3.1 CB-214 NnvigaJion ................... ................ .. ............. ......... ......... .. ................... ......... . ...... ....... 8
232 CH-209 ThnJsters ......... ............................... ....................... .... ............... .................. ... ...... ......... ............ ....... 8
2.3.3 EA-300 Drawworks (Aczive Heavt:j ... ... .. .......................................................... .. ............ .................. ...... . 9
2.3.4 EA-300 Drawworks (Auxiliary) ........ .......... .. ..... .. ........... ... ......... .................. .............. .............. ........... ....... 9
2.3.5 EF-315 Top Dr ive ............. ............. .... .. ..... ......... ..... ..... .... .... .. ..................... .................. ......... ....... ............ 10
2. 3.6 EF-368 Top Drive Pipehand/er ... .... ....... ......... .... .... ... .. .. .. ......................... .. ... ............... ........ .. ............... ... 10
1 3.7 EK-913 Stabbing Basket ....... ...... ........ ......................................... ........ ...... .......................... ...................... 10
EK-948 Fingerboards ............... ................... ........ .... ..... .. ............. ..... .. ... .... ... .... ......... ....... ........ . ..... ........... 10
EL-309 Crown Block (!via in) ....................... ........................ .. .............. .... ... ......... ................. ......... ... ......... I 1
EAI-31 1 Traveling Block (Main) .... ............................................................................. .................. 11
2.3.8

2.3.9
2. 3.10
2.3.1 l GA-327 Mud Pumps ... .................... ............... .............. ... ........ ................................ ...... ...................... / 1
2.3.12 GK-321 Mud Agilcuors .......... ... .......................... ...... ...... .... .. ...... ... ...... ............ ... ........ ...... ... .. ...... ...... 11
2.3. 13 JJ-421 Riser ............... .......................... .................... ........ .......... .. ......... .... ......... .... ............................. 12
2.3.14 /P-431 Riser Te.nsinners ........... .. ............. ....... ................................................................. .................. 11
2.3.15 !R-442 Riser Recoil ............. .. ........ ...... .......... ... ........... ...... ................. , .............. ... ........................ 1::!
2.3.!(} JG-444 MUX Cables .. ....... ....... ....... ...... ... ................. ............ ....... ............ ................ .. ............. ... ... ..... 12
2.3 17 JG-416 Ho1 Line Reel ... .. .......... ... .. ....... .. ............ .................... .................................. .................... .... 13
2.:,,]8 J0-467 Cojle.xip Hoses ..... .................. ... .... ..... ........ .............................. ........ ........... .. ....... ........ ......... 13
2.3.19 LA-948 PRS .. ..... .... ....... .............................................. ........ .................... .......................................... J 3
2.3.20 LM-568 !ron Roughneck ...... ........ .................. ....................... . ..... ......... ....... .... .......... ...................... 13
2.3.21 Mll.-625 !vfain Engines ............ ........... ... ............................. .. .... ........... ........ .................................... 14
.1. 3.22 MF-627 Main Generators ..... .............. ... ................. ......... ..................... .... ..... ............ ......................... 14
2.3 23 M0-697 Variable Frequen':1 Dhtes ( f' f-1)) ....... ...... ... .. . ........ ....... ..... .. .. .......................... /4
2.3.24 NA-607 HP Compressors............... ............. ... . .. . . . .. . . .. . ....... . ........................... .... 15
2.3 25 OB-904 Seowa;er Lines........ .......... . .... ..... . ... .. . . ............. ............... .............................. ........... 15
2. 3.26 !'C-600 Deck . ........... ............. ................................... ........................................ .. .. ... ..... 15
2.3.2 7 PC-600 Knuckle Boom Cnme .... ........ ...................................... ................. ....................................... 16
13.18 Rl;-1)51 PA Sysrem......... .... ...... .. .... .. . ... . . . .. ..... . . .. . .. . . . . ..... . . . ... . 16
2. 3. 29 TH-802 1-Vatermakers ......... ... ...... ... ..... ... ... ... ........................ ..... ........ .. ................................ .... .. .. ..... ... J 6
2 3.30 'f'.Jvi-818 Potable Wa1er System ....... ........... .. ........ .... ............................................ ................. . ....... . 16
2.3 31 T.-694 Hazardous Areas ....... .. ...................... ..... .............. ... .............................................. .. . .... 17
2.3 3.; UX-708 Ladder Fall Arrest Sysrems ......................................... ................. ........ .................... ........... 17
:::.3 33 VG-810 HVAC Syszems ...... ...... ....... .. .. ...................... .... .. ............ ......... ...................................... ..... . ..... 17
3. A1TACHMENTS ........................................................................ ............................................. _ .......................... I8

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6087 2 Nov 22, 2005 j Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment 2 18
TRN-HCE C-00063584
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Rig Assessment
Transocean Maintenance Department
Deepwater Horizon
Oct 17 To Oct 31,2005

Deepwater Horizon Rig Condition Scorecard ....... ........................... ....................... .... ............ .................. 18
(S. l ) Deficiencies and Recommendations ......................... .... ... ..... ....... ........ .............. .. .................. .... 18
(5.2) Improvement Opport:uniries ...... ................. .... ........ ... .. ...... ......... .. ... ............ ... .. .................................. 18
(5.3) Maintenance .issues .............. .................... ....... ........ .... ....... ............................ ......................... ... ...... ..... 18
4. RF.FERENCF:S .................................... ........ ........................................................................................ .................... lS
ModuSpec Report of Survey US (1361 1) ... .................... ... ............ ....... ... .. ..... ........... .. ..... ......... ............ .. . . 18
ModuSpec Suppil'.menta1 Report ofSuT,>ey (1 364.1) ..... .. .......... .... ................. .................................. ........ .... 18
West Engir.l'.ering Report oJSurvey ............. .. ........ ........ ........................ .. .. ............... ........................... .... ... 18
TOI Subsea & Bu!lezins Repon (2005) .......... ..................................... .... ..... ................ 18
Liebhe1r Crone Report - Po,\' I Fire (2005).. ....... ........ ............ ... ....... ........ ..... .. ... ... ............................. 18
Caterpillar Crane Engine Repor! Post Fire (2005) ................... ........ .................... ................................ 13
Thermographic Electrical Survey Report (20021 ....................... ... ...... .. .......... ................................ ......... .. /8
Creme Wire Condition Report (2004) ................ ............. .......... .. ...... ......... ....................... ... .... ........ ....... .... lS

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6087 2 Nov 22,2005 Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment 3 18
TRN-HCEC-00063585

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Rig Assessment
Oct 17 To Oct 31,2005
1. Introduction
1.1
Deepwater Hori zon
The DEEPWATER HORIZON is a Reading & Bates Falcon RBSSD design semi-submersible drilling unit capable
of operati ng rn harsh environments and water depths up to S,OOO ft (upgradeable to 10,000 ft) using 183t.in
15,000 psi BOP and 21in OD marine riser.
Rig Type
Design
Builder
Year Built
5th Generation Deepwater
Reading & Bates Falcon RBS-8D
: Hyundai Heavy Industnes
Shipyard, Ulsan, South Korea
2001
.. ~ - - - - - ........_. ______ .. ... ... -- - .. - ...... __ ~
Classification ABS
Flag : Panama
- ~ .. --- - ~ - - - - _ ......... ---- -- - -- -
'
Accommodati on 130 berths
Helideck Rated for 561-N helicol)ter
Moon pool 21 ft X 93ft
- . !
St ation Keeping
Max Drill Depth
Max Water Depth
Dynamically Positioned
30,000 ft I 9,144 m
. 8,000 ft I 2,438 rn
1.2 Assessment Scope of Work
The assessment was carried out by a team of surveyors under the leadership of Ron Dailey
(Transocean Team Leader).
The scope of work was to complete a hardware assessment of the Deepwater Horizon, with
particular emphasis on "Downtime Risk Equipment" as defined in the Maintenance Manual. The
equipment assessed included drilling equipment. tubulars, mud system, well control equipment,
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Rig Assessment
Transocean Maintenance Department
Deepwater Horizon
Oct 17 To Oct 31 , 2005
marine equipment, power plant, safety related assets and electrical equipment. Safety
procedures and equipment normally audited by HSE were purposely not included in this
assessment. It should also be noted that the inspection of individual items of equipment was
subject to operational and time constraints.
Over the course of the assessment and while in machinery spaces and on deck areas,
associated hull and structural items were given detailed visual inspections.
The maintenance program (EMPAC) was checked for deficiencies in the areas of Standard PM
Tasks, Riser PM scheduling, asset technical data, asset hierarchy structure, "Free Issue"
Assets, Unscheduled PM tasks, "Routi ne Tasks" Assets, Asset Registers and maintenance
backlog.
1.3

1.4
Applicable Standards and Guidelines
The HQS Rig Condition Assessment Recommended Practices - February 18, 2005 .
Transocean maintenance manual.
The Original Equipment Manufacturers maintenance and operating specifications .
ModuSpec Assessment checklist.
West Engineering checklist
Accepted oilfield operating and safety practices .
Transocean Standard Maintenance Tasks .
Objectives
The objective of the condition assessment was to provide Transocean Management with an
unbiased, comprehensive and fair evaluation of the condition of the rig and its equi pment.
The assessment evaluation and reporting methods have been standardized for t he types of
assessments made to provide consistency between similar types or classes of rigs. In order to
achieve this, the standard ModuSpec and West Engineering assessment processes were
applied, utilizing their detailed "rig specific" checkl ists that were compiled prior to the
assessment.
1.5 Assessment Process
The assessment process consisted of seven main components:
1. Asset Hislorv Review- EMPAC
12 months of the Deepwater Horizon Downtime Risk equipment history was reviewed and
summarized by the team leader prior to the hardware assessment. This review helped to
shape t he scope of the crew interviews and assessment process by highlighting
maintenance performed and identifying maintenance issues (both past and present) . It also
supplied a window for gauging the effective use of the Company Standard Tasks and quality
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J Transocean
Rig Assessment
Oct 17 To Oct 31 , 2005
of the data being entered into EM PAC. The summary revi ew and asset history records were
handed to the third party assessors upon their arrival on the Deepwater Horizon.
2. Operational Event and Incident Reviews - GRS
12 months of Deepwater Horizon Operational Events and Incident Reports were reviewed
and summarized by the team leader prior to the hardware assessment. The review brought
to light rig down time details and events related to equipment This information highlighted
downtime and failure related incidents and helped focus the assessment of the rel ated
equipment. The summary review for the OER's and Incident Reports was handed to the
third party assessors upon their arrival on the Deepwater Horizon.
3. Review of the rigs documentation - 3'd party inspection & evaluation documents
This information is required as part of the 3'd party checklist. In order to streamline the
assessment process and minimize disruption to the rig operation, the Transocean Team
Leader revi ewed equipment certifi cates and 3'd party inspection I evaluation reports.
Significant information was noted and the passed on to the 3rd party assessors.
4. Crew Interviews
Throughout the duration of the assessment there was continuous flow of assessment
information behveen the Transocean team members and the Rig Crews through both
informal conversations and during the rig's morning meetings. The 3rd party assessors
conducted f ormal crew interviews utilizing the 3'd party checklists and the historical
information supplied by Transocean. These interviews helped determine the depth of the
inspections as well as identify requi rements for additional hi storical i nformation (for non
Downtime Risk equipment).
5. Eoui pment and Structural Inspections
These were carried out by the Transocean Team Leader (as practical) and the 3"' party
assessors. At the end of each day the findings were discussed and the next day's agenda
decided. These details were discussed with the crew during the onboard meetings.
6. Action Item follow up process set i n place - Creation of EMPAC Work Orders
The Transocean Team Leader created an Assessment Master Work Order (#8705-006557-
000). Subsequent Sub-Work Orders were generated by the rig crew whenever they
performed work related t o the various assessment recommendations.
7. Close Out Meetings
A fi nal meeting was held onboard the rig before the assessment team departed. A close out
meeting was also held onshore on November 4, 2005 with the Transocean Operations
Manager and Operations Engineer at the Park 10 office in Houston. The Transocean Team
Leader, along with the ModuSpec and West Engineering Surveyors, di scussed and
explained the major items of concern .
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JTransocean
Rig Assessment
Oct 17 To O:;t 31 , 2005
2. Executive Summary
2.1 Rig Condition Summary
During this assessment. the rig was drilling for BP offshore Gulf of Mexico. The rig has been in
operation for almost five years and the first regulatory SPS is coming due in five months (March
2006). In addition, the 1825-Day Standard PM Tasks are scheduled for the fi rst half of 2006 for
several major pieces of equipment, such as the Top Drive, Pipehandler, PRS, Crown Block,
Traveling Block and the Subsea Stack. Housekeeping was good except for the Top Drive and
Orawworks which were both dirty. The rig and its equipment were generally found to be in a
good state commensurate with a five-year-old, fifth-generation vessel with some exceptions that
are listed in Section 2.3.
Rig personnel did not have a plan in place to organize the completion of the work associated
with the upcoming SPS and multiple 1825-Day Standard Tasks. Shore-based management
stated that they have an eight-day shutdown planned for sometime during the fi rst quarter of
2006 for this purpose and had assumed that the Maintenance Supervisors and Operations
Engineer could plan and execute this project. Given typical operational distractions and crew
activities during a shutdown period. rig management should consider assigning a full-time,
dedicated project manager to ensure that maximum use is made of the available time and
resources.
The AC Drive Motors for the Drawworks were dirty inside and their megger readings flucruated
with the temperature of the windings and the relative humidity. These motors are all nearing five
years of continuous use and should soon be disassembled, cleaned and overhauled at a
qualified service center.
Both main deck cranes have damaged boom lattices and the boom sheaves are worn out. The
main electrical panel for the starboard deck crane is badly corroded due to a fire and needs to
be replaced. The Pipe Grab (gripper) for the Knuckle-Boom Crane has developed cracks and
has been welded up several times, so it should be NDE tested to determine if it has reached the
end of its useful life.
The Riser Tensioners only have one of six position-indicator cir cuits worki ng. The Ri ser Recoil
System depends upon these sensors, so if this last one should fai l the system will not know the
position of the cylinder rod if the Riser is disconnected during an EDS. This could lead to
possible equi pment damage.
The Hot Line is deteriorated and needs to be replaced. It has a major leak and has been spliced
four times in the past. The Yellow MUX Cable is damaged but a new cable is onboard the rig
and it is scheduled to be replaced at the fi rst opportunity .
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TRN-HCEC-00063589

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Oct 17 To Oct 31, 2005
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Prior to the assessment, all four mud pumps were inspected by the rig crew as per Alert HQS-
OPS-EAL-327-03 and #4 was found to have a cracked crankshaft. A new repl acement
crankshaft arrived onboard the rig during the assessment.
Hazardous Area "EX" Equipment was not being maintained as per the Standard PM Tasks. The
rig did nof have a register of EX devices a nd was not using the Standard PM Tasks for
hazardous area maintenance.
2_2 Mai ntenance System Review
The rig has been using EM PAC for almost five years. A few people know EMPAC well, most
know it just well enough to get by and some are very much lacking in knowledge of how to use
it. Record keeping in EMPAC i s inconsistent. History notes are quite good in some cases and
very poor in other situations where details and readings are missing.
Mul tiple items showed up in EMPAC that should be corrected in order to comply with the
Maint enance Manual . In additi on, Standard PM Tasks are not scheduled correctly in some
cases and rig specific tasks need to be developed to augment them_ Due to the extent of the
corrections needed, it will not be practical for the rig to accompli sh this project on their own_
They have neither the spare time, available expertise or user profiles to be able to complete this
work in a reasonable amount of time. An experienced EM PAC Optimizer should be assigned to
work with the rig for one hitch to get this done_
The technical manuals, hard-copy equipment fi les and electronic files on the rig server should
be arranged alphabetically by PSS Code as described in the Maintenance Manual. At the time
of the assessment , PSS Codes were not being used to organi ze these documents.
2-3 Maj or A sset Defic i encies and Recommendations
2.3.1 CB-214 Navigation Equipment
A few pieces of R&B Falcon surplus equipment were installed during the construction of the rig
and they were old and outdated five years ago. These are reportedl y on the budget to be
replaced next year.
Recommendati on:
Follow through with the plan to replace the outdated radars, the electronic chart display
that does not comply with IMO and the GMDSS.
2.3-2 CH-209 Thrusters
There has been salt water intrusion into the thrusters that has been manageable up to this point
by cleaning the oil with two portable filtering units. Thrusters #3, #4 & #6 have been at or above
the manufacturer's maximum allowable moisture content (0. 5%) i n the past. This condition can
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118

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be expected to worsen over the years until it can no longer be controlled. Then the thrusters will
have to be pulled and the shaft seals replaced.
Recommendation:
Purchase six more portable filtering units, so that each Thruster has a dedicated filter,
and the oil can be proactively cleaned whenever a Thruster is shu down, even for a
short period of time. At the present time, it is not practical to rig up an oil cleaner for
shutdowns of short duration. The availability of more filters will enable the rig crews to
maintain the moisture content below the manufacturer's maximum allowable level (0.5%)
and delay the replacement of the Thruster seals as long as practical.
2.3.3 EA-300 Drawworks {Active Heave)
The forward main shaft seal was leaking at the time of this assessment. A previous attempt was
made by the rig crew to replace it, but the new seal did not fit properly, had to be trimmed
onboard and did not seal properly. A special split seal has been ordered from the manufacturer
to replace il
Four of the six AC Drive Motors meggered lower than the Transocean minimum standard (2
Megohms). Internal inspection revealed dirty windings; however, it is not practical to clean this
type of motor onboard because they must be disassembled to accomplish this .
Post Assessment: The drawworl<s was run for several days, thus heating up the motors. The
rig crew meggered them again and reported that they were all satisfactory (29 to 150+
Megohms). However, these motors are still dirty and will soon have five years of steady use, so
their condition should be evaluated at this point. The di rty windings, in combination with humid
conditions and inactivity of the drawworks during the assessment, would account for the wide
swings in megger readings.
Recommendation:
Send the motors to an authorized facility on a rotational basis for deaning and overhaul.
including bearing change out.
2.3.4 EA-300 Drawworks {Auxiliary)
The AC Drive Motor meggered 0.70 Megohms. which is well below the minimum company
standard of 2 Megohms.
Post Assessment : The crew meggered the drive motor again and the reading came up t o 5
Megohms. As with the main drawworks, the low megger readings during the assessment were
most likely caused by a combination of dirty windings and high humidity.
Recommendations:
Continue to monitor the insulation resistance readings.
If insulation readings permanently deteriorate in the future, send the motor to an
authorized facility for cleaning and overhaul, including bearlng change out.
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6087 2 Nov 22,2005 Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment 9 18

1Transocean
Rig Assessment
Oct 17 To Oct 31,2005
2.3.5 EF-315 Top Drive
AC Drive Motor meggered 2.5 Megohm, which is slightly above the company mini mum standard
but four months ago it was 150 Megohm. This is a sharp drop in the insulation resistance value
and should be monitored.
Post Assessment: After running the Top Drive for several days and heating up the motor, the
megger reading came back up to 150 Megohm.
Recommendation:
Monitor the insulation resistance frequently.
Exchange the motor if the resistance va lue permanently drops below 2 Megohms.
2.3.6 EF-368 Top Drive Pipehandler
This uni t appears to be weli worn and disassembiy may reveai that i t has reached its maximum
wear limits.
Recommendations:
Disassemble and perform a full NDE and take wear measurements .
If found to be at the limits of wear, exchange with a spare unit and overhaul as
necessary.
2.3.7 EK-913 Stabbing Basket
The local controls inside the basket are inoperative. At the time of the assessment, the basket
had to be operated remotel y by an extra person from the station located on the mezzanine deck
above the Drillers House.
Recommendati on:
Repair the local control s l ocated inside the basket.
2.3.8 EK-948 Fingerboards
The Intermediate Fingerboard is not used at thi s time and is racked back out of the way. It is in
a state of disrepair and could not be put into service without significant expendi ture. This unit
has been cannibali zed and thi rty-one latch fingers were missing at the time of this assessment.
In addition. several hinge pin connections for the latches are bent and damaged.
Recommendation:
Either remove the Intermediate Fi ngerboard or repair it.
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. Transocean
Oct 17 To Oct 31, 2005
2.3.9 EL-309 Crown Block (Main)
One of the four load cells is inoperative. These load cells are used by the active heave function
of the Drawworks and are therefore crilical devices. Maximum redundancy should be
maintained as much as possible at all times.
The 1825-Day PM Task completed in September 2005 calls for a complete inspection i ncluding
NOT. The work performed was only a visual on all welds and Straight Beam Ultrasonic Testing
(UT) on the main shaft and fast line shaft.
Recommendations:
Repair or replace the faulty load cell.
Review if further NOT is required on all accessible load-bearing areas for the 1825-0ay
PM Task.
Traveling Block {Main)
The 1825-0ay PM Task completed in September 2005 calls for a complete disassembly of the
Traveling Block followed by NDE on the load bearings areas and the sheaves (Step 3). St ep 6
calls for bearing renewal. Step 7 calls for a turnaround of the sheaves duri ng assembly to
prolong sheave wear. It appears that the only recorded work performed was a visual inspection
on the sheaves, followed by Straight Beam Ultrasonic Testing (UT) on the main shaft and the
Becket pin.
Recommendation:
Reopen the 1825-0ay Task and perform all of the steps (the Work Order was reopened
during the assessment).
2.3.11 GA-327 Mud Pumps
All four Mud Pumps were recentl y inspected by the rig crews as per Alert HQS-OPS-EAL-327-
03 to check for cracks in the crankshaft. Mud Pump #4 crankshaft was found to be cracked and
is scheduled to be replaced. A new crankshaft has been purchased and arrived onboard the rig
duri ng the assessment.
Recommendation:
Follow through with the existing plan to replace the crankshaft in Mud Pump #4.
2.3.12 GK-321 Mud Agitators
There have been nine failures in the last eighteen months of the submersible agitators located
in the reserve mud tanks. Most of these have been electrical fai lures in which the motor
windings have burned up.
Recommendation:
Raise an REA to determine a sol ution to the high failure rate .
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Oct 17 To Oct 31 , 2005
2.3.13 IJ-422 Riser
The Riser Joints appear to be in good shape; however, they are Vetco type HMF, but have
Standard PM Tasks scheduled against them for Vetco type MR. Schedule the correct Standard
PM Tasks (see Corporate Asset "OOABB VETCO, HMF, 21"). In addition, several joints of riser
are overdue for their 1825-Day survey.
Recommendations:
Schedule the correct Standard PM Tasks to the riser.
Contract a 3rd party to perform the overdue Riser Survey onboard the rig and avoid the
time and expense of shipping the joints to town.
2.3.14 IP-431 Riser Tensioners
Tensioner #6 rod seal is leaki ng. It can be used in an emergency. but it is normally kept offline.
A spare Tensioner is being refurbished in town and there is a plan to change out #6.
Recommendation:
Follow through with plans to change out Tensioner #6.
2.3.15 IR-442 Riser Recoil
Only one out of six Hydralift posi tion transducer circuits for the Riser Tensloners is working. The
sensors are located on the Tensioners and the Riser Recoil System relies on them for proper
operation. At this point, all redundancy has been lost, so if this last transducer circuit fail s there
could be the potential for equipment damage if a disconnect occurs for any reason.
Repeated failure of the transducers has been an ongoing problem that the ri g has been unable
to resolve. The sensors are descri bed as being very difficult to adjust properly and they have a
high failure rate.
Another related problem is mud and fluid contamination inside the related electrical junction
boxes mounted beneath the Drill Floor. Attempts to seal these boxes and the cable glands have
been unsuccessful due to the extreme natur e of the contami nation. See West Engi neering
photographs for detai ls.
Recommendations:
Contract Hydralift Service Techni cians to inspect the i nstallation and advi se how ro solve
the problem with the sensors.
Rig crew shoul d devise a means to seal off the area beneath the Drill Floor where the
junction boxes are located so that they stay clean and dry.
2.3.16 JG-444 MUX Cables
The Yellow MUX cable has a damaged spot at approximately 6700 feet. A new MUX cable is
onboard and is scheduled t o be changed out when the ri g next drills a well below that depth. On
the present well, the damaged part of the cable is not in the water . In addition. the new MUX
Rig No. Rev1slon
I
Date PAGE
OF
18
TRN-HCEC-00063594

1>
Rig Assessment
Transocean
Maintenance Department
Deepwater Horizon
Oct 17 To Oct 31, 2005
cable was found to have a damaged spot and this is scheduled to be repaired with a kit from the
manufacturer.
Recommendations:
Replace the MUX cable at the earliest opportunity as planned.
Repair the damaged spot on the new MUX cable as planned.
Provide guards to protect the new MUX cable while being stored.
2.3.17 JG-416 Hot Line Reel
The Hot Line Hose has had frequent failures that have required splicing on four previous
occasions. The LMRP was pulled during the assessment and the hose was observed to be
leaking badly. This is all indicative of hose deterioration and this item is critical when running
and pulling the BOP stack.
Recommendation :
Replace the Hot Line hose.
2.3.18 J0-467 Coflexip Hoses
The outer metal sheathing is broken and unraveling on the Mud Boost and Conduit Supply
Hoses.
Recommendation:
Send the Mud Boost and Conduit Supply Hoses for repair.
2.3.19 LA-948 PRS
Both of these units require constant corrective maintenance and have caused al most forty hours
of non-productive time (NPT) in the twelve months prior to this assessment. Due to operational
restraints, software and hardware reliability upgrades are not up-to-date and remain t o be
completed. The 1825-0ay condition survey is coming due in the first half of 2006 and will
require shutdown for disassembly and NDE. In addition, the so-called self-lubricating pins and
bushings should be pulled and inspected. Experience on other rigs has shown that if the pins
and bushings are found to be worn out, their replacement will require an extended shutdown to
complete.
Recommendation:
Plan a shutdown period whereby the hardware and software reliability upgrades can be
completed and the PRS units can be disassembled for condition evaluation.
2.3.20 LM-568 Iron Roughneck
Under visual inspection, this unit is showing signs of significant wear such as loose pins and
bushings and appears to be nearing the point where it will require an overhaul. It requires a
high level of maintenance, i.e., over forty Corrective Maintenance Work Orders have been
issued against it in the past year. The 365-Day Standard PM Task calls for complete condition
Rig No. Revtsion Date PAGE
'
OF
18
TRN-HCE C-00063595

<,>
Rig Assessment
Oct 17 To Oct 31 , 2005
evaluation and NDE of all load-bearing areas and requires disassembly. On the last PM, closed
on September 24, this was not completed due to time and resources restraints.
Recommendations:
Perform the 365-Day condition evaluation.
Exchange and overhaul the unit as indicated by the evaluati on.
2.3.21 MA-625 Main Engines
Three of the six engines have outstanding runtime maintenance: Main Engine #2 (1000hr), #3
(2000, 4000, 16000hr) and #6 (2000, 4000, 16000hr). The maintenance could not be performed
at the time of the assessment because the HV Switchboards are being run in split buss
configuration due to software problems with the ABB Thruster Drives (See "M0-697" entry
below).
Recommer.da!ton:
Perform the overdue runtime maintenance on the main engines when the main
switchboard configuration allows.
2.3.22 MF-627 Main Generators
Main Generator #1 was out of service due to a leaking heat exchanger. Three small ventilation
openings had been opened in the generator housing and covered with expanded metal shields
so that the generator could be run at a reduced capacity in an emergency.
Recommendations:
Replace the generator heat exchanger.
Close the temporary ventil ation openings.
Send the failed heat exchanger back to the manufacturer to determine how a double-
walled, tube heat exchanger can suddenly develop an external leak. This is the second
unit that has failed.
Investigate methods of avoiding future fai lures of these units as indicated by the results
of the manufacturer's examination of the iailed unit.
2.3.23 M0-697 Variable Frequency Drives (VFD)
Due to software programming issues in the ABB Megastar Sami Dri ves for the Thrusters. the rig
was being conservative and running with split main busses at the time of thi s assessment. The
manufacturer has updated their software to solve these problems and the rig has plans in place
to install the latest version in the near future.
Recommendation:
Complete the planned update of the ABB software for the Thruster VFDs .
PAGE
--6F
18

, ~
Rig Assessment
Transocean
Maintenance Department
Deepwater Horizon
Oct 17 To Ocl31, 2005
2.3.24 NA-607 HP Compressors
Two Hamworthy HP Compressors supply 3000 PSI operating pressure to the system. At the
time of the assessment, Compressor #2 could only produce 2000 PSI even though these
compressors are rated for 4500 PSI. This situation reduced the total production capacity and
highlighted the lack of sufficient redundancy in the system.
lnteNiews with the crews indicated that the system was very slow to build up pressure even
when both compressors are working normally. Instances were recounted where system
pressure was low and the compressors had to run for more than a day to build it back up. This
indicates that the compressors are possi bly undersized for the application.
Recommendations:
Troubleshoot and repair HP Compressor #2.
Raise an REA to determine what the correct compressor capacity should be for the HP
Air System.
If indicated by engineering calculations, install an additional compressor to provide
sufficient capacity and adequate redundancy.
2.3.25 OB-904 Seawater Lines
Multiple leaks have appeared in the past and the frequency of occurrence is increasing. The
piping specifications show that aluminized, lightweight schedule 40 pipe was installed duri ng
construction so this problem can be expected to worsen over the next few years.
In addition, the seawater lines are currently treated with Drewsperse SWD. a chemical that
inhibits marine growth from attaching to the insides of the pipework. This chemical presents a
potential health hazard and must be handled with care.
Recommend at ions:
Perform ultrasonic thickness surveys of this pipework on a regular basis.
In future years, add a budget item for the replacement of sections of seawater seNice
piping.
Investigate the economical feasibility of install ing an impressed current cat hodic
protection system in the seawater lines.
At the same time, investigate adding impressed current marine growth anodes in the
same system and thus eliminate the need to handle hazardous chemicals currentl y used
for this purpose.
2.3.26 PC-600 Deck Cranes
The boom sheaves for both port and starboard deck cranes have unacceptably deep wire
imprints in the grooves.
Both cranes have significantly damaged boom lattice members caused by impact with the main
block .
Rig No. Revision Dale
PAGE
OF
18
TRN-HC E C-00063597

1.>
Rig Assessment
Oct 17 To Oct 31, 2005
The starboard crane had a fire several months ago and the main electrical panel has been
severely corroded due to firefighting efforts with seawater.
Recommendati ons:
Replace all the boom sheaves in both cranes.
Replace the damaged boom lattice members on both cranes.
Install a guard on both crane booms to prevent impact of main blocks with lattice
members.
Replace the severely corroded main electrical panel in the starboard deck crane.
2.3.27 PC-600 Knuckle Boom Crane
The smallest Pipe Grab (# 3) has had four cracks welded up in the past year. This Grab has
possi bly reached its maximum fatigue life.
Recommendatio:1s:
Fully disassemble Pipe Grab # 3 and NDE all load bearing areas not normally
accessible.
Determine whether this grab can be continued to be used or should be replaced .
2.3.28 RG-651 PA System
Rack "B" amplifiers are currently out of service due to a failure of the UPS that supplies power to
this rack. The PA System is working, but has no redundancy at this ti me.
Recommendati on:
Repair or replace the failed UPS.
2.3.29 TH-802 Watermakers
Even though there are six distillati on type watermakers (one per engine). the water production is
not nearly high enough to match consumption due to the low load on the engines. Average
production over the past six months has been around 21 M
3
per day while the consumption has
averaged about 55 M
3
. This coul d be a serious problem if the rig ever relocates to an area of the
world where it is unsafe to take on potable water from local sources.
-
Recommendation:
Consider adding a modern 30-40 M
3
capacity Reverse Osmosis Watermaker to bring the
production up to the point where the rig is self-sufficient.
2.3.30 TM-828 Potable Water System
The inline filters for drinking fountains, icemakers and coffee makers did not have the Standard
PM Task scheduled to them and there was no asset for them as per the Maintenance Manual.
There was only a rig originated PM Task to change out the drinking fountain filters annually. The
Standard Task calls f o r ~ of them to be changed out every six months .
PAGE
OF
18
TRN-HCE C-00063598

1Transocean
Rig Assessment
Maintenance Department Deepwater Horiz.on
Oct 17 To Oct 31. 2005
Recommendation:
Create an Asset for all potabl e water inline filters, schedule the Standard PM Task to it
and complete the task.
2.3.31 TX-694 Hazardous Areas
At the time of this assessment, the rig did not have a program in place for maintaining the
hazardous area devices and hazardous area ventilation fans as per the PM Standard Tasks .
Recommendations:
Identify all Ex Devices, i nstall I.D. Tags on each device. create Hazardous Area
Equi pment Registers (HAER) in Elvl PAC and schedule the Hazardous Area PM
Standard Tasks to them.
Create an Asset for Hazardous Area Venti lation Fans and schedule the Standard PM
Tasks to it.
Complete the Hazardous Area maintenance as soon as possible after the Ex Devices
have been identified and the program is set up.
2.3.32 UX-708 Ladder Fall Arrest Systems
On the majority of the fixed ladders around the rig, the fall arrest systems have not been
installed correctly. The wire rope support posts do not extend high enough to be able to unhook
safely at the top of the ladders. Personnel are forced to lean back agai nst the "backscratcher"
frame, take both hands off the ladder to unhook and then climb the remaining way up wi thout
fall protection. The wire rope support posts are supposed to be high enough above the top of
the ladder to allow personnel to stand safely on the upper platform while unhooking.
Recommendation:
Properly install the ladder fall arrest eoui pment on the ri g.
2.3.33 VG-81 0 HVAC Systems
The starboard A/C Compressor 28 was inoperative at the time of the assessment. The rig has
ordered parts to overhaul this uni t.
Recorn mendations:
Continue with planned overhaul of A/C Compressor 28 .
In the future, compare the cost of an exchange compressor as opposed to overhauling it
on the rig. Often the exchange unit is cheaper .
Rig No. Revi sion Date PAGE
OF
18
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCE C-00063599
11-ransocean
Rig Assessment
Oct 17 To Oct 31 , 2005

- L-----..-
3. Attachments
Deepwater Horizon Rig Condition Scorecard
(5.1) Asset Deficienci es and Recommendations
(5.2) Improvement Opportunities
(5.3) Maintenance Issues
4. References
ModuSpec Report of Survey US (1 364.1)
ModuSpec Supplemental Report of Survey (1364.1)
West Engineering Report of Survey
TOI Subsea Alerts & Bulletins Assessment Report {2005)
Liebherr Crane Report - Post Fire (2005)
Caterpillar Crane Engi ne Report- Post Fire (2005)
Thermographic Electrical Survey Report (2002)
Crane Wire Conditi on Report (2004)

Rig No. Revision
I
Date
PAGE
I
OF
6087 2 I Nov 22, 2005
Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment 18
18
B
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HC E C-0006360 1
c::-t>
Rig Assessment
Oct 14 to Oct 28, 2005

Rig Condition Scorecard
---
TABLE OF CONTENTS
co DITTON CATF.GORJES & SCORES .......................................................................................................... 2
1.1 iv[AINTENANCE SYSTE.tv1 ........................... ........ .. ........................ ................................... ........................... 2
I .2 HULL AND STRUCTURE ......................... ................................................................ ............................ ........ 2
1.3 l\AVIGATION I DP I PROPULSIO / BALLAST i B!LG ............ .......... ................................................... 2
1.4 iv100RING SYSTEM .. .............................. ............................................... .................................................... 3
!.5 IIOISTING / ROTATINGEQUlP:VfENT ...... ........... ............... ................................. ............. ........... ............. 3 .
1.6 tv1UD/CEMENTSTORAGE ......................... ................................................................... ................... .. ....... 3
1.7 l'vfUD PROCESS ......... ............................... ........................... ................................................... ..... ....... ..... ....... 3
1.8 DRILL!l\G INSTRUMENTATION ............................ ........ .................... ........................................................ 3
1 9 RISER / ROP& WF.T.l.CONTROT F.OlJTPMF. :T ... .................................................................................... 4
1.10 DRILL STRlNG i DOWNHOLE ............ .... ............................ ... .. .. ..................................... ............................. 5
1.11 TUBULAR I PIPE HANDLING ...................................................................................................................... 5
1.12 POWER GENERATION .................................................................................... .. ........................................... 5
1.13 AIR SY 'TEI\1$ ................... ................ .. ... .................................................................................. ..................... .. 5
1.14 COOLING WATER I FV.EL I LUBE OIL/ OILY WATER ......................... .................................................. 6

1.15
1.16
LIFTING EQUIPivfENT .................................................. .. ....................................................................... ..... ... 6
COMMUNICATlONS/ DATA PROCESSING ...... ................................. .. .................................................... 6
1.17 ACCOi\1MODATIONS ..... ................... ................. ................. ........... ... .............. ........... ................. ................. 6
1.18 RIG UTILlTIES ............................ ..... ............................. .. ................................... ........ .. ....... ............................ 6
1.]9
SAFETY AND FIRE FlGHTING ..................................................... ... ................... , ... ... ..................... ........... .. 7
2 TABLE 1. DEFJI"ITIONS OF CONDITION LEVEL$ ..................................................................................... 8

R1gNo. Revision Date PAGE OF
6087 1 Oct 30,2005 Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment 1 8
TRN-HCEC-00063602
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c:::-fTransocean
Rig Assessment

Oct 14 to Oct 28, 2005
- --
1 CONDITION CATEGORIES & SCORES

Rig No. Revision Date PAGE OF
..
c:-fTransocean
Rig Assessment

Oct 14 to Oct 28, 2005
Item Description

Rig No ReviSion Date PAGE OF
6087 1 Oct 30, 2005 Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment 3 8
TRN-HC E C-00063604
4Cr>
Rig Assessment
Transocean

Oct 14 to Oct 28, 2005
l t ~ m Description

Rig No. Revi sion Date PAGE OF
c::-fTransocean
Rig Assessment

Oct 14 to Oct 28. 2005
Item Description

Rig No. Revfs1on Date PAGE OF
TRN-HCE C-00063606

Rig Assessment

Oct 14 to Oct 28, 2005
Item

0 0 0

..
-c:-fTransocean
Rig Assessment

Oct 14 to Oct 28, 2005
'--- -
Item
FIGHTING
UX-708 Ladder Fall Arrest Systems

...
,,, - , ..
c::-p.-
Rig Assessment
Transocean
Oct 14 to Oct 28, 2005
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..
- ,. - - - - ~
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2 TABLE 1. DEFINITIONS OF CONDITION LEVELS

Rig No. ReVISIOr Dzte PAGE
7l
6087 1 Oct 30,2005 Deepwater Horizon Rig Assessment 8
' ' '' ' ,I
.. ..
' . .
' ~
TRN-HCE C-00063609
c
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-0006361 0
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5.1 Asset IJoficient;ie:;.
, 11.1.:itr.. ;;s r! n. ..Jri;:\" (:.{._P r.t
NOTE: Record all work d!lne oti thesa items hy creating Sub Work Orders against the Master W(Jrk Order R705-0065fi7-000
REF I PSS I 1'\SSET DESCRIPTION I RECOMMENDATION ! PRIORITY I
1f.1 AZ-915 !Batteri es !CI<!an tr.c bRttedes for the Generator. (Completed) l ___ s
1G/ BB-131 C<:ble and cabls:; lta{s jlltird C<Jhlcs next to lha reavy tool store on tile tlrill r1oor st>ould he popcrly .'llfApped to cable I B

:3blc travs fo:lp _ rcparl)' support the or<Jnge coloreJ tleGirical caole routed t:p lht: f}OJ1?.ft iJf.!rriCk leg \v monkQY tr..ard 83.131 c
!
104
105
106
110
111
112
I
CB-232 N&vtgation

Drawworks
levei.
__ !Repair the uppor NUC ansftfie RAM NaVIgation Ltghisin thP. derncl<
'Fiungtd :; . .;lions of rnotcr air cooling ductwork on slr1e of haJc separa\ed. 13olt
together ':tiHl a proper gasKet betwnP.n them.
Ci;llan and remove any hydr.llulir. oii from drawwcrks b<lilil. r.
1
oan bn;:c i3 C:l'3entiaf :n oi!
8
B
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. ....:....=..... _ leak tracinq. whict in turn rs for a proper functioning. (Ccmtplotod) .
Re lace the r::Jt'ed sf1aft SRRI on off-drillers f\vd' side. Parts on ordM PO 11 ?837605} I 8
;: TOS Properly attach the loose TDS Mil tilt cylinder. (Completed) _ l_______g_
lTr>o Oriva !Remove tha Rn! Sf;l?.lant trom the cable glands for the Top Drive jllnr:f:on t-ax nll'J that lile g
1
anrl;, B
are prQE__erlt mst?.tieo so lh'lt thay saal and prevent water 'naressron.
Replace ocnt R8S Might adjusting <:ylincier.
Remove antenna rnrr riamaged support that has bean daMggetl by crena <:perat,cn:;, St.orboard Fwd
derrick.
l;ti- TDS dcUy frsmo the fix; cylinder on ti'e dollythaTcont<Oim; ;:1 "hom!!> on
, _ " M:r. e m?.de r.:evis pi'1 for an OEM manufactured cylinder. The o! i;J n.ade custom items should be
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;pravented at all times on critical items, only OEM manufuclured ite1!_!::. shou:d bo .;...u"-se'-r.J....:. . ___
I 113 Tn:: dolly Upf1Ar s;abilizor arm do:ly to travel blcc1<: Of the four mou"lting bolls, one was found sheared .iff, one had I B I
- ::,: r broken the wire and toe'.( out 2" and the remaining lwo \,ere Extral I the SMGt eu 1 !Y
. . bolt frorn !he t8vt,;l frame and rep loco. Ensure that all fnw bolls QO tte up1)er l>tabiliz.er arm are
.. _ - torCI_';ISd and safety wired. __
114 EK-913 Hydraulic work basket Repair local (lnslda basket) non controls (Parts on . .P.Q # B
1'15 Uppor Two latches ...,ere ooseued with worn or sheared hinge pins. one latc.h i(> mlssi,,q a fosteo':lr. B
_ . "' Recommend to rclieov f sorvl.::c ell latches on upper beard after trippit inti) the holt:.
11fl . .. i s.y.;;.: I replace failed load c.;JI (note that load cells are criliC-31 for
(here lore \.he n:>.ximLm a"allabirly should be sbived for at alltirn,;;s. {PO# f''/981!43!0 and 1'798843/1}
i
I 1 i 7 I Elfi!lfi corrcde:J McKissick sn1tch block frcrn crown deric:K: LCome,leted)
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. - - J/\1'0.3 f,r:;l opr.ol1.uflity ;r,e "lectrical department should irwestigal9 the mcgger rearling of 2.5 Meg I B
I 120
---- - Oh'CIS f<:,r the Top Dnve: AC motor. (150 Meg Ohms was tha last rccor0.cd vslue .
'Repair or replllce ihe f angas on the ducting fo the oir cooling system !or th(j dn'lwvtorks AC I B
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motors. Each of the motor;: have cracked ductwork at some ooint.
Verify lha $1f.1igh\ness of tha oil lines rouled in the pow(!r ends of the mu,; i70r excrnpls lha No.
rn11j pump :vnia:oo::J <J crimp In tha oil supply tire routed to the m.::fr nearing RH aide (&tanding
end loo!uog t:;o.vards fluid end). The No.2 crosahcc:c failure in .Cpril Nas parHally CO:'ltiibu!Gd tc
a 1.1 ?.1oii suoolv Ike accordino the his tort rlles.
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Rep!:;Jce fai'!Xl shaft &;:J3i on georbox for Mud Agitator 68.
R01ise <JO REi1 to i!.vcstigato the i3sue with the gila firr.9 aHer a :-.nur: time in Df.lera\ion. 1 i!'J
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nine failures in the last eighteen months. . .

IJ. {) riser tcnsic.ner o::hange out with the spare riser after ii is _ _ :=J C I
1
c.)nlrac.t R I lyd<.Jiift service engineer to assist Itt repalriii!-Jire RlBB' positron transducers and in I B
I 126
I 127
L
128
I
129
tile ltoQucn: f<llllire mte prol.llem. Only one risf;r \:nsloner
lcu!;eniiywor.<lng. fhe5e transducers supply roo postl!fm,npu; to i'1E: ;{t:er r:(cco\1 System. sc a l<ltlure ot
'this las: remainir:q s<nsor cause rnajor equipment darnaCJ9.
The upper ;:,nniJiar is .l<ept in the 'lent poliiti:>n due to (;I nrin:.>r :eak when I<:H fr. the open position. The l3al-:
is iote1mitlen!, Continue !rouble shooting lo fix leak as dg opportunity
-- - .. CJiarrns occur on unrelated functions Nhen cpen'ng tho lov:er inner r.hoke witt 1i1fl yP.IIO'I/ rod
I'. ci1oke/kifl talve close coil break. B chokeiK:IIIsolation Vi'llve co I n .:ho'<P.Jl<ill
(primary conn?-.-:tcr ontock. unlock col! break, lowar outer choke cfr,se A&B
!gasKet 1\Ml coli break. investigate ano repair probl'lrn.
BOP Control F'Rrlt'l wr.en shllt!J"tg to the yellow pod the regulators fluctuate rn!Ott!l'!s 11ftforP. out event
logger .sMwell )1e 11y<1rostatic transducer In STM 1 WJ!h a 120 ps! re<Joing ;;ml lt:P. nthP.r in STM 2 with
R
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l1800 In 4000 it ..vater dapth. lnvesiiP.ate to aetermine cause of lc ..,, eild n:J 111 S 1 r.\'1 tlna
b .. rcp:.:co COillk1011COI3 a:; necessary. 1 1
1\iLJ>. ;-.rvJ Hol!itlf' 1\ee s !Replat;e ii;e Hot l.ine due to frequent failures that have cer:utrP.d SPII(.II'!J fowr provk>\lk occasions. ; 8
(Jilring the the hot line was to he king haci:y ou:ing ?. rig 'I' owe. Til<>. leak has
heen rap?.irP.(i to fi1e fact that it it. ln<'-8terl dP.F.f i:lthe [.;;r,l. lhis ;3 '"rd!c;}tlveo of has.; Llaterioration I
ianri th1s item i:; c:nt;cal running Md pulling tile 801-' sack
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DW Hnri.rln October T7, 20ll'i to Ociober .H. 2i)tl':::
NOTE: R d all k {/ th "t f b .. b Work Ord
the Master W kn
130
f J . , Di\ -
. ' ' [The"'''"''" ""'" .,,;, ;, ,F
..
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l<:lsso,ili(J ;;F.l'terr. loads (hAmmering) as this :s r:!etrimon!:>ll.o t11r- Ths Ent1rfl'l:!!'l
.
'
'..;:;:; Vt>;''i on e!imln;,ting shor.l< l0.:.11ng or. !he 1" BOP ram fJo\Ciie:TJs ce; ll'le BOf> hy :
I
i11:->liii.Jng 112" in UlC 1' lno. I-' nor !o tllis the i)<ackals :!wil b.;irg t-:;m o!f tJbing
!J ;UIIIIections w-:_re oarting.
131
ll 'L/ ... f'. j.
Cho!<e lianrfu'LI Test the ClY>'{e mMifolrl to VJorking pressure, 15.COO p:>i., VRI:e # 9 was c
I
conr"r.tio1 r.cinl<> .ver<1 broken :::ond the clloke man:to!d was ta!;;ed, but 0nly to 12.000 p.;i v:ith the

1-iflllihurto'l c-e1'1flnf rr11it
.,, ___ ____ -
Sen<i the Mu1 80,)1\l nnrl Cc11duit Supply Hoses for rooa'r. The outer prm-::cl,.rt; sheatlli;;:ql.s bro:<:on and 132 /; .. Type
B
. .. .....
tr(lfnvP.:ing .
133 Cosi;t\.1 f:orm r11e maJori!y of l'ydrswlir: tilling on ti1e Moonpool mountc:J cal:ing st;;bb\ng surfar from corrosion. c
IMr.cnoool mounted} Two qu!t:k connect lill.ings on the hydraulic swing mot:>r ore W<l3leJ anrl >itould be reciet:.ed
. .
orior
134 PRS CshiP.s (h(ltn) I t:e C8!.1!2s or. the cross beilfO .viro 3hculd be.i)ropeny s(Wf:p::d to ;he Ci:lbfn tray !o B
II >t '. dama;Je.
135
1
PRSI-Wd
-
Du:ir')g trippmg it was observed that the tailing head d:>as IJrnperiy. OP /joe3 not B

r.le::h' !ewer c;Jrriagc when !ov:ering to deck. Verify reason and ter.liiy. o.:l<m ;:Jsse:nblj reqtlir:.:s
i 1- t
'
ad:u:;llner;t on strcko limiter or bettoN.
136
'; .
PRSFwd Lower Gripoer noscmbly- properly tension the fourth t1;>se catle r;ot suwur\ed tY any idler sheave and B
...
..
h:>.s dropped out !lido lic idler s'leave. Verify the reason why eru four I 10ses I ca[)I!JS routed to ihe
.. -
'owo:;r gr!ppi!r zs::emol;. Original three hoses I cables were lhEirc:f<i oni)' I !tree lrller i!re
,_
meum d. We recommend to tie together the two ho&i::s 'l'iiih simnlt> ul close intervals to reduce
fl'
1 - ,,
.
tho
137
. PRS Fwd
Replace the dama;_jed a'arm horn on the fwd PRS unit Jil ILe drll f!Cior. c
133
.. .y-7( ... _1 """
Verify the proper iunct1oning of the vadable relie' valve in the ';ounter ba:anca manifo:rt c . . , ,. ' PR::> Fwd
'
assembly and I r11 liie Sel Down sensor. During tripping it that the thr<ld er .:uil I
"'
,,
was not prop;;rly s.dJUSling on lite fwd PRS. (Adjuslmo:mt hav0 been m.;df!, Wfliting tRst whe,1 trip into
.. - hoi:)
'o4i. '
------
13g PRS rwrl and f\fr ?ropc;rly adjust a!l eecbic.;al. air and hydraulic service loops and Ho;:e to ens lire fill serviGe B

lOOPs art: r\)Ule<J .'lilleirrl.he Idler sheav<ts the g1tpper arm C'lrri:;ges. The rrtRjoi!J/ not prcperil'
. aP:l -:onsequentlr are in risk for snagging. SulJsequent:y ensure prcpe; loop re;;siCI"lers
. .
ar0 used . olf:ctric;;l Gable:> routed to !he grin:P.r we 1:1 i1"!d up t'y mpn. i'.i
' ,.,

1--_--. -.
B 140 HITe:;h drl:lers r.ab:n R..;new Je:maged wioduw irt Aux. drillers cabin. i
141
,,-. .,....
- gemove meta iJOrliciEJs fcomlm;ice Generator No.1. (Com_lllete<JL c I
142
.
Main r-emov the te1llrJOra-y veoti!&tion grills en No 1 generator wnen ihe wai!cir.ooo!!ng repc>i(erf also c
I
. " .
111!' .::ener;:,tor slrouio be cean!;!d.
143
'
' Main Gdner'itors or lh". h.'JR for gen1vator f.Jo 1 {WO 11 G21rl, ER # 119U. Waiting fo.- PO from
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ru NO'I E: Rf!cord all dom! on thosu tcms by croalin9 Sub Work Orders iliJI;linst the Mastel Work Or <fer fl7ii500655r.ooo
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155
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159
160
161

162
r.r,.1 n bCPflm:or::.
. (
I--- - - - - c- --
MK-63!1 Thru:;WVI-i..J
NA-607 HP Co'T!pres;;or
NK-959 R(':!cf Va11es
at .... l'
Liebiwrr Cmne3 Bo1h i-'S
', ' .':land
.
-
f---.------- < > .
l.mbhcrr Cr:)no:: Both PS
! t_
..
an-:! Starboard
..
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S!orb:Jwd D0c;<
..
...
Crom.J .-
---r---.
Liebhtw Sterho.ard D.::ck

Ctzl'!-='
KnucJdH Bovrr'
:;; .; . '
' .\L.
;;;;_j; f------------
Riser Ganll'f C;:;nn
. .
...
'
..
RG-651 PI\ Sy!>IOOI
,.
----
RG-6!>1.- 1 e!euhr;t;o Syslent
-
SC-805 L:-umdr}'
so:so4- Gsl!ey
TX-694 Areas
UC715 ure 8oc:t::r
t.;C-715
UN-799 Fir. Dampe:!
LJN-799 Fire Dam::.-ers
\lo!;. W3iC'r for No 1 generator. (Now HMt E-xc:h<'ng0r l'ln order PO# P80'1G7o.l)
the tiP on s_wru-Drives fs;r <:M'isli A/\P ..

ln\'estlgate \\,..,/ #/ r.ort'pressor is only ab!e to i:OOO p2i .,.,.:rking pre$Cllre ovJ rc
1
?<Jtr
'1'3C"l$SS::1' fne CO:ll[rosscr is r<:>ted for 450!) ec:i lhJ sys:o;m operali19 i!; 30()0 OS!.
ChangP. reliP.f VAiv.;; on L1e HOI' Triplex Pumps and DiJerler P.anel N:'l rawaJ cou'd be ioun-:1 v1hen lhJ
ast :iml! lhAs"l char:ged. Thic; should bo <bno fNO!'/ 2 _;&az tc keep !h1: .;;,rtifl<:<ltion current
.":il:mgr; nut e-ll hoom '<Yire sheaV9B. They all certain '.'dreiinpiinb: ,.. ;::f,ca,o gro.1ve bottorn .
.. ..
(PO# P8i.'511710, (it}
Rr::placc damaged two !altice& near boom Up (both Ucbrorr cruno:>) (WO ;': 3117., I:R ft 1120, PO#
PfB0900ifl :md flO ff P830!)0011)
lhr.t lhn. grease is caanad off the power <:lir ring (Gomptele)
Replnce 1hf> rn<!ln control panel In the (;fcl!lc! pt:d';!SI?i i\ is in a cXtrerneiy J.)O!Ji'
-
condition \:1lth;;Errosior1 ar:d untcrminated cabl3s out: lv ti"J fire tlwl oc;;!Jrred se'tP.ia' rno:1lhs SQO .
r uHy Pipe Grob :# 3 and NDE all loRd clleos I!O\ r;urma!lj ar:CISS>II:ll'3. Four weld
rf'pairs naw: teen <101f. nn llle smallest grab in pa3t yec::. Ttis Grab has possible rv<Jched maxhwn:
tiffl. Outcome should define whether the Gtab can to b':l
Provid.; prolectio: for U1e service IOOiJ to the trolley hoist at ttte loc':1tion whem the servlca iocps
enters the coMey.::r tell. The sh<Jet h3s cut hert: lhe oroitcclion .sleeve Is rubbing 01
tb3 main hydtauliG supoly hose .
f{epair UPS systelll lor ihe PNGA Rack a in ths bBCKUP r.on\ro! roor,1 'B'' is currently out of
PO# P794203)
Rtpi Dhc>rc '" pCHI GE ""'"" rO<V!l. !C<>motl"'l t
R!lp<:l or reolaca No 1 wasl'ing machine In !he laundry whlch 1<: net (Pnrts on ordP.r PO U
P834100) (It r.lfst tl'l noted with one v.ashlng ccv.n lounory c:Jnnot i!C<:p up will, rnr. rl;:;manc! irom
r!rl.}
Repair or rl3place the :lishwasher in the galley wh1ch Is sevcrsry corro:Je<l
Hie Desilter starter switch In the moon ecol area whi:il is drtm:1q"!n (GotnP-IP.tPrl)
Replr.;ce the hrol<en and worn out inboard boat fenders on life bc?_t _
Replace the cracked window in life boat No 2.
-
f\ep<Jir or repi<)_<:C 111e louvers on the fire dQmper locHtecf nn the of th:' drill floor.
lRepalr !l't: vert on t1e ezhau.;t f;"J, fnr tl1r:: mu:J purr,p rocm locat;d en :he sid;; of ll'e
lmc;in cter:i:
-----
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DW r!(JJ'iZIJfl October 17,2005 to OdoiH.i'.:. I, 2f!(l<:
NOTE: Record dono on thcsc .itcms b cre_atinq Sub Work Oruers against the Orclcr
163 I UX-700 lad:ler Fall l:!t.teno tile lJI)OCr 'lli'f.' rope suppo1 r:os\l; on gl: l<lddel' Full />.((B$1 D0'Jic!3$ !3:1 that r ,'1,
oersc.nna! rw-. .. irom ;1 rrsi\ion of tiH "L.::tdf.:)ft;' Syci;m; in en tPn rkJ 1
nnv;; :r.sl8liW liCoJir;;ctly. Tne llppe wrm r;)pe s:pfl;>rl ;::o.;!;; do o: e:<t!'nd far ancugh <'.h0'/2 U11:1
urrer rlaHcrm to perr.11t tc unhcol; sofely. On the rnaJorit{ of the he wire
sup pert pot I s I'TIO'JI)ffi:l t:e!ow the upper platform, ro:;ullirg in clir:1bnr hilvino li: refee$!j I.JcUt
fn,;,, 111.:1 ladd'lr. .thila standing on the ladder, to unhool: from fall arre><er. Th;, pror.;'lr Stup to
cY.tend t<,e upper mcu:'l\ing pole far enough above th:> plc;t(crm s:-. t11;;1 can slvnd saf!.lly un lll:J
.plattorm to U<JIIOO!.. rtHt f.hs En:act reao;on for !ho long rnour,ted O;'l the J)pcrwi.-e suf!)or!. (TIIG
iDP.rric" fall arro,ot has beer installed cor;.x.tly c<,r bn used?.:> an e,;ampio uf a sa(!;
I I I jsysr.;m L . ' I
' 64 VG-81iJ -- ,If ihe Horiz-01'1 >hcufd ever go to a cold ciimoto then the ng should the isst:e of !1:1:1 I C
duct in file a;C:1:nn;c;dot!ons. II shou
1
d be noted that t;ese heaters v:em inslaied .vhnn !he rig
!!a., 11t1e h(ll'e never been used. (Compl eted. Tho and solvl!rl the
problem. High tQrnp shutdowns were t ri pped on each hecrtnr. I I
'166 I VG-81 0 lHVAC -- l;;ce the NC c0fl'lprtlssor unit 20 (Part s on r;rder PO 1
1
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DW Horizon Assessment - October 17, 2005 to October 31, 2005
5.2 Improvement Opportunities
NOTE: t{er ')rd all work done nn these Sub Work Orders against the Ma5tor 8"705-006557.-000
...
REF PSS ASSEI. DESCRIPTION RECOMMENDATION '
201 1\N 050 EM PAC; As:;ign an experienced EM PAC Optiml7ardo a system reviow and make the necossary corrections to get !
il in\0 line with :he requirements in thf': Matntenanr.e Manual. In a::Y.HiOfl, the Opfmizor can reviev1 Standard
PM Tasks with the rig crews and attach rig-specific !asks toY'E:JTi .deemed nocessary.
202 CH-209 Azimuth thruster Provide a CJC filtration package for each thruster. (Currently two available; six more rP.quired) The
...
increased H20 content In the gear oil of several thrusters likely,noUQ reduce over time. oil filtration
wifh CJC fi'tcrs will likely maintain H20 levels for extentle<.l puriods below OEM maximum :llinwable limits.
thus rcducin9 risk to damage or removal
203 CW-90L 9ilg<1 Drains ' Provide a drain connection from the Aur.iliary M<!t;hinery Room aft sid of tne englflf! roorn with the dlrt'f water
coilectinQ,tank no drain is ln etace for il'lis technical Sf;:a<',R '.
204 I. I. Orawworks Review if having two sets of brake calipers spare and ready tor use Is curre.nt.set up will not
allow for maintenance under OEM and EM PAC gu;delfnes without prolonged shutdowl'l. Spare sots b'3
changed out with the in use at 365 days WO, dlssernbli!d and iJ'Ispegted. This way only limited
... i
"equipmt>nt not ava !able time" is required and one can comnly with F.MPAC WO and OEM maintenance
.,
!
,..
guidelines.
205
l ....
..
Drawworka (AI-ID) C()O$ider the in5ll::lllaUon of a 3rd MRU with compa:ison luncitor. will tile reliability of the active ! ' ,_.
'- -tlf
haave function sir:ce a faulty MRU will be recognized and 1wo MRU's will not be able lo distinguish
'
a faulty MRU by comparing when error Is minor. Note that recent manufactured Active Heave Drawworks ]

'
.. _.,.
are ail oulrilled with three MRU's. Consult with H1Tenh for optibns.
206
- <. . ''!
Brake hydraulics: Consider Installing a duplex fiiter to Improve maintenance availability. ("Sw Note 1)
207 Drav!Works Brake hydraulics: Consider a cost verse!! risl< based anal)'"> is to Jr:rify If 1: is desirable to insto!l a pressure
rll ...
tra'lsrni(ter on each pump outlet and to add the sofNiare legit: for positive failure detection, or logic to confirm
that positive pressut'El t:hange is achieved when the pumps are operating. {('Note 1}This item islirked to a
l_

single r..clnt that would result in a set of cafipets baing applied during oporotlon The result

can be c(acking or fracture of the br&ke disc within one minute of drum 50RPM) thus incapacitaUng
"
the Acl1ve Heave mode with verv little notice)
208 Drawworl<s Brake nyrtraullcs: Consider a cost verses risk based analysis to verify if l!'lo installation Is desirable o-r a--
caliper nosrtion indlcation system (proximity swilches) aoo implementation of software logic to detect
unwanted Cl'lliper movement. (See Note 1). -
209 FF-326 Mud Mi<ing Hoppers Improve the air extr<tclion system around surge tank fed hoppers CU!'rent air extraction capacity is
:nsu'flcient In anyway for task and present health hazard for hoppe'r and damage to neerby
equll)ment. Recommend to purchase ded:cated hopper dust exiracHon system. Sufficient space is available
for such M installation
210
! : ,. . .
-- .. --1:1
Mml PliiiiP Tha PRV outret t b!f'.ntl line cf No.1 and, No.4 pump are connacted rn a ccmb!r.cd enclosed vessel. :fhis--
...... ;
presMts nsk for the rig crew .vorking on on a of lhs PRV's or off HP valtcs whlle the other pump is in
..
nper<llron. PRV outlets should be ar.d direct1
1
rou(IXllo the pit with a sloped fine. See outlet
MuCi r.ump N0.2 ana No.3 as example.
--
Page 1 or 4
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211
212
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214
216
/16
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

DW Horizon Assessment- October 17,2005 to OctohN .H, 201J5
AS$F-T DESCRIPTION RECOMMENDATION
-----
r
I,
IWfll l...or.n<:>cfor The l'3st sturnp C:ce$ not have tho hydrota ceo! Vetcc r(.:comrne;<ds. Have it .nodlfied If Ul'J :.lump Is
jshopped. Tho slump the rig is using is a 30" urit borrowed from ti)e Of::epwa\t:r the same <IS tile
-'
Hon.zon, .$o i!'>o rccommer:dalion still appl:es. . , .
l. Flex joints. Got ricot tpare to replace rig's flex joints if a failufe occurrs and for 5 vear survey_
-
t . ,.. Riser Joint" Contract lPird party to co11duct the 1825-Day Riser onboard tne riQ; i'nis 'Nil! simplify logistics, Sl'IVA
oser transportati':m costs and eliminate transport damaue lo modules.

Riser Tem:iooar Support ChecK en inte;chaf19eability or other tensioner support d1g:> in !f:e fleet wlth' thls ng. Verify If there is a tleP-t
, .
spare that could be used if needed. This could be usell.to the rlqs riser tensloner ring allowing it to
sent in for the 5 year survey Inspection coming thUl>_ saving consJderable time, or it the vmr;
-----
Tensioner Support Ring
_ catastrophiC failure on the rigs riser tensioner support ring. ,
J .;. :r-,
Get fleet spares to replace fig's support ring if a fallu(e occurs and to rotate for 5 year
....
Riser Tensionen; Seal off the :trea beneath lhe Drill Floor where tho junction boxes !or the Riser Ten position trl'lnsducer
,. I
connections are l ocated so that the_y stay clean and dry.
- i(i\
Ram Prevenler\:: Gf1t flea\ sparas ( 1 set) to replace ram bon !'lets if failure occurre::l an:J tc> -rotate ' out for 5 year survey
".j c
. j,,,.,,,
Ram Preventers lnsf..'.l:l Teflon wear pads in upper shear ram blocks. This will lessen cavity. wear.

Annvlar TM stoneiard Cameron DL 10,000 psi rated annular pacxer In liSo wiil not striiJ 6518' uri II pipe. Consider
.. p [
using fhe Cameron Stripper packer, PN 2164H45-01. If packer is -ust::tl .lli<! pressure rating is limited to
' (

; : ..
- -
- ..
.J MUX Controls The CCU is not air, conditioned. This gets very hot in summerwhich Is deti'irnert<Ji to the Cameron MUX
" .... J ______ control system. Electronics inherently perform better and with ress oroble1lswren kept cool
. ;.' , Control Parei
Remove interlock in tl)e software that does not al'ow th;:l toHO'I/ing shear ram open'ctose ?.nd EDS
' l'
Normal! lo bet runction:ld from either pane at any Fme. EXam pte, If \he shear rams are closed from
I
the Onllers Par.el they c-dnnot be opened from the Toolpushers PaneL

BOP Con1rol All rui1ctions can be electronically lockec! out. the wellhead connector is electronically lor.ked out I'Jr.ce the
-
BOP is run. but the riser connector Is not, due to the way EDS is ch<'loging li'l9
.. .
so itlat it overrides 1he electronic lockout during_ EOS, .tl'lus allowing nser connector to be

electronically locKed out. preventing inadvertent oceratic-n durlngdnllit}g.
....,c.;
; J'. . , BOP Control Panels At present, tne LMRP connector can be unlatched befort;l the mfm cMke and \dfl connectors. Most MUX BOP
'
'
I
Contro1 system have interfccks rn lhe softwAre to l<eAp from the'!-MRP connector until the choke
. . . j
aM I'JII n\irl connector are unlatched. If the LMRP c<>nOP.rJ;y is uotc;t-;hed rlrst \he mini connectors will be
soverelydamaged. Consider upgrading the softwal'?. !:o !hal lh7 choke and kill mini connectors hate to os
_,.,.;" .. 1
unlocKed o,3fore the LMRP .connector will unlock ..
.;f ,.\.< Control Panels The ROV Panel does not BOP stack stinger "de-energize function. This function needs to bo operated
' . .
prior to unlatching the LMRP connector If this is unlatched and the are not de-'!nergizerl, both !he
female slAck re.-:"lp!acle and the packer seals and pod be damaged

.. ,; .J. ( ..... .,;..._
' . . . ' . . --i
...._. .. BOP Control P11ne'5 ThP. t<OV panel has a separate unlock lor lhti mini conner:tors and the- LMRP connector. A mist'lke r.ould
1
( Ufllock the LMRP coPnector first causing damage. Take to the choke and kill minl j
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---- - ---- - - - ---
conneetors are unlatched before the riser
-- --- I
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DW Hnrizon ASsossment - October 17, 2005 to October ] i; 2005
slightly damaged.
ctiwn !o gain access from
nyorauuc remote control unit does not have .an installed on [\.In tne event of rig air
tha would be oenaficial by h&vlrtJ a supp!}; readily available. making toe chokes opening
and oparation smootlier and more accur&le than using the backup hand pump a!one. Ttl?. hancl pump
would be used to the charged. Install an accumvlator en \t:e remote hydraulic panel
o dt:lermine the condl!lon of the gate and seat In the poNP.r chokes. IJSe murl pumps to pressure up to
2000 psi. ii pressure drops oif rapld;y the chOke woJld peo/.1 u, oo for Inspection. This couki be done
Page3 of4
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D\\' Horizon Assessment - Oc! 17, 2005 to OctouE' r 31 , 2tlll5

REF PSS
I
ASSET DESCRIPTION RECOMMENDATION
?40 TH-80:C !Watcrmakers Wnter production Is not nearly high enough to rnal.cll wnsumption to the low lu1:1d lilo Cn!-Ji nes. Averaoe
production o;er the past six months has been around ?1 per day VJhile the consu111pllon lms
I
abo:Jt 55 metric tons. Consider adding a ncdern 30-Ttn Reverse Os1raosts Watennaker to briny
. !""""' Bol
I he J.l fO(Juclion up to the point where the rig is self-sufficient.
241 Rev1ew tile current practice of using one of the four lifeboats for man-overboard rescue operal!ons. Consider
the purchase or a dedicated Resc11e for lhis purpose so !hM beat launching and retrieval is safer In
---
rough seas.
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DW Horizon A-ssesr.mcnt- October 17. 2005 to Octobei' 31, 20U5

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REF PSS - . . . R.ECOMMENOATtON- -- - -: . - . - . - -. 1
301 r\N-050 Centrallibrar;! Rig equiprnep1 paper files, equipment manuals and electroofc files r-.ust armn()fld R!phRbeticaliy by PSS code as peri
Technicai Fifes the Maintenance M<\!1Ual Section 3, Subsection 7.
.Arr an}!e the Ris'"e-'r c..,.lc""'.i- nt:-m-u-st-:l::-,e-a-n ----11
individual As:;el and r.ot an Asset Position as was 1he case at the time of !llis I
303 AN050 EM PAC Corre<"t tile PSS CGde for the Riser Tens!oner Controf Panel and Mux Systr<m. (Completed)
304 AN-050 EM PAC Create an Asset tor 'Potable Water lnllne Filters" and enter <Iii pot water tillers t:s AssetPostions for aH drinking
fountains, ice machines coffee pots. Schedule and p<>.rform Standard Task to thi<> Asset (filters are changed i
every six rnonthsl. 1
305 Al'-1-050 .EM PAC Create .O.ssets for Drilling Orivf! Motor VFD Line-Up #1 tor !he Drawworks Drive Mo!or #1, Mud Pump Drive Motor 1A andj
Muri Pump DrivP. Motor 2A. 1
306 AN-050 EM PAC CrentA the Asset Registers {with Asset Positions for each device) as re:::omme;;ded in the Mainfenance Manual and
>cN!du!e the Standard PM Tasks against \hem where available. Example!> ofare-ESD, Gas DetE\ctlon, F!re Detection,
Portable Extin:-Jutshers,Fire D<Jrnpers and Anti-Fall Devic<:s,
307 AN-050 EMPP.C De!al6 ali unscheduled PM Tasks as per the Maintenance Manual. Thare are cver<!DOobsole\e Rig Specific PM's- sUI! I
attached to Assets i>nd not scheduled. Thi s causes confusion when to and plan acti11e PM's. ,
308 AN-050 EMPAC In the ful:Jre, that more detailed information f or each task is entered Into the histor1 in tho EM PAC sysiem, I
bcluding megger readings, temperatures and amp readings fer the following equipmant AC Drive MotOi"s, Transformers
and HV Sw!tcl'lboards. I
309 AN-050 Low meggar we!'e recorded in PM notes for AtsY. DraNworks Dri'lll Motor and others, but ntnemedial aciiorr
wo:> teken IIi tho onsure thai a CM Work Order is and !hat sclion is taken to correct the problem.
310 P.N-050 EM PAC Reviel\; the Relfef Valve Register" Asset Positions and ensure thal art PR\I's are lis!sd, suc.h as the one for the BOP
Triplex Pumps ar.ll three for the Diverter Panel. Also add the three individual Relief Valva Assets lo the register and
than rra!<e thase assets inacHte so that their history is retained, but no Wor't< Orders can be written against them.
311 AN-050 .E::MPAC Review the "Routine Asset PMs and make sure the daily an<i weekly tasks are up-to-dale. Soma appear to be
lacl(inQ. tn additioo, 'Some ''Associate Assets" links are mlssin9_from the PM and need to be added
312 AN-050 EMPAC Runtime P.M scheduling for the Main Engines is incorrecUy setup in s&veral places. As per tre Maintenance Mcmual.
change fell owing PM's fr,,m no ate C!osed" to oate Scheduled'' ccr.figur:.;tion: Engine 111: 99004, 99006, !JG007.
99008. Engir.E> #3: 99007. Engine #4: 119006. (Completed)
:313 AN-050 EMPAC Step #1 of the 90 day PM for1he Main DrawworksAC Dr;ve Motors calls foi' an Jntemal inspection and tho Work Order s
are being c!os"!d out without completing t his step. In lhe future, ensvre .tl'allhis step is completed.
3';L AN-050 EMPAr. Suhmftt9d by rlg; Rig specific tasks attached to Standard PM Tasks clo no1 $how up on online Work Orders. They are
pres(nt cnly.on printed Work Orders or on a \No(r, Order Report 1horefore the Craft overlook these rig soecilic tasks on
a regular basis because they tsught to bo oificicnt by online. Tre Horizon fee:s tMt tha rig spac1fic task:;
shou'd on the online Wcrk Orders as woll as the printed versions.
Page 1 of 5
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REF
315
316

PSS I ASSET. DESCRIPTION
AN-050 IEMPAC
AN-050 IH.1PAC

DW Horizon Assessment- October 17, ZOOS to October 3 1, 2 0(15
-
RECOMMENDATION
Submitted bY rig: The field Asset Location' has been removed frorn' WorK Honzon had previously
expen<!ed a lot of lirne .and effort in entering llils data so that the Craft !;now the exP.c.flocation of the equipment that
thr: Wcrk Order is micrrinu to. Novt they do not have to sec it I'Cin:Jta!cd.
Submitted by rig; The fetd "Work Order Asset Status' has been from Work Orders. The input choices for this
wefe 'Failed' , ''Out of Service", "Running" anrt "Wifl Fail'. The used to be ab!e to run a query or report on
this data that them what equipment was our of Now unavaibb:c and lhet would like to
it reinstale:.t . '
The 180-0a}' PM Task (99004) to blow out tre Dr;;wvtorl<s AC Drilfe Motor$ shou'd be deleted. This ta.sk serves
110 puf-pose and slivuld l>e because the motors are constantly 06'09 cooled With a higb '/Oiumc Aif flow. The rig
l'tas gener<tled Ch<ipye Request DWH-015 to f!limtnate this tasi<. ,
!
The Slcmdard Pf/i I ask Report Indicated several ot the Standard available for the Ho:izorrwere not being
utiliLed. Review this report and schedule the Standard Taskswhere appro;>riate. . . .
The 365-Day PM Task, Step #1, calls for NDT inspection of the load b9aring areas. Step !14 calls for bearing cfear.ar.ce
measurement. Neither steps were completed in 2004. At the time of the ..ass'esS,mont there was an open P,.,1 Work Order
to do this PM in ?005, nut It had not been completed yet. OEM ser;ioo l)"'onu'ol EPU1424 indicates the areas that require
NDE fal! on caliper' d1sc brake system). Step it: (NOT) should be compictcd. Sieo 114 should be reviewed for feasibility
instead of.Just entering !he comment: "no access to any bearings. {McduSpec does not support the meas1.1rement of
by means of feeler gauges due to the possJb!lity of the The feasit11Uy of
measuring bearing ciearance should focus on a re!ioblc shaft lift method (whi:::n. ho)'(ever, is diffic1Jil to AC drives
and gearbox installslion). . __:_ ---= ........
JD03 Solenoid valves for thB brake hydraulics: Add a Standard Pf\1 Task to evaluate the condition of Utese
Verif'JOEM requirements for testing. {*Sco Note 1)
003 $_OI$noid valves for the brake Pcrf0!1Tl a cost ver-;es risk b<\Sed a1alysis if it is desirable to
chMge OI'Jt theoo solenoid<> at predetermined intervals {possible 1625 days) ("Set: . 1
Reducing I Relieving valvo for the bra.ke hydraulics; Adct a Standard PM Task to test uulh the relieving and
function oi ihis valve. ((*Note 'f)This Hem is linked to ,_a single point failure !hell wuuld resuftln a ll9l of callipers
oo1ng applied dVrin9 operation unr.oticed. The resu:t can be or fracture of the b ake disc within 'one minute
I( speed of drvm thos 1ncapacitatinQ ihe Active wiYl I:Uie uoUce)
Measure and record the g<>..ar bacMaah annualiy to aid in determining the gear .ar:c rnt:Un.bearing conditiorl. This in
conju(lclio{l with an baroscope review of the gear box will be an important !'all!e for l,t)e 5 yearly condition evaluation.
1
_ _ methods other then-oil samples ar.e avallab!e. . . . . . . .
Venfy 1f upper and lower !BOP have been follow1nq U1e 2005 (Reporteoly IBOP s
hova been rcplace6,_!1l_ough net recorded in EMPAC.} ,
Ensui'O the upper and lower hinge pin connections are NDE al Dl!! next lifting g3ar Inspections. Unear ndications have
found on a variety of 3imilar baskets on other rigs. . .-
tnsure the lower currently not in usc c.nd rai:;ed .iit tlie I [YJ;;itio:1 fu;iy servtcaQ prior to reinstating A
vQrictt of clame!)ed !sheareo were Utis buard. A,.,arlet;' of have removeo pres11mahl"l
_ _._ _ ____ :-<-_,.- -...,L:.; ro;;.; r..:,l;.:. }o:.:.. r:.. l , ... ,
P:;Jge 2 of 5
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DW Hori1.on Assessment- October 17,2005 to October 31,2005
REF PSS DESCRIPTION I RECOMMENDATION
327 , ' Crown Blor.:k The 1825 Day WO ta.:lk complete::! in September 2005 cails for ar\ oompfete inspechon ND 1. li1stea<J, the work
performed w;:;s..only a visual on a' I welds and a Straight BeaT, I Jiba;:onic rest (liT) on \he ma:n.ehaft zmHast line sraft
f{yv(ew .if furUwr NOT is 1cq_ulreci to satisfy the intent of the 18'?..5Day- PM iasK, that J the 3heavas are
<iisaSsemL>Ieci wuld be turned around and lt'lus 1he 'ife.
328 I ' I Travelling Bloc}; nie 182G-De:w PM Task ccmpleted In September 2005 calls for a of the Travelling Bloc!\ followed
by NDE en t!)aluau bearings areas ano the sheaves (Step 3). Step 6 ca!fs for bsnnng rcr.cwal. Step 7 calls for a
turna<Ol!nd of the sheaves'during assembly to pro!o:1g wear. onry work pe-rformed was a visual inspection
on the sheaves, followed by Straight Beam Ultrasonic TMtmg (UT) 1)0 main $t'oUfl Md the Becket pi11. (Post
' discussion revealed that WO was possibly confuaed with the 3GS .WO tmd unintentionally closed. 1825
" _ days WO Wa' reopened after discussion.) .
1--""3"'2-=9-f l r - Counforbalance S<.hadule Standard PM Tasks,
a Rolatir;_g Hook . '
330 Mlkl Pur.1p 1-2-34 E11$ure sl:icon type saalants are not ased at openings due to the it1herentfisk fer on line blcc!i.ages. The excessive
' ' quan\it'es of sitlcO!l sealant obseNed should be removed from the pmver eno f!,tomals. Dry gaskets or liquid gasket
1---::-:::--:--1 ': _ materia! sucn as dry sealant should be used on:y . -
331 c. Mud Pump:; Requ:1st a Stannard PM Task for an annual NDE of the Mud Pump cronl-:shef:. Thi3 hlstc.ry of the No.4 pump crcmkshaft
cracks \l:arrl'!nts :hts PM !asK.
332 ,, '1, , V\'QIIhoad ConnectOts Asset to( Wellhe::;d Ccnnector is Vet::o type HD-H4, but h<:t& Standard PM scheduled it for Cameron type
HC. Sche:lule tr,o correct Swndard PM Tasks (see Corporate \ssP.t "OOV\?TCO,H4'). The atso has a Cameron type
.. HG Welltiead Create a separate Asset for this and scoedule the t}<Pe HC PM Tasks to it.
333 - Flex Jo nt . . A 365-Day PI\! i>ho.tld be included to inspect the nipple of the flex :;sir!Q NDT. Cracks unde' .(J30" can be ground
.__..,..,...,....-! h . '- oJt Cracks o:er repair at Oilstates. , . ,
334 t, If , C00nect:;;r A 3BS-Day PM should be Included for stack and riser connectors. to l-e !Hsled for back-dri:<Jing as there ara no pilnt-
1 operated check \'oi'<CS on the connectors.
,__..,.33-. 5-
4
1.''' f. ".- Riser Cameron HC Riser Connector: Tf'le hub faces between the stack ma1iUrel an<Hhe riser connector need relft'!f grooves cut
J 1, ., . rn the hub. faces to balance and prevent a unpi<'IMed 1i1efl:ll to seal ,;s per Cameron E8 84fli.J1
336 To'!.. Riser Connect-:r Create o. 365 day PM to measure the connector rod stroke btllh on and off tile stumo or mar.orel. The 'off :>lump stroke
' should boat lC'&sl .1es greater than toe 'on stump" stroKe measurement. If measurement recorded is close to the 0.188
minimum. re usng a magnetic base dial indicator r mended bY Cam ;iron EB 831 M

337 ;fJ Marine RiserJo:n\s Riser Joint& arc Vctco type HMr, bul have Standard PM TasKs scheduled against thf.m for 'Iaten type MR. Schedule the
c correct Standard PM Tasl'>s {see Corpoiate.Assel ''OOABS VETCO, H:vlF.
338 ]'f:'- Riso3r Stondord PM Task 99004 is. a'Jailab!e but not scheduled these unils. Schadllie it to tha Riser 'f e.nsioner Parent
_ . ,'" A$sit is a 10!J5Day Tasl< to NOT two of the ring mount1ng IJolls on eac!1 of toe Tensioners. (Completed} j
l--::3-::3-=9---i Rarn Preventers ChtJck ram cavity dtmensions annuallyj clearances need to he recorded ror j
340 ",.
1
JRam Pre:enlars l.lPI Ri::rn S!ock in the in t.onlacl with the Ram Shaft. At;;o Slinft lo Ram'Conne.::lion 8'-Jllon
' I (Foot) and rec.o1d m equtpment history. Crackl> have been known to occuc n these. areas ard damage.
,. - - ---- --
Page 3 of 5
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HW Horizon Asiessment - October 17, 2005 to Oc_tobcr 31
1

REF PS$ ASSF::T DESCRIPTION RECOMMENDATION
341

R'-1m Pre1enters Perform prcdlclivo testing by determining the minimum operalfng requlrecl to operate tho ST !Ot;ks, this
l_t:
100-200 p;;.i. If? pressvre greater than 200 psi is requtred to open or cl:>se tl'le l1tks should be dic;as;emb!ed for
1
-
:inding. ..
....
342 I ", ! -' 'Rarn Pre.ycntcrs RecomrneilO the subsea use U1e Cameron ST-Lcx:k lnspP.cton (rlor.ument.T-24!l, 3-00} in their mafnler\3nce of
1his document is also known as TC-1363. . . . .
343 Rom Provcntcr3
Tne 5 year survey for all the BOP ram bonnets is coming up next year 21 .JuM 2lltl6. Twenty percent (20%) of the
II b?l'lnets 5hould be rep' aced each year in order to spreao \ha wofi< load, hfPR and over five years instead of
" ' 16!ting !hem an come due at o11ce. ' .
344
,--.......
Ram should PM crealtld for checking ram cavities dlmensll)1'ls reccr:iing the dimensions in order to ,;
' . . - .- -.- . ...,... _____ ltrac_k . . . . . . _
:. ..
345 fl:t Annulars Corre.::t the tlates ror the Upper and Lowet Annular 1825-Day PM Tasks. Tt-.ese Arnulars have both been
J).,:
changed out anti should not be coming due on 29 May OS currentll shows.
346

Accumula\ors During the Accumulator depletion pipR ram should be functio.'lad to simulate the sheor roms. ___ ut-..._
347
J: ..: fJ:.
Tr!J:>fex Pump Relief valve used on tr,e triolex {)llm_()s and D1verter Panel need to be added to'the register for 2 year change-out.
"-:""".,_ __ .1
348 "'1- .. ... a MUX and ;Jolfine Reels There are frequen! entriAs in the JG-416 MUX and Hotline Reels history conoomir.g r!')pair$ on tho MUX cabie JG-444. In
. .
the future, ensure that the correct PSS cede-s are entered history in the fuh.:re.
. -.-,; .
349 i' BOP Control Pods Co.rrect the rext due dates fof Pod #2 and #3 1825-0ay PM 6oth pcios.hnvc bee"! rebuHt this year and should not
, . : .1
be comino dltP. on:->9 Mal 06 as the schegule current!}; show$.
350

MUX Cortror Poos : new halter; upgrad'l kit from Cameron, Part Stocl< Number 80-02.
. -
351 BOP Test Pump Send the cMrt racorder used with the h;gh JJressure test unit for cohbration
352 ., .. Dlve1er qontrol skid . &Mdulr. theSfandard PM Tasks for a Hydril Divertor System. P.tthe time ofth's PM Tesf:s fora type KFDS'
- . - ' ' '
.J (
Diverterv.ere irC()(rectly scheduled to this Asset ;
..... ;: . ,\-'.-:;:) . . - - ... ,,
353 ll .Choke & KiiJConn-ectors Al! 'other BOP compc.,ents are lied into a 5 year survey; include the Choe a:1c. Kil\ mini Collet (Cameron) in
' i I .'
!he 5 year plan instead of the 3 year as ;ns now. . ..
354 7.7-:. ' Choke &Kill Conneetcrs Gomple{e !he 1095--Day Standord PM Tosk which calls for the choke and kill mini Collet comectors to be dh;assembled
.
for inspection and NDT checks. Duo to rig activity and the time required has net been completed. The rig should

' secure a spare mini connector to change out the chcke side mir.i Cc!letcor.nectcr, .send.it in foe inspect on. and when
i
..
:. inspected rotate it out with the kill side. '
'
355
iJQ ;:; Choke & Kiii'Connectors To oc'p monitor the connector performance, a IO'.'r' pressure predictive lesllng :;11ould be performed during between well
;
l .t
. ..
mointonancc. No reoord or !his minimum unlatching pressure has been fotwu. When locked with 1500 psi, verify the
I
... ......___
connectcn: Ufl!oc'<s at 000 psi or less. Record the date and pressure in the PM svstem.
356 PRS Fwd ;:md Aft . PRS g:ipper aim assembly: Pull one load pin for c-:>ndilion evaluation iSee suppie111tiutal report for pin locatlonj. If pin
I r, no cr bore bushings arc wcm extensively, more pins will have to be pu.led. bearing oushlngs have caused
- : worn p!ns an:! elongated' bores after several years of operation on PRS uo1i is, l c:;ulting fn exlens:ve rev; or!< ot arrn and
'
bor.;:c.
'
357 r;;r: Main Engln9s Perform the outs!a01ding Maintenance based on running hours on Main Engines 2 {11}09hr). 3 (2000, 4000, 16000hr) and
'
.
6 (2000, 4000, 'i60001r) when owitchbosrd configuration allows.
Pago 4 of5
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REF PSS
358 '):' . ?(.
-.
359 TC-956
360 TX-694
361 TX-694
362 UD654
363 UD-654
364 US-713
-----
DW Horizon -October 17, 2005 to October 31, 2005
ASSET [)E:$CRIPTION RecoMMeNoATror.f
0P.C:k P.ngii"'.e 1/etify <3r:d ensure that rig crew responsible for the dec!< crane cng<ne <Je trair ur are familiar with the
C"lerp'llar Electronic Injection system and condilio'l evaluation lhrough Cai.ewiliar supplied software on lartof) The high
occurn;ncoo of lr.jectors fuih.tres suggest r;vssrbie rncv oct Ttwse t'l[)rnss arc gr.nera!ly we.t in t11e
ltarld 1:ertorm geneiail:z: we.l. ..
Area Create an A$sot for Hazafdous Area Vent Fans. schedule the Standard :;)M Tasks to tt and r.omple'e the maintenance as
Fan5 soon as eossi?fe.
Hazardous Arfl:AS loonlify a!! the electrical devices In the hazardous..areali, atta.;h a '"I I. D. Tag to ea;;h one 311t1 entP.r into a Hazardous Area
JRegis!e(. . . '
-
the Stendam PM T<Jsks to the HaZafUOUli Area Register and CO'ljpJete the EX program as soon
' 'as possib!e. _ . . . .. .
UPS . En5ure all the UPS on the are identified for their use, lncludln1 tile AC eowAr t;ourr.l' for ea;::h
UPS System En sure tha! load teets are perf or rned rrequently to monitor the condition pf the UPS ' tin its .. Mlrltipie failures have occurred
in the past and caused <k>wnlirue. so lt1ese units need tote. watched carefully.
Gas Detection 3ystE">m 1\tpn:senl U1a <;0;nbuslib!e gas !<nels are set at 20%- LEL (H-gh) and 60o/.!.F.l (High-Hrgh), but with only 50% gas on the
rig tl')ese levels are unobtainable; therefore. reco:r-mP.I)rt !hP.I.Fl r in \he Simrad system be setup to alarm
----
s\ 20'/.LEL (HiQh) and 40%LEL (High-High). lSubmitted MOC MD 48)
Page 5 of5
F

REPORT OF SURVEY
DEEPWATER HORIZON
Prepared for
Transocean
Houston, TX, USA
Customer Reference: P7751 02
ModuSpec Reference: US1364.2
By
ModuSpec USA, Inc.
Dates: 17- 31 October 2005
Confidenti al Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCE C-00063628

1 ~ TABLEOFCONTENTS
Page
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................. 2
2.0 INTRODUCTION ...... .... ................ .... ...................................... ..... 6
2.1 Rig Data ................... ...... ............................... .... ........ ....... .... ... .... 6
2.2 Survey Workscope ...... .................. .. .................. ......... ...... .... ....... 6
2.3 Applicable Standards ..................... ....... ..... ........ ...... ..... . .... ... ...... 7
2.4 ModuS pee Equipment Rating ..... ...... ...... .. .... .... .... .... .. ...... .. ... ... ... 7
3.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............. ... .. ................................... 16
3.1 Executive Summary . ............. .... . .... . ..... . . .. .. ...... . .. . i 6
3.2 End-of-Inspection Meeting Document.. ... ...... ... : ....................... 1 7
4.0 ASSESSMENT FINDINGS ....................................................... 18
[Note: Item descriptions followed by and asterisk .. are defined as Downtime Risk
Equipment]
Al-924
AN-050
AP-044
AP-990
AZ-915
BA-100
BA-917
BA-119
BB- 131
BK-101
CB-231
CB-232
CB-234
CC-222
CH-209
CQ-244
CR-920
CS-904
CT-21o
CV-920
CVV-904
EA-300
ED-317
ED-319
AC Motors less than 135 HP ...... ....... ...................................... 18
Maintenance System ................................................................. 18
Spare Parts I Warehouse .......................................................... 19
Earthing and Earth Bonding ..................................................... . 19
Batteries ....................... ...... .. ............................... .. .................... 1 9
Hull / Pontoon ............................................................................ 19
Seawater Ballast Tanks and Voids ......... ... ................................ 21
Overflow and Vent Checks .. .. .......................... .. .. ...................... 24
Cables and Cable Trays .................. .... ... .. .... .... ........ ... ... ..... .. .... 24
Helideck ...... ....... .. .... .... .... ... ...... .. ...... . .... .. ... ..... .......... ............... 25
Obstruction Lights .. ... ........ ..... ................ .. ............. .. ........ ..... ..... 25
Navigation Lights........ ........ ... .. .. .. .... .... ...... .. ............ ...... . ..... ... 25
Fog Horns .... ........ ..... .......... ........................ ...... ..... .. ..... .. .......... 25
Radar and Navigation Equipmenl ........................ ................ ... 25
Thruser Unit ... .. .. .... ... .. . ..... . .... ...... .... . .. ......... 25
Dynamic-Positioning System .... ........ .. .................. .. .......... ....... 27
Bai last PumiJS ......... .... ...... ...... ...... ....... ...................... ......... ..... . 28
Ballast Piping and Valves ................ ...................................... .... 28
oaliast Controi Pa11el. .. .................. ....... ............ ............ ............. 28
Bilge Pumps .................. .... ..... ........................... .... ..... .. ... .. ..... .. . 28
Bilge Piping and Valves .... ................... ..................................... 29
Drawworks" .. ...... .. ......... .... .................... .................................... 29
Rotary Table ......................................... .............................. .. ..... 33
Master Bushing ........ .............. ........................... ........................ 33
Report of Survey - DEEPWATER HORIZON
Reference: Order No. US1364.2
2
TRN-HCEC-00063629

EF-315
EF-368
EF-369
EF-922
EF-991
EH-331
El-696
EK-308
EK-343
EK-913
EK-948
EL- 309
EM-311
E0-312
ER-363
EW-218
FA-361
FB-904
FF-326
FH-917
GA-327
GD-357
GD-904
GE-929
GK-321
GN-929
GP-320
GT-332
GQ-325
GU-324
GZ-920
HZ-340
KB-51 6
KC 520
KD-522
KH-531
LA- 375
LA-548
LA-948
LF-364
LF-366
LF-540
Page
Top Drive System"' . ........ ... .................... ....... ....... ....... .... ... ... .. ... 33
Top Drive Pipe Handler* ...... . ..... ............ ....... ......... ... ................ 35
Raised Back-up System- Top Drive .. ..... .......... ... ........... ........... 36
Service Loop - Top Drive Hydraulic* .... ......... .. .................. ....... . 36
Service Loop- Top Drive Electric* ...................................... ...... 36
Deadline Anchor ... ........ .. ...... . ...... .. ............................ .... ........ .... 36
Sheaves/Snatch Blocks .... ......... ......... ..... ... .. ... ... ... ....... .... .... .... 37
Derri ck ............... ................. .... ...... .. ..... .. . ..... ..... .... .... ........ ... .. .. .. 37
Dolly & Guides, Block and Top D r i v ~ . .. ... . . ... .. . ... . .. 37
Casing Stabbing Board ..... .. ..... .................. ... .. 38
Fingerboards* .... ..... . ..... .. .... . .. .... .. ..... . .... .... .... .. .. .. .. .. .. ... 38
Crown Block*........... .. .. .... . .. . .. . . ..... ... .. . .. .. .. ... .. .. . .. .. ........ ....... 39
Traveling Block* .. ........... ... ...... .. ............... ... ...... ....... ... ... .. .. ... .... 40
Hook ........... ... .... ... ... ........ .. .. ... .......... ..... ... ......................... ...... .. 41
Substructure ... .. .. ... ... ... .............. .. ..... .... .... ..... .. .. .. .. ... ...... ........ ... 41
AC Drive Motors ................ ..... .............. ......... ....... .... ... .............. 41
Bulk Tanks .. ... ..................... ....... .......... .... .......................... ....... 43
Bulk Air System .................... .. ............... .......... ................... .... ... 43
Mud-Mixing System . .. ............ ... ...... .. ... ... .. ...... ................ ... ....... . 44
Mud Tanks ............................. ....... ........ ........ ... .... ..... ................ 45
Mud Pumps* .......... ............. .. .. ... ..... .... .. ..... .. ..... ....... .................. 45
Rotary Hose .. ..... ... .... .... ......... .. ..... ... .... ............. .. ...... ..... ........... 46
High Pressure Piping (Mud} ........ ... .... ... ................. ...... ....... ... ... 46
Standpipe Manifold ......... .. ........... .......... ....... .. ...... ... .. ..... ...... .... 47
Mud Agitators ......... ..... .... .... .. ......... .. ..... .. ............... ........... ... ... 47
Cement Manifold .. ... ....... ....... ... .......... .. . ..... ... ... ... .. ..... .. ........... 47
Shale Shakers...... .. . .. . .. . ... ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .... .. .. 48
Vertical Degasser............. ...... .... . . ... ......... .. ... ... . .. .... .. .. 48
Degasser ... ... .. .. ....... ....... .. ...... ..... . ..... .... ... ........ ........ ....... .. ... . 48
Mud Cleaner.. .. .. .. ................... ... .. ... . .. ... ... .... ....... .... ... ... 48
Non-Critical Centrifugal Pumps ... ............. .. ... .... ...... .... ......... 48
Survey Line .... .. . . .. .. . . . .. ..... ....... ....... .. ... .. 49
Dri ll Pipe....... . .... ... .. ..... .. ....... . . ... . . ... .. . .. ....... 49
Heavy Weight Dri ll Pipe ...................... .. ... ... .. .. ...... .. .. .......... 49
Driii Coilar .. ... .... . .. . .. ... .. . ... .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. 49
Drilling Subs ... ... .. ................. ....... .......... ... .. ....... .. .................... .. 50
Pipe-Handiing Equipment' .. ..... .... .......... .............. .... ....... .. 50
Casing Stabbing Arm ...... .. .. ... .. . ... .. .... .. .. .... ...... .. ......... .. ..... .. .... 50
Pipe-Racking System* ..... .. .............. .... .. .... ............. .... ....... ....... 50
Catwalk Machine"' ... .. ............... ............. . .... ..... ... ............. .......... 52
MHS (Mousehole Station) ....... .. ...... .... ... .. ....... .. ..... .. ................. 52
Manual Slips ... .... .... .... .......... .... .... ......... .. ..... .. ..... ............ .......... 52
Reference: Order No. JS1364.2
3
TRN-HCEC-00063630

LF-546
LG-536
LJ-539
LK-573
LM-568
LR-370
LR-914
MA-625
MF-627
MK-630
MN-628
M0-697
MS-652
NA-607
NE-606
NK-666
NK-904
OA-920

OB-904
OE-603
OE-603
OK-613
OP-614
PC-600
PC-601
PC-935
PD-626
PJ-641
PK-941
PL-941
QF-616
RG-651
RM-669
SD-821
SD-824
TF-927
11-l-802
Tl-801
TQ-826
TX-694
UB-716
UC-714

Page
Varco Slips (PS-21 and PS-30) ............................................. .... 52
Elevator Links ..... .................................... ............... .................... 53
Manual Tongs ... ..... ....... ......................... .............. ..................... 53
Ezy-torq .... .... ............................................................................. 53
Iron Roughneck* ...... ............. ..... ..... ......... ..... ................ ....... .... . 53
HiTech ...... .. ........................... ....... .............. ..... ... .. .... ................. 54
Central Hydraulic Power Unit* .... .. ......... .................................. .. 56
Diesel Engines greater than 1000 H P ~ ........ .. ..... ..................... .. 56
Generators* ...................... .... .... ............ ......... .... .. ....... ..... .. .... 57
Main Switchboard"' .. ... ...... ..... . .... . .. ............................. .... .... 58
Main Transformer Three Phase ... .. .......... .. ............................ . 59
Variable Frequency Drives .. .... .................... ....... .. ............. .. ...... 59
MCC Panels ... .......... ... .. ................................... ... ........ : ............. 60
Air Compressors/Air System- Hi gh Pressure .... ....................... 61
Air Compressors/Air System - Medium Pressure ...................... 61
Air Receiver (APV) Medium Pressure 50-500 PSI .. .. ................ 62
Medium Pressure Piping ............................ .. .... ......................... 62
Seawater Service Pump System ............................................... 62
Seawater Service Piping and System .. ........... ........ .... .............. 63
Fuel Oil Centrifuge .............................................................. .. .... 67
Lube Oil Centrifuge ................................................ .... ............... 67
Oily Water Separator .......................................... ... ......... ........... 67
Helicopter Fuel System ....................................... .... .................. 67
Deck Crane .. ..... .. .............. .. ................ .. .... .. ............................... 68
Knuckle Boom Crane ... ... ....... .... ......................... .. ............ .... ... 70
Riser Gantry Crane ............... ...... .. ......................... .... .... ........... 71
Engi ne - Deck Cranew .................. ......... ... .. ... ................. ...... 71
Forklift .. .... .. .. . .. . .... ... ..... .. . .. .. .. ................... .. .. . . . .. .. ........ .. ... 73
Man-Riding Winches ... ...... ... .......................... .. .... ... ... . ........... .. 73
Air Tuggers .......................................... ......... ......... ................. 73
Electric Welding and Welding Di stribution ............................. .. .. 73
Communication: Telephone and PA System ... ... ......... .... ..... 73
Vessel/Power Management System .. . .. .. .. .. ........... ... .. . .. . 73
Galley Freezer/ Refrigerator .... ....... .. . .................... .. .. .. ... ...... ... 74
Galley/Miscellaneous Equipment...... .. .. ... ..... ..... .. . ... . ... ... 75
Lighting System (Main) .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..... .. .... ..... ........... ... .. .......... 75
\t\iatermaker .... .. ............................. .. .. .. ......... .... .. ............ .. .. ..... 75
Potable Water System .......... .. ... ......... ........ .. ................. ........ ... 75
Sewage Treatment Plant ........... .. ....... .............. .. .. .. ..... .. .. .......... 76
Hazardous Areas ......... ....... ........ .......... ........ .... .... ......... .. .. .... ... 76
Life Boat I Raft Launching Davits .. ............................................ 77
Life rafts .......... ... ....... ...................... ......................... .. ............... 77
Repon of Sur.tey- DEEPWA. TER HOR!ZON
TRN-HCEC-00063631

UC-715
UD-627
UD-630
U0-654
UE-722
UF-109
UG-245
Ul -927
UJ-700
UL-706
UM-701
UN-799
UP-703
UQ-704
UX-708
US-713
VG-810
5.0
5.1
Page
Lifeboats . ..... ............................................................ ................ 78
Standby Generator Set ................................................. . ........... 78
Standby Generator Switchboard ............................................... 78
UPS .... ........ ............................... ... .. .... ....................................... 79
Alarm Systems: Fire. Gas. General , Flooding .... ............ ........... 79
Hydraulically Operated Watertigh Doors/Compartments .... ...... 79
Flooded Member Detection/Leak Detection ........................... ... 80
Lighting System (Emergency) ... ......... ..... .. ......... ...... .. ........ ...... 80
Fire Detection System......... .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. . .. .. . .. ... . .. . .. . . . .. . . 80
Fire Fighting, Fixed Water System/Hydrants and Hoses . .. .. 80
Deluge/Spri nkler System.. .. . . . . . .. . ... .. 8 ~
Fi re Dampener ... ..... .................. .. ............ ........ ...... ...... . 81
Fixed C02 Systems ..... ...... .. ... .. ... ..... .. ... .. .. .. ... .. ..... ........ ........... 82
Fixed Foam Systems ........................................ ... .......... ... ........ 82
Ladder Fall Arrest System ................ ...... ... ....... ........ ..... ..... ....... 83
H2S/Combustible Gas Detection System ................................. . 83
HVAC Systems ................................................. ........................ 83
DETAILED RESULTS .. ......... ............................. ...................... 85
Asset Deficiencies and Recommendations ................... ............ 85
Report of Survey- DEEPWATER HOR.ZOt
Reference. Order No. US1364.2
5
TRN-HCEC-00063632

2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Rig Data
Vessel DEEPWATER HORIZON
Owner Transocean
Type Semi-Submersible RBS-80
Built Hyundai, S. Korea
t ~ l a s s 5th Generation DP
Classificati on ABS
Performance 8,000 water depth ft
30,000 drilling depth ft
Location Gulf of Mexico
Inspection dates 1 7 - 31 October 2005
ModuSpec References PSI/AS/dw/i r/hh - 1364.2
2.?. Survey Workscope
In accordance with the instructions received, we attended on board the DEEPWATER
HORIZON to complete a condition survey of the primary assets of the rig including
drill ing equipment. mud system, marine equipment, hull , structure, power plant,
electrical equipment, and safety equipment.
Additionally for these rigs utilizing the Transocean EMPAC system, this survey was to
determine the present state of maintenance by reviewing tasks, histories and OER
(Operation Ever1t Reports) on the assets inspected with particular emphasis on
downtime risk equipment
-,he ultrmate goal o1 tne survey was to determine t'le current condition of the rig's
assets. The audit was conducted in good fai:h, but the inspec.ion of individual items of
equipment was subj ected to time and operational constraints imposed by the lime of the
SUIVey .
Report of Survey - DEEPWP.TER HORI ZON
6

This report, prepared by McduSpec, Is confidential. It has heen prepared on behalf of the client mentioned on
cover page ('the client"; and is issued pursuant to an agreement between ModuS pee and me client. Jt has !
I
produced according !o l/1e scope of work and is only suitable for vse m conuecFon therewith. ;
All measures and oectsions based on this analysis and these findings are the sole responsibility of the dienL I
ModuSpec does not accept:
any liability for the identification, Jndicatton or elimmatmn o f dangers and non-compliances (in the broadest sense of 1
the word) , nor for any damage caused IJy any of these:
any obi/galion to report all facts or circumstances during the visit TI1is obligauon comes completely under
the authority and responsibility of the client
any liab/!Jty for the cltent's obltgations resulting from (legal) rvles and/or statUtes:
any ltabiilty or re:;ponsibtlity whatsoever In respecr of or reliance upon thts report by any third party.
Tho execution of improvements recommended by ModuSpec does not indemnity me cliem against any I or
contractual obltgatlons and offers no safeguard againsr I he elimination of dangers or damages resvlling from the
cltenf's products, services, company FJt cot era.
No pan or this publication may be reproduceo, stored m a r etrieval system or transrnflteo in :my form or by ::Jny moana.
electronic. mechanical. photocopying, recordi."lg. or otl!e.n.v1se t'llilhour pnor perm1ssmn. m .-mting, or ModuS pee.
except for rcsuictecf use within the clien!' s otgoni.c.olion.
2.3 Aoolicable Standards
The criteria which have been used as reference during this survey are internationally
recognized standards, local legislative requirements, customer' s safety and operating
standards, the original equipment manufacturer's maintenance and operating
specifications and accepted oilfield operating and safety practices .
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating
The ModuSpec Equipment Rating (MER) is a unique system to:
measure the condition of an individual rig,
compare the inspection results of an individual rig with the industry average for this
particular type of rig. worldwide or in a specific area,
visualize the strengths and weaknesses of an individual rig,
benchmark the safety and maintenance standards of an individual rig against other
rigs or against the results of previous inspections,
use as a risk analysis tool to proactively prevent accidents and downtime
The added value of the MER system is that it visualizes and measures the present
condition of a rig and its equipment. The MER allows a direct comparison of a rig with
other rigs of the same type Uack-ups with jack-ups etc.) located in a predefined area or
worldwi de.
A series of bar charts representing the inspection results of the ri g is 1ncluded in the finc:.l
inspection report. These bar charts are only applicable ro the scope of work as s-r aied in
section 2.2.
The MER is presented as an average figure for the entire rig (chart 1) and for each
individual section of the inspection program (chart 3) .
Repon of Survey- DEEPWATER HORIZON
7
TRN-HCEC-00063634

A low MER is an indication that certain steps must be taken, for instance:
1. to address the recommendations made in the report,
2. to effect structural improvements to the maintenance management system,
3. to conduct a recheck after the recommendations made in the report have been
addressed.
The following charts are included in the inspection report :
Chart 1: Rig Average Inspection Ratinq
In comparison with an industry average. this chart shows:
.. the percentage of the ModuSpec inspection program which was Gornpletell fot tlte
rig,
~ the average MER for the enti re rig.
Chart 2: Percentage Inspected
This chart shows the percentage inspected for each section of the rig in comparison
with the average coverage during an inspection.
Chart 3: Detailed MER Results
This chart indicates how the rig is rated from a maintenance and safety-qualitative point
of view, in comparison with an industry average for this type of rig for each individual
section of the inspection.
Chart 4: Detailed Critical Rating
This chart shows the percentage of critical non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program in comparison with the industry average. This chart is an
important indication of the risk to encounter a fatality or serious accident on the rig, and
the possibility of environmental damage caused by the rig.
Chart 5: Detailed Major Rating
This chart shows the percentage of major non-confom1ances identified for each section
of the inspection program in comparison with the industry average. It is an important
indication of the risk to encounter major equipment damage and/or operational
down lime of the rig.
Chart 6: Detailed MJnor _Balli!g
This chart shows the percentage of minor non-conformances identified tor each section
or the inspection program in comparison with the tndus<ry average. il is an imponant
indication of the risk of lost-time incidems and it visualizes the overall safety ~ m d
maintenance standards on the rig.
Note: Charts 4, 5 and 6 indicate t'?e probability for the rig to encounter accidents and
operational downtime measured against the industry average_ These charts are very
Report of Survey- DEEPVVATER HORIZON
8
TRN-HCEC-00063635

important indicators to estabfish whether or not the rig is capable of operating in a safe
and reliable manner.
Validity of the MER
The MER is valid for the duration of one year after completion of the initial inspection.
If a recheck is conducted and completed within four months after the completion of the
initial inspection, only the non-satisfactory and non-inspected items will be checked
again. The MER is then valid for all equipment items which were inspected and found
satisfactory during the initial inspection as well as during the recheck.
Revalidation of the MER must be completed within a year after completion ()f t he initial
inspection. An extension is possible for a maximum of three months after the expiry
date so as to establish the revalidation of the MER, provided that :
lhe inspection is completed within this three-month period,
the inspection is requested prior to the initial expiry date .
Report of Survey- DEEPWATER HORIZON
9
TRN-HCEC-00063636

Rig Average Inspection Rating
Reference: Order No. U S 1 3 ~ . 2
10
TRN-HCEC-00063637

Percentage Inspected
Report of Survey- DEEPWATER HORI ZON
11
TRN-HCE C-00063638

Detailed MER ~ e s u l t s
Reference: Order No. US 1364.2
12
TRN-HCEC-00063639

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

I DS:?WATER HORIZON
lo Semi Submersibles

Detailed Critical Rating
--
-
;
- - ------- ----
------ - --
-- -
..
--
.
- ------------ . - -
--
__ ....____ --
-
=o:a
,c:::;,
....Jl
Ill fl. ....
Drilling
Mud
Well Marine
Power
Electric
Equi pm
System
Control Equi pm
Plant
al
ent Equipm ent Equipm
1% 4% 0% 0% 0% 6%
12% 13% 0% 9% 4% 16%
safety
2%
5%
Mainte
Spare
nance
Par ts
System
0% 0%
0% 0%
13

Detailed Majqr Rating
100%
~ ~ l
90%
80%
~ - - - - --.
70%
----- .....
.. ,.
60%
- - ~ - - - - - - - _ .. ~
.I
50%
. --
40%
--
.
-
-- ~
- -- -
30%
20%
10%
0%

I DEEPWATER HORIZON
Ia Semi Submers ible s GOM

- - - - - - - - - - ~ - M - - ~ - - ~ -
~ --t=ii
A . .-=::;>! _.=n_
Drilling
Mud
Well Marine
Power
8cctric
Equlpm Control Equipm
System Plant
al
ent Equlpm ent Equipm
SO!. 3% 0% 0% 3% 5%
4;. s;. 0% 5% 3% S0.4
. ----------
.Alfi
Ji1
Mainte
Spare
safety nance
Parts
System
0% 8% 0%
3'Yo 7% 6%
14
TRN-HCEC-00063641

Detailed Minor Rating
100%
---------- .....
90%
---- -- w,.._ ...
80% -
70% - -
50%
- - - - .. -
-
i
I
50%
f--.-- . - - - -- .... -
............. .
40%
- - - - ~ ....-- - ~ - - ~ ... -~
..
30%
20%
1CP/o
0%

I OEFPWATER HORIZON
Ia Semi Submersibles GOM

,.::::;ot
.Jll . .-=11 ~ 1 1
Drilling
Mud
Well Marine
Pow or
8ectric
Equipm Control Eq uipm al
System Plant
ent Equipm ent Equipm
4% 4% 0'1.
30/. 4% 4%
8% 6"/o o1o 6% 7% 13%
....Fil_fll
111
l/l ainte
Sp01re
Sofcty nancc
Parts
System
1,..
0% 0%
6o/o 7% 10%
15
TRN-HCE C-00063642

3.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3.1 Executive Summary -
In accordance with the instructions received, we attended on board the DEEPWATER
HORIZON to complete a condition survey of the primary dri ll ing equipment, mud
system. marine equipment, hull, structure, power plant, electrical equipment. and safety
equipment.
Tne DEEPWATER HORIZON was visited for a total of sixteen days while operating
under a long-term contract for BP USA in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) _ During our stay
the LMRP was pulled to the surface, lowered and connected to the seabed and normal
tripping into and out of the hole could be observed. The rig was deballasted to surviveil
draft and ballasted to operating draft during our stay so that a variety of tanks could be
inspected internally_ A period of six months remained prior o the rig being due for the
first five-year Special Periodical Survey (SPS) and the crew had commenced the SPS
on the class-regulated items.
We would like to express our gratitude to the crew for their commitment in aiding us to
complete this survey with ongoing drilling operations .
17 November 2005
ModuSpec USA, Inc
17171 Park Row, Suite 120
Houston. Texas (7084
lJSA
Tel. No
Fax No_
E:-mail
WP-bsitE:
281 -:198-3998
: 281 -398-8694
_ usa@rnoduspec.corn
www (:IHII
Report oi Survey- DEEPWATER HORIZON
16
Confident ial Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCE C-00063643

3.2 End-of-Inspection Meeting Document
Rig name: DEEPWATER HORIZON
-
Owner: Transocean
I
--------
Location:
I
Gulf of Mexico
---
I
--
Customer: Transocean
- ------------ -
--------.--.....-
---
f-.--
...
--
... .
--
I nspection ....
17 .. 31 October 2005
....... -
-- -
- -- --
n w ..
.......:..:... ... ...
-
-
- - - -- -- --
......,
f-_- ---- ---- -- '------ --- --
---- -
---
..
- -
...
I
Date of meeti'-!9.: _ 30 October 2005
---- -
.. -
- - - ----.. -
..
-
- -- -------.. ------- -------------
Order No.: US1364.2
--------- .. --.
------]
-----
Name Title Siqnature
I
Customer Ron Dailey TOI Assessment
Representative(s): Engineer
.. --- ----l
Big Staff: Brent Younq Master
J. W. Harrel OI M
Karsten Petersen Chief Enq.
Tom Field Chief Eiec.
Tim Williams Sr. TP
Note: Tne signed end-of-inspectio11 documP.n1 i f: kRp1 nn i n tho
ModuSpec office and a copy can be provided ui)on request
17
TRN-HCEC-00063644

4.0 ASSESSMENT FINDINGS
Al -923 AC Motors> 135HP General Purpose
Numerous AC motors were visually inspected. Motor coupling guards and motor
cooling fan guards were in place and intact. Cable glands and terminal boxes were
correct for the selection regardi ng EX execution and the cables were properly secured.
The presence of earth bonding over all motors was observed and the condition and
cuirent carrying capacity of the earth bond was satisfactory. Of the motors that were
operational, temperatures were checked and bearings were sounded for any anomalies
of which none were found during our survey.
Motors in hazardous areas were selected accordi ngly and .were suitable for the areas ( 1l
installation. Maint enance to EX standard on those motors however had not been
performed on any of the AC motors. At our request, a cross section of the 480-volt
motors was subjected to insulation resistance testing and the insulation values for the
motors were satisfactory.
Al-924 AC Motors <135 HP
The smaller AC motors were visually inspected externally at vari ous locations and
checked for noise or vibration. We verified t hat grounding lead cables were properly
secured, couplings were in place and adequately protected with guards and legible
nameplates attached. The motors we inspected were secured to the rig structure. One
item of concern noted on the AC motors inspected in the hazardous areas was the fact
that no maintenance had been performed. This issue was covered in more detail in the
Hazardous Areas section (TX-694) of this report. Motors in safe areas were observed
to be in satisfactory condition and suitable for the areas in which they were located.
AN-050 Maintenance System
EMPAC was in place since departing from t he shipyard in 2001. Suff.icient work
stations were available to allow input from all departments. Maintenance offices were
well set up and a dedicated library was available for controlled dor.uments.
EMPAC was used in the daily task of planning the PM WOs and CWOs: l towever, eadt
department had used EMPAC lo different levels of detail.
There wt:t& go0ci exarnpies oi work orders compie1ed witn the required aelatl ana
values recorded. However . on average the lack of detail was strongly apparent and 011
multiple closed work orders no comments had been recorded at all.
During our survey, the rig was approximately six months away from the five-year
milestone. We did not observe any indications that proper planning, budgeting and
18

operator negotiations had advanced .for items not covered under the ABS MODU code
and the ri g was not under ABS drilling notation. We also not ed during the shore-based,
closeout meeting that it was reported that an eight-day drill ing break was planned in
2006 so that 1 ,825-day maintenance tasks could be performed. It was also noted that
the workload on the rig supervisors for daily tasks was such that there was no time
available to perform advanced planning. We supported the suggestion of separating
proj ect planning from operations.
AP-044 Spare Parts I Warehouse
The warehouse was visually inspected. It was well organized. clean and tidy. fhA t otal
inventory val ue was US $2,828, 34"1.36 with a total binned inventory of U0
a.nd an unbinned tot al of US $1 1?.,509.67
AP-990 Earthing and Earth Bonding
We visually inspected all the electrical equipment including the main generat ors,
transformers, high- and low-voltage switchboards, MCC panel, AC drilling motors and
AC general motors. All were observed to have ground leads attached and were
securely fastened and in satisfactory condiiion. There was a policy in place to megger
test the ground leads and record the value in the EMPAC system .
AZ-915 Batteries
We inspected the only battery locker which was locat ed under the helideck. We also
successfully function tes' ed the exhaust fan alarm in the compartment. All batteries
were in satisfactory condition and identified for use. AU of the electrical equipment
installed in the battery room was rated for a Zone 2 area. The chargers were also
inspected and were in satisfactory condition with the correct PPE were available i n the
battery room. There were various other battery boxes that were all identified for use
and clean apart from the batteries for the standby generator which v;ere in poor
condition. It must be noted that the batteries were cleaned during our survey, The
majority of batteries install ed were of the maintenance-free type. The electrical
department had a record of the batteries and we had no concerns with them.
BA-100 Hull/ Pontoon
To gain a good understanding of t11e struct ural and coating condition of hull and
l.Oiun1ns, we inspected the deck box wniie walking the main aecK. Tne lower s1de at thE-)
deck box was inspected by assessing the aft. center and forward stairways and
platforms leading below the deck box. T he deck box external bulkheads could visually
be inspected from the protruding cantilevered decks above the columns. The column
secti ons located above the waler l ine were visually inspected from the three mentioned
19
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HC EC-00063646

pl::.tForms undemeati-J the deck box. The columns were visually inspected dowr to the
"6.4 r1eters drafi.level with the rig being Giese to survival draft of 113.5 -neters
Tne structural conditio. of the deck box and VIas good. No damage to the
box or column structure wc.:s obszrved and no significant corrosron was present or
any st uctura' X non-structural c:reas or any or the bJikheacls. A steel plate crop 19pair
maoe se-.era: years prior o cur survE-y or. the inside of tr.e port aft colum1 at the
operat1cnal draft level was visible and nad teen doni? in a efficient manner w;u no
lasting danage T,e damage had occurred due to ar :.mcontrolled barge trat collioea
"' ith the coh . mn The :)n!y surface corrosicr observeo was on tubulars supporting th
aft-s de carHileverec decks These tubulars had bee'! nsl<:tf:ed shpyard
for stre"''gthenlnq re,'lsons cmc the coat1ng of ll1e tubAars was o a low
;t:?ndnd and c:onsccuen11y had resulic!d spct carr 1s on. are>a$
d r'1g nu surv.:y by spot h egt' g
'Rubber fendt-rs iocatad at tiKl ooe.""ational w2ter line en the i"'tboc:rc of !he fou
Ci'.A1mros were all int-:ct wit;.. ro -,pparent damag0 or sgni<icc:nt wear ar:d p-,9
<:::ondition of the ck.-Gi<. box V.I<J::> good. In 2005 l:.1rge sectiors of the vertica ext.::rnal
bu t.he2 Js hBd been ::;pol blasted and with threr.; consisting of tvto layers
of J.\merr;::Jal 235 epoxy prime!' to lowed by c: single poly rPlhan,; lopco::rt of Amercoat
450H. During cur survey a third party cortlnued on the aft verticzl external bulkheHds of
the deck box wi.h spot blasting and coatin.
R;:);)Orl cf Survey- CEEPWATER HORIZON
Order No. US1364.2
20

The coating condition of the columns was good, with no major coating damage
apparent. Biological mar_ine growth was presen.t and was not regarded as excessive
considering the four years of operational time in tropical waters. Marine growth
consisted mainly of large-sized. barnacles randomly spread covering from the waterline
down for approximately 80% of the coated area. The crew indicated that the blast and
coating job on the deck box in 2005 was planned to be followed in 2006 by a column
blast and coating job from the deck box to waterline. .
. . .
The total costs incurred thus far were US $116,51 ~ . 1 9 and the total approved project
budget was US $306,148.00. The necessity for blasting 'the columns to near white
followed by coating could be argued .. Blasting to near white metal in an offshore
environment is not desirable and should only be performed when the coating or
underlying steel work is damaged to the extent that spot treatment is not economically
or practically possible. In this case, we did not recommend shot blasting the columns in
2006 while offshore due to the very acceptable condition of the coating as observed.
With the vicinity of the seawater surface the inherent risk is present that the surface salt
contamination of sodium chloride from sea spray cannot be reduced to levels that a new
coating could be applied properly after blasting to near white metal. The end result
would be a coating in worse condition than the coating observed during our survey due
to osmotic blistering that would occur rapidly followed by the onset of corrosion .
The coating as observed during our audit did not warrant the cost for blasting and
should preferably be by mechanical brushing, spot treating and over coating. However
we did not expect the cost of spot treatments to be much lower since the same wire line
techniques would be required for blasting. Allotted time and manpower would be lower
however and as mentioned the main advantage would be removing the risk for severe
coating damage due to sodium chloride sea spray contamination.
Whether economically justified, which could be debated, it was obvious that the crew
ensured a good condition of steer, structure and coating on the external areas. We did
not expect that any remedial work would be required for the 2006 SPS.
BA-917 Seawater Ballast Tanks and Voids
To gain a good understanding of the internal condition of the seawater ballast tanks
(SWBT), void spaces and the pontoon hulls. the following SWBTs and voids were
entered and inspected.
SWBT 4P
SWBT 6P
SVVBT 8P
SWBT 3S
SWBT 11S
SWBT 19S
SWBT 20P {Aft transverse bracing PS}
21
TRN-HCEC-00063648

Aft Diagonal Brace-P + entry void
Fwd Diagonal Brace-P +entry void
All inspected SWBTs were structurally in good condition with no damage due to
corrosion or impact. The horizontal and vertical bulkheads in the SWBT and voids
located on the outer side and thus making up the pontoon hull were inspected for
impact and no indications were found. The diagonal bracings and transverse bracings
were inspected with particular attention for the connection of bracing to pontoon. These
critical areas were inspected for crack-like indications such as cracked coating; none
were found.
The coating in voids was intact and in like-new condition except for a very few minor
spots where damage had occurred to the coating likely during the shipyard phase. The
coating in the SWBT was 100% intact; however, on several transverse frames and a
few transverse bulkheads, osmotic blistering was observed with the blisters all intact in
less than 5% of transverse frame total area. The overall quantity was low and could be
treated by the crew when an opportunity became available. As long as the blisters are
intact, the corrosion process wit! not commence. However, yearly inspections must
monitor this blistering and immediately address the areas when blisters are damaged to
prevent any corrosion from commencing. The crew was in the process of clearing
several clogged SWBT sounding tubes. When reviewing the unusual pipe run and set
22
TRN-HCEC-00063649

Lip or tl1e scunding tubes. it
1
Nas not difficurt to imagir;e !hat blockage '"''ould occur on a
regular basts. This will be nn onqoing issue ard could not realistically be 1E-rnecied. 11
coulc be axpected that cJVer tne years tb<S :.-viii occur more frequently ci;..Je :o
ror :sion inside the sounding tubes.
Overall the SWBT. voids and bracings Nere in good condition and we did not expect
any remedial worl-: woL:Id be required for he 2006 SPS. The year::: Folkwving the 2000
SDS might require some mmor coal"ng toucll-UD ,o rAm?dy 're action of the osmotic
blisten -g.
oie t!l8L the te:nks J.P. 4S ar1d 1 P ::md ,, S origincl.) .:esig:lated as fuel tanks "''iii' a
3-r -r. c2pa;:.:1ty \''ere not in t...se ar.o rever haa used. The
1
085-day ?M fc r
poable .vater tanks was duf:, at tre timt: of our su1v::y -:,.-;: :'.t.:::.rooard fon,vc:rd
pdab!e lank was ir.spected t'lough the manhole snc: coating was i'i .act
1
00 ....'0. No structural damage \V3S observed anci sedir.eni quantities were act;artchl.c
::lnd .easily removed .
F:.eport of DEEPWATER HORtZOI-J
Ro'erenco; OrdGr No. US13t34.2
23

BA-119 Overflow and Vent Checks
Vent pipes from tanks located in the column and pontoon were routed outside the deck
box to the main deck level. The external sections of the vent lines could be visually
inspected from the cantilevered decks above the columns. This piping was inspected
and observed to be in good condition with a new coating that was applied in 2005. No
corrosion or damage due to previous corrosion was observed.
Sections of GRP (Ameron Bondstrand, Glass Reinforced Piping) piping had been used
in the vent lines specifically where vent lines were routed through other SWBTs or drill
water tanks. GRP had been used instead of steel piping, presumably due to the non-
corrosive quality of the material. There had been several occurrences of crack-like
indications in the GRP piping that penetrated 100% through the wall thickness and
consequently perforated the GRP at those locations. Reportedly it was suspected that
this had occurred due to stress in the mounting of the GRP piping. At the time of our
survey, the vent line from drill water tank 5P had cracked completely inside SWBT 14P
and an Ameron contractor had been requested for repair. Due to the crack, SWBT 14P
could not be charged to the top since it would subsequently fill the drill water 5P tank
through the damaged vent. SWBT 14P consequently was filled only to approximately
75%, naturally increasing the free surfaee effect. The probable root causes were
possibly not having provided stress-free support during the shipyard installation
process. Insufficient supports could bea factor as well. We supported those root
causes because they have been observed on other rigs as well. Releasing the support
stress to the GRP would normally solve these problems.
All vent checks located on the main deck were observed to be in good condition in all
aspects of structural, coating and fasteners. Fuel and oil tanks contained intact flame
arresting gauges.
BB-131 Cables and Cable Trays
We visually inspected all areas of the rig including the machinery spaces. All cable
trays and cables were in satisfactory condition with no corrosion noted. None of the
cable trays were over packed or damaged and no redundant cables were observed.
We inspected the drill floor and observed that the cables on the main carriage wire way
for both PRSs were not properly strapped to the cable tray and contained several loose
cables. We also inspected the various third party installations and all were noted to be
in acceptable condition apart from the drill floor next to the heavy tool store where
cabies were not supported by cable trays or other approved means.
Transocean had a policy of ensuring that all third party installations were inspected
before the power was applied to that system. When the third party company left the rig,
all of those cables were removed .
Repon of Survey-DEEPWATER HORIZON
24
TRN-HCEC-00063651

BK-101 Helideck
The helideck was made of aluminum and we visually inspected it with the marine
department We observed that there was no corrosion to any of the main structure
including the main piping for the drains. Nuts and bolts were in place and were noted to
be in good condition with no corrosion or damaged observed. The safety netti ng around
the helideck was i n place and properly secured to the structure. Tie-down points on the
helideck were i n satisfactory condition with no corrosion or damaged observed.
Helideck lighting was in good condition with all the lights working satisfactory. Cables
for the helideck lights were secured to cable trays and were in satisfactory condition.
We inspected the three access platforms to the helideck; handrails and grating were in
place and were in satisfactory condition.
CB-231 Obstruction Lights
There were two 15-mile and one 1 0-mile obstruction lights located at each of the four
comers of the rig. We inspected each light and noted that all the lenses and fixtures
were in good condition. Each light was controlled by a light sensor switch that was
activated at sunset. We function tested the system during our survey and no anomalies
were observed .
CB-232 Navigation Lights
This rig was equipped with a navigation lighting system with the control panel located on
the bridge. At the time of t his survey, the rig was underway to and from the drilling
location so we were able to function test the system with the crew. We observed
several navigation lights in the derrick including the upper NUC and the RAM lights that
were not operational. We were informed by the crew that a WO had been issued for
repairs to these lights.
CB-234 Fog Horns
There was one 2-mile fog horn located in the derrick. We functioned tested the system
with the crew and visually inspected the fog horn. The wiring was secured and in place
and the mari ne and ET departments ensured that the PMs were performed and the
sound levels were satisfactory. We were satisfied with the level of maintenance that
had been performed.
CC-222 Radar and Navigation Equipment
A review of the bri dge equipment in conj unction with interviews revealed that of the
bridge-mounted navigation equi pment a variety of items was obsolete and reportedly
planned under an approved budget to be replaced in 2006. The main reason was the
fact that the equipment was older than the rig reportedly since it had been purchased for
Report of SuNey- DEEPWATER HORIZON
25
other Falcon projects that never had commenced.
Items to be replaced:
Three radars (X-band): old radars were having difficulty with tracking and one
radar scanner was located at main deck height and consequently lit the entire rig
structure, overloading the scanner on the echo.
" One non-functional Doppler radar
.. One electronic chart was not in compl iance with IMO regulations (Note it was not
compulsory to have an electronic chart recorder on board)
" GMDSS (reportedly parts will become more difficult to obtain)
An automated telephone attendant was scheduled for purchase. This could be
regarded a good addition since it would prevent DPOs from being distracted from
primary tasks after 18:00 when there was no radio operator on duty and all incoming
calls were relayed to the bridge I DP station.
CH-209 Thruster Unit
The rig was equipped with a total of eight Kamewa azimuth thrusters. All thrusters were
mounted under water. A review of the history reports, interviews with the crew and
reviewing actual related documentation revealed that the thrusters could be regarded as
reliable. There were no indications other than the one described below that these
thrusters would not continue to be reliable for several more years. The thrusters top,
azimuth gear and hydraulic pumps visible in the thruster rooms were visually in good to
acceptable condition and all items were functional. Rig engineers performed
maintenance following EMPAC WOs. The main concern was the amount of water
present in the gear oil. This water normally originates from seawater through the
propeller shaft seal ; however. in limited form it can come from condensation. If
seawater is present this will show up in increased sodium chloride levels. In the case of
these thrusters. it appeared that water content measured in the gear oil was seawater.
The OEM maximum allowable H
2
0 limit (similar to industry wide recognized maximum
limits) is 0.5%. The last four oil analysis results indicated the following:
Azimuth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-- .. - . ---
-:--- --"--
Sep 05 0% 0% 0.9% 0.48% 0.39% 1.04% 0.38% 0%
July 05 0% 0% 0.4% 0% 0% 0.1 % 0% 0%
Mar OS 0% 0% 0.5% 0% 0.2% 1.0% 0% 0%
Dec 04 0% 0% 0.1% 0% 0.1% 0.2% 0% 0%
Values are % H20 in gear oil
-
-
Values in Red require attention
Values in green indicate an H
2
0 reduction after the gear oil was
circulated over a JCJ filter.
26
TRN-HCEC-00063653

Some increase in H
2
0 content could be observed after the rig had experienced the
wave action of two hurricanes and could be regarded as normal. However any H
2
0
content originating from the seawater is an indicator that shaft seals were performing in
a less-than-perfect manner. It should be noted that in general shaft seals are intended
for five year of maintenance-free operation. After the initial five years. it could be
regarded as relatively acceptable that seals would perform less efficiently and
consequentl y higher standards of gear oil treatment would be required such as CJC
filtration (or similar) to maintain H
2
0 levels in the gear oil below 0.5%. An improvement
opportunity was written for this section in the relative report.
Reportedly there was some doubt about the quality of the final oil samples taken in
September 2005. Therefore, a new batch of oil samples had recently been drawn and
sent in for analysis.
CQ-244 Dynamic-Positioning System
The Kongsberg SPD 21 system was reviewed by going through the system,
interviewing the rig crew and reviewing DP reports and OERs. At the time of our
survey, all systems related to the DP systems were operational and Gyro Ill had
recently been repaired after a failure. A total of 57.50 hours of downtime had occurred
in September 2005 due to a loss of references originating from a manual error
(maintenance on switchboard breaker) resulting in an escalating effect finally leaving
the rig on DP in relaxed mode with 2 DGPS only as reference. Contributing factors to
this situation were:
UPS 11 failure
Gyro Ill failure
GPS 1, 2, 3 and 4 correction signals from lnmarsat B failed due to the failure of
lnmarsat B which received the heading signal from Gyro Ill
Fugro Spot Beam crown antenna malfunction
Both port and starboard HI PAP were unable to communicate with any of the six
transponders on the seabed
All systems had been repaired and tested in the period immediately following the event.
Both HIPAP transducer wells were externally inspected and deemed to be in good
condition with the seawater valves operating smoothl y. Maintenance on the various
systems was done properly, primarily by using third party specialized contractors.
However, the fact that a minor manual error was able to create a situation where at one
point all references were lost and consequently the vessel had to be operated on
joystick was a strong indication of the lack of testi ng. Independent equipment testing
would possibly have highlighted the fact that equipment was not up to the task. More
non-obvious issues like the results of lnmarsat B failing after loss of gyro input could
and will be detected during DP FMEA triais.
DP trials (I MCA recommend) were not held mainly due to operator pressure and these
27
TRN-HCEC-00063654

operational issues were not covered under the workscope of our survey. Therefore, we
did not elaborate on these issues. However to maintain good condition, testi ng is
required and in this case testing would be the annual OP trials. All systems and
references at the time of our.survey were operational and sufficiently maintained.
CR-920 Ballast Pumps
After the ballast system was reviewed by performing a visual inspection on the
components and interviewing the crew, we concluded that the condition was good.
Pumps functioned well and were all able to strip down SWBTs. For additional stripping
a vacuum air primer was available in each column. These were externally in good
condition and hardly used since there was no real operational requirement for them.
The maintenance was being performed as per EMPAC WO or per CWO. The only
anomalies observed were several valves timing-out when operated. This could be an
indication on older valves of poor valve disc seating. However, in this case it was
confirmed with the engineers that the valve time-out occurred due to limit sensors that
were out of adjustment which was a common and minor issue.
CS-904 Ballast Piping and Valves
Ballast piping was visually inspected and discussed with the crew. There were no
reports of failing ballast piping and ballast strainers and overboard valves were in good
condition. There were no reports of tanks communicating, indicating valve leaks.
CT-216 Ballast Control Panel
The Kongsberg ballast control panel was observed when the system was in operation
when ballasting from the operational draft to the survival draft and back to the
operational draft with no anomalies observed. The crew had no concerns in this area
and there were no outstanding records for systems down. SWBT level indicators
functioned well and were accurate and reliable to acceptable levels. Manual sounding
was done on a regular basis to confirm the digital readi ngs.
CV-920 Bilge Pumps
The ri g was outfitted with four centrifugal bilge pumps and twelve ai r-operated
diaphragm pumps. The systems were reviewed and crew members were interviewed;
no anomalies were reported or observed. The system was properly maintained and
functioned with minor issues. The crew was satisfied with the air-operated diaphragm
pumps and generally preferred these pumps over the electrical centrifugal pumps. It
appeared that the overall condition was good .
28
TRN-HCE C-00063655
ga.c:.
8il4: Piping ano VaivE=s
r 1ue no piping iallures repor:eo ir:tcr!icv.r,ng the ere\'/ and reviewing 1he
h.: ty Overel1 it appea1<:>c.l :hai lbe. pipiny 21ll' conui.ian in Lilc bilge
;oot.l. The orH:; major problem indlcatec.l on oc.casicns -NtS the six /\MR
(P.t!Xilar- Roon-:s) iccatcd on the sidr:; ofthc individual engine rooms 1hat
d1c ct con tnin c b:lge or cl to the rifJ clir.y w8ter I Cil :lra'i. syst.err. Th<>
()1: 8in ::-vaii:.>ble vvas iOutr::d 0"8r':loarcl by c:f a botl0m plug (non
( ( .. .J c bottvm 1n this .,,tJ,ch is n::Jtur3::y not il upt'on for <:1 nJGhinery spc'Ct; h 1
r- "'' 1 1 ori 111ity ,A <-Js aised far tnrs <Jrc: In eSP-.:i\1!" epot
A Dre:co l-'.HC "i COO w;::s insta.led. Ti1e drawvvorks v.;,:;s c:tt 2.11 :)ndG
.. u.ing a drilling break th rough the normal i11specrion doors on boih fiOi 1t and ali
Inspection c;overs remoVE)d from thE :::lriller's side and o11-driller's side gear box. it
v:as -lonitored while in operation and furthermore the Ef\-1PAC history files from t1e
pre'- ious 365 days were reviewed along witn It'e existing corpor.ate Nork orders and th0
ng originated work orders.

EA-300 />.HD calipers.
Report of Surve:y - DEEf'WATCR . IORIZCN
Reference Order No. U$1364.2
Confidenti al Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC
29
TRN-HC E C-00063656
The main deficiency observed was a failed shaft seal on ll'le off-di!Jer"s side whicr was
known ::;y t11e cret/1.' and a new split shaft seal hod been ordered. An earlier attempt for
re.1air l1ad bAen done with an inco!Tect ser-:1 and consE:C'I'?fltly seal fei.ure h2d o:::currAd
Cf!iJ'box cil cassinc ihe secll was ccllr:'ded anl' drAined back to lil "' r
tlw AHD
fMPAC: .cora:::. hdic,.e. ed or:e disc r;tcr r..: OJ of C 070" vhic ,. as pas ll1e FYP
.. co c e c- 1. murr al owcb!e v8l:Je cf C' .058 1->t , that ' a EIVPAC. rec.orced
r lC>:i ,,l m :'II o vable tcJiue tie NOI ( -Jatioral 'el) m:::):iiT'-.. cPo.-vab.:;
nn 01 It r .. : f 0 035 /-\dd ilo 1ally 11. ;,:a..s - s 'rife I! haL NQ' hr1j 1nC.1 U t
allowable na.:.:i'11urr: otor run oul from <-Jn o i01nal maxirnun al:ovat)le o or no
:).0.:1 dicu1ted by th"' rranu:;ctu er borg} of 'he dis . : brake sy Le ,., .. hs r(".,
.1 ou > 0 0 0 w;:;:., th w 30 at>ove [',01 ir1 ll:::. Wri.:er .;OJ fi 1 ,a ' 1.:.c
.. , d 'c 1 .he .,e )dcr thnt the p;:__. ct-J
egarl t.:d ow pn"Jrily ;,-d moni orerl on y
fhc dra twr::. KS rt:(.i >;)ea .. s .n:::pect.;:d c. tot s1des ti autn 1he , cov ,,
.. .; rtfirner gear cone! tlol'l 10\AJr.>f pi1 .ion ge8 of lh CHar AC J :v:
e '""eli and not,ec!.::: ba1119 i1 go:)C"J {;Onditlo ThE: ( o.,r Oil eocr s
caliper::. were ir.spected end 111.1 aPotnalles we. e noted. The off-drUm's :::idr;. b, :c1ke dis .
coni.8ined an oily bahd of .:;pproxmalely 2" This V'as lil<.ely a o1 the $hafi
Rcp01i of Survey- DEEPWATER HORIZON
Referenc;:). Ortler No. U313GI,.2
30
TRN-HCEC-00063657

seal leakage or excessive greasing. Subsequently we witnessed a brake test with the
following results:
Caliper 1-2: 98.0%
Caliper 3-4: 101.1%
Caliper 5-6: 97.0%
Cali per 7-8: 89.0%
These results indicated that the grease had no influence on tbe .brake performance.
The total brake capacity at the time of our survey was 4,813 kips. Both hydraulic
systems and the gear systems were inspected and no major anomalies were
noted and no leaks were present. The crew had performed the minimum required
maintenance and there was room for maintenance improvement. These improvements
were described in the maintenance section of the supplemental report. Maintenance
was being performed using EMPAC guidelines. However, steps on WOs were
sometimes not executed due to the limited t ime the drawworks was available for
maintenance.
The lower level WOs were generally executed to acceptable standards; however, higher
level maintenance such as the 365-day mechanical was not executed to the EMPAC
PM task steps for the reason mentioned above. As an example see the following:
The 365-day WO 8704-000624-000 was completed in June 2004. The duration of this
365-day WO was 2.0 hours.
Step 1 called for NDE of load-bearing areas and stress areas.
Step 4 called for bearing clearances.
Step 6 called for disassembly of the caliper assemblies .
31
TRN-HCEC-00063658

81D"RAWWKS.- ACTin: B.4 'lt:E
Warl.:. Ordtr :So Opmed D:>b Ooled
704--000524-00t:l Ftbnll:"'/ 01, 200+ .llme: 12.2004
l'rObkml>calptian.:
W.O. De.ctipfioa:
:Nate.:
..30S DAY-ORA\\'\\IOR!:S .
AU. c::ru::u;-s !lAVE COMl''Ll>TED J>.-uU"S OF nos \\'ORXOlUlER.AS !ND!CAlE!> ll'TI'!EOrm:R!.:-vrES. SOvW C:mc:KE:D:SOL'::S FOR
CAN"I'OT AC'CESSA.'Jl
'I.ukhemi:
L Cmy om NDT .iosperoa!l of load bari.J:: acd ste5s
2. Rs:lew hile oil ifreq=ed by lube oil sa:ll}$.
4. irull = 00 <=
or cfu.l io.diate<r with. &hlfr ="mlP.DIS.
5. Vc:ifybatttqtwon.c!rst'rnod:s m\:lll.d:nian, llll)targe:ni>OXI!!:. !llS.il:l :tiOtllll>.
t<Z'qtle ::;pees.
iS. Slldil::spoecr ltll caliber assembly pins m:tmns fa: W!3l: d.mlav., :repb!e allw=
parts 11t> rt!qtlin!d
Ccmplelec!by: ______ _

Neither of these steps was completed as well as the 365-day WO in 2005 which was
due in June 2005 and still outstanding at the time of our survey at the end of October
2005. The fact that the bearings were not accessible had raised repeated comments
such as "cannot access bearings'' and had not resulted in action such as contacting TOI
support or NOI for details on how that could be executed or if was even truly required.
Consequently after four years of operation, there was little knowledge as to the
condition of the main bearings. It was noted that the recent bearing seal replacement
on the off-driller's side had allowed a visual on that bearing which had not raised any
concern. No NDE had been performed on brake calipers and the surrounding areas.
We highlighted below what the OEM manual indicated for NDE maintenance.
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL EPL-1424
ANNUALLY
Test the Emergency Cylinders by following the procedures listed below:
10. Remove all of the "Caliper Arm and Pivot Shafts". Inspect for excessive wear,
bending or visible cracks .
32

11. Inspect all shafts and caliper arms with NDE procedures for cracks. Any part with
crack-like indications must be replaced.
12. Inspect Caliper Support Arms for cracks with NDE procedures. Check for worn
holes where the caliper support shafts go through.
A valid argument would be which maintenance or inspection was necessary. These
drawworks types have only been in use since 1997 and this relative short period has not
brought forth much information indicating the need to adjust maintenance requirements.
We believed that a more active approach from rig and shore-based technical support
was required to define necessary maintenance and inspection tasks. We expected this
drawworks to continue to operate with relative reliability for the mechanical items.
In August 2006 the 1 ,825-day PM would be due and the workscope for the 1 ,825-day
condition evaluation should be defined and planned for. The relative short track record
of the AHD 1000 type drawworks warrants a conservative approach to maintenance.
The supplemental report contains a text portion indicating areas where improvements
can be made on maintenance issues. The effort of the crew to maintain the equipment
to acceptable standards was obvious; however, the applied maintenance tasks should
be reviewed and improved.
Auxiliary Drawworks:
A HiTech auxiliary drawworks rated for 300 Mt was available and installed in a mini-
derrick. This drawworks was not regularly used and no function test was performed.
The visual inspection did not reveal any anomalies and interviews with the crew did not
raise any concerns.
ED-317 Rotary Table
The hydraulic Varco RST (Rotary Suppon Table) was visually inspected although no
function test was performed. The crew had no concern and no anomalies were
observed. The rotary was not used in normal operation because tubular and riser
positioning was done with the rotating hook adapter.
ED-319 Master Bushing
The master bushing was visually in acceptable condition; however, the taper of the
bowls was not measured for wear. Third party reports were available indicating that
NOE had been performed. A dimensional evaluation ofthe insert bowls and tapered
sides had not been performed by the third party inspector.
EF-315 Top Drive System*
The rig was outfitted with a TDS-8S top drive drill ing system. The TDS was visually
Reference: Order No. U$1364.2
33
inspectec during a drilling break when we were able to gain access with a basket. The
TDS was not observed in operation with regard to rotation due to the operational weil
reouirements. EMPAC history files and OERs were reviewed to gain an understanding
of reliability. In the past 365 days the TDS had seven recoided incidents thatitad
rssul.ed in a lotal of 42.50 hours of however, several hours 1\JPT were elated to
retract systems on the dolly. This was detailed in section EK-343.
T1e vsual inspection did not reveal major anomalies: i"lowever the b8i: till c/inder was
not fixed which was brought \O the attentior. of the crew. The entire TDS was co..:ereo in
grease, oil and mud. To ensure easy troubleshooting and for identifying hoses in poor
condition and reducing dropped object hazards the TDS should be maintained to a
cleaner standard. A simple pressure washmg wo:..Jid take fifteer. minutes during a
d illing break and would greatly improve the chances for increased reliability. ft was
that an air-pressurized seal was useci on the wash pipe. The history files
indiC3ted repeated seal failures :hat had allowed mud end water to enter the gear box.
Order No. US 1361.2

This had likely increased the wear on the gear and thrust bearing. Oil changes were
performed regularly.
During our survey, the Varco-supplied lubrication oil pump upgrade was implemented
together with pressure sensors and transmitters. Maintenance was being performed as
per EMPAC WOs; however, the extent could not be defined from the records due to a
lack of details. Note that EMPAC 365-day task required the shaft to be pulled which
was not done and we the opinion that this was not required. The OEM calls
for five-year shaft removal; however, this left few clues in the years between the five
years as to the condition of main thrust bearing and bull gear which are the typical items
that cause a TDS change out after failure and thus often extensive downtime. The
maintenance section of the supplemental report contains recommendations ior
improving standards of condition evaluation. Backlash gear measurement was not
done nor was it required by EMPAC tasks. The OEM indicates a six-month interval for
this and would give an idea of the condition of both the bull gear and the swivel bearing.
End shaft plays were maintained within OEM specification as was noted in the EMPAC
records. It was noted that the OEM- and TOt-supplied safety alerts had been correctly
verified against the TDS onboard. Overall the TDS was performing in a relatively
reliable manner if one considered that a part of the NPT was caused by the dolly retract
system. However, we did not believe that the true condition of the TDS was known and
an internal borescope inspection of the gearbox or pulling the shaft would reveal the
true condition. We would not recommend performing this service any later than after
the first two quarters of 2006, which would be after five years of continuous operation.
A 1,825-day WO was due for May 2006.
EF-368 Top Drive Pipe Handler*
The PH-100 was visually inspected and observed while in operation. No anomalies
were observed; however, it was obvious that the pipe handler was well used. No
anomalies were noted other than normal wear and tear on the IBOP actuators and the
torque wrench. The PH-100 had been in continuous use since 2001 and we suggested
anticipating a complete change out for a possible fleet spare in 2006 so this pipe
handler could be disassembled and have a dimensional check and full NDE according
to the 1 ,825-day PM task due in May 2006. It appeared that various pin-to-bore
clearances had reached the maximum wear limits; however, this could only be
measured exactly when disassembied.
The lower and upper IBOPs had resul:ed in NPT. EMPAC tasks required tile lower and
upper IBOP to be changed out a! 180-day interval and records indicated that IBOP
failures had occurred within the 180-day interval. Improvements could be made by
reducing the preventive change-out interval and ensuring two spare !BOPs were on
board at all ti mes. Three upper IBOPs had failed in the period January to August 2005
and two lower I BOPs had failed in that same period. The service standard of the shops
35
Conf idential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC
TRN-HCEC-00063662

where the !BOPs were serviced should be reviewed.
EF-369 Raised Back-up System- Top Drive*
The RBS was visually inspected and no function test was performed. The crew
indicated that the RBS was functional although it contained minor adjusting problems.
The extent these issues affected the operation were not apparent; however, the visual
inspection indicated the aft side height adjusting cylinder was bent.
The history files did not raise major concerns and there were no repeated or excessive
failures recorded; however, both lifting cylinders were reported to leak. The bent height
adjusting cylinder was first recorded on an EMPAC work order on 29 August 2005. This
same item had been mentioned in a third party survey in April 2005.
Wtm:Ordoc<N O.cro-t ... ,.,_. 1!.oq..,,.,.
A".lfU.-1:, :005
.. t*.
W.O. D....;pn... DAY JUI,\. CI.."tC:
It. Z001
AclioaC.i t

l\'uk Onk: Tn>t

J:l;S!'Ecn:D !5S.lC"'UN!> ll!'T cr....IND'!:1..S:UAKlKG Ah'D l'OG!!.!' ll!'T CXl.INOE!".IlOD JreN<. "W.iLL !'E!D !C :'H!:SE u.m:rs
B!l'ORE CLOSINC PM .
If. zoos Soobioct: S!E uro ':m
IW>Alli.S PElt U'Oltl:
EF-922 Service Loop- Top Drive Hydraulic*
The TDS service loop was visually inspected and no excessive wear and tear was
present. The service loop had been replaced once since drilling commenced and a
spare service loop was available.
EF-991 Service Loop -Top Drive Electric*
The three electric service loops on the top drive were generally examined and observed
to be in an acceptable condition with adequate safety slings. The outer jackets were
observed to be in satisfactory condition and the inner cores were also noted to be in
good condition with no damaged observed. We were informed these services loops
were original and had not been replaced. Spare TDS service loops were available on
the rig.
EH-331 Deadline Anchor
The deadline anchor of both the main and auxiliary drawworks was inspected. Detai led
NDE consisting of MPI of the welds and UT on the shafts was performed in September
2005 and had not revealed any indications. In conjunction with our visual inspection,
36

we concluded that both deadline anchors were in acceptable condition and we did not
expect any major service requirement forth is item within the next few years.
El-696 Sheaves/Snatch Blocks
The sheaves and snatch blocks were inspected while performing derrick and moonpool
inspections. In general the condition of the snatch blocks was good and the make and
type in use were certainly of the higher standard recognized worldwide. One McKissick
snatch block located in the auxiliary derrick was observed to be severely corroded. This
was brought to the attention to the crew who immediately removed it from service.
Lifti ng gear inspections had been performed at yearly intervals by Hadco and were
noted as having performed at an acceptable standard with proper recordings.
EK-308 Derrick
The derrick rated for 1 ,250 St was inspected from all derrick-mounted platforms and
ladders. The derrick was of a bolted construction made up of galvanized steel. The
derrick was observed to be in good condition with no damage to any main girders or
beams observed. The galvanized layer was intact with no corrosion visible at any parts.
Ladders and platforms were in good condition and the derrick was clean with no unused
tools or items observed at heights. No requirement for any work other than the
standard maintenance would be expected for this derrick in the years following this
survey providing no damage due to impact occurs. The water table and items located in
this area were in good condition. The auxiliary mini-derrick located above the moonpool
was in similar condition with no damage observed to beams or girders. No corrosion
was present and beams were maintained clean.
EK-343 Dolly & Guides, Block and Top Drive
The TDS was outfi tted with a retractable dolly system for the TDS and travel block. The
hydraulic actuated retractable system had caused several OERs causing NPT on
several occasions in the 365 days prior to our survey. The exact amount. of NPT hours
for the dolly system was not known since the OERs were listed under the TDS.
We visually inspected the dolly system from a basket and it was noted that the dolly
system was well used; however, no damage was apparent to the structure or rollers.
The upper stabilizing arm was fixed to the block with four large-sized bolts. In January
2005 three bolts had sheared with the stud remaining inside the travel block frame.
Reportedly two of the three studs had been partially drilled out with the thrrd stud
remaining in place due to operational restraints.
The three remaining bo!ts were noted to be loose with one bolt having sheared the
locking wire and was backed up several inches. This was immediately remedied by the
crew after it was brought to their attention. The removal of the sheared stud inside the
37

travelling block frame was outstanding. Reportedly the intention was to upgrade the
arm to travelling block connection with four larger-sized bolt; however, no final decision
had yet been made. No documentation was observed indicating a possible solution or
workscope was defined.
One OER that occurred in September 2005 involved a sheared clevis with damaged
clevis pin on one of the retract cylinders. To reduce NPT the crew had manufactured a
clevis which was welded to the OEM cylinder. Additionally a clevis pin was made to
replace the damaged one. These items were still in place during our survey. Rig-made
items should not be used on critical and high loaded equi pment such as dollies.
We recommended that in conjunction with the 1 ,825-day TDS task due in May 2006 the
retractable dolly should be properly inspected, both visually and possibly NDE and the
repaired retract cylinder and all sheared bolts be replaced with similar or oversized
bolts. The issue of the sheared fasteners should gain support from TOI and the OEM.
Several OERs had occurred due to hydraulic hose failure.
EK-913 Casing Stabbing Board
A Dreco hydraulic work basket was mounted in the starboard aft corner of the derrick
and was used during our survey for inspection of the aft PRS. No anomalies were
observed although the basket was noted to be i n well-used condition but within
operational specifications. No operational anomalies were observed during our survey
except for the fact that the controls inside the basket did not function. All controls were
done from the emergency local controls at the base of the unit which should be
remedied as soon as possible since the remote operation significantly increased the
safety risk for persons inside the basket.
EK-948 Fi nge rb oa rds*
The derrick was outfitted with Varco racking boards at two height levels. The racking
boards consisted of fixed drill pipe fingers and adjustable casing fingers. A visual
inspection was performed on all racking boards and the operational condition was
verified while tripping out and into the hole. All racking boards in use were in
acceptable condition; however, three latches were observed to be damaged with
sheared pins and backed-up fasteners which are common and prove the requirement
for regular daily racking board inspections. The fingers were in good condition with no
damage visible. The racking board electronic/ pneumatic discreet controllers including
the mounti ng boxes were in good condition.
The lower fixed casing racking board was raised and not used and parts had been
removed for use on other racking boards. The majority of remaining latches required
remedial work. Prior to reinstating this intermediate, work would be required on the
majority of latches; however, the structural condition of the fingers was good .
38
TRN-HCEC-00063665
- --------- ---

A new Varco drill pipe fixed racking board consisting of five fixed fingers had been
installed in February 2005. The installation had been done properly and all systems
functioned correctly from remote HiTech stations. The purpose for those additions was
to increase the racking capacity with 70 stands of 6-5/8" drill pipe. We confirmed by
reviewing the original shipyard maximum deck load drawings that the area of the
additional set back had the same deck load rating as the original set back adjacent.
DP details were 19.5 lbs I ft, joint length; 46' and weight per joint 897 lbs was weight per
stand; 2,691 lbs = 1.22 Mt. 70 stands x 1.22 Mt = 85.4 Mt.
EL-309 Crown Block*
Main Crown*:
The crown block cluster was equipped with a total of seven sheaves. The deadline and
dual fastli ne were visually inspected and all sheaves were gauged and observed to be
within the API maximum wear limits. However, measurable wear was present.
Continuing at the same wear rate, we could expect the sheaves would allow more years
of operation before exceeding API wear limits. No anomalies were observed and the
bearings contained fresh grease. An earl ier wobble test had not raised concern with
bearing play.
Maintenance consisting of greasing and inspection was performed and no records of
any MPI were available. In September 2005, an inspection performed by Hadco had
not revealed any anomalies. The inspection had included only a visual inspection on
the welds and a UT straight beam on the main and fastline shaft. The 1 ,825-day WO
task had been performed and closed in September 2005. The task called for NOT to
determine the need for overhaul. One could argue if the "visual only" inspection of the
load bearing structure was sufficient to determine if another 1 ,825 days could be
warranted without disassembly. At a minimum, a proper 1 ,825-day evaluation should
have included an NDE of all accessible welds on the load bearing structure of the crown
cluster and the sheaves for as much as possible (two outer sheaves and fastline).
# 9900l PM: .lS:z:: OA\'-CROWN BLOCI\:...1\lDT

1. OEM ==L
Tasl:.1.tm.s:
Co;:uplete bspec.tO!l of Cro'?;::J. Blod: A5Y'..m!,ly m:::tudir;g i!'-'DT for of ave:il::.ul. I
...____ _____ ___j
We regarded the overall condition as acceptable and expected that this crown should
perform for more years without maj or intervention. The 1,825-day WO included NDE to
39
TRN- HCE C-00063666

conform with EMPAC guidelines. During the close-out meeting, it was indicated that
likely the 1,825-day PM WO had been unintentionally closed believing it was a 365-day
PMWO.
Auxiliary Crown:
The auxiliary crown cluster rated for 350 Mt that was not extensively used was visually
inspected and no anomalies or play were observed. The sheave grooves gauged within
the API maximum recommended limits.
EM-311 Traveling Block*
Main:
The traveling block rated for 1,000 St was visually inspected and did not reveal any
anomalies. The bolts were, in place. no damage was noted and sheave grooves were
gauged within maximum API wear limits although measurable wear was present. We
gained access by means of the hydraulic basket. The history files and the third party
annual lifting gear survey report were reviewed. Generally the EM PAC WO tasks had
been performed. The only anomaly observed was in the 1 ,825-day condition evolution
that had been performed and completed in September 2005 which had not involved any
disassembly. The third party inspection report indicated a visual on the sheaves and a
straight beam UT on the main shaft and becket pins. It could be argued whether this is
a sufficient depth of inspection to determine if another five years of operation is
warranted without disassembly. The 1 ,825-day WO task called for a complete
disassembly and another important step which omitted was step 7 which called for the
turning of the sheaves to prolong useful life of the sheave grooves.
File# 99011-1 PM: .182S DAY-TR-\ YEUNG BLOCK .. !'o"DT
Task Irc!m<;
I. t;ute" .... th.e lin olftluobkd :J1>d
2. till! anQfe5:lO"I"UUJ:WJU:lll a:.

pme=h"DTlllSJlKUo::> on...U stt1!l. offpllle)<e, l:!oo4 s!WtlD of ea::b
zmlio!J) 0:!.
4. Cblod< tli'.: .,.,...,. :lid co:r: profile ia fl>e" .ou .>.."1 sbeo.,..,
i:h<:"'"' ;, compl=ly o\4 bot<= =i.e;;.
S. !1>1! d4,o.i; pins :1t!!.d. iar lnspoa o.!l.ru x rips of n'eat MPI" or
pqot:IlUI:. cho!d: H l<xld :md '-"""" "'""'; for :::r:!dr.; .
6. R.ele:w W.c ;md \t:lh .
40

--

A post discussion with the rig crew highligt'lted the following:
The 1.825-day task was assigned to the craft "driller". Possibly this craft
mistakenly closed the work order believing it was a 365-day WO task.
The 365-day WO task was also assigned to the craft "driller".
The 1 ,825-day WO was reopened and crafts would change from "Dril ler" to "Mechanic"
for the high level 365-and 1 ,825-day PM tasks. The 30- and 90-day PMs would remain
with the craft ~ D r i l l e r " with which we agreed completely.
Auxiliary:
The auxil iary block was visually inspected and no anomalies were observed. A recent
Hadco NDE inspection had not revealed any anomalies. EMPAC work orders had been
followed.
E0-312 Hook
The Varco drilling hook with !Ctive counterbalance and rotating hook adapter was
visually inspected with no major anomalies obseNed. Reportedly it had been replaced
twice in the past four years. No records were available except for third party Hadco
annual inspection repon:s and no EMPAC WO tasks were assigned to this equipment.
Maintenance had been performed to the extent of the breakdown maintenance and
Hadco third party annual lifting gear suNey. Repeated hydraulic failures on the rotating
hook motor had resulted in the correct action of contacting the OEM for support. That
action revealed that a case drain had not been installed which was the root cause of the
repeated failures caused by internal pressure that built up from the leaking of oil. The
visual inspection did not reveal anomalies; however, it was obvious that this hook was
well used with significant wear on the ears.
ER-363 Su bstru ctu re
The drill floor and derrick substructure were visually inspected. The substructure
consisted of primary longitudinal heavy frames crossed perpendicularly by transverse
heavy beams. The longitudinal frames rested on several vertical legs that were in
compression. The entire substructure including the internals of the vertical support legs
were in good condition and no corrosion was present at any levels. No damage was
observed at any locations and no remedial work would be required in this area for
several years.
EW-218 AC Drive Motors
The AC motors associated to the propulsion and drilling traction duties were visually
inspected and those that were operational were checked for high temperature and
bearing noise with no anomalies noted. The propulsion motors were part of the 11 -KV
HV system and had lock systems on the terminal box access to the high-voltage
41
connections. The thruster motors were observed while running and were externally
inspected and noted to be in good condition. No abnormal noise or temperatures were
noted at the time of our survey.
The GE AC traction motors fitted to the mud pumps were externally and internally
inspected and were noted to be in satisfactory condition and we had no concerns. The
GE AC motors for the drawworks were externally and internally inspected. Internally
they were in poor condition with an accumulation of dust.
Megger insulation readings were taken for the drawworks AC motors from the VFD
drives in the switch rooms with the shunt bars removed and the megger tester on a
1 ,000-volts range held for one minute. It must be noted the motors had not been in
operation for 36 hours prior to the megger testing. The drawworks No. 1 AC motor was
megger tested a second time to confirm the initial reading. The second test was
performed with the motor leads disconnected at the AC motor connection box. The
insulation value of the motor was the noted to be the same with the cables
disconnected. The insulation value for five of the seven motors was noted to be at an
unacceptable level and below the minimum Transocean standard of 2 Mohm.
Below are the megger readings recorded with the rig electrician:
DEEPWATER HORIZON MOTOR INSULATION
Equipment Meg. Reading Date checked
0/W Motor 1 0.75 meQ at 1 KV 10/22/2005
0/W Motor 3 1 .25 meg at 1 KV 10/22/2005
0/W Motor 5 1 .0 meg at 1 KV 10/22/2005
0/W Motor 6 1.5 meg at 1 KV 10/22/2005
0/W Aux 0.70 meg at 1 KV 10/22/2005
The megger reading for the top drive AC motor was also noted to be low with a reading
of 2.50 Mohm which was above the Transocean standards. The electrical department
was aware of the low reading and further investigation should be conducted.
EM PAC maintenance history for the seven drawworks motors revealed that there had
been no previous 180-day or 365-day PM performed on the main AC motors for the
drawworks including insulation resistance values. n inspection of the main AC motors, it
was noted there had been no internal inspection as per the 90-day PM tasks apparent
in the paint that still covered the fasteners. We inspected the space heater on No. 6
drawworks AC motor and it was noted to be in good condition with anomalies observed.
We also inspected the ventilation for the mud pumps, top drive, thrusters and
drawworks and observed the supply ducting for the drawworks was crack.ed in several
places. Further investigation or repair was required by the rig crew. Note: post survey
42
TRN-HCEC-00063669
::ommen.s from the crew indicated that megger readings had been taken ega in after thE:
::lrawworks had been in operation several days. These readings were good at >7C
Mohm. We recommend carefl.l moni:oring of the megger readings on a monthly besis.
FA-361 Bulk Tanks
The b.Jik tanks were only externally inspected. ln:erviews with the crew indicated that
all bt.Hk tanks were kept clean in betweer bulk loads for contractual reouirements. /\!1
tar.ks had received 3.ttenUor. and consequently the spiders were reportedly in good
The external condition of all bulk tanks was good.
Bulk Air System
Bulk air was supplied from the rig air systerr a reducing manifold. The
compressors are described under !hat respective rig air section of this report. The crew
was irterviewed to define the operational condition of the system. Bulk transfers were
observed during our survey and no major anomalies were notBd. The systern did not
cont<::un major drawbacks and experience had maintained minor ruisances at
acceptable levels. No excessive blockage occurred and valves and piping were m
acceptable condition with cnly normal wear and tear We confirmed that the
open connection between cement and barite had been flanged.
Reporl of Survey - DEEPWATER HORIZON
43
TRN-HCEC-00063670
FF-326 Mud-Mixing System
The tTud-mixing system was reviewed ond no anomal es vvere observed. The crew was
interviewed and lhe system was observed in operatior while handling bo:h SBM and
WBM. Pumps, valves and piping were in acceptable condition. A portable diaphragm
pump was in use in the pit to transfer base oil frcm pit No. 2 to any of the other
:Jits through flexible hoses. The fixed base oil supply had excessive del very volurr>e to
accurately control the discharged quantity.
Tne sacks store cor.tained a total of four high-shear nopper mixers 811 m f:ood visual
ex:ernal conditio!. The systE:m was obse-ved while in operation up SBM.
While making up mud v;ith barite from the surge tanks. il became apparent that c.ir
system was not adequate in that area. Barite was not containec. in thG
hooper and contaminated the entire mixing area and of the sack store. This vvas 8
normal ocGurrence according the crew and the large quantities of batite observed in that
Rc::>ort of Survey- CEEPW/\TER HORIZON
Rcfe'crce: Order No. US1361.2

area prior to the mixing operation substantiated these comments. An improvement
opportunity was raised for this area.
FH-917 Mud Tanks
Ten mud pits (both active and reseNe) were located inside the deck box and four
additional storage tanks were located in the columns. Process pits were located above
the mai n deck inside the moonpool. The majority contained either SBM or WBM during
our suNey which prevented us from performing internal inspections. The only pit
internally inspected was pit No. 5 which was in good condition with no corrosion
present; no wastage or damage from impact observed. Interviews with the crew
indicated that the overall condition was acceptable.
GA-327 Mud Pur:nps"'
Four Continental Emsco FC-2200 mud pumps were installed. Cross-head slide covers
and power end inspection hatches were removed on the Nos. 1 and 2 mud pumps to
allow internal inspection. The history reports and OER were reviewed for all four mud
pumps. The internal inspection did not reveal any major anomalies; however, it was
noted that basic silicon sealant had been used to seal covers. The excessive use of
this material results in the risk plugging the oil lines with silicon particles. In April 2005,
the No. 2 mud pump had encountered a failed cross-head and cross-head slides due to
lubrication oil starvation. Debris from silicon could have contributed to this failure. In
the comments of the work orders, the crew specifically mentioned that a crimp in an oil
line could have been a contributing factor in the oil starvation. This good comment
however did not find any follow up since we observed in our inspection a similar
cri mped oil line in the No. 1 pump. Overall the history files showed that the
maintenance was being performed in line with EMPAC guidelines.
Safety bulletins issued by TOI support had been adhered to. One safety alert from
August 2005 had called for NDE of the crankshafts. The NDE on the crank shaft on the
No. 4 mud pump had revealed a significant linear indication. Consequently this mud
pump was not available for high SPM and high pressure and it was planned to have the
crankshaft replaced shortly after our survey. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 crankshafts NOE had not
revealed any linear indications. Main bearing clearances, piston run outs and cross-
head clearances had been recorded during the NOE of the crankshafts on all pumps. It
was noted that recorded main bearing clearances were well within maximum tolerances.
We concl uded that the overall condition was acceptable. NDE should be performed
annually on crankcase and pony rod ends .
Repor. of Survey:.. DEEPWATER HORIZON
Referen:::e: Order No. US1364.2
45
. .
Mud pump oil lines.
The history files had showed a high rate of premature failures on PRS which originally
had been of the disc type. In 2005 all had been replaced for the Retsco reset type
v.thich had solved t his problen. The PRV outlet and bleed-off line (same line) of the
Nos. 1 and 4 mud pump were connected in a combined vessel prior to feed'ng back to
tile s!ug pit. This presented a risk for the crew when vvorking on the or high
pressure valve in the bleed !ine on one pu TP while the olher pump was in operation.
PRVs and bleed-off lines should individuaHy drain back to a p1t. An imp ovement
opporlt..:nity has been raised for this ite-M.
GD-357 Rotary Hose
The 7,500-psi rated rotary hose was visually inspected. The hose was steel-armor
covered and the external condit'on was accep1able. The rose had jeen in use since
the first quarter of 2005 as the previous hose tt1a! was use 2001 had been
retuned to the OEM for recertification Repoiedly the OEM had t'ot been able to repair
the damaged steel armor and consequently had it. The hose had been
r0certified ar.c wc.s in transfer to the rig '".rhere it would be mzcie available as a spare
asset.
GD-904 High Pressure Piping (Mud)
the mud pumps room upwards. there were two standpipes and one booste'" line
Report of Survey DEEPWATER HORIZON
46
TRN-HCEC-00063673

each rated for 7,500 psi. The pipe runs were visually inspected for external pipe
condition and the condition of the pipe supports. In addition we reviewed the results of
a third party UT wall thickness survey of September 2005. Only the written field report
was available which did not include the percentage of waste after calculation. The
average result values did not vary much which indicated that the wear was even in the
lines and likely not to be significant. Reportedly the crew had spot checked values
against the pipe schedule original wall thickness pt determine the wastage and these
spot checks had not raised any concern. The UT survey from September 2005 had
included the two mud pump standpipes. booster line, kill line, choke line, cement line
and both derrick standpipes.
GE-929 Standpipe Manifold
The 5" standpipe manifold rated for 7.500-psi and located on the drill floor was
externally inspected only. All valves were rotated easily by hand and the external
condition was good.
GK-321 Mud Agitators
Mud pit agitators located in the mud pits were angle-gear driven and observed in
operation. No anomalies were noted except for 6B agitator that contained a failed shaft
seal. The crew was waiting for an operational opportunity to replace the seal.
Interviews with the crew did not raise any concern with regard to the mud pit agitators.
We reviewed the history for the sixteen submersible mud pit agitators located in the two
tanks in the port aft columns and two tanks located in the starboard aft columns (four
agitators in each tank). We interviewed the maintenance department and were
informed there were major problems with the agitators failing after a short period of
operation. We noted in the history that the majority of breakdown was due to electrical
issues: thermal overload failing in the motors and motors winding shorting out to
ground. The majority of motors were 15 HP but there were two motors rated at 40 HP
and zt the time of this survey there were four motors under repair.
We performed amp tests on four of the motors in operation with 16-lb mud weight and
all the readings were below the FLC (Full Load Current) of the motors which was
satisfactory. We interviewed the maintenance department who informed us the problem
could be the motors were failing because the mud was not circulating and the motors
were overheating. The crew planned to circulate the mud in each tank using the mud-
mi x motors to determine if this would help the problem. We recommended an REA be
raised to investigate the problem of the motors failing.
GN-929 Cement Manifold
The 15-K cement manifold located on the drill floor was inspected internally while the
47
Confident ial Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCE C-0006367 4

crew was clearing accumulated cement from the manifold internals. This was a
reoccurring problem after the completion of cement jobs. The many crevices and
pockets contain cement that subsequently hardens. Approximately 40 lbs of cement
was removed from the manifold. The advantage of using this type of gate valve is that it
shares spares with the choke manifold. However, the preferred valves for cement
manifolds are low-torque valves due to the full bore. The valves that were pulled did not
show any signs of corrosion; however, one valve was scored over the seal face. This
valve was returned into the manifold.
Cement line UT wall thickness readings had been recorded by a third party in
September 2005. The only report available was handwritten as the final report had not
yet arrived on the rig. We reviewed the readings for anomalies or significant exceptions
on average values and found none. However since the original pipe schedule was not
known to us, we were not able to verify if there were poor spots measured but we had
no concerns regarding this.
GP-320 Shale Shakers
There were seven Brandt cascade linear motion shakers which were visually inspected
while in operation with no anomalies observed. The overall condition was acceptable
as was the structural condition acceptable. Corrosion or wasting was not observed and
the structural condition on all shakers could be regarded as good.
GT-332 Vertical Degasser
The vertical degasser located on the drill floor was externally inspected only and the
external condition was good. Interviews with the crew did not raise any concerns about
the internal condition.
GQ-325 Degasser
Two Burgess degassers were mounted on the degasser pit and had a history of failures.
Reportedly mud cake tended to build up in the vacuum compressor. Just prior to our
survey, one new degasser had been installed.
GU-324 Mud Cleaner
A mud cleaner containing a desander and desilter was installed over a Brandt linear
motion shaker. The structural condition was acceptable and the condition of the
pipework was acceptable. No anomalies were observed during inspection.
GZ-920 Non-Critical Centrifugal Pumps
Centrifugal pumps in the low-pressure mud systems (such as desilter, desander and
48
TRN-HCEC-00063675

charge pumps) were visually inspected and function tested. These pumps were
generally in good to acceptable condition.
HZ-.340 Survey Line
The survey line located on the auxiliary drawworks deck was visually inspected and no
anomal ies were noted; however, no function test was performed. The visual condition
was good with the hydraulic and control projected against the environment when not in
use.
KB-516 Drill Pipe
The crew indicated that contractual commitments ensured that a high standard of drill
pipe condition was maintained. We took a snapshot through the inspection reports and
noted the following:
In May 2005 there were 85 joints of 5" drill pipe S-135 sent in for inspection. From
these 85 joints, 82 joints were over 95% WT and three joints were 100% WT. All were
premium with TK-34 internal plastic coating.
In May 2005 a total of 169 joints of 6-5/8w S-135 range Ill were inspected. A total of 138
of these joints were >95% RBW, all premium with TK-34 internal plastic coating. A total
of 29 joints had been rejected, mainly due to an RBW <95%.
During our survey all6-5/8rt drill pipe was tripped out of the hole into the setback. The
overall visual condition was good with no significant wear marks noted to tube or tool
joints.
KC-520 Heavy Weight Drill Pipe
Heavy weight drill pipe was maintained similarly as drill pipe to the rigid inspection
standard BD DEIP. A snap shot through the inspection reports in April 2005 revealed
the following:
Thirteen j oints of heavy weight 6-5/8" (40.00) had been inspected. All was accepted
with an RBW >95%. All HW drill pipe contained TK-34 plastic coating.
Drill Collar
Drill collars were inspected similar to drill pipe to the rigid inspection standard BP DEIP.
A snap shot through the inspection reports in April 2005 revealed the following:
Nine joints of spi ral drill collars were inspected resulting in one reject due to damage
and the remaining accepted with >95% .
49

KH-531 Drilling Subs
A variety of pup joints in the 5", 5-1/2'' and 6-5/8" were available. They were al l properly
stored under deck and were visually in good condition. All pup joints were inspected
under the BP DEIP standard.
LA-375 Pipe-Handling Equipment*
A National casing rotator was located in the moon pool to supply casing to the auxiliary
rotary set in the BOP transporter. The unit was not function tested and only a visual
inspection was done combined with an interview of the crew. Verbal indications
confirmed that the unit was fully operational and the only failures reported were
hydraulic hose and connection failures. Particularly the vertical-mounted cylinders
suffered from piston rod seal damage due to small debris contamination in the seal
area. This debris originated from the casing being transported. Our visual inspection
did not reveal any major anomalies; however, minor corrosion was present on the
hydraulic fittings. The service loop was in acceptable condition and no structural
damage was observed in any of the areas.
LA-548 Casing Stabbing Arm
A casing stabbing arm was positioned inside the moonpool to handle a Weatherford
casing tong over the false (auxiliary) rotary in the BOP transporter. The stabbing arm
was visually inspected and noted to be structurally in acceptable condition with little
corrosion present although the hydraulic fitting had suffered from corrosion. Two quick
disconnect fittings were wasted and should be replaced prior to any use.
LA-948 Pipe-Racking System*
Two Varco PRS-6i pipe rackers were available on the drill floor. In normal operation ,
the aft PRS would perform the rotary pipe handling and the forward PRS would handle
the mousehole station. Both units were observed while in operation and the aft unit was
inspected up to the lower gripper arm assembly by means of basket access. A variety
of issues were apparent and while all were generally minor issues, they could contribute
to the reliability of the equipment.
On both forward and aft PRS the electrical, hydrauiic and air service ioop routed
to the gripper arm assemblies; all required tension adjustment
The service loop tensioners were not adequate in several instances where it
consisted of wire rope.
One gripper assembly service loop had dropped outside the idler sheave and
was in risk of snagging. Several service loops were close to dropping out of the
idler sheaves.
The forward PRS functioned erratically when lifting drill pipe. This was traced
50

back to a required adjustment in the counterbalance system.
The tailing head on the forward PRS required repair or adjustment since it was
not capable to properly secure the drill pipe. Consequently a hand was required
to guide the drill pipe free of the lower carriage when setting down.
Reportedly the PRS control required OEM attention or adjustment. It was
indicated that at least three times a Varco software engineer had been sent to
the rig with the main task of resolving these issues. However, each time
operational restraints had not allowed the availability of the PRS for this Varco
service and consequently these issues had remained open up to the time of our
survey.
A total of 122 CWOs had been recorded for both PRS combined in 2005 only.
Interviews with the crew indicated that of all equipment the PRS forward and aft
required the most man hours. Work ranged from minor proximity switch repair to an
upper actuator change out which occurred during our stay on board.
The primary reason for this extensive labor requirement was related to the design of the
Varco PRS and was commonly seen on other units around the fleet. The secondary
reason was the limited amount of time allowed for maintenance and breakdown repair.
Performing Varco-issued upgrades was a good option to improve the reliability of the
existing PRS systems. The Varco-issued overall reliability upgrade had been
purchased and partially installed; however, during installation the drilling operations had
regained priority and the completion of the upgrade had to be postponed. The forward
PRS lower carriage upgrade was still outstanding during our survey.
The overall condition could be regarded as fair. The following facts should be taken into
consideration for condition evaluation:
The relatively minor issues observed during our survey mentioned above in
bullets that affected the reliabi lity.
The PRS aft is a critical path item since the forward PRS could not reach the
aft four rows (approximately 40 stands) of drill pipe and therefore no full
redundancy existed.
A total of 122 CWOs had been raised for both PRS in 2005.
The Varco reliability upgrade had not been completed at the time of our
survey.
Both PRS would be due for an 1.825-day PM task in May 2006 which would
require NDE on the load-bearing pans and pulling load bearing pins for an
visual inspection of pin and bushing (see supplemental report maintenance
section on this topic).
The maintenance was being performed and consisted mainly of greasing and visual
inspections. Interviews indicated on multiple occasions that the limited time that
51
TRN-HCEC-00063678

equipment was available for maintenance was a concern.
LF-364 Catwalk Machine*
Riser Handling Skate
A riser handling skate was available on the aft raised catwalk. The skate was visually
inspected and observed while in operation while feeding and retrieving joints of riser.
We reviewed the history files and concluded that the skate was in acceptable condition
with no anomalies or structural damage observed. We recommended following the
OEM guidelines to NDE the load-bearing areas.
Step 6 of the 365-day PM WO called for NDE of the load-bearing parts and there were
no entries found in the history files or i n the third party heavy lifting gear survey
indicating that any NDE had been performed. NDE intervals should be adjusted for the
amount of times the skate was used under load with riser and must be performed. The
riser bucket and scissors skate lifting frame were particular load bearing areas.
Raised Catwalk Conveyor
The forward side of the drill floor contained the catwalk conveyor on a raised catwalk to
supply tubuiars to the drill floor. The conveyor was function tested and observed in
operation while laying down pipe. The visual i nspection did not reveal any anomalies
and overall the structural and coating condition were in good condition. The hydraulics
functioned well and piping and hoses were in good visual condition. However, the
conveyor belt showed moderate wear. The unit was operated with an active
low pressure hydraulic oil alarm" on the cyberbase but it had not raised any attention or
action from the operating crew.
Auxiliary Derrick Pipe Conveyor
As part of the auxiliary derrick pipe handling, a pipe conveyor was available on the
portside forward side of the moon pool feeding tubulars to the NOI casing rotator. This
conveyor was generally in acceptable visual condition.
LF-366 MHS (Mousehole Station)
The mousehole station was visually inspected and observed while breaki ng out pipe
with no anomalies observed. The unit functioned well and the crew had no concerns.
LF-540 Manual Slips
Manual slips were in good visual condition and were properly stored. Third party NDE
had ensured good standards for slips available on board and several sli ps sect ions had
been rejected during the last third party lifting gear survey.
LF-546 Varco Slips (PS-21 and PS-30)
52
TRN-HCEC-00063679

A Varco PS-30 was normally in use; however, during our survey the asset was on the
shore for OEM repair and service. Slip inserts were stored properly in the heavy tool
store and were in acceptable condition. All had been recently inspected by a third party
service.
LG-536 Elevator Links
Elevator links were visually inspected and it was verified they had been inspected
during the third party annual heavy lifting gear survey with NDE and a dimensional
evaluation. All were properly stored.
LJ-539 Manual Tongs
Manual tongs were not frequently used. The tongs available were properly stored and
had recently been inspected by a third party. All were in good condition.
LK-573 Ezy-Torq
Two Varco Ezy-Torq units were available. These were only used in conjunction with the
tongs upon failure of the IRN. The units were only visually inspected and no pull test
was performed. No anomalies were observed and the overall condition appeared to be
good.
LM-568 Iron Roughneck"'
A Varco AR-3200 was available. The asset was inspected visually. The crew was
interviewed and history files were reviewed over the past 365 days. We also observed
the unit in operation during tripping out of the hole.
The visual inspection did not reveal major anomalies. However, several minor oil leaks
were apparent with some wear and tear present. We. recommended performing a
dimensional check on pins and bores on the pipe spinner assembly and both torque
arms when the opportunity existed possibly in conjunction with outstanding NDE.
Significant wear was present on the pipe spinner rollers. A review of the history files
covering the 365 days prior our survey indicated that 43 CWOs had been generated on
top of the standard PM WOs. The content of the CWOs indicated a variety of issues
with no visible trend. This fact combined with our visual inspection and interviews with
the crew brought the conclusion that it must be anticipated that this IRN will require a
strip down for dimensional check, NDE of non-accessible areas. overhaul the hydraulic
connections and motors and consequently repair of items on reaching five years of
service in early 2006. Note that a 1 ,825-day WO was not scheduled against this asset
nor did 'he OEM have guidelines for 1,825-day service. In reality, often the best option
53
TRN-HCEC-00063680

operationally and economically would be to change the IRN with a refurbished fleet
spare.
A 365-day PM due in May 2005, was completed in September 2005. It had not been
possible to complete all steps due to time and resource constraints. nevertheless the
PM WO had been closed.
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LR-370 HiTech
Three HiTech cyberbase operators were available. A dual configured driller and AD in
the main driller cabin and a single cyberbase was located in the auxiliary driller' s cabin.
mainly used for mousehole operations.
The HiTech cyberbase functions were reviewed and the crews were interviewed. A
scroll through the pages did not show any anomalies. Interviews were held with the
operating and maintenance crew. Both parties were satisfied with the performance of
the HiTech cyberbase. The software on any of the three chairs was stable and had not
shown excessive crashes. HiTech programming was run on Windows NT. In June
2005. an extensive HiTech software upgrade had been implemented. An approved
budget of US S 125,000.00 was available for this upgrade; US $6,119.91 was expensed
to date and US $66,028.20 was committed to POs.
The upgrade additionally had involved hardware in pick ups and motor encoders. The
upgrade was regarded as extremely successful.
Reiercncc: Order No. US1364.2
54
TRN-HCEC-00063681

The following areas had seen improvements:
Active heave- block height was maintained much closer to Motion Reference
Units (MRU) produced heave curve, offsets of 1' were reported.
Active heave ''pin to bottom" was installed which is a common feature on new
deliveries and in addition to HiTech changes it basically assigns a larger
amount of available kW to the drawworks. As well priorities settings are
normally changed when "pin to bottom" is active.
Frequency drops on the main switchboard had been reduced mainly due to
changing of ramp up and ramp down of AC motors.
Crown saver with kinetic energy monitoring had been implemented.
Improvement of cut and slip function. This function is required when HiTech
is not required to measure the block height in case of cut and slip functions.
Park brake is being applied after several seconds.
These upgrades were standard i n the software supplied to new deliveries and were
relatively well proven. An additional relative minor software upgrade was to be
implemented shortly after our survey and incorporated some interface upgrades. An
example was the new five fingers racking board that could properly interface with the
HiTech; however, the PRS gripper arm was not displayed under the finger instead of
above on the HiTech interface screens. The crew planned to remove the HiTech
servers from underneath the operator chairs to a location approximately 10 ft away in a
dedicated locker.
The history with particular the active heave mode had seen several anomalies. We
concluded after our interviews with the crew that the issues had for the large majority
been resolved during the June 2005 upgrade. The crew indicated an anomaly that
occurred when lowering the block from a stop position. The block would creep up a bit
prior to the start of the downward motion. The extent of the upward motion was small
and within what both the crew and operator regarded only as a nuisance and did not
requi re attention. We did not regard this as normal and recommended monitoring. The
argument that other rigs have significantly more upward creep prior to starting the
downward motion was not valid since that was not acceptable. When commissioned,
these systems are supposed to be delivered with zero creep upward prior to the
downward motion. In order to release the park brake, the AC motors controlled by the
VSDS (Variable Speed Drive System) would apply a torque against the applied parking
brakes to a moment force equal of the weight measured in the load pins. The fact 1hat
the block moved upward after releasing t he brake calipers indicated that either the
crown load cells output deviate from the real hook load or the HiTech force calculation
was not correct.
Since both the operator and crew were satisfied with the operations we did not raise an
asset deficiency. We recommended monitoring this and making requi red adjustments
when the unwanted upward movement increased .
55
Conf idential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN- HCEC-00063682

LR-914 Central Hydraulic Power Unit"
The rig was outfitted with a CHU (Central Hydraulic Unit) consisting of fNe variable
displacement pumps with a system pressure of 3,000 psi. All hydraulic items were fed
from this unit. The visual inspection did not raise any concern and no hydraulic leaks
were present. Several of the variable displacement pumps had failed over time for
reasons not clear; however, incorrect adjustment of the swash plate controller was
mentioned. It was reported that since final adjustments had been made approximately
six months prior to our survey no more pump failures had occurred. The CHU and
surroundings had been maintained in a clean and tidy manner. A good addition was
noted with the CJC filtration package that had been permanently installed for hydraulic
oil treatment.
MA-625 Diesel Engines greater than 1000 HP*
Six Wartsila 18V32 engines were installed. The engines were visually inspected
externally and no hatches or inspection covers were removed. Historical records were
reviewed and the crew was interviewed. The maintenance performed according to
EMPAC guidelines were in line with the OEM requirements. In general WOs generated
were through effort of the crew that was not allowed to go overdue many days. The
visual condition was good and an ongoing effort had been initiated to reduce minor oil
leaks.
Zero hours NPT was recorded for the power plant in the 365 days prior to our survey.
The rig was operating since June 2005 in a split buss tie operation due to power
management issues, described in the section RM-669. This fact combined with the fact
that No.1 main engine was not available for operation due to a failed heat exchanger on
the generator had resulted in the main engines being unavailable for maintenance.
Consequently several WOs were overdue as noted below:
Main engine No.2: 1,000 hour
Main engine No. 3: 1 ,000; 2.000; 4,000 and 16,000 hour
Main engine No. 6: 1,000; 2,000; 4,000 and 16,000 hour
Note that the 16.000-hr PM task was merely a visual internal inspection of built on
pumps and fittings. Although OEM indicated, we would not recommend dissembling
these components for a visual internal inspection. We recommended maintaining the
stock level and replacing these items upon failure. The power plant size allowed for an
engine shuidown due to breakdown.
The efforts of the crew to perform maintenance when due were obvious and we had no
concerns in this regard. The situation of prolonged operation with the split buss tie was
unusual and the set up was not designed to perform as such but only for short perfods
of time. All engines injectors except for No. 6 had received an upgrade .
56
TRN-HCEC-00063683
MF-627
Electrical power was generated at 11 i<V 60Hz. As a DP class Ill u ''lit, the six generator
sets and relevant switchboards were scgregatea oy watertight doors and each
compartment. At the tirre of our survey, the No. 1 generator was offline waiting on parts
to repair the water cooling system. The condition of that generator was unsalisfactosy
and cleaning was required to remove dust and water deposits from inside the gBnerator.
Temoorary vent lation grills had been installed to ali ow more air flow to tre generators.
How8ver. these types of generators were built for a closed-loop system and the grills
should be ren oved when the water coo!ing sy-stem 1s operational. it must be noted the
heat exchanger for the e;oo!ing system had faHed tw:ce on this generator.
visual inspection of the generators, control gear and instrumentatior. \vas U:1dertar,t":n
on those ngines and generators on-line A phys-cal check 01 those generators on-l1ne
revea ed no high temperatures or abnorma! vibrations. Engi;-,e genrator was
fully using Kongsberg Vessel Management System. The control of the
engines on line was observed lo he trouble free and ;he engines load-shared in a
satisiactoy manner.
-he analogte instrumentation on the /l.BB manufacturea high-voltage switchboards was
checked against the Vessel Managemem System monitor disp,ays and reflected similar
values. Generator out;:>ut. winding temperatures and bearing temperatures were all
Report of Survey- DEEPVJ;\TER
Referen:::c Oroer No. US1364.2
57
TRN-HCEC-00063684

monitored from the vessel management system and were observed to be similar and
satisfactory for the parallel loads on the generators.
The stator rotor and rotating diode assembly were inspected on several of .the generators
and gave no cause for concern. The main power connection box for the stator was also
opened and connections were checked for security and the primary connections were
observed to be in satisfactory condition. EMPAC planned maintenance history for the
generators was reviewed. Insulation resistance values and regular checks and testing of
generator safeties and operating parameters (temperatures of bearings and windings,
kW and current, etc.) were logged indicative of good electrical integrity of the generator
static and rotating components and safeties.
Each generator was outfitted with a freshwater I air heat exchanger. Over the four
years of operation. two heat exchangers had failed. The failures l:lad resulted in
freshwater entry into the generator. Note that the heat exchangers were double wall
tube, thus leakage inside the generator meant that both outer and inner tubes were
perforated. After reviewing the heat exchanger and heat exchanger drawings, we
supported the crew opinion that the failure had occurred due to:two intermediate pipe
supports made of sheet metal rubbing into the tubing. An improvement action
opportunity was raised for this issue .
MK-630 Main Switchboard*
There were various switchboards installed with 11,000 volts, 600 volts and 480 volts
located at various locations around the rig. All were visually inspected as per the
ModuSpec checklist. Various boards were opened for a spot check but due to ongoing
operation we were unable to rack out any circuit breakers. The deficiencies noted
during the inspection received immediate action to address those issues by the
electrical department.
All internal components were secured including the control wiring. No corrosion or
damage was noted in any of the switchboards we inspected and all the cable
penetrations were sealed against water ingression. Meters were observed to be
working satisfactorily. Approved rubber matting was in f ront of all the switchboards and
noted to be in good condition. Nameplates were fitted to all the panels for identification
and one-line diagrams were posted in all the switchrooms.
Each compartment had its own safety equipment available when working on the HV
switchboards. The switchboards we opened for inspection were clean as were the
rooms where they were located. Al l the main switchboards were equipped with a
ground fault system that function tested satisfactorily. There was a lock-out/tag-out
system in place and the policy was adhered to by the Transocean crew. No
overheating was observed on the buss connections and breakers and wiring appeared
to be in good condition .
58
TRN-HCEC-00063685

At the time of survey, there were split busbars and not a closed loop circuit. We were
informed the reason was that there had a problem several months ago with the Sami-
megastar drives for the thrusters and an upgrade was required by ABB. We were also
informed that these upgrades would be performed the first week of November 2005.
A current injection on the main circuit breaker and an infrared inspection will be due in
May 2006. We reviewed the EMPAC history for the HV switchboards and were satisfied
with the level of maintenance which had been performed.
MN-628 Main Transformer Three Phase*
There were several types of transformers located in various compartments including:
Eight 11 kV X 3,450V X 3,650 kVA
Six 11 kV x 600V x 3,000 kVA
Six 11 kV x 840V x 5,000 kVA
Four 11 kV x 480V
480/208/120
At the time of survey, it was it was not possible to shut down any of the transformers
due to ongoi ng operations; therefore, only an external inspection was performed. No
damage to any of the transformers panels was noted and all cable transits were sealed
against water ingression. All transformers had approved rubber mats in front of each
unit and were in good condition.
Warning signs were displayed on all the transformers. The compartments where the
transformers were located were air conditioned and all was in satisfactory condition.
The majority of the transformers had temperature alarms installed that were working
satisfactorily with no anomalies noted. The main breakers will be due to be tested in
May 2006 by means of current injection. The converter transformers for the thrusters
were also inspected. These unrts were cooled by fresh water. We spot checked the
water leak detectors in several of the units and all worked satisfactorily. We reviewed
the PM history that had been entered into EMPAC system for the last year and only one
concern was noted was insufficient information in the history.
M0-697 Variable Frequency Drives
The ri g utilized variable frequency drives with AC motors for propulsion and dril ling. The
VFD inverter panels for the drilling and propulsion were checked in the company of the
; ig electrician. There were two manufacturers of VFD drives in use. ABB was the
manufacturer of the VFD used for the eight thrusters and GE for the drilling syslem.
The VFD panels were located in various compartments and a!l were inspected during
our survey. We visually inspected for signs of overheating and damage and the
internals of the bay and components were in good condition. We were also able to
59
TRN-HCEC-00063686

witness the various systems in operation. T he VFD bays were in satisfactory condition
and sufficient mechanicaUelectrical interlocking was in place. Sufficient spare parts and
a lock-ouUtag-out facility were available.
There was a 365-day PM available for the thruster VFD drives and we reviewed the
history and noted that there had been numerous problems in the last year resulting in a
total of three hours downtime. We were informed that the reason was a problem with
the Sami-megastar drives for the thrusters. A software upgrade was required by ABB.
We were also informed these upgrades would be performed in the first week of
November 2005.
There were no scheduled PM tasks for the VFD for the drilling systems and there had
yet to be any histories reported on EMPAC. We had no majorconcerns with regard to
the VFDs. The VFD for the PRS was opened for an inspection with the ET department.
All the panels were secured to the deck and were grounded down to the structure of the
rig and the doors on the panels were a!so grounded. All internal components were also
secured. The crew informed us that the Siemens Simatic 5 PLC for the PRS and IR
systems were not being manufactured any more and there were still spares on the rig
and plans in the budget for 2007 to replace the existing PLC system to a Simatic 7.
MS-652 MCC Panels
There were various 600/480-V MCC boards located at various locations. MCC boards
were inspected as per the ModuSpec checklist and various boards were opened for a
spot check. Additionally several cans were removed for visual inspection. Internal
components were secured including control wiring and no corrosion or damage was
noted in any of the MCC panels that we inspected. Meters and gauges were observed
to be working satisfactorily and the cans which were racked out were in satisfactory
condition.
Approved rubber matting was in front of all the MCC panels and it was noted to be in
satisfactory condition. Indication lights and nameplates were fitted to all the MCC
panels and were in satisfactory condition. The MCCs opened for inspection were clean
including the rooms where the MCC boards were installed. All the MCC panels we
inspected were sealed against water ingression and there was a lock-out! tag-out
system in place. This policy was adhered to by the Transocean crew.
Current injection on the main circuit breakers and an infrared inspection will be due in
lvlay 2006. All the MCC boards had a ground fault system installed which function
tested satisfactorily. We were satisfied with the condition of the 480-V MCC boards .
60

NA-607 Air Compressors/Air System -High Pressure
Two 4-stage Hamworthy HP air compressors were available. Each compressor was
rated for 4,500 psi. System working pressure was 2,700 psi. The running hours on the
No. 1 were 2,493 and the No.2 had accumulated 3,019 hrs. A review of the history files
indicated that the majority of breakdowns and PM tracks had work involved on the either
the Jabsco cooling water pumps or the inlet I outlet valves in the cylinder heads. Both
of these failures were relatively common on HP air compressors. Reportedly both HP
air compressors had been rebuilt in 2005 by the crew.
The gauges and instruments on the two compressors were all reading satisfactorily and
were secured to the units. The piping on both compressors was noted to be in good
condition with no damaged or corrosion observed. Belts on the both compressors were
also inspected and were in good condition. AC motors on both units were secured and
the coupling to the belts was in place and adequately guarded. Control panels on each
of the compressors were in satisfactory condition with ground leads attached to the rig
structure. Preventative Maintenance was performed on both compressors by the
mechanical department and oil samples were also being taken on a monthly PM.
Although our visual survey did not indicate anomalies as both compressors were not
observed while in operation, the crew indicated that after a recent blowdown of APVs it
took over two days for chargi ng the blown-down APVs back to the working air pressure.
An investigation into the reason for this excessive time required had revealed that No. 2
working air compressor did not operate over 2,000 psi at the final stage. Further
investigation and disassembly was required and planned.
We reviewed the capacities and found the total installed compressors capacity rather
low to supply HP air to a critical path system. This was further elaborated upon in the
supplemental report.
NE-606 Air Compressors/Air System - Medium Pressure
There were four Gardner Denver screw-type compressors installed. We inspected the
air compressors. All were in operation with no abnormal vibrations noted. Pressure
gauges were in place and appeared to be working satisfactorily. The automatic lead I
lag systems were witnessed in operation and piping for the compressors was noted to
be in good condition and properly secured. The control panels were opened for an
internal inspection and were in good condit ion with internal wiring secured and properly
grounded. The main power supply cables were in satisfactory condition with no
damage noted and the cables were secured to the cable tray. No major oil or water
leaks were observed. Preventative Maintenance was performed on four compressors
by the mechanical department and oil samples were being taken on a monthly task .
61
TRN-HCE C-00063688
NK--666 Air Receiver {APV) Medium Pressure 50-500 PSI
Air vessels were visually externally inspected and no anomalies were recorded. The
overall the condition was good. The crew did not have any concerns in this area.
Pressure relief valves mounted o r ~ the air vessels had an undergone a third party
tesling.
NK-904 Medium Pressure Piping
Medium pressure piping was in good condition. No anomalies were observed and the
crew had no concerns. ~ ~ o corrosion or line perforation was r.oted.
OA-920 Seawater Service Pump System
The r;g was outfitted with eight Ham'Northy double-entry centrifugal pumps fer seawater
service supply. In addition there were seawater pumps for the thruster cooling. One
pvmp
11
Jas opened during our SL -vey for service. qevJeWi'lg tile impel!er and pump
'lousi'lg it appeared that discharge cavitation I erosion had occurred in the pump as
cavitation damage to the discharge side of the impeller and top and bottom of the
impeller was apparent. The crew indicated that this had occurred on most of the
seawater service pumps and an attempt was made to repair the impeller with bron?.:e
plastic putty.
.. ..
OA-920 Seawater service pump No. 4 PS fwd.
Report o: S;Ney- DEEPWATE ~ HORIZON
62
TRN-HCEC-00063689

It is a common problem in seawater service systems on any kind of rig that pumps work
at the outer edges or even outside the pump curve with a result that suction or
discharge cavitation occurs. The fact is that it is nearly impossible to supply pumps that
would fulfill the large variety of demand changes unless expensive pressure and flow
control is installed. The preferred option is variable rpm control by means of AC drive
usage. With variable rpm and a pressure controller, the pump could be operated at all
possible demands on the pump curve. This is however an expensive and relatively-
complex option.
The first step in reducing wear and tear through cavitation and erosion on the pumps
and piping had been made by replacing a basic analog pressure controller for a digital
pressure controller. This controller was much better suited to maintain the upper ring
li ne system pressure at a constant flow pressure. The crew indicated the pumps having
a poor track record and our experience was that the damage after five years is common
and should be regarded acceptable though not desirable. OEM-indicated pump life
expectancies would only be reached when all conditions were ideal. Unfortunately a
seawater service system on a drilling rig is far from ideal with the frequent fluctuation
demand and line changes.
The rig owner should anticipate increased costs for seawater service pump overhauls
over the years following this survey. The overall condition was acceptable and pumps
were maintained at very acceptable levels by the crew. Note that the V!=Ssel was
outfitted with eight similar seawater service pumps. We do not expect that one or even
two pumps down for extended periods would affect a reliable operation in any way.
08-904 Seawater Service Piping and System
The ri g contained an extensive seawater service system. Seawater service risers from
eight seawater service pumps located in the pontoon pump rooms supplied seawater to
the seawater ring main located in the deck box. A review of the piping system and
interviews with the crew indicated that several perforations had occurred in the
seawater system and that new perforations occurred at an increased rate. Multiple
patches were observed at the service lines located in the lower pump rooms and the
section of service line in the vicinity of the freshwater heat exchangers. In addition
entire new sections had been fabricated and installed to replace perforated sections
located in the pump rooms.
Review of the piping specification and drawings revealed the following:
The piping in use for the seawater service lines was al uminized seamless
steel pipe schedule 40.
.. Mul tiple denote waste pieces have been installed at specifically pump and
heat exchanger suction and discharge spool pieces .
63
TRN-HCEC-00063690
Below is an excerpt frcrn sheet 3 of the seawa:er seN ice P&ID. ind:cating t!1e multiple
waste r iece-s located in one puJ-p ooM oniy. These spool pieces have been
at various times. This is labor extensive since engineers, '.Jelders end natenal s
requirP.d for spool piece replacement. All spool pieces were differen:ly s!zec, so there
was n:; for having multiple spool pieces prepared en the shore for low COSl.
Natul'ally the goal cf the waste pieces is to prmect the remaining alurrirlized piping and
thus additional cost could oe regarcled acceptable. Ho'vVever, the recent yea.'S hc;d
seen an ir.creased rate of perforation of seawater lines in bcated outside
c!enote vvaste pieces. This was a majox cancer-., s11ce experience has shown thai
things would not mprcve over time.
/.J.. common issue with metal a!umnizing is the fact 'tis ar ic:eal prctec:o;
>..when :he coating is 100% t..nfortunatel) seldom JS the coa1ing 1 00% anJ a minor pin
hole in the alurninurr layer would result in a serious galvanic corros1on attack o the
open metal pipe. VVe suspected that this fact in combination with the low pipe schedule
Repcrt of Survey- DEEPWATER
Refere"lce: Order No. US1364.2
64
TRN-HCEC-00063691

(40} used and high flow rates were the reason for,lhe increased failure rate of seawater
lines. The fact that the crew had.be.en able. to reduce the total'.required flow rate in the
system with 60% and still allow for all was expected to have a positive effect
and likely reduce the pipe failures.
However, additional failure rates should be anticipated with ;an increased cost for pipe
section replacement. The. total approved budget for seawater pipe and pump repair in
2005 was US $50,000. The total costs incurred thus far in 2005 was recorded as being
us $42,303.30. .
A review should be undertaken to verify if the installation of an ICCP (Impressed
Current Cathodic Protection) would provide s,pme protection for at least the pump
rooms, where so far the majority of the pipe had occurred .
65
TRN-HCE C-00063692
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66

OE-603 Fuel Oil Centrifuge .
Four fuel oil centrifuges were available. A visual inspection and interviewing the crew
revealed this system to be fully operational and well maintained. No anomalies were
observed and both port and starboard MOO purifier rooms had been maintained in
clean order.
OE-603 Lube Oil Centrifuge
The mai n engine lubricating oil system contained only one purifier. EMPAC records
called for the engine oil to be transferred at 500-hr intervals to a circulation tank where
the oil could be puri fied with the si ngle purifier while circulating over that tank.
The 500-hr interval could often not be maintained. We supported the reasoning of the
crew that on many occasions that having an engine not available due to the lubricai ing
oi l being transferred to the circulating tank for purifying was not desired.
The proper set up would be circulation of the oil over the purifier with suction and
discharge on the engine deep sump. The engine deep sump contained 4,020 liters of
lubricating oil. The purifier could handle maXimum 4,000 ftr I hour, thus an entire sump
would have circulated one time over the purifier in one hour. The physical location of
the purifier was such that it would not allow this operation due to the long pipe run and
low pump capacities of the purifier.
The purifier. appendages and surroundings were well maintained. The crew made a
true effort to allow for maximum use of an undersized lubrication oil purifying system.
The necessity of the purifier at all could be debated since each main engine contained
two Glacier-type centrifugal spinning filters. However when H
2
0 contamination
occurred, a purifier would be the only way to remove the water.
OK-613 Oily Water Separator
The rig was equipped with two Hamworthy KSE 15-ppm oily water separators. Both
uni1s were in operational condition. Maintenance was being performed to ensure
operational status was maintained.
OP-61 4 Heli copter Fuel System
The rig was equipped with two 750-gal portable fuel tanks located on the pori side. We
inspected the two tanks, pumps, hoses and nozzles and observed that the equipment
was in good condition with no corrosion or damaged observed. The fuel tanks were
fitted with certi fied relief valves; none of which were corroded or damaged. Warning
signs were posted on the skid. The earth bonding cables were in satisfactory condition
and were properly installed. The helicopter fuel system area was covered with a fixed
foam f ire-fighting system that was last inspected by a third party company in May 2005 .
67
Confi denti al Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00063694
The marine department was responsible for ensuring that the olanned mairtenance was
performed on regular basis and we observed the system in operation during our sur.1ey
and were satisfied that PM was perfo.-med.
PC-600 Deck Crane"
Two Liebherr pedestal cranes rated for a maximum hoisting capacity of 92 Mt were
Both cranes were function tested as well as v;sually inspected on both ths
pedestal and the entire booms. The safety was tested and history files and OERs
revie\} .. ed. A toral of 1.5 NPT was recorded in the 365 days p1or to our survey.
The structural conditior of both cranes V\'as good; however. t11e foliO\Ning anomalies
were r.otec:
The majority of thE, boom sheaves had sign.ficanl wire impri11ts in the sheave
groove or both cranes.
The boom tip section contained two significant aamaged lattices due to the
main block impacting the boom in this area on botn cranes.
The sheave wear issue was recorded in the EMPAC files since the beginnin;J of 2005 to
a lesser degree a'ld reportedly reptaca11ent sheaves had beert ordered The bo:::>m tip
damage was recorded to a lesser degree in the EMPAC files in the beginning of 2005.
Reportedly replacement lattice had been ordered. In the fi'st quarter of 2005, a
Repor1 of S!.11vey- D:::EPWATER
Reference: Order No. liS1364.2
68
TRN-HC E C-00063695
severe fre originating from the engine compartment in the starboard crane occurred
after a manual error had destroyed the internals of this engine room compan:mert.
Sul:lsequenlly the majority of the internals had replaced by third party companies
such as Caterpillar, Liebherr and Sparrows. ABS approval had been granted flpon the
cornplelion of thr;; repairs The total repair costs for the damage recorded so far were
us $179,339.56.
The crane cabs were clean and in satisfac:ory afld the PAs, telephones and
radios were O()eational at the of survey. The PLC
1
oad Management system wc.s
working satisfac.orily. A fire extinguisher life jacket was also available in aach
crane cab. We successfuHy te.sted all th.a crane !!mit sv;,nches, boom up/dowr:, mai:1
blocks up including the whip line blocks. Tilt. ESD was also function tested !ro:11 the
crane cab and we reviewed the daily log book the c,.ane operators used.
W.:: vrsually inspected all the main electriC<JI switchboards in each crane and noted that
the elecbcal contra. panel in the starboard crane pedestal was in unsatisfactorv
colidition with cables and corosion. This was due to the fire which had
occurred du;ing the first quarter of 2005. The cran pedestal had been flooded wi:h
seawater and the damage was evioent in this panel. We recommended that the panel
be replaced.
Roport of Survey- OEEPWATC:R HORIZON
69
TRN-HCE C-00063696
PC-601
tarbo_ard crane main control panel .was in unsatisfactory condition.
'.Knuckle Boom Crane
A Palfinger knuckle boom crane was located on the forward deck. It was mainly used
with a pipe gripper head (pipe grabs) feedi ng drill pip'e. or' Bt!P, to the raisec catwc..lk: or
auxi liary rotary. The crane and g;ipper heads w.ere visually inspected and history tiles
were reviewed. The overall condition was .acceptable howe;er. '1lajor failures :1ad
occurred in the nydrauiic sys'Eem. On one occas!on a failed boom cylir.dcr hac
the equipment to be dowr. over two months. Note tha: the crane was not critical to
the star:Joarc deck crane C:)Uid rezch t.he same areas as well.
Three pipe g.-!pper heeds (gra\Js) were available covering all tubular sizes. The
smollest grab No.
1
1' was used the most and continuously connected to the cr:=.ne.
Reviewing the history files, we noted that in 2005 at least three weld repairs had bee'1
made. -here. were oossibly fou( repairs to the grab on fou( different locations and or
four dfferent dales after cracks had been discovered by the cre'N.
Repo1t o. SJrvey- DEEFWAT::R HORIZON
70
TRN-HCEC-00063697

. . . . . :.
Do<=btr 15, zoo.i . S.wjtct: :;>).! CCl>l?!.EIE By: :i'HORIOOl.
Jl:'.l ?El'.fORMED BY 1\lG'MiiCBA,l'UC
o..os:!:I>lrrm._"'<EIH iOHNSCN . . .
OlD CEECT.. OK ON CP.AcK NOW IN GOODWQ't.>crNci mE 01:-l:ER 2 l;l' GOOD
Ja:uu.ryl7, ZOOS. . Subjttt By. l'HORTOO!.
P:l! C1.0SED JOH:<SO};
PM OO:\lJ1LE!ED BYDOO.lS M . .u>.:IENEz
CHEO\ED AU. HOSES Au. IK GOOD WOiti>IS<TOPJJg QiECKED rll.i!DS All. OK, c:R!?P.:P.. FOu:-.1> CAA<'t: Ol\ NOTIFIED
lhy 10, SabJtcr, f).! COMI"...:EU By: P':!ORTOOt
LOPEZ
SIEPS CmJPI.cJED
stEPS NOT CCNPI.ETED: li:Ot:E
FD<'Dn;GS AlliN GOOO \IIO!liJl<GOJNDIIrON, \VE.DER FIXED atACK lN D:uzi PiP!. GRAB. CF.ANGED our HOSED< O..l>EJ>.ATOl\.
CAB
EOUR.S TO COMP!.ETE: !.0
:!'S;>ECIEO BY : L !4\'El!:
Fl)..'DD-lG
The amount of cracks in this relatively sho_rt period with little use was a likely indication
that the maximum fatigue life of the grab haa been reached. We recommended as a
minimum to c6mpletely the grab when the opportunity existed or as soon
as possible and NOE all load bearing components that were not accessible when
assembled. The outcome should define if further use is warranted or a new grab should
be purchased.
PC-935 Riser Gantry Crane
A Hydralift riser gantry crane was located on the aft deck covering the aft deck. The
unit was observed in operation during pulling and lowering the LMRP on riser in 4,000-ft
water depth with no major anomalies noted. A hydraulic leak had caused a stop in riser
handling for a short period. However, a survey of the hydraulic hoses did not raise any
concern and in general the hoses and piping on the gantry crane were observed lobe in
good condition w1th no corrosion present. Structurally the crane was in good condition
with no corrosion or wastage present: cable trays and cable conveyors were in
acceptable condition. Lifting points and riser grapples had been inspected during the
annual heavy lifting gear survey.
PD-626 Engine -Deck Crane*
Both deck crane engines, Caterpillar 3400E (Electronic Injector) series engines, were
observed while in operation with no anomalies observed. The history files were
71
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HC E C-00063698

reviewed afld it was Aoted.that maintenance. was being performed based onrunning
hours which i s the best option for engines .. One trend could be noted in the 365 days
prior to our survey. Repeated injector failures had eaused starting problems on several
occasions.
Without training, it would be difficult for the crew to perform a condition evaluation via a
laptop set up which is the pnly method available to evaluate the condition and setting of
the combustion process on a Litronic-managed engine.
Verbal comments from the crew strongly indicated very little confidence in the electronic
injectors configuration of these types of engines. Note that similar engines are popular
in a variety of land drilling rigs around the world and are known to function well. We
believed the root cause of the repeated failures was the lack of crew training for those
performing the regular maintenance on these engines.
To substantiate our conclusion that was lack of training, we highlighted the
following:
A 500-hr service called for injector condition verification which was done on 28 July and
completed with no anomalies recorded. On 4 August, a CWO was raised for a starting
failure on the same engine as a result of injector failure and all of the injectors had to be
replaced.
WO:
Pt.wo,.-.
tt.:<>O; Juh- "*'
l't ...... ))no. "-!
__.!'OQHZ:.'K:Af.EMI, 3.:0C:l&O:

1'aU:llmls:
!. 1JJt: cell-lD!epon :md ifz:H.dd.
:-:or c aMPl""""lEDA."'. "D'REASON".All. SiEPS CC)7- "TE
TO .BS r:< (;()()!) t\'OPl:!NG nGKIE,"[) t HYDJ> J..L1.!C" l..n-'ES :liA T SJ)\\'EO 1'0 B S
L:I11.E ..u.so
CWO:

(M."tle!'C!Sr)l....:.r."
Oaa'Giota.."' c..v.,,\St :,"1.1.1.1 Al''''l.U
\Y,O. l>fur'iptw!

This proved the importance of proper inspection on injectors if the history showed
repeated failures linked to the injectors. Overall the engines were in acceptable
condition, though it was regarded prudent by us that hourly-based maintenance was
properly performed .
Reference: Order No. US13S4.2
72

PJ-641 Forklift
We inspected and functioned tested the electric forklift located in the sack room. The
condition of this unit was satisfactory. The battery for the forklift was observed to be in
a satisfactory condition with no corrosion on the terminal s and the cells had access for
maintenance. The tires were in good condition and the reverse horn and lights worked
satisfactorily. The forks on the truck were also in good condition.
PK-941 Man-Riding Winches
Man-riding winches were in acceptable condition. They were visually inspected and
observed while in use. No anomalies were observed.
PL-941 Air Tuggers
Air tuggers were visually inspected and observed during operations. No anomalies
were recorded and overall the condition was regarded as very acceptable. The annual
lifting gear surveys had included these air tuggers with visual inspection and NDE.
QF-616 Electric Welding and Welding Distribution
We inspected the four electric welding plants and connection boxes. All were in
satisfactory condition including the cables were clearly labeled and located in safe
areas. The rig welder had no issues with the equipment during the survey.
RG-651 Communication: Telephone and PA System
We inspected the communication system and several anomalies were noted. The UPS
system for rack B in the back-up control room was not operational and we were
informed the parts to repair the system were ordered. The PA system was audible in all
areas including the working areas and machine spaces. The PA speakers that were
visually inspected were all of the correct type and suitable for the areas in which they
were installed.
We performed a spot check on the telephone system and there was only one phone
which was not working at the time of survey (located in the port GE switchboard room).
Parts were on order to repair the same. E-mail , fax and telephone facilities with direct
lines to Houston were available. In case of problems with the telephone system, the rig
was also equipped wiih an lnmarsat.
RM-669 Vessel/Power Management System
The functional condition and reliability of the Kongsberg Vessel/ Power Management
system was reviewed by interviewing the crew and through verification of alarm pages
Report of Survey- DEE:PWATER HORIZON
73
TRN-HCEC-00063700

and system pages. The review did not raise any major concerns and the crew indicated
that the system was stable and reliable. All functions operated as designed.
A review of the history files highlighted the following:
1. A client (BHP) DP trial in April 2005 had indicated the anomaly that after a
recovery from a 100% black out, the four on-line thrusters did not automatically
restart. The root cause was traced back to faulty batteries in the respective
individual thruster drive UPS. This event had made the crew come to the
conclusion that the existing PM task would not ensure a reliable operation.
Consequently the crew was seeking to create a rig-specific task. However, the
underlying fact became apparent that those faults I issues would only be
highlighted during proper trials. Unfortunately yearly DP trials, although
recommend by the IMCA, were not performed on this rig. See DP section CQ-
244 for more details.
2. In July 2005, a Thruster 6 drive fault had caused switchboard power interruption,
resulting in tripping of all four on-line thrusters. A sequence of events resulted
from this which after review revealed that the ABB (thruster drives) software did .
not function as designed and required a software change. This software change
was ready and available at the time of our survey; however, would only be
implemented after well completion and thus disconnecting from the well. See
OER-DWH-05-038 for event details. Three hours downtime had occurred.
Due to the event described under No. 2, a decision had been made to operate the 11-
kV switchboard in split configuration until the software upgrade would be implemented.
Note that the power management design specification indicated that the overall set up
was designed to operate with a closed-loop switchboard. Split switchboard operation
should be done for recovery situation only until the event has stabilized.
SD-821 Galley Freezer/Refrigerator
The freezer and chiller compressors were located in the starboard side of the machine
spaces for the galley system. The piping was properly lagged and secured to the units
which were clean and no major oil or water leaks were observed. Motors for the
compressors were in satisfactory condition and earth bonded to the structure of the rig.
Gauges appeared to be working satisfactorily when the system was operational and the
seawater lines for cooling system were in satisfactory condition with no corrosion
observed. No unusual noises or vibrations were noted on the compressors. The doors
for the freezer and chillers were in good condition with no damage observed. The units
were equipped with lock-in alarms which we function tested. The galley freezers were
observed to be clean with no damage observed and the controls and readouts for
indicating temperatures appeared to be in good working order for each unit. The
maintenance department was responsible for ensuring that the PM was performed on
74

the units and we had no concerns with the level of maintenance performed on the galley
freezer and chiller units.
SD-824 Galley/Miscellaneous Equipment
We inspected the electrical equipment in the galley and noted the majority of the
equipment was in good condition apart for the dishwasher which was severely corroded
and should be repaired or replaced. We inspected the laundry which included three
washing machines and three dryers but at the time of survey the No. 1 washing
machine was not operational. We were informed that parts were order. At time of this
inspection, the remaining machines in the laundry were in operation and were noted to
be in satisfactory condition with no anomalies observed.
TF-927 Lighting System (Main}
We visually inspected the lighting system during the day and night. All areas were
sufficiently illuminated and in satisfactory condition. The lighting and power distribution
panels inspected were clearly labeled and each circuit was identified for use. The pane!
doors we inspected all had ground wires attached and the lights mounted at height all
had safety wires installed. We had no concerns with the lighting system .
TH-802 Watermaker
There were a total of six watermakers installed. Each individual watermaker obtained
the heat required for the evaporation process from the respective engine it was
connected to. After a visual external inspection combined with an interview of the crew,
we concluded that the condition was acceptable. No issues were reported and
maintenance consisted mainly of cleaning and descaling (acidizing) the internals.
Each watermaker was rated for 20 m
3
/hr maximum output. Being switchboard kW load
dependant, the average output was not sufficient to assure self support. Average
readings taken over a 180-day period showed an average production of 21 m
3
per day
against an average consumption of 55 m
3
per day.
Tl -801 Potable Water System
We inspected the potable water equipment which included the hot water system, the UV
sterilizers and the silver ionizer unit. We reviewed the PM tasks for the water system
and it was noted that there was no 180-day PM task assigned to replace the inline water
filters for the dlinking fountains and i ce machine as per the Transocean HQS-HSE-PP-
01 manual.
75
Conf ident ial Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCE C-00063 702

TQ-826 Sewage Treatment Plant
The sewage treatment plant was visually inspected. Interviews with the crew completed
our review. We concluded that the overall condition was good. Internal inspection by
the crew had not raised any concerns.
TX-694 Hazardous Areas
We visually inspected the hazardous areas and reviewed the history. The following
concerns were noted:
No maintenance on electrical equipment in hazardous areas had been performed

since going into service in 2001.
There were no identification tags on any of the EX equipment.
Only breakdowns were entered into the PM history system .
We recommended an electrical company be hired to inspect all the electrical
equipment in hazardous areas and enter all the information into EMPAC. When
this work was complete, the electrical department could assume the tasks and
ensure 20% was inspected every year as per the Transocean standard tasks.
We also recommended that if any EX equipment was to be replaced, it should be
by EX if it is suitable for the location in which it will be installed.
Transocean must ensure all third party equipment installed in hazardous areas is
inspected and the report entered into EMPAC.
In the moon pool area there was an EX starter for the desifter pump which was
damaged. It must be noted this switch was replaced by the electrical department
during our survey.
We also performed a spot check on the flame paths on several motors and junction
boxes to determine the condition of the equipment. The following equipment was
opened for inspection:
Four mud pit agitators terminal boxes
Terminal boxes and covers on motors and junction boxes on four of the eight
shakers
Fan heater j unction box on the drill floor
Fan heater junction in the shale shaker
The condition of the equipment opened for inspection was unsatisi actory in light of the
corrosion on all the terminal and junction box covers. We were informed by the
electrical department that all flame paths would be cleaned before the equipment was
reinstated .
76
TRN-HCEC-00063703
UB-7 .. 6
Life Boat I Raft Launching Davits
We visually inspected and function tested The lifeboats davits limit switches. All davits
on tre rig were last tested in May 2005 These tests dates were marked on each davit.
The wies for the davits were also replaced in May 2005. No r.;orrosion or structural
damaged was noted on any of the davirs The marine department personnel performed
regl.!lar planned maintenan:-.e which was noted when we reviewed the PM system fer
the equipment.
UC-714 :...ife rafts
We visually nspecte.j thE: six 25-man inflatable life, :afts located at the forvvara and stern
of the rig pe1 approved safetf plan. The life rafts were the davit launch type ar:d all
were r.otec to be in satisfactory cond'tion. The life rafts and hydrostatic releases were
ell in date and it was the resoonsibHitv of :he marine department ro ensure the safety
equipment was in satisfactory condition \ll/e were informed by the marine depar:mem
that there were no concerns v;ith the life rafts.
Report of Survey- DEEPWATER f i O f ~ I Z O N
Confident ial Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC
77
TRN-HCEC-00063704

UC-715 Lifeboats
There were four lifeboats consisting of two Fassmer 73 man boats located forward of
the rig and two located at the stern. No. 2 boat located forward was also utilized as the
rescue boat.
The life boats were clean and dry inside. All of the doors were in satisfactory condition
with no structural damaged noted. We observed that two boat fenders were damaged
on the inboard of boat No.4 and one of the windows was cracked in life boat No.2. No
other damage was noted to any of the boats. Internal equipment was secured including
the batteries and the GMDSS radio that was functiontested with the DP operator. We
performed a visual inspection of each boat and we also ran the engines on the forward
boats only but we were unable to test the sprinkler system. No oil or water leaks were
observed and the engines started satisfactorily. The sprinkler piping on all six boa::s
was in satisfactory condition with no damage observed. The release mechanisms for all
four boats were in satisfactory condition and the boats were lowered into the water
every 90 days. The sprinkler systems were functioned tested by the marine
The marine department was responsible for ensuring PM was performed
on a regular basis and we were satisfied with the level of maintenance on all four
lifeboats. The boats were last inspected by a third party company in May 2005 and the
reports were made available for us to review .
UD-627 Standby Generator Set
The rig was equipped with a Caterpillar 480-volt x 370-kW AC generator. The
engine/generator set was visually inspected and in satisfactory condition. The
automatic: starting and transfer panel was visually inspected with no defects noted. The
emergency generator had two starting systems available. Meters and gauges were
observed to be working satisfactorily when the generator was on line and the fuel/water
line was in satisfactory condition with no damage noted. The exhaust for the
emergency engine was observed to be in good condition with no damaged or missing
lagging.
The generator control box was open for a visual inspection and i.t was noted lo be in
satisfactory condition with the internal wiring secured and only minor dust noted. During
the time of our survey, the standby generator was put online and operated for one hour
UD-630 Standby Generator Switchboard
We visually inspected the standby generator switchboard. All was noted to be clean
and in satisfactory condition. The cable transits inside the panels were sealed to
prevent water ingression. The meters and gauges were in place and appeared to be
working satisfactorily. All the internal wires and components were secured and in
satisfactory condition .
Report of Survey -DEEPWATER HORIZON
78
TRN-HCEC-00063705

There was no overheating noted on the connections for the busbar and breakers and
safety equipment was also available in the emergency room along with rubber matting
in front of the panels. Current injection and a thermographic survey was due in May
2006. We function tested the ground fault system satisfactorily and it was noted that
there was a lock-out/tag-out syst em in place.
UD-654 UPS
The UPS systems were at various locations and the majority was identified for use;
however, there were still several which should be identified including the power source
for each system. At the ti me of survey. we did not perform any load tests of the UPS
system due to the ongoing operations. We reviewed the OER and interviewed the
maintenance department during our survey.
Upon reviewing the documentation, it became apparent that there had been multiple
examples of UPS failures, which consequently had resulted in systems failures during
operations and trails. On one occasion a si ngle UPS failure was the initialing factor in a
snowball effect that resulted finally in 57 hrs of downt ime. On one other occasion while
performi ng power management trials for a new client, four thrusters failed to auto restart
after a partial planned black out. This failure was l inked to four UPS failures .
Another item observed was the fact that the UPS battery for the dead-man circuit for the
mux reel had expired and there was an open work order to replace this battery. This
was mentioned in more detail in JG-435 of the sub sea section of this report. Obviously
the UPS testing was not up to a sufficient standard which had been recognized prior to
our survey by the crew and PM task changes were being requested. We recommend
more frequent load tests t o be conducted on UPS systems to determine the condition.
UE-722 Alarm Systems : Fire, Gas, General, Flooding
We inspected the alarm system that was programmed to sound over the PA system
during an emergency situation. We were able to function test the .alarms during the
boat drill and it was noted that the electrical department performed this task every t hirty
days. The PA alarm was audible in all areas and the alarm panels were noted to be i n
satisfactory condition and functioned correctly. We were informed by the electrical
department that there were no concerns in this area.
UF-109 Hydraulically Operated Watertight Doors/Compartments
There were hydrauli c-operated doors throughout the rig remotely monitored from the
bridge. We functioned several doors at vari ous locations locally and several doors
remotely from the SVC (Simrad Vessel Control) on the bridge and no problems were
observed. There were hand pumps available in case the hydraulic failed at each
location at each door and all doors operated smoothly and the seals and mechanisms
79

were in good condition. We conducted water tests on two doors at the starboard
forward 28-meter level and no leaks were observed. We visually inspected severa'
watertight doors at various locations. The doors we inspected were ir. satisfactory
condition with rubber seals in place and no damaged noted.
UG-245 Flooded Member Detection/leak Detection
Bilge alarms were present in t he voids and bracings and were visually inspected for the
voids and braces entered (see section BA-917). No alarms were active and it was not
clear when these alarms had been tested. Part of the five-year ABS SPS would call ior
void and tank entry and consequently bilge alarms to be tested during those
inspections. This was scheduled directly after our departure from the DEEPWATER
HORIZON.
Ul-927 Lighting System (Emergency)
Emergency lighting was clearly marked with the red letter E and contained standard
fluorescent lighting with a built-in battery pack. During our survey, we inspected and
function tested the battery lights at the lifeboat station on the forward and aft sides of
the rig. The exits from the mai n accommodation and at various locations all had battery
lights installed which were in satisfactory condition with no defects noted. All of the
lights we inspected were equipped with safety chains.
UJ-700 Fire Detection System
The fire detection panel was located in a compartment outside the bridge on the
HORIZON with indicating panels located in the bridge and the back-up control room.
The system consisted of smoke, manual call points, heat and IR sensors placed in
various locations including the well test area and all the machinery spaces. We visually
inspected and functioned tested various sensors. All detectors responded correctly and
were in satisfactory condition with no deficiencies noted. The ET department was
responsible for the PM pertormed on the system and regular tests were pari of this task
The PM history was made available by the ET department for review and we had no
concerns. There Vlere no faults with U1e systems observed
UL-706 Fire Fighting, Fixed Water System/Hydrants and Hoses
We peiiormed a comprehensive inspection of the fire-fighting equipment including a
function test of the one of the fire pumps with li 1e marine departmem and the ng
electrician. Two fire hydrants were opened on the helideck and we used one of the four
fi re pumps loca:ed in the stern for test purposes and noted the water pressure to !Je 120
psi at 38.5 amps. We walked the fire line wit h the marine department and no leaks
were noted. There was no corrosion noted on any of the main deck fire lines. The
piping was noted to be secured to the structure with pipe hangers and expansion joints .
so
TRN-HCEC-00063707

The fire hoses, nozzles, cabinets and valves were all in satisfactory condition. well
maintained and numbered by the marine department as per the Transocean-approved
safety plan.
UM-701 Deluge/Sprinkler System
The following areas were protected by a deluge system:
Shale shaker house
Drill floor/moonpool area
Due to ongoing operations, we were unable to iunction test the deluge system.
Therefore, we conducted an inspection with the marine department only. We visually
inspected the piping for the deluge system and it was noted to be in good condition.
properly secured and no corrosion or damage present. The nozzles we inspected were
in good condition with no corrosion observed and all nozzles being in place.
This rig was equipped with a sprinkler system installed in the accommodation. The
system was charged with fresh water: in emergency, salt water could be used. We
visually inspected the sprinkler tank and pumps located on the starboard forward 28-m
deck. The tank had a capacity of 792 gallons and was in satisfactory condition with no
corrosion or damaged noted. At the time of this survey, we were able to function test
the system with the marine department which was achieved by opening the test valves
on each level of the accommodation then the bridge would receive the alarm on the
SVC (Simrad vessel control) then the DP operator would take the necessary action.
The fragile bulb sprinkler heads in the accommodation were noted to be in satisfactory
condition with no corrosion observed. The marine department periormed regul ar
maintenance on the systems and we were satisfied with the level of maintenance
performed.
UN-799 Fire Dampener
The rig was equipped with automatic and manual fire dampers installed on the supply
and exhaust fans including the main accommoda:ion and machine spaces. We
conducted an inspection of the fire dampers, reviewed the EM PAC history for the
system and interviewed the crew. On inspection of the dampers. the majority were
11oted to be in satisfactory condition with one only that required attention. There was nC)
corrosion or damage to actuators or limit svvilches including the linkages. The marine
departmem was responsibfe to ensure that PMs were performed on the system and we
were informed by the crew they had no concerns with the fire dampers .
Report of Survey- DEEPWATER I tORIZON
Reference Order No. US1364.2
81
TRN-HCEC-00063708

UP-703 Fixed C02 Systems
The HORIZON was equipped with fixed C0
2
fire-fighting systems and the following
. areas were protected:
Paint locker
Engine rooms
All electrical s v . . ~ t c h rooms including HV
Engine control room
Standby generaior room
Galley exhaust ducts
Back-up control room
Centra I control room
" Transformer room
Fuel oil room
Mud pit room
Main generator room
Main generators
There was a one cemral locker on this rig for C02 bottles and several areas had a
separate system. Each C0
2
area was inspected but no function tests of alarms were
performed. During this survey, a third party company was on board inspecting all the
fire-fighting equipment including the f ixed C0
2
system. All the C0
2
bottles were secured
in racks and were noted to be in good condition with no damage or corrosion observed.
Hoses and pipework were also in good condition with no corrosion or damage
observed. The marine department was responsible for ensuring the PM was performed
on a regular basis. The system was last inspected by a third party company in June
2005 and the reports were made available for review.
UQ-704 Fix ed Foam Systems
The rig was equipped with a foam system with a 200gallon tank and pump and motors
located below the helideck. The following locations were covered by foam:
Foam nozzles over he!ifuel area
Three foam monitors for helideck
The tanks were examined externally and were observed 10 be in satisiactory condrtron
with no corrosion or damage noted. The marine depar:ment took regular samples of
ioam for independem analysis and it was notea that a foam sample was last sent for
testi ng in May 2005.
Monitors and nozzles and the associated piping for the foam system were all inspected.
With the exception of light surface corrosion that was noted on lhe foam piping at
various locations, we had no other concerns .
82
TRN-HCEC-00063709

UX-708 Ladder Fall Arrest System
Extend the upper wire rope support posts as necessary on all ladder fall arrest devices
so that personnel can unhook from a safe position. Most of the "Ladsafe" systems in
place on the rig ladders were installed incorrectly. The upper wire rope support posts
do not extend far enough above the upper platform to permit personnel to unhook
safely. On the majority of the installations, the wire rope support post is mounted below
the upper platform, resulting in the climber having to release both hands from the
ladder, while standing on the ladder, to unhook from the fall arrester. The proper setup
is to extend the upper mounting pole far enough above the platform so that personnel
can stand safely on the platform to unhook. That is the exact reason for the long pole
mounted on the upper Y.lire support. (The derrick ladder fall-arrest system has been
installed correctly and can be used as an example oi a safe system.)
US-713 H2S/Combustible Gas Detection System
The H
2
S/combustible gas detection system outside was part of the fire alarm system
with the master panel located in a compartment outside the bridge with indicating
panels located on the bridge and in the back-up control room. The system consisted of
H
2
S and combustible sensors placed at various locations The ET department was
responsible for the PM performed on the system and regular tests were conducted by
this department. We inspected and performed a function test of the system at various
locations with the ET department. The alarm levels for H2S sensors were set at 5-ppm
low and 10-ppm high. At present the combustible gas levels were set at 20% LEL
(High) and 60% LEL (High-High), but with only 50% test gas canisters on the rig, these
pre-set levels were unobtainable. Therefore we recommend the LEL values in the
Si mrad system to be set up to an alarm at 20% LEL (High) and 40% LEL (High-High).
We also inspected various portable gas detectors and observed that all were in date.
The ET department was responsible ior ensuring the PM was performed. They were
located in the DP room where all detectors were logged in and out.
VG-810 HVAC Systems
We visually inspected the HVAC systems and each space with major equipment
induding the switch room had cl1iller units and dedicated air-handling unit installed. V\'e
also v'isttally inspected t he units for the main accommoda:ion. There was a simpler sr;t
up with chiller and dedicated air handling unit all the system appeared :o be worki ng
::;ati sfactury with conirois and readouts tndicating temperat ures appeared to be in good
vvorking order for each system. There was no corrosion on any of tne piping that we
inspected including the air handlirg uni ts.
One compressor for the main accommodation on the starboard side of the rig was down
at the time of this survey. We were informed that parts were on order for the unit. Duct
83
heaters in ail of the rooms were not operational at the time of this sutvey. We were
in'ormed that the heate s i:lstalled were 220 volt and the rig power for the system 'Vas
110 volts; therefore, tre heaters had never been used since the rig left the shioyard.
If the rig were to go to a cold climate, then an REA should be raised to investigate me
issue with duct in the accommodation not being the corect voltage ro operale.
Workshops were equipped with self-contained air-conditioning units as well as air
handier::>. We inspected the units and no unusual noises or vibrations were noteo.
Controls and readouts indicating temperatures appeared to oe in good working orcer 'or
each system.
Report of Survey- DEEPWA
Reference Order No. US1364.2
84
TRN-HCEC-00063711

5.0 DETAILED RESULTS
The detailed results of this survey are highlighted in the following table. Refer to the
relevant assets under section 4.0 of this report for further discussion about any
recommendation below.
Table 51 Asset Deficiencies and Recommendations
Ref PSS Asset Asset Recommendation Severity
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
1108
1109
I

Code Description
AZ-915 Batteries Clean the batteries for the standby
qenerator. (Completed) .
BB-131 Cable and Third party cables next to" the heav.y tool
cables trays store on floor shpuld be properly
strapped to the eabletray. (Completed)
BB-1 31 Cable trays I Properly $Upport the
I
electrical routed up the port-aft derrick
leg to the morikeyboard level.
CB-232 Navigation Repair the upper. NUC and -the RAM
Lights navig.ation lights i n the derrick (Completed)
EA-300 Drawworks Flanged sections of air cooling
ductWork on aft side of drawworks have
separated. Bolt sections together with a
proper gasket between them.
EA-300 Drawworks Properly clean and remove any hydraulic oil
from the .drawworks sump base. A clean
base is essential in oi l leak tracing, which in
turn is essential for a proper functioning.
(Completed)
EA-300 Drawworks Replace the failed shaft seal on off-dri ller's
(fwd) side. (Parts on order PO # P837605)
EF-315 TDS Properly attach the loose TDS bail tilt
cylinder. (Completed)
EF-315 Top Drive Remove the RTV sealant from the cable
glands for the top drive junction box and
ensure that t he glands are properly installed
so that they seal and prevent water
ingression.
EF-369 I RBS
I
Replace the bent RBS height adjusting
EK-308
cylinder.
Antenna in Remove antenna from support that was
Derrick damaged by crane operations, starboard
forward derrick .
Major
---
Maj or
Minor
Major
I
Major
I
Minor
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
I
Minor
85

Ref PSS
Code
112 EK-343
113 EK-343
114 EK-913

115 EK-948
116 EL-309
117 El-696
118 EW-218
I
I

Asset Asset Recommendation
Description
TOS dolly Replace the TDS retractable cylinder on the
frame dolly that contains a "home made" welded on
clevis and home made clevis pin for an OEM
manufactured cylinder. The use of rig-made
custom items should be prevented at all
times on critical items, only OEM
manufactured items should be used.
TDS dolly Upper sta.bilizer arm dolly to travel block: of
frame the four mounting bolts, one was found
sheared, one hacf broken the safety wire and
back out 2'' and the remaining two were
loose. Extract the sheared mounting bolt
from the travel block frame and replace.
Ensure that all four bolts on the upper
stabilizer arm are properly torqued and
safety wired.
Hydraulic Repair local (inside basket) non-functi onal
work basket controls. '(Parts on order PO # P81 0069_1
Upper Two latches were observed with worn or
Fingerboard sheared hinge pins, one latch is missing a
fastener. Recommend to review I service all
latches on upper board after tripping into the
hole.
Crown Renew I replace failed load cell (note that
Block toad cells are critical for AHD (Active Heave
Drawworks) and therefore the maximum
availability should be strived for at all times.
(PO # P798843/0 and P798843/1
Snatch Remove one corroded McKissick snatch
Blocks block from crown of auxiliary derrick.
(Completed)
AC Drive At the first opportunity the electri cal
Motors department should investigate and remedy
[ the low megger readings on the following
Drawworks AC Drive Motors + Aux
Drawworks drive (0.70 Mohm)
No.1 , 0.75 Mohm
No. 3, 1.25 Mohm
No. 5, 1.0 Mohm
No. 6, 1.5 Mohm
86
Severity
Major
Major
Major
Major
I
Major
Minor
Major
I
I
I
TRN-HCEC-00063713

Ref PSS
Code
119 EW-218
120 EW-218
121 GA-327

122 GK-321
123 GK-321
133 LA-548
134 LA-948
135 LA-948
U_

Asset As set Recommendation
Description
AC Drive At the first opportunity the electrical
Motors department should investigate the low Mohm
megger reading of 2.5 Mohm for the top drive
AC motor. (150 Mohm was the last recorded
value in June 2005)
AC Drive Repair or replace the cracked flanges on the
Motors ducting for the air cooling system for the
drawworks AC motors. Each of the motors
had cracked ductwork at some point.
Mud Pumps Verify the straightness of the oil fines routed
in the power ends of the mud pumps. For
example the No. 1 mud pump contained a
crimp in the oil supply line routed to the main
bearing RH side (standing power end side
looking towards fluid end). The No_ 2 cross-
head failure in April 2005 was partially
contributed to a crimp in an oH supply line
according the history files.
Mud Replace failed shaft seal on gearbox for mud
Agitator agitator 68.
Mud Pit Raise an REA to investigate the issue with
Agitators the submersible agitators failing after a short
time in operation. There have been nine
fai lures in the last eighteen months.
Casing The majority of hydraul ic fitting on the
Stabbing moonpool mounted casing stabbing arm
Arm suffer from corrosion. Two quick connect
(Moon pool fittings on the hydraulic swing motor are
mounted) wasted beyond use and should be replaced
prior use.
PRS Cables The cables on the horizontal upper cross
(both) beam wire way should be properly strapped
to the cable tray to prevent damage.
PRS Fwd During tripping it was observed that the
tailing head does not secure the drill pipe
properly. DP does not clear lower carriage
when lowering to deck. Verify reason and
rectify. Appears claw assembly requires
adjustment on stroke limiter or new bellow .
87
Severity
Major
Major
Minor
Minor
Major
Minor
Major
Major

Ref
136
137
138

139
I
! 140
141
142

PSS Asset Asset Recommendation
Code Description
LA-948 PRS Fwd Lower gripper assembly - properly tension
the fourth hose- cable not supported by any
idler sheave and has dropped outside the
idler sheave. Verify the reason why there
are four hoses I cables routed to the lower
gripper assembly. Originally t hree hoses I
cables were routed therefore only three idler
sheaves are mounted. We recommend tying
together the two hoses with simple tie-raps at
close intervals to reduce the snagging risk.
LA-948 PRS Fwd Replace the damaged alarm horn on the
I forward PRS unit on the drill floor.
PRS Fwd Verify the proper functioning of the variable
pressure relief valve in the counter balance
manifold assembly and I or the set down
sensor. During tripping it appeared that the
thread compensating circuit was not property
adjusting on the fwd PRS. (Adjustment was
made awaiting test when trip into hole)
LA-948 PRS Fwd Properly adjust all electrical, air and hydraulic
and Aft service loops and hose tensioners to ensure
all service loops are routed within the idler
sheaves of the gripper arm carriages. The
majority were not properly tensioned and
consequently were in risk for snagging.
Subsequently ensure proper service loop
tensioners are used. Several electrical
cables routed to the gripper assemblies were
held up by mpe.
HiTech Replace damaged window iQ auxiliary
drillers driller"s cabin.
cabin
MF-627 1 Main
Remove metal particles from inside
Generators Generator No. 1. (Completed)
Main Remove the temporary ventilation grills on
Generators No. 1 generator when the water cooling
system is repaired also the generator should
be cleaned .
88
Severity
Major
I
I
Minor
I
Minor
Major
Major
Minor
Minor
TRN-HCEC-00063715

Ref PSS
Code
143 MF-627
144 MF-627
145 MK-630
146 NA-607
147 NK-959
148 PC-600
149 PC-600
150 PC-600
151 PC-600
i

Description
Main Repair or replace the AVR for generator No.
Generators 1 (WO # 6287, ER # 1198. Waiting for PO
from Purchasing).
Main Repair the water cooling system for No. 1
Generators generator. (New Heat Exchanger on order
PO# P804674)
Thruster Ensure the upgrades on the ABB Sami-
VFD megastar drives for the thrusters are carried
out ASAP.
HP Investigate why No.2 compressor is only
Compressor able to produce. 2000 psi working pressure
and repair as necessary. The compressor is
rated for 4,500 psi and the system operating
pressure is 3,000 psi.
Relief Change relief valve on the BOP triplex
Valves pumps and diverter panel. No record could
be found when the last time these valves
were changed. This should be done every
two years to keep the certification current
Liebherr Change out all boom wire sheaves. They all
Cranes contain significant wire imprints in sheave
Both PS groove bottom. [PO# P825147/0, (1 0
and sheaves]
Starboard
Liebherr Replace damaged two lattices near boom tip
Cranes (both Liebherr cranes) (WO # 3112, ER #
Both PS 1120, PO # P830900/0 and PO#
and P830900/1)
Starboard
Liebherr Ensure that the grease is cleaned off the
Starboard power slip ring on the starboard crane.
Deck Crane (Complete)
Liebherr Replace the main electrical control panel in
Starboard the starboard crane pedestal as it is in
Deck Crane extremely poor condition with corrosion and
unterminated cables due to the fire that
occurred several months a_go .
Report of SuNey -- DEEPWATER HORIZON
Severity
Major
Minor
Major
Major
Minor
Major
Major
Major
--
Minor
89
TRN-HCEC-00063716

Ref PSS
Code
152 PC-601
153 PC-935
154 RG-651

155 RG-651
156 SC-805
157 SD-804
158 TX-694
159 UC-715
160 UC-715
161 UN-799
162 UN-799

Asset Asset Recommendation Severity
Description
Knuckle Fully disassemble pipe grab No. 3 and NDE Critical
Boom all load bearing areas not normally
Crane accessible. Four weld repairs have been
done on the smallest grab in the past year.
This grab has possible reached maximum
fatigue life. Outcome should define whether
the grab can continue to be used.
Riser Provide new protection for the service loop to Major
Gantry the trolley hoist at the location where the
Crane service loops enters the conveyor belt. The
sheet metal has cut here through the
protection sleeve and is rubbing on the main
hydraulic hose.
PA System Repair the UPS system for the PA/GA Rack
in the back-up control room. Rack "B'! is
currently out of service. (On Order PO #
P794203)
Telephone Repair phone in port GE switch room.
System (Completed)
Laundry Repair or replace No. 1 washing machine in
the laundry which is not operational (Parts
on order PO# P834100} (It must be noted
with one washing down the laundry cannot
keep up with the demand from the rig.)
Galley Repair or replace the dishwasher in the
galley which is severely corroded.
Hazardous Replace the desilter starter switch in the
Areas moonpool area which is damaged.
(Completed)
Life Boats Replace the broken and worn out inboard
boat fenders on lifeboat No. 4.
Life Boats Replace the cracked window in life boat No.
2. (Complete}
Fire Repair or replace the louvers on the fire
Dampers damper located on the main deck aft of the
drill floor.
Fire Repair the damaged vent on the exhaust fan
Dampers for the mud pump room located on the
starboard side of the main deck .
I .. Ma}Oi-l
Critical
Major
I
I
I
Major
Major
Major

I Minor I
Minor
90
TRN-HCEC-00063717

Ref PSS
Code
163 UX-708

164 VG-810
165 VG-810

Description
Ladder Fall Extend the upper wire rope support posts as
Arrest necessary on all ladder fall arrest devices so
System that personnel can unhook from a safe
position. Most of the "Ladsafe" systems in
place on the rig ladders were installed
incorrectly. The upper wire rope support
posts do not extend far enough above the
upper platform to permit personnel to unhook
safely. On the majority of the installations,
the wire rope support post is mounted below
the upper platform. resulting in the climber
having to release both hands from the
ladder, whil e standing on the ladder, to
unhook from the fall arrester. The proper
setup is to extend the upper mounting pole
far enough above the platform so that
personnel can stand safely on the platform to
unhook. That is the exact reason for the
long pole mounted on the upper wire
support. (The derrick ladder fall-arrest
system has been installed correctly and can
be used as an example of a safe system.)
HVAC If the rig should ever go to a cold climate,
then an REA should be raised to investigate
the issue with the duct heaters in the
accommodation not being the correct voltage
to operate. (It must be noted these heaters
were installed when the rig was in the
-
shipyard and have never been used.)
HVAC Repair or replace the starboard A/C
compressor unit 2B. (Parts on order PO #
P835533)
Report of DEEPWATER HORIZON
91
Severity
Critical
I
Minor
Minor
TRN-HCEC-00063718
G

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF SURVEY
DEEPWATER HORIZON
Prepared for
TRANSOCEAN
United States
Customer Reference: P7751 02
ModuSpec Reference: US1364.2
By
ModuSpec USA, Inc.
Inspection dates: 17- 31 October 2005
Confidenti al Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00063720

1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................... .......... ........... ........... .. .. . 2
2.0 INTRODUCTION ...................... ..... .. ............ .. .......... ......... .. .......... .. 3
3.0 IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES ...... ............................. ........... 4
Table 3.1 Improvement Opportunity Recommendations .... ... ........................ 4
[No1e: Item clP.scriptiOns followed hy and asterisk" are defined as Downtime Risk Equipment]
CH-209 Thrusters Unit .. ........ .... ................................................................. .. 6
EA-300 Drawworks* ... ..... ......................................................... ................. .. 7
LR-370 HiTech ................... .... .. ..... ..... ...................... .............. .. ................... 8
L.A.-607 Air compressor I Air System HP air ............................................... 8
4.0 MAINTENANCE ISSUES .................................................. ... ......... 9
Table 4.1 Maintenance Issue Recommendations ......................................... 9
[Note: Item descriptions followed by and asterisk are defined as Downtime Risk Equipment]
EA-300 Drawworks* .. ..................... ... ............................... ......................... 13
EK-913 Casing Stabbing Basket. .............................. ............................. ... 14
LA-948 PRS-6i" .. ............................... .... .......... .. .. ................................... ... 14
Reference: US 1364.2 -Supplemental
2
Confi dential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00063721

2.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this supplemental report was to capture ideas of merit and other
subjective recommendations resulting from the survey of the DEEPWATER HORIZON.
Some would be easily implemented for little cost while others have major budget
implications. All recommendations having a direct effect on the current state of the
assets were already submitted with the mai n report.
This supplemental report is divided into two main sections:

Improvement Opportunities
Maintenance Issues
Each section contains a table with recommendations sorted by PSS code. There was
no priority given for these recommendations as that can be assigned by Transocean
staff.
The improvement opportunity recommendations could be reviewed by rig management
who then decide on ideas of merit. Many of these ideas were already known by rig
management or they may have been partially aware of some circumstances .
The maintenance issues recommendations may apply to corporate, regional or be rig
specific. These recommendations could ultimately help the thoroughness or level of PM
implementation on the rig and throughout the company .
Reference: US1364.2-Supplemental
3
TRN-HCEC-00063722

3.0 IMPROVEMENT OPPORTU NIT1ES
Some discussion is made below this table to add clarity if required for the
recommendations given. These recommendations are mainly subjective in nature and
reflect the opinion(s) of individuals attending the survey. These could be considered by
rig management for future budgeting purposes for instance.
Table 3.1 -Subjective Recommendations for Rig Improvement
-
Ref PSS
Code
201 AN-050
f..-----
202 CH-209
203 CW-
904
204 EA-300
205 EA-300
I
206 EA-300
207 EA-300
I Asset Recommendation
Asset
Description
- --------
EM PAC Assign an experi enced EMPAC Optimizer do a full
system review and make the necessary corrections for
compliance with the requirements in the Maintenance
Manual. In addition, the Optimizer can review Standard
PM Tasks with the crews and attach rig-specific tasks
-
where deemed
---
Az;mut.L;
Provide a CJC filtration package for each thruster.
thruster (Currently two available; six more required). The
increased H
2
0 content in the gear oil of several
thrusters is likely not to reduce over time. Proper oil
filtration with CJC filters will likely maintain H20 levels
for extended periods below OEM maximum allowable
limits, thus reducing ri sk to damage or removal
reQuirement.
Bilge Drains Provide a drain connection from the auxiliary machinery
room aft side of the engine room with the dirty water
collecting tank system. Currently no drain system is in
place for this technical space.
Drawworks Review if having two sets of brake calipers spare and
ready for use is useful. The current set up will not allow
for maintenance under OEM and EMPAC guidelines
without prolonged shutdown. Spare sets be changed
out with the calipers in use at 365 days WO, dissembled
and inspected. This way only limited not
available time" is required and one can comply with
EMPAC WO and OEM maintenance guidelines.
Drawworks Consider the installation of a third MRU with
(AHD) comparison function. This will enhance the reliability of
the active heave function since a faulty MRU will be
recognized and rejected. Two MRUs will not be able to
distinguish a i aulty MRU by comparing when error is
minor. Note that all recent manufactured active heave
drawworks are all outfitted with three MRUs. Consult
with HiTech for options.
Drawworks' Brake hydraulics: Consider install ing a duplex filter to
improve maintenance availability. ('See Note 1)
Drawworks
Brake hydraulics: Consider a cost-versus-risk based
analysis to verify if it is desirable to install a pressure
transmitter on each pump outlet and to add the software
logic for positive f ailure detection or logic to confirm that
Report of Survey - DEEPVV ATER HORIZON
Severity
Minor
..... : ....
. VICoi.J V I
Minor
Maj or
Minor
I
I
Minor
Minor
4

Ref PSS
Code
208 EA-300
209 FF-326
210 GA-327

235 MF-627
236 1\A-607
237 OB-904
1
I
l 238 PC-600

239 SC-805
Asset Asset Recommendation Severity
Description
positive pressure change is achieved when the pumps
are operating. ( .. Note 1) This item is linked to a single-
point failure that would resul t in a set of calipers being
applied during operation unnoticed. The result can be
cracking or fracture of the brake disc within one minute
(speed of drum 50 rpm) thus incapacitating the Active
Heave mode wi th very little notice)
Drawworks Brake hydraulics: Consider a cost-verses-risk based Minor
analysis to verify if the installation is desirable of a
caliper position indication system (proximity switches)
and implementation of software logic to detect
unwante<;! calieer movement. (See Note 1 ).
Mud Mixing Improve the air extraction system around surge tank fed Major
Hoppers hoppers. Current air extraction capacity is insufficient in
any way for task and present health hazard for hopper
operator and damage to nearby equipment.
Recommend to purchase dedicated hopper dust
extraction system. Sufficient space is available for such
an installation.
Mud Pump The PRV outlet f bleed line of No. 1 and No. 4 pump are Minor
connected in a combined enclosed vessel. This
presents a risk for the rig crew working on one of the
PRVs or bleed off HP valves while the other pump is in
operation. PRV outlets should be independently and
directly routed to the pit with a sloped line. See outlet
mud pump No. 2 and No. 3 as example.
Generator Return the failed heat exchanger of Gen No. 1 to a work Major
Heat shop to determine exact leak location. The suspected
Exchanger root cause of intermediate tube supports cutting into the
tubes can be determined and consequently the fact
---------
__used in new type heat allocation.
--
HPAir Raise an REA to determine if the current HP Minor
Compressors compressor instal lation has sufficient capacity and
enough redundancy to limit the risk of fai iure to an
a_ceptably low critical oath system.
Seawater Review if an ICCP (Impressed Current Cathodi c Miner
Service Protection) system installed in each pump room
Piping seawater service lines would protect against corrosion
in this system. This in turn should reduce the railure
rate of the seawater service lines located in the pump
rooms. Also consider installing marine growth anodes
with the same system so that use of marine growth
control cnemicals can be avoided.
Liebherr Provide additional protection for boom chords and
M . --
aJar
Cranes Both lattices at boom tip against clashing of main block and
PS and boom (root cause boom damage) (WO # 31 12, ER #
Starboard 1120, PO# P830900/0 and PO# P830900/1)
Laundry This rig is approved for 146 POB and therefore should Minor
consider installing an additional washing machine and
--'--------
Report of Survey - DEEPVV A TER HORIZON
5
Code Description
dryer to keep up with demand. At the present time.
there are only three washing machines and three
dryers. One washer was down during the assessment
and the laundry was unable to keep up with demand.
Clothes put out at 6 PM were very often not ready until
9 or 10 AM the following d a ~ .
240 TH-802 Watermakers Water production is not nearly high enough to match Minor
consumption due to the low load the engines. Average
production over the past six months has been around
21 metric tons per day while the consumption has
averaged about 55 metric tons. Consider adding a
modern 30-ton reverse-osmosis watermaker to bring
the production up to the point where !he rig is self
; sufficient.
CH-209 Thruster Unit
An increase of H20 content was obseNed in the gear box oil of several of the eight
azimuth thrusters.
Values in Red require attention
- - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~
Values in , indicate an H
2
0 reduction after the gear oil has been
circulated over a JCJ filter.
The OEM recommends maintaining HzO levels below 0.5% in the gearbox oil. The two
available CJC Jensen filters have proven to be capable of reducing the H
2
0 levels
below OEM maximum allowable levels. By maintaining H
2
0 levels below the 0.5%
level, operational time will be increased. An improvement is an additional six CJC
filtration packages (or similar brand; however CJC Jensen is well known and proven
world wide for exactly this function). All thrusters could then be outfitted with one
permanent installed CJC filtration package and hard piped into the thruster piping. The
estimated budget would be approximately US S60,000 for six units with installation by
the crew.
Experience on other rigs indicated that even with the worst leaking shaft seals, water
content can be maintained within acceptable levels and thus ensuring continuous
operation of the thrusters of several years beyond the five-year designed unattended
Report of Survey -- DEEPWATER HORIZON
Reference: US13S4.2-Supplemental
6
TRN-HCEC-00063725

service life.
EA-300 Drawworks AHD1 000
A total system review performed in 2003 on a similar AHD1 000 but on a different MODU
had revealed some of the following issues described below. These issues are as well
applicable to the AHD1 000 on this rig and should be reviewed against a cost I risk base
to verify if improvements can be made. The issues are related to the hydraulic brake
release system. The brake release system was regarded critical due to the requirement
of continuing in active heave mode. Caliper brakes are spring applied, hydraulic
pressure released. Loss of hydraulic pressure will result in the brake calipers being
applied and consequently active heave operati on will be impossible.
Note that the disc brake manufacturer indicated in an estimated calculation that was
based on a drum speed of 50 rpm. If a set of calipers would be appl ied unintentionally,
the disc would heat up in a time frame of approximately one mi nute to a level that the
thermal stresses would become so high that the disc brake will most likely crack and
possibly f racture. A fracture is likely to result in damage to hydraulic lines which in turn
would apply all calipers thus the block would come to a stop. However, the damage
would be such that major NPT is ensured and likely no possibilities would remain to
raise the BHA to a safe position within a reasonable period .
Check valves (AH)
If one of t he check valves fails, the hydraulic oil will either circulate to the tank and heat
up the oil or give a reverse leak over the stand by pump resulting in loss of redundancy
of the hydraulic pumps. There are no provisions in place to detect a reverse flow. A
possible improvement is:
Consider a cost I risk based analysis to verify if it is desirable to install a
pressure transmitter on each pump outlet and add the software logic for positive
failure detection or logic to confirm that positive pressure change is achieved
when the pumps are operating.
Hydraulic filters:
The system contains only a single hydraulic filter with bypass.
Consider installing a duplex filter to improve maintenance availability.
The risk of a set of calipers being applied is low due to a relative low quantity of
components that upon failure will result in a set of calipers being applied. However, the
result of a set of calipers being applied during operation can be significant with high
NPT implications .
7
TRN- HCE C-00063 726

D03 Solenoid Valves (C) and Pressure reducing I relieving valve (K) are realistically the
only items that have some risk potential for unintentional caliper applying. We
generated maintenance recommendations for these items in the maintenance section of
this report.
One way to remove the risk of unintentionally calipers application is to install hardware
(proximity switches) and a software logic that can detect if the cal ipers are slowly being
engaged (due to internal leakages in the caliper valves or solenoid valve). Consequently
an alarm can be given to the operator who would immediately have to go to a safe
condition. The downside however is the increased risk for failures during operation due
to the increased quantity of items installed. Proximity switches on brake calipers would
be vulnerable and could be stepped on during maintenance or cut and slip action.
Consider a cost I risk based analysis to verify if the installation is desirable of a
caliper position system {proximity switches) and implementation of software
logic to detect unwanted caliper movement.
MRU
The active heave mode of the AHD 1 000 gains the heave signal through two MRUs.
Recent AHD1000 installations are outfiUed with three MRUs which have proved to be
more reliable. If when outfitted with two MRUs a minor permanent error occurs in one
of the two MRUs, the software will not be able to distinguish this error since it will have
no comparing value and the systems continuous with an error which will be visible
between the MRU curve (heave height) and block height. With three MRUs installed,
verification of the signal is possible. If an MRU fails and its signals move outside an
acceptable deviation from the calculated average, the erroneous MRU will be taken out
of the average calculation. Consider to upgrade from the existing two MRU
configuration to a three MRU configuration.
NA-607 Air Compressors/Air System- High Pressure
The installed Hamworthy KSE HP air compressor capacity consisted of:
Two HP air compressors rated for an Free Air Delivery (FAD) of 35-75 cfm
Displacement of 53-1 00 cfm at 1 00% duty
Maximum rated pressure: 4,500 psi
System working pressure: 3,000 psi
Running hours of No. 1: 2493
Running hours of No. 2: 3,019
A review of the history files indicated that the majority of breakdown and PM tasks
showed work involved on the either the Jabsco cooling water pumps or the inlet I outlet
valves in the cylinder heads. Both of these failures are common for compressors
operating at the high end of their capacity curve. Reportedly both HP air compressors
had been rebuilt in 2005 by the rig crew.
Report of Survey - DEEP\NATER HORIZON
Reference: US13642-Supplemental
8

The installed APV capacity was thirty APVs with a total capacity of 2,747 ft
3
_
Report of Survey - DEEPVVATER HORIZON
9

4.0 MAINTENANCE ISS.UES
Some discussion was made below this table to add clarity if required for the
recommendations given. These recommendations sometimes apply to improvements
that should be made at the rig level, while others might require regional or corporate
involvement. No distinction between which party might be responsible for these
recommendations is given in this table.
Table 41- Maintenance Issues Recommendations
Ref
301
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
PSS Asset Asset Recommendation
Code Description
AN-050 Central Library/ Rig equipment paper fi les. equipment rnanuals and
Technical Files electronic files must be arranged alphabeticall y by PSS
code as per the Maintenance Manual Section 3.
Subsection 7.
AN-050 EM PAC Create an asset for ''Potable Water lnline Filters" and enter
all pot water fi lters as asset positions for all drinking
fountains. ice machines and coffee pots. Schedule and
perform the standard PM task to this asset (filters are
..
chanoed every six months) .
AN-050 EM PAC Create assets for drilling drive motor VFD Line-Up No. 1
for the drawworks drive motor No. 1. mud pump drive
motor 1A and mud pump drive motor 2A .
AN-050 EM PAC , Create the asset registers (with asset positions for each
device} as recommended in the Maintenance Manual and
schedule t he standard PM tasks where available.
Examples are ESD. Gas Detection, Fire Detection,
Portable Extinguishers, Fire Dampers and Anti-Fall
Devices.
--
AN-050 I EMP AC Delete all unscheduled PM tasks as per the maintenance
manual. There are over 400 obsolete rig specific PMs sliil
AN-050 EMPAC
AN-050 EMPAC
AN-050 EM PAC
attached to assets and not scheduled. This causes
conf usion when :rying to review and plan active PMs.
In the future, ensure that more detailed information for
each task is entered into the history in the EMPAC system,
including megger readings, temperatures and amp
readings for the following equipment AC drive motors.
transformers and 1-N switchboards.
Low megger readings were recorded in PM notes for the
aux drawworks drive motor and others. but no remedial
action was taken. In the future. ensure that a CM Work
Order is created and that action is taken to correct the
problem.
Review the "Relief Valve Register" asset positi ons and
ensure that all PRVs are listed, such as the one for the
BOP tripl ex pumps and the three for t he diverter panel.
Also add the three individual relief valve assets to the
register and then make these assets inactive so that their
history is retained, but no work orders can be written

Reference: US 1364.2-Supplemental
Severity
---
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor

Major
Minor
10

Ref PSS
Code
311 AN-050
312 AN-050
313 AN-D 50
314 AN-050

315 AN-QSO
316 AN-050
317 AN-Q50
I
318 AN-Q50
319 EA-300

I
Description
EM PAC Review the "Routine Task" Asset PMs and make sure t he
daily and weekly tasks are up-io-date. Some appear to be
lacking. In addition, some "Associate Assets" links are
missing from the PM Tasks and need to be added.
EMPAC Runtime PM scheduling for the main engines is incorrectl y
setup in several places. As per the maintenance manual.
change the following PMs from "Date Closed to "Date
Scheduled" configuration: Engine No. 1: 99004. 99006.
99007, 99008. Engine No.3: 99007. Engine No.4:
99006. (Completed)
EM PAC Step 1 of the 90--day PM for the main dravtworks AC drive
motors calls for an internal inspection and the work orders
are being closed out without completing this step. In the
future. ensure that this step is completed.
EM PAC Submitted by rig: Rig-specific tasks attached to standarc
PM tasks do not show up on online work orders. They are
present only on printed work orders or on a work order
report. Therefore the craft overlook these rig-specific tasks
on a regular basis because they are taught to be efficient
by working online. The crew feels that the rig-specific
tasks should appear on the online work orders as well as
the printed versions .
EM PAC Submitted by rig: The field "Asset Location" has been
removed from work orders. Previously much time and
effort was expended in entering this data so that the craft
will know the exact location of the equipment that the work
order is referring to. Now they do not have access to that
information and would like to see it reinstated.
EM PAC Submitted by rig: The field "Wori< Order Asset Status"
has been removed from work orders. The input choices for
this field were "Failed". "Out of Service . "Running" and
''Will Fail". The crew had been able to run a query or
report on this data that showed them what equipment was
"Out of SeNice". Now that function is unavailable and they
would like to see it reinstated.
EM PAC The 180-day Standard PM Task (99004) to blow out the
drawworks AC drive motors should be deleted. This task
serves no purpose and should be eliminated hecause the
motors are constantly being cooled with a high volume air
flow. The rig has generated change request DWH-015 to
eliminate this task.
I EMPAC
The standard PM Task repor1 indicated that several of the
Standard Tasks available were not being utilized. Review
I
this report and sche-dule the standard tasks where
appropriate.
Dra'"vworks The 365-Day PM Task. Step 1, calls for NOT inspection of
the load-bearing areas. Step 4 calls for bearing clearance
measurement. Neither step was completed in 2004. At
the time of the assessment there was an open PM Work
Order to do this PM in 2005, but it had not been completed
Report of SuNey - DEEPWATER HORIZON
Severity
Minor
Major
Major
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Minor
Major
11

Ref PSS
Code
320 EA-300
321 E.A.-300
- -
322 EA-300

323 EF-315
324 EF-315
325 EK-913
326 EK-948
327 EL-309

Description
yet. OEM service manual EPL-1424 indicates the areas
that require NDE (all on caliper ciisc brake system). Step 1
(NOT) should be completed. Step 4 should be reviewed
for feasibility instead of j ust entering the comment: "no
access to any b earings". (ModuSpec does not support the
measurement of bearing clearance by means of feeler
gauges due to the possibility of damaging the shaft seal.
The feasibility of measuring bearing clearance should
focus on a reliable shaft lift method (which, however, is
difficult due to AC drives and gearbox installation).
003 solenoid valves for the brake hydraulics: Add a
standard PM task to evaluale the condition of these valves.
Verify OEM requirements for testing. csee Note 1)
Drawworks* 003 solenoid valves for the brake hydraulics: Perform
a cost-verses-risk based analysis to verify if it is desirable
to change out these solenoids at predetermined intervals
(possibl e 1825 days) Note 1)
Drawworks* Pressure Redu cing I Relieving valve for the brake
hydraulics: Add a standard PM task to test both the
relieving and reducing function of this valve. (Note 1) This
item is linked to a single-point failure that would result in a
set of calipers being applied during operation unnoticed.
The result can be cracking or fracture of the brake disc
within one minute (speed of drum 50 rpm) thus
incapacitating the Active Heave mode wrth very little
notice).
TDS Measure and record the gear backlash annually to aid in
determining the gear and main bearing condition. This in
conjunction with an borescope review of the gear box. will
be an important value for the frve year condition evaluation.
Currently no evaluation methods other then oil samples are
available.
TDS IBOP Verify if upper and lower I BOP have been replaced
following the 180-day WO in September 2005 (Reportedly
I BOPs have been replaced, though not recorded in
EMPAC.)
Stabbing Ensure the upper and lower hinge pin connections are
Basket NDE at the next lifting gear inspections. Linear indications
have been found on a variety of similar baskets on other
riQS.
Lower Ensure the lower fingerboard currently not in use and
Fingerboard raised ir: the vertical position is fully serviced prior to
reinstating. A variety of damaged I sheare::l latches were
observed on this board. A variety of latches have been
removed presumably for part usaQe.
Crown Block The 1,825-day WO task completed in September 2005
calls for a complete inspection including NOT. Instead, the
work performed was only a visual on all wetds and a
straight beam ultrasonic test (UT) on the main shaft and
fast line shaft. Review if further N DT is required to satisfy
Severity
Major
'
I
Major
Major
Maj or
Major
Major
Minor
Major
12
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN- HCEC-00063731

Ref PSS
Code
I
328 EM-311
329 E0-312
330 GA-327

331 GA-327
356 LA-948
357 MA-625
358 PD-626
359 TD-956
360 TX-694

j Asset Asset Recommendation
Description
the intent of the 1 ,825-Day PM task. Note that if the
sheaves are disassembled, they could be turned around
and thus increase the useful life.
Travelling Block The 1 ,825-day PM task completed in September 2005
calls for a complete disassembly of the travelling block
followed by NDE on the load bearings areas and the
sheaves (Step 3). Step 6 calls for bearing renewal. Step 7
calls for a turnaround of the sheaves during assembly to
prolong sheave wear. The only work performed was a
visual inspection on the sheaves, followed by straight
beam ultrasonic testing (UT) on the main shaft and the
becket pin. (Post discussion revealed that WO was
possibly confused with the 365-day WO and
unintentionally closed. 1 ,825-day WO was reopened
after discussion.)
Counterbalance Schedule standard PM tasks, none were scheduled at the
Rotating Hook time of our survey
Mud Pump 1-2- Ensure silicon-type sealants are not used at openings due
3-4 to the inherent risk for oil line blockages. The excessive
quantities of silicon sealant observed should be removed
f rom the power end internals. Dry gaskets or liquid gasket
material such as Locktite dry sealant should be used only .
Mud Pumps Request a standard PM task for an annual NDE of the mud
pump crankshaft. The history of the No. 4 pump
crankshaft cracks warrants this PM 1ask.
PRS Fwd and PRS gripper arm assembly: Pull one load pin for condition
Aft evaluation (see supplemental report for pin location). If pin
or bore bushings are wom extensively, more pins will have
to be pulled. Pre-greased bearing bushings have caused
worn pins and elongated bores after several years of
operation on PRS units. resulting in extensive rework of
arm and bores.
r.Jlain Engines Perform the outstanding maintenance based on running
hours on main engine No. 2 (1 ,000 hr). 3 (2.000, 4.000.
16,000 hr) and 6 (2. 000. 4.000. 16,000 hr} when
switchboard confiquration allows.
Deck crane Verify and ensure that rig crew responsible for the deck
engine crane engine main1enance are trained or are familiar with
the Caterpillar electronic mjection system and condition
evaluation through Caterpillar-supplied software on laptop.
The high occurrences of injector f ailures suggest possible
incorrect settings. These engines are generally well
accepted in the land drilling industry and perform generally
well.
Hazardous Create an asset for hazardous area vent fans, schedule
Area Vent Fans the standard PM tasks to it and complete the maintenance
as soon as possible.
Hazardous Identify all the electrical devices in the hazardous areas.
Areas attach an I. D. Tag to each one and enter into a hazardous
area reqister.
Severity
Major
Major
Ma;or
Major
Minor
Minor
Major
Miror
lVI in or
13
TRN- HCEC-00063732

Code Descri ption
361 TX-694 Hazardous Schedule the standard PM tasks to the hazardous area Major
Areas register and complete the EX maintenance program as
soon as possible.
362 UD-654 UPS System Ensure all the UPS systems on the rig are identified for Minor
use, including the AC power source for each system.
363 UD-654 UPS System Ensure that load tests are periormed frequently to monitor Major
the condition of the UPS units. Multiple failures have
occurred in the past and caused downtime, so these units
need to be watched carefully.
364 US-713 Gas Detection At present the combustible gas levels are set at 20% LEL Major
System (High) and 60% LEL {High-High). but wi1h only 50% gas on
the rig these pre-set levels are unobtainable: therefore.
recommend the LEL values in the Simrad system be set up
to alarm at 20% LEL (High) and 40% LEL (High-High).
(Submitted MOC MD 48)
EA-300 Drawworks AHD1000
Several things can be done to improve the reliability of the drawworks_ The areas that
we focused on are items that upon failure would directly result in either loss of Active
Heave capability or direct NPT due to other reasons .
Pressure reducing I relieving valve (K)
If a failure occurs in this valve preventing it from opening, it will eventually result in an
inability to release the brakes. An internal leakage will eventually engage the brakes. A
premature open situation might overpressure the brake calipers and might lead to an
external leakage. All actions will eventually result in a loss of Active Heave capability.
Add a PM standard task to test both the relieving and reducing function of thi s
valve.
D03 Solenoid Valves (C)
If an internal leak occurs during operation, a maximum of two cali pers might
unintentionally be set and consequently will incapacitate the active heave mode. There
are no possibilities to remove this risk; however, proper maintenance will reduce the
possibility of f ailure.
Add a PM standard task to evaluate the condition of these valves at possible
730-day to '1 .095-day intervals.
Consider a cost I risk based analysis to verify if it is desirable to change out
these solenoids at predetermined intervals (possibly 1,825 days).
EK-913 Casing Stabbing Board
14

Crack-like indications were found in the knees supporting the upper and lower main
hinge points caused by the force applied by the hydraulic cylinder that swings the
assembly.
Similar areas where cracks have been found were upgraded by adding heavier knees
and web plates at the hinge pin connection. The next annual inspection should include
an NDE of the knees supporting the main frame connection.
LA-948 Pipe-Racking Syst em*
An 1 ,825-day PM standard task should include the task to pull at least two pins from the
lower gripper arm assembly. This will allow an inspection of the pin, bore and bushings.
Inspections on similar arm assemblies after three years of operation revealed worn
bushings to the extent that the pin had worn out the bore, resulting in time-consuming
reworking of the bore. If worn bushings are found, then it should be verified if
greaseable pins are installed. If pre-greased bushings are used with no grease options
in the pin, an upgrade should be considered. The upgrade would consist of changing
the non-greaseable pins out for greaseable pins. See pictures below of worn bushings
and worn bores and the new pin upgrade. Note that the damage visible in the pictures
below were observed on a non-TOI rig. These are not actual pictures from the
DEEPWATER HORIZON. The picture at bottom indicates the upgraded pin version
with grease bores .
15
TRN-HCE C-00063734

'-lu -Ju
v-Ii'"'"
.- l"'C.."#
..r"'
.... , _
...,-.,.r w;Cf' "'-'=..
:;ubuJ.
Report of Survey- DEEP\'V ATER HORIZON
16
TRN-HCEC-00063735
17
TRN-HCEC-00063736
H

Report on Subsea Equipment Condition
Deepwater Horizon
Prepared
by
Gary Eastveld
for
Transocean
WEST Job #OOlC
30 November 2005
\:( l.::::::::-1- ENGINEERING
~ - 1 ~ SERVICES
ISO 9001:2000 Certified
Deepwater Horizon WEST Job #OOJC

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Executive Summary
3.0 Assessment Findings
IG-405 Wellhead Connector (Vetco SHD H-4)
IG-405 Wellhead Connector (Cameron DWHC)
IH-425 Flex Joint (LMRP)
IH-425 Flex Joint (Divertcr)
IJ-405 Riser Connector Cameron HC !OK
IJ-422 Riser
IJ-426 Telescopic Joint
TJ-480 Marine Riser Adapter
J0-423 RiserTensioner Support Ring
10-432 Riser Spider and Gimbal
10-433 Riser Handling Tools
IP-43 1 Riser T ensioner
IP-473 Riser Tensioner Control Pand
JQ-41 1 RiserTcst Tools
IR-442 Riser Recoil System
J A -40 I Ram Pre venters
JB-400 Annular BOP
JD-412 BOP Hub Clamps
JD-427 BOP Stack Frame (General)
JD-930 Gate Valves (Failsafe/Subsea BOP)
JE-413 BOP Control Panels
JE-434 BOP Mixing Unit
JE-448 Accumulator Bottles
JE-474 BOP Triplex Pumps
JG-416 :MUX and Hotline Reels
JG-435 BOP Control Pods
JG-444 MUX Cable
JH-478 BOP Handling Unit
fl-474 Test Pwnp
JJ-407 Diverter Assembly
JK.-430 Diverter Control Slcid
nvf-468 C&K Manifold and Piping
JN-469 Remote Choke Control Unit
J0-443 Choke (Auto, Drill ing)
J0-467 Coflexip Type Hoses
J0-484 Choke and Kill Collet M1m Connectors
. D-604 Receiver, Air (APV) High Pressure Bottles
>JJJ-904 Piping High Pressure Air Piping & Va.lves & Regulators
4.0 Asset Deficiencies
5.0 Maintenance Issues
6.0 Improvement Opportunities
7.0 \VEST A TP

1.0 Introduction
Project Summary
Rig: Deepwater Horizon
Transocean
Location: Atwater Valley 398#1 OCS-G 16910
Dates of Audit: 17 to 31 October 2005
Team Members: Gary Eastveld- WEST
Allan Schneider - Moduspec
Peter Sierdsma- Moduspec
Ron Dailey- Transocean. (Team Leader)
WEST ln-Housc Technical Keview: Leon Schwartz
\\'EST In-House Admir.ist:"ativc Review: Angela Caliandro
Operator Personnel
Rig Manager: John Keeton
Rig OIMs: Van Williams, Jimmy Ha.-"Tell
Maintenance Supervisors: Kenneth-Peter Hildre, Karsten Petersen
Toolpushcrs: Greg Magee. Tim Williams
Senior Subsea Engineers: Mark Hay, Billy St1ingfcllow
Electrical Supervisors: Steve Benone, Tom Field
.Deepwater Hori:on WJ:.'ST Job #00/C
Confidenti al Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-000637 40

2.0 Executive Summary
The subsea equipment was in good condition. The subsea engineers were keeping up with the PMs .
There does not seem to be any planning for the five year survey on the critical path equipment. The rig
will have to shut down operations to accomplish the five year survey on several major pieces of
equipment These are in the critical path, requiring the rig floor to be involved to assist in pulling the
equipment. The Tensioner Support Ring is a good example. It will have to be disconnected from the
riser tensioners and put on deck. The PM calls for the following tasks: fully disassemble the support
ring to its component level; remove all seals; visually, dimensionally and NDT inspect the tensiouc:r
pad eyes and the body; visually and dimensionally check all sealing areas; visually and dimensionally
inspect the dogs and bores and rotating dogs and cylinders; ensure all hydraulic p011S are clear; and
then pressure test all chambers to maximum working pressure. During the inspection process,
problems could be fow1d in sealing areas requiring the supp011 ring to be shopped. Having a spare
support ring to change out would eliminate potential problems and save time and effort. The ram
bonnets are all due 21 June 2006. Once again, spare components, a set of bonnets in this case. to rotate
out with the om::s on the BOP stack would save time and effort. This applies to all majorp1ects of
equipment. Statting the five year survey on equipment eariy and replacing or rebuilding 20% of the
each year is an efftctive means of accomplishing the required maintenance without
shutting down rig operations. The key is having spares to change out, a llowing the removed
equipment to be shopped for complete inspections. The r ig does have a spare riser tensioner. The #6
riser tensioner leaks. Once the spare riser tensioner is refurbished. it should be changed out with #6.
When the audit team arrived on the rig, the LMRP was being deployed, and tl1c BOP stack was on
bottom. To assess the condition of the subsea drill through equipment, past maintenance histories and
Vv'EST reports were used as the basis. The audit was conducted with the following five quest10ns in
mind:
1) \\'hat was inspected? Equipment, space, tank?
2) How was it inspected? Visual? Measurements/readings? Function test?
3) \\'hat was the condition? Good operational shape? Wore out? Broke?
4) Row was the maintenance? Being done'? Not being done?
5) was the conclusion?
At the conclusion oftl1e audit, a closeout meeting was held with key ri g personnel to discuss :he
findings and the recommendations .
TRN-HCEC-00063741
3.0 Assessment Findings
IG-405 Wellhead Connector (Vetco SHD H-4)
The well head coMector presently being used is a Vetco SHD H-4 15K connector. The BOP stack is
subsea, so it was unavailable for close visual inspection. The ROV was mn to obsetve the riser
connector indicator rod during the riser connector tmlatch. While the ROV was down, a visual
inspection of the BOP stack was done. Nothing out of the ordinary was noticed at that time. Tbe
connector wa<> latched with no leaks observed. The Assethistoty on the wellhead connector was
checked, the subsea log was checked, and the maintenance was discussed with the subsea engineer.
The PMs arc being done. The c01mector was sent ru Vetco to be refurbished and the 30" inserts were
installed. The connector was installed back on t he BOP stack 28 June 2005. Chamber tests were done
ar the time of installation. The connecter has the upgraded hydrate lip s c a l l a t ~ s t revision. Rev. D.
Figure 1. The lip seal has gone through several revisions. The latest, part number H- 120251 Rev. D ..
has a solid heel for increased stability in the groove. This replaced the Rev. C that only had a hard cap.
The improvement was gene.rated to makt: !he hydralt: seal hardt:r to dislodge when landing on the
wellhead. The wellhead connector does have wash pons ser up tor glycol injection. The wellhead
connector and the test stump do have the VX/\l T r ing groove upgrade. The VT is tbc secondary seal
on a VXJVT ring gaskt:r!ring groove. The r ing groove is in good condition on the test stump. Figure 3.
Old full elastomer seal Rev C Seal with Nylatron cap Latest Rev D Sea] with solid heel
Figure l The upgraded hydrate lip seal latest revision, Rev 0 .
Deepwater Horizon WEST Job iKJOJC
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdi ngs LLC TRN-HCEC-00063742
Figure 2 'T'hc stump with bevels added to centralizing r ing is shown on left. a."ld the stu.:np with
hydrate seal test sk!rt is showa on right.
Hgu.e 2 ... s the old style lC$t stump the rig has <Uld \'etco
tc:>t stu.np wilh the hydra:c sealles:. skirt. 3 1s the wst slw11p the rig is usi"lg. -\t ti1c end u. th;s
w ... the wellhead connector will be replaced with the DWHC <;onmxwr
' t I
Figure 3 The test stun1p the r ig i s using is the Millennium's. nus stwnp was being used because it
has the 30 inserts: Their stump is the sa.-ne a.1d is not mocificd with the hydrate seal test skirt
lJet>pwaJer Harizf>f1 'ri'E:')T feb #00/C
IG-405 Wellhead Connector (Cameron DWHC)
The rig is equipped with two
wellhead connectors. At
present, the Vctco SHD H-4
1 SK is installed; however, at
the end of this well. it wil: be
>eplnced with LlJe Cameron
DVlHC c.or.nector shown in
Figure 4. The operating
cht:mbcrs have been
+cstcct to 3000 psi and the
g;15l:ct t .. ) 1500 psi.
The "'lump rng groove
was visually and
ound lo be L1 good condition.
llc ;;ubsea cngine:r ha:>
inspected th:: ring AX
ring gu:>o\ funnd it o Le
i.n gcod c:mdition. n1e plan is
to shop the coru1cctor o.t tht':
end of the next s.1or1 well.
IH-425 Flex Joint (LlVIRP)
Figure 4 The Cameron D\VHC v..ellhcad connector will be installed
for the next wel l.
fhe Oil State:: fley Joint on the LMRP was visually iJ:specled afk:.- jt was p,tlled for Hurrica.'1e \Vilmn.
TI1c flex dencnt ,, tn be free from cut; anr
1
g.:mges, 1!" good cond!tion. '.l.as only mino
:<cysc:at ng !\ho n 5 on the \Vear bushing. The PM rr.ain:er.ancc was la5t done 02 July
200:>; Ct.ll Th<:> v.a::. cb.cc.kcd on the hnhfclanp <>tud nuts. On 1 S 200<\
. lt\\tr fkx join1 subs were checked for the proper torque. The PMs arc being do1e, :1nd
tre '"':::>:joint s r::molly in condition. Tbc protective c-over was iu good c0nJition. 1\ft;
mfom1atJon fouud on lhe "N"DT /\ yc:uly NDT in:-:pedion wa::- Tl!e
fiv.: vcar is dne in 31 Mcy 2006 .
.Dei!pwater Horizon WE.Sl Job #OOJ C
Confidenti al Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-000637 44
Figure 5 The view is looking dovvn the wellb1)re. The arrow shows the minor keyscating that rig
records and the subsea engineer confirm :s several years old.
ffi-425 Flex Joint (Diverter)
rhc F.c:; ]i)int \VuS visually
fr.)r curs. eoug-:;->g a:'d
s..:par.1ticn in the element. Figures 6
a .. :l/. The flex was in
OOc! condit;on. l11e stud nuts
to the PM.
The five yc:.11 !'t! ''.::y is in i\1av

Figure 6 The arww points t o the Flex Joint element visually
checked and found to be in good condition.
Deepwater Horizon WEST Job fiOOJ C
Figm e 7 ;ltTOWS point to the flex Joint ck:mcnt and the stud i1Uts that arc torque checked per PlvL
U-405 Riser Connector Cameron HC lOK
The Cameron HC 1 OK Rise: Connector was to C::uneron refurbished. It was installeci back on
rltc L!VlRP on the 8 June 2005. The opcrati'!lg chambers have beer! pressure tested to 3000 psi and the
gasket release to 1500 psi. The test stump AX ring gasket was visually inspected and found to be in
.:,:ood condition. The hub faces between the stack mandrel and the connector need relief grooves cut to
prevent an unpl:mned metal-to :netal seal. On the Cameron HC nser connector, the indicator rod
sl10uld b::: measured a:tilua]y off the ::-tump <md on. Thc:r:ser cunnecto should be tested lor
b:tek-dri.;ing as ao: a Pilot Operated Chcd. Valve (POCV,.
J-422 Riser
1llc general condition of ;he joints \'tsnally \Vas good. Clc.scr i11Spcction v.:a.s d0nc on
.::hoke and kill, boos! Uld conduit box and pin The JQner sea.! on the and kill
conduit and boost were cleancl, in:spc<:t..:d and nc"' s-:als in:stallcd. Tht>. groo-ves wer.-; iu good
All :mxili:lry line c.amps and flotation nspecrcd was secure.: mounted on the
the box and pin end on t1e two bottmn rows ofriscr. The :;cal change out
completed and the ck.aneci. choke '111<1 kill ranctuil ancl boost
1
:.ins e ilil and a
ae.,. mud seal "''as ulstalled on the ptr: end The sculing aretls on the pn:; were good condition flt"
A'>Ms being usca were not for Vctco H:iv!F but wer:: for v c::1cc 'vfR type Tl:is PC(;ds to be
changed to \'<;:teo "iMF type riser for proper P:tvfs. The riser upgrarles for rser bolLs.
7NH14!522-3; new style lor;gcr :nscr:s, PN Hl41521-3: and steel snap rings,
N 19.5184 14.., wt:re compkiccl. mll 10 April ?.004 There some <nertiw.; ior
nsp.;ctton. l he critcri:. for detcnn:ning the inspection: :5% a year for [onr years cr 20 %a year for
'ivc m<l:' be changing according to information received. Some rigs uo>v us days run.
This makes a lot more sense. Figures 8 and 9 are typical ex::unplcs of the good condition of th-: sealing
a.cas on the pin end and equally goo<! on Lhc box end. Figures 10 anJ 11 arc close-ups.
Wbt:n lht: ::.t::al:s a.c changed on the hox end. the seal grooves are cieaned and inspected. with any sharp
edges found dressed.
Deepwater Horizon WE:ST Job #00 f C
s Pin -.nd of the riser.
fj.aure 9 l.3o-.:: end of t1lc ,.;scr.
"'
Decpwatcr H ori::.MI Job #OOIC
TRN-HCEC-000637 4 7

ngurc 10 Closer view of 01c choke line box end showing Jle lip seals and cleaning .
Figure 11 C"to:-cr view of the choke line pin end.
Jl.l!j '.0 bottOF"I ".V<:nt smcoLhly wit.1 and kill lines bCtnf" pres;;ur:: \"!S1ed [0 12000 rsi
to ''nbk:n:..
Deepwater HQrizon fVEST Job #OOIC
IJ-426 Telescopic Joint
The Telescopic (slip) Joint #2 is being nm. Til.is was put iri service inApriJ 2005 after a complete
inspection. In addition to the standard shop inspection at Expert Riser SohJtion, the area around the
slip joint where it locks to the riser tensioner r!ng was strengthened. The packers were replaced, the
inner bane! \>,:as inspectec., and the fluid bearing was rebuilt. The slip joint"# J is no\\' shopped to ge'
the same aml upgrade Roth vtsually and operationally, the !>lip joinr was in good condition.
The rig. was rotated several times, with be fluid bearing working well, at 1500 psi en the
During this process, the cylinder above the Diverlcr sktd it indicating be system
""a" properly filled. Current forces have cause damage to tho hydraulic lmes cn the 3lip jDint running
down to the: fluid beating. To remedy this problem a protective channel was fabricated anc
1
.nstatlcd to
cover the hydr:>.ulic to the t1uid bearing, Figure 12.
l2 ll1e slip joint with the arro',v pointing to the protecti,e channel mstalled over tlw
lines.
D:1cpwat ,,. florizo11 WEST Job #00 I C
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HC E C-00063 7 49
IJ-480 !\'Iarine IDser Adapter
The Marine Riser Adapter was in good condition, the well bore was visually mspccted for keyseating at
the same time as the t1exjoinL See Figure 51lbove. ll1c five year survey is due tn 2006.
I0-423 Riser Tensioner Support Ring
The Riscr Tensioncr Support Ring was vi&o;!tly inspected from the deck, Figurt.: 13. The ring
\).'3S visually in good ':'.ondition from the deck vic'"' While on the tig, rig operations \\:ere as
the LMRP \Vas pulled and run to hunie<me Wilma No problerns <..vcrc encountered i:llatching and
unlatching th:-; R;scr Tcnsioner ring. The contro sand locking cylinder .n good 'i\or:<i.ng
ord.;r Equipment operztional problems concqrning the riser Lt:::n::ioner support ring were
discUscd with the subsea eng.iutX:r:s. The prohlerns were primari:y with t.1e cci1troJ hose bw1<ik
damaged by the em en: and v:eatl:er. L1e control h0sc bundle is made up of6 lengths of hose, 110ft.
long. A spare control hose bundle is on board. Tbc. Assel rcYiC',>.'CI.i. and :he 365 day PM
\\D.S compktcd on !he 2 July 2005. All checks were made. and the Control Hose
U\ie year sun cy i-; due 21 June 2006. The rig has qc.otc-5 on comcrting thcit riser Tenstun..:r
s ... ppo'": Ring :nto KT L)J:jt. ring. TIH:: pn.'lj.:ct is nngning nnd should happen in 2006. KI
..._.ould allow lJl<... choke and kill and conduit and boost host'S ro stuy attached, eliminating timc-
con-:umingjoh of mstalltng the on the tcm1inntion joint. One to take into
account is th;; availability of a spare cnsioncr ring. Transocean sh::mld check into the intcrcllangabilt,y
the tt.:usioner rings so they could possibly carry one spare ring for five rigs. ll1e advantage oi' this
would be havmG a spare to utilize for the five year su:-vcy, allowing the tig's unit to be sent in for
inspection.
Figure 13 Locking down at the Tensioncr Support Ring that was n good condition.
DeepwaJar Hori:on Fr,.EST Job #()OJC
TRN-HCEC-00063750
I0 -432 Riser Spider and Gimbal
The Rtscr Spider and (hmbal were visua:ly
checked and io good condit:ou. The running
and p11lli.ng of t:1e LMRP was observed,
1
11
a11d 15. The spider ran smooth
v ith uo probkms. Upgrade
v. ere added by V ctco when the nser spider :::nd
p:imbal ,...ere 'Cnt ir: for repai: for damagt:
incurred duri:1g H111TicMe ivan.
Figure 14 Pulling riser j oint. gimbal and S?idcr. in
good condition. The LMRP is hanging below.
Figure 15 Side view oflbe Spider/Gimbal whicb operated 'A ell.
Deepwater H o1i1.o11 WEST Job #OOJC
In addition to replacing a locking cylinder,
H2:?.21 9-1: t\'\'O riser spider lccking
dogs. PN H302221-.5: tvvo hushings.
PN HJ02222-S. a new va lve contml
n--:.<mifolcl n:oaification was ccmplctcd
along with t. b1m1per 10 prNect it.
l\gmc 16.
I0-433 Riser Handling Tools
-he C!peration of tl1c hycl:-aulic r.ser
runnbg tool was observed, both running
;,nd pulling riser. The ric-er hydraul:c.
runni:1g tool worked .:ci)' well with no
problems encountered. The rig's other
hydrauhc nmning tool was nor beiag
used due loa leaking hydraulic cylinde:.
n1c hydraulic num.ing tool from tbe
"hmilus was shippe.d over to be used as
a backup i 'l the event of failure of the
rig's. Vctco has the
cytmders used in .he hydrau.lic
mnnin g Lools. Tv .. o of tb:- nt'w design
cvt:ndes ann lhey cxpecr
Ct;;!.\cr-: ro ynrd in
\i11di::: on i 7 October 2005. 1hc
the cylinders. the plan i.s to
i:lstal! .'1c cyiinders in both
hy(.raul'c,; tunniug. tools. Tl:c l-1i"
1
01Y
werL' c-\'l:;."cd and
discussed wi )1 th<;: subset engineers.
Th<.: Ptv. is bein3 complececl in a tmcly
rnan:tef. HADC'O N DT inspected all
lrandling on work ndc:r
. .:; 1: 12 in ScpL:mber 2005.
Figute 16 manifold b ,"c::ll ptotected and speeds up
the Sptder o_pc.1ing and closing.
Figure 17 TI1e Hydraulic Riser Running Tool .;vorkecl If
sbouJd with no problems and COllsiderably speeds up
1iser running and pulling.
])ecpweter Horizo11 WE:>I Job #00/C

IP-431 Riser Tensioner
At present. the rig has open work orders for the five year NDT inspection. Tbese arc Jobs #8705-
00361 8 through 003623. The coating on the riser rods were dye pen checked 26 f<' bmary
2005. The :ods were inspected between tbc 15 to 35 foot range. Riser tcnsioncrs #1, 1#2. and tftl had
no Ri::;er T..:nsioner and :!!6 h:1cl Sm."l. ll cracks and chips in the C()atine up to about ..
CJ<l.11Ctcr The #6 tens toner was the worst case. hi t;6 1s lea.kir.g a:1d neccs repait or

!P-473 Riser Tensioner Control Panel
Tl:t" T'isa (';.)nttol Prone! history
wos revtewcd. All p:vf m:.intcmmcc is
being C.3ITid out. Operation ur .itt:
p:m::-1 W3S oi);cn<?d ""bm pressure was bled
dmva for LMRP clisconnect and,. hen pressure
was increased alkr landing t11e LMRP and
latching back on the BOP stack. The pnels
worked v\eli with no proble:-tlS. The sub5ea
e:1gineers han: mi nimal problems wit h thi3
equipment.
rQ-.:tJ 1 Riser Test Tools
Figure 18 The Riser Tcnsioncr Panel was in good
condinon and ;vorkcd no pro:.,(ems.
n1c Risc1 Test "'ere observed being usN! to 1est the rl:;er cho-:e w.d kill hnes tc 12000 p:-i. No
probbns w.:tc Ihe to.:>l went throt:gh m'n-dcstructive testing on 'Ncrk mder r'S I 12 i1
2005.
J).;epwmer Hori::.o11 fVEST Job #OOJC
IR-442 Riser Recoil System
The Riser Tensioncr system has six tensioners. Oniy om; of the six riser Lensioncrs has the position
transducer wori.:.ing. For the riser recoil system to wo;k properly, it relies on the output of the
t ansducers for cylinder rod location. Figu:-e 19 ghows t'lc revised control sequence \vhi ch is
depend :rtl on cylinder stroke ro function properly According to the ET, the tiser recoil system \\-ill
on cne transducer. TI1e redundanc) on this system hos been lost with five transducers not
\\ orki ng. .'\S $hown i;1 the table bdu .. v, cylimk:I .comrob the percentage of hrotlk v:llvt.
c!t)>:(' to prc<:ct positwr .s to control the assent of the rod 2nd keep it at a controilabk rate of spt::.1>.tl. This
i:; to <>void clamnging cqttipmcnt. Without lt.t' au nncon(.roll<.x) :ii'toff could occur during
an EDS Hyd:ct Lift be ca.lie-1 to help nssist in making the tnm;;clucers op<:;r:llional and reliable.
The junctio:-t boxes arc in a very bad loc:ll=oil, unckr ilic rig tloor. Figures 20 and 21 show the
:;;,de jun.-:tion box locaticn.
rcf1:'1f' .."t! f! . I r ,,r.( C.o.J'rr l'J \."', .!. 1'\ .tr'ol .,t, l;'\
'.:1'\C...;c."n_ _________ rt\r.tr.l"'. '-t'.!.: ... t:. it: ... : I , ...... ' "
Co11di tiu;;- _ --
..... I Ill !I u :r:.
t'': ..
Figure 19 Riser sequence.
Fignre 20 The ::nain aft side junctio!l box for position transducers.
Decpw(ltcrH()ri;:c11 WEST JoiJ #OOJC
Figure 21 The small are inteconncctingjunc!ion boxes for _he proximity switches on the BOP
Tr:p Saver.
The mounting an:a for t.1e jnnc:ion boxc!' s!10uld be sealed to keep the mud and water out. lf this
cannot be accompl ished, cons1dcr moving them. Moving them would ben major operation in time and
monc:y and J.ould be a less preferred choice. The rig is using oil mud anu it has been p::ovcn the
mud \Vili w1ck up the wm insulation and damage packing glands. According to the ETs. tc da:e tht-y
have been unsucce::;sful in trying to seal the juncton boxes, findi:1g mud and water ins: de them.
TJ:c Riser RC('.Otl System worked very- well d,_ring 1h:! LMRP unlatch using EDS
Dlsconncc:i .Sequence}. Tr.c LtvlRJ
1
tif;ed smoothl;. off the stack. n1cre w-as no His.OI) to
review. The perfom1ancc of the system was c'iscussed tl\c subs-ea The Re..::.o 1 System
has WYkcd wdl <Uld u:>cd for all LMRP unlatches. I"hc p:ping :md vulves were visually inspected
and ,) he in condition; hV\\'C\'Cr, tht:n:: are su111e !kll m:<;!tl to b.:: aaurc:sscd to
the S)'->tcm operntionnl ns wdl as reli:1ble. that being tll(" repair cf the t .t:
issues 'Utrou the junction bo). 0s.
Dccpwatc-Hori:cn WEST Job irOOJ C
Ram Preventers
Super Shear R.aJm.
The EMPA.C Down Time Risk Equipment IIistory and ;\ssct History on the Ram Prcvcnter super
shear rams was reYiewed. The condition of tbe ram cavities was discussed with the subsea cngim:er,
and tJ1e Asset History ,,as reviewed. which also docume11ts the gooQ condition of the raul cavity
i\reas, no wear. The: producl advisory ak:r.s have been
cnmpl icd 'Nitb 0.:1 the rams in service In July 2002, the connecting pins were repiaccd pet Acvisory
l8164 and the ro.rn blocks were modified \Vith a slot per Advisory #6020. Even with the modifications,
U1C last timt: nuns vere opened in April 05. pln on the starboard .va<; lle<:xly sheared orr clue
to cuttings. cement and swarf found packed off behind the rarr: body. TI1c port pin slight damage,
., .. ith ihc same material packed behind the tanJ block, only lt:ss of iL The holes in t.a':te r:un aud the sh<ft
, c1istor:ion <Uld were okay. n,e- Transocean HQS-OPS-ADV-401-00-"
J,c. pin shearing problems by i:miting the opcraticiJ of the super rarus cluriDg dri, 'ing
1tmcbnc :r I. On vtdls. BP from the MMS to not require th:: ii.mc-tton
'''ting ( f he s11pcr shear rams.
Sj).l'"t" $hCC1J 1(1.1",1 blocks have 11). had the slOtS C"Jt to COU1p!y \:t.'ith advisory
:md . .,.i I b.:: sent 111 to Carno:ron, Fig;tue 22.
:Figure 22 S:1a-c supc:- nun block \vith nc cut
The blue arrow shows pins; the red so.'>s ' the
s.hoo:d :>c.
J stQi.;:.; rcvie\'\Cd, and the of the r1l\1 was discussed with the subsea
lh:.: BCP is subsea on nw rarn Gf..Vitics in gooC; eondition. v,ith 11'.>
fh-:: threads 01 all bonnet studs .... ,:ere :n good co1dition. 1\.fo ecorci wag fcr..:ncl Lhe 13st
imc th:.: r .r bl0cks ancl ram shaft buttons -vvere J\:fPT i1spccted. This shoult.l be done to \eri:fy tiKre <.r<'
'' 011 tht' last rig m.::.we, a.l the ram f'ttbbcrs were replaced and the BOP rams prcs.stll:: ;ested
to 250/15)00 for 5 minutes relying on the ST locks only, with no operating pr0ssurc.
Deepwater /[(>rh,o11 WEST Joi> #00 I C

Lower Rams
The lower rams \vere converted to test rams by tuming the ram block upside down. The valve spool
piece for the lower kills was moved up to the next ram. now between tbc middle and lower. The rig
has a dmmTy ram block made from alnmi:mm, specifically made to check the ram cavity dimention;
by actcally measuring the top clcCirance between the ram block and the top cavity scaling area '.\ith
l:mg fe-der gauges
All ram cavities were in good
a<:c.ording to t:1e subsea.
engineer a:1d the Asset history
information c.;ute:c.:d dunq;; rig
move ram cJvily Tllis
is the firs rig this SUI".'.:')'Or has
seen to take rbc initiativt! get a
dllmmv ram block for checkm2 t1w

r;,m cavity 1:1p :':lld :;ide
C u:::ing the
ram bloc..k Md lotH; 1Cdcr gauges
in their procedure. The r2m block
sho;vn Fipt<(' 23. All ram
.Jonnds arc due the 1825 day
s11rvey i11 1 June .2006.
JB-400 Annular BOP
Figure 23 TI1e dummy aluminum ram block maKes checking the
ram cavitiy dimensions a lot easier and quicker.
Tile upper annttlar was replaced on :iS Ju:..1c 05 with a ref.trbishcd ont; from Cameron. refurbished
Liberty Tc:\as. 'l11c Jowcr annu.:t: was changed out II February 2004.. Tht.. t 825 da:y PM is
scheduled tor 2<) IV!::Jy 2.006. !\.complete new was tnstalle.d 28 June 200). I 825 day 'PM
should be acUust-!d to 2S June 20 I 0 On DP rigs. Cameron installing ant1-rotation blocKs
U.e:.;c have: been instat:t"c. A n::w collapsed res!stant :1ose installed on the btJtcks for btlth
1l1c up;>0r and lower annular:; dt!e .o tlattcning of the p:-e\'ious Jwses. The operator should be mad-:
the standard Cameron D 1 OK ,A,mmlar packer will not !'t!ip o :o- _;tool joints. Cameron offas a
p<'l.cker capabk of his ht.t redures prcssu-e rating to 5000 psi There an inter(11ittc.:'nt leak i.1 !he
system on the upper ;Jnnu!ar. only happens when the BOP stack is rnn It could r.os::;ibl)
b<.' in th;;; A:1nul:.r operating Sjl$1\:;tn lll lil u'(.' co;mol syst!:.t'\1, lo !h ...
fl!JlCtion discussion included in JE-413. The le:.1k should he 1Scla:ed and :11 the
;1-!Xt oppXItmiy .
. !D-41'2 BOP Hub CJamps
T:1e DOP stack v .. as subsea therefore U1e clamps were not ava.ibblc for inspection. Typically ihe
clamps are houble free and only inspected \vhen the opport..1nity such as disnsscmbly for
replacement cf other components. Currently there are PO assets opened w[th assigned tasks.
should be '\fDT tested as part of the five year survey of other components, but should be tracked
separately.
Deepwuter f1'EST Job ;!{)OJC

JD-427 BOP Stack Frame (General)
The BOP was visually inspected subsea at 3600 fl. water depth with the ROV. 111crc were no issues
observe:t. 7he f:":une appears in good conchtton.
JD-930 Gate Valres (Failsafe/Subsea BOP)
The 1825 day smvc;: is J June 2006. 111<' d0se assi::t ci,-cuits ,vert' rt>.moved. auto she: rand
de3dm.an .>ystcms were into Lhe in.:1-::r choke a11d kill valves. The rig has been :::hangint! out \'a
\1.
1
lt:n rig oppommit:..r allc.ws. The nppcr chokes and hleed valves have bcL:n replaced wilh rcbui:t ones
in th..; pa.<:Lyeor. P'rior to these being replaced. three sets of valves were .istcd as changed but there W[-tS
no reference as to which on:.:s. lllis has rut o:1going problem with d1t work ordc:s. not
l' JCugh det<.ilc< infonnation en terce!. The valves were successfully function and tester!
th the BOP stbsc.'l ,his trip. The Ncssurc test 'rVS to 12000 psi wi h no problcxns. '!11e
ate up wirh the v:>.lve rotation; the only conct:rn i:; tracking which \'alvcs arc
1<mgecL Just recording '- ::::.1\es were :::1ang>!d out doc> 1ot pr )''IJ.: Lhc valve Joc:1tion.
;!bt:crs knew, but it should be ecordcd :n the PM\ ork order notes.
E-413 BOP Cnntrol Panels
fhc toolpushcr's control pa.tcl \Yas visually inspected during a BOP Subsea. function from the
bridge on the blue pod, Figure 24 The cquipnent wa;; i:1 good conditjon. am:ulars c:oscJ -,vitl!in
26 :;cconds with a t1ow of 50 gallons and
cpcncd in 18 seconds wLth a flow of 40 gallons.
The rnms closed v.:ithin 16 seconds v.ith a flow
of23 gallons. o.nd opened in 16 seconds with a
now of 20 gallon&. TI1e choke anti kill valw::.
opened and closed in 8 seconds with a t1ow of
.-to .8 total. The upper annular had a
leak ?.nd wa.;; >t'pt in the opcn/ven
posit1on to mminm:e Lamp t:::sts vere
pvrfow1d on the divcrtC1 a11d BOP control
n<: :,. and all we-i! One itc'll noticed
s pe:::uliar It) only the lo,ver inner dwk-:
pt:I unet1on on !h..; pod \Vhc:n the
;.ahc W:JS O(X:.tcct, tl funct:on properly, but
ocr ... ;tnnalh it .ould cati3C th .. fc.Jlo..,ving al:m11
statll'> ,o appear: /\ chokc.'ki'llsvbtion valve
c co i B Ghokc!l:il is<.lation ,talve
c 'S' c0il bre.ak. 1\.. chok('
1
k' ll pr.rnary
c:mnccttl unlock locl; coil brc' k, lon.ct OlHCr
c okc clcsc \ ,.nd p. ('0! break. and wcllhcnd
c:mnecror g:.r::kt:t release A R coil
I all come trum the same p1e
'I he ::>rob en\\ ill be ch.::chd at fi
pport,mi y
Figute 24 The toolpusher' s panel. Red t:1pc shows
where rhe lo'\\1-cr ki:I was moved up bctv.-ecn the
middle ram and :ower test ram.
Deepwato flon::.on WT:ST Job #00/C
TRN-HCEC-00063758
Another item of interest is the operation of the shear rams and EDS. These functions, if operated from
one pat1el, such as closing from the driller's panel could not be opened from t11e toolpusher's panel. Jf
the EDS was set to nonnal mode from the drille::-s pane:. it could not be changed to the casing
from the toolpusber's panel. This issue should be investigated. The EDS and shear rams should be
capable of being operated from either panel. Also noted. the regulators fluctuated several minutes
be for<.: s:abilizing during pod change. A review of the event logger showed the hydrostatic transducer
fo:- STh-f (subsea transducer modnle) 1 was uot operatiug properly, sh.0\1ving hydrostatic pressure at 120
psi. 'Xhik 2 :-hov,:ed hyclrosta:ic ::t 1800 psi. The hydrostal.lc traasducers have an
ro'c in the "'l"i::SSL.tre subsea rn.s G.scrcpancy w:n be checked :tt first opportunity. Also
noted. all functions can be elec!.rorlical !y locked om. The wellhead COIUlector is clcctronic:tlly locked
cut. but the rise-: is no1 due to be of the EDS funct:on. A present the software
vvill not ov:::rride 6e locked out functions. The software could be changed to O\'erride the elect-oni'
lockout during EDS, aliO\ving the rist'r ccr.ncctor tO also be locked out, preven'ing
0peration during.
RCV !'nid en the LMRP ha<: fle I.MRP unlat<:h. k.ll and choke unlatch, and 3ccumulntcr dump
furctions, 2.5. n1e BOP stack de-energize ft.'1Clicn be tied into th::
the UvrR.P lfthc L!vfR.P i::; unlatched and the :'tiagcrs a"c not d0-enc:rgi:!ed boU1 ft!m:Jie
aud the packer seals and stinge. could be da.mngcd. Also worth noting, if the LMRP
connector w:1s unlatched before the Kill and Choke connector. se,,ere would occur to the K i'l
Choke
25 Tne LMRP ROv has no function for cc-cnergizing the pod sta.cK sting,':- sca.s. ".l"'lc
LMRP unlatch is $hown by the red arrow
Deepwater 11 orizon WEST .Tcb #OG 1 C
Confidential-Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC
TRN-HCE C-00063 759
JE-434 BOP Mixing U nil
The 1vlix unit was visuall y inspected, and U1e mjx unit running was observed during the BOP slack and
ft:nction tests The unit performed very well with no problems. The Asset History was reviewed. The
sub:;ca engineers are following the PM system. The filters arc checked and changed out every two
\'-'ecks and as needed after every BOP test. Water samples are sent in ever 30 days. TI1e is
"cry consistent, nmn:ng 2 8 to 3.8% of Stack Magic 200. The unit is Yery good condition and has
had a min1111il. :mrnber of problems, as in the History and as discussed with llu:
engineers The mix tank is eqt1ipped with a circu1ati!1g pump.
Figu rc 26 The BOP Mixing unit was botJ1 visb.ally and operationally in good condition.
JI::-448 Accumulator Bot.iles
)e Accunm"ator Driil .. on 13 July 2005 on the bh1C
dnr 1g A'!. 398 'i\'dl #1 ;h1m driller's panel on the ri g
tloo1. r':-Yii:wed SL.11ting accumulator pressure was 1850 psi.
to be 1umps W3S sht!t off. Surface prcchargc was
500 p!>l. Both mu1ul:>rs were closed ::tnd opened, upper and
niJ:ik r::1ms :>pened and all choke and kill fai lsafe
niH'S "'-t:rc opl.:ncd and closed. Final acctnnul<hor pressure was
; 11 " On..:: set of pipe rams wexe not twtce to
shcm rams. bUl there was more than ample
'UJ>rl) kft. prechargc was c11cckcd June 2005,
prt:cbrgc S::'t :"lt I son psl. The bottles \.VCre visually inspi!cted and
o1.111d t.c be n good con.diticn. Janua1)' 2006 is the next schedukd
prccr.?.r3c check 7 May 2007 i5 Lne ive year sur;cy. leqtunng
\\all thickness cbccks, bo:escopc check and replacement of seals
ir1 poppcLs.
Deepwater WEST Jub WOJC
Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdi ngs LLC
Figure 27 As shown, the
a.ccurnulalor botllc::; were .in good
condition.
TRN-HCEC-00063760
Accumulator bottles on the stack are the piston type, 80 gallons. The stack was subsea. There are no
leaks. and all is good with the hottles. Every well, tbeprecbarge is adjusted for depth. Tt was
discussed \1\.itb the subsea engineers if there were any problems with the stack mounted accumulator.
There have been no issues. The PM system does not have a Schedule PM task for the subsea
but it is picked ur in the end of well PM .
.JE-474 BOP Triplex Pumps
All thn;c Lriple:x pumps visually in good coudit.J.on, F1gwes 28 and 29. The pumps -an
smoothly >vith no odd sounds. The start and stop prcssun:s were as follows: p"l:mp #1 cut 4250
psi and off at 5000 psi. pump n e-n at 4700 psi and off 5000 psi, pump #3 on at 4500 psi Cl!Kl u:f ;-.1
5000 ps1. Eve-ry days, the lead chang<..-s ro one of the other pumps. oil was changed 1 pump!'"
L'll tvby 200:\ usint:, 'lotdla !SW/40. 0:1 8 Ma:t 2005 the:: oil was changed on uiplcx pump tr2
'13 usin.g tht: ol. The surge bottles were prccharged to 3000 ps1 on 27 feb1uat) :wo.:-. There was
""l'-) of lhc. rcl:cfvalves being changed out. These should be replaced with valves '.vill current
.::crti ttctio:1 and discharge f.tltcrs arc replac.ed afte every BOP test.
F!gurc 2R T11c :lrro\ poims to the re!kfvalve. As sho>vn, the pumps were .n good '?lsu:->1
is back side: view.
!Jorizon. WEST .Job ffOO!C
Figure 29 The front side of the triplex pumps arc in good condition.
be 1 825 day PM i" c:ue 20 lvi::ry 2006 on the three Triplex pumps. The PMs sbeould be ut
dates.
JG-416 JVIUX and Hotline Reels
The i\.1UX and Hotline Reel:; were visua.J:y inspected anc.l in good condition. Duling the running and
pu:Jing 1iser, they pctiom1cd well. During the pulling of the LMRP, the !eve. wind system wa,.o:;
c rking on a.l three reels, the hot line, and the yellow and blue MT.JX reets. The reel operatioa ''i'M
smooth with no hydraulic leaks. These are direc1 d1ive air motors, with the only chain being used to
drive the level '-Vind mcctanism. '!11is chain clean and well grcascxt as well as all grease :'ittings.
Til.- A:>sl'L Ii:stor:es wer' to confirm maintenance is beinq done. and judging from good
ordition cftht couipmcn1 and the made) <he PMs are being comp,ctcu. More dctail;d ..:n
v.ould be beneficial. ">uch as :>crvivcd pn: and po:::-l rig m0vcs clo n()t give 1 great ckal nf
c;' n::n '-: clonc. n1e nssumptton would be a.l steps in t\e PM wen; compkkd. MU X
haf 1ts own ?SS cod( but a lot of c:1tries in the MUX and hotinc reels are repair ug the Ml.JX
cabk. 'i11.;s..: should be \.:nl<;;red PSS c0df' JG-444 MUX Cable. Anothtr e-ntry found .'reqtlcntl)
conccmi 1g th; probkrns w1tl: th<.: hot lir .. t.: hose failing. There have already been four splice:; made t::l
fi: L;;:n.s. was Jraclc dui.ng nmning the LMRr, JO. Thi:s photi..l w<t::. \d1ik:
the LMRP. l"iftcen feet of damaged bose 'Vas t;ut offm<.king the rhcr. lS stilt '!1
:!000 ft. Of bO.>? \ .ICrC re;ekd off i:-J <W :l.ttcmpt iO t(,c bad section, but the teak nJ.S l11tJC.h
to the hose :eel ccntc;;!, and il was no: feasible to unsponl any rnorc hor :inc llosc .. Tht> hot s
f::!ili:1g tm>r<: freguoo:ntl v thon it should, iu,hcating has:: The hol line an
es::.<;;ntial p;:;n ofkccpmg tbe :1yd<anlicu.lly up;\ h.:u llllJ i1g and pulli11g lle GOP ..
(.\JU:'>JC't.:ral..ion :;holl ld be to replacing .t Th 182) day survey i:: <.hH:: 29 May 2006
))eepwtder llorizon WEST .Job ;r()O.IC
'Figure JO The hot .inc leaking :luring :b ;mliing of the LMRP.
rcpnired.
G-.::135 BOP Control Pods
c b<" foun an
The pods \:\,.ere n good condition visually and opcrat10nally. No major prohte-ns were wlule
witnessing two BOP stack function tests and one BOP pressure test with the BOP stack subsea. All
functions were operated with times and gallon counts. The system was in good condition, vet)
tigl:t with no Je:tks during the last BOP fwtction test. The upper annular open has a slight intermittent
leak. Because ofthe leak, the anuular is
kept in 6c open/vent position. According
to the Cnjncer, the shuttle valves
have been rep and the pod \'alvc and
sokr oid valve have been r<.:placed. They
now smpect the leak to be hydrostatic
ft'lated, possibly in the annular scats. T.:1e
only occurs \\hen the ROP s1a:l.: is
S'..lbsea and is on both pods. 'll1c problem
will be (;:>Llowcd up by Lhe subsea
\.'hen rig neti ,itits permit. The LMRP "as
pullt-d for hurrican<: Wilma, affording an
opportunity fui a visual inspection of
rh.:: pod<:>. poets looked in good
condition Th.:; BOP stack stingers
:; ril l reuactcd from EDS nsed to
LMRP due to the 1mnicanc. A
fnnction kst 1N1lS with :tJ
:.:.:-en The :;c cncids have all been
upgr::-.dC'd. anrl Cameron prcmim'l vak.;s
't:e in:>talled 111 1he pocL<:. Tnc 18?.5 day
;urvcy ts 29 May 2006 on the ycllo.
;11, blue #2 3nd white #3 pod.
Figure 31 The control pod in good cond,tton.
Deepwater lfori:;on 'WEST Job f.OOlC
The # 2 yellow pod was replaced early this
year with the #3 white pod afl er it was
completely .-ebuilt. The five year survey
29 May 2006 needs updating. The #2 pod-
yellow \>.'llS
rebuilt and :was scheduled

hy the subsea engineer to replace the# i -blue . .
pod for yea:- survey, sq the #2 pod
couk be rebuil, to be pur back in the rotatio:t.
Unforiunately. the pod v.as sent to town for
u:::e on the Nautilus. All hoses have been
removed from .he female p0d anc!
replt1c.e<l with tubmg. This should further
enhanc" -he. pod reliabilit\ Figure 32.
JG-4-44 MJ. X Cabh'
Fignre 32. The female pod running tuhing
instead oftt:e t;-pica' bose for incrcasca rcliabijty.
The MUX cables had The n<"i:<.' s1ylc SE:'\.CO;\f connectors. PN MSSL12CC.PF1TA02, instalJ(;)d in
2004. This was a ncv: style with pressure testable connectors, wh. cb is a grea1 unprovcmcnr
ovcr the old one. The blue 3nd yellow lvfUX cables are lvfEG ohm che:::ked at each rig move, as
vcr-fied by tl::e Asset history, but the Meg Ohm value was not in all cases. It is important to
record these values as a trend could be detected of the cable starting to deteriorate. The conneclo.rs are
pressure tcs:ce lo 5000 psi by the
s:1bsea engineer. There is a
damaged spot on the
1\:fCX cable at approximately
6700 feet. A new MUX cable to
replace the yellow is onboanl. uuL
tl'c wells bring done now arc
bclt)W th3t v:ater depth so the
ct.::c :s1or \\<as madt.:: noL to replace
t .is unti neccssruy. Sa \\ell
ilkd \VDuld put :n the
tbc cable would be
r: 1angcd cut. The new MllX
c;..bk was :::lightly damaged while
sining on deck, Figu:e 33. !'he
damag.:- .. ,.,1!\ be repaired by
.a.td.ing with a repair k:r f-om
1!-:c a::: rdacturcr
l<'igure 33 arrCI\V points to the slight:y are<:. The
damage can easily 0e r-cp'lircd. The cab\!:: needs to be bdtc::r
protected while sitt:ng on deck.
Deepwater H(Jriwn WEST Je>L' #{)()JC

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.... .... l -----=-------- Nov 4, 2005 R. Da1ley --I

nine failures in the last eighteen months. . .

rebuilt and :was scheduled

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